NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I”

REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT STUDIES

DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

THE 14TH SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ATTENDANCE ORGANIZED BY THE REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT STUDIES

7th- 8th November 2019, Braşov

Coordinators:. Lecturer Brînduşa Maria POPA, PhD Associate professor Vlad DUMITRACHE, PhD

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,,CAROL I” PUBLISHING HOUSE BRAŞOV, 2019 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019 Moderators: Professor Ileana TACHE, PhD Professor Cezar VASILESCU, PhD, eng. Asociate Professor Dorel BADEA, PhD Associate Professor Vlad DUMITRACHE, PhD Lecturer Brînduşa Maria POPA, PhD Liliana FILIP, PhD Candidate

International Scientific Committee:

Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU Stelian PÂNZARU Virgil ENE-VOICULESCU Emilian DOBRESCU Vasile CĂRUŢAŞU Ghiță BÂRSAN Mihai ALEXANDRESCU Constantin – Iulian VIZITIU Alexandru STOICA Octavian TĂRĂBUŢĂ Liviu FILIP Ioan Vasile ABRUDAN Edith Mihaela DOBRESCU Ileana TACHE Mărioara PATEȘAN Mary S. McCULLY Anca DINICU Fahri ERENEL Ioan Gabriel POPA Mustafa Kemal TOPCU Dumitru IANCU William BARTLETT Luminița GIURGIU Eleftherios THALASSINOS Daniel-Sorin CONSTANTIN Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET Dănuț-Eugeniu MOȘTEANU Andrzej SOBON Aurelian RAȚIU Maciej MARSZAŁEK Dorel BADEA Elzbieta Jadwiga SRYMASISKA Lucian ISPAS Agnieszka BRELIK Cezar VASILESCU Ramona RUPEIKA– APOGA Florin Eduard GROSARU Ebru CAYMAZ Maria CONSTANTINESCU Vladan HOLCNER Aura CODREANU Igor SOFRONESCU Brînduşa Maria POPA Svetlana CEBOTARI Cristina ANTONOAIE Larisa PLOP- Vlad DUMITRACHE Ion ROCEANU

Editor: Lecturer Brînduşa Maria POPA, PhD

ISSN: 2248 - 2245 (CD-ROM)

ISSN: 2248 - 2385 (online) The content of the papers is the entire responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Scientific Committee. The authors take full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of their papers. . The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

CONTENTS

1. OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION ALHOSANI Abdulla, UAE Armed Forces______page 1

2. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES, BADEA Dorel, Associate Professor, PhD, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of , Romania______page 13

3. A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE , BRÂNDA Oana-Elena, University Lecturer, PhD, “Titu Maiorescu” University, , ______page 18

4. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA, CAYMAZ Ebru, PhD., Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, , ERENEL Fahri, Associate Professor, Ph.D., Department of Business Administration, Istinye University, Istanbul, Turkey, UMUT Batuhan Dokuz Eylul University, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Izmir, Turkey ______page 26

5. THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE POWERS, CEBOTARI Svetlana Doctor habilitate, associate professor, "Alexandru cel Bun" State University of , Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations , Chisinau , Republic of Moldova, PLOP Sergiu "Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy Commander (Rector)/ Chisinau/ Republic of Moldova ______page 31

6. KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES, CHAUDHARY Muhammad Amir Pakistan Air Force ______page 45

7. THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS, COMAN Marian, ”Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania ______page 57

8. SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA, COZMEI Andreea Ștefania, Masters Student, National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Department of International Relations and , MA - Security and Diplomacy, Bucharest, Romania ______page 66

9. MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN POLISH SECURITY SECTOR, DRAPIKOWSKA Barbara Faculty of National Security, Studies University, Warsaw, ______page 72

. The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

10. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL, DUMITRACHE Vlad Ionuț, Associate Professor, PhD, Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies – NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre, Brasov, Romania ______page 85

11. SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT, GHEORGHE Alin, , Romania______page 91

12. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION, GROCHMALSKI Piotr, Associate Professor, PhD, Faculty of National Security War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland ______page 100

13. ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT, IANCU Dumitru, Associate Professor, PhD, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu, Romania, DINICU Anca, Assoc.prof. PhD, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu, Romania______page 109

14. SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR, KIS Alexandru, PhD, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, , Romania, ARHIP Vasilică, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania, TARCALA Oliver, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania ______page 114

15. THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SEZGİN Orhan PhD, KORKUT Cüneyt Master Student, AYGÜN Salih Master Student, Atatürk Strategic Research Institute, Defence Resources Management, National Defence University, İstanbul, Turkey______page 124

16. PRIVATE RURAL PROPRETY IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, MANCIA Mircea Sebastian PhD Lecturer Dipl., MANCIA Aurora PhD, University Professor Eng., Faculty of Construction, Cadaster and Architecture, Department of Cadaster , University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania ______page 130

17. WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, MARSZAŁEK Maciej, Professor, PhD, Dr Cyprian Aleksander KOZERA, The War Studies University, National Security Faculty, Warsaw, Poland_____ page 134

. The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

18. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY, MICHINICI Lucian, Romanian Air Forces, Bacău, Romania______page 142

19. EUROPOL AND INTCEN SECURITY PROVIDERS FOR THE EUROPEAN SPACE, PĂDURARU Mihail, MA, VOICU Claudia-Iohana, MSc. Candidate, Center for Strategic and Competitive Analysis, Chamber of Commerce and Industry Romania- Turkmenistan______page 149

20. STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUTERED IN ACCESING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES, PAIU Andrei, Ministry of National Defense, Romania ______page 158

21. ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENTS FORCED FOR NATO EFP MISSION IN ?, PALAVENIS Donatas, Institute of University Studies in the Department of Political Science, The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania ______page 165

22. LEVEL OF ENERGY SECURITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER, PARCHUKASHVILI Kakhaber, Ministry of Defense, Georgia______page 181

23. TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND, MILIAN – POGONOWSKA Malgorzata PhD, The War Studies University, National Security Faculty, Warsaw, Poland ______page 188

24. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS, POPA Brîndușa Maria, PhD University Lecturer, Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies – NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre, Brasov, Romania ______page 197

25. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES, POPA Ionuț Claudiu, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania ______page 203

26. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES, POPA Ionuț Claudiu, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania______page 210

27. ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY, RAȚIU Aurelian, Associate Professor PhD,”Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Faculty of Military Sciences, Sibiu, Romania______page 217

. The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

28. HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES. SADIYEV Sadi, Ministry of Defence International Military Cooperation Department, Baku, Azerbaijan______page 223

29. THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?, SAVU Gheorghe, PhD. Associated Profesor at the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration______page 231

30. SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES, SOBOŃ Andrzej, PhD, The War Studies University, National Security Faculty, Warsaw, Poland______page 244

31. ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING, STRÂMBEANU - Liviu-Daniel, Romanian Armed Forces, Bucharest, Romania______page 252

32. THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING, SWIEBODA Halina, PhD, Associate Professor, The War Studies University, National Security Faculty, Warsaw, Poland______page 259

33. SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY, TACHE Ileana, Professor, Ph.D., “Transilvania” University of Brasov, Department of Marketing, Tourism-Services and International Business, Romania______page 266

34. ABOUT THE SAFETY AND THREATS IN THE POLISH EDUCATION - THE GENESIS AND NATURE OF THE OBJECT "EDUCATION FOR THE SAFETY" AT SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN POLAND, URYCH Ilona, PhD, Faculty of National Security War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland______page 273

35. INFRASTRUCTURE USE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS, ZAHARIA Petrică, PhD candidate, National Defense Academy „Carol I”, Bucharest, Romania______page 289

. The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION

Abdulla ALHOSANI

United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, Abu Dhabi, UAE

Abstract: In an ever-changing world that is exponentially advancing towards dependence upon technology and science-based researches, it is common among organizations to look for the best combination between the cost associated with human resources and incorporating technology to achieve competitive advantage over peers. Human resources remain an essential element in conducting many missions and technology is not able to replace their role yet, hence, optimizing human resources role within the organization remains important to get the expected return on investment spent on them throughout their service life. This paper covers the areas of possible improvement areas where human resources utilization can be optimized and the tools to achieve that.

Keywords: Optimization; Human Resources; Utilization; Productivity; Retention; Competitiveness; Development;

1. Introduction Human resources constitute the cornerstone to any organization and deliver its products and services utilizing their skills and talents. Technology is normally introduced within the work environment to augment, improve or replace some of their roles and transfer them into autonomous or machine operated jobs. Hence, technology is a favorable choice for decision makers when it comes to modernization and advancement in the work environment. This is due to the fact that technology provides many advantages over human such as accuracy, efficiency, productivity. Never the less, technology advancement has not reached a level where it can effectively replace the human resources with their vast specialization, mixed abilities and flexibility in performing tasks in a different environment. Another limitation to technology is the inability to perform the sequence tasks in contentious manner and from start to end in addition to the need for maintenance, calibration and adjustment as well as quality control and inspection. Moreover, technology is subject to obsolescence and hence requires management to upgrade and update their outdated components and software. Human resources, on the other hand, require an advanced level of management to obtain the best utilization to deliver certain expected planned output. In order to efficiently and effectively utilize the workforce, they need to be trained, their needs to be attended and their expectation must be met regarding career advancement and promotions. Since humans vary in their abilities and capabilities and are more flexible in delivering the required tasks assigned to them there must be a clear strategy and planning where their capabilities are best utilized to produce the desired products or services; optimization of the workforce utilization. Chapter 1: Essential organizational setup 1.1 Definition of workforce optimization

1 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION

It is a periodical routine to follow employees' performance and tasks achieved through a set of review procedures and analysis to determine to what extent they met the standard policies and procedures. However, they are not carefully followed for the quality of time spent to achieve their duties over a shorter period. Employees are evaluated based on their average performance over the whole period of evaluation leaving the evaluation of daily performance and achievement to the memory of the evaluator. This comprises the consistency of the ability to correct/align employees' efforts to the organizational goals along the way leaving them to their personal initiatives and personal circumstances that would play a big role in shaping their overall performance. Workforce optimization (WFO), on the other hand, set the roadmap to achieve the balance between the need to maximize utilization of workforce and minimize cost and burden on management. To optimize workforce utilization is to set "a business strategy focused on balancing customer satisfaction, service levels, workforce scheduling, operational costs, and other key performance metrics in order for a business to get the maximum benefit out of the employees working for them at any given time." [1]

1.2 Why optimize workforce When it comes to efficiency in the workplace, it is an integral part of the overall system interrelated components which comprise of humans, machines, infrastructure and information/systems. The combination of these elements in an organized complex relationship produces the work environment. These elements are interdependent and affected by the performance level of the other elements. The final outcome is a product of the entire system efficiency as a whole and the level of competitiveness will depend on the weakest part of the chain. Many organizations tend to focus on obtaining the state of the art technologies to compete in the market, which is gives partial advantage, but forget that the technology is operated and functioned by their employees; who would be the driving factor to successfully produce the desired outputs and products. Hence, investing in human resources development is of equal importance to achieve the desired.

Not like technology which requires a well-defined set of procedures and orders to operate and their outcome are well expected according to their design, human resources, on the other hand, constitute a management challenge when it comes to variation in the level of performance and commitment. Employees are not machines; they require more than orders and instructions to carry out their tasks. They need to be trained, motivated, supervised and incentivized to operate in harmony along with the other work environment elements and peers. The management role in an organization is not limited to the set of rules and regulations that constitutes the vertical and horizontal relationships for each employee along with their roles and responsibilities. Engagement of the organization's management and leadership is a key element in obtaining the desired level of employees' performance. In other words, the management should not rely solely on their well-defined set of rules and regulations and forget to interact with the work environment challenges and needs which should be reflected on the policies and procedures that would empower employees to do their utmost to achieve the organization's goals.

1.3 Organizational structure It all begins with how the organization is set up to deliver its products/services to the intended customers. Essential departments include: human resources, financial, operations departments and other branches to handle additional functional necessities such

2 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION as R&D, marketing and sales. For an organization to be dynamic and flexible, each one of these departments should complement the other in order to achieve the desired harmony in their horizontal and vertical relationship to end up with an organization-wide orientation to any responses required to be addressed. This means that organizations should be able to modify their hierarchy, policies, and procedures based on the input and feedback received from all entities as changes become advantageous. Successful organizations are normally on the move to seek, evaluate and is ready to act on new opportunities as they become visible. This is not an option anymore as competitors are always on the move to dominate the market and leave companies without long vision behind. IBM is a good example; it was dominating the computer market for decades - both in hardware and software but failed to realize the new product's significance, says David Bradley, one of the teams of 12 who produced the PC at IBM [2] and subsequently lost the competition. Hence, we realize the importance of relying not only on robust and dynamic organization structure but also learn for their past mistakes as well as others to truly avoid slipping from the winning arena. Organizations hierarchy are built around job positions that shall be occupied by a suitable candidate who must deliver a number of tasks and duties described in his job description. These positions are connected to higher managers where they would report to and subordinates who will facilitate to perform and carry out detailed tasks under their supervision and guidance. The single most important relationship between any manager and his subordinate is the continuous follow-up and coaching/guidance to make sure that employees' performance progress is being monitored and corrected during their work duties, not periodically based the evaluation report only. This would allow both, managers and employees, to achieve the desired level of understanding about the end product/service intended and progress accordingly. There is no formula that fits all organizations when it comes to authority delegation. As a general rule, it must be sufficient enough to enable the person-in-charge to conduct the proper level of control and decisions to run the work environment according to the organization's vision and deliver the end product according to expectations. This authority must be reviewed and adjusted from time to time whenever a major change is applied within the organization whether in expansion or downsizing cases or even when going through transformation/modernization shift. Depending on the business type, top management take the role of planning and monitoring and leave the decentralized execution authority to the operational managers who would manage the work accordingly. The appropriate span of control depends on the experience, knowledge, and skills of the employees and the nature of the task. Depending on the size and nature of the organization, it might need to have a duplicate/redundant structure for some of the departments or production facilities. This poses a challenge/opportunity to the management as the performance of one might have a negative or positive impact on the other facilities if not correctly handled by the upper management. This is especially evident where each facility is independently operated and the work system is not imposed by the higher management to allow flexibility in managing the work accordingly and evaluate them based on their certain performance metrics. Advantages to this product-oriented structure include product focus, flexibility but results in duplication of effort. A successful facility workplace orientation can be used as a model to elevate the others' performance within the organization with the required adjustments. If the organization does not act to spread the successful business model, it will negatively influence the overall performance. There are many types of organization structures but, mostly fall on two types; "mechanistic" and "organic." The former is highly bureaucratic, quite rigid, and responds

3 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION slowly to change, while the latter is very flexible, fluid and responsive. While in actuality very few organizations are pure organic or pure mechanistic, most organizations are a mix between these extreme points. The organic structure would be more suited to the implementation of an innovation strategy, while mechanistic structure would better accommodate the mass production of items whose basic composition and methods of production change infrequently. The concept of Network Organizations defines the organization's core competence and contracts the remaining functions. This concept eliminates the strategic business units that are misaligned with the main characteristics of the parent company, except the core competency, by outsourcing them or making subsidiaries or divisions independent as long as their performance is satisfactory. 1.4 Organizational Culture 1.5 An integral part of a successful business strategy, the organization should not ignore the important effect of its culture which includes their shared beliefs, expectations, and values. Strong organizational culture is a powerful talent magnet. There are three key elements to achieve this; 1) transparent environment, 2) cultural design and implementation and 3) make employees feel they belong. To illustrate, Mr. Horst W. Schroeder started working for Kellogg in West Germany as a controller, and later managed Kellogg's European operations, where he accumulated impressive results. But in Battle Creek, Michigan, his colleagues described him as a strong-willed, even imperious, autocratic European. This style conflicted drastically with Kellogg's small-town family culture that stressed teamwork, subordinate involvement, and sharing credit with others. Clearly, the contrast between Kellogg's culture and Mr. Schroeder's leadership style was too great to overcome; especially when the performance of the firm began slipping, and he was terminated by Mr. William E. LaMothe, Kellogg Chairman and CEO [6].

2. Performance methodology To achieve the expected level of performance, we need to look into the connection between the reaction of employees to the work setup and environment. The main intent is to align the workforce attitude and behavior with the organization goals and objectives. This would enable employees to better understand their performance expectations and results and correct their effort level accordingly. 2.1 Leadership style Two mainstreams that shape leadership styles. The first one concerned with executing decisions, once they have been made, this is the dimension of leader direction or follow-up. Participatory management or leadership is where employees are involved in significant day-to-day, work-related decisions. However, the participation of employees in making decisions is a separate issue. Based on the amount of direction that a leader provides in executing those decisions a leader can be participatory or democratic by consulting employees during the decision making phase, yet still, be directive by following up closely on progress toward the ends that have been mutually decided. By combining the leadership styles - participation and direction - the result can be classified into four patterns of leader behavior, shown in Figure (1) [3]. 1. The directive autocrat makes decisions unilaterally and also supervises the activities of subordinates very closely. 2. The permissive autocrat still makes decisions alone, but permits followers a great deal of latitude in accomplishing their delegated tasks.

4 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION

3. The directive democrat invites participation from subordinates in decision making but continues to supervise employees very closely to make certain they carry out their democratically assigned tasks properly. 4. The permissive democrat allows subordinates to participate in decision making, as well as to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in executing the decisions.

High Directive Directive autocrat democrat Amount of Leader Direction Permissive Permissive autocrat democrat Low High

Degree of Participation in Decision Making

Fig.1: Types of Leader Behavior

The directive autocrat is not a bad representation of leadership, but a way to make the important decisions, set the significant goals, and direct subordinates along the way - especially in a crisis when subordinates tend to rally around a decisive leader. So long as the decisions and goals are considered by subordinates as legitimate and reasonable, and the subordinates are treated with courtesy, dignity, and respect, the autocratic and directive supervisor, manager, or executive is received much better by subordinates. For obvious reasons, "directive/autocrats" normally do not groom successors very well, and this legacy can lead to a succession crisis. In today's intensely competitive world, many floundering firms need to be transformed quickly into lean, growth-driven, performance-based enterprises with global perspectives. And at times these transformations must be driven by autocratic and directive CEOs and their key subordinates because of the hard decisions that must be made.

2.2 Management by Objectives (MBO) This methodology is an effective implementation mechanism by which employee behaviors are ultimately linked to strategic goals. Successful implementation of MBO program not only ties strategic goals to employees' objectives and behaviors, but also connects goal attainment to performance evaluation and the organization's reward structure: thereby creating the necessary motivational, planning, and control conditions for individual and organizational overall success. Moreover, managing employees with properly set goals in conjunction with monetary incentives constitute a very powerful motivational approach. However, top-management commitment, i.e., enthusiastic support and involvement of the entire chain of command remain the single most critical factor in seeing the desired results. The MBO program should be harmonized with the leadership dimension; in the case of directive autocrat leadership also dictate autocratic and directive MBO is required and permissive democrats should employ democratic and permissive MBO, etc. Ideally, the MBO process involves five distinct phases: 1) Goal setting, 2) action planning, 3) periodic reviews, 4) performance appraisal on the basis of degree of goal attainment, and 5) rewarding organizational members in accordance with the degree of goal difficulty and attainment whenever possible, as depicted in figure (2). The feedback

5 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION loops in the "management of performance model" emphasizes that feedback or knowledge of results in relation to one's goal is necessary for goals to regulate performance effectively, or in other words, most employees will do what is measured and rewarded [4].

Fig.2: The management of Performance Model [4]

2.3 Compensation strategy Employees tend to seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then, depending on the perceived attractiveness of the rewards offered, seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. There are five factors related to efficiency and effectiveness of strategy implementation that are influenced by organizational reward systems: 1) Attraction and retention of personnel; 2) motivation; 3) organizational culture; 4) organizational structure, and 5) cost [5]. Hence, it is necessary to demonstrate the relationship between rewards and the other organizational variables to attain strategy implementation outcomes. Because of its utilitarian as well as its symbolic value, money serves as a reward for most behaviors, for most people, most of the time. Hence, connecting monetary rewards to performance appears to be the most effective way of motivating employees. However, the relationship between performance and rewards is quite complex and without appropriate organizational culture in place, that strategy might fail to succeed. Pay-for-performance is evaluated based on the output or the value of the job importance to the organization. The two options are used to focus on the organization's tendency to emphasize the outcome main driver. The first method is mostly quantifiable and can be tied to personal or group performance. The other option is normally used by organizations which need to employ high-performance individuals to deliver intangible/ unquantifiable results but grant annual or semi-annual merit increases as the result of performance differentials captured by reliable and valid performance appraisals. It is worth noting that individual and group incentive plans play an instrumental role in rewarding performance. Can Pay-for-skills compensation, referred to as "learn and earn" plans, be effective? It is obvious that unless employers are able to reflect those skills and knowledge in producing the expected level of output, the organization would end up overpaying for a worthless and unproductive resource. On the other hand, the added skills give the

6 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION organization greater flexibility, permit it to operate leaner, and make the employee that much more valuable. This takes into consideration the employee's formal educational levels, variety, and richness of experience, patents held, reputation among peers and in professional organizations, and the role that was played by the employee in the development of successful products. This would greatly elevate the level of innovation within the organization. One of the best ways to create a beneficial motivational climate is to create a sense of ownership by making: "everyone a capitalist." To achieve that, employees' are given the opportunity and encouragement to purchase the stock of the company, which would be bought back at employment termination time. Lincoln Electric provides an excellent example of a powerful motivational climate. However, their incentive program didn't work and their manufacturing operations had to shut down when they expanded in Germany, simply because they pasted their American model without understanding the social differences and the standard of living between the two countries.

3. Analysis and Discussion 3.1 Workforce effectiveness In order to evaluate the workforce response to the ambitious organizational setup implemented, performance metrics need to be in place to measure the alignment of employees' efforts to the organizational goals and objectives. Many quality systems have been developed in the field of manufacturing and production to allow precise understanding over the operations overall performance such as Total Quality Management (TQM), Lean Six Sigma, and Total Productive Maintenance (TPM). These systems measure the workforce contribution as part of the whole system performance which gives equal importance to all objective/quantifiable components of the work equipment and system in order to achieve the target production goal. However, it does not provide a clear understanding of the organization's culture performance. When it comes to measuring an organization's social environment, it would take a different approach to quantify the results by means of feedback information based on field surveys with employees. The collection of data collected would shape the individual and the overall organization's performance in that regard. The metric used to assess employees’ loyalty to the organization is called the employee Net Promoter Score (eNPS). To measure the overall outcome of the relationship between an organization and its employees an indicator called employee engagement is used. When the level of engagement is high, employees tend to fully absorbed by the organization and would show enthusiasm about their job with a willingness to commit to the company and its goals. It would be hard not to recognize the value of employees' engagement to organizations. In 2013, a study by Gallup found that business units in the top quartile in employee engagement outperformed bottom-quartile units by 10% in customer satisfaction ratings, 22% in profitability, and 21% in productivity. These teams also saw significantly lower turnover, absenteeism, and fewer safety incidents [7]. Many factors influence engagement and need to be measured individually to obtain a proper understanding of how an organization is performing to promote a successful work environment. Peakon made use of the applicable theories, (Ryan & Deci), Job Characteristics Model (Hackman & Oldham), and Employee Engagement (Kahn), as well as best practices and came up with electronic software that transforms relevant data collected into a simple to use dashboard to quickly identify misaligned issues and focus on what matters the most. These theories focus on the driving factors that motivate employees to fully exploit their potentials and make them feel belong to their work environment. The

7 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION software relies on the following factors to measure the organization's level of engagement [8]: 1. Accomplishment Measures the employee's feeling about his daily accomplishment. The individual intrinsic motivation would be undermined if he perceives himself as incompetent. This can be avoided by establishing positive feedback to fulfill their need for competence. A greater sense of accomplishment is achieved when continuous challenges are introduced and solved by employees. 2. Autonomy This factor determines the level of freedom given to employees to perform tasks, unhindered by micro-management. When autonomy is reduced, intrinsic motivation is undermined and the employees would continue working in a state of extrinsic motivation or a state of amotivation. 3. Environment The availability of several physical locations and equipment to conduct various work-related activities would positively enhance employees' performance. These include workstations, conference rooms, and unstructured places to facilitate collaboration and teamwork. 4. Freedom of opinion The degree which enables employees to comfortably express their opinion in order to effectively immerse in the organization's culture and develop proper relationships with peers to get the belonging feeling. 5. Goal setting Measures how clear are the organization's goals communicated as well as deliverables and expected level of contribution to others. This will enable employees to understand their performance and avoid anxiety and ambiguity in evaluation. 6. Growth Indicate how far the organization goes to achieve employees both personal and career expected future development ambitions. This will vary from one employee to another; where one has high expectations, others are looking to make living out their job. 7. Management support Highlight the level of quality of effective managerial role in supporting employees to achieve their tasks and obligations while showing care and openness when carrying out this interaction. 8. Meaningful work Measure the employee's level of satisfaction/importance about the jobs he carries out daily whether they add value to him, the organization and/or the society. This is an important motivator to self-actualization and hence, dedication. 9. Organizational fit Relates to the level of submerging within the organization environment and with peers by sharing the same values, culture and fundamental characteristics. This would make employees feel properly connected to their surroundings. 10. Peer relationships Indicate how employees establish trust and care about each other which would result in openness and better confidence among peers that would ultimately result in a productive relationship. 11. Recognition Relate to the level of connection between employee's performance and feedback communicated back to him in a form of praise or simply task achievement. Feedback can be from other people, such as supervisors, peers, subordinates, and customers, or it may

8 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION come from the job itself. This process would enable employees to understand how effective they were in performing their tasks and realize that their achievements are being valued. 12. Reward Measure the level of satisfaction about the fairness of compensation against their perceived level of accomplishment. If employees are happy, he would be motivated, otherwise, he would feel under-rewarded and start reducing his input and encourage others to do the same. 13. Strategy Relate to the perception of employee's about the level of trust and confidence in the leadership of the organization and that their strategy is in line with the goals. This would create a strong feeling of relatedness and support to the plans being executed. 14. Workload Measure how employees feel about the amount of work assigned to them. Their jobs could be manageable or cause of stress, potentially leading to burnout which is defined by the three dimensions of exhaustion, cynicism, and inefficacy. Engagement would be the way out to this dilemma.

3.2 Case study So far we looked at the constituents of making proper organizational setup and methodologies that would optimize workforce utilization. We haven't covered the available tools to arrange the workflow and arrangement which shall incorporate the earlier mentioned information into an easy to use platform to ease the daily work tasks and associated communication between the different departments in order to optimize workforce time and effort utilization. One of the effective tools available is the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) framework. It will be covered here using a case study to explain how in practice it was utilized by a South African company which is into linen manufacturing and making uniforms for the hospitality to achieve improved and effective communication among departments to meet delivery dates. They designed an ERP framework to reduce work in progress on the shop floor and inventory. Their approach focused on three aspects; reduction in working capital by integrating firm's activities, intra-organizational communication and wider collaboration, second, eliminate waste for effectiveness including material, energy, inventory, defects or wasted capacity, third, reduction of product cycle times through minimizing set-up and delays, coordinating machine maintenance with production operations and optimizing space in order to better utilize workers, equipment and workstations [9]. It is essential to utilize efficient information systems within the organization as well as its customers to improve competitiveness through cost reduction and better logistics. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is a great tool to synchronizes, integrates, and streamlines data and processes of the organization into one single system and avoids independent/redundant departmental work to gain a competitive edge. ERP is defined as a method for the take, make, ship and account for customer orders in a manufacturing, distribution or service organization [10]. Such integration of functions can be achieved through a software package solution offered by vendors to support the seamless integration of all information flowing through the company, such as financial, accounting, human resources, supply chain as well as customer information [11]. ERP software comprises of many software modules that cover the basic activities of organizations including Production Planning, purchasing, inventory control, sales, marketing, financial and human resources modules. Implementing an ERP system would

9 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION reduce operating costs, ease managing daily tasks and enable overall strategic planning of operations this would streamline operations and increase profits. In order for ERP system implementation to succeed, a pre-screening and business process reengineering (BPR) need to be carried out to modify the current organizational process according to best practice. The ERP implementation requires proper transition with the help of a professional consultant who will guide the steering committee throughout the integration phases: initial stages, training of employees, workflow study, customized interfaces, troubleshooting and assistance with ERP issues. The case study is about a company specialized in manufacturing linen and uniform for the hospitality industry based in Cape Town, South Africa. The main challenge it was facing was not being able to meet the delivery time and an ERP system was recommended to overcome this problem. Initially, the organization was using the conservative capacity lag strategy which led to the loss of customers due to failure to meet demand, as the capacity was only increased after demand had increased. Not all the operations were automated; new recruits needed training and familiarization to engage in production, a lot of paperwork move around departments which delayed actions including the quality control section despite the availability of local network which connected the computer machines. Based on the production analysis, it was found that the load schedules were beyond the capacity of labor resources. Thus delivery delays would result for the bulk of the orders, and unnecessary costs were incurred in overtime or hiring excess contract workers due to panic. In addition, internal inherent poor activity coordination resulted in late deliveries of uniforms. In order to use ERP software, competitive software was sourced from Oracle, who had to initiate expert training for the shop floor staff and supervisors. Since the work schedule was beyond the existing capacity, therefore capacity has to be adjusted upwards by hiring 4 more permanent workers and one more casual worker to work for 6 days a month to match the load assigned. The main outcomes were [9]: 1. The reduction in product cycle time was achieved by reducing setting up times and delays, coordinating maintenance by Technical Services, with production operation schedules, as well as optimizing space in order to better utilize workers, equipment and workstations. 2. Improvement was noticed in the elimination of all resource wastages in the form of material, energy, inventory, defects or wasted capacity, through labor control and work in progress control. 3. Waiting time could be reduced by better coordinating the flow of material by carefully optimizing the balance between changeover times and inventory costs. 4. The ERP system improved the employee efficiency as data and information could now be captured and updated at one point with no duplication of effort which could waste resources. 5. Operational efficiency resulted from greatly improved communication and corporation from all departments. 6. Online updates on inventory levels enabled informed decisions to meet the products' delivery dates.

4. Conclusion The optimization concept mainly depends on the organization's top leadership ability to understand that work environment output is a natural outcome to their commitment to putting the right strategy in place to make their vision come to life. This takes a lot of dedication and openness to accept the different factors that play a major role

10 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION in identifying the organization's overall setup and current performance and act upon that with a professional transformation plan that would take advantage of their current hard- earned resources to move to the next desired position. Realizing that employees are only one part of the organization's chain constitution will enable the leadership to take a holistic approach to improve the overall performance and the human resources eventually. There is a strong harmony established between the means and ways within the organization to ensure seamless operations and production. In other words, the organization's setup shall integrate the tools, systems, and equipment to overcome the shortfalls caused by the incompetent business process to achieve faster, more reliable and stress-free workflow. The organizational structure shall respond to changes and enable its employees to share that vision to overcome the competitor's race. This would require constant review and evaluation on the current daily activities and the performance results then project the future changes in a timely manner. The concept of Network Organization can help focus on the core competence and avoid distractions. A proper cultural work environment should not be ignored as it enables employees to comfortably fit within the organization's social network. The level of control that managers need to employ on work processes depend on the status of the organization; autocratic when things go wrong and require correction, and democrat when carrying business as usual. Management by Objectives can be used by these managers as a powerful tool to properly align both the organization and the employees' interests. One effective method to ensure that alignment is Pay-for- Performance as it ties the individual or group incentive pay to their level performance in delivering expected results. To make sure that these initiatives are fruitful, performance measurement should be employed to quantify how employees are successfully carrying out their tasks and duties and whether the other resources and work environment are in harmony with each other.

References:

[1] Grace Madlinger, What is Workforce Optimization and Why Should I Do it? Small Business Blog, 2018, https://wheniwork.com/blog/what-is-workforce-optimization/ [2] Vicki Broadbent, How IBM misjudged the PC revolution, BBC World Service business reporter, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4336253.stm [3] Muczyk, J. P. & Reimann, B. C. 1987. “The Case for Directive Leadership,” Executive, 1, 304 [4] Jan P. Muczyk, 2004,”A Systems Approach to Organizational Effectiveness: The Alignment of Critical Organizational Dimensions with Selected Business/Competitive Strategies”, Air Force Institute of Technology, Ohio, U.S.A. [5] Lawler, E. E., 1984. ”The strategic design of reward systems, in Readings in Personnel and Human Resource Management,” 2nd ed., West Publishing Co. [6] Gibson, R. B. 1989, “Personal chemistry abruptly ended rise of Kellogg president,” The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1 [7] SUSAN SORENSON, 2013 “How Employee Engagement Drives Growth”, Gallup (https://www.gallup.com/workplace/236927/employee-engagement-drives-growth.aspx) [8] Michael Dean, 2019, “An introduction to the eNPS and driver methodology behind Peakon”, Peakon, https://help.peakon.com/peakon-methodology/the-psychology/question- library-and-theory-references

11 OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION

[9] Ignatio Madanhirea, Charles Mbohwab, 2016, “Enterprise resource planning (ERP) in improving operational efficiency: Case study,” Elsevier B. V., 2016, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2016.01.108 [10] Chen C. “Taiwan Enterprise Data Operation Requirement Analysis: Manufacturing Version,” 2003. MIC Research report. [11] O’Leary D.”Enterprise Resource Planning Systems: Systems, Life”; 2000.

12 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

LTC, assoc. prof. eng. Dorel BADEA, PhD*

* “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu

Abstract: The analysis of the proposed topic of the article had as working assumptions two tendencies with opposite directions from the point of view of the contribution to the sustainable development of the present society, namely, the exponential, quantitative and qualitative increase of the dimension of knowledge, as a process that favored in time the social transformation, respectively, the multiplication of the types of threats and the ways of their manifestation that ultimately affect the social balance. The activity segment chosen in this context for investigation is that of critical infrastructures (CI), a relatively recent field set from the point of view of knowledge management (KM) challenges and, at the same time, very sensitive to the desired state for the functionality of nowadays globalized society. The way of approaching the aspects specific to the stated topic is interdisciplinary, at the micro (operator and/or IC holder) but also macro (national and/or European IC system) level, the opportunities to identify possible solutions (4D structured - define, design, develop, deliver), being highlighted by the use of methodological tools of conceptual modeling, applied in the spectrum determined by the coordinates as is and are to be.

Key words: critical infrastructures, security, knowledge, modeling

1. Security of critical infrastructures - certainties and challenges Critical Infrastructure Security (CIS) is a topic that is increasingly more present at the center of the concerns of government decision-makers, managers in the private environment who work in critical infrastructure systems and not least, the academic environment, as a provider of specific educational programs. All these stakeholders want to find optimal solutions to ensure the continuity of activities endangered by increasingly diverse threats, of which the most current is the cyber spectrum. 5G technologies like knowledge increase the possibilities of social reality in a comprehensive manner, but, at the same time, make individuals and organizations vulnerable. Constraints in terms of time, quality, resources of developing sustainable solutions for problems on the public agenda are combined with those of risk assessment, security measures, incident reporting, in an information overloaded framework, asserting that we live in an exponential time. The need to investigate the influence of activity within space systems on other common systems and, to a greater extent, on critical infrastructure systems [1], [2] is increasingly felt. Solutions containing metaconcepts are required and are discussed in the literature [3], an example in this respect being the governing and resilience. More and more standards that regulate the unitary approach of some major fields of activity and interest are produced within the profile organizations, of which we can highlight those regarding risk management and information security, which are, in fact, tools that facilitate the uniform management of complexity.

13 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

In order to organize and structure the analysis of the factors that contribute to the determination of a satisfactory level of security of the critical infrastructures (reduction of the level of vulnerability) as well as of some interdependencies between these factors, the mind mapping method was used with the help of a dedicated software product available online [4]. The incidence and influence of these factors (figure 1) within the organizations holding critical infrastructures is different depending on the sector of activity (transport, energy, chemical, etc.), the size of the organization and the national or international scale (holding national and / or European critical infrastructures), the type of financing (public or private).

Fig.1 The relationship between CIS analysis factors

2. Modeling the processes of governance of critical infrastructure systems using the Zachman architectural framework Starting from the differentiations (provided by the meaning, context and structure) between the data, information and knowledge and considering the objective of conceptually modeling a knowledge management framework dedicated to the security of critical infrastructures (especially the analysis of the required requirements), the Zachman model was chosen, used mainly for information systems in the business environment and in industry, also knowing the fact that [5], related to this situation, the focus is on the fact that all the aspects characteristic of an enterprise must be well realized and organized. The exploratory research undertaken is meant to clarify, define and identify the fundamental correlations that are manifested within the proposed theme and will allow, in the alternative, a deeper understanding of the concepts and the essence of the phenomena and processes envisaged, finally contributing to the awareness of the specialists with topical notions and approaches. The exploration of the opinions, reasons, attitudes and values that influence the understanding of the behaviors and decision processes specific to change management is carried out within Enterprise architecture (EA), a practice and emerging field intended to improve the management and functioning of complex enterprises and their information systems [6].

14 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

For the particularization of the Zachman model in the case of critical infrastructure security, a simplified working tool was used in comparison with dedicated applications [7], the idea being to create an integrated big picture, necessary to understand the governance of the CI system from a managerial point of view (table 1).

Abstractions > Data / Function / Network / People / Time / Motivation / What How Where Who When Why \/ Perspectives

headquarters of deadlines for establishing the ensuring a central issuing / Scope / the list of essential sustainable institutions in national revising SMEs from national processes for development the national authorities at national presidential security values ensuring framework in defense , public strategic level defense administration ​​and missions national national and order and planning security regional context national security documents system semantic setting the inter- Enterprise Model / model of the general ministerial the national after approval implementation integrated requirements framework for committees coordination of the budget / of proposed management of CI for the ensuring the with center of the the budget government at government management of effectiveness of responsibilitie CIS constraints security policies authority level CI policies in the s regarding the interdependencies field of CIS CIS agreed facilitating the defining the areas of national operational or deadlines for interoperability implementation System Model / specific or European risk managers reviewing or requirements in of governance domain leader framework for importance in at the level of approving the the field of CI, initiatives and (sector) of CI achieving CIS terms of public-private security plans critical values business management criticality partnership of CI continuity operators periodicity of testing the optimization of Tech Constrained essential viability of organizational Model / security risk updating the CI performance in holders / requirements organizational management holder's CI location terms of cost and administrators for the chart plans in the security plan effectiveness of (public / private) of equipment used framework of providing critical CI within the CI integrated service training exercises use of specialized working shifts according to Detailed requirements systems / based on the Representations / for reliability SCADA; the space of role awareness factors specifications operators of of measuring operationalizati arrangement of within the specific to of the major systems / and control on of active / the IT organization that human- equipment installations equipment and passive / semi- subassemblies holds the CI machine maintenance subcomponent of CI tools active interfaces plan redundancy variants supervisory the need to receiving the authorities of Functioning have provided the utility of the deliverables of understanding the network / the quality of Enterprise / the critical CI system's the CI systems the criticality channel for critical beneficiaries of the service deliverables in at the required of the provided providing the products / services of the CI continuously ensuring daily functionality service critical service services systems or activities parameters provided to discontinuously consumers

Table 1 Zachman model (version) for CIS analysis

15 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

3. KM- a business driver for CIS implementation The above table provides a comprehensive picture for identifying locations generating specific KM processes, the importance of these processes being emphasized at EU level in a broader context given by disaster management, ever since 2017, as follows: “Better knowledge, stronger evidence and a greater focus on transformative processes and innovation are essential to improve our understanding of disaster risk, to build resilience and risk-informed approaches to policy-making, and to contribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.” [8]. The approach used to define the concept of Knowledge Management (KM) with the meaning [9] of a study discipline that promotes an integrated approach for identifying, capturing, evaluating, retrieving and sharing all of an organization's information assets (may be included database, documents, policies, procedures and previously uncaptured expertise and experience in individual workers). The main problem for the current situation in many critical infrastructures is the existence of data management systems and less information, which does not lead to knowledge, examples of good practices belonging to the private environment and IT industries (figure 2). The effects are as expected, thus diminishing the possibility of achieving integrated emergency management systems. Given that, generically, a KM framework contains hardware, software, people, and organization, environment around it, the challenge that appears so imminent at the level of governmental CIS management authority is setting up an integrative KM framework that should encompass at least one of the following elements: establishing the content of a minimum package of updated information necessary to be provided at any time in crisis situations by the CI holder to various stakeholders (as they were described in table 1); the creation of a CIS management software product with a common component regardless of the CI type and the level of decision hierarchy but also with a specific component of each CI, which can be interoperable both horizontally and vertically in terms of supporting the decision- making process; a coherent subsystem (in connection with the one proposed above) to generate lessons learned based on the problematic situations that have appeared in the organizations holding CI; regularly conducting interdisciplinary training sessions and integrative exercises with a robust practical component; KM structure.

Fig. 2 The place of a KM department within an IT CI [generated using 10]

16 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

4. Conclusions The need to find the optimal mix on knowledge management within complex systems is not new, the means of implementing it creating this perception. It has evolved in the same trend as the changes in business intelligence processes. The statement is also valid in the case of CI systems that are becoming increasingly dependent on the electrical and IT components, the desire to create robust, threat-resistant structures, further emphasizing the importance of the enterprise architecture approach and, subsequently, of the Zachman model. Under these circumstances, the words of Hansen W. [11] are expressive, who, as a visionary, emphasized almost thirty years ago that when people understand the vision and larger tasks of their enterprise, and are given the right information, resources and responsibilities, they will do the right things. It can be argued that the restructuring of some CI systems based on specific concepts of top-down or incremental architectural development models and of technological enhancing factors (exploding complexity of technology, proliferation of technology) is at the same time a rsolid premise of creating an appropriate KM framework for CIS.

References: [1] Georgescu, A., Bucovetchi, O., Tatar, U., Space Systems as Critical Infrastructures, in FAIMA Business & Management Journal, vol.6 (1), 2018, pp. 24-34. [2] Gheorghe, A. V., Georgescu, A., Bucovețchi, O., Lazăr, M., Scarlat, C., New Dimensions for a Challenging Security Environment: Growing Exposure to Critical Space Infrastructure Disruption Risk, in International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, Beijing Normal University Press, vol. 9(4), 2018, pp. 555-560. [3] Pulfer, R., Bucovetchi, O.M.C., Gheorghe, A.V., The Governance Risk and Compliance (GRC) Model within a Dynamic Business Environment, in Proceedings of 26th IBIMA Conference, Madrid, 11-12 November 2015, pp. 2651-2658. [4] https://www.mindmeister.com, accessed 09.10.2019 [5] http://www.ia.ase.ro/Sie/SIE-4-2013.pdf, accessed 15.10.2019 [6] Lapalme, J., Gerber, A., Van der Merwe, A., Zachman, J., De Vries, M., Hinkelmann, K., Exploring the future of Enterprise Architecture: A Zachman Perspective in Computers in Industry, Volume 79, June 2016, pp. 103-113. [7] https://www.visual-paradigm.com , accessed 16.10.2019 [8] Poljanšek, K., Marin Ferrer, M., De Groeve, T., Clark, I., (Eds.), Science for disaster risk management 2017: knowing better and losing less, EUR 28034 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, , 2017, p.10. [9] Duhon, B., It's all in our heads in Inform, Vol. 12, No. 8, September, 1998, pp. 8-13. [10] https://ams001.blueworkslive.com/scr/processes/1000069c4d9359b#map, accessed 17.10.2019 [11] Hansen, W.C., The Integrated Enterprise. In Foundations of World-C/ass Manufacturing Systems: Symposium Papers, National Academy of Engineering, 2101 Consortium Ave, N.W. Washington, DC, 1991.

17 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Oana-Elena Brânda, PhD, Lecturer in International Relations

Titu Maiorescu University, Faculty of Communication and International Relations, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract: Although a nice leisure destination for summer hot days, the Black Sea is an incredible security landmark for both NATO and the EU. Situated on the eastern border of both, the waters of the Black Sea stem much trouble, when it comes to who is controlling them and who is benefiting from their resources. Being situated on the border of both NATO and the EU, this area has been the object of many strategies aiming to maximize its economic potential and enhance its role of stabilizer in the region. The Black Sea became part of the Three Seas Initiative and has its own Synergy, issued by the EU, looking forward to strengthen its position as an actor of its own within the international community. Despite a clear delineation of maritime borders, the Black Sea remains an object of dispute among the regional powers, looking forward to expand their control and influence over its waters. The aim of the present article is double-folded. On the one hand, it aims to investigate the security- related matters surrounding the Black Sea region, while on the other, it will look at the main EU and NATO security policies concerning the Black Sea. The second part of the article shall focus on a compare and contrast perspective, intended to highlight the differences in perspective of the two organizations and their separate views in approaching the Black Sea area.

Key words: security, Black Sea, holistic approach, tailored forward presence, enhanced forward presence, NATO, EU

1. Introduction Although a nice holiday destination, with beautiful landscapes, protected flora and wildlife, the Black Sea is more than just a collection of beaches, sand and seashells. Given the fact that it is the EU and NATO border in the east, its role is growing by the day. And recent events – starting from 2014 onwards have shown the importance of the area, beyond the traditional geopolitical approach – resources, people, interests, etc.

The Black Sea is a sea of trouble. And not only because it is the house of a tiny species of sharks that is 1 meter long, or because Ovid, once exiled here, named it black because of the dark waters incomparable to the clear ones of his Mediterranean. It is hard to establish the moment when the Black Sea began to be considered trouble. It is trouble by simply considering its geopolitical significance. “He who controls the shores, shall control the world; he who controls maritime commerce, shall control the outcome of war”, said, in a few more words, Admiral Alfred Mahan. Immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the , the Black Sea area experienced a rise in importance, as frozen conflicts emerged and states - both littoral and non-littoral ones started making demands on

18 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION it. This idyllic sea that is today became the centre of dispute for Great Powers. Their object of dispute: control over the Black Sea, not in terms of international law maritime delimitation, but rather in terms of spheres of influence.

The Black Sea needs to be perceived from multiple perspectives. It is both a geographical formation, as well as an area. It can be approached from the perspective of a water reservoir, with flora, fauna and underground resources that could be exploited, but it could also be perceived as an area whose significance depends on the importance allotted to it by its surrounding countries. And there are other countries besides Romania, which have access to the Black Sea – the littoral countries: Turkey, , and Russia. Not to mention the non-littoral countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Moldova, which have interests in the area. The Black Sea is thus an open canvas for the countries interested in using its potential, especially for NATO countries which, after 2014, were forced to commit to the area, seeking to contain the expansion of Russian influence in the region.

2. NATO policy on the Black Sea During the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in 2016, decision-makers agreed that the south – eastern flank of the Alliance needs to be consolidated. As a result, NATO officials came up with the “Tailored Forward presence” (Warsaw Summit Communique, 2016) in the region, which energized politicians, because it would lead to tense relations with the eastern neighbour - Russia. However, NATO had been experiencing tensions with Russia since 2014, when the annexation of came as a shock to NATO member countries. After Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, many believed that Russia would refrain from overstepping the territorial integrity of the countries of the area, maintaining thus at least the appearance of European security balance. However, when the annexation of Crimea became a reality, NATO reacted in the best way it could – decided to enhance another sea – the Baltic as a stronghold against Russian expansion. By doing this, it once again sent Russia a frightful message, stating that it views the country’s expansion with concern.

The Warsaw communique (2016) highlighted the importance of the Black Sea as well as the destabilizing policies of the Russian Federation in the area. However, no clear doctrinaire action was issued afterwards, except for military build-up on both sides. Since the annexation of Crimea, an increase in military presence and exercises was registered in the Black Sea, both on the part of the of America, as well as on that of the Russian Federation. Ambitions on both sides to assert control of the sea lead to a security conundrum. This security conundrum was launched back in October 2011, US Secretary of Défense Leon Panetta announced the stationing in the Black Sea of four US navy destroyers for the Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Défense (BMD) Program and other purposes (Congressional Research Service, 2018). This did not remain unnoticed by the Russians, especially since the US destroyers are a constant rotational presence in the Black Sea (Rempfer, 2018).

19 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

A year after the annexation of 2014, in 2015, General Philip Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe issued a warning regarding the enhancement of Russian military power in the region, which can lead to an isolation of the Black Sea – “Russia has developed a very strong A2/AD capability in the Black Sea and (…)essentially their (anti-ship) cruise missiles range over about 40 to 50 percent of the Black Sea” (Gibbons-Neff, 2015). Such a strong presence can only close the Black Sea basin to the other NATO member countries. The Kerch Strait dispute stands as a case in point of the containment and closure policy applied by the Russians in the Black Sea area.

NATO has been holding its annual multinational exercise Sea Breeze in the Black Sea since 1997, aiming to strengthen interoperability and cooperation in the Black Sea region. In 2018, Russia responded with a “snap” drill (Day, 2018) aiming to simulate and test at the same time its reaction speed towards the destruction of enemy ships. Surely such a response it not strange to the enhanced presence of NATO ships in the Black Sea.

The Black Sea is important to the North-Atlantic Alliance from several perspectives. Firstly, it is a “key strategic intersection linking NATO’s Eastern and Southern flanks and the Balkan’s role as a gateway to Europe from the Southern , the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East” (Malvin, 2018). Secondly, given the sea’s presence in what was formally the , having the area peaceful is a requirement to help maintain the European balance and status quo after the fall of (NATO, 2016). In that regard, any type of interference on the Russian part is highly disapproved of and seen as a means of attempting to construct a fundament of influence into the Middle East and Northern Africa – the two most unstable regions of the world and where the presence of American forces on the one hand, and Russian ones, on the other, would probably lead to an undercover continuation of the Cold War through proxies.

Furthermore, the modernization of the Russian fleet, despite the provisions of the Montreux Convention can also be a means of projecting power towards Central and Eastern Europe and the , which are currently on the integration row in the European Union (at least on a declaratory level). Should one remember the influence exerted by the Soviet Union in the area during the Cold War, such power projects are meant to derail the Balkans from their European path and send them into a Russian sphere of influence, not to mention the fact that such a transition of the Balkans into the Russian area of influence, would provide the latter access to the Mediterranean and the straits.

There is an acute need of strengthened NATO air and maritime presence in the Black Sea, as Romania highlighted also repeatedly. However, international law in the field is raising bars in front of such demands. The 1936 Montreux Convention (1936 Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, 1936) stipulates that only littoral states can have a standing naval presence in the Black Sea. Ships belonging to non-littoral states can stay for only 21 days in the Black Sea, while aircraft carriers and submarines are banned. This is an obstacle in the quest for more military security and stability at the Black Sea, especially on the part of littoral states.

20 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

While countries such as Romania, once confronted with the back lash of Crimea, were rooting for NATO to move forward from reassurance into deterrence, NATO officials though to come up with a more concerted approach – that of the “trip wire “deterrence (The Economist, 2016) that can resort to local capabilities. A similar solution has been applied in the Baltics, where -sized battle-groups, led by the US, UK, Canada and Germany can work together with national forces to combat threats. In the case of the Black Sea, such defensive actions fall within the responsibility of the multinational framework training NATO forces – MN BDE-SE stationed in Romania (NATO, 2018). However, while the Enhanced forward presence in the Baltics is concrete and able to react immediately, in the case of the Black Sea, the Tailored Enhanced Presence is rather feeble, and dependable on the existing stationed capabilities in Romania. Initially, Romania called for the creation of a NATO Black Sea Fleet, but faced Bulgarian refusal and Turkish skepticism in that regard.

From a Romanian point of view, the Black Sea is both an asset, as well as an area of turmoil. From the warning issued by President Traian Băsescu back in 2005 when he claimed that the Black Sea was being treated as a Russian lake (Hotnews, 2015), to the presence of the Black Sea frozen conflicts as threats on the National Defense Strategy 2015-2019 (Romanian Presidency, 2015), Romanian officials have expressed their concern towards Black Sea evolutions in one way or another. As a result, Romania would like to see NATO move forward from reassurance to deterrence in the case of the Black Sea.

The Black Sea is a complex security environment, unpredictable just like the sea facing a storm. Anytime turbulence can strike and ruin the balance of the ecosystem, or in this case, the balance of the political system in the region. Furthermore, the key aspect in managing the area is adaptability to the existing conditions, just as NATO is currently consolidating itself through its ability to adapt and change (Ichimescu, 2019) to the requirements of the international environment, just as was discussed in February in Munich, as a necessary step in its evolution in the 21st century.

Consequently, the best option for the good management of the area is to apply a comprehensive approach by introducing the matter of the Black Sea area in the NATO crisis management process. After all, it appears to be a crisis ready to outbreak. The comprehensive approach is structured on three levels: strategic, operative and tactical (Ichimescu, 2015), all three highly applicable in the Black Sea basin. However, the manner in which the crisis management process shall be enacted as far as the Black Sea is concerned, depends very much on the extent of forces employed in the area.

3. EU policy on the Black Sea

The EU policy can, unfortunately be characterized by lack of cohesion and united vision. More likely, there are individual interests which take precedence in front of collective ones.

The European Security Strategy of 2003 (European Security Strategy, 2003), is the first EU document to mention the area indirectly, by referring to the Caucasus as a region

21 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION requiring attention in the future, highlighting that the issue shall be handed over to the Black Sea Synergy to be issued on the matter. Unfortunately, years later, after so many negative developments, the new European Union Global Strategy of 2016 - does not provide an ampler approach to the Black Sea area, although its potential for conflict grew. Instead, it refers to the European security order, which is challenged by “Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilization of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region” (EUGS, 2016).

The Black Sea is central to several other documents, which contain more direct references and might be considered instruments of EU policy in the area: the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004), the Black Sea Synergy (2007) and the Initiative (2009). It is impossible to speak of one without the other. The Black Sea is nothing but a pond, should one not integrate it in the larger geopolitical debate of the area. However, there is no recorded convergence between these three documents, although they were intended to function complementarily. This is because of the different areas of impact.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (European Neighborhood Policy, 2016) is a form of bilateral policy between the states involved (16 in number - Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, , Egypt, Georgia, , Jordan, Lebanon, , Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia and Ukraine), and was meant to create and maintain a fruitful framework of cooperation between ENP countries and EU ones.

The Black Sea Synergy (Black Sea Strategy, 2007), despite being the most focused of the three, focuses on regional cooperation in the area, leaving aside any other outside interests. Ever since it was enacted, no significant change was brought to its content, which is unfortunate, given the changes that the Black Sea went through in time, not just geographical ones, but also geopolitical ones. The most successful project of the Black Sea Synergy was the EU Cross-Border Cooperation Project for the Black Sea Basin, focusing on economic and social development, environmental protection and conservation and cultural and educational initiatives. This a very good example of why there should be a holistic approach to the Black Sea area.

Finally, the Eastern Partnership Initiative (Easter Partnership Initiative, 2016) is a multilateral cooperation initiative which focuses more deeply on shared interests between member states which comprise EU members, and 6 Eastern European partners such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Although the Black Sea is on the top of these interests, the strength of the Initiative is still not enough to create an impact in the region and create a whole EU policy on the Black Sea that could be autonomous and have a long-term impact.

Lately, the European Union has shown itself to be highly interested in promoting blue economy. There is an annual high-level stakeholder conference on blue economy, addressing public administrations, maritime practitioners and entrepreneurs. Also, the European Union is an observer in two regional organizations: the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Commission for the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution.

22 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

While the European Union is fragmented in policy towards the Black Sea and NATO is undecided on how to act, one also needs to remind the challenges that arise in the area. Apart from the negative ones, such as migration and political instability, there are also the positive ones, such as the 3 Seas Initiative, which, although less political and more economically oriented, takes the debate on a whole new level – that of resources and the interdependence of regions in managing these resources. There is also the Silk Road initiative revived by China, who intend to connect the South-China Sea to the centre of Europe through the Black Sea, among others, acknowledging its strong potential to become once again, a significant transport route.

4. Conclusion The importance of the Black Sea resides in many fields: security, commerce, transport routes, to name but a few. However, the dilemma around the efforts made by one another is to assert a Great Power status. For instance, Russia has vowed to increase its Black Sea fleet to 80 warships by 2020 (Soldatkin, 2014), to be able to engage in longer deployment around the world. Could that be interpreted as anything else but a seeking of former glory?

The issue needs to be perceived in a holistic manner, meant to lead to meaningful policies in the field. Competition in the Black Sea leads to confrontation. How to spin it around and have it lead to cooperation instead?

The Russian Federation needs to understand that any military build-up in the area, just as it was the case of the Aegis Ashore system, is not meant to enervate it or worse, challenge it. Far beyond Russia, both NATO and the European Union fear other problems: migration, ISIS, frozen conflicts, China, to name but a few. All these could access European shores easier through the Black Sea than they could through the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, failure to perceive the wrong aggressor, had Russia determined to fight the European – be they EU or NATO member, rather than put together a front against the Middle East threats tending to spill over in the near future.

Any approach to the area should be done after having completed a course on semiotics, as any policy on the Black Sea is a result of significance and perception. Perception depends very much on where you sit. Consequently, NATO is currently approaching the Black Sea as if its arch-nemesis, the Soviet Union were still in place. Of course, Russian Federation aggressive policies in Ukraine have not helped in the representation that NATO countries have built themselves of Russia after the Crimean annexation.

What NATO and EU countries fail to is build a holistic approach. While NATO is focused on military issues attempting to respond to cries for help from littoral countries who fear the expansion of Russian influence, the EU is focusing on the stimulation of blue economy. A holistic approach would have the two organizations unite in a comprehensive action, one that would send the proper message to the Russian Federation: if you stir trouble, trouble you shall get!

23 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

References: (Times New Roman 14 Bold)

[1] Day, Joseph A, Reinforcing NATO’s Deterrence in the East, General Report, Defense and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, November 17th, 2018, available at https://www.nato-pa.int/download- file?filename=sites/default/files/2018-12/2018%20- %20DETERRENCE%20IN%20THE%20EAST%20-%20DAY%20REPORT%20- %20168%20DSC%2018%20E%20fin_0.pdf. [2]Gibbons -Neff, Thomas “Top NATO general: Russians starting to build air defense bubble over Syria”, The Washington Post, September 29th, 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/29/top-nato-general- russians-starting-to-build-air-defense-bubble-over-syria/. [3]Ichimescu, Cristian, ”NATO - A strong alliance by transatlantic cooperation and capacity to adapt and change”, Volume of the 15th International Scientific Conference „Strategies XXI” „Strategic Changes in Security and International Relations”, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, April 2019, p. 108, available at https://www.strategii21.ro/A/2019- 04.%20STRATEGIC%20CHANGES%20IN%20SECURITY%20AND%20INTERNATI ONAL%20RELATIONS/Security%20and%20Defence%20Faculty%20- Strategic%20changes%20in%20security%20and%20international%20relations%202019 %20vol2.pdf. [4]______, “Managementul crizelor în viziunea NATO”, Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare ”Carol I”, No. 2, 2015, pp. 212-218, available at https://revista.unap.ro/index.php/revista/issue/view/13. [5]Malvin, Neil J., “Rebuilding Collective Security in the Black Sea region”, SIPRI Policy Paper 50, December 2008, p. 53, available at https://www.sipri.org/publications/2018/sipri-policy-papers/rebuilding-collective- security-black-sea-region. [6]Rempfer, Kyle, “Here’s the US military footprint in the Black Sea region”, Military Times, November 27th, 2018, available at https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/11/27/heres-the-us-military- footprint-in-the-black-sea-region/. [7]Soldatkin, Vladimir ,“Russia will add 80 new warships to Black Sea Fleet: fleet commander”, Reuters, September 23rd, 2014, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-navy-ships/russia-will-add-80-new-warships- to-black-sea-fleet-fleet-commander-idUSKCN0HI16K20140923. [8] ***, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 2016, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. [9]***, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 13th, 2018, available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33745/188. [10]***, NATO Deputy Secretary General: stability in the Black Sea is an important component of Euro-Atlantic security, April 22nd, 2016, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_130342.htm?selectedLocale=en.

24 A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

[11]***, 1936 Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, Montreux, Switzerland, July 20th, 1936, available ar https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp- content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-the- Straits.pdf. [12]***, “Trip-wire deterrence”, The Economist, July 2nd, 2016, available at https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/07/02/trip-wire-deterrence. [13]***, Brussels Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the in Brussels 11-12 July 2018, July 11th 2018, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm. [14]***, “Traian Basescu aduce reprosuri Rusiei in problema Marii Negre”, Hotnews.ro, 16th September 2005, available at https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva- 1209713-traian-basescu-aduce-reprosuri-rusiei-problema-marii-negre.htm. [15]***, National Defense Strategy 2015-2019. A Strong Romania within Europe and the World, Bucharest, 2015, p. 14, available at https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/National_Defense_Strategy_2015_-_2019.pdf. [16] ***, European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 2003, p. 17, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf. [17]***, Shared Vision, Common Action. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, June 2016, p. 33, available athttp://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. [18]***, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), December 21st, 2016, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy- enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en. [19]***, Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative, Commission of the European Communities, April 4th 2007, Brussels, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com07_160_en.pdf. [20]***, Eastern Partnership, October 19th, 2016, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern- partnership_en.

25 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7-8th 2019

MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA Ebru CAYMAZ* Fahri ERENEL** Batuhan UMUT***

* Ph.D., Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey ** Associate Professor, Ph.D., Department of Business Administration, Istinye University, Istanbul, Turkey *** Dokuz Eylul University, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Izmir, Turkey

Abstract: Today’s world is in the middle of a major revolution in the way the work is done. Unlike previous labor shifts, this revolution is led by the advanced technologies such as Robotic Process Automation (RPA) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). RPA and AI has opened up new horizons both for organizations and their workers. While repetitive and mundane work is performed easily by them, people can allocate time to focus on more strategic activities. Naturally, these revolutionary developments has taken the attention of military forces and started a digital transformation. In due time wars are expected to be fought with hybrid military forces. However the development of these hybrid forces will bring forth several concerns and human resources management is one of the most significant issues among them. In this study, we discuss different points of views to analyze these issues and challenges and try to put forth recommendations for a more modern military human resources management in the robotic warfare era.

Keywords: Human Resource Management, Military Human Resource Management, Robotic Warfare, Human-Robot Co-working.

1. Introduction Technology has always changed the nature of wars. During the recent years significant developments have been experienced about artifical intelligence and robotics research fueled by the Industry 4.0 revolution. Even some studies suggest visions for Industry 5.0 human – robot co-working as a result of rapid developments in technology. However, these improvements bring along a number of technological, sociological, organizational, moral, legal and ethical concerns. Apart from these issues, there are significant questions still waiting for answers. For instance how these developments should be addressed by different military departments remain partly unanswered. In order to keep up military specialists need to have an understanding of current robotic technologies as well as evolving ones; advantages and disadvantages and how to lead and manage hybrid military forces. In this study, we discuss different points of views to analyze these challenges and put forth recommendations.

2. Robotic Warfare Era The progress in unmanned system technologies has initiated a transition the focus from specific domains to become domain agnostic. Developments in any domain are beneficial for all of them and future operations are expected to be relied heavily upon

26 ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA multi-domain capabilities which requires a joint force structure. Major developments, advancements, challenges and trends are examined in four critical themes. These themes are selected due to their potential to accelerate unmanned systems into the future:

 Interoperability: It is a major thrust in the integration and operation of unmanned systems. As a result of increasing synergy of manned and unmanned systems’ capabilities, a robust interoperable structure becomes compulsory for future advances in warfighting. Interoperability consists of common / open architectures, modularity and parts interchangeability, compliance, test, evaluation, verification, validation, data strategies and rights.  Autonomy: As a significant force multiplier, it is one of the major revolutions in robotic warfare era. Advances in autonomy and robotics have already revolutionized warfighting concepts. Autonomy has potential to provide strategic advantages for defence ministries due to significant increase in efficiency and effectiveness of manned and unmanned systems. Autonomy involves AI and machine learning, increased efficiency and effectiveness, trust and weaponization.  Network Security: This theme is especially indispensable for national security because operations of unmanned systems heavily rely on networked connections and efficient spectrum access. Network vulnerabilities should be addressed immediately in order to avoid any disruption or manipulation. Network security includes cyber operations, information assurance, electromagnetic spectrum and electronic warfare.  Human – Machine Collaboration: Human-machine collaboration becomes the ultimate objective when integration and interoperability is applied. Teaming between human forces and machines will accelerate warfare transformation. It will enable a revolutionary collaboration in which machines will be considered as critical teammates. Human – machine collaboration is related to human-machine interfaces and human-machine teaming[1,2,10]. In order to ensure a successful progress in line with the rapid technical and capability advancements of all systems, these four key themes must be supported by strong policies. Strategic advantage of a military can be maintained as long as the emphasis remains on the evolution, availability and employment of unmanned technology [3]. It is obvious that robotic warfare will eventually change the nature of wars [4]. As it is pointed out by former DARPA Director Mr. Prabhakar“Advances in autonomy and in AI and autonomous control systems and advanced computing and big data, and learning machines and intuitive graphic visualization tools, metamaterials, miniaturization – they are leading us to a time of great human-machine collaboration...”[5]. Naturally, a new type of armed forces becomes imperative in the robotic warfare era. These hybrid armed forces will be composed of humans, drones, and robots. Human-machine teaming is the key element in this process. We can describe human-machine teaming as synchronized employment of soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen as well as civilian experts working with manned and unmanned systems to achieve improved lethality, survivability and situational awareness. Hence, synergy and overmatch with asymmetric advantages by combining the inherent strengths of the warfighter who uses these systems will be ensured [6]. However, the transition to hybrid armed forces is not an instantaneous development. First of all, human-machine teaming mission should seek for the most efficient balance between the warfighter and the unmanned systems. In addition to utilizing the current state of technology, optimization of the tasks requires a delicate balance as well. Adding more automation into unmanned systems eventually allows one operator for many systems. Hence, the human’s role will be shifted from operator towards mission manager. In order

27 ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA to keep up with these developments, a joint structure within the military forces needs to be established. And then acquisition, education and training issues should be addressed comprehensively by defense experts from different fields [7]. The main concerns to be dealt in robotic warfare era are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Armed Forces Development Issues in the Robotic Warfare Era Human-machine tactics, techniques, procedures and strategy Management of public perception Legal and policy constraints Development of robotic warfare operations concept Weaponized autonomous system policy Transformation of military forces Acquisition of robotic and AI defense systems Strengthen connections to private sector advancements Vulnerable network security – new approaches to securing data Education and training Military human resources management

All of these issues are highly significant and require immediate attention. In this study we only focus on the issue of military human resources management.

3. Military Human Resources Management (MHRM) in Robotic Warfare Era The requirements for future employees have started to change owing to numerous emerging multidisciplinary support alternatives due to autonomous machines. While the demand for workers decreases, demand for more qualified employees increases. Although a better education helps in this process, it is only valid for certain circumstances. In order to meet the new standarts set for Industry 4.0, future personnel should also be adapted to new framework conditions. Adaptability is one of the major challenges yet it can be a major strong point as well. The next generation of employees is expected to adapt quickly to technical, social and digital change [8]. For instance a production robot is supposed to have fine motor skills, perception, adaptability and cognition. In order to function properly, is should be programmed dynamically and rigidly. Thus, the operating human is supposed to be able to adapt the system’s functions to their individual needs if the system fails to recognize [9]. The additional qualification of an employee is directly connected to the work in question. It is also argued that mere knowledge workers will no longer be required. The training and skills requirements for operating autonomous machines are much complicated compared to conventional tasks and this situation leads shifts in employment. To ensure agility during missions, human-machine interfaces are expected to support a range of control options. In these options the human can be either “off the loop” which means no control over an autonomous system. He can be “on the loop” and supervise the unmanned systems or “in the loop” which means exercising commands to control a vehicle [10]. Although it is a highly controversial topic, the main focus should not be on taking the

28 ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA human out of the loop but to redefine where the human fits into that loop. Thus, non- formal qualifications such as ability to act independently, build networks or organize teams with a focus on targets and to think abstractly has gained significance in this process [11, 12]. In the future, finding creative solutions to problems will become more and more significant. To sum up, challenges of robotic warfare era require informed decisions on force structure requirements, personnel recruitment and retention programs, well-being programs as well as personnel readiness from both individual and unit perspectives. The life cycle of military human resources management (MHRM) is given below:  Personnel structure  Acquisition - Manpower management - Accession and retention management - Training integration  Distribution  Development  Deployment  Compensation  Sustainment  Transition [13]. However, without overcoming legal and policy constraints and developing human- machine tactics, techniques, procedures and strategy along with the military transformation process, this life cycle will remain as a futile attempt. MHRM would only be enhanced after developing proper policy and strategies.

4. Conclusion Robotic warfare is becoming a reality. As a result of increasing speed, number and efficiency of the weapon systems, modern battlefield has become a very complex environment; it necessiates a great burden of knowledge more than soldiers can manage. Developments of unmanned technologies within the armed forces have made it necessary to take a different approach in terms of organization and process management. It is thought that the structural and functional reorganization of the human resources management approach should be prioritized in terms of adapting to the developments and meeting the needs of the future warfare. Rather that a fixed organization structure, this requires a flexible organization structure which can perform different tasks in different human- machine combinations in order to overcome the asymmetric threats that may rise in the uncertainty environment. To manage this transition process successfully, a vision and strategy plan called “Digital Transformation” should be prepared. Starting from the top headquarters, establishing digital transformation offices suitable for the military hierarchical structure and preparing training programs for the assigned personnel in these offices will enable a more efficient transformation process. Last but not least, public perception is another significant issue in this process and public should also be informed about these developments.

Acknowledgements and Disclaimers: The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of any affiliated organization or government.

29 ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA

References: [1] The Office of the Secretary of Defense (2017). “Unmanned Systems Integrated Road Map, FY 2017 – 2042: https://cdn.defensedaily.com/wp- content/uploads/post_attachment/206477.pdf (Accessed on 10th, October 2019). [2] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2013). Thinking About the U.S. Military’s Next-Generation UAS Force: Final Report. Prepared for the Office of Net Assessment Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Contract HQ0034-09-D-3007- 0013. September 2013. Available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/Litigation %20Release%20- %20Thinking%20About%20the%20U.S.%20Military%27s%20Next%20Generation%20U AS%20Force%20Final%20Report%20%20201309.pdf,(Accessed on 10th October 2019). [3] U.S. Department of Defense (2012). “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, DC 20301-1000, Washington. [4] Demir, K.A., & Caymaz, E. (2017). Robotic Warfare, Law of Armed Conflict, and Law of Robotic Armed Conflict. In the Proceedings of the 12th International Scientific Conference “Defense Resources Management in the 21st Century”, Braşov, November 9- 10, 2017. [5] Prabhakar, A. (2016). “Work: Robot Warship Demonstrates Advances in Autonomy, Human-Machine Collaboration: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles- view/release/3/172878/robot-warship-shows-advances-in-autonomy%2C-man_machine- collaboration.html (Accessed on 10th October 2019). [6] Manauver, Aviation, and Soldier Division Capabilities Integration Center (2017). The U.S. Army Robotic and Autonomous Systems Strategy, March. [7] Caymaz, E.; Erenel, F. (2012). Addressing the Need of Qualified Personnel in Defense Industry: The Turkish Case. The 7th International Scientific Conference “Defense Resources Management in the 21st Century”, Braşov, November 15, 2012. pp. 25-29. [8] Bernstein, D., Crowley, K., Nourbakhsh, I. (2007). “Working with a Robot: Exploring Relationship Potential in Human-Robot Systems”, Interaction Studies, 8:3, pp. 465-482. [9] Moniz B. A. (2013). “Robots and Humans As Co-workers? The Human-Centered Perspective of Work with Autonomous Systems”, IET Working Paper Series, Germany. [10] Autonomous Horizons: System Autonomy in the Air force – a Path to the Future. Volume 1: Human-Autonomy Teaming. USAF Office of the Chief Scientist, AF/ST-TR- 15-01, June 2015. [11] Wisskirchen, G., Biacabe, B. T., Bormann, U., Muntz, A., Niehaus, G., Soler, G. J., Brauchitsch, B. (2017). “Artifical Intelligence and Robotics and Their Impact on the Workplace”, IBA Global Employment Institute. [12] Moniz, A. B., Krings, B. (2016). “Robots Working with Humans or Humans Working with Robots? Search for Social Dimensions in New Human-Robot Interaction in Industry”, Robots and the Work Environment, Societies, 6 (3). [13] U.S. Army War College (2017-2018). How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, Carlisle.

30 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

Svetlana CEBOTARI, Doctor habilitated in political sciences, associate professor* Sergiu PLOP, Colonel, Rector (Commandant) of the "Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy**

*Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, State University of Moldova,"Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy/ Chisinau/ Republic of Moldova **"Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

Abstract: The Black Sea region over the centuries played an important geostrategic role in the relations between the great powers. Currently, at the confluence of two Versailles culture and religions, the Christian and Islamic and many nations, the Black Sea is a space of both convergence and collision of the interests of the riparian countries, but also of the various international actors. This article outlines the main interests of the great powers. Thus, the geostrategic, political-military and geo-economic interests of the US and NATO, the Russian Federation, and, incidentally, those of the EU are under investigation.

Key words: Black Sea basin; Russia; US; EU; NATO; geopolitical interest; geostrategic interest; geo- economic interest;

1. Introduction Over the centuries, geographically, geo-economically and geostrategically, the importance of the Black Sea was mainly based on the role that the region played by major powers and empires (Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Russian). It was simultaneously a connecting bridge and a border, a buffer zone and transit between West and East, between South and North. In addition, the Black Sea has been and continues to be a connecting point for trade for the energy-rich regions [11]. In this context, the geopolitical energy axis joining Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea deserve attention. Oleoducts and pipelines are the connecting routes for these spaces. The Black Sea region of Stricto Senso includes the territorial sea and the coast of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova [9]. There are three NATO member states and two EU Member States around the Black Sea. A number of political transformations have prompted advances to democratic regimes in other states in the region. The area of the Black Sea basin continues to be transformed [16, p. 42]. The Black Sea region is the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and some of the EU Member States (and therefore the Union) [19, p.225-241].

31 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

The Black Sea Basin is the aquatic space with an area of 413 000 km2, with a length of 1 150 km from the West to the East and 600 km from the North to the South [14]. The Black Sea region also includes a diversity of cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious identities. The heterogeneity is also met in terms of the structure, size and economic orientation of the countries of the Black Sea region. Surrounded by Europe, the Caucasus region of Anatolia, the Black Sea basin is connected to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea to the south through the Bosphorus Strait and the Marmara Sea [18]. The Black Sea as a region has been disputed in the light of its dual bridge or frontier vocation. The size of the Black Sea and the increase of the projection capabilities of the forces, plus the fact that it is a great internal power, with a unique way of exiting the planetary ocean and the one controlled by a single state, Turkey [7. p. 142]. Being at the confluence of two cultures and universal religions, the European Christian and Islamic, and many families of nations, the Black Sea is a space of both convergence and collision of the interests of the riparian countries and also of the various international actors. The geopolitical and security developments in the Black Sea region, the geographic position of the region, the risks and threats to stability in the area, political, economic and military aspects of cooperation are issues that further attract the interest of the international community, European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, generates a closer look at the area's problem. In the context of new realities, geopolitics and geostrategic, Euro-Atlantic, as a result of the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, gives the Black Sea basin the characteristics of a geostrategic space of importance [10]. It is an intersection of strategic directions and routes that provide the connections between the West and the Orient, competition, cooperation between important international actors, from different economic and social collocations and antagonistic value systems. Since 2004, the Black Sea has been defined as the eastern limit of the EU and NATO, located in the vicinity of the CIS and the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The analyzed region also has a special economic value due to the presence of energy resources and terrestrial and marine raw materials, modern industrial capabilities, the number and degree of education of the population, the magnitude of regional and trans- regional trade etc. [11, p. 492]. Also, the Black Sea Basin is a densely populated area with significant natural resources connected to the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, and has direct links with important communication lines through the , Volga, Don and Corridors on a land link from east to west Central Caucasus and Central Asia, and from north to south the Baltic region of South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. These routes have been used extensively for both military campaigns and trade since the establishment of the first Greek colonies along the shores. The only time the Black Sea represented a "frozen lake" and the communication channels were interrupted was during the 50 years of the Cold War when the border between the two blocks was practically the center of the region.

2. Black Sea in the context of the major powers interests The geostrategic importance of the Black Sea Basin over the centuries has been based on the role played by the region, being both a bridge and a border, a buffer zone and a transit zone between Europe and Asia at the intersection of former powers and empires. In addition, the Black Sea was a junction point for trade routes and regions rich in energy resources. The Black Sea has always been a strategic area for the deployment and mobilization of the armed forces, both from the perspective of defensive and expansionary policies.

32 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

Its strategic position, between the hydrocarbs reserves in the Caspian Basin and Europe, places the Black Sea in a unique position. But while the opportunity to transfer Caspian oil and gas to European markets increases economic development and regional economic prosperity, competition for the control of pipelines, waterways and transport routes to ensure greater political and economic influence not only in the region, on a global scale, raises the risk of confrontation. At the same time, the proliferation of routes, while the potential for increasing bilateral cooperation to the detriment of the region can at the same time lead to redundancy due to too many capacities for not sufficient gas and oil [1]. In the context of the analysis of the Black Sea Basin, consideration should be given to analyzing the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the actors present in the region. Thus, in the Black Sea region can be assessed under the following headings: 1) Global Powers: United States, European Union and Russia 2) Regional Powers: Turkey, Ukraine, and Romania. These actors have difficulties in formulating policies independent of global actors, so they have to work in coordination with them. 3) International Organizations: NATO, EU, OSCE, GUAM, Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) [1]. Thus, by looking at the strategic interests of the Russian Federation, the US and including those of the EU in the Black Sea Basin, these can be examined from several perspectives a) Geostrategic interest After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, newly created states are in the orbit of different power centers. This also applies to Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caucasus states, including the Republic of Moldova, for which both the Russian Federation and the US and the EU are interested. In the early 2000s, geopolitical competition for control over the Black Sea Basin began between the West and Russia [24, pp.75-83]. Analyzing the position of the Black Sea from a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective, we could determine the causes of the geopolitical, geostrategic and geo- economic competition triggering the interests of the Russian Federation and the USA, EU and NATO for this space. What are the US, NATO and EU interests towards Ukraine? [26, p.75]. The main actors of the new strategic scenario that is portrayed in the Black Sea border, with the Caspian oil stake, are the United States of America, Russia and the European Union. The United States of America is the benchmark on the "grand chessboard", primarily aimed at strengthening its position in the Black Sea area, its main pillar being geo-economic interest. The intention of removing the Russian monopoly over the Caspian energy exploitation and transport processes is also a strategic successor of the United States of America. In the context of the global anti-terror war, the United States is engaged in the modernization efforts of the Georgian and Azerbaijan armed forces, as well as in the process of monitoring and evaluating the Black Sea oil traffic, especially through the Turkish straits [9]. The significance of the Black Sea for the US is also important for the following reasons: • Through the Black Sea, U.S.A. can control the "vulnerabilities" of Russia, the North Caucasus, and engage in different forms of provocation. • Can increase the confidence and courage of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova to manifest themselves as international law actors in the country, causing them to raise their voices against Russia. • In addition to Iran, the Black Sea serves as a plateau to exert pressure on Middle East countries such as and Syria. • The region is strategically important for the war on terror, which began in . • The Black Sea region offers feasible opportunities for the isolation of Russia. • NATO has included the region in the Partnership for Program (PfP).

33 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

• The strategic position of the Black Sea could allow the mobilization of ships and war bases in and around this region, which in practice could be used to conduct intelligence operations against Russia. The United States has also formulated a six-pronged strategy in the region: • Frozen conflicts should be of higher priority: attention should be given to the conflicts in Transdniestria - Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia's objectives are to create turmoil in these regions for its own interests and use conflicts to exert pressure on regional powers. • Ukraine should focus on: The US considers that the coup in Ukraine is a positive development for the region [17]. Another factor regarding the United States and NATO has been to prevent new independent states from yielding to Russian influence or pressure. The US has reassessed its geostrategic interest in the area and added a military dimension to its strategy to strengthen NATO's role. This has led to a predictable response from Russia. The United States has sought to develop a more coherent and comprehensive strategy towards the Black Sea Region. This had three main points. First of all, US administrations have paid special attention to promoting democracy and the market economy. This approach has focused on greater political freedom, as a result of free and fair elections, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the transparency of market economies. Second, priority was given to the energy issue and the expansion of free trade. This includes an increase in the number of gas and oil pipelines; an increase in trade and economic development due to improvements in transport and infrastructure communications; and the promotion of tourism, customs cooperation, environmental protection, etc. Security is the third pillar of the US approach in the region. In this case, the main focus was on combating terrorism, organized crime and smuggling with weapons of mass destruction, a strengthened border security regime and a civil-military response. Of particular importance in this regard was the US support for the Black Sea Border Security Initiative and the Black Sea Civil Emergency Response Plan, funded by the US Department of Defense, which is designed to improve cross-border coordination. For improving the profile in the area, the US has developed close bilateral security ties with regional actors such as Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania. If we are to analyze the interest of the USA, NATO and the EU for the Black Sea Basin, then we can see that it serves as a tool for coercion and stopping Russia's expansionist interests and ambitions - Ukraine's independence from Russia and its inclusion in the sphere of influence of the US and NATO. As stated in 1997 Zb. Brzezinski, the purpose of the US lies in "not admitting the creation of an Eurasian empire that would be able to put an end to US geostrategic trends and goals." US goals in the Black Sea Basin focus on ensuring geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet space. Goals and interests in the Black Sea Basin are also NATO, although in principle they coincide with US interests. Firstly, it aims at extending the Alliance to the East. In the event of joining NATO, Ukraine, it will soon be the role of "keeping" the Russian Federation in its expansionist tendencies and of participating, as necessary, in the formation of a new "health cordon", which would allow division, removal of Russia from the states of the European Union. Speaking about the interests of NATO member states, according to F. Cune, there are five reasons for showing interest in this area: 1. Geographic and geostrategic location of the region; 2. The role of the Central Caucasus for Eurasian security; 3. Total unexploded gas reserves in the Caspian basin;

34 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

4. The presence of problems with the threat and spread of the weapons of mass destruction; 5. Not admitting the hegemony of a power in the area [22, pp. 13-14]. In the context of the analysis of the interests of the great powers in the Black Sea Basin, attention is drawn to the interests expressed by the Russian Federation in the region. Thus, for the Russian Federation, the Black Sea area is a fundamental strategic objective, and in its relationship with the riparian states it imposes a status equal to that of the North Atlantic Alliance. Being one of the main actors, Russia's main concern in the "near neighborhood" is to maintain and consolidate its power and to restrict the presence of other powers, building on the premise that Ukraine and Georgia considers Russia as a threat, but the Russian Federation, considers to be surrounded and covered by the West, the reason for maintaining influence in the area is to achieve the interest - to ensure national security. As the USA exercised simultaneous military and political influence on the Black Sea through the expansion of NATO in the region, the Russian Federation considers it the intensity of the Russian fencing fear was evident during the August 2008 crisis. For this reason, Russia's interests in the Black Sea region could be defined as follows: 1) Given the growing influence of regional and global actors in the Black Sea region, the Russian Federation is trying to maintain its position as one of the main actors in the region; 2) to prevent the emergence of problems or projects that are not under Russian control; 3) preventing the emergence of anti-Russian military coalitions; 4) preventing countries in the region from joining NATO; and 5) fighting and suppressing separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism [6]. The Russian Federation has faced a crisis in the last decade as a result of the loss of the status of the second world superpower. Simultaneously with the developments in the Yugoslav crisis and the serious involvement of the US in the region, Moscow has abandoned the claims of political hegemony in Southeast Europe. Analysts believe that today's Russia focuses on the issues of corporate restructuring and strengthening the CIS while at the same time diversifying its partnerships with the US and the EU and its relations with the countries of the Far East. The Russia-US Partnership is perceived in Moscow as a global understanding, and the Russian-NATO Partnership (renewed in May 2002) addresses the issue of combating terrorism, cross-border crime and the proliferation of nuclear weapons [3]. The Black Sea region is an extremely important area of Russia's foreign policy, due to its geopolitical importance and the specificity of Russia's interests during the difficult transition period. The concept of "Neighborhood" was developed to reflect the sudden replacement of the former Soviet republics by sovereign states, generating widespread concerns also in the Black Sea area. There are a number of reasons for Russia's interests in this area. For Russia, the Black Sea has always been a gateway to the world oceans. The region is also a natural bastion for Russia and is marked by a number of potentially destabilizing factors such as the alarming situation in Transcaucasia and North Caucasus, a terrible crisis in the Balkans, the Kurdish issue and the perceived situation around Iran and Iraq. In addition, many Russian regions have maintained strong economic links with the Black Sea area. Russia faces a transformation of the geopolitical environment in the Black Sea region, clearly marked by an increasing number of international actors in the area [5]. The Kremlin considers Georgia and the Caucasus to be exactly what the White House thinks of Central America: its own playground backyard [13]. The Kremlin does not see the growing involvement of the United States in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the area of influence that Russia regards as its own. On this aspect, essentially geopolitical, he attracted the attention and report of the "Strategic Studies Institute". The huge US investments in the two mentioned giant pipelines - pipelines deliberately diverting the very

35 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS turbulent Russian territory from Central Asia-Caucasus, establishing US bases in the region and supporting pro-American governments in the area, lead to counter-Russian reactions [9]. South Caucasus is regarded by Russia as "close neighborhood". So, it is a Russian military zone for intervention, if necessary. What turns the conflict in the Caucasus into a major international crisis, with possible big "surprises" in the future. Moscow has already made known its ambitions to restore a "Russian orbit," composed of states belonging to the "close neighborhood", Ukraine, Belarus and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. The Russian energy giants RAO and the UES - where most of the actions are held by the Government - have begun a major operation to restore this regional supremacy. RAO acquired most of the energy actions in Armenia and Georgia and announced plans to export energy to Turkey and Azerbaijan [9]. Moreover, the overlapping of the NATO-EU border on the Black Sea by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Alliance is explicitly perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its security, for which it feels right to remodel "geostrategic practices specific to the Cold War and abandoned in 1992. The Russian Federation's military manifestations in fact mark the Kremlin's tendency to resume the force policy before the collapse of communism on the one hand and on the other hand a hard exercise image [15]. b) Political-military interest The Black Sea Basin for the Russian Federation is also an interest from a political- military perspective. Thus, analyzing the political and military interests of the Russian Federation in Eastern Europe, they, depending on the geographical position of the states, have their degree of manifestation. Ukraine's independence has deprived Russia of its dominant position in the Black Sea, where Odessa was a vital gateway to trade with the Mediterranean and the world beyond. Ukraine's loss is a loss of geopolitical pivot because it has limited Russia's geostrategic options in the Black Sea basin. By keeping control of Ukraine, Russia could still try to be the leader of a Eurasian empire in which Moscow dominated non-Slavs in the south and south-east of the former USSR. The loss of the Baltic Sea dominant position is repeated in the Black Sea not only because of Ukraine's independence but also because of the independence of the Caucasian states - Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Prior to 1991, the Black Sea was the starting point for Russian naval power in the Mediterranean. Following the Russian-Turkish wars, Russia gained access to the Black Sea in 1783. At the beginning of the twentieth century and during the Second World War, 1939-1945, the Black Sea fleet was one of the main military forces. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the maritime fleet became a patrimony of the CIS, and on April 5, by signing by the President of Ukraine the Decree on "The means of establishing the maritime forces of Ukraine", according to which "the Black Sea maritime fleet passes under the jurisdiction of Ukraine and its basis became the ". Russia's reaction was immediate. Already on April 7th the same year, the President of the Russian Federation issues the decree by which the Black Sea maritime fleet falls under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Over the course of 7 years, there have been disputes to resolve this issue. Only on May 28, 1997, the signing of the Agreement on the Black Sea Fleet Splitting Parameters - "Status and conditions of the Russian Federation's fleet on the territory of Ukraine", "Mutual calculations for the division of the Black Sea Maritime Fleet on the Ukrainian territory". All these agreements have been concluded for a period of 20 years, being automatically extended for a period of 5 years if one of the parties does not require their termination. These agreements allowed the signature of the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation Agreement on 31 May 1997, according to which the maritime fleet will not have nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

36 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

The purpose of finding these forces in the Black Sea aquatic territories is to ensure the safety and exploration of the sea. Thus, until the 2014 events in Ukraine, with the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation, in the Black Sea waters there were 388 units. Basically, 70% of the Russian Black Sea Fleet's infrastructure is in the Crimean area. Also, the maritime fleet also had deployments in Sevastopol (Sevostopolskaia, Iujnaia, Karantinnaia, Kazacia), Feodosia and Nikolaev - for the repair of seagoing vessels. The Director of the Institute of CIS States mentioned that in August 1992, the Black Sea Maritime Fleet consisted of 894 vessels, the maritime aviation had 400 aircraft, the land forces had 28 anti-missile shields, 258 medium-sized tanks, 826 armored vehicles, 457 systems. Aircraft fleet coverage was performed by the FAA (Anti-Air Force) forces. Under those conditions, the fleet was located on the Black Sea coast from the Danube Delta to Batumi. Its foundations were located on a length of 1,750 kilometers, 200 kilometers from the seaside. Also in the defense system were the bases of Bulgaria, Syria, Egypt and other Mediterranean countries, which constituted a ratio of 2.5: 1 in favor of the USSR [26]. Already in 1997, the fleet's arsenal shrinks considerably (by 2014 there is only one submarine), the seaside division is reformed, and the foundations of the cities of Simferopol, Eupatoria, Perevalinoe and Megorya are lost. The 31 tanks (reduced by 8 times), 211 armored vehicles (reduced by 4 times), 54 weapons and mine launchers (reduced by 6 times), and marine aviation has been fully liquidated [26, p. 108]. A part of the air force was transferred to the Novorossiysk region. All these reductions denote the considerable weakening of the Russian Federation's maritime and military power in the Black Sea. In this context, it is also possible to mention the request of the Ukrainian side to submit to it all its naval and hydrographic objects, motivating the responsibility for the security of swimming in the aquatic territories belonging to Ukraine. As a result of the submitted requirements, the procedure for the liquidation and withdrawal of Russian objects is taking place. Claims against Russia also had the Crimean Property Fund, according to which the Black Sea fleet of the Russian Federation illegally uses 96 objects from the Crimea. Another requirement from Ukraine concerns the revision of the cost of renting the bases on which Russian naval forces are deployed. Although there in the agreements is stipulated the amount of 97 million. US $ annually [26, p. 108], Kiev quite often raised this issue, showing a firm position. An issue not less important in the Russian-Ukrainian relations is the delimitation of the maritime borders between the states of the Strait of Kerch and the Azov Sea. Until the collapse of the USSR, the Sea of Azov was largely internal, and, according to the principles of international law, the Kerch Strait was a way of internal waters with a "strait" status. The borders between the Crimean and the Krasnodar regions as part of a state were purely nominal. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union on the international arena, this border becomes interstate, the Strait of Kerch and the island of Tuzla pass under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. Under these circumstances, both the military and civilian ships to pass through the Sea of Azov to Rostov, Taganrog, Eisk, Temriuk, Caucasus Port, have to pay the fee for transiting and operating the straits (annually over 2000 ships). Ukraine, in this case, accounts for 70% of the Azov Sea water area, rich in various species of fish, multiplied by only Russia, with the exploration of the mineral resources on the coast and about 120 gas and oil. Negotiations have been taking place since 1992, but by 2014 the issue remains unresolved, leading to disputes and conflicts [26, pp. 109-111]. The Russian Federation is also limited by NATO and Ukrainian joint military and naval maneuvers, including Turkey's growing role in the Black Sea region. The geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian area are quite visible

37 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS lately, and the events in Kiev on Ukraine's integration policy in the European Union show us once more the tendency to maintain the former union republics in its sphere of influence. In this context, the fight for Crimea, a geostrategic point of the Russian Federation in the Black Sea basin, the involvement of the armed forces in the Donbas, and Lugansk area can be mentioned. Also, the Russians viewed the Orange Revolution of Ukraine in December 2004-January 2005 as an attempt by the US to attract Ukraine into NATO and to prepare the scene for Russia to disintegrate [12, p. 69]. The political-military aspect of the Russian Federation's interests is also present in Armenia. Thus, in 1995 the Russian-Armenian agreement on the location of the Russian Military Base 102 in Armenia was signed. The location of this strategic object serves as a pretext for the Russian Federation to protect Armenia from possible intervention by Turkey and Azerbaijan. On August 20, 2010, Russia and Armenia signed a Protocol (No 15) to Yerevan to extend until 2044 the term of application of the 1995 Inter-State Agreement on the Russian military base no. 102 in Gyumri, a locality in northern Armenia. The protocol was signed by Defense Ministers of the two countries, Seiran Oganian and Anatoli Serdiukov, in the presence of Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Serje Sargsian. The Russian-Armenian agreement on the Gyumri Military Base originally provided that Russian military troops would be stationed in Armenia for 25 years (by 2020). Protocol No. 15, signed on August 20, provides for a term of 49 years, to be calculated from the entry into force of the Interstate Agreement. A new element brought by Protocol no. 15 is the possibility of automatically extending, after 2044, the term of the Russian-Armenian Agreement every five years, "if neither party expresses a contrary will"[2]. Military presence needs to be examined in a complex way with other aspects of foreign policy and state economy. The Military Base in Gyiumri includes motorized subdivisions, tanks and artillery. The force is 3,500 soldiers, including some of the officers transferred to Armenia as a result of the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Batumi and Ahalkalaki (Georgia) in 2007 and currently located in Ghiumri, Erbuni and Yerevan. Thus, in the absence of a full Russian security system, the Gyiumri Base is just one point, which serves Armenia's interests, but which, in the future, can be seen as a potential for strengthening Russia's influence in the region. Russia's pragmatism lies in prolonging its military presence and ensuring its presence in the event of a possible confrontation with the interests of the US, Turkey, and Iran. The Russian Federation also assumed the responsibility to protect the 345-km-long Armenian-Turkish border and the Armenian- Iranian border segment of 45 km [20]. In the case of the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the region, other powers would claim to impose their presence in Armenia. Thus, withdrawing from Armenia, the Russian Federation is aware that the degree of danger to Russia's security would increase considerably, and its economic interests in Azerbaijan would also be limited. Against the backdrop of the events in Ukraine, Armenia seems to be a stable partner of the Russian Federation [21]. During the Soviet period, the region inherited a potentially strong nuclear power and structure. The Caucasus states, especially Georgia, have deposits such as uranium. The Institute of Physics and Technology in Sukhumi can be considered one of the dangerous objects of the USSR. Due to the conflict with Abkhazia it cannot be controlled. Also, the Medzamore nuclear power plant (Armenia) can lead to a similar catastrophe to Chernobyl's impact on Turkey's markets as well. NATO allies also worry that states such as Iran, Iraq and Pakistan may demand exploring this region in the region. Thus, the Caucasus has an important role to play in US, NATO and EU policy. Enforcing a monopoly of power in the region could deprive the US and the European states of income.

38 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

No less interest raises the issue of the fleet of Black Sea coastal states. On 2 April 2001, they established a naval cooperation body called the BLACKSEAFOR Black Sea Naval Joint Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR), aiming at mutual knowledge, confidence building and security in the Black Sea, the actions being focused on humanitarian issues, search-rescue, mines, pollution and so on It can be used as a force in the Black Sea, but on request it can also intervene outside, in accordance with the agreement of the participating states. There is a strong Russian military presence in the Crimea, which has led to certain disagreements between Russia and Ukraine on the status of the Black Sea Fleet and the strategic base of Sevastopol (June 1995 agreement on the Black Sea fleet allocates 81.7% of Russia and 18.7% of Ukraine). According to the military doctrine, the Russian Black Sea fleet will secure the defense of its own coasts, maintain capacity for the execution of the blockade, and be able to carry out a assault maritime long distance operation.

c) control zone of important frozen conflicts In the geopolitical sense, the Black Sea position is the key to its importance for the entire South Caucasus, especially if the conflict between two countries in the region - Armenia and Azerbaijan is also taken into account. Because of its location among nations with systemic risk factors, as well as a very high degree of corruption, it has left the way for the development of this country. Maintaining frozen conflicts is a geopolitical priority for the Russian Federation, as they are very important regional control levers, monitoring or involving armed forces in such conflicts is ensured by concluding bilateral agreements. Overall, Georgia can be considered a geopolitical "bridgehead" for the development of regional businesses and the promotion of economic interests in the area's local markets, the exploitation of mineral resources in the area, the use of labor, etc. [18, pp. 129-130]. From a geostrategic point of view, on the one hand and the other on the Black Sea, the Balkans and especially the South Caucasus are characterized by numerous tensions and conflicts (Chechnya, South Ossetia, , the Carabakh Mountain, Abkhazia etc .), for which international security organizations are working hard to solve [4].

d) Energy interest

The strategic importance of the Black Sea Basin lies also in the fact that one of the two routes crossing the North Caucasus and reaching the Black Sea passes on its territory. The significance of Abkhazia is even greater, because it is on the Black Sea coast, and Sukhumi port is on its territory. On the other hand, Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan and Baku - Soupsa pipelines and the NABUCCO (Baku - Erzerum) gas pipeline have been designed in Georgia. Georgia also has several Black Sea ports (Suhumi, Poti, Soupsa, Koulevi and Batumi), which have become very active in oil exports to the EU. Russia does not control the supply routes, as is the case in Northern Caucasus routes (Bacu - Novorossisk). The importance of this area comes from the considerations of the geopolitical strategies of the great powers disputing the spheres of influence. Construction of the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the Baku - Tbilisi - Erzerum pipeline and the Karas - Akhalkalai pipeline are part of a plan to capitalize Georgian geostrategic position between Europe and Asia. In geo-economic terms, Georgia is located on the shortest route connecting Europe to Asia, meaning that this territorial proximity has been transposed into other projects such as TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe ) - projects in which Western economic functions and interests are visible in the economic development of the state. The energy potential of the Caspian basin requires that these resources be transported through a branched pipeline system, some of which must cross

39 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

Georgian territory. Currently, Georgia has two maritime terminals where Caspian oil is transported to other locations. One is located at Supsa, with a capacity of 200,000 barrels per day, and the other in the Batumi port of the same capacity. Georgia is an essential energy corridor towards the West and, along with other transit states, it has an obligation to guarantee the safety of oil and gas pipelines from the Azeri region of the Caspian Sea. Pipes are of great importance to the European Union because they reduce dependence on Russian supplies and do not cross Russian territory. The Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipeline has a total length of 1768 kilometers, of which 443 kilometers cross Azerbaijan, 249 - Georgia and 1076 kilometers cross Turkey. It crosses numerous mountains that reach up to 2830 meters and intersects 3000 roads, railways, useful lines and 1500 waterways with widths of up to 500 meters (such as the Ceyhan River in Turkey). The Oleo duct occupies an 8-meter corridor and is buried along its entire course at a depth of at least one meter. In parallel with BTC, there is the Southern Caucasus gas pipeline that transports natural gas from Sanganchal Terminal to Erzerum, Turkey. It has a useful life projected for a period of 40 years and, since 2009, it has carried one million barrels (160 000 cubic meters) of oil per day. It has a capacity of 10 million barrels of oil, which will flow through the oil pipeline by 2 meters per second. There are 8 pumping stations along the pipeline (2 in Azerbaijan, 2 in Georgia and 4 in Turkey). The project cost $ 3.9 billion, 70% of the costs were financed by third parties - the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, operating credit agencies in seven countries, and a syndicate of 15 commercial banks [18, p. 128]. Brussels is primarily concerned with the formation of a stable economic and political area that focuses on common European values. The publishes in March 2003 the "Neighborhood of extended Europe. A New Framework for Relations with Neighboring Countries in the East and South", which outlined the basic principles of the future European Neighborhood Policy addressed to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Republic of Moldova, as well as to the Caucasus states. This document outlines the EU's strategy for relations with neighboring countries. The aim of this strategy lies in "creating a prosperous neighborhood and neighborhood friendship - "friends ring", with which the EU has close ties with friendship, peace and cooperation. The Communiqué and the Concept had a negative reaction from the Russian administration. For Moscow, this release signifies the EU's intention to strengthen its economic positions in Russia's sphere of influence in the CIS - the area of priority interests. At the same time, the EU's interest is also the issue of fuels exposed on European markets from Russia, which transit through Ukrainian territory. That is why the EU is not interested in triggering a conflict with Russia because of Ukraine, doesn’t want to worsen the Russian-Ukrainian relations, following which it suffers the energy security system [26, p.75]. The South Caucasus region has an important role, which makes the EU interested in this region. The main thrust of the newly independent South Caucasus states after the collapse of the Soviet Union is the possibility, without the involvement of the Russian Federation, to explore energy resources and to build on the territory of these countries ways of transporting energy sources to the European area of the region South Caucasus and Central Asia. The geopolitical role of the states in the region has grown as a result of Western states' interest in diminishing influence and dependence on the Russian Federation. In the last 13 years the Azerbaijan pipelines in Turkey - "Baku - Supsa" and "Baku - Tbilisi - Geyhan" - and the Azerbaijan pipeline in Turkey, Baku - Tbilisi - Ezrum [23, pp. 59-63]. Georgia is a transit state for international markets, which runs counter to the interests of the Russian Federation, which intends to control the transit of exported fuel to Europe. Georgia also has a tourism potential but has not explored it fully.

40 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

Unlike the interest in former Eastern European states, especially in the preservation of the monopoly over energy resources, the Russian Federation's interest in the EU member states is a pragmatic one, focused on deliveries of petroleum products and natural gas to the area. The decisive factor in the relations between the Russian Federation and the East European countries remains to be the export of natural gas and oil. The Russian Federation exports about 44 million tons of oil to the region, half of which comes from Poland. Starting with 2014, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, there is a more political turn in the relations between the Russian Federation and the Eastern European states (EU member states). The Russian-Ukrainian crisis also affects the trade relations between the Russian Federation and the Eastern European partners. Eastern Europe's trade deficit with the Russian Federation is down to $ 32.5 billion ($ 36.4 billion in 2013). If Russia's imports to Eastern European countries in 2008 were 2, 6 times higher than in 2014, then in 2014 it dropped 2.2 times. Regarding energy resources, the states of the analyzed region depend strongly on energy supplies from Russia's oil and gas supplies, a particularly important vulnerability. Thus, with the support of Western Black Sea states, the West seeks to open up access to energy sources in the Caspian Sea and the near and Middle East, which would in the medium term reduce the dependence of Eastern Europe - the EU in general - on The Russian Federation. The geo-economic and geopolitical location of the Central Caucasus states is not so important to NATO member states but serves as a point of reference for all other interests. The region is the border of the European Common Space, an economic center and a transport corridor. The Caucasus is the bridge between Europe and Asia, an important element in trade relations between the Orient, the US and NATO, and between North and South. It plays a strategic role in reviving the Silk Road, as it is a land-based way of transporting goods and raw materials from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. Due to its economic potential and commercial cooperation, the region can become an important economic center. The civilization of the Caucasus is not European, but cannot be considered as Asiatic either. It is a connecting link of European and Asian (Muslim) civilization. Thus, according to S. Hadington, this type of culture is growing considerably, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, as a bridge between Christianity and Islam. The existence of conflicts in the area is of interest to European security. Throughout history, the South Caucasus has been a buffer zone, or an area of influence of the great powers - Russia, Turkey and Iran - each of which has its own interests. The difference is that the status of the former empires turns into one of regional powers [22, p.15]. That is why the primordial interest of the US and NATO in the area is to keep Russia at the periphery of these interests and not to admit the fortification of Russia's presence in the Caucasus. NATO members watch Turkey's growing role in the region. Thus, by estimating all these interests, it can be mentioned that cooperation with the NATO member states is only a matter of priority interests. The region is an "important periphery". It is a region where it is difficult to reach a consensus [22, p. 22]. Russia can be considered the main US and NATO competitor in this area. Its policy and actions in the region can be qualified as the main factor influencing NATO policy. Both NATO and the Russian Federation, having common interests in the region, are two competitors. In order to increase the influence in the region, both actors use methods of exerting influence, but the methods are different. The US intends to intensify its influence by the method of cooperation and economic principles, hoping to expand the commercial aspect and expand the security in the region. The Russian Federation, for its part, does not allow the independent development of the Caucasus states. Russia continues to invest enormous amounts in order not to lose control in the region.

41 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

Also, for the US, the Black Sea is an important passage in the transfer of energy resources from the Caucasian-Central Asia line to the Western markets. Not only are the foreign powers operating in the region influenced in shaping the energy policies of the countries of this line, but they can also dictate the energy policies of the whole region, the main export channel for oil and natural gas. In this context, the location of the Black Sea at the core of North-West, North-South energy corridors and the manifestation of the region as a considerable alternative to the Middle East reserves, an increasingly unstable area, urged both the US and the EU to establish good relations with the states of the region. The Black Sea is a region considered by Iran as a channel for export of oil and natural gas. Therefore, the active involvement of the US in the region offers the opportunity to manipulate Iranian energy policies. At the same time, geographical proximity can turn Iran into an easy target for aircraft that could take off from bases or aircraft transported to the region. Another key state for the realization of oil and gas transport projects from the Caspian Sea to Europe, bypassing Russia, is Turkey. Ankara is interested in managing transit of oil and gas in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Thus, since 1994, Ankara has become one of the promoters of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project, as an alternative to the "Nordic Route" proposed by Moscow. Competition does not exclude, however, and cooperation within certain limits. Turkey is massively importing natural gas from the Russian Federation, although it is trying to diversify its sources of supply (the Nabucco gas pipeline, between Iran, the Balkans and Central Europe). The Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines offer Turkey an alternative energy source and increase the strategic importance of the state [9]. Thus, more economical transport routes and energy routes (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the trans-Caspian gas pipeline) align the countries of the two groups [4]. Throughout this equation, Romania has an important strategic role in international economic circuits, both for Russian oil transit or the Baltic Sea basin to (for example the Constanta-Belgrade-Trieste project) and quality an exporter of electricity and petroleum products. The uneven economic development of these states has negative effects in turning them into credible economic partners for Western investment. Therefore, in order to strengthen regional cooperation and cooperation, Black Sea states have set up a number of organizations, such as the BSEC, or are members of others - CIS, GUUAM. With the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, the EU has become the Black Sea Neighborhood. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the EU has become an active power in the Black Sea region. Starting from the premise that the EU is bordering the Black Sea, the problems of this region are addressed through the "European Neighborhood Policy" framework. The European Neighborhood Policy seeks to recognize sovereignty and independence, to resolve conflicts, to recognize human rights and democratic foundations and to implement economic reforms. Being located on energy routes, the Black Sea is becoming an important area for the EU. In addition, environmental factors have created a link between the Black Sea and the EU through the membership of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. Thus, the EU has a coastline on the Black Sea, and responsibilities such as coastal protection, water scarcity and the fight against radioactive waste will come to the fore. In addition, the Black Sea oil tankers will have to comply with EU security standards. The EU's relationship with the region is also necessary to control potential immigration from the fragile and relatively underdeveloped countries of this region in Europe [16]. The intensification of the energy dependence of most riparian states, together with the forced delay of the implementation of the Western countries' plans to exploit and transport energy resources, are the premises of a cumulative risk.

42 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

NATO's strategic goal in this part of the globe is determined by the need to strengthen security and stability in the region and to build a model of cooperation. After the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO, the construction of the seat belt around the Balkan conflict zones will be completed, which has considerably increased its importance in this area as a major trade route between East and West, especially from the point of view of transport energy resources. As a result, the unified security region expanded and the Black Sea, which ceased to be isolated, "becoming" a continuation of the link between the Mediterranean, Caspian and the energy resources of the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and the Near East.

3. Conclusion Thus, analyzing the Black Sea Basin region from a geopolitical, geostrategic and geo- economic perspective, it is worth mentioning that the region is the area in which the interests of major powers such as the USA and NATO, the Russian Federation, including the EU. Russia is interested in not accepting the presence of the US and NATO in the area which, according to Moscow, is the area of its exceptional interests. Foreign presence in the area, especially the location of the Western military contingent in Ukraine and Georgia, will weaken and ultimately neutralize Russian influence in these states. The interest of the USA, NATO and the EU lies in constraining and hindering Russia's interests and influence in the region. The intention of the European Union to integrate into its sphere of influence the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine is determined first and foremost by the formation of a stable economic and political zone that would ensure the stability at the eastern borders.

References: [1] A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region A Report by the Commission on the Black Seahttp://aei.pitt.edu/74137/1/2020_Vision_for_the_Black_Sea.pdf [2] Armata rusă rămâne în Armenia până în anul 2044 . În: http://archiva.flux.md/articole/10207/. [3] Bădălan E, Repere ale construcţieiarhitecturii de securitateînarealulMăriiNegre, la http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is18.pdf [4] Black Sea bastion regional profile: the security situation and the region-building opportunities.https://www.isis- bg.org/Research_Studies/Black_Sea_Basin_Regional_Profile/BlackSea1999_10-12.htm [5] Büyükakinci E. Security issues and patterns of cooperation in the Black Sea region. Çelikpala M. Security in the Black Sea Region Policy Report II. Commission of the Blak Sea. p. 23 [6] Chifu I. Gândire strategică. Ed. Institutul de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale. București 2003. p. 334 [7]Detalii despre operaţiune pe site-ul NATO, la http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/ActiveEndeavour/Endeavour/Endeavour.ht msihttp://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html [8] Gerald S. M. Tendințele geopolitice, geoeconomice și geostrategice regionale în zona Mării Negrehttps://www.academia.edu/724470/tendin%c5%a2ele_geopolitice_geoeconomice_% c5%9ei_geostrategice_regionale_%c3%8en_zona_m%c4%82rii_negre_caucaz._geopolitic al_geoeconomical_and_geostrategical_tendencies_in_the_black_sea-caucasus_area [9] Frunzeti. înregiuneaMăriiNegre. Revista de Ştiinţe Militare Editată de Secţia de Ştiinţe Militare a Academiei Oamenilor de Ştiinţă din RomâniaNr. 2 (43) Anul XVI, 2016, p5-11.http://aos.ro/wp-content/anale/R-S-M-Vol-16-Nr2Full.pdf

43 THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS

[10] Frunzeti T., Zodian V. Lumea 2009. Enciclopedie politică și militară (studii strategice și de securitate). Ed. CTEa, București, 2009. p.1104 [11] Frunzeti, E. D. Politici şi interese energetice în spaţiul Mării Caspice, la http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is18.pdf [12] 94. Friedman, G. Următorii 100 de ani. Previziuni pentru secolul XXI. București: Litera, 2009, 213 p. [13] La mer Noire et les intérêtsqu’ellesuscite. https://l-express.ca/la-mer-noire-et-les-interets- quelle-suscite/ [14] Maior G. C., S. Konopliov. Cunoaștere strategică în zona extinsă a Mării Negre. București, 2011. P. 251. [1] Nicolaescu G. Geopolitica securității. Ed. Universitatea Națională de Apărare ,,Carol I, București, 2010. 299 p. [15] Oğan S. The Black Sea: new arena for global competition http://turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/sinan%20ogan.pdf [16] Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea. Building an inclusive, innovative, and integrated regionhttps://www.bstdb.org/publications/Regional_Cooperation_in_the_Black_Sea.pdf [17] Țăranu, M. Geopolitica. Concepte și teorii social-politice. Iași: Instiutul European, 2011. [18] Triantaphyllou D. The ‘security paradoxes’ of the Black Sea region. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2009, 225–241 [19] Военно-техническое сотрудничество между Россией и Арменией. Досье. În : http://tass.ru/info/803760 [20] Караваев, A. Российская база в Армении: прагматизм или долгосрочная стратегия присутствия?În: http://ia-centr.ru/expert/8821/ [21] Kуне, Ф. НАТО и Южный Кавказ. Кавказский институт мира, демократии и развития. Тбилиси, 2003, с. 342. [22] Пашков, И. Деятельность Евросоюза на Южном Кавквзе. În: Мировая Экономика и Международные Отношения, № 5, 2009. [23] Работяжев, Н. Украина между Россией и Западом: опыт геополитического анализа. În: Мировая Экономика и Междунородные Отношения, № 9, 2008. [24] Федеральный закон от 28.12.2010 № 390-ФЗ (ред. от 05.10.2015) "О безопасности". În:http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_108546/. [25] Эксперт: Расширение НАТО на восток возникло из-за ошибки Горбачева. În:http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1010280.html

44 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

(TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

Muhammad Amir CHAUDHARY

Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan

Abstract: The age of information necessitates the assimilation of information at a very fast pace. Threat escalation and aggravation of situation is fast as tele and web based media unfolds the situations and molds the opinion more quickly than the press conferences of institutions. Defense organizations are no exceptions and are heavily being affected in the age of information overflow. Not only in contingencies and asymmetric warfare but combat ready status in peacetime difficult to be reached overnight. It is a systematic process of moving from conventional to modern data flow organization. Alone, database banks are of less use until converted into meaningful information. As the stocks and entitlement volume starts to increase, so becomes difficult the rational and judicious consumption along with adherence to adequate reserves level for optimum war potential. Defense Resource planning and accountability is a responsible regime as failures in conflicts have been often attributed in history for inadequacy of the rolling stock and failed logistic supply chains. The real time stock taking of defense resources can be achieved by spatial visualization of database converted into summary tables and graphical displays. As the consumption record is frequently updated in Enterprise Resource Management (ERP) web portals, the displayed status converted into Dashboards depicts accurate live picture of support commodities and war fighting potential. It also gives clues for economic consumption, prevent wastage and order replenishments in time considering the channels of supplies and shipment time periods. The Dashboards are evolved by the keen interest of end users and offer opportunity for executives and managers for quick glance at performance and evaluate the situation. Decision making matrices facilitate consensus. These ideas were crystallized during the presentations by the faculty and guest lecturers visiting DRESMARA. Lastly, the dividend that cannot be ignored is that realistic and accurate forecast is given for financial requirement projection. This results in austerity and diversion of resources for capability building. The Micro to Macro approach is essential to link field level management with strategic designs of higher command and control institutions. This paper is written based upon action research. Elaborate graphics are incorporated for on spot clarity rather than to rely solely at abundance of verbatim.

Key words: Key Performance Indicators (KPIs); e-Dashboard, Defense Resources, Goals / Objectives; Stock Management; ERP Worksheets; Interoperability; Graphical Display; Evaluation;

1. Introduction Every organization is obliged for performance evaluation and remains accountable for principal amount spent as input to meet its Vision and Mission. The accomplishment of related goals and objectives can be measured by performance parameters. These can be tangible output figures or non-tangible fields that need indexing and conversion into graphs that indirectly give progress state.

2. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): An Overview To have effective evaluation of organizational output, structured analysis of performance parameters is required. This demands that performance indicators should be determined with respect to their influence and criticality. This leads to their categorization

45 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES from generic to key performance indicators (KPIs). Their major utilization is to evaluate and steer the organization.

2.1 Definition of KPIs There are many definitions of KPIs. In essence, “KPIs are a measurable value that reports progress against a result” [1]. At Oxford Dictionary, it is that in Business “A quantifiable measure used to evaluate the success of an organization, employee, etc. in meeting objectives for performance” [2].

2.2 Classification of KPIs -- Action Oriented & Informative The popular contemporary approaches on KPIs classifies them in certain categories. These are mostly:

2.3 Action Oriented KPIs To trigger an organizational level response upon identified areas of improvement and capacity building. These help to align short & long term goals with strategic intention of leaders.

2.4 Informative KPIs Many fields augment the secondary and tertiary information needed to execute the action oriented KPIs. Time, Cost, Quantity and Revenue are often regarded as important most KPIs in projects. Moreover, Critical Success Factors (CSF), Key Risk Indicators (KRI) are monitored by the organization to identify potential risks and timely decision making. Trade-offs and Balanced Score Chart are also used for realistic projection of data for meaningful analysis. The various perspectives at hand can be viewed from the lenses of financial, customer, internal business and future growth perspectives. The emphasis is laid that the performance indicator consistently reflect the level of achievement for goals and objectives.

2.5 Action Research on KPIs: Control of Organization Various factors emphasize importance and use of KPIs through innovative means to increase organizational input. Being a military organization, it requires a control system for Management of its Defence Resources and optimization through collective Decision Making. This may require systematic implementation to overcome resistance to organizational change and structure.

2.6 The Aim of Final Paper The evolved Aim of the Action Research Paper comes out to be “To understand the Importance and Use of Performance Indicators in Evaluation of a Defense Organization’s Resource Planning. Moreover, to rationalize consumptions, inventory management, routine tasks achievement and stock optimization for operations via e-Dashboard of an Enterprise Resource Planner [ERP]”.

2.7 KPIs Based on Goals and Objectives The popular thumb rule for conversion of organizational Objectives into Goals was given a user friendly perspective by Peter Drucker, an Austrian borne American who emphasized Management by Objectives [MBO] approach. His ideas were refined and published by George T Doran in 1981 [3]. The MBO specifies the objectives are to be

46 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES achieved by the management in a participative style through approaches of Top Down or Bottom up approaches. In the later one, the objectives are laid by the involvement of lower tiers through consensus of middle and top management members. Once the goals of the individuals are aligned by the organizations, workers strive hard to reach the commonly perceived end.

2.8 KPIs Based on Goals should be S.M.A.R.T KPIs in the same sense are to be developed and shared with organizational members for coherence. The Peter Drucker’s ideas were presented in his book published by Bouge Robert in 2018 [4]. The outlook of S.M.A.R.T Goals is equally applicable to selection of Key Performance Indicators as reflected below: S – Specific [KPIs should identify the progress of a specific field] M – Measurable [KPIs should be quantifiable] A – Assignable [KPIs should relate to somebody responsible for output] R – Realistic [KPIs should indicate a field for re achievable progress] 2.9 KPIs to Dashboard Flowchart: Leading from Known to Unknown With pre-knowledge of KPI’s nature and purpose, the issue is brought for their use and meaningful outcome to review organizational input and evaluate critical aspects for decision making. The block building approach involves the leading concepts, the pre- requisites, sample e-Dashboard templates and tapping of ERP data into graphs. The end results are presented in accurate output assessment. This in turn provides realistic feedback for yearly fiscal planning to link organizational goals with strategic plans of higher formations.

2.10 Utilization of Enterprise Resource Planner [ERP] for a Dashboard Accurate data process and trend formulation helps in short term and long term performance evaluation for future planning for financial needs. Projection of a sample Dashboard is depicted:

Fig 1 : Sample e Dashboard Template [ 5]

2.11 The End Goals: KPIs and e-Dashboard with a Single Entry Window

The process of The Enterprise Resource Planner (ERP) give access to data sheets which are bread and butter of respective work section/station, appointment holder or

47 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES project officer. The assimilation of needful information is accomplished through e- Dashboard which displays tapping of processed essential fields. Interoperability of ERPs is achieved by import worksheets.

Fig 2. Cyclic Function for KPIs evolution and Executive Summary Sample Template [6]

Such a graphical display offers instant clues for brain storming by executive office holders and managers. Access to instant changes and live real time performance also helps to evaluate Quantified parameters. It also helps to ascertain practices and deviation from defined standards of customer care, quality assurance, maintenance ethics or transparency levels. Another higher level in customer service standards is reached by interface of CCTV frames with graphical comparison of public / end user opinion polls.

3. Defense Resources Management through e-Dashboard The archives of Enterprise Resources data fields can be linked to produce a graphical view of monthly consumption trends. Further links of graph bars can lead to worksheets depicting date wise consumption and identify surges in consumption data. This helps to establish reorder points and to accomplish replenishment of stock. The data in ERPs is painstaking fed by every section after the advent of computers and is centrally available through Intranet networks.

3.1 POL Management by KPIs and e-Dashboard During action research linked with defense resources consumption and replenishment, the POL emerges as an important area for lifeline of operations. Similarly, POL Tanks can be linked with a graphical view for capacity versus holding stock percentage. Essentially, all such custom search models can be incorporated with time function period calendar.

48 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

Fig 3. Cyclic Function for KPIs evolution and Executive Summary Sample Template [ 7]

3.2 Custom Search: Identification of Surge Points The mechanism helps to identify surge points in consumption. Considering the supply chain, the replenishment delays can be mitigated with adequate storage to meet the war time reserve as described in contingency planning. Timely stock can be built with minimum shuttles. This would curtail duplication of efforts and help to avoid any interruption in operations and critical stage of execution of plans. It is to be noted that unusual and prolonged storage can result in chemical property changes thus causing faulty engine operations during flight.

Fig 4. Localization of Surge point in Consumption and ready Link for Storage efficiency

49 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

3.3 Aircraft Spares Inventory Management and Replenishment A lot of advancement has taken place in this field whereby electronic Bar, QR coding and RFID Inventory count management has developed. [8] This of course results in instantaneous update of the spares inventory which was a laborious and time consuming job in the past. Consequently, fast moving and show stopper items are timely ordered.

Fig 5. Update of A/C Spares inventory & Worksheets by RFID drones in Log Depots [9]

3.4 Hospital Workloads / HR Disease Trends & Medicine Consumptions Similarly, the monthly trends of Out-door and In-door patients can be plotted. The seasonal hypes in workloads suggests study of Diseases Trend. This can be targeted with Preventive Health Campaigns in order to maximize the availability of work force and retain organizational performance. Consequently, nutritionists can target patient clientele instead of medicine therapy.

Consumption of medicines trends can be focused to identify potential factors in drop of immunity and in order to minimize drug dependency. This rules out the possibility of abnormal issue or retention of old medicine stock by entitled patients in a military organization. End results are reduction in med boards, austerity and HR health. However, access to such this data is to be limited for consultation by concerned hospital management and executive committee only.

50 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

Fig 6. Patient Workload & Monthly trends/ Plot of Diseases & Top Medicine Consumers

3.5 Crisis Management – Blood Donation Recall Similarly, the Blood Group data and donation record with available frozen stock can be databased and linked with portals of e-Dashboard. This aspect becomes critical in times of shock and awe and scale of contingency or mass casualties.

The important feature of such templates is expand and squeeze feature for search criteria with soft buttons to clutter or de-clutter the visible screen and auto-sum calculation. Over here, highlighting any number and clicking generates the list of available donors of a particular blood group and as per medically restricted matrix for transfusion eligibility.

Fig. 7. Matrix for Blood Groups and available Donors Spread in various Units [10]

3.6 Military Transport Fleet Management The above explained template pattern is also helpful for management of a vast fleet of Military Transport. Once maintained in hard format, the job is cumbersome due to frequent shifting of inventory amongst the user sections unless restriction on shifting is imposed due to specific role.

51 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

Fig. 8. Matrix for Inventory of Various Category Mil Transport Types and Age

3.7 Management of Sustainability Funds: Consumption Trends/Bills Payment The yearly allocation funds for sustenance and support need to be judiciously utilized as per defined quarterly milestones. Likewise, expenditures are done on the repair and maintenance of inventory, machines and military transport. These levels of allocation, commitments, expenditures and imbursement state of payments can be tracked with graphical view hyper linked with deep level custom search. Ultimately, the Life Cycle Cost for service life of held assets is reduced.

Fig 9. Stacked Graph Bars Depicting Funds Expenditure, Commitment & Bills Payment

52 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

3.8 Ration Stock Accountability – DOS Management The daily feed of data in respective portals of existing Ration Management data sheets can be configured to generate template for dashboard. Instant and real time stock reduction cues help to order replenishment and prevention of perishable stock. In peacetime and contingencies, maintenance of Days of supply (DOS) [11] is extreme important and delicate managerial affair.

Fig 10. Stacked Graph Bars Depicting Funds Expenditure, Commitment & Bills Payment

3.9 Superior Management – Hi-End Gadgets for Accountability & Transparency The high end gadgetry such as QR/Bar Code, RFID readers for automated tools / inventory management systems ensure accountability of traffic together with Electronic Check Posts in designated areas. Moreover, where customer services are involved; voice and screen capture of desktop PCs can be compared with background CCTV to retain circumstantial evidences. Moreover, the customers Bar-coded transactional slips front side reconciles the data at a rescan for POS deposits and financial reconciliation. Balance sheets are updated instantly with graphs.

Fig 11. Elect Cash Machines, RFID / QR / Bar code readers at POS outlets / Check posts

53 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

3.10 Customer Feedback on Care & Satisfaction / Service Provider Evaluation Transactional slips can have rating codes at the back to instantly provide the feedback of the end users. Above explained set-up helps to achieve very high levels of customer satisfaction as per latest ISO standards. Additionally, the net public rating can be assigned a modest value say 60% weightage in total annual performance evaluation of an individual. Once culturally accepted with the passage of time, setup result in equilibrium in customer & service provider’s relationship.

Fig 12: Instant Feedback on Ratings by Scan of Backside QR codes of Transactional slips [12]

3.11 Matrix for Consensus in Collective Decision Making The organizational Decision Making Matrix can also be automated. This way, a non-structured function can be brought to a structured and tangible format within a Dashboard.

3.12 Leading from Micro to Macro — Financial Management for Strategic Goals Accurate data process and trend formulation helps in short term performance evaluation to long term future resource planning and financing. Verification of yearly financial need realistic inputs from the field units. Sound financial plans thus minimize the chances of unusual surrender of allocations or extraordinary shortfalls to meet yearly requirements. The available surplus reserve with higher institutions can be committed at required places. Mechanism thus evolved serves for linking organizational performance with national strategic goals. In contingency scenario, real time information on defense resources and committal of reserves remains critical for operational goals.

3.13 Who Can Assist in e Dashboard Preparation and KPIs Optimization? Chief Information Officer (CIO) is kept directly under Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the organization due to the importance and use of Key performance indicators and their projection for review in meetings. Statistics expert and Economist can be used for structural format, templates preparation and to rationally decide the limiting bars based upon the empirical formulas.The reference Bars need periodic review for changing parameters in condition of un-certainty to have variety of optimistic and pessimistic evaluations for decision making.

54 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

3.14 Expectations from Executives & Managers: Age of Information Overload Statistical understanding has evolved after the IT advent in defense organizations. The knowhow of Executives and Mangers has come a long way from worksheets provided by software like Lotus Series. Further refinement is provided by latest flexibility offered of MS Excel etc and available peripheral hardware interface. Executives and Mid-Level managers need to be conversant with the available features like Pivot Charts and hone their skills for imaginative orientation of display of their choice of assimilation at a glance. To accomplish such Dashboard views and evolve further is the job of IT engineers. However, it is seen that real difference is created by the interest of the end user. Quick analysis of organizational performance, contemporary info-graphics at open source media like Google Analytics are becoming hobby tools

4 Conclusion Accurate data process and trend formulation have become necessary traits in the age of digital competition. Ability to do it accurately and faster than the adversary is the key to survival in combat environment. The analytical leverage offered by such features needs to be harnessed by military supervisors for efficient management of Defense Resources. It is essential to keep the field formations in action ready state with real time access to data in the age of information overflow. The differential edge requires conversion of conventional hard format data offices to digital archiving Analysis Cells. The Field supervisors and executives need to be excelling in imaginative skills to grasp logically prepared tables and graphical perspectives. User friendly Dashboard portals and templates are easy to be formulated, provided active participation takes place by the end user. Constant evolution can result is quick assessment of organizational key performance indicators (KPIs). This can help to timely steer the organization for austerity and efficiency at the same time. Lateral dividends are linked with accurate feedback for large scale financial projection and rationale commitment or diversion of financial resources. The job of Statistical Experts and Economists is to provide reference bars and data iteration for volatile and non-definite areas of performance. This has also immense potential to reduce fog and friction in operational theaters and areas of active engagement / battle zones.

Excluding Title, Index, Abstract & References

55 (TIMES NEW ROMAN 14) KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES

References:

[1] Allan Wille. Klipfolio co-founder in article “What is a KPI: Definition, Examples and Best Practices” at klipfolio.com). [2] oxfordictionaries.com https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/key_performance_indicator [3] Doran, G. T. (1981). "There's a S.M.A.R.T. way to write management's goals and objectives". Management Review. 70 (11): 35–36. [4] Bogue, Robert. "Use S.M.A.R.T. goals to launch management by objectives plan". Tech Republic. Retrieved 10 February 2018 [5] https://www.flock-associates.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/kpi.png, : Image used

[6] www.flock-associates.com/marketing-procurement/best-kpis- practice/attachment/kpi/ [7] Diagrams depicting yearly POL consumption data thru graph bars & custom time period search for Tank storages [8] http://air-management-solutions.fr/spm_en.htm [Aircraft Logistic Spares Datasheet]

[9] AROX smart Tech : Drone Cycle Counting www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfKoDuoLW2o [10] www.disabled-world.com/calculators-charts/blood-chart.php : Table Depicting Blood Gp [11] Page 15 of NATO Supply Standards concerning Ration for Days of Supply (DOS) https://eportal.nspa.nato.int/eProcurement/DownloadFile.aspx?id=%2Fuploadpublicfolder %2 FeProcurementRFPAttachments%2FPIO16017_RFP%5C08.+PIO16017+- +NATO+Standard+-+AMedP-1.11.pdf [12] https://www.indiamart.com/proddetail/toshiba-laser-barcode-scanner- 13175549088.html e-Book Consulted [14] “Key Performance Indicators for Dummies” by Bernard Marr Founder & CEO Advance Performance Institution published 2015 https://books.google.ro/books?id=yF06BAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:Uf 38AdigPXcC&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiXl- DI7afiAhVslYsKHebRBzkQ6AEICTAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

56 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS

Marin-Marian COMAN

“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu

Abstract: Critical infrastructures (CIs) are the specific physical, non-physical, and cyber resources or assets and systems that provide reliable essential services, which are indispensable for day-by-day life of the population, social wellbeing, and economy. The broad spread and access to existing and new technologies, gadgets or tools based on information and communication technology (ICT) offer to modern societies an important variety of services necessary for current life of citizens and for controlling the well functioning of critical infrastructure sectors. The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic view related to the vulnerability issues of critical infrastructure functioning in a continuous changing cyber environment from the perspective of emerging cyber threats. During cyber attacks, the normal running of critical infrastructures is affected and the critical infrastructure security programs have to identify and mitigate the cyber threats in order to counter them. The critical infrastructure interdependencies are taking also into account for having a relevant analysis and a broad picture of real effects of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures.

Key words: critical infrastructure protection, vulnerability, cyber threats, cyber security

1. Introduction Nowadays, population's usual life is linked to many services that enable more and more their wellbeing. The delivering of these services in a continuous and reliable manner should be one of the overarching considerations when we bring into discussion actual globalization and its effects on countries' economy, citizens' life and communities all over the world. Usually, the critical infrastructures, which are facilities or assets that afford the emerging and sustainable development of the economic environment of every country, provide all those necessary essential services to population. The essential services are related to infrastructure sectors, such as transportation system, commercial sector, communications, information technology, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, healthcare and public health, chemical and nuclear sectors, waste system, and water and wastewater systems. If the functioning of CIs would be disrupted or stopped, the population's usual life would be dramatically affected. In this respect, the critical infrastructure protection remains a big concern for all government institutions that are involved in the securing and protecting these special facilities. The technological advance of society influences every person’s life in some way or another and helps businesses and organizations saving time and cost of production in order to gain competitive advantage. Today, the industrial sectors are rely more and more on digital technology that creates an emerging technological environment which evolves in a fastest manner in every domain of activities. The advancement of technology and mainly digital technologies make the world a better place as time progresses. Today, the essential digital services, which were not possible in the past due to the lack of specific technologies, support people and contribute to the citizens’ wellbeing. The internet, digital

57 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS mail, social media, electronic banking transactions, and e-commerce are just few examples of digital services that are used all over the world in an intense manner by many citizens. In this way, the world of businesses and countries' economies are evolving by having no any physical boundaries among digital transactions and communication (data and big data). Digital technologies provide huge advantages and essential services to population but, in the same time, by using them could be a great challenge for all private or government institutions in securing and providing protection to computer networks and electronic devices that are connected through internet technologies. Due to the fact that the cyber environment has no boundaries and not so many regulations, when operating within cyberspace almost everyone (citizens, private and public organizations, or government institutions) could be unprotected and unsecured at a certain time. As a result, cyber security has never been more critical than nowadays. In the same manner, the critical infrastructures viewed as a special systems of systems, which are operating using cyber environment and run by public or private organizations for offering essential services to population, need maximum supervision, physical protection, and cyber security due to their vulnerability to certain cyber threats. From this perspective, risk assessments and analysis are mandatory in order to mitigate and remediate all critical infrastructure cyber vulnerabilities that could appear when operating in the cyber environment.

2. Critical infrastructure and the cyber environment perspective Critical infrastructure is foundational for the prosperity and quality of life in any society. By definition, its destruction or disruption would cause severe damage and possibly loss of life. [1] In a big picture, CIs are those systems, which involve elements that are vital to the normal operations of the human society. There are many approaches to define a CI, but these definitions slightly vary from one country to another or supranational entities, such as European Union: - United States: "Critical infrastructure describes the physical and cyber systems and assets that are so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our physical or economic security or public health or safety. The nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American society." [2] - European Union: "An asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions." [3] - NATO: "Critical Infrastructure: Physical or virtual systems and assets under the jurisdiction of a State that are so vital that their incapacitation or destruction may debilitate a State’s security, economy, public health or safety, or the environment." [4] Based on each country economic development level and own policy related to identification and classification of infrastructures as being critical, the list of critical infrastructure sectors comprises a different total number of CIs specific to every country. All critical infrastructures can be vulnerable to different threats that affect their normal functioning and the associated sort of risks can be related to natural hazards or man-made intentional or unintentional acts. As a result, every country have to issue own national strategy and a plan applied for critical infrastructure protection by taking into account the essential services provided to population, official international endorsed documents and assigned government institutions that are tasked to conduct specific activities during a certain intervention when an attack to a critical infrastructure occurs. Furthermore, the resilience of critical infrastructures is one of the paramount features that is related to their

58 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS qualities to reduce vulnerabilities, minimize the consequences of threats, accelerate response and recovery, and facilitates adaptation to a disruptive event. [5] Besides the great commercial and economic advantages of making use of information and communications technology (ICT) through automation and digitalization in all industrial sectors and critical infrastructures, the wide spread and use of ICT also raises a lot of security vulnerabilities and emerging risks that could be easily exploited by all kind of attackers. The nowadays set up of cyber environment, the emerging technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) or blockchain technology are used for operating the majority of digital resources and technical facilities, with implications in manning the critical infrastructures. From this perspective, with an increase in cyber threats, the special cyber security measures are paramount conditions for any government institution that is involved in securing and protecting a certain critical infrastructure. In the paperwork 'How to create a secure cyber environment', Don Hall has asserted, "the government entities are experiencing more cyber crime than ever before, with agencies twice as likely to experience a data breach than non-U.S. government organizations, according to the 2018 Thales Data Threat Report. The vast quantity of personal and confidential data that is gathered and stored by government makes it a prime target for cybercriminals, which both explains and exacerbates the issue." [6] Taking in considerations all the above, the cyber resilience of critical infrastructures, viewed as an ability to resist, recover and evolve to improve own capabilities, when faced a certain cyber attack by making use of any of the information and communication technologies, must be appropriate and to function in a timely manner. Public and private sector security partners have an enduring interest in assuring the availability of the infrastructure and promoting its resilience. The Information Technology (IT) Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) represents an unprecedented partnership and collaboration between the IT public and private sectors to address the complex challenges of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection. [7] At the European Union level, the legal framework and regulations concerning cyber security and specific security agencies were set up. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) was already established as being in charge with policies and strategies concerning cyber security domain. In 2013, the EU Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) was published detailing a series of actions to enhance the cyber resilience of IT systems, reducing cybercrime and strengthening the EU international cyber security policy and cyber defense. Then, the NIS Directive (Directive concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union) as first piece of EU-wide legislation on cyber security that provides legal measures to boost the overall level of cyber security in the EU, was published in 2016. [8] The objective of the Directive is to achieve a high common level of security of network and information systems within the EU, by means of improved cyber security capabilities at national level, increased EU-level cooperation and risk management, incident reporting obligations for operators of essential services and digital service providers. The NIS Directive is a major milestone towards building cyber security resilience on the European level. [9] Based on NIS Directive the "security and notification requirements should apply to operators of essential services and to digital service providers to promote a culture of risk management and ensure that the most serious incidents are reported." It is noticeable that the critical infrastructure operators were defined in the EU NIS Directive as operators of essential services meaning a public or private entities and comprising following type of services: energy (electricity, oil, gas), transport (air transport, rail transport, water transport, road transport), banking, financial market infrastructures, health sector, drinking water supply and distribution, and digital infrastructure. Related to digital service

59 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS providers, the NIS Directive also takes into account in the Annex III the following service types: online marketplace, online search engine, and cloud computing service.

3. Digital transformation through artificial intelligence Population standard of living has increased nowadays by owing to the application of technology, in special the application of digital technology, which led to what it is called today - the digital transformation (DX). In a broad understanding, the digital transformation is related to integration of digital technology into all areas of business and industry sectors by changing the ways in how the economic activities are conducted. Even cultural interdependencies are boosted by digital technologies, social media as a service being a great example in this respect. The Agile Elephant Company defines DX as a "process of shifting your organization from a legacy approach to new ways of working and thinking using digital, social, mobile and emerging technologies. It involves a change in leadership, different thinking, the encouragement of innovation and new business models, incorporating digitization of assets and an increased use of technology to improve the experience of your organization's employees, customers, suppliers, partners and stakeholders". [10] At the end of 2018, the Zymr Company considered the following digital technology trends as being relevant and important to digital transformation for the year 2019: cloud computing, internet of things (IoT), big data, Artificial Intelligence (AI), blockchain technology, 5G, e-commerce, enterprise resource planning (ERP) solutions. The digital technology has boosted all industry sectors that result in very profitable businesses, which are growing very fast, resulting in creation of more employment opportunities for citizens all over the world. The globalization effects allow stakeholders and customers to stay connected through the means of digital technologies. Furthermore, in almost every industry sector the digital technology adoption plays a major role in managing the informational flux among the stakeholders and customers. Implementation of digital technology into day-by-day life of the people influences our perception related to interaction human-computer type. AI plays a huge role in this perception. AI has the power to enhance customer service solutions such as messaging platforms, chatbots, and video for quick and error free customer support. AI has also a significant role in digital transformation potential, being a key element and a great enabler in digital businesses with an enormous potential for transforming everything around, from business operations to potential customers. AI changes the business models by helping to develop and advance in many industry sectors. There are many applications of using AI such as cognitive applications (Neural network, genetic algorithms, intelligent agents, fuzzy logic, learning and expert systems), robotics applications (visual perception, locomotion, navigation, and object detection), and natural interface applications (speech recognition, virtual reality/VR, image analysis, natural language processing, health monitoring).

Fig.1 AI applications [11]

60 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS

AI is already immersed into our life through the means of smart devices that are part of the internet of things (IoT). A good example of AI implementation is the use of smart phones by means of online applications and services for finding the fastest itinerary when we travel into a city or when we have to predict the best time to travel to a certain country. IoT and AI are currently the buzzwords for every industry. IoT has improved the quality of life with its smart devices. AI has already proved its importance in all major business sectors like healthcare, education, automotive, agriculture, etc., to provide qualitative service. With the positive and overwhelming response to AI, researches are in progress to integrate it with IoT, to make it easier in decision making for some devices (smart home appliances, self-driving cars, etc) connected in IoT. [12]

4. Critical infrastructure - cyber threats and vulnerabilities Besides reliable essential services provided to citizens, public or government sectors, the critical infrastructures have become also an integral part of cyber environment and they play a vital role in supporting many of our daily activities such as travel, water and power usage, telecommunications, financial banking transactions, and so on. From this perspective, the protection of critical infrastructures today is one of the most important areas of cyber security domain. The damage or destruction of critical infrastructures by natural disasters, terrorism and criminal activities accomplished with the use of physical means or by using the cyberspace as a way to launch a cyber attack may have negative consequences for the national security of any country and for the wellbeing of its citizens. The process of globalization has led to the emergence of regionally and globally distributed critical infrastructure networks, which are vulnerable to cascading disruptions and other specific phenomena. [13] The physical and virtual interconnections through networking among the critical infrastructures that are accomplished through the means of information and communication technology (computer networks working through WAN or internet environment) represent a way to manage the proper functioning of critical infrastructure systems and subsystems. At the same time, all these interconnections between critical infrastructures could imply real weaknesses and vulnerabilities from the perspective of cyber attacks resulting in a domino effect among critical infrastructure sectors.

Fig.2 An interconnections’ model of CI sectors (ENISA) [14]

61 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS

As far as the digital technology is evolving, from the cyber security perspective, a comprehensive threat and vulnerability assessments are essential in order to secure the critical infrastructure sectors. Cyber threats on critical infrastructures differ from physical threats in nature by using information and communication technology (computers or other digital devices and means) in order to exploit all vulnerabilities of computer networks that are part of a certain critical infrastructure control system. Vulnerabilities are weak points and security holes that may cause threats, and which are specific to an asset. Vulnerabilities do not cause any damage by themselves, but they may help threats to occur or cause damage. [15]

Fig.3 The relation between threats, vulnerabilities and risks [15]

Cyber-physical systems as part of critical infrastructure comprise and integrate ICT parts and physical elements in order to improve usability, reliability, efficiency of the processes, etc. The Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are part of operating critical infrastructures and are widely used in Industrial and Power sectors such as energy, water, manufacturing and pharmaceuticals. Usually, they include Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), and Distributed Control Systems (DCS). Besides an advantage related to critical infrastructure system operating, those kind of controlling elements introduce also a wide spectrum of cyber risks and an increase in vulnerabilities that are related to cyber attacks. Cyber security is currently one of the main concerns for SCADA and ICS operators. In fact, SCADA systems collect the data and monitor the automation processes, which are visualized to the operators of the system via human-to-machine interfaces. [16]

Fig.4 A general architecture of a SCADA network based on remote substations [17]

62 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS

The ICS are vulnerable to cyber attacks from inside and outside the control system network based on their associated communications and operations' types. In fact, the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures are increasing due to implementation of ordinary ICT which employs open digital technologies, universal operating systems (OS), or standardized specifications that are the subject to security risks similar to usual information and networking systems. For better understanding of ICT implementation on the industrial control systems that belong to certain critical infrastructures, on US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) website is portrayed and described a large-scale production system that utilize SCADA or DCS configuration with many computers, controllers and network communication components.(fig. 5)

Fig.5 Typical two-firewall network architecture [18]

An attacker who wishes to assume control of a control system is faced with three challenges: gain access to the control system LAN; through discovery, gain understanding of the process; gain control of the process. [18] All cyber attacks that affect the critical infrastructures, concern the critical infrastructures' operators, government institutions or private companies and service providers. They can be inflicted by the cybercriminals that are seeking financial gain or by some sort of hackers (black hats) that are operating under a certain state actors umbrella. In the year 2010, a well-known cyber attack was conducted in Iran. A malware named Stuxnet, which was susceptible of targeting SCADA systems, in special the programmable logic controllers (PLCs), was employed to Natanz uranium enrichment facility for destroying numerous centrifuges by causing them to burn themselves out. In fact, the first known successful cyber attack on a critical infrastructure system was conducted on December 2015 in Ukraine by using a malware called BlackEnergy3. Hackers were able to successfully compromise information systems of three energy distribution companies in Ukraine and temporarily disrupt electricity supply to the end consumers. Most affected were consumers of «Prykarpattyaoblenergo» (servicing Ivano- Frankivsk Oblast): 30 substations were switched off, and about 230 thousand people were left without electricity for a period from 1 to 6 hours. At the same time consumers of two other energy distribution companies, «Chernivtsioblenergo» (servicing Chernivtsi Oblast) and «Kyivoblenergo» (servicing Kyiv Oblast) were also affected by a cyber attack, but at a smaller scale. [19] The attackers demonstrated a variety of capabilities, including spear phishing emails, variants of the BlackEnergy 3 malware, and the manipulation of Microsoft Office documents that contained the malware to gain a foothold into the Information Technology (IT) networks of the electricity companies. They demonstrated the capability to gain a foothold and harvest credentials and information to gain access to the Industrial Control System (ICS) network. [20]

63 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS

5. Conclusions Today, digital transformation is a reality of our modern society and it evolves very fast producing effects in all activity sectors. The information and communication technology, artificial intelligence or internet of things offer to all citizens, industrial sectors, and private or government institutions great opportunities by delivering essential services but in the same time, they could offer many possibilities to cybercriminals for launching cyber attacks within cyberspace. The reliability on essential services provided by critical infrastructures, continuous operations, safety and security, maintenance and their protection represent national priorities for many countries around the world. The cyber attack on Ukraine power grid that disrupted the energy system has proved the real impact of cyber environment for proper functioning of all critical infrastructures that could be or not interconnected each other. The disruption or shutting down of a certain critical infrastructure due to a cyber attack could have a domino effect leading to a failure of the associated essential services that are necessary for population wellbeing, for proper operating of the industrial sectors and government institutions, or could cause the stopping of business activities among private institutions. From this perspective, there is a need and a paramount condition to complete a cyber vulnerability assessment and analyses of all possible scenarios that imply the cyber attacks' effects for discovering of the patterns, ways and means used by cybercriminals in order to plan and assure real cyber security measures for a smooth and continuous functioning of all critical infrastructures.

References: [1] Olga Bucovetchi, Alexandru Georgescu, Dorel Badea, and Radu D. Stanciu, Agent- Based Modeling (ABM): Support for Emphasizing the Air Transport Infrastructure Dependence of Space Systems, Sustainability-Open Access Journal, 2019, pg. 1, available online: https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability (accessed on 26 September 2019) [2] Critical Infrastructure Security, available online: https://www.dhs.gov/topic/critical- infrastructure-security (accessed on 26 September 2019) [3] Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF (accessed on 27 September 2019) [4] Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, available online: http://csef.ru/media/articles/3990/3990.pdf or https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn- manual/ (accessed on 28 September 2019) [5] David Rehak, Pavel Senovsky, and Simona Slivkova, Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Elements and Its Main Factors, Systems-Open Access Journal 2018, available online: https://www.mdpi.com/journal/systems (accessed on 28 September 2019) [6] Don Hall, How to create a secure cyber environment, Systems-Open Access Journal 2018, available online: https://gcn.com/articles/2018/07/19/secure-agency- environment.aspx (accessed on 29 September 2019) [7] Information Technology, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Homeland Security, 2007, available online: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=474327 (accessed on 03 October 2019) [8] Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, EUR-Lex, 2016, available online: https://eur- lex.europa.eu/legal-

64 THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TO C (accessed on 30 September 2019) [9] About the CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Team) Network, available online: https://csirtsnetwork.eu/ (accessed on 30 September 2019) [10] David Terrar, What is Digital Transformation?, 2015, available online: http://www.theagileelephant.com/what-is-digital-transformation/ (accessed on 01 October 2019) [11] Artificial intelligence applications, available online: https://zitoc.com/artificial- intelligence-applications/ (accessed on 01 October 2019) [12] IoT Environment Compromising Cyber Security, 2019, available online: https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/iot-environment-compromising-cyber-security/ (accessed on 03 October 2019) [13] Olga Bucovetchi, Alexandru Georgescu, Dorel Badea, and Radu D. Stanciu, Agent- Based Modeling (ABM): Support for Emphasizing the Air Transport Infrastructure Dependence of Space Systems, Sustainability-Open Access Journal, 2019, pg. 1, available online: https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability (accessed on 02 October 2019) [14] Rossella Mattioli, CSIRTs relations team, ENISA, Securing Europe’s information society: bridging the gap between industry, security community and Member States, 2019, available online: https://download.ernw-insight.de/troopers/tr18/slides/TR18_Keynote_ Day_2.pdf (accessed on 02 October 2019) [15] Marzieh Sameni Toosarvandani, Nasser Modiri, Mehdi Afzali, The risk assessment and treatment approach in order to provide LAN security based on ISMS standard, 2012, available online: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272391570_Critical_ infrastructure_protection_Requirements_and_challenges_for_the_21st_century (accessed on 03 October 2019) [16] Leandros Maglaras, Mohamed Amine Ferrag, Abdelouahid Derhab, Mithun Mukherjee, Helge Janicke, Stylianos Rallis, Threats, Countermeasures and Attribution of Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructures, 2018, available online: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328077921_Threats_Countermeasures_and_Attri bution_of_Cyber_Attacks_on_Critical_Infrastructures (accessed on 03 October 2019) [17] Cristina Alcaraz, Sherali Zeadally, Critical infrastructure protection: Requirements and challenges for the 21st century, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 2015, available online: httpshttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 272391570_Critical_infrastructure_protection_Requirements_and_challenges_for_the_21s t_century (accessed on 03 October 2019) [18] Overview of Cyber Vulnerabilities, available online: https://www.us- cert.gov/ics/content/overview-cyber-vulnerabilities (accessed on 03 October 2019) [19] December 2015 Ukraine power grid cyberattack, available online: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/December_2015_Ukraine_power_grid_cyberattack (accessed on 03 October 2019) [20] Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case, 2016, available online: https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E- ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf (accessed on 03 October 2019)

65 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA

Masters Student Andreea Ștefania COZMEI

National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Department of International Relations and European Integration, MA- Security and Diplomacy, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract: Taking into consideration the crisis that Venezuela is passing at this time, I considered the opportunity to analyze what could by the factors that occurred the pithiest for the failure of this state. I write this essay for the purpose of understanding in which sectors of security, this state is a failed state. The importance of this paper for the field of international relations consists in the method I use in this approach. Based on Barry Buzan`s vision over the concept of security and securitization, I will try to analyze each security sector by taking a close look on what is happening in this state and, judging by the way these sectors intertwine each other.

Key words: words: security sector; military; economy; state; power; politics; United States of America

Keeping in mind that security is a politics that should not be concentrated only on the military sector, it has a particular nature that allows it to cover a wide range of issues, it can be applied to five essential sectors of the state. These would be the social sector, the economic sector, the environmental sector, the political sector and last but not least, the military sector that is also considered the traditional sector for the operationalization of this concept.1 I will analyze the way security works in the other four sectors of a state the is passing through a very vulnerable period in its history due to factors that could more or less be influenced by the political decisions of the leaders. This way of thinking by dividing the security concept into sectors to make it easier to analyze the situation of a state, became more and more popular especially during the Cold War that nowadays is a normal and quite necessary thing to specify whether you are referring to the economic security sector for example or to the social security sector when making an affirmation or debating about it. To be easier to define each sector, we can look at the types of interaction, for example in the military sector the interactions of forceful coercion but also the two levels that concern security, the offensive and defensive and the perception of these levels of the degree of arming of other states. In the political sector it refers to recognition of the governing authority by the ideology that offers them the legitimacy. In the economic sector the main relation refers to trade and finance and access to goods that offer the state a certain level of welfare that translates into power for that state. The social sector refers to interactions from which results collective identity, creating

1 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security - A New Framework for Analysis. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

66 SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA the necessary conditions or the evolution of cultural patterns, language and even religion. And the last one is the environmental sector that regards the interactions between human beings and nature, the maintenance of the ecosystem in normal parameters constitutes the support for all forms of life. 2 Now that there is a clear definition of what each security sector means, I will draw my attention on the security and stability of these sectors in the state of Venezuela with the purpose of finding the main reason why this state has failed in governing. 1. The Political Sector First of all, I will start by looking at the political level to see if the condition of recognition of the legitimate regime and its representatives is respected, and if the population is represented by the political elite. Judging by the actual situation in Venezuela, there are huge tensions in what regards representation of the people`s interest that have to be spoken and heard. As the situation is very insecure, any time there can be “born” new leaders from the will of reestablishing the equilibrium, as it happened in what regards the appearance on the political stage of the new figure Juan Guaidó. He is a supporter of the United States and has very close ties to the American decision makers, fact that gave him the courage and support needed to declare himself rightful president of Venezuela after a conversation with the Unite States vice-president, Mike Pence that promised him the support in what regards this decision. Juan Guaidó argues publicly that the elections that took place in May were illegal and that makes Nicolas Maduro an illegitimate president of Venezuela. Even though this new character is very promising in its speeches and visions for the future of Venezuela, it has very little support from the population and this is a legitimacy problem even though it has all the support form United States, around 81% of the Venezuelans did not hear about him before the date of 23 January when he declared himself president.3 Looking at what a secure political sector should be like, I can confirm that the situation in Venezuela in not any close to what the definition of security refers to. Illegitimacy is the word that describes the best the alternating power process that is taking place at the political level of the Venezuelan state. The ideology that is promoted by one or another temporary political figure is not in relation with what the population believes and not even the cleavages formed do not represent the categories existing at the level of the civil society. From here come most of the problems that emerge into crisis and attempts of coup d`etat, destabilizing the initial equilibrium of any apart from its predominant ideology. 2. The Military Sector The next sector I will be referring to is the military sector, being considered the filed charged with providing traditional security. In this regard, there are two fields, the defensive and the offensive that concern the security status of a state form the military point of view. The measures taken in this field during the Nicolás Maduro administration regard more the intervention of the military forces in the internal affairs of the state in relation directly with the population. Venezuela doesn`t have problems with the neighbors or other foreign actors bigger then the problems it has in the domestic field. One measure that was criticized at the international level is the “Plan Patria Segura” that presupposed the

2 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security - A New Framework for Analysis. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 3 Croce, Celina della. 2019. People Dispatch . March 1. Accessed June 1, 2019.

67 SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA presence of 21,000 soldiers on the streets of Venezuela. Maduro, president of this state, made massive changes regarding the administrative sphere and that means promoting around 200 military cadres in offices as generals. Corruption also made its way through the and in some cases, have betrayed their vow by creating ties with the drug mafia on the territory of this state instead of fighting it in purpose creating a safe environment for the citizens. Maduro`s initiative of militarizing the county has its origins in a historical fact that the previous leader, Hugo Chávez came from the ranks of generals. However, all the effort put into creating security is for nothing if we look at the statistics showing the murder rate that during a year did not changed at all. Behind all the numbers, one thing is for sure, the fact that using coercive force doesn`t help diminish the insecurity in a territory, it only creates more terror and the will of the population to leave the country is more and more present. Also the military forces are the once that in time of shortages, they command on how the very few of the food resources left are distributed and to who, this being a very big problem taking into account the need of the population for self-governing.4 3. The Economic Sector The following security sector I will be referring to is the economic sector. This field refers to the all the links this state has with international trade markets even if it`s a major importer or exporter, it refers also to the power of production in terms of means and workforce that bring wealth and prosperity to the state as a whole, establishing a status of the state among the international hierarchy, which means power in the international system. In what regards Venezuela, the problems of the economic sector have their roots in the political one. Because of extremely bad governing of Nicolas Maduro at the macroeconomic level, most problems occurred from the lack of transparency and from here, the country`s woes extended very fast affecting also the other sectors of the state`s security causing big vulnerabilities. From the statistics the International Monetary Fund have taken into account in what regards the economic situation of this country results that the economic power of this state has shrunk with 18% only during last year. It is also known that between 2013 and 2017, Venezuela`s economy has contracted over one-third, according to the information owned by the International Monetary Fund. There has been a massive migration from Venezuela since 2015, three million people have left the country, resources like water and electricity are extremely limited, the medical system can no longer be considered in usable standards and, of course, malnutrition is a national problem. For this, the first to be accused at the international level was Nicolas Maduro that blames the United States for dragging the country into an economic war against them.5 The main and most important reason why the relation between United States and Venezuela is so tense is the oil possessed by the Venezuelan state and the defectors maned these resources are used in the first place in relation with the United States and in the second place in relation with the population on this filed state. As if the this situation wasn`t enough, the United States announced through the Treasury Department that there could be a series of sanctions applied to Venezuela`s state-owned company in what regards the export of diluents to the international shippers. The purpose of this measure is to limit

4 Ventura, Marcel. 2014. Venezuela’s Agony: Weak President, Strong Generals, Riots and Cocaine. April 14. Accessed June 1, 2019. 5 Sabga, Patricia. 2019. What brought Venezuela's economy to ruin? February 1. Accessed June 7, 2019.

68 SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA president Nicolas Maduro`s access to profit from the oil resources the state possess. 6 This would be the brief exposure of the economic status of this degrading state in the context of analyzing the state`s economy as a separated sector when talking about security. Therefore, from the perspective of economic security, Venezuela in not a secure state, its economic vulnerabilities regard in the first place the lack of stable relations with other international trade markets for oil industry raw materials and in the second place, the threat of imperialistic extension for the United States that keep interfering in Venezuela`s affairs. 4. The Social Security Sector All the radical changes these people go through has had a big and negative impact on many aspects of their lives. At the level of the civil society, the people suffer and endure major repercussions in their everyday life. Social security presupposes a safe environment, far from threats that could disturb the equilibrium on which is based the evolution of the society that means creating and maintaining the collective identity of a people, evolution of cultural patterns and, the main element that constitutes a nation, language. In what regards the social security sector, Venezuela`s problems have reached a new level of insecurity, meaning people are desperate from the lack of medicine, disease are spreading rapidly and causes mass migration towards neighbour countries. As the statistics show, 90% of the country`s population lives below the line of poverty and most of the families can`t ensure basic food needs. To better describe de dramatic situation of these people, Secretary General of the Organization of American States made an affirmation that the compares the situation in Syria with Venezuela. Because of the spread malnutrition, newborns in Venezuela are less likely to survive than the ones in Syria. In what regards security, Venezuela is in the first place in the hierarchy of the countries with the highest crime rate in the world, more than 73 Venezuelans die each day violently.7 Form living in such in such miserable conditions and concentrating on the daily worries of how to survive, politics and their will of changing something at the institutional level is quite far from their daily thoughts. Somehow, some directions are distinguishable when it comes to political manifestations of the existing societal cleavages, the institutionalization of the civil society did not work as expected in the case of this state. Formations of different orientations almost arrived on the point of stating a civil war instead of gathering against the abusive measures of the state counting on a common collective interest that they could have built as a nation.8 I can conclude from here that the civil society has its own guilt in the emerging tensions that are now at the political level judging from their lack or participation at the political level, not being, in my opinion, aware of their power of influence over the political sphere. Returning to the importance of the social security sector, for the reasons debated above, the Venezuelan state has a very unstable internal situation with threats that come from inside, from the civil society level that has a very high risk of starting a civil war at any time, but not against the state, but against each other.

6 Rampton, Roberta. 2019. U.S. tightens Venezuela oil sanctions, indicates more actions to come. June 7. Accessed June 9, 2019. 7Quick facts: Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. April 10. Accessed June 9, 2019. 8 García-Guadilla, Maria Pilar. 2004. "THE MULTIPLES FACES OF VENEZUELAN CIVIL SOCIETY: POLITIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRATIZATION." Research paper, Las Vegas, Nevada.

69 SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA

5. The Environmental Sector The last but not least of the five security sectors I used for analyzing the situation Venezuela is passing, is the one referring to the environmental problems. A report published by The World Bank speaks about the problems that Venezuela is facing in this sector. One main problem is deforestation that if it isn`t stopped or at least decreased it can cause extended damage to the biosphere, one other major problem that Venezuela has to deal with is the lack of water supply taking into account the high level of industrialization of the country, running water is a necessity for a ensuring a decent living standard for the population. Due to the big number of rare species of tropical plants and animals, Venezuela has to take a series of measures to protect their habitats in order to create a safe environment9 and to remove any type of vulnerability even in this sector, only this way it will be ensure security in all security sectors. Conclusions Through the course of this paper I have analyzed the particularities and importance of the of the security sectors of Venezuela, by understanding the main most pregnant problems of this state and the way its decision makers think and directions chosen, its foreign relations with major powers like the United States, its position on the international arena, and most importantly, analyzing the state of Venezuela. Being a particular type of state, due to its geostrategic positioning, leaders and societal cleavages, the perspective from which I choose to analyze this state helped me understand the importance of operationalization of the subject in purpose of obtaining the best results for the analysis.

References:

[1] Bank, The World. 1991. "Environmental Issues in Venzuela." The World Bank. December 4. Accessed June 9, 2019. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/880751468128992011/pdf/multi-page.pdf. [2] Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security - A New Framework for Analysis. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. [3] Croce, Celina della. 2019. People Dispatch . March 1. Accessed June 1, 2019. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2019/03/01/who-is-the-real-culprit-behind-venezuelas-political- turmoil/. [4] García-Guadilla, Maria Pilar. 2004. "The Multiples Faces Of Venezuelan Civil Society: Politization And Its Impact On Democratization." Research paper, Las Vegas, Nevada. [5] 2019. Quick facts: Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. April 10. Accessed June 9, 2019. https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/venezuela-crisis-quick-facts. [6] Rampton, Roberta. 2019. U.S. tightens Venezuela oil sanctions, indicates more actions to come. June 7. Accessed June 9, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela- politics-usa/u-s-tightens-venezuela-oil-sanctions-indicates-more-actions-to-come- idUSKCN1T731E.

9 Bank, The World. 1991. "Environmental Issues in Venzuela." The World Bank. December 4. Accessed June 9, 2019.

70 SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA

[7] Sabga, Patricia. 2019. What brought Venezuela's economy to ruin? February 1. Accessed June 7, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/brought-venezuela- economy-ruin-190201152238535.html. [8] Ventura, Marcel. 2014. Venezuela’s Agony: Weak President, Strong Generals, Riots and Cocaine. April 14. Accessed June 1, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/venezuelas- agony-weak-president-strong-generals-riots-and-cocaine.

71 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR

Barbara Drapikowska, Ph.D.

Faculty of Management and Command/War Studies University/Poland

Abstract: The article concerns the issue of gender perspective in Polish army. The key points of presentation are gender definition in polish society and polish army, presents statistics of women military services, the awareness of gender perspective in the mind of men soldiers. The presentation shows results of qualitative and quantitative research in Polish army (both women and man). The army is the institution has been created by man and for man from many ages. Nowadays, the women are minority in army. There are dominated masculine style of work and communication. It is connected with gender, culture, stereotypies and society`s mentality

Key words: women in army, women military service, gender and security.

1. Introduction Security as an area of functioning of society and the state has strict masculinistic connotations. The services acting on his behalf from the beginning of time constituted institutions of male domination, both in number and in terms of their prevailing patterns of behavior. The presence of women was only visible in a situation of higher necessity and usually with a shortage of men capable of fighting. In almost every country in the world, the army is a perfect example of this trend. When analyzing the issue of feminization of security, it should be borne in mind that Poland belongs to the bloc of former communist countries, where the social roles of women and men were closely related to work and family. In the family, the man was responsible for ensuring material existence, while the woman was responsible for looking after children. The professional activity of women in post-war Polish society was focused mainly on occasional jobs, and their income was so small that they were only an additional element to the household budget. For about a century, in various corners of the globe, the social role of women began to increase, slowly moving from the family sphere to the sphere of public life, including professional life. The culmination of these changes is women's entry into the area of defense and security, which has always been a space of male domination. Depending on the geographical variables, we have a different pace of change in this respect. The criterion for differentiating is also the type of uniformed service, e.g. in the Polish Police women have been present almost from the very beginning of their existence, so their formal and informal status is less diverse than in the army, where the possibility of service for women has existed for less than three decades. The purpose of the following article is to present the issue of quantitative and qualitative aspect of gender policy management in the Polish security sector on the example of the . The main problem of the study was formulated in the form of

72 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR the question: How is gender policy implemented in the Polish security sector? On this basis, specific issues were specified, covering the following issues: - What are the legal and doctrinal foundations for implementing gender policy? - What is the participation of women in the Polish armed forces? - How is gender policy implemented in the armed forces?

2. Legal and doctrinal foundations The legal foundations of women's military service are both international and national law. In the case of the first set of normative rules, the prohibition of discrimination against women in public life is important, which is not related to the equalization of professional opportunities for women and men, which is also necessary to achieve in the area of uniformed services. The provisions of international law with equal status for women and men are: - UN Convention on Combating Discrimination in the Field of Education - ratified in 1964, - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women - ratified in 1981, - International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - ratified in 1977, - European Cultural Convention, including "Recommendations regarding gender equality in the field of education" - ratified in 1989 [1]. The fight against this phenomenon was also announced in the Treaty on European Union, which in one of the provisions states that the EU institutions may take action in the event of any discriminatory practices. It also emphasizes the desire to eliminate inequalities between women and men [2]. The national legal system also includes provisions prohibiting discriminatory practices of women when standing in the ranks of uniformed services. The highest-ranking piece of legislation in the legislative system equalizes professional opportunities, defining equal rights for women and men to education, choice of profession and remuneration for work. According to the provisions of the Polish Constitution: "Everyone is equal before the law. Everyone has the right to equal treatment by public authorities. [...] No one may be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason” [3]. Representatives of both sexes have equal rights to education, employment, promotion, holding positions and performing public functions, as well as equal remuneration for work of the same value. A similar provision can also be found in the Labor Code [4]. This rule also applies to previously uniformed services. Moreover, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland also says that "[...] it is the duty of every citizen to defend their homeland” [5]. It is difficult to disagree with the statement that today the term citizen assumes a coed educational overtones. In the same year in which the Basic Law was adopted, the Government also adopted the "National Action Program for Women". The document issued a commitment to the Ministry of National Defense to create legal and organizational conditions ensuring equal access to military education for women and men [6]. The first changes in this area appeared as early as 1991, when a provision was made in the amended military law that women may also be appointed to military service if they have the appropriate qualifications [7]. According to the modern legal order, the article allowing to appoint women to military service is art. 11 of the Act of 11 September 2003 on military service of professional soldiers. This provision states that if justified by the needs of the Armed Forces, any person who has completed at least junior high school and has specific

73 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR qualifications or skills useful in military service may be appointed to professional military service. Finally, the legal basis for appointing women to the army is also the Act of November 21, 1967 on the universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland. The proper footnote here is art. 48, which states that women with appropriate professional competence may be subject to the obligation to appear for military qualifications. According to the Act, such features are possessed by graduates of medical, veterinary, marine and aviation faculties, as well as women practicing the professions of: psychologists, physiotherapists, radiologists, laboratory diagnostics, IT specialists, ICT specialists, navigators and translators [8]. Women who volunteer for active military service, which they perform on general principles, are also envisaged for military qualification [9]. Only some of them are subject to universal defense. This applies only to certain professional groups. Until 2006, pursuant to the Act of 21 November 1967 on the general obligation to defend the Republic of Poland and the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 April 2004 on submitting women to the obligation to appear for , these professional groups mainly included medical staff [10]. In addition, only women aged 18-24 were subject to these legal regulations. After the amendment to the law and the entry into force of the Act of 29 July 2005 amending the Act on the universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland and amending the Act on substitute service, as well as the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 March 2010 on subjecting women to the obligation to appear before of recruitment, the catalog of qualifications has expanded, the possession of which allows calling specific groups of women for recruitment and thus allows them to be called to serve in the reserve. Currently, in accordance with existing legislation, compulsory appearances for military qualifications have been extended to graduates of state and private universities in such fields as: medical analytics, pharmacy, medicine, medicine, dentical, nursing, psychology, emergency medicine, veterinary medicine. This obligation also applies to women graduating from post-secondary schools in the fields of pharmacy, emergency medicine and veterinary medicine [11].

3. Gender policy in the armed forces The course of women's military service is assumed to be the same as for men. In addition to specific situations, which are a kind of necessity related to sex, e.g. motherhood, they have the same rights and obligations as men, and therefore also career opportunities. The current military pragmatics gives women the right to occupy positions in all personal : privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. There are also no restrictions on the specialty and availability of positions. In Poland, no restrictions have been introduced so far for positions reserved only for men. An exception in this respect is provided only for pregnant and breastfeeding women who cannot be entrusted with tasks that are burdensome and harmful to health [12]. Unlike the civilian environment, which protects all women, military regulations provide protection only during pregnancy and feeding. The exception in the field of equal treatment of men and women are different qualification requirements when assessing physical fitness both during exams to military universities and in subsequent service. It should be noted that until 2003 women were exempted from the annual physical training exam. Currently, in accordance with existing requirements, every professional soldier is subject to the test. The test covers exercises

74 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR varied according to gender, age groups, military units and the position held. Based on its results, a soldier's physical fitness rating is given on a scale of 2 to 5. Assessment is based on four motor skills: endurance, abdominal muscle strength, arm strength, and speed and agility. The measure of endurance is passing a run over 3000 meters. It is worth noting that this distance was standardized only in 2018, previously only men were running on 3,000, women on 1,000 meters [13]. These differences have been emphasized many times as a source of negative attitudes of the male environment towards women soldiers [14]. Until recently, there was also a legally sanctioned difference between the service of men and women in granting parental leave whose beneficiaries could only be women [15]. A soldier - a woman who was pregnant and after giving birth was entitled to maternity leave on the terms and to the extent specified in the Labor Code. The same rules for granting maternity leave were not applied to male soldiers. Pursuant to Article 180 of the Labor Code, a woman was entitled to maternity leave of 18 weeks for the first delivery, 20 weeks for the next delivery, or 28 weeks for more than one child in one delivery. Maternity leave was also granted after the adoption of the child [16]. After introducing changes to the existing pragmatics, from 2010, the beneficiaries of parental leave may also be men - soldiers. The amended provision of the Pragmatic Act stipulates that every professional soldier is entitled [...] to maternity leave, additional maternity leave, leave on maternity leave, additional leave on the conditions of maternity leave, paternity leave and parental leave on the principles and to the extent specified in the provisions of the Act of June 26, 1974 – Labor Code […]” [17]. In accordance with applicable legal principles, a soldier is entitled to a 20-week maternity leave, with the option of extending it for an additional two weeks. Then it is possible to apply for parental leave, and if it does not exceed twelve months, the soldier is guaranteed a return to the position performed earlier. In addition, there are 50 days of annual leave to look after a child up to 4 years old [18]. It is also worth mentioning that since 2016 a male soldier is also entitled to paternity leave. These are 2 weeks of leave after birth or adoption. Other rules for men and women apply in the candidate service. Pursuant to the applicable legislation, "[...] a soldier serving in the candidate service - a woman, in case of pregnancy during pregnancy and the puerperium is granted unpaid leave of no more than twelve months” [19]. If after the expiry of the period for which the leave has been granted, the woman does not take up the candidate's service or if she becomes pregnant again, she is dismissed from the service. Legislation also regulates issues related only to women's military service and applies only to the interested parties themselves - these are issues arising from the maternity of women soldiers. Initially, the pragmatic law did not regulate many matters related to women's military service. Two years of its practical application have shown spheres whose verification has become necessary. The amendments were introduced in 2006, adopted a year later, and came into force in 2008 and concerned regulations for pregnant or breastfeeding women, women after childbirth, and marriages of soldiers [20]. Pregnant or breastfeeding women were restricted to 40 hours a week and forbidden to work at night. A ban on the posting of women outside the place of service was also introduced at that time, unless the person concerned agrees to it. Women expecting a child may not be entrusted with official tasks that are particularly onerous or harmful to their health. The changes also included the introduction of breaks for breastfeeding, i.e. two half- hour breaks or in the case of a woman giving birth to more than one child - two 45-minute breaks, which are included in the service [21].

75 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR

Women who became mothers were exempted from having to take an annual physical examination for up to six months after having a child [22], as well as a leave to care for a child (equivalent to parental leave) - paid in the amount of 75% of the salary, which is granted at the request of a woman for up to 10 months. An element supporting the legal and practical protection of women's motherhood is also the change according to which a soldier – a woman who is the wife of another soldier and the mother of a child under four years of age, cannot be delegated without her written consent outside the place of military service at the same time as the spouse [23]. Legal regulations also apply to different standards in the field of women's military service used in uniforms, however, only in the case of gala and outfit. The difference is wearing a skirt instead of pants, although it is also possible to wear pants for the starting uniform. Other types of uniforms are not differentiated by gender, but with the proviso that each item of work clothing must be a women's pattern. This applies to women's uniforms, which, according to accepted rules, have buttons on the right side and are fastened in such a way that the right side of the jacket is on top, unlike in the men's clothing standards, where the buttons are located on the left side of the jacket. Women - soldiers also wear a different headgear, which is a furrier, put on in all types of uniforms, except for the field uniform, and also excluding the situation when climatic conditions require wearing a fur hat. The small, although used in the army, difference also applies to monetary equivalents awarded in exchange for uniforms and equipment that every soldier is entitled to, also in the candidate's service. The amount of these receivables is calculated taking into account current market prices, however, due to the fact that women's clothing items differ significantly from men's, and women and men use other sanitary and hygienic articles, the amount of the equivalent granted to soldiers of different sexes is also differentiated. The General Regulations regulating certain issues related to military service constitute the formal basis for the functioning of women in the army. Pursuant to the Regulations, a soldier – a woman is required to wear short-haired hair during the performance of official duties, she cannot also have expressive makeup and brightly painted nails [24]. Soldiers in uniform, regardless of gender, are forbidden to wear any kind of jewelry and decorations. Only a watch, a ring and a signet ring or ring may be worn [25]. The provisions of the Regulations also specify the principles of gender mainstreaming in the use of military infrastructure. In accordance with the applicable rules of soldiers - women are lodged in separate soldiers' chambers, separated from joint permanent quarters in the sub-unit area or outside it [26]. Compliance with formal provisions and the representation of the interests of women soldiers is supervised by the Council for Women in the Armed Forces, which is also an entity demonstrating legislative activity in the field of taking into account the interests of women in the army. The Council was appointed by Decision No. 22 of November 25, 1999 by the Undersecretary of State for Social and Parliamentary Affairs as a body representing women in the Armed Forces [27]. The representatives were chosen from among women with the most experience in military service, from various personal corps [28]. The Council is an advisory body to the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense in matters of women performing military service. It is also a representation of women in national and international contacts. The members of the Council are representatives of the types of armed forces and all personal corps, as well as organizational units of the Ministry of National Defense having influence on women's military service. This composition is representative, which means that it reflects the structure of women's distribution in individual corps and personal groups [29]. As a representative body, the

76 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR organization maintains constant contact with the Women's Committee in NATO in Brussels and participates in conferences organized by it. The indirect goal of the Council's activity is to increase the participation of women in the Polish army, extend the range of available positions for them, as well as to promote women's military service in society. These goals are implemented through the main tasks of the Council, which are: - conducting study and analytical works and preparing legal and organizational solutions for women's military service; - developing opinions and expert opinions; - maintaining constant contact with women soldiers; - representing the Polish Armed Forces in international contacts; - cooperation with organizations working for gender equality [30]. The collection of international documents, in addition to universal acts regulating the functioning of military units during military operations abroad, such as the Hague and Geneva Law, as well as resolutions of general legislative bodies of international organizations, also contains regulations devoted to the participation of women soldiers in military missions. The list of such documents is: - European Parliament resolution on the participation of women in the peaceful resolution of conflicts; - UN Security Council resolutions - Women, peace and security: - No. 1325 from 31.10.2000, - No. 1820 from 09.06.2008, - No. 1888 from 30.08.2009, - No. 1889 from 05.10.2009, - No. 1960 from 16.12.2010, - No. 2106 from 24.06.2013, - No. 2122 from 18.10.2013; - Bi-S.C.40-1 Strategic Command Directive on the "Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and issues related to gender equality, including protection measures during armed conflict, to NATO command structures". The European Parliament resolution stated that the participation of women in the implementation of operational tasks is necessary due to the improvement of relations with civilians in the area of the mission noticeable in the co-educational contingents. In view of the above, Member States were called on to increase the number of women engaged in activities to promote global peace, e.g. diplomatic missions, observation missions, crisis response operations, peacekeeping missions [31]. Formulations and precise suggestions for increasing the composition of female personnel in military contingents did not appear until 2000 in Resolution 1325, which initiated the cycle of UN involvement in promoting women's participation in operational tasks. According to its content: "Member States are called on to ensure greater representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.” [32]. The resolution also called on the Secretary-General to provide a component involving women for operational activities and to increase the number of women in the area of UN operations among military observers, civil police, human rights and humanitarian organizations [33]. Each subsequent resolution also recommended that Member States increase the participation of women in missions carried out by the UN. The multitude of regulations of this type was caused not so much by non-compliance with the provisions in this respect by

77 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR states, but by the necessity to pay attention to the continuing problem of sexual abuse and violence against women noticed in countries covered by UN activities. However, the report summarizing the tenth anniversary of the application of Resolution 1325 emphasized that a satisfactory result in the number of women in military contingents was not achieved. It was also pointed out that military personnel responsible for mission planning and management are not responsible for failure to comply with the Resolution's recommendations. The reasons were seen in the lack of understanding on issues of gender equality by military decision makers [34]. The need to involve female staff in building peace is also emphasized by NATO, which states that women should be involved in activities at all stages of the crisis or conflict. The Doctrine on the implementation of Resolution 1325 presents the assumptions that come down to striving to create representative personal compositions and expanding the role of women in operations and missions at all levels, taking into account the needs of women (health requirements, supplies, accommodation) in the planning process, making efforts to increase women's representation in NATO command structures and crisis units, as well as organization of education and training programs that make women aware of the importance of gender and women's involvement in missions and operations [35].

4. Women in the Polish Armed Forces During the entire period of the Polish People's Republic, women were not allowed to perform military service. Only a few of the participants in World War II remained in the army until they retired. The situation in the Polish Armed Forces changed only in 1988, when women began to be admitted to the army on special terms, which in practice only meant the opening of medical and musical corps for them. However, a completely new chapter in women's military history was only started at the threshold of the 21st century. It began with the entry of Poland into the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance – 1999 – which in practice was associated with meeting NATO standardization requirements, which did not provide for gender discrimination in recruitment to the army. There was therefore the opening of the closely guarded gates of military units for women and enabling them to pursue a professional career in the army. What's more, it also created the need for gradual adaptation of existing military-only property to the presence and service of women, as well as the socialization of soldiers for co-educational service. While initially they did not supply a large number of candidates for soldiers, from year to year there were more and more women among military students. Their growing number caused a discussion on a number of changes in the army. This resulted in changes in legislation regarding issues that had not been regulated in the army so far, e.g. maternity leave, breaks at work for breastfeeding, exemptions from some classes during pregnancy, etc. Another qualitative change was associated with the resignation from universal conscription and the creation of the National Reserve Forces (2008), which in practice opened the corps of privates for women. The share of women in the Polish army at the end of last year reached 5.98% and indicates an upward trend [36]. Among the types of armed forces, the greatest interest of women is invariably enjoyed by the Land Forces, which supplied more than half of all women serving in the Polish Armed Forces. It should be noted that the tendency to choose this type of army has continued since the beginning of women's military participation [37]. The Air Force was second in terms of numbers. On the other hand, the Navy was the type of armed force most often chosen by female personnel. Few women also joined the ranks of Territorial Defense Forces, which may be related to the fact that this is a new type of

78 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR armed forces in the Polish army. (about 2%) also have a small percentage of the female sex, which, however, is certainly not related to the small number of such troops in the entire defense system.

2500 2293

2000

1500 1096 1000 828 453 443 500 356 174 44 138 88 52 133 0

Figure 1. Personal status of women – soldiers by personnel divisions, source: Professional service: women's military service, source: https://archiwum2019- bip.mon.gov.pl/przydatne-informacje/artykul/sluzba-zawodowa/wojskowa-suzba-kobiet- 10325478/ (*DGRSZ – General command of the types of armed forces; **IWSZ – Armed forces support inspectorate; ***JOWSZ – Organizational units of the military health service; ****TDF – Terutorial )

From 2014, the logistics corps became the most numerous passenger corps in terms of women's representation. Currently 1241 women are serving in it. It is worth mentioning that a significant increase in this respect occurred only during the year, because in 2012 only 253 women served in the corpus [38], but in 2013 as many as 451 [39]. Before, invariably, the largest number of women have always served in the medical corps, while nowadays it is the third largest female representation. In turn, the second in this respect is the communications and IT corps. In addition, as of June 1, 2018, 623 women - candidates for soldiers were educated at military schools, NCOs and training centers. Other corps are already far less numerous in terms of female staff involved. The least representative in this respect are the following cryptology and cyber security and financial corps [40]. If the point of analysis is moved to the personnel corps in which women perform military service, then the most numerous in this respect is the corps of privates. This trend only increased after 2008 with the creation of the NSR – a formation that allowed women to enter the structures of this corps. As it was mentioned earlier, due to the lack of women's participation in general conscription, in practice this corps was very difficult to reach for the female part of society.

79 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR

26%

Officer corps NCO 59% Private 15%

Figure 2. Personal status of women – officers' corps soldiers, source: ibidem.

The participation of women in shaping security on a global scale, i.e. in missions and operations outside the country, is an extremely important issue in this area. The Polish Armed Forces have been participating in such activities since 1953, when the Polish contingent was involved in the implementation of operational tasks in Korea. The fact is that for almost half a century, this participation included only male military personnel due to the absence of women in the structures of the army. The situation changed after 2003, when the ranks of the army began to join graduates of officers' schools and military academies representing various military specialties. Of course, not immediately after graduation, women were sent to missions, in practice it was only after gaining minimal experience in service in units in the country that one could speak about participation in missions and operations. Undoubtedly, in this regard, it was quite important to direct women to positions related to civil-military cooperation. Conclusions from the analysis of quantitative data made available by the Council for Women in the Armed Forces indicate that the number of women participating in missions outside the country on average fluctuated around 50 people every year. This represented about 1% of the quota composition. Despite the lack of formal restrictions on the availability of positions on the mission, the most female staff carried out operational tasks in the medical corps. The institutions responsible for the formation of quotas have identified various causes for this phenomenon. First of all, there was a lack of candidates with the required qualifications, just necessary for the Armed Forces in the area of the mission. Secondly, there was a lack of adequate sanitary conditions - the need to guarantee separate toilets. Another reason was also the very dangerous nature of most missions and the desire to protect women against "extreme living conditions". According to the position represented by the Women's Council in the Armed Forces in connection with the implementation of UN Convention 1325 regarding the need to guarantee women's participation in supporting peace and security, in the recruitment process of candidates, as ensured by institutions representing the interests of women in the armed forces, no barriers were created for interested women service in quotas.

80 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR

Nowadays women - soldiers participate in several missions and operations outside the country. Most of them join the ranks: - PMC Afghanistan RSM – 16; - PMC KFOR () – 12; - PMC – 10; - PMC Romania – 7; - PMC Orlik (Baltic Sea) – 1; - PMC Czernicki (Mediterranean Sea) – 3; - PMC EUFOR BiH () – 1; - PMC Iraq (Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan) – 2; - PMC OIR Kuwait (Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar) – 3 [41]. It should be noted that many of the missions and operations undertaken by the international community are implemented in Islamic countries. As it was mentioned before, due to the region of activities and cultural conditions, women - soldiers are the only people in the composition of the Polish Military Contingent that can interact with the female part of the population in the areas of operations.

5. Conclusion The purpose of the following article was to present the issue of quantitative and qualitative aspect of gender policy management in the Polish security sector on the example of the Polish armed forces. Achieving the adopted assumption required solving specific issues specific to research problems. With reference to the first specific problem concerning legal and doctrinal foundations related to the implementation of gender policy, it was established that this issue results from a number of international and national legal acts related to the regulation of public life. They prohibit all forms of discrimination in working life, including on grounds of sex. The Act on military service of professional soldiers, which since 2006 regulates a number of issues related to women's military service, is also important in this respect. In turn, as regards the participation of women in missions and operations outside the country, the intensification of legislative efforts or formal recommendations took place only after 2000. It was a breakthrough point in the discussed issue due to the publication of UN Resolution 1325 suggesting to countries of the international community to increase the participation of female staff in international activities for peace and security. In Poland, it took less than twenty years, i.e. in 2018, to issue the first National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN agenda on women, peace and security for 2018-2021. With reference to the second specific problem involving the army as the chosen uniformed service constituting an example of a structure operating in the security system, it was found that the quantitative share of women in this respect is small – less than 6%, although it adopts an upward trend. A small percentage of them also participate in missions and operations outside the country - on average it is about 1%. Referring to the third specific problem one should start from the fact that the participation of women in the army has changed throughout history. Starting from the very limited role of a woman, bringing her only to providing and raising new members of society, ending with the possibility of full-fledged military service on the same principles as men. Apart from the exceptions related to the regulation of parenthood, the principle of women's military service is the same for both sexes. Today, the qualitative determinant is also the participation of women in missions and operations outside the country. As the results of the study cited fragmentally show, female staff is necessary to communicate with

81 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR local women in the mission area both in the medical aspect, as well as during conversations or searches. Contemporary security actors are increasingly diverse in terms of gender. This trend is a derivative of two factors, namely the opening of the male "uniformed world" to the presence of women, as well as women's interest in occupations that are enclaves of male domination. This, in turn, is not related to a general change in the perception of the role of women in social life, as well as an increase in the activity of women in the professional sphere, and at the same time an increase in men's interest in the family sphere. Changes in this area lead to greater partnership in the overall social life of the individual. In view of the above, feminization rates in uniformed services are following an upward trend and it can be assumed that this will continue. Moreover, as I. Urych [42] rightly notes, the military environment should already be interested in young women, high school students in uniformed classes. As the results of empirical research show, they achieve better results in science and sport. Therefore, the results of the research indicate that in the future more and more women will want and have the opportunity to apply for service in the army.

References:

[1] A. Dębska, Kobieta w mundurze czyli nowa jakość w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa, Publishing House of Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2005, p. 61. [2] M. Branka, U. Hermanowicz, M. Tański, Koedukacyjna armia. Zagadnienia równości płci dla kadry pedagogicznej szkół wojskowych, Foundation Partners Polska, Warsaw 2005, p. 8. [3] The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997 [Dz. Of Laws of 1997 No. 78, item483], art. 32. [4] See: Act of 26 June 1974 – Labor Code (codified text) [J. Of Laws of 2004, item 1502, 1662], art. 11.3 [5]The Constitution…, op. cit., art. 85. [6] A. Dębska, Kobieta w mundurze…, op. cit. ., p. 62. [7] Ibidem, p. 64. [8] Act of November 21, 1967 on the universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland [Dz. Of Laws of 2004 No. 241, item 2416], art. 48 p. 1 and p. 2. [9] Ibidem, art. 48 p. 4. [10] Journalism, law, English philology and AWF graduates were also marginally subject to this mode. [11] Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 10 March 2010 on the indication of groups of women who are required to appear for military qualifications [Dz. Of Laws of 2010, No. 54, item321], § 2.1. [12] Act of 11 September 2003 on military service of professional soldiers (codified text) [Dz. Of Laws of 2013, item 675, 829, 852, 1355], art. 65 section 2 points 3. [13] Ordinance of the Minister of National Defense of February 12, 2010 regarding the physical fitness test of professional soldiers [Dz. Of Laws of 2010, No. 27, item 133], § 7 and the Ordinance of the Minister of National Defense of December 17, 2013, amending the ordinance on the physical fitness test of professional soldiers [Dz. Of Laws of 2013, item 1634]. [14] Cf: Gender and Security – Female Military Service in Social Perspective – History, Present Days, Law and Communication , Proceedings of the 4thWorld Conference on

82 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR

Women’s Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 18-29, source: http://tiikmpublishing.com/data/conferences/doi/wcws/wcws.2018.3203.pdf [15] Cf: B. Drapikowska, Innowacyjne podejście do polityki rodzinnej w Siłach Zbrojnych RP, [in:] W. Kieżun, J. Wołejszo, T. Całkowski (ed.), Public Management 2014. Innowacyjność w procesach zarządzania i dowodzenia organizacjami publicznymi, AON, Warsaw 2014. [16] Announcement of the Minister of Labor and Social Policy of December 23, 1997 regarding the publication of a uniform text of the Act - Labor Code [Dz. Of Laws of 1998 No. 21, item 94], art. 180. [17] Act of 11 September 2003 on the military service of soldiers ..., ed. cit., art. 65. [18] Poland – The National Report 2011, źródło: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50327.htm [access: 25.07.2012]. [19] Act of 11 September 2003 on the military service of soldiers ..., ed. cit., art.134. [20] Raport służba kobiet w Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 2007 r., p. 2-3. [21] Act of 11 September 2003 on the military service of soldiers., ed. cit., art. 65 p. 2 and 3. [22] Ibidem, art. 50a p. 3. [23]Ibidem, art. 65 p. 4. [24] Decision No. 445 / MON of the Minister of National Defense of December 30, 2013 regarding the implementation of the General Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland [Dz. Office. Ministry of National Defense from 2013, item 398], p. 96. [25] Ibidem, p. 97. [26] Ibidem, p. 149. [27] Rada ds. Kobiet w SZ RP. Historia – w decyzjach MON, source: http://www.wojsko -polskie.pl/download/tmp/2012-08-23/e2c6679af8c430b206c8d596fc2751f3historia_w_ decyzjach.pdf [acces: 20.06.2014]. [28] B. Szubińska, 5 lat funkcjonowania Rady ds. Kobiet w Siłach Zbrojnych RP, [w:] Wojskowa służba kobiet w Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, E. Wieczorek (ed.), Polskie Przedsiębiorstwo Geodezyjno-Kartograficzne S.A. Drukarnia KART, Warsaw 2004, s. 7. [29] Decision no. 157/ MOD, ed. quoted., § 1 pt 2. [30] Wojskowa służba kobiet w Siłach Zbrojnych Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, E. Wieczorek (ed.), Polskie Przedsiębiorstwo Geodezyjno-Kartograficzne S.A. Drukarnia KART, Warsaw 2004. [31] European Parliament resolution on participation of women in peaceful conflict resolution (2000/2025(INI)), source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do? pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2000-0541+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [access: 20.09.2014]. [32] Security Council Resolution 1325 - Women, peace and security, [in:] Women - peace - security. Documents and materials, B. Szubińska (ed.), Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw 2011, p.52. [33] Ibidem, p. 53. [34] M. Ratschka, 10 lat rezolucji Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ nr 1325 (2000), source: http://www.unic.un.org.pl/aktualnosci/26,2179,,2011,/ [access: 22.09.2014]. [35] Bi-S.C. Strategic Command Directive. 40-1 on the "Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and issues related to gender equality, including protection measures during armed conflict, to NATO command structures, [in:] Kobiety – pokój – bezpieczeństwo…, op. cit., p. 37.

83 MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN THE POLISH SECURITY SECTOR

[36] Kobiety w WP – statystyki, source: http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/pages/kobiety-w- wp-statystyki-t/ [access: 05.07.2018]. [37] For more information: B. Drapikowska, Military participation of women in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, Scientific Journal AON, Kwartalnik nr 2 (91), Warsaw 2013. [38] Rada ds. Kobiet w SZ RP – statystyki, op. cit. [39] Wojsko Polskie: Statystyki, source: http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/sily-zbrojne- rp/wojskowa-sluzba-kobiet/statystyki/20151,statystyki.html [acces: 01.03.2014]. [40] Statystyki. Stan na 01.07.2014 r., source: http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/sily- zbrojne-rp/wojskowa-sluzba-kobiet/statystyki/31669,statystyki.html [access: 10.10.2014]. [41] Professional service: women's military service, source: https://archiwum2019- bip.mon.gov.pl/przydatne-informacje/artykul/sluzba-zawodowa/wojskowa-suzba-kobiet- 10325478/ [access: 01.10.2019]. [42] I. Urych, Potencjał obronny klas wojskowych . Teoretyczno-empiryczne aspekty kształcenia obronnego, ASzWoj, Warsaw 2019, p. 234.

84 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL.

Vlad DUMITRACHE, Associate Professor PhD.,

Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies – NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre, Brasov, Romania

Abstract: Since the 2% budget allocation for defense expenditures has been approved by NATO countries several member states have tried to reach this objective. However even though the allocation of 2% of the budget has been achieved, real expenditures of the 2% budget have had several shortfalls. It is the aim of this paper to analyze the difference between allocations and expenditures for several countries, while also taking into consideration the impact this allocation has on the PPBEES process and some of its vital stages.

Key words: allocation, expenditures, PPBEES process, NATO commitment

1. Introduction The PPBS tool has long been a subject of analysis. While most focus has gone into understanding the three original phases, the Planning, Programing and Budgeting Phase it is the aim of this paper to focus the Execution Phase of the Process. Over the years the PPBS has been described as a strategic level process that has the aim of linking plans to budget and therefore create resources management system (RMS). Through the RMS the original purpose of the Department of Defense in the US was to develop analytical capabilities that would answer questions like decision making, choosing between alternatives, public auctions, tenders and offers, procurement, life cycle cost and so on. If we were to realize a short history of the PPBS we could say that this process was first implemented at the idea of President Dwight Eisenhower, former General of the during the Second World War. It was Eisenhower who understood that because of scarce resources the DoD has a challenge in managing how this resources are spent and that the United States ran the risk of having duplicate expenditures between its own armed forces like the navy, army or air force. It was for this reason that Robert McNamara became Secretary of State and as former RAND Corporation member and a former FORD director he was asked to innovate in the field of defense resources management. As a result Robert McNamara proposed the PPBS system as a solution to the so called “defense management challenge” and developed a tool to try and better connect planning to budgeting. That tool became the new phase inside the PPBS, the Programing Phase. A medium term planning device, it helped connect planning goals and objectives to the final outputs in terms of capabilities, equipment, personnel. [1] The PPBS also tries to answer to another fundamental economic problem- the tradeoffs among multiple competing objectives or goals given constrained resources. Therefore the PPBS

85 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL

offered the possibility for the decision makers to use different instruments and tools for analysis from life-cycle cost, to cost benefit analysis or cost effectiveness analysis. In the end the PPBS became a merger of different types of budgeting that put together offered end users a much easier platform to use. The three budgets that together built the PPBS were:  Control Budget (input/resource focus)  Management Budget (activity/output focus)  Planning Budget (output/outcome focus)

As we can see by aligning this three types of budgeting together they focus on inputs and outputs of different types. [2] The PPBS brought the management science which focuses on effectiveness and efficiency in defense resources analysis. Therefore in terms of how the DoD used PPBS we can say that the PPBS became a tool that helped in different fields like: • Strategic Planning • Program development • Resources determination • Budget justification and execution

The aim to implement this system was to help Mods in NATO member states including US to better link missions to resources and to plan and budget beyond the next fiscal year.

2. Challenges in Long term, medium term and short term planning.

The PPBS has changed the dimension of planning bases on time frames. Because of its conception, the programming phase has actually became an example of medium term planning, while budgeting has become an example of short term, yearly planning which of course leaves planning to actually mean long term planning. This is important when we think about actual execution of the budget because we are used to identifying shortfalls when we pass from long term to short term planning, or from planning to budgeting. [3] We are used to adjust what we originally plan because in real life experience, what we are actually going to budget will be slightly different that we had originally planned. Experience and scientific models or examples tell us that in the end we budget less than we have originally planned. Why is that? We tend to consider that the errors are in our decision making matrixes and we do not fully grasp the true nature of how scarce resources really are and therefore we plan with a different level of ambition that what we can actually afford to budget. But what if the explanation stands elsewhere? If we look at the graph below [4] we will see that defense expenditures have been going down in NATO states after the cold war. Of course, that all finished after the Crimea Crisis and the NATO Summit of Wales in 2014, when NATO countries agreed to increase their defense budget. But if for around 25 years the defense budget has been going down globally and since long term planning takes into consideration a time frame of more than 10 years while short time planning means a time frame of one year wouldn’t it be natural that we are left year by year with

86 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL

smaller budget and therefore our only solution is to adjust downwards in spending because the financial ceilings become less and less than what we originally planned for?

Fig 1. Defense Expenditures as a share of GDP

This dilemma has the purpose of showing us just how important the Execution phase of the PPBS actually is. And if we were used to adjust downward to regulate de expenses matched with what we have planned, will we not have difficulties now that the budget is going upwards when again we are faced with executing something that will outmatch what we can plan especially on short term?

3. The Execution Phase following the 2% of GDP expenditures commitment in NATO

To understand how countries execute the budget we first must look at a pictures of how countries that are members of NATO have managed to increase their budget when in comes down to trying to reach that 2% objective from the budget. This is will be described in the following figure, Figure 2:

87 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL

Fig 2. Defense expenditures as %of GDP 2018

As we can see in the figures above there are countries that have managed to reach the 2% in allocation like the Baltic States, Poland and Great Britain and countries that are close to the 2% like Romania who has pledged by law to allocate 2% of the Budget to Defense Expenditures. However one must note that allocation is not the same with execution. That’s why for a country like Romania even though the allocation is declared 2% as we can see in the figure above in reality expenditures only add up to 1.8% This constitutes a challenge as countries that were used to allocate less than 1.5 to their defense budget are not used to plan their defense expenditures in order to consume yearly budgets that go to 2%. The reason for which this is difficult comes down to bureaucracy, slow public auction process, legislative burden, budget reallocation at six months and decision factors that cannot match the one year time frame. It is for this reason that the Execution phase of the PPBS model has become more important than it used to be. There are countries that separate the budgeting or allocation part from the execution part, like the US and Canada. This approach is natural for the two states mentioned before as they work with multiannual budgets. For a country like Romania the situation is different as Romania is used to developing the budgeting and execution side of the PPBS as an integrated process not a separate one.

88 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL

The question that appears next is whether other countries that don’t allocate 2% of GDP do it because they have not planned for such an expenditures or just like in the case of Romania even though they have committed to the 2% expenditures on defense they cannot physically commit to this percentage when it comes down to actually executing the budget. To have a better look at countries that have not yet met the 2% margin on defense expenditures we will observe Figure 3:

Fig.3 Defense Expenditures as a share of GDP

From the figure above we can conclude that more than two thirds of all NATO member states have not increased their budget to 2% yet. However we can see that all member states have started to increase their budget since 2014 when the Crimean Crisis take place and the NATO commitment in Wales for increased defense expenditures was approved. So for countries that are going to be faced in the following years with increased defense expenditures it is important that they don’t face the same challenge as Romania, of having a gap between what they allocate and what they are actually able to spend. The means of how this can be realized will be presented in the conclusion part of this paper.

4. Conclusions

89 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL

One of the essential steps that needs to be taken is that of adapting the legislative pillar, the law so that the defense budget is not affected by different changes in reallocation and can be blocked and kept for more than the fiscal year and overlap into the following fiscal year. The easiest way to realize this would be to change the yearly budget into multiannual budget approach. This model that is used in the US would suit a country like Romania for example that has difficulties in tracing its defense expenditures from year to year, and would help in medium term planning as well, which is in the end one of the core PPBS request as it represents the development of the programing phase. If this is not possible than countries having difficulties in executing the allocated budget should at least try and split de budgeting and execution phases in the PPBS process and have specialist work separately in the two phases with hope that a two dimension view of the expenditure challenge would help the process run smoother and the allocated money actually be consumed. A final take way from this challenge is what happens if defense budget get even bigger than 2%. Because one of the discussion in the NATO Summit in Wales was that for a long term projection such expenditures should go to even 3% of the budget. If that is the case what would countries that have trouble execution 2% do when they have to execute even more than that? The previous solutions offered here might help or they might not be enough and other decision making and managerial options should be looked at. For this reason this paper is just a step in trying to present the right direction for executing defense budgets in NATO countries. It is the authors opinion that further research on the situation at the hand is to be developed in order for a correct PPBS process to actually be developed in all NATO member states and for defense expenditures to be spend wisely and efficient.

References:

[1] Lewis, L, Thie, H., J., Brown, R., A., Shrader, J., Y., Improving the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), The Planning Phase Rand Corporation, RAND Monograph Online, 2000 [2] Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, Understanding the PPBE Process, 2013 [3] Howorth, Joylon, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, The European Union Series (Paperback 315pp ed.). Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, ISBN 978-0-333 [4] Organisation, Press & Media – Presse & Médias, 2019 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf [5] , MAE, ROMANIA'S PERMANENT DELEGATION to NATO, 2019

90 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

Alin GHEORGHE

Romanian Armed Forces, Romania

Abstract: This paper is a description of SWOT analysis used as a tool for organizations’ strategic development. The study is examining the SWOT Analysis from a theoretical stand point, as a decision making tool for an organization to plan its future development. SWOT Analysis is but one of the methods used by decision makers and their staff to evaluate the organization by assessing the ‘strengths’, ‘weaknesses’, ‘opportunities’ and ‘threats’ pertaining that specific organization. Throughout the study the SWOT analysis is first explained from the decision maker perspective, with a focus on advantages- disadvantages and the limitations of this method, and then each component is described. Finally the study provides a Romanian Joint National Training Center SWOT Analysis as a case study.

Key words: Vision; Mission; SWOT Matrix; Strategic Planning; Master plan;

1. Introduction

Any organization, civilian and/or military, is striving to meet their leaders’ vision by achieving /accomplishing its mission and objectives, and setting its future for success through strategic planning. The decision makers are using specific frameworks to conduct analysis of their organization, make decisions and implement specific actions in order to fulfil organization’s strategic vision. Vision is the start point for an organization change or upgrade. The decision maker is required to provide his/her staff an envisioned image of the organization future development and capabilities. The vision describes in broad terms what the organization needs to accomplish in a medium/long term. Therefore, leaders with vision are paramount for organizational strategic development and success. The clearer the vison the easier is for the staff to develop a strategic plan to achieve the envisioned end state. The organization’s mission is the next mandatory statement to be developed to support the vision. Missions define what an organization is striving to be in the long run and what it wants to avoid while doing so. Out of mission statement specific objectives or goals are drawn and pointed out as milestones into the strategic plan to accomplish the mission and meet the envisioned end state or vision. These critical milestones could define the success or failure of the organization strategic development plan.

91 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

In order for a sound strategic plan to be developed a thorough analysis needs to be conducted, and SWOT analysis is one of the tools that can be used to determine what is the organization status quo, to actually see what the organization looks like at a specific moment in time, by analyzing from an internal perspective, dealing with organization’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as from an external perspective, talking about opportunities and threats. When conducting analysis from an external perspective, a unit detects the critical threats and opportunities within the foreseeable future needed to be addressed in order to accomplish the mission. At the same time it allows the leaders to see what the possible adversary is likely to evolve and how the implications of that evolution would actually affect the threats and opportunities that unit is about to deal with. From the internal perspective analysis an unit identifies its strengths and weaknesses. As well as an understanding of which of its resources and capabilities are likely to provide a decisive advantage over the adversary. The results of this analysis provide courses of action leaders need to consider in order to make an informed, timely, and sometimes, bold decision for the organization’s strategic development. Once a strategic development decision has been made there are steps to be taken in order to develop a strategic plan, with specific actions, goals, objectives, timeline, and evaluation criteria. Implementing these specific actions, meeting the goals and objectives in the agreed timely fashion could actually tell the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful organization.

2. What is SWOT analysis?

“SWOT Analysis is a simple but powerful tool for sizing up an organization’s resource capabilities and deficiencies, its opportunities, and the external threats to its future”[1]. SWOT Analysis is a planning tool used to evaluate the internal Strengths and Weaknesses, as well as external Opportunities, and Threats of an organization/unit. A result of a SWOT Analysis is a list of strategic improvement opportunities that could bring decisive advantages over competition or adversaries. The analysis is two folded. On one hand it identifies the internal and external factors that could help or, on the contrary could hinder, achieving a goal or strategic objective. Every identified factor needs to be analysed on the probability of occurrence and associated with respective facilitating or mitigating measures. On the other hand, once these factors are identified, for Weaknesses and Threats, mitigation measures must be carefully planned in order to decrease the probability of occurrence and/or magnitude of impact. As mentioned above, the leader’s vision and organization’s mission, as well as the envisioned strategic goals and objectives, are the guideline for driving the SWOT analysis. All these are the main factors to be considered when conducting a SWOT analysis, or any other analysis for that matter. Once the internal and external analysis is complete a strategic decision is made and an action plan is being developed in order to implement the agreed improvement measures as well as the mitigation measures for any identified external threats.

1 THOMPSON, A. A., STRICKLAND, A. J. & GAMBLE, J. E. (2007). Crafting and Executing Strategy- Concepts and Cases, (15th Edition), USA: McGrawHill/Irwin.

92 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

VISION VISION INTERNAL STRATEGIC STRATEGIC DECISION IMPLEMENTATION EXTERNAL MISSION

ANALYSIS

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OBJECTIVES SWOT Fig.1ANALYSIS - The Strategic Management Process

The SWOT Analysis provides strong and weak factors of an organization that are identified by examining the elements in its environment while environmental opportunities and threats are determined by examining the elements outside its environment. Strengths and opportunities are helpful to achieve the organizational objectives. They are favourable for organizations. Weaknesses and threats are hindering to achieving the organizational objectives. They are harmful for organizations. A thorough and detailed analysis of the organization’s internal strengths and weaknesses characteristic to the internal environment and the opportunities and threats that are characteristic for the external environment becomes the very basis of a successful strategy choice that meets the expected outcome for the organization, by balancing the organization’s strengths and weaknesses in the light of environmental opportunities and threats. Organizational Strengths: “A strength is something an organization is good at doing or a characteristic the organization has that gives it an important capability”[2]. This is what any organization strive to foster within its environment. Organizational strengths are the factors adding value for own organization over competitors’ or adversaries’. Along with opportunities, the strengths are paramount into achieving organizations’ goals and objectives.

Organizational weaknesses: “A weakness is something an organization lacks or does poorly -in comparison to others- or a condition that puts it at a disadvantage”[3] Even though it has a negative connotation, weaknesses, if correctly identified, could turn out into a positive result by developing a plan or specific actions in order to overcome them, thus contributing to improving organization’s status quo and therefore decisively contribute to achieving organization’s end state. Sometimes identifying and overcoming organization’s weaknesses can be more important than using the existing strengths.

Environmental Opportunities: “Opportunities are conditions in the external environment that allow an organization to take advantage of organizational strengths, overcome organizational weaknesses or neutralize environmental threats” [4]. The importance of identifying the opportunities in a timely fashion to be considered for

2 THOMPSON, A. A. & STRICKLAND, A. J. (1989). Strategy Formulation and Implementation, (4th Edition), USA: Irwin, Inc. 3 Ibidem 4 HARRISON, J. S. & St. JOHN, C. H. (2004). Foundations in Strategic Management, (3.Baskı), USA: South Western.

93 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER strategic planning is of the outmost importance for the decision makers. Opportunities refer to either time and/or actions needed to be taken in order to create an advantage over the competition. Opportunities are those that would provide positive results for the organization, as a result of the analysis of the environment.

Environmental Threats: For organizational managements, a threat is the element that makes it difficult or impossible to reach the organizational goals. Threats are the situations that come out as a result of the changes in the distant or the immediate environment that would prevent the organization from maintaining its existence or lose its superiority in competition, and that are not favourable for the organization.[5] (Ülgen and Mirze, 2010: 161). Identifying the environmental threats is one of the most difficult tasks for the staff to accomplish. Once correctly identified mitigation measures are employed inside and/or outside the organization to protect it and be able to meet the aforementioned objectives and goals

3. A SWOT analysis of the Romanian Joint National Training Center

The Romanian Joint National Training Center (JNTC), situated in Cincu, Romania, is the largest training capability used for collective training, both for national and partner/allied countries units, in a joint and multinational environment. JNTC has a 100 years old history, being used over time in different ways to train Romanian units. It started as a live fire range first for artillery and units and evolved all the way to being able nowadays to conduct joint, multinational exercises. The Land Forces HQ chief vision on JNTC is to become a South East European Regional training center capable of conducting national and multinational training events, across the full spectrum of operations up to division level using cutting edge real, constructive and virtual simulation systems. JNTC mission is to conduct collective training for the Romanian/partner/allied units’ HQs and their staff, and subordinate units in order to increase their readiness level for conducting operations across the spectrum of operations by using a combination of existing simulation systems, as well as live fire capabilities. JNTC’s key tasks: 1) Training leaders and staffs for Romanian and multinational units to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict 2) Develop CIS infrastructure to support national and multinational exercises 3) Develop specific training programs for individual and collective training 4) Develop a complex training capability using cutting edge techniques, technology and equipment from modelling/simulation domain as well as real simulation 5) Develop the facilities and infrastructure to support individual and collective live fire exercises 6) Connect the Romanian National Simulation Network (JNTC is the lead stakeholder) to NATO simulation training network. JNTC is a regional simulation network hub for regional training events.

5 ÜLGEN, H. & MİRZE, S. K. (2010). İşletmelerde Stratejik Yönetim, (5. Baskı), İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım.

94 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

7) JNTC becomes a certified regional training center for both Romanian and multinational units training for any mission in any operational environment 8) Develop JNTC’s logistic support infrastructure to sustain all exercises participants JNTC level of ambition and major objective: By 2021 JNTC reaches full operational capability and becomes a regional training center using cutting edge simulation systems, technology and equipment to support combined arms and joint training events. There are also specific objectives established for JNTC such as: 1) Connect with national, NATO and European simulation training networks 2) Develop the necessary capabilities to conduct joint, multi-echelon, distributed, and integrated training events up to division level, in a multinational context Based on the above elements the JNTC’s SWOT analysis can identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that are to be used to make a plan in order to meet the established objectives.

Strengths Weaknesses

- Strong reputation / training - Lack of personnel experience - Limited maneuver space

- Skilled JNTC cadre - Limited life support capacity - Training Capacity & framework - Limited maintenance capacity - Technology - Life cycle of SIM systems - Commitment Opportunities Threats

- Use different funding streams for - Surrounding countries training

capabilities development facilities - Regional countries contributing to - High prices of SIM systems life JNTC training capability pool cycle replacement - Romanian authorities commitment - ROUNATSIMNET vulnerabilities to spend 2% of GDP on defense - Personnel burnout Fig. 2 – JNTC SWOT analysis matrix

JNTC Strengths: - Strong reputation / training experience Based on recent JNTC history and all the training events conducted within the last 12 years this training center has built a strong reputation throughout the Romanian units but even more throughout the partner and allied units that benefited of the outstanding training experience JNTC has provided. The After Action Reviews conducted after each exercise

95 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER brought up things to be improved pertaining the training events as well as positive remarks on aspects that needed to be maintained. For all the training events JNTC has provided the best training capability Romanian Land Forces has been able to offer for all participants building up reputation on the realism of the training environment, the simulation systems used, professional after actions reviews provided to units, JNTC cadre experience, and the partnership with the US Army Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) from Hohenfels Germany, which provided the initial train the trainer program for JNTC personnel. - Skilled JNTC cadre As mentioned above, most of the JNTC cadre have been trained at JMRC and learned and implemented the way to conduct an efficient training event using specific simulation systems and specific techniques for the unit to benefit the best from the training experience. - Training Capacity & framework Training at JNTC provides the capacity and the framework for up to a brigade HQ and three using constructive simulation, two battalions using real simulation and one company using virtual simulation system. The live fire ranges can fit up to a maneuver battalion as well as fixed and rotary wing platforms to conduct live fire exercises. - Technology JNTC is the only training center in Romania providing a training experience using all three simulation systems in an integrated manner, providing one single common operational picture for the training audience. At the same time JNTC is the Romanian hub when conducting distributed exercises with other European simulation training centers using constructive simulation systems. - Commitment There is an enduring Land Forces HQ as well as JNTC leadership commitment to continue improving the training experience in Cincu by using all the existing ways and means to deliver it, but at the same time build new capabilities for future exercises.

JNTC Weaknesses: - Lack of personnel JNTC manpower was developed to cover all the tasks associated with JNTC mission. The current manning however is not at the level to be sufficient to cover all the tasks when conducting exercises. Therefore augmentation is key to fill all the positions JNTC cannot cover. The problem is that the augmentees are not experienced enough and the training experience could potentially be affected. - Limited maneuver space With a maneuver space of about 103 square kilometers JNTC can only accommodate up to one maneuver battalion and a combat support battalion conducting training simultaneously. - Limited life support capacity Life support is another shortfall that needs to be addressed. With a capacity of accommodating approximately 1,500 soldiers on hard top buildings and feeding capacity up to 1,500 soldiers there is a limited capability to conduct an exercise with more than a brigade HQ and two battalions. For bigger exercises augmented life support for the participants is required. - Limited maintenance capacity

96 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

JNTC’s maintenance capabilities can only fit the needs of JNTC’s vehicles and equipment. For all exercises supplementary maintenance capacity is to be considered. - Life cycle of SIM systems All JNTC’s simulation systems and equipment are now towards the end of their life cycle and need either upgrades or replacement. This requires funding streams either national and/or allied funding programs. Time is also a negative factor to be considered in accessing any of the fund streams for equipment life cycle renewal.

JNTC Opportunities - Use different funding streams for capabilities development As mentioned above there are multiple funding streams that could be used for future projects to improve JNTC training capabilities. NATO through NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), US through Foreign Military Sales (FMF), Foreign Military Funds (FMF), and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), as well as national funds are all choices to be considered for funding projects. - Regional countries contributing to JNTC training capability pool When declared as a Regional Joint Training Center other regional partners and/or allies could contribute to improve the training capability and in return use its facilities to train their troops in Cincu. - Romanian authorities commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense After the last NATO summit, a political commitment in Romania has been agreed upon to allocate 2% of Romania’s GDP for defense spending for the next ten years. The training is a major component for readiness level of the units committed to NATO and other missions under different organizations. Therefore there are good chances for more funds to be allocated for JNTC’s future projects.

JNTC Threats - Surrounding countries training facilities Most of the surrounding countries have been built their own combat training centers. These centers are now competitors for JNTC to attract NATO or US funds in the region for improving training capabilities. - High prices of Simulations systems life cycle replacement As mentioned JNTC’s SIM systems built in the early 2000s are now towards the end of their life cycle. Any upgrade or replacement of any of the SIM systems are very expensive and cannot be done all at once. The new SIM systems and technologies are offering perhaps more capabilities but at a higher price. - ROUNATSIMNET vulnerabilities As any other computer network working online, ROUNATSIMNET is exposed to digital threats that could affect the execution of national or multinational distributed exercises. - Personnel burnout Due to the JNTC manning level and considering the number of training activities planned to be yearly conducted at Cincu, personnel fatigue is a negative factor already affecting JNTC’s men and women working to support all exercises. The results of the SWOT analysis should be quantified and combined with gap filling priorities to establish a comprehensive prioritization within a Master Plan that addresses at least the medium term future.

97 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

After all the above aspects have been analyzed , personally, I would develop a strength and opportunities focused JNTC development strategy, yet without ignoring addressing the weaknesses and potential mitigation measures for the identified threats. In this SO strategy the strengths need to be maintained and fostered with the new coming personnel, and at the same time the development opportunities have to be the thrust for JNTC to reach its level of ambition and major objective. Moreover, the identified weaknesses are to be addressed and eliminated or at least diminished through an aggressive advertisement for new personnel to join the JNTC team and prioritized projects focused on increasing life support capacity. A medium to long term plan to add more maneuver space into JNTC is also a must to fit the continuous increasing request for training at Cincu. Even though there is no silver bullet to be sure that the JNTC is going to meet its level of ambition, I believe that a sound strategy, thoroughly analyzed, endorsed by the higher echelons and supported by JNTC’s partners is most probable to provide the highest chance to reach the desired end state.

4. Conclusion

The SWOT analysis has been a used over the years as a technique in the analysis of internal and external environments to provide insights for strategic decision. SWOT involves to determine objectives and to identify the internal and external factors which are advantageous and disadvantageous to achieve those objectives. Strengths and weaknesses are studied while considering current and future opportunities and threats. For JNTC case study the SWOT analysis is just one of the tools used by its leadership and staff to determine the status quo of the organization, the external threats that need to be mitigated and the opportunities that need to be pursued or taken in order to improve JNTC in planning, preparing and conducting the training events and provide a better training environment for the Romanian and/or partner/allied units. The result is a Master Plan or a road map comprising the objectives needed to be achieved and the threats and weaknesses that need to be addressed.

References:

[1] THOMPSON, A. A., STRICKLAND, A. J. & GAMBLE, J. E. (2007). Crafting and Executing Strategy-Concepts and Cases, (15th Edition), USA: McGrawHill/Irwin. [2] THOMPSON, A. A. & STRICKLAND, A. J. (1989). Strategy Formulation and Implementation, (4th Edition), USA: Irwin, Inc. [3] HARRISON, J. S. & St. JOHN, C. H. (2004). Foundations in Strategic Management, (3.Baskı), USA: South Western. [4] ÜLGEN, H. & MİRZE, S. K. (2010). İşletmelerde Stratejik Yönetim, (5. Baskı), İstanbul: Beta Basım Yayım. [5] GÜREL, E. & TAT, M., SWOT Analysis – A theoretical review, available online at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emet_Guerel/publication/319367788_SWOT_ANAL YSIS_A_THEORETICAL_REVIEW, retrieved on 28May2019.

98 SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT. CASE STUDY AT THE ROMANIAN JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

[6] DEALTRY, R. (1992). Dynamic SWOT Analysis: Developer’s Guide, : Dynamic SWOT Associates. [7] CHERMACK, T. J. & KASSHANNA, B. K. (2007). The use and misuse of SWOT Analysis and implications for HRD professionals, Human Resource Development, 10 (4) [8] WEIHRICH, H. (1982). The TOWS Matrix- A Tool for Situational Analysis, Long Range Planning, 15 (2). [9] HUMPHREY, S. A. (2005). SWOT Analysis for Management Consulting, SRI Alumni Association Newsletter, December.

99 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION

Associate Professor Piotr Grochmalski

National Security Faculty , War Studies University , Warsaw, Poland

Abstract: The article analyses the consequences of the strategic rivalry of the People's Republic of China with the United States for global leadership. It takes place in the area of culture, economy and technology. Both sides are attaching increasing importance to research into artificial intelligence. The US and the PRC recognise that this is the most important area of confrontation. A country that will creates advanced artificial intelligence algorithms will have a strategic advantage over its opponent. At the root of the conflict lies a fundamentally different axiology of both societies, as well as different strategic cultures of both countries. Mutual incomprehension greatly limits the possibility of avoiding confrontation. The growing race between the United States and China for domination in the AI is the most dangerous conflict in the history of the world. It has no precedent. The country that wins it will have a huge strategic advantage over its opponent. The leaders of the USA and the PRC still see the possibility of reaching a consensus. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. Deng Xiaoping's strategy has brought China a renaissance of power. The current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has denied Deng's political will. He accumulated more power than Mao Zedong had. This reduces the chances of a peaceful solution to the growing US-China confrontation.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; United States; Republic of China; strategic advantage; deep learning; US Strategy on China; China Strategy on US

Introduction The world is changing and with it the limits of its interpretation and interpretation of our place in it. Bartosz Brożek says that "Changes in the image of the world - especially in its central part - cannot be immediate. This is usually a long evolutionary process, not a one-off revolution” [Brożek, 2018, p. 233]. The evolution of the boundaries of interpretation poses the problem of the so-called bifurcation point, in which the imbalance system is in a critical point. "The smallest accidental fluctuation can tilt the scales and irrevocably determine the future fate of the system” [Ball, 2007, p. 141]. This situation refers to the area of physics concerning thermodynamics of imbalance. It cannot be directly transposed to social reality, but it is well characterized by the features of a set, which is characterized by high complexity. Manuel Castels, in three publications that provide a concise description of the ongoing processes of transformation and modernization in the modern world ("The Rise of The Network Society" [8], "The Power of Identity" [10], "The End of the Millennium" [9]), points out that, increasingly, under the influence of technology, our social structures have undergone profound transformations. The Internet, artificial neural networks, algorithms, machine learning, nanotechnologies, format and impose new forms of social and personal activity on us. We are facing the challenges posed by science and technology, which may be an imbalance system approaching a critical point. There is still no general theory to describe complexity [Barrow, 2005, p. 163]. However, in recent years, a complex structure has been identified that has intrigued researchers. It was called self-organized critical state (self-organizing critically, SoC) [Barrow, 2005, p. 163]. The Internet, equipped with qasi-intelligent algorithms, can undergo

100 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION such a structural form of critical self-organization and aim at the so-called bifurcation point in relation to society. As humanity, since the second half of the 20th century we have had sufficient resources to cause a global disaster. John D. Barrow believes that "scientific cultures, of our own kind, must contain the seeds of our own destruction” [Barrow, 2005, p. 135]. This English physicist and mathematician notes that "a propensity for short-term benefits rather than ultra long-term planning will not allow us to stop catastrophes that are slowly and gradually becoming more and more real, albeit imperceptible, in the course of one human life” [Barrow, 2005, p. 135]. The risk of a potential catastrophe for mankind seems to be inscribed in the civilization development, which is accelerating more and more. Ray Kurzwail notes that in the 21st century we will witness not a hundred years of technological progress, but a progress of 20,000 years (in relation to today's rate of progress, of course) or a thousand times greater than that achieved in the 20th century [Kurzwail, 2013, p. 26]. The phenomenon of social time falling apart from technological time will continue to grow. This disharmony will put increasing pressure on the search for technical tools to overcome it. But the distance will be logarithmically increasing, not decreasing. During human life, the next "generations" of technology will die, and their duration will be radically shortened. Ray Kurzwail, one of the most eminent AI theorists and practitioners and the main authority in the transhumanist community, believes that the development of artificial intelligence will result in a process of progressive human-machine integration, resulting in a new form of integration of a biological being with a digital entity. Nick Bostrom, head of the Institute for the Future of Humanity at Oxford Martin School, does not share Kurzwail's optimism. He believes that the natural consequence of man's creation of artificial intelligence will be its further development, until it radically becomes smarter than all mankind. After reaching a critical point, it can gain a strategic advantage over us. Bostrom has introduced the concept of superintelligence [Bostrom, 2014] into scientific discourse. In his view, it is any mind with many times greater cognitive and creative abilities in any area of activity than the global potential of all human minds. Both positions indicate, however, that we are approaching this point of bifurcation for the development of research on AI. Competition between the USA and the PRC for world domination will accelerate the process of development of modern technologies and research on artificial intelligence. Competition between the USA and the PRC for world domination is likely to accelerate the process of developing new technologies and research on artificial intelligence. Both countries are already on the brink of economic war. May 10, 2019. The United States has introduced customs duties on Chinese products worth USD 200 billion. In response, China has taken retaliatory measures worth US$60 billion. Odd Arne Westad predicts in Foreign Affairs that we may be on the eve of a conflict that will be similar to the Cold War [Westad, pp. 86-95]. The risk of conflict between the United States and China has also worried a Harvard professor, Graham Allison [Allison, 2017]. Separating the predictable from the unpredictable is a difficult job. But we can accurately anticipate fundamental trends in world events. A large part of what American intelligence does are forecasts of global political and economic trends. However, this did not prevent the USA from making a strategic mistake in assessing its relations with China. Their consequence is a dynamic growth of the power of the PRC. The United States has twenty thousand intelligence analysts who do everything that is important for US interests in the world. In the article, based on analytical methods, we will try to verify three fundamental theses: I. The growing escalation of the conflict between the USA and China results, among other things, from a different strategic culture of both countries.

2

101 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION

II. Between the United States and China, the most dangerous and unpredictable arms race in the history of mankind is taking place to gain a strategic advantage over the opponent thanks to AI. III. The American-Chinese race for strategic dominance in the field of artificial intelligence can lead to the creation of a superintelligence that will become independent of humanity.

1. Different strategic culture in USA and in China. The modern western concept of international relations appeared in the 16th and 17th centuries. The structure of Europe disintegrated into a group of countries of approximately equal strength. No country was strong enough to improve its will. The concepts of sovereignty and legal equality of states became the basis of international law and diplomacy. However, China has never been involved in permanent contact with another country on an equal footing. Why? Because they have never met societies of comparable culture and size. The Chinese elite were convinced of the uniqueness of China, which was not simply a great civilization among others, but the only real civilization. According to the Chinese, the natural order of the universe was the existence of a number of smaller states that accepted Chinese culture and paid tribute to China. As H. Kissinger notes “ Not only was the scale of China traditionally far beyond that of the European states in population and in territory; until the Industrial Revolution, China was far richer” [Kissinger, 2012, p. 11]. Samuel Huntington reminded the world in the mid-1990s in his loud work "The Clash of Civilizations" that in 1750 China produced about one third of global production and the West about one fifth [Huntington, 2000, p. 114]. This situation lasted until the 1820s. There's no exaggeration in Kissinger's statement that he says “In fact, China produced a greater share of total GDP than any Western society in eighteen of the last twenty centuries” [Kissinger, 2012, pp. 11-12]. A characteristic feature of China in history is its great pragmatism. It is one of the main reasons for the fundamental difference in the Chinese and Western approaches to strategy. In Chinese tradition, strategic culture is an integral part of one whole - past and future, weakness and strength - everything is interrelated. "Strategy and statecraft become means of 'combative coexistence' with opponents" [Kissinger, 2012, p. 31]. In this competition, the goal is to strengthen one's own advantage and push the opponent into a worse position. It is a process, part of a larger cycle. Kissinger aptly observes that "The most remarkable expression of China’s fundamental pragmatism was its reaction to conquerors. When foreign dynasts prevailed in battle, the Chinese bureaucratic elite would offer their services and appeal to their conquerors on the premise that so vast and unique a land as they had just overrun could be ruled only by use of Chinese methods, Chinese language, and the existing Chinese bureaucracy. With each generation, the conquerors would find themselves increasingly assimilated into the order they had sought to dominate. Eventually their own home territories – the launching points for their – would come to be regarded as part of China itself” [Kissinger, 2012, p. 22]. According to tradition, the most important Chinese strategic text "The Art of War, Sun Tzu" comes from the "Spring and Autumn" period of the Czou Dynasty and is to be written by Sun Wu, so it was written at the end of the 6th century BC [Rodziński, 1974, p. 51]. Another outstanding work "Military Methods" comes from the Warring Kingdoms period and was probably created by Sun Pin between 356 and 341 BC [Sun Tzu, 2014, p. 9]. During the Warring Kingdoms Period (475-221 BC), which is widely regarded as the golden age in the history of Chinese thought and philosophy, there was also a Chinese school of strategists. The Warring Kingdoms period also provides the first information about Weiqi, which is known in the west under the Japanese name of “go”. The Warring Kingdoms period also provides the first information about Weiqi, which is known in the west under the Japanese name of go. To this day, it is the basis for strategic education in China. In these oldest documents, strategy is not

3

102 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION so much an analysis of a specific situation as a definition of its links with the context in which it exists. This is reflected in the Chinese notion of shi - "potential energy" of the developing military situation - its developmental tendency. The concept of shi has no simple equivalent in Western culture. The essence of Chinese strategy is therefore the patient accumulation of relative advantage. This is a diametrically opposed approach to the Western approach. The classic of European strategic thought, Antoine-Henri Jomini, believed that the strategy consists of unchanging values, creating universal rules of warfare. In turn, Carl von Clausewitz emphasized the complexity of war as a phenomenon. He believed that circumstances differed so much in war that many factors had to be taken into account. There are no general, identical rules. A strategist responsible for evaluating the whole must have an intuition that sees the truth at every moment of the changing reality. However, they both believed that it was necessary to strive for a decisive blow to the opponent. This is the essence of Western strategic thinking. - the pursuit of a decisive clash of forces.

1.1. The growing escalation of the conflict between the USA and China as a result of the different strategic axiology of both countries. Most influential American analysts believed that China's accession to the world economy, its opening to globalization, would sooner or later lead to the democratization of the PRC. Successive American presidents also succumbed to pressure from large corporations, which claimed that cooperation with this giant market is economically, commercially and politically beneficial for the United States. This confirmed the rate of growth of mutual trade turnover - from USD 8 billion in 1986 to USD 578 billion in 2016. As B. Góralczyk notes: "Only now does it reach the Americans that they misjudged the situation and too often succumbed to the temptation to conquer the great Chinese market. They were driven by more short-term interests than by strategic imagination” [Góralczyk, 2018, p. 448]. The United States has long felt that it can understand China and influence its development. The United States has long had the external feeling that it is able to understand China and influence the direction of its development. In 1967, R. Nixon said, "The world cannot be safe until China changes. So our goal, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to bring about change" [Nixon, 1967, pp. 111-125]. Kurt M. Cambell, one of China's most influential analysts, rightly presents it “"Ever since, the assumption that deepening commercial, diplomatic, and cultural ties would transform China's internal development and external behavior has been a bedrock of U.S. strategy” [Cambell, 2018, p. 60]. These hopes turned out to be a very costly mistake. As the author notes “Diplomatic and commercial engagement have not brought political and economic openness. Neither U.S. military power nor regional balancing has stopped Beijing from seeking to displace core components of the U.S. - led system. And the liberal international order has failed to lure or bind China as powerfully as expected. China has instead pursued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in the process" [Cambell, 2018, p. 61]. The analyst, who for years co-created the erroneous strategy of the United States towards China, writes nowadays :"The starting point for a better approach is a new degree of humility about the United States' ability to change China. Neither seeking to isolate and weaken it nor trying to transform it for the better should be the lodestar of U.S. strategy in Asia. Washington should instead focus more on its own power and behavior, and the power and behavior of its allies and partners. Basing policy on a more realistic set of assumptions about China would better advance U.S. interests and put the bilateral relationship on a more sustainable footing. (...)... the first step is relatively straightforward: acknowledging just how much our policy has fallen short of our aspirations" [Cambell, 2018, p. 70].

4

103 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION

Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Secretary of State under the leadership of President George W. Bush, believes that since the beginning of the reforms in China, no country has done more to increase China's power than the United States. The United States itself has created the greatest threat to its global interests. For the first time, they are competing with a country with comparable economic potential and vast strategic experience based on a sense of its historical uniqueness [Christensen, 2015, Prologue]. Deng Xiao Ping was the main creator of the strategy for rebuilding China's power. It is worth remembering that Deng Xiaoping has a long military career behind it. He commanded the army that conquered Tibet in the 1950s. Then, as Secretary General of the CCP, after the "100 Flowers" campaign, he brutally exterminated the "anti-party elements" on the order of Mao Tze Tong. He was responsible for the so-called "big leap" in 1958-62. He was responsible for the so-called "big leap" in 1958-62. It led to the tragedy of the "great famine". According to F. Dikötter, the number of victims could reach 45 million people [Dikötter, 2013, p. 455]. This is considered to be the greatest famine in the history of the world, and Mao was at the mercy of the Cultural Revolution. These personal experiences had a major impact on his concept of modernising China and his strategy game with the USA. Deng Xiaoping left clues for his successors. They have the character of short advice (chengyu). They present China's strategy for the future. As B. Góralczyk notes, "he addressed his successors with the following recommendations and even commandments: - Lengjing guancha - to carefully observe the situation and analyse it coolly; - Yousuo zuowei - to attempt to contribute; - Wen zhu zhenjiao - to hold firmly to the ground and firmly defend your own interests; - Chenzhuo yingfu - to approach the changes in progress calmly and with confidence; - Shanyu shouzhuo - to be careful not to exalt yourself; - Juebu dang tou - do not try to be a leader; - Taoguang yanghui - the hide the skills and intentions” [Góralczyk, p. 161]. Especially the last three councils (chengyu) - shanyu shouzhuo, juebu dang tou and taoguang yanghui indicate that Deng recommended great caution in relations with the USA. He clearly recommended not to provoke the United States - to hide not only his potential but also elements of his own strategy. All the successive leaders of the PRC followed these principles. It was only Xi Jinping who openly broke these rules.

2. Between the United States and China, the most dangerous and unpredictable arms race in the history of mankind is taking place to gain a strategic advantage over the opponent thanks to AI. In July 2017, China’s government adopted the National Artificial Intelligence Development Program [Ding, p. 31]. A strong impulse for the creation of this program was the event of March 2016. The AlhaG algorithm defeated the Chinese champion Lee Sedol, one of the highest rated players in the world in the Go game. The algorithm was based on MCTS (Monte Carlo Tree Search) heuristics created by DeepMind, acquired in 2014 by Google. Creating a program that could beat a professional player in Go was extremely difficult due to the great complexity of this game. To analyze 3 moves forward you need to calculate 8 million combinations. The calculation of 15 forward movements requires an analysis of the number of combinations greater than the number of atoms in the universe [Ding, p. 51]. In the Chinese tradition, this game played a special role in learning strategy. The AlphaGo algorithm uses deep learning artificial neural networks. Tom Walsh compares the AlphaGo algorithm with Deep Blue, which he beat in Kasparov's chess. As he notes, "Deep Blue used specialized equipment to study about 200 million movements per second. For comparison, AlphaGo sets only 60,000 positions per second. Deep Blue's approach used brutal force to find a good move - but that doesn't translate

5

104 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION well into a more complicated Go game. In contrast, AlphaGo had a much greater ability to evaluate his position, and he learned that skill by playing billions of games with himself” [Ding, p. 3]. The fact that the company is a part of the American corporation and also co-creates, with IBM, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook. The partnership for AI, which created such an advanced algorithm, was a strong impulse for Chinese politicians to increase spending on AI in the PRC. The Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) of Oxford University, in its report "Deciphering China's AI Dream", thoroughly evaluated the Chinese AI development programme. FHI analysts point out that the country is systematically increasing its spending on the development of artificial intelligence, but at present it is accelerating rapidly. Over three years - from 2017 to 2020 - they are expected to increase tenfold [Ding, p. 3]. What is characteristic for the Chinese strategy is a strong reliance on domestic companies such as Bajdu, Alibaba, or iFlyTek and supporting them financially as well as creating a base for the development of own technologies and research. China is also skillfully using large amounts of data for the development of AI, which in turn is being blocked from access by companies and scientific institutions from other countries [Ding, p. 3]. At the same time, the system of searching for and recruiting people with special IT talents is being developed at the regional and national level. The largest companies also open foreign branches in order to search for and attract the most talented people to cooperate with. They are also offered attractive jobs in China itself [Ding, p. 4]. The report points to a particular emphasis on the development of robotics and intelligent production processes, which are to be based on domestic solutions and technologies [Ding, p. 5]. According to the plan, China intends to develop its AI industry to the level of the most developed countries in the area by 2020. By 2025, they want to gain a lead in some AI areas and by 2030, the PRC is expected to become a global centre of research and innovation related to artificial intelligence, with Chinese production exceeding USD 60.3 billion[Ding, p. 5]. The PRC has made a special leap in building supercomputers. Still in 2014 in the global Top 500 list Americans had 232 units (46.4%) and China 76 (15.2%), but already 3 years later in the Top500 in June 2017. The PRC had 159 supercomputers (31.8%) and the USA 168 systems (33.6%) [Ding, p. 24]. More importantly, the report indicates that the Middle Kingdom has already in 2014 overtaken the United States in terms of registering patents related to AI as well as scientific articles on deep learning processes. However, they are still far from the USA in the field of basic research [Ding, p. 26]. The report shows that more and more analysts indicate that the potential of AI developed by the USA and the PRC may play a key role in gaining strategic advantage over the opponent by one of these countries. The high degree of civil-military fusion in the PRC raises legitimate concerns about the widespread use of the AI's potential in the Chinese armed forces [Ding, pp. 32-33]. Little information reaches the general public about the research conducted in China in this area of AI development. However, the level of advancement of the implemented projects is confirmed by the global position of many companies based in the Middle Kingdom. Megvia and SenseTime dominate in face recognition algorithms. The technology, which is supposed to allow active observation of citizens using 170 million CCTV cameras and China Mobile devices, has been developed by SenseTime. In November 2016, researchers from Shanghai Jiao Tong University in China presented a system that learns to distinguish criminals from other people on the basis of their photos [Walsh, 2018, pp. 226]. DJI (The Futureis Possible) has a 70% share in the global drones market. Its products are equipped with algorithms to recognize objects in the field. Ubtech Robotics has a strong position in the market of humanoid robots. Cambricon Technologies equips Huawei smartphones with chips that allow them to use deep learning algorithms. iFlytTek specializes in algorithms that allow people to talk to the machine, and Cloudwalk specializes in AI technologies that ensure public safety

6

105 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION

[Cieślik, 12]. Little information reaches the general public about the research conducted in China in this area of AI development. However, the level of advancement of the projects is confirmed by the global position of many companies based in the Middle Kingdom. Megvia and SenseTime dominate in face recognition algorithms. The technology, which is supposed to allow active observation of citizens using 170 million CCTV cameras and China Mobile devices, has been developed by SenseTime. In November 2016, researchers from Shanghai Jiao Tong University in China presented a system that learns to distinguish criminals from other people on the basis of their photos [Wójcik, 2009, p. 185]. DJI (The Futur eis Possible) has a 70% share in the global drones market. Its products are equipped with algorithms to recognize objects in the field. Ubtech Robotics has a strong position in the market of humanoid robots. Cambricon Technologies equips Huawei smartphones with chips that allow them to use deep learning algorithms. iFlytTek specializes in algorithms that allow people to talk to the machine, and Cloudwalk specializes in AI technologies that ensure public safety [Wójcik, 2009, p. 185]. The most dangerous and unpredictable race in the history of mankind is taking place mainly between the USA and China. Both sides are interested in gaining strategic advantage over the opponent. The AI applications with the greatest importance for combat and strategic advantage will also be the most difficult to regulate, as states will be interested in investing in them and their further unrestricted development. The arms race will increasingly be based on forecasts of the future battlefield created by autonomous systems to combat autonomous systems.

3. The American-Chinese race for strategic dominance in the field of artificial intelligence can lead to the creation of a superintelligence that will become independent of humanity. Nick Bostrom believes that "it may be reasonable to believe that human-level machine intelligence has a fairly sizeable chance of being developed by mid-century, and that it has a non-trivial chance of being developed conciderably sooner or much later” [Bostrom, p. 25]. Analysis of several areas where AI technologies are being developed shows that the pace of Artificial Intelligence is accelerating more and more. It is becoming a real perspective of the present generation entering adult life. When it appears, it will radically change our cognitive perspective and our place in the world. Ray Kurzweil clearly states, "The intelligence we will create through reverse brain engineering will have access to its own source code and will be able to quickly improve over repeated design cycles” [Kurzweil, 2018, s. 363]. The key issue we face in the next 30 years is the dynamics of the AI explosion. Nick Bostrom says that a slow exit - counted in decades - is a chance to build a security infrastructure: "Nations fearing an AI arms race would have time to try to negotiate treaties and design enforcement mechanisms” [Bostrom, p. 77]. This is, however, a scenario that seems less likely. The analysis should also consider an option that is extremely unfavourable to humanity. This is a violent explosion of the AI. Bostrom notes that: "A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days. Fast takeoff scenarios offer scant opportunity for humans to deliberate. Nobody need even notice anything unusual before the game is already lost. In a fast takeoff scenario, humanity’s fate essentially depends om preparations previously put in place” [Bostrom, p. 77]. The strategic perspective of mankind must take into account the emergence of artificial intelligence and also include an option in which it goes beyond the critical point and achieves a huge advantage over humans in all areas of knowledge. General Robert H. Latiff rightly points out that Few understand what the future holds, and frighteningly few seem to care [Latiff, 2018, p. 23]. Further research on AI cannot just include a strategy for its development. The new risk logic must increasingly be taken into account. Whether we change the paradigm of the

7

106 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION security sciences and take into account the reality of the AI explosion scenario may determine not only our future, but our existence as humanity.

Conclusion The different strategic culture of the USA and China increases the likelihood of confrontation between the two countries. The main area of the struggle for domination will be modern technologies. Both countries believe that winning the race in the area of artificial intelligence will give them a strategic advantage over their opponents. However, the US and China must take into account the fact that their competition for primacy in the area of artificial intelligence may lead to the emergence of superintelligence, which will have a huge advantage over people in all fields of knowledge. Danetisation of the human environment and the development of Artificial Intelligence technologies will lead to the development of autonomous systems and increase their independence. The Multinational Capabality Development Campaign (MCDC) project has adopted a scale of autonomy that distinguishes between 6 types of autonomy. On this scale it means level 0: "The machine performs missions and is under full human control", and on level 6 "based on knowledge of the wider environment, the machine can automatically initiate a mission. The machine collects, filters and prioritises data. It integrates and interprets data and makes forecasts. Performs the final ranking. Under no circumstances is information displayed to people. The machine does the work automatically and does not allow human intervention”. The ongoing technology race between the USA and China has a military dimension. Toby Walsh warns that autonomous weapons will destabilize the current geopolitical system. It will destroy the delicate balance built after World War II. Our planet will become a more dangerous place1. In an arms race in which the US and China use AI technologies to gain strategic advantage, it will eventually accelerate its development and we will reach for solutions that will make machines autonomous on the sixth scale - without human intervention.

References: [1] Allison G., Destined for War: Can Amerika and China Escape Thucydides Trap?, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. [2] Ball P., Masa krytyczna. Jak jedno z drugiego wynika, Kraków 2007. [3] Barrow J.D., Kres możliwości? Granice poznania i poznanie granic, Opole 2005. [4] Bostrom N., Superinteligence. Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford 2014. [5] Brożek B., Granice interpretacji, Kraków 2018. [6] Cambell K.M., Ratner E., The China Reckoning. How Beijing Defied American Expectations. “Foreign Affairs”, vol. 97, No 2, March/Aprill 2018. [7] Cambell K.M., Ratner E., The China Reckoning. How Beijing Defied American Expectations. “Foreign Affairs”, vol. 97, No 2, March/Aprill 2018. [8] Castels M, The Rise of The Network Society, Oxford 2010. Second edition. [9] Castels M, The End of Millenium, Oxford 2010, second edition. [10] Castels M, The Power of Identity, Oxford 2010, second edition. [11] Christensen Th. J., The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, New- York-London 2015, Prologue. [12] Cieślik E., Chiny zaskakują sztuczną inteligencją, Obserwatorfinansowy.pl, https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/makroekonomia/chiny-zaskakuja-sztuczna- inteligencja/, (last visited: January 12, 2019).

1 T. Walsh, To żyje…, p. 192.

8

107 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION

[13] Dikötter F., Wielki głód. Tragiczne skutki polityki Mao 1958-1962, Wołowiec 2013. [14] Ding J., Deciphering China’s AI Dream. The context, components, capabilities, and consequences of China’s strategy to lead the world in AI https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp- content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf, (last visited: January 12, 2019). [15] Góralczyk B., Wielki renesans. Chińska transformacja i jej konsekwencje, Warszawa 2018. [16] Góralczyk B., „Wielki renesans. Chińska transformacja i jej konsekwencje”, Warszawa 2018. [17] Huntington H., Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego, Warszawa 2000, original title: The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order. [18] Kissinger H., On China, New York 2012. [19] Kowalczewska K., Drony a zabójcze roboty. Prawo międzynarodowe wobec nowych technologii wojskowych, w: Czego pragną Drony?, R. Nahirny, A. Kil, M. Zamorska (red.), Gdańsk 2017. [20] Kurzwail R., Nadchodzi osobliwość, Warszawa 2013. [21] Kurzweil R., Jak stworzyć umysł. Sekrety ludzkich myśli ujawnione, Białystok 2018, s. 363. [22] Latiff R.H., Wojna przyszłości. W obliczu nowego globalnego pola bitwy, Warszawa 2018. [23] Nixon R., Asia After Viet Nam, Foreign Affairs, Volume 46, No1, October 1967. [24] Rodziński R., Historia Chin, Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków, Gdańsk 1974. [25] Sun Tzu, Sun Pin, Sztuka wojny, Gliwice 2014. [26] Walsh T., To żyje. Sztuczna inteligencja. Od logicznego fortepianu po zabójcze roboty, Warszawa 2018. [27] Westad O. A., The Souces of Chinese Conduct. Are Washington and Beijing Fighting a New Cold War?, Foreign Affairs, Volume 98, No 5 Sept/Octob. [28] Wójcik G. M. , Obliczenia płynowe w modelowaniu mózgu, in: Neurocybernetyka teoretyczna, R. Tadeusiewicz (red.), Warszawa 2009.

9

108 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT

Assoc.prof. Dumitru IANCU, PhD* Assoc.prof. Anca DINICU, PhD**

*“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu **“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu

Abstract: The management of the organizational capabilities basically implies the optimization of their specific components mix according to the level, volume and quality of the organizational objectives. Taking into account that the most important component of the organizational capabilities is the human resource, it is to be considered that the manner of its acting is strongly determined by the characteristics of the organizational culture (form, value, intensity, etc.). The results obtained by the organization will occur as a result of the proper location and/or the use of the elements that constitute this important social variable which is the organizational culture, in close connection with the management process, as a whole.

Key words: culture; organization; management; capability.

1. Introduction The effectiveness and the efficiency, as fundamental objectives of each manager / management team, are the result of the level of functionality achieved by the organization during the period which is analyzed. It is obvious that the organization functionality depends on the material / technical / financial resources held or attracted, on the quality of the specific processes carried out within the activities necessary to achieve these objectives, on the quality and motivation of the human resource or on the philosophy of the construction and existence of that organization.

Fig.1 The connections between the components of the organizational capabilities

109 ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT

The organizational capabilities are obtained "by" and "through" human resource, whether we refer to that from the managerial level, or we are talking about the one from the execution level. And this last statement is supported by the interdependence between the components highlighted in the figure above (resources, technology, processes, doctrine, etc.), as well as by the effects generated by the human resource by interacting with them.

2. Organizational culture and its implications in the organization management process From the management perspective, the organizational culture must be analyzed from two points of view: which are the elements that generate it, on the one hand, and what kind of implications it has in turn over the organization functioning as a whole organization, on the other hand. The organizational culture is a social construction at the level of the organization (fig. No. 2), its components taking concrete forms as a result of using a certain type of organizational structure and management style, referring mainly to those periods when the best results were obtained by the respective organization.

Fig.2 The components of organizational culture [1]

The organizational structure, by the manner way it is built and used (positions, functions, departments, etc.), will support the understanding, awareness and assumption of values, symbols, rules and norms etc. which are favorable to both individual and collective performance, and thus for the proper fulfillment of the organization's objectives. More concretely, depending on how the correlation between the performance standards related to each position and the recognition of their achievement by the management is established, the specific value is generated and both current and future employees will target it during their actions related to meeting the specific objectives (for example, employee of the month, etc.). Secondly, the management style is a factor that generates elements of the organizational culture, because through the personal example of the manager or through his vision behavioral patterns are generated, desirable for the proper functioning of the management process or for building a socio-moral climate meant to support the subordinates’ focus on increasing performance.

Regarding the ways in which, in its turn, the organizational culture helps to operationalize the organization management system operationalization it is to highlight its contribution at different horizons levels when achieving:

110 ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT

 a specific / particular guide of values, symbols, principles, etc. which helps employees to adapt as quickly as possible to the organizational requirements regarding the support of the management process in a way that is most favorable to it;  a major orientation of the subordinates towards identifying and solving the problems that the internal environment of the organization can face, on the one hand, and an appropriate integration of the organization in the external environment where it is forced to survive, on the other hand. In general, the following functions of the organizational culture are accepted from the perspective of its management:  ”Integrating the employees within the company. It is a continuous function that is not limited to new employees only. In fact, it is necessary a permanent maintenance of the cultural integration - the organization of the employees, in order to prevent major conflict situations and centrifugal actions within the company.  Guiding the employees and the groups of employees to achieve the company's planned objectives. Its mission is to trigger the latent energies of the employees, in order to carry out certain actions under specific time and economic conditions, so that the objectives included in the company's strategies and policies to be met.  Adopting certain behaviors of the organization. The main role in pursuing this function is belongs to the management culture, the respective decisions and actions constituting a major component of the human resources management.  Protecting the employees against any potential threats posed by the organization the environment. The culture of the organization constitutes the support for organization behaviors and actions which are of preventive nature or of direct control of the negative consequences that might emerge inside in the environment of the company.  Preserving and transmitting the values and traditions of the organization. The culture of the organization is the main depository of the values and traditions specific to each company and achieved in time. It is important, especially when generations are changing within the organization, that they are maintained. ”[2] Without diminishing the role played by the other factors that influence the management process in any organization, we consider the organizational culture to be the "invisible hand" of the management team that can use it in the specific actions designed to optimize the activities in the organization.

3. Organizational culture - resource of the process of achieving organizational capabilities Organizational capabilities management aims to achieve the expected performances through a superior use of the existing elements (strategy, human resources, technology, material and financial resources) during the restructured, resized or redesigned management processes. As it was stated earlier, the organizational culture is the intangible component of the manner in which the components of an organization manifest themselves in within the activities of an organization. Organizational capabilities are obtained only through the superior use of the knowledge, skills and qualities of the human resource. In this context, the organizational culture is transformed into an essential resource for each

111 ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT manager, with the help of which he/she will manage more efficiently the actions of achieving the organizational capabilities. In our opinion, the way in which the management team will track and use the elements of organizational culture that favor a higher qualitative leap in terms of achieving organizational capabilities will lead to a properly functioning organizational capabilities management process. Developed in different phases, the organizational capabilities must be designed, planned, operationalized and evaluated, as it is shown in fig. 3.

Fig.3 Generic model for the development of organizational capabilities [3]

The organizational culture, through the components selected and valued by the management of the organization during its own capabilities development, becomes an active and positive factor in any stage mentioned above:  The vision, the mission, the objectives - the organizational culture explicitly supports an adequate construction of them, as the design of the future is also a result of the practical materialization of the system of values, organizational symbols, of the type of behaviors manifested today with implications for tomorrow.  Capability requirements - identifying the levels of capability required for a certain level of organization efficiency is absolutely dependent, for example, on the individual abilities of seeing things as a whole, for the entire organization.  Environment of the organization - the analysis of this factor is influenced by the connection between social / national culture and organizational culture, because the principles that people adhere to in society do not fundamentally change from the way they accept the principles within the organization.  Current capabilities - gap capabilities - acceptance and action in the field of capabilities depend, overwhelmingly, on the objective analysis of the current stage of these capabilities and the realistic determination of differences in relation to the identified needs, a fact influenced by the organizational culture through the specific ways of thinking of employees have (proactive or passive, for example).  Capabilities development plan - is the result of implementing the correlation of strategic thinking within the organization, as part of the organizational culture, with the design of the phases of achieving the desired level of capability.  Resource constraints - at this stage, the organizational culture makes the greatest contribution, because even though certain resources cannot be found in the required quantity and quality, they can be overcome by the subordinates’ desire and sacrifice to achieve their goals, almost no matter the cost.

112 ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT

 Future capabilities - future and change are a tandem to which the organization must have adequate answers, and these are obtained with the help of the available or future capabilities. The involvement of the organizational culture in establishing the future organizational capabilities is emphasized by its openness to the new, the ability of the subordinates to be open to the unknown, to new experiences and feelings towards the ways in which the objectives can be achieved. The organizational capabilities are the result of the combination of several components, tangible and intangible, but their superior quality depends substantially on the intangible ones, in particular, on the quality of the organizational culture.

4. Conclusion The interdependence between the organizational culture and the management of the organizational capabilities is strong, dynamic and continuous, both structurally and procedurally. We can say unequivocally that the organizational culture is a "double-edged sword" at the manager reach within the process of developing organizational capabilities. The manner in which the organizational culture components are managed is reflected by the projected levels of performance.

References: [1] Vlăsceanu, M., Organizations and organizational behavior, Polirom Publishing House, 2003, page 266 [2] Adler, A., International Dimensions of Organizational Behavior, Second Edition, Boston, Kent Publishing Company Publishing, 1991, pp. 226-232 beside State, O., Organization Culture and Management, http: //www.biblioteca- digitala.ase.ro/biblioteca/pagina2.asp?id=cap3, accessed on 07.10.2019 [3] Stojković, D., Kovač, M., Mitić, V., The model of organizational capabilities development, Conference: International Symposium SymOrg 2014, Zlatibor, Serbia, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287996075, accessed on 09.10.2019

113 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

Alexandru KIS PhD* Vasilică ARHIP** Oliver TARCALA***

*NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania **NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania ***NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania

Abstract: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) represents the oldest and most elementary form of intelligence activity; however, in the modern HUMINT collection, the manner in which operations are conducted is more complex, dictated by both official protocols and the nature of the source of the information, and limited by legal and ethical constraints. In this venture, the performance of HUMINT operators is influenced by several factors that can be both objective and subjective in nature - either technical, economic, social, situational and organizational conditions, or personal, personality, health, and psychological features. Although many HUMINT collection skills may be taught, the development of a skilled HUMINT operator requires experience in dealing with people in all conditions and under all circumstances. There are many intangibles in the definition of a “good” HUMINT operator, but certain character traits are invaluable and deserve being carefully observed in the selection process, along the career development and task assignments. Disclaimer: This paper expresses the views, interpretations, and independent position of the authors. It should not be regarded as an official document, nor expressing formal opinions or policies, of NATO or the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence.

Key words: Intelligence; HUMINT; operator; traits; skills; personality; communication

1. Introduction A basic principle of Intelligence is to make use of as reliable and extensive information as possible. This principle is almost as old as humanity and that`s why Intelligence is sometimes considered as one of the oldest craft in the world, and strongly linked to the institution of power. Nowadays, many people see the HUMINT personnel as individuals with super skills who can do unbelievable things, just like the famous special Agent 007, James Bond. But honestly, who from the commanders would like to explain and defend his actions usually resulting in killings, destructions of public places, and spending a lot of (public) money? And what is also very interesting, we never see James Bond filling in extensive reports, which is a painful HUMINT operator job in documenting the circumstances (sustaining responsibility and accountability) and the outcome of his work. So, finally, what the characteristics or qualities of a good HUMINT operator are? Who can be, and who cannot be a HUMINT operator? Which virtues should be preferred in the HUMINT community?

114 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

Each country has its own requirements and limitations for selecting personnel for the military service, with additional prerequisites for Intelligence positions. However, the recommendations available related to such a profile undoubtedly deserve further development and discussion. We have to bear in mind that collection from human sources is really extended to potentially any soldier, less or more organized or systematic, and less or more professional. Even more, different varieties of HUMINT practice record various individual statuses for the collectors, particular collection circumstances, or specific pools of sources that particularize the requirements.

2. The HUMINT operator (and activity) portrayed at a glance In his work, a HUMINT operator usually engages in the collection of information by interacting and building rapport with human sources, including hostile, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel coming from various environments, who voluntarily or involuntarily share information and data of interest. Thus, HUMINT is dependent on the subjective interpersonal skills of the individual rather than on the abilities to operate Intel collection (technical) equipment. At the end, the quality of operator’s reports depends on his communication skills. Without proper communication skills and mastering of questioning techniques it can be difficult to collect complete information from source and fulfill the commander’s requirements. The HUMINT operator must be strong in oral communication and able to use proper wording, to avoid misunderstandings especially if using a foreign language. Hence, language skills and cultural awareness are critical for effective communication. Knowledge of the standard language is sometimes not enough; often, familiarity with local dialects and cultural nuances is necessary. The communication skills are closely tied with the type of human personality (it means that people who are considered as extroverts are more preferred for position of HUMINT operator). Equally important is the HUMINT operator`s self-knowledge and self-control1, as well as understanding basic human behaviour (emotional intelligence [1]). The operator must be as objective as possible in evaluating the information obtained and his relation with the source. The HUMINT collector must maintain an objective and dispassionate attitude regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience in his activity. Lack of objectivity can lead to unconscious distortion of the information acquired, while self-control will help to keep him connected to the mission scope and avoid displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy, or weariness that may cause him to lose the initiative during questioning [2]. He has to prove flexibility and adaptability and should trait his interlocutor with patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport. At the same time, his credibility is supported by a professional attitude and his personal appearance and demeanour, in respect to local customs. For this work is necessary to realize that HUMINT operators need a wide range of personality traits and social skills that have to be trained and developed. Additionally, they need to prove a wide range of knowledge from different areas of social (and professional) life. They must be highly motivated to do the work themselves with perseverance and robustness, even in difficult and crisis situations. The common denominator of the effectiveness in the equation of the whole operational cycle and professional tradecraft is initiative, creativity, motivation and responsibility of the HUMINT operator. In all their actions, it is very important to have

1 Tendency to neuroticism is not tolerated, as long as it is filled with factors that are visible in experiencing anxiety, depression, embarrassment, impulsiveness, hostility, or vulnerability. On the contrary, we expect the operator to be conscientious, which manifests in responsibility, discipline, prudence, purposefulness, orderliness. We expect modesty that is contained in relation to self-knowledge and self-confidence.

115 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

HUMINT operators who are honest, with strong morale, ethic principles and values. Integrity is profiled as one of the most important traits, as long as the operator will be afforded a disproportionately high level of responsibility in his activity. Obtaining information from human sources could hardly exist without courage. Aristotle reported that all virtues were placed between two vices. If you do not have courage, you are cowardly. If you have more courage as is appropriate, you are irresponsible [3]. It is not beneficial to have HUMINT operators who do not have fear. HUMINT operator should be afraid of compromising sources, revealing operations, loosing of reputation and also about the lives of people related to his activity. HUMINT operator without fear of death is suicidal or simply madman. That type of person is not what should represent a HUMINT operator. Selection of HUMINT operators should serve as a tool to identify the person who is afraid of a death, but much more fear of losing the reputation. The HUMINT operator who meets these criteria will rather avoid the dangerous situation, but on the other side will be ready to die, when required by his oath of loyalty or code of ethics. Moreover, the essence of the operator activity is that he works in a team, whose composition can be various – depending on the national structures, type of operational environment and, of course, on type of mission. Logically, the operator must be a team player and have aptitude for teamwork. He must be able to accept different views, accept decisions or adopt consensus, not compromise. Working in a team brings sometimes criticism from the leaders. The HUMINT operator must be able to assume a positive criticism and recommendations not only from commanders, but also from teammates. And, above everything, recalling the operational environment where HUMINT operators perform, operator’s alertness improves operational security and collection effectiveness. As each of the HUMINT collection activities is unique in the method used to gain access to the source [4], but sharing the common denominator of the operator interacting with the human source, R. A. Sayre jr. approaches the HUMINT operator’s traits and skills under a pragmatic view of “HUMINT sensor characteristics”, paralleling the technical sensor features. Searching through historical and current papers on this subject, he finds that modern writers on HUMINT, like the ancients, place great value on a series of traits that broadly define the personality and the quality of the person. Though, as Sayre jr. shows, key traits are centered on: loyalty and integrity, intelligence and wisdom, subtlety and sophistication, and courage – but equally patience, tact, calmness, and prudence. In matters of interpersonal skills, the operator must be able to accurately assess the character of other people (by observing expression, body language, or demeanor) in order to determine the opportunity of cooperation and evaluate the source and the information provided with regard to truthfulness and reliability. Moreover, observing the motivation of the source is of paramount importance, for obvious operational security reasons2.

3. HUMINT – required areas of knowledge The US publication FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations points out precisely the required areas of knowledge for HUMINT operators, in order to ensure effectiveness in their activity: [6] - the area of operations, including the social, political, and economic institutions; geography; history; language; and culture of the target area;

2 The reason behind the Camp Chapman attack against CIA operatives can be easily found from the source profile [5].

116 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

we may emphasize here the need of cultural awareness (social taboos, desired behaviors, customs, and courtesies, etc.); - current and potential threat forces within the area of intelligence responsibility and their organization, equipment, motivation, capabilities, limitations, and normal operational methodology; - applicable law and policy that might affect HUMINT collection activities; - the collection requirements, including all specific information requirements and indicators that will lead to the answering of the intelligence requirements. Beside knowledge that is acquired in different steps of professional development or mission preparation, there are other areas equally recognized by FM 2-22.3 as useful in HUMINT collection, some of them inherent to the operator’s character and life experience, but still dependent in their effectiveness by sustained training, like: understanding basic human behavior or neurolinguistics, and proficiency in the target language, which may (preferably) come as a native heritage or, if not, is intensively taught. CIA places emphasis on Intelligence preparation for working in cultures, or cultural intelligence, understood as the capability to relate and work effectively across cultures, which draws on the social sciences and study of culture based on: scientific analyses of culture and character (cultural anthropology), the relationship of personality traits to subsets of a given society or a given category of roles of that society, or is retrieved from comparative studies [7] that can go deeper into details like contrasting the roles of stereotypes in different societies [8]. Cultural intelligence embraces a myriad of dimensions, looking to develop cross-cultural competences [9] that further value the knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enable individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments [10] and acquire effectiveness in their job performance. In NATO, AIntP-11 – the standard for Intelligence training, defines a minimum level of proficiency for intelligence personnel (designated for NATO Peace Establishment or Crisis Establishment positions), by pointing out core competency areas that are specific for basic (national) training, and those for advanced (NATO specific) training, to include HUMINT. However, Nations are primarily responsible for the level of education and training they provide to HUMINT operators. However, education and training of HUMINT operator is a very long and complex process that may take months and years. The HUMINT operator should be prepared for lifetime educational process, which improves one’s capabilities and skills. Sayre jr. mentions the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor agency to the Central Intelligence in the WWII time, as constructing an elaborate system of situational and written testing combined with interviews, designed to provide the deepest possible understanding of the recruit's personality (intelligence, emotional stability, social skills, observation skills, communications skills, initiative, also the sense of humor, basic honesty, and well-rounded competence). On the other side, the German Interrogation practice in placed emphasis on honor (as a sum of moral and social values), education and knowledge (as refinement of heart and mind acquired by time and learning) and mental and moral virtues, enhanced by experience and maturity. Extended to a comparison between Western and Eastern cultures, he founds not much difference in the valued personal features, still pointing out the eastern practice to select Intel personnel amongst the top students in military schools or academies. [11] The selection pool is somehow relevant in outlining the character vs. knowledge: a military has a vetted profile, but skills and knowledge limited to its branch/specialty, while people selected from the civilian „labor market” would have a desired professional

117 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

background as enabler for establishing rapport with sources from intended target population, still having to undergo the personality and character assessment. Currently, in the selection process of a HUMINT operator, the human resources managers and career brokers for Intel collectors usually insist on: multiple language skills, interpersonal skills, and an appreciation of cultural differences (cultural awareness). [12] Additionally, Bradford Karony, Director of National Security Operations for Logistics Management Institute (LMI) Government Consulting, considers three things as ideal traits or experiences for a potential HUMINT operator: life experience, writing skills, and being a good listener. [13] Whatever, if we take all these traits and skills as a whole in defining a character, we will get very close to an ideal, unrealistic picture. Many times we have to accept individuals’ limitations as well as their talents; a good knowledge of what they know and what they can do (assessing individual differences [14]) is necessary in the mission appointment and task assignment, ensuring the best exploitation of the available human resource. In order to support a better understanding of the subjective areas where operators vary in their individual performance, we will further elaborate on several skills and traits (with no claim of complete inclusiveness) required in HUMINT. The first addressee is the operator himself, in his effort to better fit for his mission/profession, but the expressed considerations equally help commanders, trainers, or mentors in supporting the operator’s continuous improvement. In a first stage, in order to disambiguate the referenced categories, we need to differentiate between personality traits (inherited talents and features of the character developed as the personality matures) and skills, learned through experience in life or acquired in the professional development programs.

4. Desirable traits of the HUMINT operator personality Scientifically, in personality psychology, temporally stable tendencies of behaviour in which persons of a similar age differ from one another are called dispositions. Dispositions that characterize the personality of an individual are called personality dispositions, or personality traits. [15] Citing Allport and Weinberg & Gould, McLeod outlines that their definitions of personality emphasize the uniqueness of the individual and consequently adopt an idiographic view, while the nomotetic approach insists on comparability among individuals, traits having the same psychological meaning in everyone, and people differing in their positions along a continuum in the same set of traits. [16] Further, social learning theories postulate the influence and interaction of nature (biology, genetics, etc. – innate instincts in the Freud’s psychodynamic theory of personality) and nurture (the environment, upbringing - parental influences in Freud’s theory) in defining the personality. [17] Generally, “Big Five” core traits (Fig. 1) (the stable dispositions that drive behavior) are referred by researchers for defining standing dimensions of personality, manifested to different degrees and variations from high to low levels for each individual: openness to experience (inventive/ curious vs. consistent/ cautious), conscientiousness (efficient/ organized vs. easy-going/ careless), extraversion-introversion (outgoing/ energetic vs. solitary/ reserved), agreeableness (friendly/ compassionate vs. challenging/ detached), and neuroticism (sensitive/ nervous vs. secure/ confident); a sixth one is also considered and integrate a measure of ethical behavior into the chart, covered by the honesty-humility factor. [18]

118 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

Fig.1 The “Big Five” Personality traits [19] Although many theorists consider traits remain relatively constant over the lifespan, M. Travers shows - citing a study conducted at University of Illinois and Michigan State University - that a sustained effort focused on behavioral changes may lead to tangible achievements in the individual effort to cultivate positive and inhibit negative traits, though leading to personality change. [20] It makes an important point for HUMINT activity, where requirements to build rapport and apply questioning techniques, accompanied by controlled non-verbal communication, define a personality profile that can be internalized through intensive training and practice (basically, by acquiring skills). It somehow matches the Neuro-Linguistic Programming creed that “conscious mind is the goal setter, and the unconscious mind is the goal getter” [21]. Further, investigating the association between social interactions and personality states dynamics [22] is of high importance for matching operators to sources based on effective approach expectations. A research performed in 2007-2010 by I. Podbregar, G. Hribar, and T. Ivanusa with the aim to gather data about ‘‘the significance of personality traits for the intelligence relationship’’, basically defining agents’ traits and skills, led to the ranking of desirable qualities, from top to bottom: memory, ability to regenerate, perception, personal emotionality, attentiveness, ability to control emotions, communicativeness, mental health, patience, personal maturity, adaptability, reasoning ability, and the ability to make social connections, followed by persuasiveness, possible dependencies, and the ability to develop friendships. [23] However, even though many of the traits can be recognized as equally desirable for Intel personnel, the assessment model for the HUMINT operator’s desirable traits has to be thought as a complementary representation. Placed in the context of an enduring relation between the operator and the source, FM 2-22.3 makes a strong stance on a series of traits that are “invaluable” for the operators in building up effective interactions: alertness (in relation to the collection requirement and focus, meeting environment, and source); patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport; credibility in tradecraft performance and with his source; objectivity and self-control in relation to the source and assessment of the information acquired; adaptability to various personalities encountered, operational environment and tempo, etc.; perseverance in pursue the objective; achieving and maintaining the initiative in questioning; organized and professional appearance and demeanor. [24]

119 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

A survey conducted in our institution on a selected number of professionals across NATO places emphasis on the importance of high levels of openness, extraversion and agreeableness (in terms of communicativeness, self-control and adaptability), followed by conscientiousness (supported by terms of perception, memory, attentiveness, or ability to regenerate). At the same time, neuroticism signs have to be carefully addressed. Personal emotionality can affect operational security, the relation with the source or the quality and usability of the confidential data.

5. Requisite skills in the HUMINT operator’s activity Unlike personality traits, skills – alongside knowledge – are competencies that people can learn or develop through education, training, or life experience. The levels of training include, besides the cognitive (the knowledge elements) and psychomotor domains (the skills elements) the affective dimension (the attitude elements), which addresses emotions, beliefs, feelings and convictions, driving behavior and motivating actions, and being integrated into the learning that supports the cognitive and psychomotor domains. Copeland distinguishes personal skills as soft skills, people skills, or interpersonal skills (including problem solving, adaptability, dependability, self-motivation and leadership skills), and professional skills as hard skills or technical skills (specific proficiencies that are taught in school or on the job, including foreign languages, computer programming, writing skills or machine skills). [25] While personal skills are generic and transferable between disciplines/ environments, professional skills have limited applicability within a job tradecraft. Intel collection involves many approaches and methods, adapted to the operational environment. However, in HUMINT, the personal environment - a sum of outer and inner drivers - prevails over the operational environment’s characteristics. Thus, we can reasonably assess there is a perfect mix of personal and professional skills, the last sometimes dependent on the proficiency of the first. We will further comment on several such skills: a. Foresight (the “Bigger Picture”) Being a HUMINT operator does not necessarily mean it will always be conducting research on a high profile case or threat that the general public may assume. It’s all about understanding and conquering what might come next tomorrow’s threat. That’s fine because his research may be significant in the future (in the context of knowledge development and alertness/awareness), and the ability to maintain dedication and preparation to be called up at a moment’s notice is what’s expected of the operator. The bigger picture can also be appropriated during times in which a HUMINT operator is presented with odd outlying data points that differ from their presumption. The ability to stick to his (validated) convictions is paramount. b. Critical thinking Within the Intelligence cycle, there is much to think critically about. Framing challenges and difficult questions in a way that will bring at resolutions and answers is key for protecting the interests of our organisation, our people, and assets. A crucial skill or fortitude to have is the ability to systematically challenge key assumptions. c. Discipline and organization Rather than thinking of Intelligence as a technical field similar to science, one should think of it as an intricate field in the form of art. To perform to its best ability, the operator needs to have that “x”-factor inside that oozes the ability to decipher information, just as a musician can pick apart music. It should be understood that “great HUMINT operators are not taught, instead they are nurtured”.

120 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

Whatever, the operator will be also required to analyze and assess situations in a scientific manner, in order to present information from which conclusions can be drawn. d. Ability to fuse tradecrafts The field of military Intelligence is very complex and requires a set of knowledge and skills in order to handle it properly. Just like for any other job, the operator needs years to specialise and become proficient in his activity; but this is not enough if the practitioner is not capable to complexly combine different skills and experiences when is performing. Before the HUMINT operator starts to carry out assignment, individual and collective training for operational procedures is necessary, with focus on communication tradecraft, data and information acquisition, specific tools mastering, OPSEC and INFOSEC, but also other common knowledge in the military realm. These skills are highly beneficial when taking into consideration how tremendous the ability to successfully cross-utilize different tradecrafts in order to get the desired outcomes. e. Determine patterns and recognize unusual differences We aren’t soothsayers, but fortunately humans tend to act on pre-learned algorithms, and predicting future patterns within reasonable accuracy is surprisingly feasible. Data patterns for every threat possible have been assimilated for years by great analysts before us and are constantly being worked on. While not every situation is the same, a correlation can be made to try and deduce, based on logical skills, what can be expected next. Still, while background information and past references are available, every threat will be assessed uniquely; in order to develop new patterns (which can sometimes take years) you will be required to exercise an abundance of patience. The HUMINT operator must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby enhancing the success of the questioning. f. Taking action Flexibility is an important factor and skill. When the operator recognizes a certain path deteriorating based on miscalculation, he should be able to adjust and bring the situation back into perspective, effectively taking it under control. Not being afraid to accept failure is essential, since bad intelligence may be expected, and not changing the course is a slippery slope. Therefore, taking action when witnessing changes in threats such as terrorism and strategic criminal threat, is important. Assessing legal parameters and criminal predicates and sharing this information allows for efficient intelligence output and impact. This ability to turn concepts and principles into action by incorporating the subject-matter expertise is vital in anticipating change and seeking new and innovative solutions for challenges. Achieving and maintaining the initiative are essential to a successful source meeting. The HUMINT operator must grasp the initiative and maintain it throughout all questioning phases. This does not mean he has to dominate the source physically; rather, it means that the HUMINT operator knows his requirements and continues to direct the collection toward those requirements. g. Writing skills Being able to write well is essential. No matter what the operator collects, he will have to refine that information into an argument that will be examined by his chain of command and by analysts. Every report should be competent enough to be included in the commander’s intelligence briefing, and that is the standard the operator should hold himself to. Learning local languages, nuances in foreign cultures, and the ability to absorb a wide array of information across diverse subjects is a critical trait for a HUMINT operator.

121 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

6. Conclusion All of us experience the situation to prepare and attend important meetings, whether in professional or personal life. Such a meeting requires a process of preparation and thinking about participants, topics and of course, the main goal and desired outcome of the meeting. The result of the encounter may be affected by many factors, such as readiness and methodology to prepare, method of communication, first impression, negotiation skills, ability to build rapport, etc. Retrospectively analyzing such a meeting, we realize how important it is to have enough communication skills, flexible and critical thinking, conflict management and stress situations control, mastering or deciphering non-verbal communication. These abilities contribute to the good outcome of such a meeting. In a professional environment, this activity is even more challenging and complex. The traits and professional acquaintances (knowledge and skills) of the HUMINT operator are retrieved either as personal features or resulted from enduring education and training in a comprehensive and multidisciplinary manner. Moreover, HUMINT operators have to be prepared for teamwork, in any form that proved effectiveness in different operational environments and organizational setting. As people judge others on two characteristics when they first meet – trust and respect (Can I trust this person? / Do I respect this person?), C. Reid proposes a relevant similarly model for the traits character (equivalent to trust) and competence (respect), concluding that persons with both high competence and high character are centres of influence [26]. For a HUMINT operator, this is a goal serving his effectiveness and proficiency. This article shows that a slightly deeper insight into the personality traits of the HUMINT operator helps establishing their significance for the successful intelligence operations. The assessment and evaluation of personality traits are formally included in the selection processes of the intelligence services, but should equally find a proper place in the continuous improvement programmes. This process is interlinked to other levels of organization and definitely to the HUMINT leadership. Another central idea is the value of sharing the best practice in the selection and professional development of the operators (to include standardization), as well as exercising teamwork in various scenarios. In NATO, the experience of HUMINT organizations across the Alliance provide excellent models for improvement, and the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence is the central venue where HUMINT specialists can learn from each other, develop their skills, and becoming better prepared for their mission.

References: [1] Ben Stark, The Ultimate Guide to Human Intelligence (HUMINT), October 12, 2018, in https://www.intelligence101.com/the-ultimate-guide-to-human-intelligence-humint/. [2] Department of the Army Headquarters, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations, September 2006, in https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf. [3] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 6. [4] Robert A. Sayre, Jr., Some Principles of Human Intelligence and Their Application. A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College - Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY, 2004, p. 5, in https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a429361.pdf. [5] Brian Ross, Nick Schifrin, Nasser Atta, and Lee Ferran, How a Double Agent Lured Seven CIA Operatives to Their Deaths, January 5, 2010, in https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-balawi-double-agent-turned-suicide- bomber/story?id=9486017).

122 SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR

[6] Department of the Army Headquarters, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), 1-12, 1-13 . [7] https://web.archive.org/web/20080213114422/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v18i3a06p_0001.htm. [8] Alexandru Kis, Intercultural Communication in the Military Realm – the Role of Stereotypes, in proceedings of the 11th International Scientific Conference Defense Resources Management in the 21st Century, DRESMARA, Braşov, 10-11 Noiembrie 2016. [9] http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Cross-Cultural- Competence.jpg. [10] Allison Abbe, Lisa M. V. Gulick and Jeffrey L. Herman George, Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation, United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, October 2007, in http://www.hqda.army.mil/ari/pdf//SR_2008-01.pdf. [11] Robert A. Sayre, Jr., Op. Cit., p. 14. [12] https://www.thebalancecareers.com/human-intelligence-collector-35m-mos-job- description-3346154. [13] Caroline D'Agati, Recruiting Spies and Stealing Secrets: The Art of HUMINT, October 24, 2018, in https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/10/24/recruiting-spies-and- stealing-secrets-the-art-of-humint/. [14] Jeanine M. Williamson, Individual Differences, in Teaching to Individual Differences in Science and Engineering Librarianship, 2018, https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780081018811/teaching-to-individual-differences- in-science-and-engineering-librarianship. [15] Jens B. Asendorpf, Personality: traits and situations, in The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology, edited by Philip J. Corr and Gerald Matthews, Cambridge University Press, 2009, https://sangu.ge/images/PersonalityPsychology.pdf. [16] S. A. McLeod, Theories of personality, 2017, in https://www.simplypsychology.org/personality-theories.html. [17] Ibidem. [18] https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/basics/big-5-personality-traits. [19] https://www.verywellmind.com/the-big-five-personality-dimensions-2795422. [20] Mark Travers, Is It Possible to Change Your Personality?, September 23, 2019, in https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/social-instincts/201909/is-it-possible-change- your-personality. [21] http://www.nlp.com/what-is-nlp/. [22] Didem Gundogdu, Ailbhe N. Finnerty, Jacopo Staiano, Stefano Teso, Andrea Passerini, Fabio Pianesi and Bruno Lepri, Investigating the association between social interactions and personality states dynamics, in Royal Society Open Science, Volume 4, Issue 9, September 2017, https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/full/10.1098/rsos.170194. [23] Iztok Podbregar, Gasper Hribar, Teodora Ivanusa, Intelligence and the Significance of a Secret Agent’s Personality Traits, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 28: 520–539, Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2015, in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276852254_Intelligence_and_the_Significance_o f_a_Secret_Agent's_Personality_Traits. [24] Department of the Army Headquarters, FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), 1-10, 1-12. [25] Angela Copeland, Personal Skills vs. Professional Skills: What’s the Difference?, in https://www.livecareer.com/resources/resumes/basics/job-skills-values. [26] Caroline Reid, Character vs. Competence: Which Would You Choose?, December 12, 2016, in https://www.leadingteams.net.au/character-vs-competence/.

123 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

SEZGİN Orhan PhD* KORKUT Cüneyt Master Student** AYGÜN Salih Master Student***

*Atatürk Strategic Research Institute, Defence Resources Management,National Defence University,İstanbul,Turkey **Atatürk Strategic Research Institute, Defence Resources Management,National Defence University,İstanbul,Turkey ***Atatürk Strategic Research Institute, Defence Resources Management,National Defence University,İstanbul,Turkey

Abstract Wars constitute the vast majority of human history. When and how the prehistoric wars began were the subject of discussion among historians and anthropologists. Social roles were not evident in hunter-gatherer societies except for age and gender differences. With the emergence of agriculture, it is thought that societies are attacking each other's villages especially in times of scarcity these attacks were becoming increasingly organized. Over time, arrows, swords and armor were made. With the use of gunpowder in firearms, the wars became more organized, and the wars we called conventional wars arose. Conventional wars, especially with the industrial revolution, increased their importance. The struggle for power and interest of humanity did not end; on the contrary it has become increasingly intensified and increased and in this case it has laid the ground for asymmetric wars. Terrorism, CBRN attacks, and proxy wars have become the terms we hear more and more every day. Apart from all these struggles, technology has reached such a point that it has begun to be seen in many dimensions of war. In this article, the aim is to draw attention to the use of artificial intelligence in today's wars and the points that are expected to be used in the future.

Keywords: War; Threat; Technology; Artificial Intelligence

Introduction Throughout history, there has been a constant struggle between groups, villages, nations and states for the sharing of limited resources, and this struggle is still ongoing, especially for the use of energy resources around the world. It would not be wrong to call this ongoing struggle as endless war. In the previous periods, this struggle started with simple combat vehicles such as swords, arrows, shield spears and was replaced by war vehicles such as cannons, rifles and tanks. Conventional warfare was observed especially in the First and Second World Wars. During the Cold War, different means of struggle developed according to the priority and size of the threat, and in time, the concept of artificial intelligence emerged

124 THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE by developing technology. Although artificial intelligence is used in various fields today, it is aimed to give this capability especially to military operations. In this way, it is predicted that there will be less people in the field, there will be more robots that communicate directly with the satellite and each other, also these robots are foreseen to have the ability to reason in the future in order to enable communication among themselves.

1.Artificial intelligence Although what intelligence defines and which cerebral activities encompasses is a subject that has been discussed for many years, there is a common understanding by the experts that it is a talent that can be developed and that it is based on biological processes due to its connection with the brain. Although there is no agreed definition, intelligence primarily refers to the ability to comprehend the relationship between concepts and objects, to think abstractly, to analyze, to adapt, to solve problems, to reason, and to learn from experience. Accordingly, the stages of learning, analysis of what is learned and being able to produce any output at the end of the analysis are indicative of intelligence (Dülger, 2018). In general, cognitive activities such as comprehension, problem solving and planning are defined as the capacity of cognitive activities (Baştanlar, 2018). “There are three major events in history. The first of these is the formation of the universe. The second is the beginning of life. The third is the emergence of artificial intelligence. In his interview with the BBC, Edward Fredkin, a MIT Computer Science laboratory administrator, used the above statements.

2.History of artificial intelligence The developments that have become the cornerstone of the development history of artificial intelligence are as follows (Mijwel, 2018): 1) Known universally as the father of modern computers, Alan Turning published a paper describing the Turing Test in 1950, also known as a game of imitation, testing whether a machine can influence a person to believe in himself or herself. 2) Computer scientist John McCarthy produced the term "artificial intelligence" at a conference at the University of Dartmouth in 1956. As a result, the US government gave McCarthy and other scientist Marvin Minsky financial resources to develop artificial intelligence to strengthen their position in the Cold War with Russia. Efforts to use artificial intelligence to understand the patterns of Russian language translate Russian documents more quickly. 3) Deep Blue, one of IBM's supercomputers, surprised world by defeating chess champion Garry Kasparov in 1997. Deep Blue was able to analyze 200 million potential positions per second. 4) The invention of driverless vehicles. 5) Development of drones that recognize each other.

3.Deep learning Data scientists in industry and academic environments use GPUs in machine learning to achieve ground-breaking improvements in a variety of applications, including image classification, video analysis, speech recognition and the natural language learning process. In particular, the use of advanced, multi-level deep neural networks to create systems capable of detecting large amounts of tagged training data can be described as Deep Learning (Toranoğlu, 2018). Deep learning activities and usage areas are as follows: 1) Face recognition systems 2) Plate recognition systems

2

125 THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

3) Fingerprint readers 4) Iris readers 5) Voice recognition systems 6) Driverless cars 7) Spam detection 8) Drone technology.

4. Internet of things (IoT) Thanks to developing technologies, billions of people have been able to connect to the internet with computers or portable mobile devices. The major step expected after this step is that the interconnected computers exchange information with the interconnected objects. From cars to books, from electrical appliances to food, from refrigerators to kettles, from smart buildings to shoes, the connection of all things / objects you can think of will be an improvement in the future. This is the stage that we can define as the Internet of Things. Since it is a developing concept and practice, different definitions have been made so far. The Digital Agenda, published by the European Union, said, “It is a developing technology and market that enables objects and applications to communicate among themselves, produce data, and share this data. This structure is defined as the ecosystem of smart applications and services that make people's lives easier and raise their living standards ”. The European Technology Platform defines IoT as a common network of things/objects that can be physical and virtual, but also have pre-defined functions and work in intelligent environments, and this network enters into information exchange with other networks and users (Turak, 2015). 5.The use of unmanned aerial vehicles regarding artificial intelligence The fourth generation war marks a period in which the monopoly of victory came from powerful and the weak sides began to believe that they could win the war. Although terms such as guerrilla warfare and irregular warfare are used, the term that best describes this strategy is “asymmetric warfare.. The fourth generation war put an end to the idea that both of the fighting sides should be regular armies. In addition, the asymmetric war has abolished the premise that powerful armies will always be the victors of the war. In this type of struggle, it is seen that the weak side uses terrorism as a means and loses its legitimacy. Asymmetric approach; is explained by the use of methods, weapons and technologies that are unexpected, unavoidable or not normally preferred to overcome the enormous power of the superior by exploiting the weaknesses of the superior (Asimetriksavaslar.wordpress.com, 2011). In this context, unmanned aerial vehicles have been developed to combat terrorism to be used in various parts of the world. The importance given to UAVs in the fight against terrorism has further increased due to its role in detecting bombs buried or trapped on roads and roadsides. Thanks to this ability in Afghanistan, the lives of many soldiers seem to be protected. It is also seen that the relocation of land units and the travel of military vehicle convoys in both Iraq and Afghanistan are partially conditional on UAV support(“Center for Security Studies (CSS),” 2010). The use of UAVs in Iraq has made significant contributions to reducing American losses. As of 2005, the most casualties of the Iraqi coalition forces were mostly homemade, bomb explosives. In the fight against such attacks, UAVs and surveillance activities and intelligence gathered reduced the incidents of such attacks and reduced losses by 85% (Duncan, 2012). When we look at the application, it is seen that artificial intelligence technology used in UAVs are the areas that need to be developed, especially as a result of the operations

3

126 THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE carried out by the US military, civilian casualties have emerged and efforts to develop intelligent systems have been started to prevent this.

6. Predictions for the use of artificial intelligence in combat field The rapid emergence of the Internet of Things revealed two technological arguments, machine intelligence and network communication. When people use their intelligence correctly, they can achieve more effective and more productive tasks. This may apply equally to new uses that are planned to have artificial intelligence predicted to take part in future battles. Robots can better serve human warriors when they manage to coordinate intelligence and actions among themselves. We call this the Internet of Battle Things (IoBT). In some ways, the IoBT is already becoming a reality, but is expected to take part intensely in battles 20-30 years from now (George, 2015). It is likely that the battlefield of the future will be intensely filled with such things. Some of these things (IoBT) are thought to be intelligent and some are objects that do only what is expected of them without a certain intelligence. In this sense, they can perform a wide range of tasks: perceive each other and human fighters, communicate, act and cooperate, dress like human fighters, selectively gather and process information, act as an intermediary to support announcement, perform coordinated defensive actions and will include the emergence of various effects. They are expected to be able to collaborate, communicate, coordinate, negotiate and plan and execute jointly. In other words, they will become the Internet of War Things (Kott, Swami, & West, 2016). However, in order to realize all these capabilities, many important challenges will have to be overcome. As an example of such a challenge, communication between things will need to be fast, flexible and adaptable to changing situations and military tasks. This will involve organizing and managing a large number of complex equations as well as a large number of dynamic entities to achieve the objectives. This adaptation should be carried out in an almost completely autonomous way, without the need for support and maintenance services, avoiding the overburden of human fighters, managing and reorganizing networks (Kott, David, & Wang, 2015). In 2004, the American DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) launched a program for unmanned land vehicles. Although the first vehicles were slow to move, they were largely used without accidents. A short time later, the driver- free automobiles around the world could be used effectively. These vehicles, which are produced in the future, are expected to carry various loads for the needs of the soldiers in combat environment. In this way, it is foreseen to minimize the loss of life ( Future of Life Institute 2015). Developed by Boston Dynamics, robots can instantly identify obstacles that can come in front of them, allowing them to jump over them. These robots, which can carry a small amount of load for now, can move quickly. These robots, which can react quickly and accurately in the battles of the future, are to some degree a candidate to replace people (Brian, 2016). Human warriors under extreme cognitive and physical stress may be confronted with the enormous complexity of the IoBT and the information it will produce. In addition to the ever-changing mission, IoBT may have to help people in understanding this vast, complex, confusing and potentially deceptive ocean of knowledge, taking into account the social, cognitive and physical needs of people (Kranz, Holleis, & Albrecht, 2010). The increasing need and the competitive environment created by companies capable of producing such technologies point out that artificial intelligence will take more place in the battles of the future.

7.Challenges of Artificial Intelligence Technology

4

127 THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

As artificial intelligence technology develops, it is considered that competition will be inevitable among companies producing this technology, as it will increase its use in military and commercial fields. However, it is obvious that the companies that will realize the production will need state support for high cost projects. Support for projects that are costly and the likelihood that these projects will fail to meet the needs may adversely affect the budget of states (Gigerenzer, 1999). On the other hand, it is considered that engineers employed in these technologies need to develop their expertise in software and hardware according to the conditions of the time. In order to meet this need, universities open robotic coding, mechatronics and similar departments and train students. However, it is thought that the number of students raised in these departments is limited. There is a need to train qualified and qualified students from such departments. Artificial intelligence technologies are needed at least in the civilian field as well as in the military field. If the technologies produced in the military field fail and they cannot sell the products they produce, they may face economic risks. In this case, these investor companies are directed to the civilian market where the probability of not selling products is low and the number of customers is higher. With the inclination to the civilian market, investment in military technologies involving artificial intelligence may be reduced. In the table, the artificial intelligence technology that can be used in the military field falls behind the artificial intelligence technology that can be used in civilian areas (Industrial Research Institute (2016). Another danger that is likely to be faced by investor companies is the danger that innocent people are harmed by autonomous robots that contain such artificial intelligence, as artificial intelligence is used in the military field. It is not clear what kind of legal legislation will be used in such cases. This may impose some restrictions on the use of artificial intelligence in the military field. For this reason, companies may prefer to stay away from the military (Human Rights Watch 2013). Also, the use of drone technology in attacks by terrorists in various parts of the world should take into account the fact that terrorists can acquire and use other technologies in the opposite direction.

Evaluation and conclusion It is recognized by many authorities that today's armies do not lose their conventional capabilities but are prepared for the asymmetric wars that have become the reality of the day. Although each period has different paradigms, paradigms of our age bring greater responsibilities when compared with the past. Now the number of variables in combat areas is increasing, it becomes difficult to make decisions and the effects of the decisions are great. As in all other fields of technology, it has a significant effect on military fields. States and their armies that cannot keep up with the dizzying speed of technology may experience more casualties in the battlefield of the future, and may face difficult challenges in making decisions. In this sense, artificial intelligence is an important reality in the wars of the future. It should be taken into consideration that the states that can effectively incorporate artificial intelligence into their armies in the battles of the future will be ahead of the other states.

5

128 THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

References:

[1] Asimetriksavaslar.wordpress.com. (2011). Asimetrik Savaşın Harp Strtejilerindeki Yeri Nedir? Retrieved January 2, 2019, from https://asimetriksavaslar.wordpress.com/2011/03/30/asimetrik-savasin-harp-stratejilerindeki- yeri-nedir/ [2] Baştanlar, Y. (2018, April). Yapay Zekâ ve Yapay Öğrenme. Retrieved from http://bilimgenc.tubitak.gov.tr/makale/yapay-zeka-ve-yapay-ogrenme [3] Brian, M. (2016).Retrieved June 1,2019 from https://www.engadget.com/2016/06/01/toyota-alphabet-boston-dynamics [4] Center for Security Studies (CSS). (2010). Retrieved November 16, 2018, from http://www.css.ethz.ch/%0Apublications/pdfs/CSS-Analyses-78.pdf [5] Duncan, H. (2012). UAVs critical for Afghanistan. [6] Dülger, M. V. (2018). Günümüz Yapay Zeka Teknolojisi ve “Robot Yargıç/Avukat Gerçeği,” (January). [7] Future of Life Institute (2015). ‘Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics [8] Researchers’.Retrieved May18,2019 from http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous- weapons [9] Gigerenzer , G. (1999), Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press [10] George, I. S. (2015). Defense Department Awakens to Internet of Things, 98–101. [11] Human Rights Watch (2013), ‘Arms: New Campaign to Stop Killer Robots’. Retrieved May 12,2019 from https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/23/arms-new-campaign-stop- killer-robots [12] Industrial Research Institute (2016), '2016 Global R&D Funding Forecast’, supplement to R&D Magazine, Winter 2016.

[13] Kott, A., David, S. A., & Wang, C. (2015). Will Cybersecurity Dictate the Outcome of Future Wars? [14] Kott, A., Swami, A., & West, B. J. (2016). The Internet of Battle Things, 1–11. [15] Kranz, M., Holleis, P., & Albrecht, S. (2010). Embedded interaction: Interacting with the internet of things. [16] Mijwel, M. M. (2018). History of Articial Intelligence, (February). https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26872.55047 [17] Toranoğlu, S. (2018). Derin Öğrenme. Retrieved from http://kergun.baun.edu.tr/20172018Guz/YZ_Sunumlar/Derin_Ogrenme_Songul_Torano glu.pdf [18] Turak, Y. (2015). Nesnelerin İnterneti ve Güvenliği.

6

129 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

PRIVATE RURAL PROPRETY IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT

PhD Lecturer eng. Mancia Mircea Sebastian* PhD Univ.Prof.eng. Mancia Aurora**

*Faculty of Construction, Cadastre and Architecture / Department of Cadastre / University of Oradea / Oradea / Romania ** Faculty of Construction, Cadastre and Architecture / Department of Cadastre / University of Oradea / Oradea / Romania

Abstract: The Earth is by nature, the most precious economic asset and most essential means of human’s production. Out of all rights, real estate ownership is among the most important, it is the foundation of sustainable and coherent democracy and development; it is the guarantor of economic mechanism functioning. At different stages of our history laws have been elaborated that have tried to improve the structure of private property in Romania. The fundamental desideratum of the Romanian citizens, and in the particular, of the Romanian peasants was and still is to be the owner of the dwelling where they lives and the land they is working on.

Key words: real estate, sustainable and coherent democracy, private property, human’s production, economic asset.

1. Introduction

Managing the agricultural land becomes an element of geopolitical strategy [] in today's global context, with numerous changes and transformations. As of September 2019, the world's population reached 7.734.000,000 inhabitants. According to a Report - Population Division, prepared in 2019, the estimated Earth population was 9.7 billion inhabitants by 2050 and 22 billion by 2100. The fastest growth is in poor countries, and in particular Africa and India. The existing pressure in the field of primary resource management, and here we are talking about the productive agricultural land resource, is increasing. The state entities react to the control of this heritage element, the productive agricultural land resource.

2. Content The average arable area per hectare of the Earth is 1.5 ha. In 2015, the United Nations proposed the 2030 Agenda. It is a global action program comprising 17 concrete and very ambitious points: 1. Poor country 2. "Zero" hunger

130 PRIVATE RURAL PROPRETY IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT

3. Health and well-being 4. Education and quality 5. Gender equality 6. Clean water and sanitation 7. Clean and affordable energy 8. Decent work and economic growth 9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure 10. Reduced inequalities 11. Sustainable cities and communities 12. Responsible consumption and production 13. Climate action 14. Aquatic life 15. Terrestrial life 16. Peace, justice and efficient institutions 17. Partnership to achieve the objectives

The physical-geographical environment is the proper space in which we carry out our activity and which defines us as a national entity. The total area of Romania is 23.839.000 ha, out of which agricultural land, 14,630,100 ha and arable land 9.208.900 ha. The issue of rational exploitation of agricultural land is part of EU policies. It considers the protection of the environment, the sustainable development, the protection and responsible management of the fertile lands having in view the background of limited resources and the increase of the demand for food. The country that has fertile agricultural land is a rich country. Romania has an average of 0.51 ha of arable land per capita, while in the European Union, the average is 0.212 ha per capita. Studies conducted by specialized institutes of the European Union show that Eastern Europe has largely estranged its fertile agricultural land. They were purchased by individual persons and companies inside EU, but also outside the EU. According to the Transnational Institute Amsterdam, in the paper elaborated in 2015 required by the EU Agriculture Commission, about 40% of Romania's arable land belongs to foreigners: 30% EU citizens and 10% non EU citizens. After 2014, Romania's land market was liberalized, and law no. 17/2014 is the one that regulated the sales of unincorported agricultural land. It should be mentioned that pieces of land were sold before 2014, based on Law no. 268/2001. According to the data transmitted by the Ministry of Agriculture to Agerpress, on June 2019, the lands sold in the last years are presented as follows: Year Surface (ha) 2015 172.353,79 2016 144.350 2017 153.927,46 2018 154.076,23 2019/30.apr. 48.746,67 Table 1…. The owners, individuals or companies, are from: Germany, , Austria, Holland, , , , Greece.

131 PRIVATE RURAL PROPRETY IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT Former minister of agriculture, Mr. Valeriu Tabară said in an interview for Sputnik, dated 10.06.2019, that as of February 2nd, 2012, 820.000 ha agricultural land had been sold. There are lands bought by people from Arab countries: the Maria group of companies, belonging to Libanese citizens, owns 65,000 ha with storage spaces and a port on the Danube. According to Capital magazine published on September 21st, 2019, Balta Brăilei, the most fertile land in Romania, with a surface of 50.000 ha, is managed by a foreign company. Given that agricultural production was and is a priority sector for Romania, it is necessary to encourage Romanian farmers to buy agricultural land. While in Europe agricultural land can cost up to 63,000 EUR/ha in Holland, according to Eurostat, in Romania, the average prices for agricultural land are as follows: - Arad, Timiş, Caraş: 6.000-8.500 EUR/ha - Satu Mare, Bihor: 4.000-7.000 EUR/ha - Maramureş, Sălaj, Bistriţa: 2.500-5.000 EUR/ha - Mureş, Sibiu: 4.000-5.500 EUR/ha - Gorj, Mehedinţi: 2.500-5.000 EUR/ha - Vâlcea, Argeş: 2.500-4.000 EUR/ha - Dolj, Olt: 4.500-5.500 EUR/ha - Braşov, harghita, Covasna: 4.000-7.000 EUR/ha - Buzău, Prahova, Dâmboviţa: 4.000-7.000 EUR/ha - Ilfov, Ialomiţa: 5.000-10.000 EUR/ha - Brăila: 5.000-7.000 EUR/ha - Călăraşi: 4.000-8.000 EUR/ha - Teleorman, Giurgiu: 3.000-6.000 EUR/ha - Tulcea, Constanţa: 4.000-7.000 EUR/ha - Vrancea, Galaţi: 3.500-6.000 EUR/ha - Suceava, Neamţ, Bacău: 3.500-5.000 EUR/ha - Botoşani, Iaşi: 3.500-7.000 EUR/ha - Vaslui: 2.500-4.000 EUR/ha

After 1990, laws were drafted to return agricultural land to their previous owners. The retrocessed land had different increasing values, according to the law, as follows: - Law no. 18/1991 regarding the land fund: provided up to 10ha in arable land and 1ha forested land per family; - Law no. 169/1997: modified the surfaces to 50 ha in arable land or equivalent, and up to 30ha of forested land; - Law no. 1/2000 regarding the re-establishment of the right to own agricultural and forested land: it provisioned the establishment of full right of ownership for forested lands; - Law no. 247/2005, art. 11 provisioned that: “the lands, as existing at their original sites, are legally returned to their previous owners”. Romania is the country with the most agricultural holdings, with small farms and disconnected pieces of land, practicing subsistence farming. There is only a small number of performant domestic farms. It is necessary to amend Law no. 17/2014, and is already being worked on by the Commision for Agriculture of the Chamber of Deputies. Measures have been proposed to encourage young Romanian farmers: - allowing young people access to the land market, - pooling of agricultural land,

132 PRIVATE RURAL PROPRETY IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT

- discourage the sale of land for speculative purposes, - prevent the sale of agricultural land outside of urban areas before 15 years from purchase have passed, - the owner’s domicile to be in the locality, for surfaces larger than 30 ha, - the secondary headquarters of the company to be in the locality and to have performed agricultural activities for 5 years prior to purchase. 3. Conclusion The Romanian legislation regarding the trading of agricultural land is still minimal. Romania must protect its agricultural land resource. The new economic policies place particular emphasis on the sustainable development of the regions and communities for the protection of the environment. France, Belgium, Germany require residences from 3 to 10 years, as well as checking the professional capacity of the buyers, in addition to other conditions. In you can buy a maximum of 300 ha of agricultural land, in Poland a maximum of 500 ha of agricultural land, in Latvia a maximum of 500 ha, in Yugoslavia 200 ha of agricultural land. Sustainable development, in conjunction with the state's economic policies, must provide for the needs of the population and future generations; the legislation is in progress and needs to be amended to meet these major demands.

References: [1] Anuarul Statistic al României/2015, 2016, 2017. [2] Eurostat Year Book/2015, 2016, 2017. [3] Ministerul Agriculturii – Statistică terenuri tranzacţionate de străini, 2019. [4] Raport ONU – Divizia populaţie, 2019. [5] Raport Transnational Institute Amsterdam. [6] Revista Capital, Florin Gherguţ, 21.sept.2019. [7] Revista Sputnik, Georgiana Arsene, 10.iunie.2019. [8] Legea nr. 18/1991. [9] Legea nr. 169/1977. [10] Legea nr. 1/2000. [11] Legea nr. 247/2005. [12] Legea nr. 17/2014.

133 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARYIRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Prof. Col (Ret) Maciej MARSZAŁEK* Dr Cyprian Aleksander KOZERA**

*National Security Faculty, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland

**National Security Faculty, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract: The aim of the following analysis is to update academic knowledge about failures of modern asymmetric and irregular conflicts. Basing upon statistical data up to 1998, authors briefly analyse recent interventions and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to draw conclusions and provide some suggestions on the matter of conducting modern irregular warfare.

Keywords: Irregular; Asymmetric; Unconventional; Conflict; Iraq; Afghanistan

1. Introduction The main prerequisite to ensure and sustain regional and international security is for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members to constantly modernise and improve their military potential. Such potential should not only ensure an efficient defence of one’s own country, yet also enable to provide an effective support to aggressed allies and guarantee high efficiency in international crisis management operations. The latter activity of the NATO forces should be considered through the prism of countering threats, especially the military ones, far away from the NATO borders. Such approach is deemed most desirable from the perspective of the Alliance member states, and this very practical strategy arises from modern warfare characteristics, in which a lot of attention is given to projection of military superiority. However, despite visible dominance of the Alliance on the global military stage, and its technical superiority in any given conflict, NATO did not come victorious in all of its military engagements of the late 20th and early 21st century. We can therefore assume that outstanding technical superiority has not proved sufficient in the reality of modern conflicts. Neither the US coalition in Iraq, nor the NATO in Afghanistan could not cope with a seemingly weaker adversary to the outcome that would permit to claim effective control of the territory. The outcomes of these two missions show that reaching an “operational success” in terms of defeating the enemy forces in main battles and nominally controlling the country is much easier than solving the conflict. In fact, such end state of “nominal victory” could be considered as remote from the real victory as the starting point was. In both cases, serious issues arose when the “occupational” forces were to enforce its rule and will over the territory in their stabilisation stages. We can therefore pose a following question: Why effectively stronger party to the conflict (e.g. the NATO, the coalition, or earlier: the US or the Soviet Union) could not achieve full solution to the conflict on its terms?

134 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

2. Various faces of armed conflicts After the end of the Cold War, the rise in numbers of internal conflicts has been observed. In the last decade of the 20th century, 92 out of 108 armed conflicts occurred among irregular actors and governments, or among irregulars themselves. Such phenomenon was obviously observed much earlier, as for instance various independence wars in colonial period (and earlier) or separatist conflicts were characterised by an armed struggle between non-state actors and governments. Such conflicts, where at least one party is a non-state (irregular) actor are dubbed irregular conflict, as opposed to ‘regular’ party which is official armed forces of state. Usually, irregular conflicts are as well asymmetric due to lack of equality of potentials of warring parties (in terms of quality and/or quantity) – most often the governmental side (regular armed forces) are in possession of technically advanced weaponry and higher number of troops, while the irregular side is frequently underequipped, lacks modern weapons, or is basically lacking militiamen. It seems that, to effectively control any territory and its inhabitants, the governmental or occupying foreign power ought to possess a physical component, such as organised armed forces, strong enough that would guarantee supremacy over their foe. Nonetheless, however well-trained, motivated, multicomponent, and equipped with advanced weapons some armies are, they still struggle when opposing an irregular enemy on its terms. Cyberwarfare, can be a new factor further undermining dominant party supremacy. Despite the fact, that the technical development occurs on the side of economically advanced countries, and consequently their armed forces are the first to profit from technical advancement, an irregular foe tends to easily adapt to that environment, exploiting gaps and lack of flexibility of massive armies, and surprisingly quickly acquiring know-how on technology available on the civilian market, that could be used in warfare. Increasing employment of civilian unmanned aerial vehicles by terrorist or irregular organisation (e.g. Daesh in Syria) is a disturbing example of that phenomenon. Furthermore, as Robert H. Latiff, a retired American general, put it armed forces are not prepared to adequately respond to threats from the cyber domain, as the strategists are not even aware of their full scope and form – we still have not defined what kind of cyber-actions amounts to an act of war, and how to respond to that. [Latiff, 2018, s. 11] Definitely, the evolving environment of war adds electronic and cyber dimension to already complicated and ambiguous setting. Irregular actors, although seemingly lacking modern military technology, tend to make up for it by employing the civilian technology, that, for instance, can cause enough damage to the banking system via hacking or Denial-of-Service attacks. It should be noted, that the cyberwarfare will not be the only ‘face of war’ in the future, especially in the, so called, Global South, or underdeveloped countries, that too frequently are ranked high on the fragile states index. Such states struggle with enforcement of their authority and full control over the territory, and hence various non-state armed groups, terrorist organisation including, are capable of finding a safe haven in areas outside of the governmental control, “filling the gap”, and imposing their rule. Such was the case of , where total lack of governmental authority over the north recesses of the country caused an emergence of a “black hole” of insecurity, where an amalgamate of violent non-state actors had a free reign until 2013. [Kozera, 2018, pp. 43-62.] Such phenomena are undermining regional security and threatening other states, as territories controlled by illicit actors are often used to plan, organise, or execute attack on democratic states and their interests. Contrary to often creative methods, that we have seen in irregular warfare, weaponry of such attacks remains, though, most frequently less sophisticated. It can be sometimes described as low-tech, or even technically primitive in

135 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE comparison with arsenal of the developed states and their armies. For obvious reasons – as non-state actors do not have access to international arms industry. They can, though, be supported by a state favourable to their cause and hostile to their foe. Such cases are rarer but still existing as the case of Second Lebanon War in 2006 proved. In that conflict an Iranian-supported and equipped with modern weapon system Hezbollah successively resisted against Israeli . Furthermore, as it was stated earlier, the civilian market offers technology, that with some creativity can be used for military purposes by non-state actors. Therefore, the relation between technology and warfare is much more complicated than it seems and cannot be simply put into equation “a powerful state armed with modern weapons versus an irregular actor with primitive weapons”. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the technological superiority is considered of the highest importance by the security experts and military strategists when it comes to the humanitarian intervention and crisis management operations abroad. The most distinct common characteristic of Western military arsenal in that context is its ability to minimise own casualties and, so called, collateral damage, or civilian deaths. Thus, the technological superiority is employed to reduce the death tool, and not increase it. What paired with democratic values and public transparency, crates a significant challenge for technologically advanced Western armies in countering an irregular enemy.

3. When weaker faces stronger – methods of warfare Conflicts involving irregular actors are caused by various and multiple factors, often nationalist, ethnical or religious, that are exacerbated by erosion of state institutions. In such circumstances, warfare, to which most irregular actors resolve, allows the weaker party to successfully engage stronger opponent such as the government and its armed forces. The weaker side, taking advantage of its flexibility and “invisibility” when operating among local population, exposes regular forces weaknesses. The latter lack rebels’ mobility, are easy distinguishable due to its uniforms, struggle to differentiate civilians from insurgents, or tend to abuse local population, in consequence farther alienating the government, reducing its support, and thus fuelling the insurgency. The by- product of such conflicts is too frequently high number of casualties on the civilian side – despite various breakthroughs in humanitarian approaches, armed conflicts occurring in the last decades – only to name , Bosnia and Hercegovina, Rwanda, and Syria – confirm the trend. The weaker party in an irregular conflict is therefore not necessarily without chances of winning the struggle, or at least – by protracting the conflict – deprive its foe of victory, forcing him to abandon the fight. Research conducted by a Harvard academic, Ivan Arreguín-Toft, collected all the asymmetric conflicts of last two centuries between the years 1800-1998. The results showed that majority of these were concluded with victory of the stronger party (in 70,8% of cases), while the weaker side won in less than the third of encounters (29,2%). However, the trend is favouring the weaker side. While the first part of the 19th century was characterised by even more decisive domination of the strong party over its weaker opponent (88,2% to 11,8%), the trend has been consequently reversing over time. In the second part of the last century, the figures were almost opposite: since 1950 (until 1998) it was the weaker party to the conflict won in majority (i.e. 55%) of the cases (see fig. 1 below). [Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 96] Numerous global powers have learned it “the hard way”, including the USA and NATO, or previously the Soviet Union and colonial powers.

136 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Fig. 1. Victory in asymmetric armed conflicts by strong actor (dark grey) and the weak (white). Despite the fact that the overall numbers favour the strong actor, the trend is reverse and in recent decades it has been the weak actor who has been delivering victory in armed struggle against a stronger foe. Source: Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars”, International Security, vol. 26, nr 1, (summer 2001), p. 97.

Irregular warfare, conducted by weak actors in asymmetric conflicts, is a special tactic, considered an antidote against military superiority of the stronger opponent. The tactic relies on small and lightly armed partisan units (groups) that resort to two main activities: firstly, they avoid direct and open fight with a stronger opponent, secondly, they resort to surprise attacks against enemy’s weakest spots, including the rear or the supply chains, thus constantly haunting, yet never engaging the opponent. [Cf. Gąsiorek, 2010, p. 16] While mobility and flexibility of actions is their strong points, the sustainability of irregular units depends almost entirely on the support of the civilian population living in the territory where partisans operate. The local population provides partisans with food supplies, housing and intelligence. Without these key resources any insurgency cannot last long. Hence, the main pillars of a successful counterinsurgency rely mostly on wining “the hearts and minds” (i.e. preferably proactive support) of the local population, and consequently: on providing the locals with necessary security and protection against possible revenge attacks of alienated insurgents. [Galula, 1964, p. 87, 89] [Kilcullen, 2010, p. 3-4] [Petraeus, Amos 2006, p. 13] Such approach, adequately named “population- centric” [Whither, 2016, p. 132] reflects the role that population plays in irregular armed conflicts – both from the perspective of insurgent, as the government or intervening external party. The temporal factor is not the less important in irregular warfare. Namely, the longer the conflict last, the more it profits local irregular groups, and becomes more and more costly for intervening party as deployment of the armies and their logistics is always an immense cost for the government. Costs that governments need to sustain draw scrutiny and criticisms from the public opinion, what pushes the decisionmakers to quickly terminate the conflict militarily or withdraw. While the former usually entails reinforcements and greater involvement, the politicians prefers scaling down the commitment. At the same time, much more modest needs of non-state groups can be fulfilled by local resources, and the broader public opinion (contrary to the local population) has much lower influence over

137 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE irregulars as they do not run in elections. Hence, protracted irregular conflicts favour irregular, weaker sides. Andrew Mack, who was the first to introduce the term of asymmetric conflict, relates success in warfare with motivation to achieve it. Asymmetry of powers may entail asymmetry of motivation yet in opposite relation. Thus, the greater power, the lower may be motivation to win a conflict with an actor of less importance, as the big power would not fight for its survival. The weaker party to such conflict though, fights for its very survival, thus is driven by the highest possible motivation. This, as previously showed, frequently translates into victory of seemingly weaker, yet more determined actor. Arreguin-Toft completes Mack’s reasoning with conclusion that victory in asymmetric conflict is dependent on the adequately chosen strategy, that should take into account not only the military potential but also the motivation of the parties involved. [Arreguin-Toft, 2001, p. 94-95] As it has been discussed, intervening forces, whether of national or foreign government, face tactics that aim at exploiting their greatest weaknesses. Due to superior firepower and sophisticated protection of regular forces, insurgents resort to improvised explosive devices (IED) in various forms, including suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) or person-borne IED (PBIED). This “weapon of choice” of modern irregulars and terrorists was successfully employed against coalition and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, causing many casualties and damage to the equipment. Introduction of mine-resistant vehicles (MRAP), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) helped to limit the threat, though in they are not available to all the military interventions, as for instance the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) troops still lack needed equipment.

4. Iraq 2003-2011 The first, conventional, stage of the coalition intervention in Iraq in 2003 was realised at the impressive pace of 21 days leading to the total victory over Saddam Hussein armed forces. Such successful coalition campaign was of no surprise given the fact that clear asymmetry between the foes’ armies could have been observed, while their sphere of contact remained conventional. Least to say that Saddam Hussein’s forces were from the previous era and lacked motivation. The conventional stage success, though, led to occupational stage, that translated into unconventional conflict with various irregular actors involved. Situation in Iraq, as in many others unconventional operations, involved numerous insurgent groups, whose structure, relations and aims were sometimes hard to define or comprehend. Frequently, they served their own particular short-term aim. Therefore, there was no one single enemy to face, yet rather amalgamate of irregular actors. The insurgency, thus, had no common structure, hierarchy, organisation, leadership, ideology or common aim. [Marszałek, 2016, pp. 232-233] The enemy’s centre of gravity [Eikmeier, 2017, p. 8] was thus hard to define, and the coalition struggled with countering many opponents at a time. The stabilisation phase of the Iraqi operation proved to be a huge challenge for the multinational intervening forces, that were not entirely prepared to realise complicated and multifunctional mission. Armed forces realised these tasks in warzone, often under enemy fire, haunted by insurgents’ attacks. These attacks included fire directed on the coalition bases, ambushes on the patrol routes and supply roads. Coalition forces conducted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations whose aim was to stifle Iraqi insurgency,

138 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE eliminate armed group and terrorist organisations. Yet even more important proved to be the fight for “hearts and minds” of the local population, without which – as it has been already pointed out – any irregular conflict in the form of insurgency cannot be solved positively. Achieving proper relations with population required, however, complex cooperation between both civil and military components in various spheres. Few years after the operation in Iraq was concluded, it seems though, that the huge effort of the coalition forces and the gains achieved on the ground, had not brought the enduring peace or even lasting stability. Resurgence of politicised ethno-religious conflict just after the coalition forces withdrew, was a clear sign that the second stage of the operation in Iraq was far from being successful. The most advanced army in the world did not manage to efficiently counter and eradicate Iraqi irregular and paramilitary units that some of whom later emerged as extremely violent terrorist group – Daesh, or so called “Islamic State”.

5. Afghanistan since 2001 The wide-coalition operation codenamed “Enduring Freedom” was initiated in response to the 9/11 attacks. The aim of the mission was to eradicate Taliban forces, establish control of the whole territory, hand in the country to authorities, that were to be elected in democratic process, and creating conditions favourable to restoration and rebuild of the country. [Marszałek, 2016, pp. 133] The superiority in both quantitative and qualitative terms was on the side of the intervening coalition forces. The multinational coalition included the Northern Alliance, a local Afghan insurgent group opposing the Taliban. The intervening forces quickly achieved victory against the Taliban regime when it meant abolishing organised state-like institutions and conducting conventional-like warfare. The victory was however undermined in the spring and summer period of the following year, when the Taliban undertook an insurgency directed against both the international forces and their local partners. Organised crime networks, involved mostly in opium production was a significant factor supporting and funding the Taliban insurgency. In this context, ISAF was forced to commit its resources not only to fighting the insurgency but also tracking the drug-traffickers, which cannot be considered a purely military task. In the initial phase ISAF area of operations was restricted to the capital city of Kabul and surroundings, when it was focused on supporting the provisional government. Although, in 2003, the coalition command was taken over by NATO. The ISAF area of responsibility was systematically enlarged in four consecutive stages. The fourth one commenced in October 2006, completing consolidation of the NATO responsibilities over whole the country’s territory. [Marszałek, 2014, pp. 177-178] Since 2009 ISAF had been increasingly focusing on training and formation of the Afghan security sector (military and the police). The multinational character of the mission provided the broad legitimisation, yet at the same time obstructed actions of ISAF, as limitations of specific national components deeply affected efficiency of the whole force. However, some states as Poland for instance, willing to significantly contribute to the mission, did not object any type of actions and were deployed to the most dangerous south-eastern region, where they conducted typical combat operations. ISAF mission completed in December 2014 and gave place to the NATO-led training mission, “Resolute Support”, on-going as of October 2019.

139 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 6. Conclusions Both above briefly presented missions underscore a thesis that in modern conflict it is much easier to assume military victory in the classically defined, conventional armed conflict, than in protracted irregular conflict that tend to replace the former. The stronger actor, as confirmed upon statistical data and case studies discussed above, often does not solve the conflict and rather gets involved in an improvised protracted withdrawal. Such scenario occurred almost simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, conventional military victory, previously championed as the end-goal of armed campaign, becomes less and less significant in the context of solving conflicts and regime change. In the modern armed conflicts, conventional victory is just a prelude to the further and greater involvement, that is necessary, if the peace is to be achieved. Yet, both in Afghanistan and Iraq lack of clearly defined desirable end-state and changing strategy only committed to bigger dispersion of limited resources and lack of overall efficiency. Moreover, in both operations, the insurgent sides enjoyed superiority in terms of knowledge of the operational territory and broadly defined environment, including local population and stakeholders. In many cases, this advantage could not be balanced by the technological superiority in the reconnaissance and enemy geolocation on the coalition side. The local partners, what both missions proved at some point, are a key component to ensuring victory and legitimisation of the effort. [More on employment of local non-state armed groups in counterinsurgency see] In these very specific operational environments international intervening forces were not flexible enough in changing their approaches and methods to efficiently respond to the mounting pressure of irregular insurgent groups. Such much required flexibility cannot be however obtained out of the blue and should be trained in the peace time. Although, this may require a totally new approach to the formation of soldiers and their relationship with the civilian components. Besides, the quantitative factor, although not the most important as it has been discussed, cannot be overlooked. The need to control the territory and provide security to the local population requires involvement of an immense number of troops. According to the “father of modern counterinsurgency”, David Galula, the preferred ratio of regular forces to insurgents can amount even to 20:1. Moreover, untypical for the conventional forces armed conflicts require untypical preparation and training, and consequently – adaptation to not-classical situations related with the use of violence. Such training would encompass not only counterinsurgency tactics against small and mobile irregular units, but also countering organised crime, fight in the urban area, and even training of local forces and provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, in order to effectively protect population and diminish the so called collateral damage, regular forces have to restrictively respect laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement (RoE). Yet, these restrictions have to be adapted and adjusted to the context of operational environment. Without any compromise in protection of civilians, they RoE should allow certain flexibility to realise given mission and ensure security of the military personnel involved. Such adaptability should minimise the phenomenon of exploiting democratic armies’ self-restraint by non-respecting irregular fighters. Last but not least, the military is conceived in order to use violence what elementarily entails killing of enemy. As the last resort, special forces operations aimed at eliminating the high-value (high-threat) targets should be considered as they are often the only solution to limit the violence, if the target cannot be apprehended and trialled by the court. This

140 WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE method, though, cannot be abused, as it can create resentment and in result more enemies than it eliminates. After all, the point is to solve the conflict, not fuel it.

References: [1] Arreguin-Toft I., “How the Weak Win Wars”, International Security, 26/1, (summer 2001). [2] Eikmeier D.C., “The Center of Gravity Still Relevant After All These Years?”, Military Review Online Exclusive, May 2017, p. 8 (footnote 8); cf. M. Wiatr, Dowodzenie operacyjne w sztuce wojennej, AON, Warszawa 1998. [3] Galula D., Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger, New York 1964, p. 87, 89; cf. Kilcullen D., Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, p. 3-4; cf. Petraeus D., Amos J., (eds.), U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, 15 December 2006. [4] Gąsiorek K., (ed.), Działania nieregularne [Irregular Warfare], AON, Warszawa 2010. [5] Kozera C. A., “The Use of Local Non-State Armed Groups in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism – Examining the Case of Mali”, in: Besenyo J., Marsai V., (eds.), The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century, Budapest 2018. [6] Kozera C.A., “Black Holes of Insecurity – the North of Mali” in: Besenyo J., Marsai V., (eds.), The Dynamics of Conflicts in Africa in the Early 21st Century, Budapest 2018. [7] Latiff R.H., Wojna przyszłości. W obliczu nowego globalnego pola bitwy [Future War: Preparing for the New Global Battlefield], Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 2018. [8] Marszałek M., Operacje utrzymania i wymuszania pokoju w systemie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, Difin. Warszawa 2014. [9] Marszałek M., Wojny nieregularne. Przeszłość i przyszłość. Doświadczenia i wnioski, [Irregular Wars. Past and Future. Experiences and Conclusions], Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2016. [10] Whither J. K., The Role of the Security Forces in Combating Terrorism, in: Whither J. K., Mullins S., (red.); Combating Transnational Terrorism, Procon, 2016, p. 132; cf. Max Boot, Invisible Armies. An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York – London 2013.

141 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY

Lucian MICHINICI

Romanian Air Forces, Bacău, Romania

Abstract: Global communication capabilities make news and information simultaneously available from the strategic to the tactical levels of military operations. New communication technologies and the expansion of international media alliances have affected the conduct of military operations to a degree equal to that of emerging weapons technologies.

Key words: Information; news; communication; media; rumour;

1. Introduction Today’s global information environment is characterized by continuous real-time information proliferation, 24-hour news cycles spurred on by advanced information and communication technologies. The modern information environment enables individuals, groups and often nations to report – and verify or refute – information of various authenticity and accuracy, rumour, supposition and in some cases, outright disinformation and offer either a supporting or countervailing opinion to the global, news-consuming market. The changes allow audiences in the country and throughout the world to receive real-time information from national leaders and military from theatres of operations. The effect is simultaneous influence on domestic and international publics and their decision makers as they consume information – truthful and untruthful. This effect can translate into political pressure on national leaders and military commanders to change strategic goals, policies, guidance, objectives and procedures that affect military missions. Global communication capabilities make news and information simultaneously available from the strategic to the tactical levels of military operations. New communication technologies and the expansion of international media alliances have affected the conduct of military operations to a degree equal to that of emerging weapons technologies. For example, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM’s embedded reporter program placed roughly 700 journalists with military units from the outset of the operation. Those journalists employed a thickening web of communications infrastructure to deliver visuals, audio and first-hand insights to a worldwide audience. Reporter’s access to the operation was as unimpeded as the release of their products; media delivered news from the operation without military sanitization or manipulation. This unfettered information flow gained credibility as the ground truth and is credited with reducing the potential for Iraqi misinformation that could have undermined public support. Just as the operating environment has changed from the Cold War era, so must the methods and tactics of communication and the organizational constructs that facilitate them. The Cold War focus was to contain communism while sustaining democracy. The communication techniques were focused on influencing the ideology of communist populations; the intended effect of the consistently repeated message was deterrence. However, the communication challenge in the

142 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY

Global War on Terror is to reach a massive, global audience – one that includes many members who are united in common religious beliefs – to change the negative perceptions and beliefs regarding Western values.

2. What is Strategic Communication?

The question “what is strategic communication?” can bring as many answers as the number of people asked the question. Differing perspectives of the concept are common among public relations professionals, marketing staffs, strategic planners and government agencies. The Romanian Department of Defence - DoD roadmap for strategic communication states it is “to support commanders by communicating / transmitting true, accurate and timely information audiences, in order to maintain high public confidence in the military institution and achievement in a framework of military culture necessary for an adequate understanding of the military issue the role, the objectives, the missions, the operations and the activities carried out, thus contributing to the promotion and strengthening the credibility of the military institution and the military profession.” The broader, operational view of DoD desired strategic communication process goes far beyond the basic communication construct of ‘sender – message – receiver’ to interpret every DoD action or statement as a form of communication. This new approach is to establish a strategic communication process in which all DoD strategy, planning and operational decisions are made. The intent of the Romanian government’s efforts in strategic communication is to synchronize and integrate efforts between all instruments of power: diplomatic, information, military and economic. There must be harmony between this instruments to realize their full potential and DoD’s current efforts in strategic communication are to provide a process to coordinate efforts to achieve desired effects. The strategic communication process will help to ensure a consistent application of Romanian government policy to actions and statements. The linkage of actions with statements in support of policy is vitally important because when statements and actions are not synchronized, or are not consistent with policy, a “say-do gap” is created that degrades efforts and adversely affects credibility of the military and, ultimately, the nation. The DoD concept for strategic communication places a high priority on public information. The developing processes put information experts in the planning and decision-making cycles for operations to achieve desired effects. Regardless of definition or perspective, the importance of effective public communication and relations – strategic communication – cannot be overstated. With proper prioritization and authority to integrate information planning and engagement into operations and other efforts, strategic communication can help build relationships with various publics – foreign and domestic – that improve the ability of our country to meet its national objectives. Delivery of public information may result in increased public support of policy initiatives, procurement efforts and operational objectives. The public may be internal to the organization, a supporter, a taxpayer, Government, a foreign country or a potential adversary. Just as varied is the perspective of the audiences: the vested interest may come because the publics benefit from, or are harmed by, the behaviour of military organization. Regardless of the nature of the public’s association with an organization, the bedrock of public communication is the building of key partnerships based on relationships. This also is where the true value of DoD’s Public Affairs (PA) capabilities resides since its people are charged with conducting the core of the department’s public relations work. However, to be effective, the people charged with executing the public communication component of DoD’s strategic communication efforts must have the knowledge, skills and training necessary to allow them to understand the nuances of varied, global audiences. Investment must

143 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY also be made to build understanding of new and emerging communication technologies, how different publics use them and what communication tactics should be employed for our military system to success. Increasingly, conflict is in a population’s cognitive space, making sheer military might a lesser priority for victory in the Information Age. To bring success in the modern operating environment, policy, diplomatic and military operations must include consideration of public information and integration of the efforts of the resources that deliver it. Military leadership must also understand that specific, intended strategic communication effects may be difficult to attain and that unintended second and third order effects are possible, especially in the near term. Effective communication strategies will bring near-term results and successes, but patience, persistence and messages consistent with actions are requisite for communication’s intended strategic effects. Many times, the outcomes of strategic efforts are beyond-the-horizon: the efforts are often generational in nature, with their results years in the future. DoD may not have the patience for beyond-the-horizon strategic communication. Continuity of the effort may be difficult to achieve in an environment made fluid by leadership changes, frequent workforce turnover due to military reassignments, shifting national security priorities and varying budgets.

3. Why Strategic Communication

I will stress the following statement made by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda deputy: “More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle, a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma (community of Muslims).” During the Cold War, it often was acceptable for a government agency or senior leader to avoid interaction with public groups or the media in the name of national security. However, the world has changed; the demand and appetite for information has grown dramatically. Success within the information domain in the Global War on Terror – and most likely every future conflict – demands engaged leaders who clearly articulate the country’s vision and goals. Failure to engage is to allow others to solely frame the issue from their point of view. The modern environment in which DoD’s information resources operate is global in nature. “The Global Information Environment (GIE) includes all individuals, organizations or systems that collect, process and distribute information. A significant subsystem of the GIE is the public information environment – the realm in which public communication operations occur. The public information environment includes all individuals, organizations or systems that collect, process and disseminate information for public consumption. It is comprised of many sub-systems ranging from interpersonal communication to international public information and mass media.” The public information environment is a key battleground in the modern information environment. Some military leaders have labelled the current operating conditions as Fourth Generation Warfare, a term that refers to an enemy that operates in a virtual realm and uses mass media cleverly, effectively making the media the battlespace. Personal electronic devices such as smartphones, digital cameras and various kinds of computers have created a new intersection between the individual and the mass media. The public can no longer be viewed as passive information consumers: the public now more than ever is actively contributing to the information environment via World Wide Web sites, blogs and social networks. The new technologies also give individuals, groups and, in some regard, nations enormous capability to organize and influence various audiences.

144 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY

For instance in April 2006, Nepal's King Gyanendra ordered cell phone service cut after protesters used text messages to help assemble street protests by tens of thousands of democracy advocates. Another example, on January 2001, during the impeachment trial of Philippine President Joseph Estrada, loyalists in the Philippine Congress voted to set aside key evidence against him. Less than two hours after the decision was announced, thousands of Filipinos, angry that their corrupt president might be let off the hook, converged on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a major crossroads in Manila. The protest was arranged, in part, by forwarded text messages reading, "Go 2 EDSA. Wear black." The crowd quickly swelled, and in the next few days, over a million people arrived, choking traffic in downtown Manila. The public's ability to coordinate such a massive and rapid response -- close to seven million text messages were sent that week -- so alarmed the country's legislators that they reversed course and allowed the evidence to be presented. Estrada's fate was sealed; by January 20, he was gone. The event marked the first time that social media had helped force out a national leader. Estrada himself blamed "the text-messaging generation" for his downfall. Modern conflicts include battles far beyond the physical battlespace. The information environment is quickly becoming the place of advantage for adversaries, giving them asymmetric options for attacks. Terrorist organizations are very effectively harnessing Western information technology, such as the Internet, to help them achieve their global ambitions. Several virtues of the Internet make it easier to generate the fear the terrorists seek. Characteristics such as ease of access, anonymity of posting, a potentially large audience and lack of regulations have allowed terrorists to reach millions of people with little risk of being detected and stopped. Through operating their own Web sites and online forums, terrorists have effectively created their own “terrorist news network”. Not only are new technologies used to carry terrorists messages to the global audience, they also are used to create a command and control system that is hidden in public by using Web sites, social networks, Internet chat rooms and cell phone networks.

4. External factors that influences Strategic Communication

Strategic communication processes and organizations may be influenced by several factors beyond the control of DoD. These influences range from new media and their effects on the delivery of information in the public information environment, to international relations between the Romania and its allies or strategic partners. Some factors are clearly beyond the direct control of the Romanian government, such as the free press and private - sector relationships with, and image projection to, foreign audiences. The growth of computer-generated information and content is largely responsible for a modern media category labelled as new media. The new media category describes digital information or content that only can be viewed or used with a computer of some form. Oftentimes, new media also bring the opportunity for a degree of interaction between the media and its consumer. Nowadays media offer vast, new means to reach various audiences, from Web sites that offer images, video, live streaming, text in the form of stories or online journals, to social networks like Facebook or Twitter that allow the consumer to comment about the information or even help advance the story. This type of media also present a challenge in reaching a broad cross-section of society. The personalized delivery nature of new media allows people to increasingly self-select their news sources while avoiding media outlets that may counter their opinions or ideologies. When considered through the lens of strategic communication, the segmentation of societies by media delivery channels means some target audiences may be extremely difficult to reach. In many ways, success in reaching some target audiences will depend on the access granted to DoD messengers by the varied media outlets and, then, how the outlet frames the information.

145 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY

Websites as YouTube, allows their users to post self-produced videos, encouraging to gain popularity among population, allowing them to bypass the conventional mass media’s editorial process to directly convey a message to a mass audience. While each of the military services has robust Web presences with multimedia features, the Romanian DoD has done the best job of embracing new media on its site (https://www.mapn.ro/) and on his Facebook account (Ministerul Apararii Nationale, www.mapn.ro) focused on external audiences. The Web site also encourages interaction with visitors by offering comment links with most of the information presented. Indeed, one of the aspects of many new media offerings is consumer collaboration. This technological phenomenon greatly expands the voice of a population, allowing anyone with basic computer equipment, or even the cheapest smartphone, to potentially reach a global audience with their views and opinions. The power of individuals to potentially reach multitudes in near real-time also brings tremendous capability to spread misinformation and falsely refute facts. Alliances, coalition operations, military-to-military contact programs, humanitarian missions, academic exchanges and other relationship-building activities with key partner states are fundamentals of modern international relations. Their implications on DoD strategic communication efforts are important to consider. First, partner nations in alliances, coalitions and strategic relationships can greatly aid DoD’s efforts in strategic communication. Strategic goals for all partner nation-states may be more easily achieved through improved information sharing and more tightly coordinated communication efforts. Statements by national leaders, policies and actions that support the Romania positions – or at least don’t directly counter them – can be helpful reinforcements for DoD’s efforts to reach international audiences. Transnational relationships simultaneously can potentially create significant negative effects on DoD’s strategic communication efforts. Although it is unreasonable to expect sovereign nations would ever agree on all issues of policy or strategic goals, it’s not so unreasonable to believe they can cooperate on communication efforts for shared success. An example of this cooperation occurred during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) combat operation against Serbia in 1999 to stop the bloodshed in Kosovo. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s government was adept at spreading misinformation that gained momentum as media outlets reported it. The number of media queries for each of Milosevic’s claims quickly overwhelmed the small public affair staff at NATO’s military headquarters. This resulted in Milosevic dominating the news cycle with his information because the NATO staff had no time to be on the informational offensive. The problem was exacerbated by leaders of NATO nations drowning each other out with statements – sometimes contradicting one another on alliance policy and the strategic aim of the operation – during interviews and press conferences in their own countries. The NATO public information staff took a strategic approach to the problem by creating a daily public information schedule, or grid, to coordinate and deconflict press conferences, statements and interviews scheduled in the member nations. The result was a consistent NATO message provided on different mediums and in different countries throughout the news day. The public information grid effort did not stop Milosevic’s misinformation operations, but it did give the alliance a means to better communicate its messages while its public information staff continued to fight the misinformation. At that point this event it was the most eloquent example of media power and the way of influencing public opinion was raised at the "art" level. All this campaign was conducted by Ruder & Finn Global Political Affairs, a company specializing in the intoxication and manipulation of world public opinion at the request of a government, state or political party that pays for the campaign. The purpose of this institution is to build or redefine, especially through television, the

146 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY image of international conflicts, peoples or ethnicities according to the wishes and interests of the client. In 1993, the company worked for , Bosnia and Herzegovina and the opposition in Kosovo, and in a period of 18 months, it created a strong and extremely favourable international image. The campaign was huge and, for huge sums, included obtaining and promoting the favourable opinions of the most important dignitaries, business people and opinion leaders in the world. International coordination and complementary informational efforts in the Global War on Terror could be extremely beneficial to achieving success. Hard-hitting, consistent statements against terrorism, particularly by national leaders or opinion leaders in Muslim nations, could do much to reach the non-radicalized elements of Islamic populations. The statements would not necessarily need to be explicit in their support of the NATO and its partners in the war against terror, but rather could condemn terrorist action as counter to the beliefs of Muslims. Efforts should be made to create a trans-national communication strategy group comprised of willing nations. As a beginning, at the most basic level, the group could share information and coordinate communication efforts on issues of common concern. The academic community, with its immense resources for research, education, cultural expertise and language skills, also is a valuable conduit through which strategic communication efforts can be strengthened. Building and maintaining relationships with international students studying in the alliance countries is a resource that should not be overlooked. Relationships begun in the this foreign educational system and continued after the student returned to his or her home country would create a useful, global network of people who have personal understanding of the other countries culture and may be willing to share that insight with their home populations. Additionally, many of the international students may rise to important positions in their home countries, making them influential opinion leaders in their populations. Research shows that people look to family members, personal friends or community leaders more than to the mass media to form their opinions. The free press is one of democracy’s most important strengths: It helps to provide a flow of information between government and its population while also creating a degree of transparency for government actions. The mass communication media are the most common means to convey a message to a diverse audience. However, due to the editorial process, traditional media outlets employ to vet and refine the information gathered by their reporters before printing, posting or broadcasting the products, it’s uncertain in what form the audience will receive the message. The military has no control over the media or the editorial process inherent in commercial news production, nor should it. The editorial threshing machine, however, is a serious external factor for strategic communication efforts since the potential is very real for intended messages to be distorted or unrecognizable when a reporter’s story is eventually distributed to the public. There is little to be done to mitigate the possibility of messages losing their intended focus during the editing process except to be aware of the possibility, invest time in building the knowledge and understanding of the reporters and retain focus on the strategic goal of the communication. Use of varied communication channels to consistently convey the messages in support of the strategic goal is critical and underscores the value of strategies that coordinate actions and communication.

147 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY

5. Conclusions

Modern technology continues to improve to meet society’s increasing demand for up-to- date information. The sharpening focus on information provides an increasing opportunity for DoD to successfully communicate with intent through a strategic communication process. However, top-heavy organizational structures built to control and perfect information are not compatible with the modern information environment, characterized in part by its rapid flow of information. Although centralized control and decentralized execution has great merit in most military operations, DoD must be careful to avoid killing its strategic communication process with the very bureaucracy it’s building to create it. Additionally, as commanders execute plans that include strategic use of information, they must be very careful to ensure the public information capabilities, such as those employed by public affair, are used in ways that protect their earned audience credibility. Public information resources potentially broad, rapid reach provides unique capabilities to commanders but must not be misused to communicate misinformation. To do so would be devastating to these capabilities greatest asset to the military – their credibility – and would have lasting, limiting effects on the commander’s ability to successfully employ public communication operations afterward. Long-term funding, renewed training programs, equipment and systems to enable information resources to deliver their full capabilities to the strategic communication effort also must be at the forefront of DoD’s efforts. Effects may not be immediately apparent from each action under the rubric of strategic communication. This must not dissuade commanders, DoD and national leaders from continued engagement in the information environment. To back away from communication with intent is to cede the opportunity to current and future adversaries.

References:: [1] Communication strategy of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense in the period 2017-2020; March 2017; [2] Joint Publication 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,” 13 February 2006., I-2; [3] Satinder Bindra and Prithvi Banerjii, “Rain, police douse Nepal protest” Available online at Http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/04/22/nepal/, Accessed 20 May 2019; [4] Alex Spillius, “People power topples Estrada” Available online at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/1318823/People-power-topples- Estrada.html, 22 May 2019.

148 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

EUROPOL and INTCEN SECURITY PROVIDERS FOR THE EUROPEAN SPACE

Mihail PĂDURARU* PHD Candidate Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, MSc Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy Claudia-Iohana VOICU** MSc Candidate Military Technical Academy Ferdinand I, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

*Law Enforcement Officer, Honorary Vice President Chamber of Commerce and Industry Romania-Turkmenistan

**Director for Research, Strategy and Development Chamber of Commerce and Industry Romania-Turkmenistan

Abstract: As technological advances accelerated changes in the security paradigm, the rise and unpredictable alterations of hybrid warfare strategies and rise of terrorism gained significant terrain on the global scene, often proving to be difficult to identify and neuter in a timely matter. Moreover, as the European space saw an increase in threats’ number and severity, members signalled the need for an EU security mechanism that answer to NATO blindspots. The present paper argues that enhancing the activity of specialized EU intelligence-sharing bodies would strengthen regional security, ensure the defense of non-Nato EU states, and complement NATO mandate.

Key words: intelligence-sharing, security blindspots, EU-NATO Complementarity

1. Introduction

Since the Information Age reshaped warfare and brought on a slew of new threats, modern states are faced with adapting their security infrastructures to ensure long-term stability. Also, as consequence of strong political, economic and social interconnections, EU coalition states cannot thrive in isolation. Therefore, for efficiency, there is a growing need for a collective approach for common problems, information sharing and strong cooperation mechanisms being crucial.

149 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

A special challenge to the EU’s need for a common security framework is raised by EU members that are not also part of NATO. Austria, Cyprus, , Ireland, Malta, and Sweden1 as non-NATO members are dependent on the common EU defence infrastructure in case of an imminent conflict. Also, as they are spread out throughout NATO’s space, the countries can become strategic weaknesses to the Alliance’s defence. In addition, as mixed messages regarding the US’s foreign policy priorities rippled through its allies, the latter began questioning their alternatives. In the EU’s case, recent geopolitical evolutions and growing tensions within the Alliance regarding NATO funding contributions, meant calls raised for an EU army2. Regardless, as defense remains an attribute of the member states, these calls were met with reluctance, giving preference to improving existing collaboration platforms. Moreover, to address growing concerns over NATO’s sustainability, the EU intensified its efforts to boost cooperation among states in security matters and strengthen its defense capabilities. To this end, a series of new initiatives were implemented such as launching PESCO, setting up the , conducting regularly joint military, cybersecurity or counter-terrorism exercises3. Similarly, as the successful endeavors of the recently set up European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats show, the EU and NATO are working together in addressing information gaps and any vulnerabilities exploitable by traditional or non- traditional aggressions.4 Moreover, NATO and the EU’s security prerogatives for the European space are deeply interconnected. As proof of that, the EU’s Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, gives special attention to the organization’s close partnership with NATO. Moreover, the Capability Development Plan is built on the existing NATO infrastructure to ensure an efficient allocation of defense resources.5 Therefore, in continuation, the present paper argues for an increased role to be given to EU structures which complement the existing NATO infrastructure and simultaneously address weaknesses in the common security blanket.

1 EEAS- EU-NATO cooperation – Factsheets, 11 July 2019, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en, accessed on 25 October 2019 2 Azeem Ibrahim - Europe Is Ready for Its Own Army, Foreign Policy, 5 September 2019, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/05/europe-is-ready-for-its-own-army/, accessed on 25 September 2019 3 European Parliament - Defence: is the EU creating a European army?, EU Parliament News, 24 July 2019, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/eu-army-myth- what-is-europe-really-doing-to-boost-defence, accessed on 25 September 2019 4 NATO Review - Cooperating to counter hybrid threats, published on 23 November 2018, available at https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/EN/index.htm, accessed on 27 September 2019 5 EEAS- Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence_2.pdf, accessed on 25 September 2019

150 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

2. Possible Answers to Growing Security Architecture needs

2.1 EUROPOL - Helping to make Europe safer

When an issue such as the spread of terrorism threatens the European space, perhaps the most active role is evoked by the institutions which are dedicated to security itself, in the view of the permanent state of safety, even if all of them are pursuing this ideal.

In this sense Europol was formed, whose main purpose is to strengthen Europe's security for the benefit of its own citizens6. Enforced by this idea, it assists EU Member States in the fight against large-scale criminal activities, becoming increasingly active in the present European reality7.

Headquartered in The Hague, the organization positions itself as a hub for transnational law enforcement operations, information sharing and expertise. It’s mandate allows it to support all 28 EU member states as they tackle threats such as terrorism, money laundering, human trafficking. Moreover, Europol collaborates with many non-EU partner states and international organizations.8

Europol does not have legal powers, so it cannot detain persons. It can only support the work of the organizations involved in law enforcement activities, by analyzing and disseminating the intel provided by the Member States.

6 European Ombudsman- Report of the European Ombudsman following his visit to the European Police Office (Europol), 2012, available at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:hrOjDg5PJFsJ:https://www.ombudsman.europa .eu/pdf/en/49145+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ro, accessed on 5 October 2019 7 Europol – About Europol, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol, accessed on 5 October 2019 8 idem

151 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

The intel in question is proposed for the purpose of coordinating operations9 and Europol's interest includes the fields of terrorism, international drug trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime and human beings trafficking.

Europol activities are carried out by a staff formed by individuals that come from the national police, border authorities and intelligence services of the Member States. Moreover, the Europol long-term strategy has significant milestones in the development of the agency as a European expertise center, including a homogeneous, complete, coherent and accurate outcome through the EPE (Europol Platform for Experts)10. It also proposes a permanent support in the form of a intelligence headquarters, but also as a forensic entity based on compliance with the laws and values of the European Union. The real threat of terrorism is accelerating, and casts doubt on the EU's prompt response capabilities, which is why European institutions have to stimulate the idea of international cooperation across the continent.

Euroscepticism is particularly dangerous in conflict situations, which is ironically more likely in such situations when some events prove structural vulnerability. Solidarity and unity are values that must be permanently promoted to consolidate the EU's basic structure, its ideal being as strong as the weakest link in the European chain. Europol ECTC’s recent warnings argue that future terrorist attacks in the European space are likely in the near future.11 Its analysis and expertise supporting, on the basis of facts, the idea that terrorism is not an isolated phenomenon that appears without any future result and without well- determined causes: "We have to deal with a serious, well-funded, determined international terrorist organization that is now active on the streets of Europe. It is reasonable to assume that there is a likelihood of new attacks. [...] We are dealing with a more significant and dangerous form of terrorism. I received a clear statement of intent from the Islamic State terrorist network, which wants to export brutal terrorism to Europe and on the international scene. " The Europol expert even compared the attacks in Paris, where 129 people were killed, with the bombings in Mumbay (India) where 166 people were killed in 2008: "Mumbay attacks have come true in Europe."12

The Islamic State terrorist network claimed the 13th and 14th November attacks in Paris. More than 129 people were killed in terrorist attacks, and around 400 were injured.

9 Europol - EUROPOL’S 20 MOST NOTEWORTHY OPERATIONS, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/europol-20-years/europols-20-most-noteworthy- operations, accessed on 5 October 2019 10 Europol - EUROPOL PLATFORM FOR EXPERTS (EPE), available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/information-exchange/europol- platform-for-experts, accessed on 5 October 2019 11 Europol - EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CENTRE – ECTC, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc, accessed on 5 October 2019 12 Raffaello Pantucci - Paris terror attacks: The lessons of Mumbai were learned – by the jihadis, The Independent, 14 November 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/paris-terror-attacks-the-lessons- of-mumbai-were-learned-by-the-jihadis-a6734836.html, accessed on 5 October 2019

152 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

The Sunni radicalistic organization has warned that all countries participating in the bombing coalition in Syria and Iraq will face attacks such as those in Paris (the Islamist fundamentalist-terrorist organization has occupied regions of Iraq, Syria, northern Egypt and northern Libya , locations it had proclaimed as part of the "Islamic Caliphate"). The security-related institution Europol seeks to understand the phenomenon, so it attaches significant importance to the causes of terrorism and the effects it may have in the long run. Thus, its present effects are an aspect to be abandoned on a psychological basis, being just an impulse to improve the system. The main interest is to understand and stop the phenomenon, of course, with the aim of minimizing the potential destructions that might intervene as a necessity. At the same time, Europol shows Europe's need to cease to be a material and intellectual source for the outside world as they have direct implications on terrorist capabilities: "The EU continues to serve as the area for funding, providing logistics, refuge and recruitment for terrorist groups which operates mainly outside Europe. This applies in particular to the Turkish terrorist groups PKK and DHKP / C, the terrorist groups in the northern Caucasus and the Lebanese Hezbollah groups. " European Union Member States define terrorism as inherent in intimidating the population and trying to obey under certain rules, criteria or demands by individuals or groups of individuals trying to impose their own interests by domination. This definition fails, however, to attain the implications that radical ideology can have on the European population. One TE-SAT report states that: "There is an increasing threat from those EU citizens who have gone to conflict zones to engage directly in terrorist activities, returning to the EU with a desire to commit terrorist acts." At a conference held on 19 November 2015, the Director of Europol also recalled the taking down of a Russian passenger plane in Egypt. "We are facing a serious, well- funded and determined international terrorist organization that is now active on the streets of Europe. It is the worst terrorist threat to Europe in the last ten years." The hearing in the European Parliament came on the eve of an extraordinary meeting of EU interior ministers and justice ministers to discuss the necessary steps after the attacks in Paris. Europol (the only European authority empowered to act against terrorism and organized crime) warned about the fact that militants on the Syrian front pose a threat to European security. At the same time, the report states that most terrorist attacks in the EU are linked to separatist groups, and most Member States consider terrorism (as a major threat) to be inspired by religion (which was proven by the increase in arrests in 2013). A worrying situation was reported by Europol in relation to a part of Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The Arab Revolutions and similar actions launched in 2010 in Tunisia have made it possible to strengthen operational capabilities and foundations in favor of terrorist groups involved in regional conflicts. These actions and developments in the situation could also have repercussions for European security, without any abstraction from the European population that tends to start a process of psychological transition through the created cultural discrepancy. It is also worth noting that there is a need for joint actions, this idea being one of the first answers given by the European Parliament to the terrorist issue. In order to improve the capacity to fight terrorism, Parliament reached an informal agreement with the governments within the Council to extend the mandate of Europol; The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs approved the agreement on 30 November 2015. Rapporteur Agustin Diaz de Mera (Spain): "The new Europol rules are the best answer we can make to the terrorist threat."

153 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

With these new competences, the Agency as a whole should be able to more easily mobilize specialized units and exchange information with private entities in certain cases; the high potential for identifying suspects or foreign fighters is a necessary tool for law enforcement with efficiency.

2.2 INTCEN connecting the dots and outlining the knowledge

It is also important to mention the importance that the intelligence analysis center of the European Union plays in managing the current terrorist problem. The EU Intelligence Analysis Center INTCEN is an individual structure in the European landscape. In general, it evaluates and is mindful of manifestations, phenomena or realities that can generate crises or phenomena such as terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. The aim of INTCEN (formerly known as EU Situation Centre - EU SITCEN)13 is to inform policy makers at high level through intelligence analysis. These intelligence reports can also be provided at the request of the High Representative, and after the attacks of September 11, 2001, a strengthened exchange of sensitive information, generally referred to as intelligence, has been achieved. The multilateral co-operative system facilitates this compact model of continental information structure, INTCEN closely cooperating with the intelligence services of the member states and functioning as a headquarters that brings together the aspects of the European Union as a whole. Moreover, INTCEN fills the gap in the information exchange mechanisms implemented by NATO’s Allied Command Counterintelligence and similar structures, by addressing the non-NATO EU states blind spots and integration needs14. In terms of staff, it is made up of experts and intelligence experts from the intelligence agencies and connected departments of the countries of origin, but also from members with permanent status, although the meaning of the term is forced through such expression. 15 To this extent, INTCEN develops analysis and briefings, supports external representation missions by the President of the (and by the President of the European Commission) and is the unifying point of contact for European services that are confronted with major and impact phenomena, such as terrorism or organized crime. At the same time, the European Intelligence Center collaborates with the EU Military Staff through the SIAC agreement (it is a virtual entity, has no employees or headquarters, acts as a purely agreement).

13 EU INTCEN Factsheet, published on 5 February 2015, available at http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-intcen-factsheet.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2019 14 Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, Mark Rhinard – Making Sense of Sense-Making: The EU’s Role in Collecting, Analysing, and Disseminating Information in Times of Crisis, The Swedish National Defence College, 2014, available at http://www.societalsecurity.eu/uploads/Articles/2014_Boin%20Ekengren%20Rhinard_Sensemaking_FHS% 20Book.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2019 15 EU INTCEN Factsheet, published on 5 February 2015, available at http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-intcen-factsheet.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2019

154 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

The INTCEN can only focus on its analytical capacities without allocating resources in the field of phenomena monitoring (through the ) and its structure consists of the 110 officials, 70% of whom are detached nationally. Through threat assessments, situation assessments, reports and summaries, a strategic radiography of the continent is provided, giving Europe the advantage of knowing, anticipating, observing and modifying reality. After the Paris bombings, referring to INTCEN as an institution that did not do enough is somewhat inappropriate due to the priorities and means it uses. Numerous press agencies did not see increased effectiveness in this structure, being, in public opinion, a European element with no capacity to respond or react to immediate problems. INTCEN Director Ilkka Salmi replies, "We do not have a data collection capability. We do not deal with personal data. We are not dealing with clandestine operations." National security is left to the Member States, so a European Intelligence Agency has not been a topic of interest to the European Union after the terrorist attacks in Paris. INTCEN analyzes major topics (such as terrorism), so it can provide intelligence products on demand to an individual state to solve an extended problem. It is self-evident that the intelligence product inside the European organization will be, in terms of quality, far beyond the finished product of any national information service. Most reports produced by the INTCEN are classified on different levels as the intelligence activity started becomes ineffective as the data obtained becomes public. The analysis is done through a discrete activity when it comes to the security of different states. INTCEN will not provide a flow of public opinion information, and this is not for misinformation, but because individuals or badly-minded groups could profit from them and the measures adopted by the state concerned would become impossible imposed in the conditions of a new reality determined by the enemy. The conclusion is that very few INTCEN assessments are available, but general directions can be detached from other than official ones. The idea of homogeneity is also found in the case of the intelligence center, the Prime Minister of saying: "We have a unique currency and we should have a common security with a system of intelligence connected to the requirements. Europe must be united against terrorism." An INTCEN official also claimed that: we are committed to implementing all measures that may be helpful in sharing intelligence on the various forms of the threat, particularly foreign terrorist fighters. Both EUROPOL and INTCEN are absolutely necessary institutions for ensuring security in the European space and in relation to the new threats and manifestations of the risks proliferated by the criminal and terrorist organizations of today, as well as by certain states that encourage the hybrid warfare, they have the duty to develop organically and contribute to the establishment of the European Intelligence Agency.

3. Conclusion To sum up, the EU needs to create a sustainable security mechanism that ensures the defense of all its members, while not overlapping with other bodies’ mandates. On one hand, as not all member states are also part of NATO, there is an urgent need for the EU to address the security needs of its entire space through a comprehensive and inclusive strategy. This entails building a mechanism that allows EU-intelligence and expertise sharing in security matters among its members. On the other hand, for NATO, these non-member states strategically scattered throughout its territory constitute blind-spots for the Alliance and potential vulnerabilities.

155 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

These need to be addressed by strengthening existing cooperation partnerships and by coordinating with EU’s defense bodies to address the information gaps. Moreover, in recent years, the EU and NATO have shown increased interest in creating a common security umbrella, by complementing each other’s mandates to maintain sustainable stability and build resilience to foreign aggression. All in all, the EU’s best odds to tackle the rapidly changing security paradigm and threats the European space will be facing in the near future, are given by enhancing its ties with NATO and support the Alliance’s information needs, while also strengthening cooperation among its members.

References: [1] EEAS, EU-NATO cooperation – Factsheets, 11 July 2019, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation- factsheet_en, accessed on 25 October 2019 [2] Azeem Ibrahim, Europe Is Ready for Its Own Army, Foreign Policy, 5 September 2019, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/05/europe-is-ready-for-its-own-army/, accessed on 25 September 2019 [3] European Parliament, Defence: is the EU creating a European army?, EU Parliament News, 24 July 2019, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/eu-army- myth-what-is-europe-really-doing-to-boost-defence, accessed on 25 September 2019 [4] NATO Review, Cooperating to counter hybrid threats, published on 23 November 2018, available at https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/cooperating-to- counter-hybrid-threats/EN/index.htm, accessed on 27 September 2019 [5] EEAS, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/implementation_plan_on_security_and_defence_2.pd f, accessed on 25 September 2019 [6] European Ombudsman, Report of the European Ombudsman following his visit to the European Police Office (Europol), 2012, available at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:hrOjDg5PJFsJ:https://www.omb udsman.europa.eu/pdf/en/49145+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ro, accessed on 5 October 2019 [7] Europol, About Europol, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol, accessed on 5 October 2019 [8] Europol, EUROPOL’S 20 MOST NOTEWORTHY OPERATIONS, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/europol-20-years/europols-20-most- noteworthy-operations, accessed on 5 October 2019 [9] Europol, EUROPOL PLATFORM FOR EXPERTS (EPE), available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/information- exchange/europol-platform-for-experts, accessed on 5 October 2019 [10] Europol, EUROPEAN COUNTER TERRORISM CENTRE – ECTC, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc, accessed on 5 October 2019 [11] Raffaello Pantucci, Paris terror attacks: The lessons of Mumbai were learned – by the jihadis, The Independent, 14 November 2015, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/paris-terror-attacks-the-lessons-of-mumbai-were- learned-by-the-jihadis-a6734836.html, accessed on 5 October 2019 [12] EEAS, EU INTCEN Factsheet, published on 5 February 2015, available at http://statewatch.org/news/2016/may/eu-intcen-factsheet.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2019

156 EUROPOL and INTCEN Security providers for the European Space

[13] Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, Mark Rhinard, Making Sense of Sense-Making: The EU’s Role in Collecting, Analysing, and Disseminating Information in Times of Crisis, The Swedish National Defence College, 2014, available at http://www.societalsecurity.eu/uploads/Articles/2014_Boin%20Ekengren%20Rhinard_Sen semaking_FHS%20Book.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2019

157 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

Captain Andrei PAIU

18th Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade “Decebal”, Timisoara, Romania

Abstract: This study is about the way this cohesion fund is given to the European community member states with the purpose of helping UE member states with a gross national product per citizen less than 90% than the general media reduce their deficits between economic and social levels and to stabilise their economy. These funds are a part of the European community structural policy with the sole purpose of balancing economy and social growth, urbanism, interregional and international cooperation between states and revitalization of the economy .Romania as a UE member state will benefit from this fund through a program of financing starting from 2021 until 2027.

Key words: cohesion funds; cohesion policy; economy; social growth; gross national income; Financial Framework.

1. Introduction to economic and social cohesion

Economic and social cohesion as so accurately described in the 1986 Single European Act is about reducing differences between the various countries that are prosperous and the less flourished economies of the least-encouraged regions. Cohesion policy is the policy behind the hundreds of projects all over Europe that receive funds from the European Regional Development Fund or ERDF, the European Social Fund or ESF and the Cohesion Fund. Cohesion policy has been born from the Treaty of Rome in 1957.In essence, it expressly refers to ones country’s needs to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their uprising development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of other nations that couldn’t keep up with the growth of other regions. The idea is that cohesion policy should also promote a more balanced, more sustainable development and a broader concept than regional policy, which is specifically connected to the ERDF and operates mostly at regional level. The Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s most recent treaty, adds a new face to cohesion, mostly referring to economic, territorial and social cohesion. It is divided into planning cycles which last for 7 years, and its resources are based on the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, which provides the financial planning of the European Union.

158 STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

The Cohesion Fund is a financial tool which implements the regional policy of the European Union. The aim is to reduce regional disparities in income, wealth, social growth and other opportunities. Europe’s less developed countries receive most of the support, but all European countries are eligible for funding under specified funding programs. Besides the Cohesion Fund there are Structural Funds as well. The Structural Funds are made up of the European Regional Development Fund or ERDF and the European Social Fund or ESF. These two, together with the Common Agricultural Policy or CAP, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund make up the bulk of EU funding, and the majority of total EU spending. It is up to both the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to decide upon the tasks, objectives and the organization of the Structural Funds ( based on a certain framework), through the ordinary legislative matter and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee of the Regions.

2. The Cohesion Fund as part of the Investment Fund

There are five European structural and investment funds (ESI): 1. The European regional development fund or ERDF which promotes a balanced development in all countries of the European Union. 2. The European social fund or ESF which support with funds employment- connected projects throughout Europe and investments in Europe’s human capital, including its workers, the young people and all those searching for a job. 3. The Cohesion fund or CF with funds which encourage mostly environmental projects in certain countries where the gross national income or GNI per inhabitant is less than 90% of the European Union’s average. 4. The European agricultural fund for rural development or EAFRD with these funds they focus on resolving some challenges regarding the European Union’s rural regions. 5. The European maritime and fisheries fund or EMFF with funds used to help fishermen to adopt sustainable fishing practices and coastal communities to diversify their economies, improving the quality of life along European coastal regions. All these funds are managed by the European Union member countries themselves, through means of partnership agreements. Each country prepares an agreement, in synchronization and collaboration with the European Commission, setting out how the funds will be used during the current funding period which is 2014-2020. The Cohesion Fund is one of the European Structural and Investment Funds or ESI used to help European Member States achieve economic, social and territorial cohesion, thus reducing differences between regions. This funding supports large-scale investments in environmental sustainability, including an increase in renewable energy use and energy efficiency as well as in transport and infrastructure, especially the trans-European transport networks or TEN-T. In the current planned period, 15 member states meet these requirements also known as “cohesion countries”. These member states are: Bulgaria, Croatia, the , , Malta, Poland, , Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, , and Romania.

159 STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

3. Institutional and legal framework

In its title on economic, social and territorial cohesion, the treaty establishes that the union must develop and follow its actions leading to the strengthening of its economy, society and territorial cohesion. By introducing the concept of territorial cohesion, the Treaty of Lisbon recognizes a strong territorial dimension for the cohesion policy. This approach requires a unique and modern system of leadership, combining different forms and levels of government (European, national, regional and not to forget local). Member states conduct their economic policies and coordinate them for the promotion of the all-around cohesion. European territorial cooperation is a component of the economic policy framework of the European Union. The Common Strategic Framework, of the Cohesion Fund, is a successor of the community strategic guidelines on cohesion policy for urban and rural development, but it covers all five types of funds mentioned above. It also provides guidance to the member states and regions in taking full advantage of the possibilities offered by the ESI Funds and the other European policies and instruments in their partnership agreements and programs thus maintaining a clear focus on the Europe 2020 objectives. The framework’s goal is to simplify and facilitate coordination and synchronicity between interventions supported by the ESI Funds. Member states are encouraged to ensure cooperation between the managing authorities responsible for each ESI fund at all stages of the programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their support both at the strategic and at the operational level. There are new tools which help the development of this framework such as: 1. Combining the funds under one unique frame; 2. Integrated Territorial Investments or ITI; 3. Joint Action Planning or JAP; 4. The Community local development or CLLD. These tools are used as a practical mean of coordinating different aspects between the ESI funds. The Common Strategic Framework provides further guidance on practical implementation of horizontal policy doctrines and cross policy objectives such as multilevel governance, non-discrimination and addressing climate modifications. Although the Cohesion Funds are part of the EU budget, the way they are spent is based on a system of shared responsibility between the European Commission and the member state authorities. The Commission negotiates and approves the projects and strategies proposed by the member states, and after all conditions are met it starts to allocate resources. The member states and their regions manage the projects. This includes the implementation of the operational analysis by selecting individual projects, controlling and assessing them. The commission is involved in the overall project, allocating funds to approved expenditure and verifying the national control systems. Until the year 1989, funding decisions were taken by the European Commission. This was followed by a period where EU member states tried to maximize control by systematically approving projects that had a large impact upon development and economy. But unfortunately these were in a small amount. Beginning with the year 1994 more coordinated and complex methods of allocating resources have started to be introduced.

160 STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

4. 2014-2020 ESI fund projects

4.1 Types of projects and fund allocations ESI fund projects will contribute even further to deliver the objectives of the investment plan by using these funds more effectively and by the double usage of financial instruments or FI during 2014-2020 in comparison to the previous programming period. This will be facilitated by the new, more comprehensive and coherent rules adopted for 2014-2020 FIs with the sole purpose of supporting and encouraging their use as a more efficient and sustainable form of European Union support. These rules are non- prescriptive in regards to strategies, types of projects and activities that are to be supported. Member states may use FIs in relation to all their needs and request support via projects with full access to all types of funds where it is efficient and effective to do so. The new framework also contains rules on combining FIs with other forms of support such as education, research and technology in different domains, as this further facilitates the design of well-tailored assistance schemes that meet the specific needs of member states or regions. For the 2014-2020 as can be seen in Fig.1 the latest planned period provides support to: 1. Investment in the environment, including areas related to sustainable development and energy which present environmental benefits; 2. Trans-European networks in the area of transport infrastructure; 3. Research and technical assistance.

Fig.1 Cohesion fund allocation for EU states 2014-2020

In this context of projects serving the European Union’s environmental protection objectives, the cohesion fund may also contribute in fields related to sustainable development, such as:

161 STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

1. Energy efficiency in the transport sector outside the trans European networks including here rail transport, sea transport, inland waterway transport, systems and their interoperability, the management of roads, maritime and air traffic, urban transport and public transport. 2. Support of shifts towards a carbon reduction economy in all sectors; 3. The promotion of climate protection and anti pollution; 4. The protection of the environment and promotion of resource efficiency and management; 5. The promotion of sustainable transport and removing obstacles in key network infrastructures; 6. The enhancement of institutional capacities and efficient public management.

4.2 Cohesion Funds in Romania In terms of implementation of the cohesion policy, statistics have shown that Romania has fallen behind in terms of managing to utilize available resources. Absorption rates have been low in the previous programming period until almost the end of the schedule due to political pressures in 2011-2013. However, the fast pace of absorption of funds during 2007-2013 did not mean that European money have been necessarily used in an efficient manner. Rather it suggests that the rush towards accessing EU money has led to numerous mistakes in the management of EU funds, the financing of the same project multiple times as well as problems with monitoring and implementation, especially in cases that required commitment from regional authorities beyond the lifetime of the projects. The country still has some difficulties in accessing European Union funds especially because some changes in the managing authorities which impacted the timing of launching the projects. Furthermore, public procurement and corruption remain the main issues associated with EU funds both in terms of populace perceptions as well as how stakeholders perceive the EU funds in Romania. Procurement rules remain one of the main issues in Romania and public authorities blame them for the delays associated with the EU funds. It’s actually a paradox situation in which although Romania has a laggard in terms of absorption rates, it was the champion of penalties applied by the Commission due to mismanagement of European funds. In terms of communication, the conclusion of the EU Council is that communication activities are a secondary concern in Romania and are often perceived as an additional burden by both public bodies as well as beneficiaries. In the 2007 -2013 programming period communication has primarily focused on improving the knowledge about the funds but this activity has been delayed mainly because of some failures in putting forward projects. At the same time communication activities are highly unequal between the various operational strategies. The general opinion was that Romanian citizens in general lacked the necessary knowledge it took to access these funds .At the same time, evaluations show that knowledge about EU funds across the country has improved since 2007. By comparison, as the citizen survey shows, in the case of the western part of Romania, the level of knowledge about EU funds is relatively high, although the perceived impact of these funds on the daily lives of the citizens is perceived to be relatively low.

162 STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

In terms of institutional structure, although the organization of the cohesion policy is highly decentralized in Romania, the managing authority preserves the decision making power in terms of goals and setting the calls for projects. In 2014-2020, Romania will manage six operational directions under EU Cohesion Policy: four projects funded by the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund, and other two funded by the European Social Fund including the Youth Employment Initiative. At the same time Romania has been allocated around € 23,4 billion in total for Cohesion Policy funding as follows: 1. 15.05 billion € for the low developed regions (except Bucharest); 2. 441.35 million € for medium developed regions (including Bucharest); 3. 456 million € for Territorial Cooperation; 4. 105 million € for Youth Employment Initiative. Out of this large sum, 6.95 billion € will represent the Cohesion Fund. The actual share will be set in light of the specific challenges the country needs to address in the areas covered by the Cohesion Fund.

5. Conclusions Although the European Union with all its funds encourages all member states to reach a certain level of development, it’s still a long way to go especially for those countries that were former members of the Warsaw Treaty. These countries grew with an ideology that was focused not on technological development, commerce, research and so on but on industry and mass scale production. An illusion of grandeur was embedded in the hearts and minds of every citizen. Although those days have passed there is still a tremendous gap between the western and eastern countries. In order for eastern countries to catch up, there should be a change regarding many political and social aspects that have a significant impact upon the countries stability and integrity and by that I am referring to the belief in government, justice, equality in front of the law. All those things and many others add up in creating the image of how that country is perceived by the other EU members. As I have mentioned earlier, Romania focused more on rapidly accessing funds rather than on making their projects sustainable. We wanted the money but we didn’t know how to best use them. But in the last years, many things have changed. People started to think more outside the box, they have become more creative and successful in developing better tangible projects for which all the EU funds can properly be utilized. For example in agriculture, education, culture, IT, research and development. We have started to think big not only for ourselves but for our community, for a better life and for our children. We have only one year of funding remaining, but some of the investments can already be seen in our cities, our villages, fields, schools business centers and so on. These tendencies can be seen not only in Romania but also in other former soviet countries that joined the EU later.

163 STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ACCESSING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES

References:

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_Funds_and_Cohesion_Fund; [2]https://epthinktank.eu/2016/10/10/eprs-and-the-2016-european-week-of-regions-and- cities/the-cf-allocation-per-member-state/; [3]https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/; [4]https://www.fi-compass.eu/sites/default/files/publications/CF-factsheet.pdf; [5]https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/basic/basic_2014_en.p df; [6]Regulation (EU) No 1300/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the Cohesion Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006; [7]https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/countries/RO; [8]http://www.cohesify.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/RO_Romania.pdf; [9]https://www.fi-compass.eu/cf/cohesion-fund-cf; [10]https://www.welcomeurope.com/european-funds/cohesion-fund- 306+206.html#tab=onglet_details.

164 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

Major Donatas PALAVENIS, PhD student

Institute of University Studies, Department of Political Science The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy, , Lithuania

Abstract: In 2016 at the Warsaw Summit NATO in response to increased threats from Russian Federation, made a decision to enhance its forward presence (eFP) by establishing four battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The battalion size military formation in Lithuania is led by Germany as a framework nation and has a multinational character where other NATO nations contribute. Lithuania has began to spend more money for defence since the Crimea annexation by the Russian Federation and war in Donbas region (Ukraine) and has currently reached NATO’s requirement for defence needs of 2% from Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Due to the increased defence budget the armed forces could afford to procure better armaments, ammunition, re-equip and properly man them. On a similar timeframe decisions for major procurements (for more than 2,2 billion Euro), that will be completed until 2022 were made, where majority of tenders were in favour for German companies. This naturally leads to a conspiracy theory that Lithuania indirectly pays for its security to Germany. But is this really true? Was Germany influenced by these procurements while making decision for eFP mission? This research reveals facts and figures of Lithuanian and German economic and military interrelationship, and presents conclusions that are not in favour for conspiracy theorists but rather outlines rationalistic and pragmatic approach of both nations.

Key words: Lithuania; Germany; NATO; military procurements; Defence Policy; enhanced forward presence (eFP); economics.

1. Introduction In 2016 NATO made a decision to deploy forward four battalion size battle-groups (BGs) to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland due to increased threats and unpredictable contingencies from the Russian Federation. eFP BGs are multinational with one leading framework nation in each deployed country with the main task not only to deter Russian aggression but at the same time it symbolizes NATO cohesion and full involvement in strengthening eastern NATO countries. The eFP BG in Lithuania is an important additional military force to the country`s relatively small national armed forces. From the beginning of military activities in Ukraine Lithuania felt threatened and immediately recognized a need to strengthen its own armed forces. Since 2014 defence expenditures more than doubled and now nearly reach the NATO required target of 2% GDP. Initiated reforms supported by decent budgeting allowed the gradual enhancement of armed forces in both a qualitative and quantitative way. Major procurements took place with more than 2,2 billion Euro foreseen for needed armaments, equipment and ammunition. Surprisingly the majority of tenders were won by German manufactures, but this finding was not so thoroughly and intensively discussed in public yet. This aspect might draw an attention to

165 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? the fact that Germany is also a framework nation for eFP BG Lithuania where the majority of the troops and equipment comes from. This fact naturally leads to a important question whether the success of German companies in major armament procurements in Lithuania lead to the decision by Germany to deploy eFP with Framework nation`s responsibilities in Lithuanian? Can we draw a parallel here? The aim of this research is to define interconnection between the German decision to take a leading role in eFP mission in Lithuania and the armament procurements of the where majority of tenders were won by German companies. In order to reach the aim following objectives are defined:  Examine the eFP initiative. Characterize its historical evolution, meaning and effects for NATO.  Explore Lithuanian armed forces adaptation to threats and major arms procurements. Outline the important factors in bilateral cooperation with German armed forces. Detail national support for eFP.  Investigate German rational behind decision to deploy the eFP while looking in to the triggers for this particular decision and consider different reforms of the .  Research the impact of economic and other factors for German and Lithuanian defence policy decisions for eFP and arms procurements. The topic of the eFP initiative is well defined and examined in a wider NATO context by international researchers than mainly work on NATO issues (Martin Zapfe; Jens Ringsmose; Sten Rynning; Christian Leuprecht; Joel Sokolsky; Jayson Derow; Vanaga Nora; Marcin Zaborowski and others) To note, particular interest for this topic was given prior and after Warsaw summit. As we consider Lithuanian researchers, the eFP topic is not analysed in isolation, but rather forms a part of wider defence policy and defence security contexts. The main contributors are: Tomas Janeliūnas; Ieva Karpavičiūtė; Mantas Bileišis; Svajūnė Ungurytė-Ragauskienė; Liudas Zdanavičius; Tomas Jarmalavičius and others. This particular article will provide an insight to the decision making for the eFP and its connection with armament procurements and will definitely contribute in existing studies of eFP. Comparison analysis was used throughout the article where only secondary data from official ministerial sites or news agencies was analyzed and interpreted. The majority of academic papers used were devoted to the investigation of new NATO initiative and outcomes of different German military reforms. The paper starts with definition and evolution of the eFP concept while outlining the need for this initiative. It continues with a Lithuanian specific analysis that looks into the changes of the Armed forces and the main procurements that were recently approved (by the Resource Board which is chaired by Minister of Defence or by the State Defence Council which is chaired by President depending on specifics) and in parallel cooperation aspect between German and Lithuanian armed forces are brought forward. In the next part German particularities are presented, beginning with different reforms and later with a focus to eFP decision. The last part explores the economic aspects of bilateral trade and outlines other factors related to the topic. This paper closes with concluding remarks on eFP issue and its connections with armament procurements.

2. New NATO initiative for the eastern NATO members: historical perspective, meaning and effects of eFP Antczak and Śliwa while describing the contemporary geostrategic context for the Baltic states and the perceived Russian threat outline that: the democratization processes in Russia remains slow (it means unpredictable nature for future actions, that are

166 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? implemented using efficient vertical command and control system); continued Russian military build-up and reinforcement of the Oblast (signals for increased preparedness for perceived encirclement); developments of Anti Access/Area Denial capabilities which could be used for offensive operations; restructuring and deep reforms of Russian land units; the practice of “hybrid warfare” or so called non-linear warfare instruments; planned utilization of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear submarines, heavy armour formations, strategic aviation and more all of that reveals Russia’s preparedness for future “adventures” in military domain (Antczak and Śliwa 2018, p. 120-122). In that regard Lithuania acknowledges these threats, stressing certain possibilities of such actions and believes that there will be no major changes to the current situation in terms of possible de-escalation (State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Second Investigation Department under the MoD 2019, p. 62-63). The latest events in Ukraine showed Russia’s ability to use direct and indirect military power in pursuit of its national interest regardless of international isolation and other targeted measures. This triggered NATO to amend its perception vis-à-vis Russia and revisit its core collective defence tasks (ICDS 2019, p. 3). The NATO decisions for a gradual approach towards Russia were developed during the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits (Antczak and Śliwa 2018, p. 123) with the overall principles being transparency (active public communication) and tailored response (use of minimum forces that are required for deterrence) (ICDS 2019, p. 3). During the Wales Summit NATO adopted the so called Readiness Action Plan composed of assurance measures (enlarged scale of collective defence and crisis management activities and more exercises in the eastern part of Alliance territory) and adaptation measures (reforming NATO Response Force (NRF), the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), increase of Standing Naval Forces, and creation of eight NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU)) (Arnold 2016, 74-106, p. 76). It’s worth noting that at Wales the Alliance did not examine options for deployment of combat troops to its eastern borders (at that time the US had already provided a symbolic military presence in the form of airborne infantry companies) (Stoicescu and Praks 2016, p. 5). As no de-escalation signs were seen in Ukraine, and as ambitious Russian mission started in Syria, it became clear that four companies (one in each of three Baltic States and Poland) from one nation (US) would not provide enough deterrence in east of NATO, neither would such a presence would signal Allied solidarity in support for this region. Based on these factors it was decided in the Warsaw summit to establish eFP BGs in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In 2017 between January and April the first eFP contingents deployed and slowly replaced the US infantry companies. The decision for the eFP illustrates a compromise on common threat assessment among all NATO members (ICDS 2019, p. 3). Agreement for eFP within whole NATO was a surprising experience since some member states were doubtful about eFP and wanted to mitigate tensions with Russia only through dialogue (ICDS 2019, p. 3). The eFP battalion-size BGs are seen: “as a symbolic component of NATO cohesion and involvement in strengthening Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland’s sovereignty” (Antczak and Śliwa 2018, p. 123); “as a trip-wire” for immediate NATO response to any type of aggression (NATO 2016); as a strategic deterrence (eFP should persuade Russia not to test the Alliance or to provoke conflict) (ICDS 2019, p. 3). The United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States volunteered as framework nations respectively for this operation (NATO 2016). Framework nations provide the bulk of the troops and support elements with reinforcements from other participating nations, meanwhile ensuring force generation process. Deployed forces are ready 24/7 with rotations scheduled from 4 to 9 months dependent on national restrictions. Units “are fully integrated” into host nations’ land forces , they are subordinated to NATO’s Joint Forces Command in

167 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

Brunssum through regional divisional headquarters and the Multinational Corps North-East headquarters (ICDS 2019, p. 3). In the Baltic States, less Poland eFPs are an important addition to relatively small local armed forces. eFP brings value in political, economic, military and other practical domains for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (less militarily). Germany took the role of framework nation in Lithuania, and deployed its forces to a historically sensitive area (due to former occupation, holocaust and committed war crimes) (ICDS 2019, p. 3). Currently Belgium, Czech Republic, , and troops and civilians serve with Germans in Lithuania while representing 1055 men strong formation (NATO 2019). The consensus that eastern NATO members got from the Allies during the Wales summit was not satisfying to them since it did not bring any NATO ground combat troops into the region for greater deterrence effect. The Warsaw summit was more successful in terms of receiving combat elements – eFP BGs appeared in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Throughout the same period host nations also implemented efficient reforms, increased defence spending, procured new equipment and boosted manning for their respective armed forces. The Lithuania that recently celebrated its 15th anniversary of NATO membership enhanced its own military to be better prepared for future challenges and as well as continuously supporting eFP efforts in country.

3. Lithuanian Armed Forces adaptation to threats, major arms procurements, cooperation with German armed forces and eFP BG. Challenged by the events in Ukraine, Lithuania recognized a need to enhance its ability to respond to threats. Intensive military reforms were followed by the priorities set in National Security Strategy ( 2017) where focus was given to “the ability of the Lithuanian Armed forces together with its allies to ensure credible deterrence” and in the case of failure to deter “defend the Republic of Lithuania individually and together with allies”. In order to meet priorities the following long and medium term actions were foreseen: strengthening defence capabilities (increase funding at least 2% GDP; strengthen combat capabilities of the armed forces; man forces; enlarge prepared reserve; maintain high readiness of military units; develop mobilization system); enhancement of NATO collective defence (contribute to collective defence; promote and support NATO's decisions on substantial NATO military presence; provide required host nation support); bolstering state preparedness for non-military threats (Seimas 2017). Since 2014 Lithuania increased its defence budget rapidly. In the period from 2014 to 2019, the spending for defence more than doubled (2014 – 0.88% GDP; 2019 – 1,98% GDP) and for 2019 in real terms defence budget consists of 948 million Euro (NATO PDD 2019). The growth of defence spending ensured increasing defence capabilities, deterring potential aggressors and convincing Allies at the nation’s determination to invest in to own defence. It is worth mentioning that all the main political parties agreed to the increase in defence spending for the next decade, reaching at least 2.5 % GDP by 2030 (Sytas 2018). Increased budgeting allowed upgrades in the Armed forces’ structure, readiness, manning, training and equipment. Lithuania established a Rapid Response Force, as a primary responder to the threats, with around 2500 troops at rapid readiness times (MoD 2017b). Additionally two brigades were inaugurated ( Brigade Žemaitija - on 1 January 2016; Light Infantry Brigade Aukštaitija - on 27 March 2017); additional units were revived in various parts of Lithuania as a part of the National Defence Volunteer Forces (Jokubauskas 2018, 331-371). Starting from 2015, the decision to renew 9 month conscription service was taken (MoD 2017b). In terms of

168 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? manning Lithuanian armed forces from 12 450 personnel in 2014 became 20 073 in 2019 (MoD 2018c). It is assumed that more than 2,5 billion Euros will be spent for the acquisitions of: armament; military equipment and stockpiling of ammunition during 2017-2022. In parallel military infrastructure is being renovated and expanded with investments for more than 200 million Euros in 2017-2022 (MoD 2017b). Currently it is clear that the major armament procurements for 2014-2022 are nearly defined (table 1) with the main priority for land systems and air defence assets.

Equipment Manufacturer Price Data Anti-UAV equipment US 1,16 (MoD 2019a) Vehicles M557 BAE Systems, US 1,6 (MoD 2016b) Gap-filler radars ELTA Systems, Israel 2,8 (VZ 2018) RBS-70 munitions and Saab, 9,7 (MoD 2018a) system upgrades Small arms, grenade H&K, Germany 12,5 (15 min 2016) launchers Self-propelled artillery Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, 16,2 (ELTA 2015) “PzH2000” systems Germany Man-portable air defence Mesko S.A., Poland 34 (MoD 2014) tools “” Oil pollution response, Competition not started 39,6 (LTLIFE 2019) maritime rescue ship Long range 3D radars Indra Sistemas, Spain ~ 40 (MoD 2018b) Long-range anti-tank Raytheon-Lockheed 49 (Global Security 2015) systems “Jewelin” Martin Javelin, US Helicopters “Eurocopter Eurocopter, France 52 (MoD 2015) AS365N3+” Vehicles UNIMOG Daimler AG, Germany 70 (Army Recognition 2018) U5000 Medium range ground Kongsberg Defence & ~ 109 (MoD 2017a) based air defence Aerospace, Norway; capability “NASAMS” Raytheon, US All terrain vehicles Oshkosh Corporation, US 142 (Lietuvos kariuomenė 2019) L-ATV “Oshkosh” Medium utility Competition not started ~ 300 (BNS 2019) helicopters Infantry fighting vehicles ARTEC, Germany, 386 (MoD 2016a) “BOXER” Netherlands Totals ~ 1.265,56 Tenders completed ~ 925,96 German manufacturers part ~ 484,7 ~ 52 % of tenders completed Table 1. Lithuanian major armament acquisitions 2017-2022 (prices in million Euros).

Based on the information available (to note that there is limited information available on MoD and other governmental websites on military procurements. The author managed to collect around 50 % (only 1,26 billion Euros) of all intended procurements by MoD with announced total value of 2,5 billion Euros) the following conclusions could be made while analyzing major armament procurements of Lithuanian armed forces for 2017- 2022: the tenders won by German companies (or German led) comprise more than half of all finished tenders; the biggest part of German won procurement belongs to the acquisition of Boxer (its treated as Infantry fighting vehicle by Lithuania where Germany considers it as Armored personnel carrier); assumed median balance payment to German companies could comprise at approximately 81 million Euro per year; assumed median balance yearly payment to German companies could comprise approximately 8,5% of all Lithuanian

169 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? defence budget; the selection of German made equipment might have been based on better value for money principle. Cooperation between Germany and Lithuania militaries was officially initiated by signing a Memorandum of Understanding in 1994 that was later renewed in 2010. Cooperation is being conducted throughout different levels and in diverse fields. Starting from 1994 more than 400 soldiers and officers have finished different training schools, attended different courses in Germany and some of officers successfully finished Bundeswehr staff officers course (ger. Militärische Ausbildungshilfe). German soldiers and civilians provide regular consultations to support development of the Lithuanian armed forces. Lithuanian and German troops were and are engaged in different bilateral and multilateral training activities, were on duty for European Union Battle Group. German jets were deployed six times for Baltic air policing mission in Lithuania. Meanwhile Lithuania continuously deploys troops to support of UN mission in German led unit in Mali; several times had sent soldiers to secure German vessel deployed in EU (MoD 2018d). Germany assigned officers to NFIU in Lithuanian and Lithuanian NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence. Lithuania affiliated brigade size unit “Iron Wolf” to German division with the aim to enhance interoperability among headquarters and complement ongoing training (MoD 2018c). Lithuania puts a lot of effort in providing the required host nation support (HNS) for incoming NATO troops and particularly for the eFP BG. HNS is one of the main tasks defined by law for the Lithuanian armed forces (Seimas 2017). Separate legal acts define specifics for the provision of HNS. In terms of eFP specific Technical arrangement was signed between framework nation and Lithuania in 2017 January to clarify the details of required support. Lithuanian brigade that is affiliated to German division plays a higher headquarters role for eFP BG and trains alongside its soldiers in its military training cycle. Also to reinforce this interconnectivity liaison officers were exchanged between countries. The relationship between eFP and Brigade is very close due to many combined exercises and staff training events organized during the year, and close unit`s proximity. eFP is participating in the main exercises that are organized by Lithuanian armed forces, NATO or US in Lithuania. Public opinion for eFP deployment was supportive and continues to be so (76% of respondents in 2018 (67% in 2016) claim that eFP is contributing to the deterrence against Russia; 83% of respondents in 2018 (81% in 2016) agree for NATO troops deployment in Lithuania) (MoD 2016a; 2019). Lithuania heavily invests in infrastructure to support better training opportunities and provide decent living standards for eFP BG soldiers (MoD 2019b). Meanwhile the German commitment in Lithuania can be judged by future investments in the military field. Germany is planning to invest 110 million Euros to upgrade existing NATO battalion infrastructure and training areas until 2021. This provides clear evidence that Germany is looking for a long stay in country, presumably as long as the security situation will demand it (Writer 2019). As detailed Lithuania is rapidly improving its defence capabilities due to increased defence budget and perceived threats from Russia. Lithuania sends a clear message to its NATO allies that defence is taken seriously and that defence expenditures for 2019 already are at 2% benchmark. Increased financial provision for the armed forces led to procurements of required armaments, ammunition and equipment. Major procurements for 2017-2022 are nearly complete with more than half of the tenders won by German companies. Cooperation with German armed forces that started from 1994 at this moment is blooming in all military spheres with the main cooperation point being the eFP BG. At the same time Lithuania is providing the required HNS, shows more interest in participating in international missions and other military constructs with Germany. It seems that military relationship will sustain the momentum for a long period of time since

170 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? it leads to ultimate win-win situation, but before stating that firmly there is a need to examine German national situation and rational for eFP decision and more active role in the Baltics.

4. German rational behind decision to deploy eFP. Ukraine crisis in 2014 along with the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian- engineered insurgency in Eastern Ukraine have led to a fundamental realignment of German security policy, especially with respect to Russia. This realignment not only put an end to the period of a reduced German military <...>, but also to Germany’s self-imposed restrictions on military commitments and its willingness to finally accept greater responsibility in <...> world (Seyda 2018, p. 3). Prior to analysing specific motives for German decision for eFP task, there is a need to look into the last decade where continuous military reform, economic situation and security challenges dictated contemporary German choices for future roles in NATO and wider world. In 2011 it was announced by Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière that “the Federal Republic would no longer be the frontline in case of an attack on European NATO forces; that role now belonged to Poland and the Baltic nations”. The mentioned realignment would allow German armed forces to focus on “geographically remote regions, insofar as they affect our interests” (German Ministry of Defence 2011). This short phrase just illustrates the peak of the reform (that was called Reorientation), which began in 1990s, and was designed to “significantly reduce defence expenditures by casting off what had come to be seen as wasteful overhead of legacy Cold War systems” and provide “needed expeditionary forces with enhanced capabilities”. Reorientation reform ceased conscription (initiated by predecessor Zu Guttenberg), put more focus to professionalization, enhanced processes of management, procurements, human resources management and streamline command structures (Seyda 2018, p. 27). An additional trigger for reform was a pressure to cut the defence budget due to the Euro financial crisis where former defence minister (for 2011-2014) promised to find an additional $10 billion in savings (Haglund 2019, p. 42). As an outcome of realignment the numbers of Bundeswehr bases and facilities in Germany were reduced from 394 to 264 and major army equipment shrunk rapidly. At the same time reform led to overstressed personnel and material where the gap between demands and resources available grew each day. It was just a matter of time when an external trigger would reveal this as obvious fact. Concurrently it was nearly impossible politically to stop reorientation of the Bundeswehr due to agreed coalition treaty of 18th government (Seyda 2018, p. 40-47). Soon this trigger appeared as a reality in 2014 where on one hand Putin was challenging the liberal world order and on the other hand the migration crisis with its peaks in 2015 and 2016, was turbulent (more the one million refugees seeking asylum in Germany). The German public reacted immediately to the situation demanding greater role of German military (Seyda 2018, p. 60). In 2014 there was a turning point for Germany’s foreign and security policy and its role in the North Atlantic Alliance. In February 2014, at the Munich Security Conference, then President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen publicly promised greater German engagement in countering international crises and conflicts (Gauck 2014, 34). During the NATO summit in Wales Germany “committed itself to take on more responsibility in the world and pledged considerably more funds and resources”. As additional intention for greater involvement, Germany, to surprise of most NATO allies, was promoting its Framework Nation concept (Matlé and Scheffler 2014, p. 6). All NATO nations recognized the announced intentions, as a decisive change in attitude, but there has been lack of proof of actual work (Chatham House 2015, p. 4). At that time Germany finally acknowledged that “Russia has left the European security order that was established after the Cold War and terminated its partnership with NATO” (Kamp 2016) and that lead

171 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? to understanding that Germany was not able anymore to act as a link between transatlantic as well as European security interests and Russia (Council of American Ambassadors 2015), to mentions this as well it was noted in revised security strategy for the Bundeswehr (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2016). The reform of 2011 was followed by considerable adjustments (Turnaround) in 2016 since it did not provided expected outcomes and was not able to cope with contemporary challenges. On 2016 July 13 Federal Chancellor in her speech outlined that “the task of the Federal Government is to redefine country’s security policy interests, priorities and objectives and to develop <...> [responses due to] changed security situation” (Merkel 2016, p. 6). This triggered a major change in German position from “Ostpolitik to Frostpolitik” towards Russia, as it was named by Thomas Forsberg (Forsberg 2016, 21-42). In 2016 Germany consistently initiated a comprehensive €130 billion program of military build-up to counter the Russian aggression and to reassure its allies of its rediscovered loyalty (Seyda 2018, p. 59). The changes in defence policy were evident: in 2016 German defence minister ordered an increase in the sustainability of the Bundeswehr by expanding its personnel strength, boosting its robustness and resilience, and establishing missing and new capabilities. Von der Leyen’s turnaround was based on three priorities: image enhancement, procurement of new equipment, and stopping the sell out of the Bundeswehr. The external pressure by NATO was decisive factor that initiated defence reform (Seyda 2018, p. 66-68). At the NATO Warsaw Summit in July 2016 Germany renewed its commitment to NATO with specific promises to provide troops and to take over the lead by serving as a framework nation in the East. Moreover, Germany´s contributions included: the willingness to take over a key role in the new VJTF; to participate regularly at important exercises; and to lead a multinational battalion in Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence1 (Bunde 2016). During Brussels summit in 2018, Germany applied to host the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC). This decision marked Germany’s commitment to NATO and recognition that “German territory would be the hub for any NATO force movements to the east in the event of a crisis”. These commitments might seem useful while countering the Trump administration’s criticism of not spending enough for defence. In the period from 2014 to 2018 it was approved a total of 32 billion Euro for procuring military equipment; while in 2019 – 2022 military purchases will decrease to total 6 billion Euro. Ministry of Defence plans reveal an increase in defence funding of 15 billion Euro in the period 2019 – 2022, that would lead to approximately 1.5 per cent of GDP (Kamp 2018, 63-74, p. 66-72). As for the future Seyda recognizes that Germany will play vital role in the revitalization of the idea of a European Common Defense and the potential birth of a European army will remain as priority (Seyda 2018, p. 79). Required capabilities for the future armed forces (by 2023) will be developed in line with the needs for collective defence and deterrence tasks (e.g. to have three fully equipped Army Divisions (two Mechanized and one Light Infantry)) (Glatz et al. 2018, p. 6). Reorientation reform that was launched in 2011 to optimize the German armed forces did not met reality test in 2014. 2014 was a year of change in understanding in pursue of greater role for Germany and its armed forces that came as a reality in 2016 where inner Turnaround reform took place with measurable outcomes for the Bundeswehr in terms of increased financing and for NATO in terms of key role in eFP and VJTF

1 To note “As for most of the Allies, the eFP is an operational and training mission, but not a NATO operation. Germany is an exception – for Berlin the eFP is, for political and administrative reasons, designated a ‘training activity’”. (International Centre for Defence and Security 2019, p. 3).

172 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? construct. The fact that Germany currently does not meet NATO required 2 % GDP threshold for defence spending and that is not to be realistic for the nearest future makes majority of NATO allies unhappy, but for that Germany has its own arguments and looks on how to balance those claims while engaging in arising opportunities (as it was the case for eFP, VJTF and JSEC) while harmonizing defence expenditures. The future plans outline capability development towards collective defence and deterrence that is in line with NATO’s priorities while not putting aside idea of European army. Germany demonstrates its own rational behind politic-military decisions and keeps looking for situations where optimal result can be reached: as for inner and outer audiences.

5. Economic and other factors behind German and Lithuanian defence policy decisions for eFP The main economic factors that are defining economic interconnectivity between countries include the inflows of inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) (table 2, 3) and import-export balance (table 4). In terms of other factors, for this research, details of Boxer procurement case will be scrutinized (to investigate the impact of Lithuanian order of the Boxer production for German producers (table 5)) and a generic decision making time line (table 6) will be introduced to indicate Lithuanian choice’s (to buy the Boxer) impact on the German agreement to deploy eFP.

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Median From Germany 1112,73 1246,53 1039,86 1081,14 1148,59 Growth/decrease n/a 133,8 -206,67 41,28 67,45 8,96 From all countries 12746,53 13496,82 13925,59 14816,47 15500,38 Growth/decrease n/a 750,29 428,77 890,88 683,91 688,46 Table 2. Inward FDI in Lithuania by Germany and all countries combined for period 2014 – 2018 (million Euro) ( 2019)

German inward FDI (table 2) growth throughout the period of 2014 – 2018 fluctuates with no signs of stability. The median for FDI growth throughout the examined period can be estimated to the figure of 8,96 million Euro. Regardless of low annual growth for FDI, Germany still remains a leader for total FDI at nominal figures with approximately 10% share within all countries. In comparison all countries’ combined FDI growth median for the same time frame shows 688,46 million Euro (76 times bigger than Germany’s FDI median) and that could indicate a careful approach of German investors and also could indicate that there were no indirect offsets arrangements made out of public knowledge while procuring the Boxer.

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Median To Germany 18,28 11,28 10,21 15,82 12,56 Growth/decrease n/a -7 -1,07 5,61 -3,26 -1,43 To all countries 2286,51 2397,09 2548,75 2944,38 3696,05 Growth/decrease n/a 110,58 151,66 395,63 751,67 352,38 Table 3. Outward FDI by Lithuania in Germany and in all countries combined for period 2014 – 2018 (million euro) (Bank of Lithuania 2019)

In return Lithuanian companies invested (table 3) in the German economy with negative median figure at -1,43 million Euro where the median of overall investments abroad is at 352,38 million Euro per 2014 – 2018 period. This illustrates that the investment climate is not favourable for Lithuanian companies or it does not meet their expectations for reinvestment opportunities and market expansion in Germany.

173 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Median Lithuanian exports to Germany 1762,8 1794,5 1735,3 1933,8 2084,2 Germany exports to Lithuania 2902,4 2918,2 3026,2 3507,8 3700,3 Trade balance -1139,6 -1123,7 -1290,9 -1574 -1616,1 -1348,86 Lithuanian total exports 24361,3 22903,9 22607 26410,5 28271 Lithuanian total imports 25889,5 25399,5 24737,3 28516,2 30942,6 Total trade balance -1528,2 -2495,6 -2130,3 -2105,7 -2671,6 Table 4. Export-Import balance for Lithuania and Germany for period 2014 – 2018 (million euro) (Oficialiosios statistikos portalas 2019)

The biggest Lithuanian trade deficit (table 4) is with Germany. It has always been more than one billion Euro and within period 2014 – 2018 it increased rapidly from 1,1 to 1,6 billion Euro. Lithuania has always had a deficit trade balance with all countries, which in recent years increased for more than 1 billion Euro (up to 2,6 billion Euro totally) and in that particular figure German trade deficit plays major role (from 45 % (2015) up to 75 % (2014, 2017)). At the same time positive signs can be observed due to increasing Lithuanian exports to Germany by annual median of 80 million Euro, especially in 2017- 2018.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Australia 211 Germany 272 131 Netherlands 200 Lithuania 88 UK 500 Table 5. Orders for manufacturing of Boxer (MoD 2016a; European Defence & Security 2019; Defesanet 2015; Chuter Andrew 2018; Stocker Joanne 2018).

While analyzing Lithuanian order’s impact on Boxers producers (table 5) there should be noted that one year prior to Lithuanian purchase the Bundeswehr ordered production of 131 pieces of equipment, albeit other major reservations appeared only later in 2018. This can indicate that Lithuanian representatives had good bargaining opportunity due to stagnant production line (before major offers by UK and Australia) but on the other hand negotiation freedom could have been restricted due to amount intended to procure (only 88 out of total 1402 (6 %)). Important to note that there are three companies that comprise the ARTEC joint venture (the one that produces the Boxer) which also produces other types of equipment, armament and due to that it is very hard to assess actual benefits for particular Lithuanian order.

Lithuania (related to Boxer Time NATO (related to eFP) Germany (related to eFP) procurement) Meeting of Defence Ministers. Decided to draft a Readiness 2014 II Q Action Plan for adoption in Summit. 2014 III Q Wales summit 220 German troops deployed 2015 II Q for exercises for 3 months ARTEC with the BOXER vehicle has been declared 2015 IV Q preferred bidder by the Lithuanian State Defence Council.

174 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

NATO Defence Ministers 2016 I Q agreed on the need of eFP 600 German troops deployed for exercises Meeting of Defence Ministers. Merkel “pledged military 2016 II Q Agreement to deploy eFP support to Lithuania”. Commitment made by defence minister to deploy eFP troops Signing official contract for 2016 III Q Warsaw summit Warsaw summit Boxer (Delfi 2016) (DW 2016a) Source (NATO 2016) (MoD 2015; MoD 2016b) (DW 2016b) Table 6. Decision making timeline for eFP deployment and Boxer procurement

Time line analysis (table 6) reveals that the decision to procure the Boxer (on December 2015 by the Lithuanian State Defence Council) was made before even knowing that eFP initiative would appear on NATO’s agenda despite early eastern NATO nations attempts to boost NATO’s presence in their region. The eFP topic on NATO’s agenda came out at the beginning of 2016. The Boxer contract officially was signed at the same time as the Warsaw summit, but this meaning is rather symbolic and indicates lengthy negotiations and transition activities. The German decision to take a framework nation role was made very late just prior to the Warsaw summit. As it was depicted in previous part the Boxer procurement can only bring 385 million Euro for the German economy per 5 years period that constitutes median of 77 million Euro. While considering this figure with current FDI, trade balance (table 7) and other factors

Lithuania Germany FDI 8,96 -1,43 Trade balance 1348,86 Boxer procurement 77 Investments in to eFP infrastructure 36,7 Totals 45,66 1424,43 Table 7. Lithuanian and German FDI, Trade and arms procurement median comparison (million Euro) following conclusions can be brought forward: the Boxer procurement will not have major impact (up to 5,4%) for trade balance which is not in any favour for Lithuania; Boxer procurement expenses only can outbalance increased Lithuanian export to Germany; economic benefits of this procurement for Germany (where overall trade balance for 2018 is 264 billion Euro surplus (DW 2018)) are marginal, the same as for ARTEC where Lithuanian procurement comprises a small part (6%) of their overall sales of Boxers.

6. Conclusions 1. The decision for eFP was influenced by: continuous Russian adventurism which illustrated potential danger for eastern NATO flank; strong influence from Baltic States and Poland; US leadership; consensus amongst allies on the Russian threat assessment. eFP is a symbol of NATO cohesion and a “trip-wire” for an immediate NATO response to any type of aggression. In the Baltic States, eFPs are an important addition to relatively small local armed forces. 2. As an aftermath of Ukrainian events, Lithuania more than doubled its defence spending and implemented a variety of reforms in the armed forces that enabled better military preparedness

175 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? for possible future crisis. An increased budget for defence has led to expanded procurements. Procurements for 2017-2022 that are nearly completed with more than half tenders won by German companies. Cooperation with German armed forces at this moment is blooming in all spheres with the main cooperation point - eFP BG. Military relationships would likely to sustain the momentum for a long period since it leads to a win-win situation. 3. Several German armed forces reforms could not pass a reality test in 2014 and Bundeswehr was forced to adapt to contemporary situation again. The latest 2016 Turnaround reform provided measurable outcomes for the Bundeswehr in terms of increased financing and for NATO in terms of Germany’s key roles in eFP and VJTF. Germany has its own arguments for NATO’s required 2 % GDP threshold for defence spending and looks how to balance those claims while engaging in arising opportunities (as it was the case for eFP, VJTF and JSEC) while harmonizing defence expenditures. 4. Timeline analysis reveals that the decision made by Lithuanian State Defence Council to procure Boxer (as the biggest procurement from Germany) (December 2015) was made prior to even knowing that eFP initiative as such would appear on NATO’s agenda (NATO defence ministers meeting in 2016). The final German decision to take the framework nation role in Lithuania was made very late just prior to the Warsaw summit. 5. Findings of economic measurements emphasize that: Boxer procurement has nearly no impact (up to 5,4%) on Lithuanian-German trade balance; economic benefit of this procurement (predicted median 77 million Euro) for Germany (overall trade surplus for 2018 is 264 billion Euro) is less than marginal, the same as for ARTEC where Lithuanian procurement comprises small part (6%) of their total sales for this model. 6. Lithuanian procurement of the Boxer (the same as other procurements from Germany) had no scalable impact for the German decision to deploy eFP in Lithuanian and become framework nation. The economic benefits for this procurement are marginal while existing bilateral trade surplus, which is getting bigger each year is more beneficial for Germany. Most likely the German decision for eFP was shaped by couple of factors such as: US determination, recognition of opening opportunities to balance defence expenses vs engagement in NATO projects; inner need to take more responsibility in NATO and EU; honest intent to show German solidarity and engagement. 7. Lithuanian wishes to appease Germany, while procuring their armaments, participating in combined missions and other initiatives, is misleading since it will not have any greater impact for an upcoming decision to sustain or not participation in eFP in the years to come. This might work for inner audiences but definitely not for decision makers in Berlin. 8. Acquisition for future armaments from Germany should be based on “best value for money” principle with no politics involved.

Acknowledgements: My thanks to unknown scholars who took time to review and evaluate my paper. I would also like to extend a warm thanks to my colleagues Lieutenant Colonel Alan Sweeney (UK Army) and Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Jannsen (DEU Army) for their advices and encouragement. Special thanks for conference organizer for the possibility to publish this research paper.

References: [1] 15 min. Lietuva perka papildomą partiją modernizuotų automatinių ginklų ir granatsvaidžių, last modified 2016 August 29, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/lietuva-perka-papildoma-partija-modernizuotu- automatiniu-ginklu-ir-granatsvaidziu-56-675401.

176 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

[2] Antczak Anna and Zdzisław Śliwa. Security Dilemmas of the Baltic Region. Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne (3). 2018. [3] Army Recognition. New batch of Unimog U5000 trucks delivered to Lithuanian Army, last modified 2018 October 15, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.armyrecognition.com/october_2018_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/n ew_batch_of_unimog_u5000_trucks_delivered_to_lithuanian_army.html. [4] Arnold John-Michael. NATO's Readiness Action Plan: Strategic Benefits and Outstanding Challenges. Strategic Studies Quarterly 10 (1): 74-106. 2016. [5] Bank of Lithuania. Inward Foreign Direct Investment by Country , last modified 2019 January 3, accessed March 20, 2019, https://www.lb.lt/en/inward-foreign- direct-investment-by-country-1. [6] BNS. Kariuomenė naujiems sraigtasparniams ketina išleisti apie 300 mln. Eurų. last modified 2019 June 22, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/1071931/kariuomene- naujiems-sraigtasparniams-ketina-isleisti-apie-300-mln-euru. [7] Bunde Tobias. NATO Summit Special Series: Germany, last modified 2016 June 30, accessed July 23, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-summit-special-series- germany. [8] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Weißbuch 2016, accessed September 6, 2019, https://www.bmvg.de/de/themen/weissbuch. [9] Chatham House. Implementing the NATO Wales Summit: From Strategy to Action (Part II), last modified 2015 February 26, accessed July 23, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150226ImplementingNA TOWalesSummitUpdate.pdf. [10] Chuter Andrew. British MoD Names Boxer Vehicle as Best Choice for Army Brigades, but Lawmakers Skeptical, Defence News com, last modified 2018 April 24, accessed July 8, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/04/24/british-mod-names-boxer-vehicle-as-best-choice- for-army-brigades-but-lawmakers-skeptical/. [11] Council of American Ambassadors. From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, last modified 2015 Spring, accessed July 23, 2019, https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/spring-2015/from-wales- to-warsaw-nato-s-readiness-action-plan. [12] Defesanet. Germany Buys another 131 Boxers, last modified 2015 December 21, accessed July 8, 2019, http://www.defesanet.com.br/en/land/noticia/21147/Germany-buys-another-131- Boxers/. [13] Delfi. Germany will Send More Troops to Lithuania to Deter Russia, last modified 2016 April 29, accessed August 3, 2019, https://en.delfi.lt/politics/germany-will-send-more-troops-to- lithuania-to-deter-russia.d?id=71132644. [14] DW. Germany Poised to Set World's Largest Trade Surplus, last modified 2018 August 21, accessed August 3, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-poised-to-set-worlds-largest-trade- surplus/a-45150968. [15] DW. Reports: Germany Mulls Stronger Support for NATO Mission in Lithuania, last modified 2016(a) April 29, accessed August 3, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/reports-germany-mulls- stronger-support-for-nato-mission-in-lithuania/a-19223914. [16] DW. Merkel Says NATO Summit with Russia is a 'Good Sign', last modified 2016(b) April 20, accessed August 3, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-says-nato-summit-with-russia-is-a- good-sign/a-19202229. [17] ELTA. Lietuva ir Vokietija pasirašys sutartį dėl haubicų pirkimo, Vakarų ekspresas, last modified 2015 September 28, accessed July 05, 2019, https://www.ve.lt/naujienos/lietuva/lietuvos- naujienos/lietuva-ir-vokietija-pasirasys-sutarti-del-haubicu-pirkimo-1399957/.

177 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

[18] European Defence & Security. Increasing Investment in Defence – Procurement Overview: The Netherlands, last modified 2019 May 14, accessed July 8, 2019, https://euro- sd.com/2019/05/articles/13248/increasing-investment-in-defence-procurement-overview-the- netherlands/. [19] Forsberg Tuomas. From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy Towards Russia. International Affairs 92 (1): 21-42. 2016. [20] Gauck Joachim. Germany's Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances. Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly: 34. 2014. [21] German Ministry of Defence. Defence Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests– Assuming International Responsibility–Shaping Security Together. last modified 2011 May 27, accessed September 7, 2019, https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/16136/0c1b6d8d0c0e6ba0aed5f0feb0af81d8/g-03-110527- vpr-engl-data.pdf. [22] Glatz Rainer L., Wibke Hansen, Markus Kaim and Judith Vorrath. Missions in a Changing World: The Bundeswehr and its Operations Abroad. 2018. [23] Global Security. Lithuania-Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units, last modified 2015 December 30, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2015/12/mil-151218-dsca01.htm. [24] Haglund David G. Alliance within the Alliance?: Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense, Routledge. 2019. [25] ICDS (International Centre for Defence and Security). Contemporary Deterrence. Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence, last modified 2019 January, accessed July 17, 2019, https://icds.ee/wp- content/uploads/2019/01/ICDS_Report_Contemporary_Deterrence_Stoicescu_J%C3%A4rvenp% C3%A4%C3%A4_January_2019.pdf. [26] Jokubauskas Vytautas. Territorial Defence and Partisan Resistance (Lithuania’s Experience), Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 16 (1): 331-371. 2018. [27] Kamp Karl-Heinz. NATO’s 2014 Summit Agenda. Research Paper 97. 2016. [28] Kamp Karl-Heinz. V. Defence and Security in Northern Europe: A German Perspective. Whitehall Papers 93 (1): 63-74. 2018. [29] Lietuvos kariuomenė. Patvirtintas ilgalaikis Lietuvos ir JAV karinio bendradarbiavimo planas, last modified 2019 April 2, accessed July 5, 2019, http://kariuomene.kam.lt/lt/naujienos_1887/patvirtintas_ilgalaikis_lietuvos_ir_jav_karinio_bendra darbiavimo_planas.html?pbck=20. [30] LTLIFE. The Lithuanian Armed Forces Announcing Procurement of a New Ship in April, last modified 2019 March 20, accessed July 5, 2019, https://ltlife.lt/lt-life-english/the-lithuanian- armed-forces-announcing-procurement-of-a-new-ship-in-april/. [31] Matlé Aylin and Alessandro Scheffler. After the Wales Summit: An Assessment of NATO's Strategic Agenda, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 2014. [32] Merkel Angela. White Paper 2016: On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Federal Ministry of Defence. 2016. [33] MoD (Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania). The Lithuanian Armed Forces is buying Anti-UAV equipment, last modified 2019a March 25, accessed July 5, 2019, http://kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/the_lithuanian_armed_forces_is_buying_anti- uav_equipment.html. [34] MoD. Rukloje pažymėtos antrosios NATO Priešakinių pajėgų bataliono metinės, last modified 2019b February 4, accessed July 31, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/rukloje_pazymetos_antrosios_nato_priesakiniu_paje gu_bataliono_metines.html.

178 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?

[35] MoD. NATO vertinimas Lietuvoje – aukščiausias per penkerius metus, last modified 2019c January 9, accessed September 5, 2019, https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/archyvas_930/ziniu_archyvas_2019_metai/ziniu_archyvas_2019- 01/nato_vertinimas_lietuvoje__auksciausias_per_penkerius_metus.html?pbck=30. [36] MoD. Lietuvos kariuomenė pradeda eksploatuoti vienus moderniausių radarų regione, last modified 2018a December 4, accessed July 5, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/lietuvos_kariuomene_pradeda_eksploatuoti_vienus_ moderniausiu_radaru_regione.html?pbck=0. [37] MoD. Lietuvos kariuomenės Mechanizuotoji pėstininkų brigada „Geležinis Vilkas“ priskirta Vokietijos divizijai, last modified 2018b October 21, accessed July 30, 2019, https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/lietuvos_kariuomenes_mechanizuotoji_pestininku_ brigada_gelezinis_vilkas_priskirta_vokietijos_divizijai. [38] MoD. Lithuanian Defence System: Facts and Trends, last modified 2018c September 24, accessed March 16, 2019, https://kam.lt/download/63096/national%20defence%20system%20in%20numbers%202018_09_2 4c.pdf. [39] MoD. Lietuvos kariuomenė modernizuos trumpojo nuotolio oro gynybos sistemą RBS 70, įsigys naujų raketų, last modified 2018d August 23, accessed July 5, 2019, https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/lietuvos_kariuomene_modernizuos_trumpojo_nuoto lio_oro_gynybos_sistema_rbs_70_isigys_nauju_raketu.html. [40] MoD. Stiprinamas Lietuvos ir Vokietijos karo medikų bendradarbiavimas, last modified 2018e January 22, accessed July 30, 2019, https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/archyvas_930/ziniu_archyvas_2018_metai/ziniu_archyvas_2018- 01/stiprinamas_lietuvos_ir_vokietijos_karo_mediku_bendradarbiavimas.html?pbck=10. [41] MoD. Pasirašyta sutartis dėl vidutinio nuotolio oro erdvės gynybos sistemų „NASAMS“ pirkimo, last modified 2017a October 26, accessed July 5, 2019, https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/pasirasyta_sutartis_del_vidutinio_nuotolio_oro_erd ves_gynybos_sistemu_nasams_pirkimo.html. [42] MoD. The White Paper on Lithuanian Defence Policy, 2017b. [43] MoD. Lietuvos kariuomenės dalinius papildys iš Vokietijos įsigyjami šarvuočiai M577, last modified 2016a November 30, accessed July 5, 2019, https://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/lietuvos_kariuomenes_dalinius_papildys_is_vokieti jos_isigyjami_sarvuociai_m577.html. [44] MoD. J. Olekas: „Pasirašyta sutartis dėl 88 pėstininkų kovos mašinų – tai ženklas, kad Lietuva rūpinasi savo saugumu ir investuoja į jį", last modified 2016b August 22, accessed July 5, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/j._olekas_pasirasyta_sutartis_del_88_pestininku_kov os_masinu__tai_zenklas_kad_lietuva_rupinasi_savo_saugumu_ir_investuoja_i_ji.html. [45] MoD. Sutartis dėl pėstininkų kovos mašinų „Boxer“ įsigijimo bus pasirašoma rugpjūčio 22 dieną, last modified 2016c August 16, accessed August 3, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/sutartis_del_pestinininku_kovos_masinu_boxer_isigi jimo_bus_pasirasoma_rugpjucio_22_diena.html. [46] MoD. Lietuvos gyventojai ypač palankiai vertina NATO sąjungininkus, last modified 2016d January 29, accessed September 5, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/lietuvos_gyventojai_ypac_palankiai_vertina_nato_sa jungininkus. [47] MoD. Ministras J.Olekas: Valstybės Gynimo Tarybos sprendimas įsigyti BOXER pėstininkų kovos mašinas žymi naują kariuomenės modernizacijos etapą, last modified 2015a December 11, accessed August 3, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/ministras_j.olekas_valstybes_gynimo_tarybos_spren

179 ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENT FORCE GERMANY INTO THE NATO eFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA? dimas_isigyti_boxer_pestininku_kovos_masinas_zymi_nauja_kariuomenes_modernizacijos_etapa. html. [48] MoD. Į Lietuvą atskrido pirmasis iš trijų naujųjų Lietuvos kariuomenės įsigytų paieškos ir gelbėjimo sraigtasparnių, last modified 2015b June 2, accessed July 5, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/i_lietuva_atskrido_pirmasis_is_triju_naujuju_lietuvo s_kariuomenes_isigytu_paieskos_ir_gelbejimo_sraigtasparniu.html. [49] MoD. Lenkijoje pasirašyta sutartis dėl priešlėktuvinės sistemos GROM Lietuvos kariuomenei pirkimo, last modified 2014 September 2, accessed July 5, 2019, http://kam.lt/lt/naujienos_874/aktualijos_875/lenkijoje_pasirasyta_sutartis_del_prieslektuvines_sis temos_grom_lietuvos_kariuomenei_pirkimo.html. [50] NATO. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, last modified 2019 March, accessed July 18, 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_04/20190402_1904- factsheet_efp_en.pdf. [51] NATO. NATO Defence Ministers Agree to Enhance Collective Defence and Deterrence, last modified 2016 June 14, accessed August 3, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_132356.htm. [52] NATO PDD (Public Diplomacy Division). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011- 2018), 2019. [53] NATO PDD. Warsaw Summit Communiqué. 2016. [54] Oficialiosios statistikos portalas. Užsienio prekyba, last modified 2019 July 26, accessed August 2, 2019, https://osp.stat.gov.lt/uzsienio-prekyba1. [55] Seimas (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania). National Security Strategy, 2017. [56] Seyda Michael R. The German Military Turnaround Repair, Reorganization, Or Rearmament, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey United States. 2018. [57] State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Second Investigation Department under MoD. National Threat Assessment 2019, last modified 2019 February 5, accessed July 17, 2019, https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-Gresmes-internetui-EN.pdf. [58] Stocker Joanne. Australia Signs €2 Billion Contract with Rheinmetall for 211 Boxer Wheeled Armored Vehicles. The Defence Post, last modified 2018 August 17, accessed July 8, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/17/rheinmetall-australia-boxer-crv-contract/. [59] Stoicescu Kalev and Henrik Praks. Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area, Report, International Centre for Defense and Security, Tallinn. 2016. [60] Sytas Andrius. Lithuania Commits to Spending 2.5 Pct of GDP on Defence by 2030. 2018. [61] VZ. Kariuomenė įsigis trumpojo nuotolio oro stebėjimo radarų, last modified 2018 March 29, accessed July 5, 2019, https://www.vz.lt/verslo-aplinka/politika/2018/03/29/kariuomene-isigis- trumpojo-nuotolio-oro-stebejimo-radaru. [62] Writer Staff. Germany Pledges €110 Million to Boost NATO Battalion Infrastructure in Lithuania, last modified 2019 February 4, accessed July 17, 2019, https://thedefensepost.com/2019/02/04/germany-lithuania-nato-battallion-infrastructure-funding/.

180 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

LEVEL OF ENERGY SECURITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Kakhaber PARCHUKASHVILI Ministry of Defense, Georgia

Abstract: The lack of energy resources and dependence on a single supplier could cause internal/external threats and provoke various instruments of national power. This thesis illustrates that geographically distant states should be linked to the same energy interdependence chain to have an affordable and sustainable energy supply and security margin. The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) applicability to energy gives all contributors diversification of supply, and also, economic, as well as, security and environmental benefits. This paper employs the argumentative method to illustrate the Energy Security situation. Additionally, this paper gives recommendations on what should be done to achieve the main National Interests from Georgia’s Energy Security perspective to not to provoke various instruments of national power.

Keywords: energy security; national security; regional security; instruments of national power; interdependence; energy balance; availability; affordability; sustainability.

Introduction Energy security is a worldwide concern that is complex and multi-dimensional. It depends on the diversity and availability of the energy resources in an adequate volume and at a reasonable price. It's not the only concern of a resilient energy system [1]. Energy security influences countries economic development, and links instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) [2]. In the strained political situation in Georgia when the state is countering threats postured by the Russian Federation (RF), and at the same time when Georgia lacks local energy resources [3], it makes Georgia even more sensitive to energy security requiring a full and timely understanding of the threats to mitigate the vulnerabilities [4]. That makes energy security an important objective of energy policy and strategy of Georgia [5]. Azerbaijan, which can fulfil the state’s needs with guaranteed, uninterrupted, and reliable energy supply [6] becomes Georgia’s sole supplier and strategic partner due to Georgia’s geopolitical location and its transit capabilities for the foreseeable future [7]. While energy security obtains distinctive importance, risks must be subject to control and do not cause critical threats to the state [8]. Thus, this paper will use the argumentative method to illustrate Georgia’s energy security situation. It aims to apply Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) to energy security to provide suggestions for various measures to counter external and internal threats caused by the lack of energy security from Georgia’s perspective. This paper argues that energy is a key element of Georgia’s national power, but its energy security is vulnerable to liabilities caused by its dependence on a single importer.

181 The paper is supported by these questions: 1) What is the status of Georgia's energy security? 2) How does the energy security concept materialize in national and regional relationships? It is limited to Georgia’s energy security and only covers gas and oil.

1. Theoretical framework Following chapter at first provides energy security outlines and then overviews RSCT to apply to energy security. Following that, it analyses Georgia’s energy balance to increase an understanding of energy security affects the state’s economic development.

1.1. Energy Security Concept and definition Energy security protects the state against negative external/internal policy factors and counters a diversity of threats caused by the lack of energy resources. It is also attached to the relationships between nations, how they interact with each other and how energy affects overall national security [9]. Energy security can be defined as ‘Access to adequate energy resources at reasonable prices in the foreseeable future, free from the serious service and risk disruption’ [10]. 'The International Energy Agency (IEA) describes it as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price' [11]. So, energy security depends on the interdependence between participants because it is the basis of trades, which includes supply and vital assets [12]. 1.1. Application of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) According to the RSCT, the degree of security interdependence among participants within such complexes are more influential than between players outside the complex [13]. Applying the RSCT to energy security highlights that pipelines for oil and gas exports can link geographically distant states into the same energy interdependence chain [14]. Moreover, energy-related factors pose challenges to the international community’s stabilized energy security [15]. So, RSCT can influence states’ national economic achievements and military- political stability [16]. The next section firstly assesses Georgia’s energy balance, secondly overviews and links theory to the state’s instruments of national power. 1.2. Georgia’s Energy Balance Assessment We used The Qualitative Research Method, specifically the International Energy Agency (IEA) approach with special indicators, particularly Model of Short-Term Energy Security (MOSES) to assess Georgia's internal/external risks and energy resilience [16] and to analyse and link various Instruments of National Power to energy security. To combine and apply Regional Security Theory to DIME could be said that regional projects allow the transit country to strengthen national interdependence, economic development, and collaboration. Azerbaijan, due to those facts, would not stop delivering it in the nearest future. Even though, in the case of unexpected scenarios of cessation of supply from Azerbaijan, Russia (Main gas supplier to Armenia through Georgia) and Turkey may technically become gas suppliers for Georgia. Thus, overall, Georgia has a very flexible situation of energy supply (See Table 1).

182 Name Crude Oil Natural Gas Production 1,359.6 297.5 Imports 2,531.3 81,739.0 Exports 314.5 -

Besides, Georgia has high diversity suppliers in oil, according to Georgia’s National Statistics Office Data; all oil products have a deficit [17]. So, average stock levels would be classified lowest. Natural gas in Georgia depends on external sources, also on importers and importing infrastructure resilience [18]. As a result, Georgia will be assigned to the highest risk and the low resilience group; for both, domestic and external factors (See Figure: 1). Figure 1. Georgia’s Energy Security Level [19].

Figure 1. Georgia’s Energy Security Level [19]

* Green: Norm; yellow: Before crises; red: Crises According to the Energy Trilemma [20], Georgia’s energy balance position is sixty- nine, meaning that Energy Security, Energy Equity, and Environmental Sustainability performance [21] shows influences of decisions, and proposes needs for policy to develop energy structures in the setting of the Grand Energy Transition [22]. Accordingly, Georgia needs to have access to reliable, affordable and sufficient supplies through keeping effective response capabilities in case of energy supply disturbances. So, the government needs to find ways for more energy diversification routes, and it should be supported by diplomatic and informational instruments of national power to have warm relations with the main suppliers.

2. Energy security and its implications on national and regional security from Georgia’s perspective This chapter discusses energy security connection to people’s welfare. It also discusses the needs of involvement of economic and military instruments of national power to energy security in the state. 2.1. Energy security as a national security issue When providing energy security, the settings of ideal effective economy functioning could be created, which backs to strengthening national security, to create synergy to integrate all dimensions giving them strength and reliability.

183 It is obvious that Georgia is concerned with the stability of resource supplies, mainly when these are vital to the defence/security forces, so energy would be a natural aspect of the state’s concerns, and if any sudden energy disruption occurs and energy security will not be protected the military instrument will be provoked as a resilience strength, so, confidently it’s interrelated to energy accessibility and affordability. Hence, securing energy supplies of Georgia is needed to accumulate capital, control own territories, and make the well-being of the population, and overall to make functioning the state and meet national interest. Georgia reviews energy security as a precondition for economic well-being. It is not considered individually, without considering neighbour countries’ energy policies and strategies, since it requires a comprehensive approach and the principles of “smart defence.”

2.2 Energy security as a regional security issue Energy security as one of the economic dimensions’ is considered as a subject of regional and collective security. If an actor challenges the state, it will be neutralized by strategic partners, as far as it will signify their safety. Georgia’s transit potential and energy supply are important to Europe to support a balance on the energy and have enough energy resources availability and diversity. So, Georgia as a crossroad of Europe and Asia have recognized its significant role, as an energy transit state. These pipeline projects allow becoming an energy transit state. These regional energy projects enhance national interdependence and strengthen strategic cooperation between countries. Indeed, energy interdependence among countries is realistic and should be enhanced [23]. The main idea of SCP and BTC is to avoid the transit running across the Russian territories, or territories influenced by Russia. Reducing Russia’s ability, as an energy producer, to influence Caspian and European countries [24] as it did in Georgia and Ukraine [25]. So, those projects give reliable and affordable supplies, resulting in securing economies from Russian politics and interests [26]. (See Figure 2). .

Figure 2. Map of pipelines running from Baku [27]

184 Reasonable prices and new solutions in energy diversification are important for sustainable growth of the countries where Georgia has the most significant role. To improve and increase states sustainability of the states need to create energy networks, which will lead to Georgia and its neighbours as well as EU countries’ sustainable and continues supply. To sum up, Georgia is a rational unit and the principal player in regional politics, where actors use military power and economic strength to reach their desired outcomes.

Conclusion Georgia has an important geographical location and transit-country status. The research-validated the hypothesis that energy is a key element of Georgia’s national power; however, its energy security is vulnerable to liabilities caused by its dependence on a single importer. It was assessed how a sole importer to create instability and influence on economic development could use energy resources. RSCT theory was used to energy security conditions and to settle statements to mitigate vulnerabilities triggered scarcity of local energy resources affecting various instruments of national power. It was identified why it is needed to obtain, and diversify energy supplies, and to create a security margin as a leading security concern for Georgia. It was identified that energy projects are important to maintain energy balance and enhance energy security by involving other states in energy projects besides Russia’s intent to obstruct the projects, due to its interests. Georgia cannot be considered individually, there is a need for the government’s involvement to make decisions for more energy diversification routes. At the same time, Georgia has to maintain warm diplomatic relations with main suppliers using diplomatic and informational instruments of national power. The basic principle in Georgia’s energy security would be energy infrastructure and transit capabilities development and working on diversification of roads. As well as Critical infrastructure protection (CEIP), Energy Management and Defence energy security will reinforce the efforts of international energy transit for promotion. The establishment of a transparent legal and regulatory framework for western standards will support this development and give attractiveness to new projects. All these directions are useful grounds for international cooperation, which could provide contributors with economic, security and environmental benefits.

References:

[1] Hillebrand, Evan. What is Energy Security? Definitions and Scenarios. Climate Etc. WordPress. [Online] WordPress, 30 March 2016. [Cited: 17 October 2019] https://judithcurry.com/2016/03/03/what-is-energy-security-definitions-and- scenarios/#comments. [2] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Joint Doctrine Note (JDN). Joint Electronic Library. [Online] 25 April 2018. [Cited: 17 October 2019]. https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctrine- Pubs/Joint-Doctrine-Notes/. [3] Uplisashvili, Nugzar and Anzor, Dundua. The European Union for Georgia. Eap-csf.ge. [Online] 2016. [Cited: 17 October 2019]. http://eap- csf.ge/images/doc/politics/Energy%20Security%20Geo.pdf. [4] Gulmira, Rzayeva, Gurbanov and Ilgar, Gurbanov. Gas Diversification Policy of Georgia. SAM - Center for Strategic Studies. [Online] October 2017. [Cited: 17 October 2019] https://www.academia.edu/35886485/Gulmira_Rzayeva_Ilgar_Gurbanov_Gas_Diversificatio n_Policy_of_Georgia_Role_of_External_Actors_Azerbaijan_Russia_and_Iran_SAM_Comm ents_2017. ISSN: 2070-5638.

185 [5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (MFA). National Security Concept of Georgia. Tbilisi: 2014. [6] Ibrahimzade, Mirsaid. Georgia to increase Import of Azerbaijani Gas. Sputnik-Georgia. [Online] 14 April 2019. [Cited: 16 October 2019]. https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/147181.html. [7] Kochladze, Manana. Geopolitics of South Caucasus: Georgia and Oil Prices. Heinrich- Böll-Stiftung. Website of the South Caucasus Regional Office of the Heinrich Boell Foundation. [Online] Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 1 April 2016. [Cited: 16 October 2019.] https://ge.boell.org/en/2016/04/01/geopolitics-south-caucasus-georgia-and-oil-prices. [8] Yergin, Daniel. The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World. London: Penguin Group, 2012. p. 269. 978-0-241-95777-6. [9] Barton, Barry, Redgwell, Catherine and Anita Rønne, and Donald N. Zillman. Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment. Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press. [Online] January 2010. [Cited: 9 October 2019.] http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271610.001.0001/acpro f-9780199271610-miscMatter-7#p1. [10] International Energy Agency (IEA). What is energy security? International Energy Agency Web site. [Online] 2018. [Cited: 17 October 2019.] https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/. [11] Esakova, Nataliya. European Energy Security. Frankfurt: Springer VS, 2012. http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-531-19200-0. [12] Buzan, Barry and Ole, Waever. Regions and Powers. United Kingdom: Cambridge, 2003. ISBN 0 521 81412. [13] Palonkorpi, Mikko. Energy Security and Regional security Complex Theory. Scribd Inc. Scribd Inc. [Online]. 7 AUG 2010. [Cited: 16 October 2019.] https://www.scribd.com/document/35525605/Energy-Security. [14] McPherson, Hugo, W, Wood Duncan and Robinson, Darek M. emerging threats to energy security and stability. Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Springer Link. [Online] 16 December 2005. [Cited: 15 October 2019.] https://kadayawan.com/1402035683/emerging- threats-to-energy-security-and-stability. ISBN10-1402035683. [15] Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn. Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition. [ed.] second. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. p. 75. [16] Jewell, Jessica. The IEA Model of Short-term Energy Security (MOSES). International Energy Agency Web site. [Online] 2011. [Cited: 17 October 2019.] https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f8ad/371edeac850f825219c9368d66cf0be7cad9.pdf?_ga=2.1 62383228.1180895748.1549486318-808993382.1549486318. [17] GEOSTAT. Energy Balance of Georgia. GEOSTAT Official Website. [Online] National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2017. [Cited: 16 October 2019.] http://geostat.ge/?action=page&&p_id=2916&lang=eng. [18] Font, Elizabeth; Margvelashvili, Murman and Mukhigulishvili, Giorgi. MOSES Energy Security Ratings for Georgia. Tbilisi: Business Caucasus Week, 2017. [19] Bitchiashvili, Irakli. Predictive Analysis of Georgia's Energy Security and Ways of Raising it. Library of Georgian Technical University. 2017. [20] Song Lianlian; Yelin Fu; Peng Zhou; Kin Keung Lai. Measuring national energy performance via Energy Trilemma Index: A Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis. Science Direct. Elsevier B.V. [Online] 04 07 2017. [Cited: 14 October 2019] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988317302414?via%3Dihub.

186 [21] Oliver Wyman. World Energy Trilemma Index 2018. London: World Energy Council (2018). [Online] 04 07 2017. GB 123 3802 48. [Cited: 14 October 2019.] https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/World-Energy-Trilemma-Index-2018.pdf [22] UK essays. Regional Security Complex Theory. UK Essays site. [Online] November 2018. [Cited: 1 October 2019.] https://www.ukessays.com/essays/essays/politics/the-regional- security-complex-theory-politics-essay.php?vref=1. 842417633. [23] Valigi, Marco. 2014. Caspian Security Issues. Italy: Novi Ligure (AL), 2014. p. 21. ISBN 978-88-98914-31-6. [24] Allen, Nick. Attack on the gas pipeline is 'sabotage by Russia'. Telegraph Media Group. The Telegraph. [Online] Telegraph Media Group, 23 January 2006. [Cited: 11 October 2019.] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1508581/Attack-on-gas-pipeline- is-sabotage-by-Russia.html [25] Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030. [Online] 2010. [Cited: 10 October 2019.] http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf [26] Blomberg, Thomas. Wikimedia Commons. [Online] 6 December 2015. [Cited: 10 October 2019.] https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baku_pipelines.svg.

187 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

Dr Małgorzata MILIAN-POGONOWSKA

National Security Faculty, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract: This paper discusses the links between long term financial planning and performance based budgeting and assesses the beneficial effect that extension of financial period can produce. The article begins with presenting the rationale and advantages behind introduction of multiannual budget planning. In the second part the author looks at the legal framework for multiannual financial planning in Poland. Next, the connection between performance based budgeting and multiannual financial plans and the strengths of the latter are covered.

Key words: multi-annual financial planning; state budget; performance budget; budget forecasts; Poland

Introduction The task-oriented budget, implemented for several years in Poland, has an operational character, because it concerns the annual time horizon, and the entries in the task-oriented system are defined and present a high degree of detail. However, in recent years, the task- oriented approach to the projected state activity also appears in medium-term and strategic documents. This means that the task-oriented arrangement of the annual budget can be referred to the task-oriented approach to the goals of the state (society) in the long term, to facilitate parliamentary decision-making. This direction of changes in budgeting the goals and tasks of the state is a significant extension of knowledge about the management of public financial resources in comparison with the traditional layout of the Budget Act and annexes. The aim of the article is an attempt to assess the possibilities of long-term financial planning from the point of view of annual state budget planning in a task-oriented system. Budget forecast in Poland in terms of total revenues, tax revenues as well as the accuracy of basic macroeconomic assumptions adopted when building the state budget. The issue of estimating the future revenues of the state budget is so important that the possibilities of effective use of the task-based budget method depend to a large extent on the stability of providing budgetary resources to entities implementing public tasks.

1. Basics of multi-annual budget planning The principle of "annual" budgeting developed over the centuries results primarily from the need to maintain parliamentary control over the executive authorities regarding the functions, programs, tasks, etc. entered in the state budget (commune, poviat, voivodship). The annual budget planning horizon results from art. 219 of the Constitution, the Sejm adopts the state budget for the financial year in the form of a budget [Constitution, 2008, p. 63] act and constitutional functions of the state budget. This fundamental feature of the budget is not called into question the fact that some of the tasks (expenses) included in the Budget Act go beyond one year, e.g. taking the form of multi-annual programs.

188 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

The adopted principle of the state budget also allows, at least in abstract terms, to adapt the state budget, especially its expenditure side, to the changing needs of society and the economy. However, the principle of "annuality" also has weaknesses, which is associated with too short a time horizon for budget revenues and expenses. Along with the development of budget relations, the growing role of the state budget (public finances) in socio-economic life, there was a need to extend forecasts and financial (budget) planning. This is related to, among others with the construction by the national and supranational authorities (e.g. European Commission) of various programs implying financial public funds. Mention may be made here of, for example, national programs such as: "Country's development strategy 2007-2015" [Strategy, 2006]; "National Development Strategy 2020" [Strategy, 2012]; "Poland 2030. The third wave of modernity. Long-term national development strategy (project)" and from transnational programs: the Lisbon strategy [Strategy, 2002], whose creative continuation is the Europe 2020 [Strategy, 2010] strategy, numerous transnational sectoral and operational programs, etc. A positive example of the long-term perspective approach to public finances is "The Union's financial perspective European Union 2007–2013” or currently being the subject of works and arrangements between the member states of the European Union “The new financial perspective 2014– 2020 ”. Experience with the "Financial Perspective 2007–2013" [Communication, 2004], as well as previous various EU programs for members of this organization or candidate (associated) countries, lead to the conclusion that such a budget planning horizon and the directive's specific provisions directive are an important factor stabilizing the process long- term budget planning, especially in countries for which net revenues from the EU budget (funds) are significant, as is the case in Poland. To sum up, the performance budget should be an expression of the implementation of multiannual plans and strategies in specific public spheres. These documents should be reflected in the budget plan, which links the objectives and funds allocated to their implementation. Ensuring such consistency seems necessary because current standards in this area cause the existence of many so-called "Dead" strategies that operate basically plans without being linked to specific financing provided for in the budgets. The situation is not improved by the fact of mutual intersection and imposition of many strategies, and the number of those in force in terms of individual functions of the state is not conducive to the transparency of the system of strategic management of the state. Units obliged to implement the budget in terms of tasks were obliged to link their budget tasks with the strategic goals of the state. In the statement of the Minister of Finance regarding standards for defining objectives for public finance sector units in the task-based expenditure plan for a given year, we note the dependence of the objective with a clear definition of the reason for spending public funds for a given task depending on the socio- economic needs that the implementation of this task is to satisfy. The choice of individual goals by the administrator should be based on a thorough, realistic analysis of the country's strategic possibilities in a given area, for which goals are formulated, taking into account current and expected internal and external conditions as well as socio-economic development of the country in the context of a long-term perspective. Objectives in the task- based expenditure plan should be consistent with all strategic objectives set out in strategic documents, regardless of the duration of the overarching objectives. The diagram below presents the mutual relations between the strategies. The main development strategies in individual areas are presented against the background of general strategies.

189 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

The obligation to ensure compliance between the indicated strategic documents and the performance budget results from normative acts1. Compliance with strategic documents is maintained by the administrator / unit of the public finance sector when formulating objectives and measures in the performance budget, ensuring their adequate consistency with the provisions and values specified in development strategies and development programs referred to in the Act on the principles of conducting development policy, in cases where the content contained in these documents relates to the objectives and measures of tasks, subtasks and activities in the task budget2.

Long-term National Development Strategy

Medium-term National Development Strategy

Strategy for National Efficient state Innovation and Strategy for Efficiency of the Regional Economy Development

Social Capital Human Capital Transport Development Development Development Strategy Strategy Strategy

Energy Security Strategy for Strategy for the and Sustainable Development of Development of the Polish Environment Rural, Security Agriculture and System Fisheries

Diagram 1. The new strategic order Source: Multiannual State Financial Plan for 2014-2017, Council of Ministers, Warsaw 2014, p. 11.

1 Regulation of the Minister of Finance of 17 June 2014, item 825 on the detailed method, procedure and deadlines for the development of materials for the draft budget act for 2015. In chapter 6 The Task budget in para. 76 points 6 it was defined that the state of affairs resulting from the analysis of the needs of society and the state, which the public funds administrator intends to achieve, in accordance with the objectives set out in development strategies and development programs referred to in the Act of 6 December 2006 on the principles of conducting development policy; 2 Ibid

190 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

2. Multi-year budget planning in Poland Referring to the sources and significance of long-term budgetary planning in Poland, it is easy to notice that in the first period of political transformation it was abandoned, both in formal and practical terms. This situation is understandable to a certain extent, because it was a manifestation of a reaction to a rigid, ineffective planning system in the socialist economy. The Budget Law adopted in 1991 was oriented towards the annual planning horizon [Act 1991, item 18]. Entries beyond the financial year were exceptional and concerned, for example, state (central) investment from the state budget. Multiannual planning appeared more widely in the Act of 26 November 1998 on public finance (Journal of Laws No. 155, item 1014), which obliged the Minister of Finance to present within the state budget under development macroeconomic assumptions for the financial year and two more patch. These were macroeconomic assumptions such as: gross domestic product (GDP), economic growth or public debt, budget deficit, inflation rates, unemployment rate and others. The cited act introduced multi-annual programs and obliged the Minister of Finance to present to the parliament alist of multi- annual investments and sources of their financing, expected results from outlays. Some progress in implementing the concept of long-term planning was brought by the amendment to the Public Finance Act of June 30, 2005 (Journal of Laws No. 249, item 2103). The Act imposes anobligation on the Minister of Finance to develop a three-year public debt management strategy. The obligation to present the draft state budget together with macroeconomic assumptions for the next two years has been maintained. Significant progress in extending the budget planning horizon was made by the Act of 27 August 2009 on public finance (Journal of Laws No. 157, item 1240), in which the idea of the "Multiannual State Financial Plan" appeared for the first time. Pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the Minister of Finance was obliged to present to the Council of Ministers the assumptions of the draft state budget for the following year. These assumptions are to be included the arrangements adopted in the "Multiannual Financial Plan of the State" and directions of actions contained in the "Convergence Program"3 adopted by the Council of Ministers. The rapid significance of long-term financial (budget) planning occurred in Poland with the accession to the European Union. This is evidenced by the need to include in the national social, the European Union. This is evidenced by the need to include in the national social, economic and financial plans not only the common objectives of the European Union, but also methods of drawing up plans, setting priorities, strategic areas, etc. Poland, becoming a member of the European Union, is also to some extent a planning entity. Paradoxically, however, it can be seen that the scope of the areas covered by planning and the detail of the plans are reminiscent of the system of planned economy from the past system. Planning within the European Union is also subject to criticism due to extensive procedures and excessive bureaucracy for this political, economic and social organization [Kulczyk].

3. The concept of performance budgeting The idea of performance budget is closely related to the concept of New Public Management. It puts emphasis on proper goal setting and performance monitoring, financial management (efficiency), setting service standards, the use of benchmarking solutions (the

3 Act of 5 January 1991 - Budget Law, Journal of Laws No. 4, item 18. Developed in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the supervision of budgetary positions and the supervision and coordination of economic policies, OJ Office. WE L 209 of 2 August 1997, p. 1; Dz. Office. EU, Polish Special Edition, 2004, chapter 10, vol. 1, p. 84, as amended

191 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND possibility of making comparisons on a sample of proven, good solutions [Krynicka, 2006, p. 195]. Task budgeting and the concept of management by goals implement many principles of New Public Management, which may include: - orientation not on processes but on achieving results; - moving from traditional public administration towards a model that puts much more emphasis on the personal responsibility of managers; - the will to move away from the classic bureaucracy towards creating more flexible employment, work and organization conditions; - clearly set goals set for the organization and employees as well as the extent to which they can be assessed by means of indicators; - evaluation of public programs according to the 3 E principles (savings - economy, efficiency - efficiency and effectiveness); - some of the tasks carried out by the public sector subject to market evaluation in the form of; - striving to limit the functions performed by public authorities through privatization business entities [Zawicki, 2002, pp. 78-79]. The main question to be asked is as follows: to what extent can it be possible to reconcile the requirements of an operative, detailed task-specific approach with multiannual budget planning in order to maximize the potential of innovative methods of managing entities operating in the public sphere. An extension of the planning horizon is a feature of rational action and decisions taken by business entities. Predicting economic, financial, social processes etc. is, however, subject to uncertainty. The main tasks of New Public Management include: - a clear indication of public sector entities with the introduction of the principles of task delegation; - implementing competitiveness within the public sector and between the public and private sectors; - increasing the level of management to that of the private sector; - economical use of resources; - increasing management responsibility when departing from the traditional bureaucratic system and based on the implementation of tasks in a way that allows the measurement of the results of actions and comparison with specific standards; - regular results control [Zysnarska, 2010, pp. 17-18]. The approach to entity management in the light of New Public Management is significantly different from the traditional approach. The main differences include treating the public sector as a kind of market entity. Therefore, in this management method we come across many borrowings from the sphere of managing market entities. The main motive behind the introduction of performance budgeting was the desire to achieve greater transparency of public finances, as well as to provide external recipients deciding on the shape of the budget with clear and transparent information on the objectives of spending public funds. In Poland, an attempt to implement a task-based budget at the state level was first made in 2008, when a part of the budget was presented in a task-based system. In subsequent years, the scope of subjects was expanded, imposing the obligation to develop financial plans in this form on subsequent categories of public finance sector units.

4. Multi-annual programs as a link to the annual performance budget The considerations to date lead to the conclusion that the strongest and direct relationship of multiannual planning with annual task planning are multiannual programs.

192 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

As the name implies, multi-annual programs form a separate part of the tasks for which funding is provided in subsequent years, for which the budget law is adopted. Multi-annual programs are included in the functions of the state highlighted in the task budget. Multi-annual programs are implemented at the level of activities identified under task-based classification. Each program has a stated goal, usually contained in the program name, the entity implementing the program is indicated, and in the case of several implementers - the unit responsible for program coordination. The duration of the entire program is indicated, the amount of expenditure for the entire program, the amount of expenditure incurred before the budget year for which the draft budget bill is being prepared, the amount of expenditure (expenses and other costs) in a given budget year, as well as expenditure to be incurred by the state budget in subsequent years of the program implementation. For each program, the base (output) value of the meter and the target value of this meter have been determined. Information on the degree of implementation of the target (measure) in the year for which the state budget is planned allows to assess the progress in achieving the objectives of the given program. Due to the presentation of programs in official documents, it would be necessary to maintain discipline of terminology. Definitions of measures used in the implementation of multi-annual programs can be controversial, however, from the point of view of an innovative method of budgeting public activities, multi-annual programs are an example of a model solution. The effectiveness of multi-annual public funds allocated through individual programs would require in-depth analyses, but it can be said that this way of implementing state tasks ensures continuity of task financing. This creates the necessary conditions for the entity implementing (coordinating) the program to focus efforts on the search for the best methods of spending public funds, on the search for alternative best paths to achieve the set goals. This direction of modernizing financial allocation mechanisms can be described as the most promising, although the excessively extensive number of multiannual programs leads to an increase in budget expenditure rigidity, which in Poland is significant due to the high share of legally determined expenditure in total expenditure. It is worth noting the lack of consistency in the presentation of the implementation of the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State in confrontation with the Public Finance Act. This applies especially to the large freedom of information provided. The Act requires the presentation of the degree of implementation of the Multiannual Financial Plan of the State against the background of the medium-term national development strategy, while in this document within the framework of the 22 functions discussed, reference is made to various documents of different time horizon, which obscures the picture of the functioning of multiannual programs. The analysis of the concept and functioning of multi-annual programs also prompts reflection that these programs, due to their long-term nature, show great resistance to changes in groups in power. The history of public finances also provides examples of the wastage of public funds as a result of cessation of various projects due to other preferences, priorities, current financial difficulties of the state, etc., which are born together with new government teams (also at the local government level). This resulted in a partial or total degradation of expenditure previously incurred. The relative resistance of multiannual programs to political change is an important argument for developing this method of budgeting public tasks. This, of course, does not preclude some flexibility in providing financial programs with budgetary resources in specific budgetary years, but the fundamental condition for effective use of performance-based budgets is maintained - funding continuity.

193 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

The current foreign4 and domestic [Hardt, de Jong, 2009] experience with the use of the budget in the system of tasks allow for the formulation of certain universal conditions, from whose fulfillment depends on the effective use of this tool. These elementary conditions include a clear formulation of tasks, assigning them to specific contractors, defining performance measures. Understandably, the use of a performance budget requires an efficient economic event registration system, reporting system, task monitoring system, etc. One of the conditions for effective financing of tasks is the stability of their financing. The significance of this condition depends on the type of tasks, and especially whether they are continuous or one-off tasks. In the case of continuous tasks, the degree of their implementation is related to the level of financial support recorded in annual budget laws. Against this background, the question arises about the method of planning annual expenditure under the functions of the state, implemented goals, tasks, subtasks and activities. The point is whether the historical expenditure (cost) method is respected when determining the amount of budget allocated, or other criteria are the basis for determining them. This issue is important because, as already emphasized earlier, the revenues of the state budget and other public funds depend on the activity of the economy (business cycle) in the year for which public tasks are planned, and the amounts allocated in the state budget to finance them. In such a situation, an approach implemented by public authorities is important, which may consist of mechanically adjusting the level of financing tasks to expected revenues or ensuring the stability of financing tasks at the expense of budget deficits. This is a fundamental issue for the effective use of the budget programming method, since the planning of the state budget revenues may be grossly flawed, and their effect will be to reduce (cut) expenditure on the implementation of public tasks and have negative effects on the determined levels of task measures. Task budget is the management of public funds by objectives, appropriately focused and hierarchical, in order to achieve specific results, measured using a fixed system of measures [Lubińska, 2011, p. 26]. The performance budget allows you to determine which tasks are most important for achieving your goals and shows the extent to which they have been carried out using measures. Pursuant to this definition, performance budget is a management tool by goals with the use of a system of measures to answer the question whether the goals set have been achieved. Task budgeting is also words of management by goals. This method involves the concentration of the individual's activity around its goals using the organizational, material and financial resources it possesses. A condition of management by goals is knowledge of those goals. Otherwise, there is no effective management. Another definition of performance budget calls it the method of managing public funds recognized as a consolidated plan of expenditure of public finance sector units drawn up in a horizon longer than a year, in a system of state functions, tasks and budget subtasks with measures determining the degree of goal achievement [Postuła, Perczyński, 2008, pp. 22-23]. The performance budget is a tool for increasing the quality of public funds management, in particular [Podstawka, et all, 2007, p. 4]: - eliminates duplicate goals of individual ministries; - it provides the opportunity to complete the financing of the objectives already achieved faster;

4 Studies on study trips of representatives of the Ministry of Finance implemented as training: Patterns of task budgets, foreign solutions on the example of Finland, Warsaw 2009;

194 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

- increases the state budget's clarity and transparency; - it facilitates the control of spending and achieved results; - increases the state budget's clarity and transparency; - it facilitates the control of spending and achieved results; - provides information on economic indicators of individual financial services from the budget; - requires more work with more careful planning, but helps to spend money more efficiently; - it gives the opportunity to determine the rank of individual goals and choose those that best serve economic growth; - obliges the new public authorities elected in subsequent elections to continue and stabilize development-oriented policy; - gives the possibility of a global, not departmental approach to tasks and public funds.

5. Conclusion The need for long-term budgetary and financial planning is not polemical. The prerequisites for long-term planning lie in the principles of rational action, and therefore the need to plan socio-economic processes with an extended time horizon does not require special argumentation. However, it should be noted that the longer the financial planning horizon, the greater the risk of making a mistake. Therefore, there remains an important issue of the impact of these errors on the effectiveness of the use of the activity-based budget method, whose horizon is limited - in its basic form - to one year. Although the "Multiannual State Financial Plan" is also presented in the system of 22 functions and tasks of the state and tasks for which goals and measures of implementation have been formulated, it should be assumed that they are indicative. Therefore, the crucial issue is to resolve the inevitable contradiction in the budget process, namely how to ensure continuity and stability of tasks performed in the face of uncertainty as to the level of financial support for entities implementing budgetary tasks. The essence of this contradiction boils down to the need to take into account the state of public finances (state budget balance) in subsequent years on the one hand, and the requirements for stability of the inflow of financial resources to task contractors on the other.

References: [1] Hardt Ł., M. de Jong, Performance budget as a tool for improving the quality of governance in Poland, the "Efficient State" program, Ernst & Young, Warsaw 2011. [2] Hawkesworth, Trapp L., Nielsen D.F., Performance Budgeting in Poland: An OECD Review, "OECD Journal on Budgeting" 2011, Vol. 1. [3] Krynicka H., The concept of new management in the public sector, Works of the Institute of Law and Administration PWSZ in Sulechów 2006, No. 2, [4] Kulczyk J., Bureaucratised European Union will lose, http: //biznes.Pl/ consciousosci/unia Europejska / kulczyk bureaucratised Europe will lose, 5265395, wi- deo-detal.Html [accessed: September 20, 2019]. [5] Lubińska T., Performance budget in Poland. Reorientation from spending on public money management, Warsaw 2011, [6] Owsiak S., New management of public finances in crisis conditions, PWE, Warsaw 2011. [7] Postuła M., Perczyński P., Task budget in public administration, Warsaw 2008, [8] Postuła M., Perczyński P., Implementation of performance budget Ministry of Finance, Warsaw 2009.

195 TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND

[9] Podstawka M., Dynowska J., Góralski P., Rudowicz E., Preparation of Government Administration to prepare a task-based expenditure plan for 2008. Training materials, Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Warsaw 2007. [10] Zawicki M., New Public Management and Public Governance - an outline of the concept of public management, studies in public management. Materials of the scientific seminar, vol. 2, edited by J. Hausner, M. Kukiełka, Kraków 2002. [11] Zysnarska A., Budget accounting in the light of the concept of true and faithful image, Gdańsk 2010.

Legal Acts: [12] Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Publisher Literat 2008. [13] Act of 5 January 1991 - Budget Law, Journal of Laws No. 4, item 18. [14] Act of 26 August 1998 on public finance, Journal of Laws No. 155, item 1014. [15] Act of June 30, 2005 Public Finance, Journal of Laws 2005 No. 249, item 2103. [16] Act of 6 December 2006 on the principles of conducting development policy, Journal of Laws No. 227, item 1658, as amended: from 2007 No. 140, item 984; of 2009 No. 84, item 712; No. 157, item 1241; of 2011 No. 279, item 1644. [17] Act of 27 August 2009 on public finance, Journal of Laws No. 157, item 1240. [18] Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union signed by Poland on March 2, 2012. [19] Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on strengthening the supervision of budgetary positions and the supervision and coordination of economic policies, OJ Office. WE L 209 of 2 August 1997, p. 1; Dz. Office. EU, Polish Special Edition, 2004, chapter 10, vol. 1, p. 84, as amended). [20] Resolution No. 71 of the Council of Ministers of May 8, 2012 regarding the update of the "Multiannual Financial Plan of the State for the years 2012–2015", M.P. of May 14, 2012. [21] "National Development Strategy 2007-2015", Ministry of Regional Development, Warsaw, November 2006. [22] "The country's 2020 development strategy - Active society, competitive economy, efficient state" was adopted on September 25, 2012 by the Council of Ministers. [23] The Lisbon Strategy - a path to the success of a united Europe, Office of the Committee for European Integration, Warsaw, May 2002. [24] “A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, European Commission, Brussels, 3 March 2010, COM (2010) 2020. [25] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Financial perspectives for 2007–2013”, Brussels, 14 July 2004, COM (2004) 487.

196 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

University Lecturer BRÎNDUȘA MARIA POPA, PhD

Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies – NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre, Brasov, Romania

Abstract: Communication is one of the basic elements and processes in any organization. Simply put, an organization is a group of people set up to meet specific goals. Achieving these goals depends to a large extent on proper coordination and integration of human effort. Coordination and integration of activities are possible only if there is an effective communication system within the organization. The more efficient this system is, the better the relationship between the management and the execution personnel.

Key words: communication, organization, characteristics, objectives

1. Introduction The term "communication" derives from the Latin word "communis", which means " making common, imparting, communicating; a figure of speech," noun of action from past-participle stem of communicare "to share, divide out; communicate, impart, inform; join, unite, participate in," literally "to make common," related to communis "common, public, general"[1]. The term could also be encountered with the meaning of "passing on to others", "sharing something with others. Communication is an important aspect of human behavior, meant to create a common understanding. Concurrently, communication is the easiest way to convey opinions, feelings, information and ideas through words (written or spoken) and non-verbal language, it is the process of transferring commands, ideas and expressions from one individual to one or more individuals. The information to be communicated must be clear and accurate, if one individual transmits the message and the other receives and interprets it the same way as the sender intended, the communication process is declared complete and successful. Communication can be effective only if the receiver receives the message in the same form and context as it was sent by the sender. When there is no error in the interpretation of the message and the sender receives the correct feedback, communication can be considered effective. Communication is one of the basic elements and processes of any organization. Simply put, an organization is a group of people set up to meet specific goals and the achievement of these goals depends to a large extent, on proper coordination and integration of the human effort. However, proper coordination and integration of activities are possible only if there is an effective communication system within the organization. The more efficient this system is, the better the relationship between management and the execution personnel.

197 THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

2. Communication particularities Managerial communication particularities are generated by the purpose and objectives of each organization, but also by the organizational structure and the context of the organizational culture. Organizational culture is the one that encompasses all written or unwritten rules, customs, attitudes and these, in turn, are the ones that structure communication. Organizational culture affects how people interact with each other, within the organization, but also with the external environment. Despite the very varied nature of organizations, we will find a number of competencies common to all managers, who are required for them to perform the functions associated with their jobs (POLC - planning, organizing, leading, controlling) and if we analyze carefully, each managerial function is supported by communication.

2.1. The nature of communication

Communication has three constituent elements: a sender, a message and a receiver (recipient). There are cases when the receiver does not have to be present or aware of the sender's intention to communicate when the communication takes place, and still communication can take place, we are talking here about communication covering long distances in time and space. Yet, the communication process is completed only once the receiver understands the sender's message as it was intended. Communicating with others involves three main steps: a) Developing the message idea - Thinking: First, the information exists in the sender's mind. It can be a concept, an idea, a piece of information or a feeling. b) Coding:-Putting the abstract idea into words or symbols. The message is sent to the receiver using words or other symbols. c) Decoding:- Finally, the receiver translates the words or symbols into a concept or information that he can understand. By analyzing the definitions above we can identify the following characteristics of communication. a. It is a process - (the process is an identifiable flow of interconnected events that depend on each other and advance in time towards a purpose or a goal). Accordingly, communication is a process in which there are some identifiable, interconnected events that have as their starting point a transmitter. Then the process continues with a series of messages that are encoded by the transmitter, transmitted through a channel and received by the receiver, and the end of this process ends with the feedback offered by the recipient. b. It is inevitable: - Communication is essential from a physical, social and psychological point of view and no human activity can be performed in its absence. c. It is based on meaning: - Communication is based on meaning. In order to have effective communication, we must be able to put the words together so that sentences can be understood and carry logics. d. Communication is intentional and unintentional:- Communication can be done intentionally, having a specific purpose in mind, but most of the communication is unintentional, sometimes transmitting even what one does not want to communicate. e. Communication is systemic: - Each component of the communication is affected by the other. The sender of the message, the message itself, as well as the recipient of the message; all these are interconnected and influence one another. f. It is bidirectional: - A significant aspect of the communication is the fact that it involves at least two persons, a sender and a receiver, within it. In fact, a person cannot communicate only with themselves, they always need a receiver to complete the communication act. There is no communication until the message transmitted by the sender

198 THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS is received by the receiver. In the communication process not only the transmitter is involved but also the receiver, the communication being carried out in both directions because the receiver is the one who transmits the feedback in turn. g. Communication is a social process:- the human being is a social being that cannot live in isolation. Communication is a process that helps the humans in their interaction with other human beings. h. Communication is a dynamic process, "under constant change": - Communication is not a unique event, it is a dynamic process, which changes all the time. i. Communication is a continuous process: - most often, it is repeated to obtain the desired results. It is a continuous stream of interactions. j. Communication is both interaction and transaction: - The participants in these exchanges of ideas influence each other. k. It is contextual: - Communication happens with reference to a certain context. The same words meant different things if said in different contexts. l. It leads to the achievement of the organizational objective: effective communication does this by creating the right sense of activity in the organization. m. It is ubiquitous: - Regardless of the type and size of the organization, communication is inevitable, takes place at all levels.

2.2. Types of communication

Communication can be classified according to the number of persons (recipients) to whom the message is addressed: a. Intrapersonal communication: - Communication in which there are no interlocutors, such as the monologue; b. Interpersonal communication: - This is the exchange of messages between two persons. c. Mass communication: -This occurs when the message is sent to large groups of people, for example through mass media. In this process, each person becomes a faceless individual and there is almost no opportunity to give a personal response or feedback. d. Verbal communication: - communication using words, written or spoken. Verbal communication consists of speaking, listening, writing, reading, and understanding. It can be further classified as oral or written. e. Non-verbal communication: - This includes the use of images, signs, gestures and facial expressions for the exchange of information between people. f. Meta communication: - In this case the word chosen by the transmitter unintentionally transmits something more than what the words themselves represent. g. Formal communication: - A means of communication, which is officially controlled by the persons holding management positions in an organization. The communication is carried out through official, preset channels. This ensures that the information is transmitted in an orderly, timely and accurate manner. Any information, decision, circular, document necessary for the activity within the organization follows this path. h. Informal communication: - this is carried out in parallel with the official communication, each organization having a parallel channel, as well as efficient communication, the informal channel. She is not officially accepted and is even discouraged. However, it is impossible to control it, precisely because it runs in all horizontal, vertical, diagonal and sometimes directions, it is used even by those in the management positions of the organization.

199 THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

i. Vertical, descending communication: - communication that runs from top to bottom, from those in positions of leadership to subordinates, is known as descending communication. Every organization has an intrinsic hierarchical system and therefore, in the first instance, communication is invariably from top to bottom. j. Vertical, ascending communication: - communication that takes place from the bottom up, from the hierarchically lower level to the higher level, is called upward communication. The main function of the upward communication is to provide information to the upper levels regarding what is happening to the lower levels. It's just the reverse of the descendant. k. Horizontal communication: - communication between two or more persons who are on the same hierarchical level. l. Diagonal communication: represents the flow of information between persons at different levels, who do not have direct reporting relationships. This type of communication is used to accelerate the flow of information, to improve understanding and to coordinate the efforts needed to achieve organizational goals.

2.3. The objectives of the communication

Communication can have several objectives, depending on the context and the people involved. The objectives depend on the purpose pursued. The objectives of organizational communication include: a. Information: - This is the primary objective of communication. Information is power, the information needed inside and outside the organization can be satisfied through communication. b. Persuasion: - the activity performed in any organization is should be based on trust. It is important for those who have to carry out the activities necessary to achieve the objectives that they should work effectively and it can be done only if the information provided is reliable, on time and sufficient. The recipient depends on the good intentions and the trustiness of the transmitter. c. Preparation: communication is necessary for the dissemination of knowledge and the development of skills and attitudes among people working in an organization. Communication is an integral part of any training, training program needed to achieve specific competencies. d. Motivation: - it is necessary to have a high level of morale and motivation of each member of the organization in order to achieve a high level of productivity and long-term efficiency. Communication is the most important means that can be used for this purpose. e. Integration: - Any organization involves a smaller or larger number of people who work in different departments and offices. Communication provides the means for an integrated approach needed to achieve organizational goals. f. Change: - change takes place in an organization in order to adapt the activity to the challenges arising especially from the external environment and sometimes, even from the internal one. This adaptation takes place through the organizational repositioning, changing the way the work processes are carried out. The efficiency of change is very much based on how its necessity and usefulness is understood, and these things cannot be achieved without proper communication.

200 THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

3. Conclusion

Communication is a complex social process, used for the exchange of information among individuals by using a common system of symbols, signs and behaviors [2]. Individuals, as members of social groups, communicate with each other in different contexts, communication having the role of "the main instrument of man in the socialization process" [3]. Through it you can find out the views of individuals and achieve the homogenization of groups that will lead to the normal functioning of the community, regardless of its nature or size. Schematically, communication is defined as a transfer of information from a transmitter to a receiver, through a channel, under the conditions of the correct understanding by the recipient of the message content. The purpose of organizational communication is to create cohesion, introduce change, channel efforts to achieve goals and ultimately achieve performance. In management, communication is the basis of the successful staff coordination process, but we also find it within all other management functions. Through communication, the manager harmonizes and synchronizes in time and space the decisions, actions, activities, staff requests and the concrete realities of the organization thus, conferring cohesion, continuity and dynamism to the managerial process, all these being fundamental characteristics necessary to promote efficient management. Formal communication is performed at the level of an organizational structure through the communication procedures and is based on the organizational chart, but it is also carried out through informal channels, which is a very important factor in the smooth running of the activities of an organization. It represents a specific form of interaction between individuals, being a process, usually intentional, of transmitting "messages between people and groups at different levels within the organization, in order to achieve both individual and common goals" [4]. Within the organizational communication, the primary role belongs to managerial communication which fulfills the role of an activator, having a direct and indirect impact on the organizational evolution. This is visible in all the activities of the organization, impacting immediately the results obtained and the quality and efficiency of the management. For that all, managerial communication is an important tool when trying to implement organizational change, being essential for the gradual preparation of change acceptance and for the development of a favorable attitude in this respect thus, significantly improving the likelihood of success for this implementation. Managerial communication is a complex process of interaction that has at the core the feedback and aims to coordinate individual efforts in a synergistic manner. Based on the compliance of the norms imposed by the managerial and organizational culture and the politics of each specific organization, managerial communication is a tool which the manager uses in the interaction with the environment to increase the individual and organizational performances. Properly applied management is the main source of economic efficiency, and the way communication flows between the manager and their subordinates stimulates the organizational processes, motivation and, at the same time, lays at the basis of a positive organizational climate. The manager’s functions to organize, forecast, coordinate, motivate, control and evaluate the activity require constant communication with those inside and outside the organization.

201 THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

References:

[1] https://www.etymonline.com/word/communication [2] Chişu V.A., Manualul specialistului în resurse umane (Human Resources Specialist Manual), IRECSON Publishing House, Bucharest, Romania, 2002. [3] Cândea Rodica, Comunicarea managerială aplicată (Applied managerial Communication), Expert Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998. [4] Viorel Cornescu, Mihailescu Ioan, Sica Stanciu, Managementul organizașiei (Organization Managemet), ALL BECK Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p.239. [5] Putnam, L.L. and Nicotera, Anne.M. (editors), Building theories of organization. The constitutive role of communication, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, New York, 2009. [6] Nicotera Anne M (editor), Origins and Traditions of Organizational Communication, Routledge, Taylor and Francis, New York, 2019. [7] Mumby Dennis K., Kuhn Timothy R., Organizational Communication –A Critical Introduction, SAGE Publishing House 2018.

202 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

Ionuț - Claudiu POPA

Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract: The theoretical debates in the security area have undergone an extensive evolution, especially in the last 20 years. Eloquent aspects of this research were found in typical works elaborated by research specialists such as Taurek, Floyd Balzacq, and Stritzel. Based on the exploratory analysis that targeted the specialized literature in the field, but also through some case studies, the implications of the problems from the economic sphere on the security aspects involved in the air transport services were demonstrated. The costs generated by the security services at the airport, to facilitate the transfer of passengers, have seen a substantial increase in the last years, even if the investments were substantial. Through this article, we aim to devise a picture of the whole problem in the field of economic complicated, predominantly related to cost, price, and performance funding aviation security. The research area includes cost-benefit analysis, the relationships between production input prices, information flows, human factors that are involved in measuring performance, and the role of technology and risk-based security.

Key words: Air-Transport Services; Marketing; Flight Security.

1. Introduction

An important aspect that we will deal with through this article concerns allocation issues, as well as the measurement of resources that are endemic to aviation security. Also, a cost analysis will be carried out in the field of aviation security, which has been widely used in recent years. At the same time, we aim to highlight the significant financing differences based, most of the time, on the national policies of governing the security of life, as well as on the consequences of events that have marked this area. One of the fundamental problems underlying the organization of logistics in the field of aviation is the security of the flight. Here are situations regarding how to allocate resources, managing the technique, and maintaining it precociously, highlighting the best solutions to reduce the probability of an attack to an acceptable level. Aspects regarding the economic coordinates are divided into two major sectors. First, all the resources used for defense of any kind directly contribute to raising the level of economic well-being. Still, on the contrary, they reduce the level of prosperity because by spending the resources to protect us, the resources available for investments in various goods and technology are reduced. Secondly, following a precise budget allocated to the general national defense activity, the totality of the resources dedicated to aviation security represents a decrease of the resources available for the protection of objectives outside the sphere of aviation.

203 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

2. Historical landmarks in the development of aviation security

At the same time, the problem of allocating resources is difficult, as this is one of the strategic decisions; the risk generated by security cannot be compared with problems caused by natural disasters. By allocating consistently higher amounts to avoid potential accidents, the risk of their production will not be reduced. In contrast, by increasing the resources allocated to flight security, the risk of a crisis will be reduced. This article aims to provide an overview of current issues as well as forecasting aviation security perspectives from an economic point of view. Due to the technological evolution of the last 45 years, many segments of the market, such as trade, technology have allowed the creation of the favored environment to create an era of globalization. Q in the standard of living of its people, entities, and countries of the EU become interconnected. In total, this on rioadă aviation has evolved from a powerful led by entities' airlines and airports operated by the state to a global industry much higher after boosting competitiveness. This is created through private airline companies and airports that compete with public counterparts and various hybrid organizations, each having different forms of management and policies. In the last decades, the evolution of the number of passengers who chose the flight to travel has undergone an extensive evolution, and the current forecasts claim that this will continue in the " century of speed." If at the beginning of the 70s, around 500 million passengers were transported globally, in 2000, their number reached 1.5 billion, and in 2015 more than 3 billion (Eurostat, 2018). With this broad expansion, the number of security incidents and terrorist attacks on civil aviation has increased. Throughout this period, there have been ongoing security threats to air travel. According to ( Rand Database of Worldwide Terror incidents ) most often, we encounter threats followed by the hijacking of airplanes, especially in the beginning 70s bomb attacks have become a severe threat of years, and 80 managed to remain one of the main problems today. Thus, the data capture the way security has evolved in the field of aviation, following the direct involvement of the big players in the area, as well as the participation of the government authorities. Most of the time, the attackers carefully watch how the authorities create strategies to prevent attacks and adapt their actions to overcome and exploit a possible breach. Analyzing from the total number of attacks globally, there is a dramatic decrease. If in the 1970s, they exceeded 100, in the first decade of the 21st century, their number became of the order of the tens (21). Between 1970-1990 aviation security followed an upward trend and at the same time very expensive In order to be able to provide safe air services, the information services , entities providing security services, airport personnel specially trained for such actions were involved in this area and not last but not least, investments in state-of-the-art technology equipment, capable of Detect bombs in passengers' luggage, weapons or any other prohibited equipment. Until the 1990s aviation security responded and evolved into a complex (and expensive) system that combined intelligence agencies, airport security personnel, and investments in scanning equipment to detect bombs, weapons, and prohibited objects, in the 1990s, the total number of casualties from all terrorist attacks in aircraft dropped to

204 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

160. Still, the following decade will be definitively defined for the 2938 deaths resulting from the September 11, 2001, New York and Washington attacks. Excluding the 9-11 attacks, there were only 94 victims worldwide as a result of the terrorist attacks inside the aircraft from 2000 to 2009. September 11, 2001, was a significant moment in recent history in terms of security policies and beyond. This eve meet is listed as being the most significant and most shocking meeting point with a terrorist group. By diverting civilian aircraft, it has been demonstrated how they can be used as weapons of mass destruction. The way the attackers were perceived contributed to the installation of a state of mass panic. Since 2001, governments have begun extensive actions to create organizations to implement new security systems at airports, investing heavily in new technologies, additional staff training, and highlighting potential security breaches. It has several challenges. One of the most critical concerns the maintenance of the time a passenger spends at the airport, given that the new security policies were much more complex, and their duration was considerably increased. Passengers were forced to bear the new ticket prices, which included security investments and to get used to how they were put into practice. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the European Union has initiated extensive procedures for legislative changes to prevent and stop terrorist actions. They placed terrorism at the top of security threats, a list of terrorist organizations was drawn up, the concept of terrorism became generally accepted, and plans were devised to combat terrorist actions. (European Union, 2008) . The tragic events of September 11 brought to the attention the safety of transport from the world authorities at the passenger level. Still, October 2010 Events involving the finding of two bomb packages in the UK and Dubai, originating in Yemen and destined for two synagogues in the US, have shown to the world authorities that freight and postal security should also be a concern. There have also been improved policies on immigration, creating new and Instruments legislation aimed at deterring terrorist financing and strengthen the air (Adela Gooch, 2002). Even so, the events in Madrid on March 11, 2004, could not be prevented, and one of the worst terrorist attacks in post-war history in Europe took place. Analyzing from a military point of view, countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg have proposed a series of seven initiatives aimed at strengthening the military actions of the other Member States of the European Union, as well as creating a rapid response operational capability built on the structure of a brigade. Franco-German is already existing. In the strictly military field, the four states have proposed a number of seven concrete initiatives aimed at deepening the naval integration of the Member States of the Union: the creation of a European rapid response capability, available for EU, NATO or EU-led operations under UN auspices, whose core will be made up of the existing Franco- German brigade, which will integrate the Belgian commandos and the Luxembourg recognition elements; the establishment, until June 2004, of a European command for strategic air transport and, in the long term, of a unit for strategic air transport, placed under his control (taking into account the possibility of establishing by the interested states a standard command for strategic transport - maritime, air and land); the creation of a European unit for protection against chemical, biological or nuclear attacks (NBC); creation of a European system for humanitarian disaster assistance (EUFAST - European Union First Aid and Support Team); setting up European training centers for air force pilots, A400M strategic transport aircraft crews, helicopters and sea fleets; the creation, until the summer of 2004, in Tervuren, a suburb of Brussels, of a center for the planning

205 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

and operational control of EU missions carried out without appeal to capacity (Adrian Pop, 2004) . In Romania, the main aim in the aeronautical security assurance is to generate effective internal control, meant to create a risk management and thus obtain a reasonable assurance that all the security objectives will be respected and that the activities related to the realization of the object of airport activity is carried out under appropriate conditions of safety and security, while respecting the requirements imposed by applicable standards (PNSA, 2012). The Ministry of Transport, through the General Directorate of Civil Aviation (PNSA, 2012), has started the activities related to the implementation of regulations in the field of civil airport security. The Romanian Civil Aeronautical Authority is the entity delegated by the authority to ensure the application of the public aeronautical rules in our country as well as the supervision of their implementation by the legal and natural persons, Romanian or from abroad , who provide services or products for the civil aviation industry in Romania, performing thus the function of security oversight in the field of civil aviation.

3. The cost of flight security

Today, the security environment is unpredictable and characterized by an instability widely accepted that in a system of complexity at IU aeronautical held a vital area is challenging to talk about security in absolute terms. Policymakers in the security and safety of its aviation have to prove efficiency and accountability in resource allocation (Elias, 2010). Analyzing from some insignificant changes, the monetary costs to the current aviation security system will reach unsustainable levels in the next two decades. The main argument that supports the previous opinion refers to the number of their air passengers and of the goods transported that follow an upward trend. As a percentage, specialists' estimates point to an increase in the number of passengers with an average annual rate of between 4, 2, and 4.7% by 2033. By 2030, an estimated 6 billion passengers (approximately 80%) From the current population of the Earth) will benefit from security measures, thus increasing ongoing costs. As far as the costs generated security Macario et al. (2012) confirmed that at this moment, there is a great difficulty in retrieving information on this topic. The reasons are different, but mostly because of confidentiality. Security costs include screening equipment, training of personnel, and ensuring the perimeters around the facilities, auditing and validating the regulated entities, and, last but not least, investments within a sometimes vague framework. The same authors presented the average cost figures for screening the air transport cost:

Installation X-ray: 240 000 EUR; Explosive Detection System (EDS): 50,000; EUR Human cost: 17-25 EUR / hour

To calculate costs, we will use a generalized cost function, taking into account fixed costs for equipment and operating hours. Given that all screening equipment has a life span of 4 years, the fixed price for each equipment will be considered the installation cost distributed per year.

206 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

Total annual cost = Equipment cost + Human cost ;

Human cost = total number of employees x Human cost/hour x number of days worked ;

At the request of the European Commission, it was found that at the level of 2002, the total European expenditure on aviation security (for 18 Member States at that time) amounted to EUR 2, 8 billion (about USD 3 billion). We estimate that total expenditure on aviation security at European airports more than doubled in under 10 years, reaching 5 , 7 billion (7.6 billion USD) in 2011.5 A complete picture of the trend in aviation security costs available for the USA and Canada. A comparative analysis between the financing of the security of the bloc of the countries of the European Union and the funding of the American government of the Transport Security Agency (TSA), shows a considerable difference , even though in the case of the two costs they have increased significantly since the establishment, since 2, 2 billion in 2002 to nearly $ 8 billion in 2013 . Comparing the US with Canada, there is a considerably higher financial allocation for the US, which is because the number of US air passengers (relative to the population) is much higher than in Canada. The reflected peak of expenditures for 2009 reflects different responses to the financial crisis and recession in the two countries. While passenger volume decreased in both Canada and the US (reducing aviation security fee revenue), expenses for each passenger analyzed increased in the United States but fell in Canada. Part of the explanation lies in the differences in the financing of aviation security in the two countries. In order to solve problems related to high financial values to which s to come with investments in aviation security services have developed public-private partnerships between local authorities and transport companies: • Coordination of opening hours with the needs of the airlines. • The delivery of the pen away from reducing the need for the crew (Gustavsson 2 011) describes some of the works carried out by LFV, Sweden, to reduce the operating costs of the airport, maintaining at the same time the necessary security level. • Reduce the need for expensive ground navigation systems to implementing systems such as space-based augmentation systems that support existing GNSS signals. He is called WAAS systems in America North and EGNOS in Europe ( Schaad 2011 ) Briefcase study on this topic. • Sharing marketing costs with local stakeholders, e.g., the tourism industry and local chambers of commerce. If marketing efforts increase traffic, then the fees required for each passenger will be reduced ( Halpern, 2010 ). The cost-benefit analyses associated with the problems related to the risk of terrorism in aviation have failed to advance beyond several limitations, such as the difficulty of estimating the threat of terrorism and the security environment (Ezell et al., 2010). If we look at the costs, especially those for reducing the risk of terrorist attacks, they can be relatively easily quantified; the benefits, expressed by decreasing the probability of successful attacks and diminishing the consequences, become difficult to assess in quantitative terms. To obtain a relevant image of the cost-effective analysis used to explain the reasoning of the non -aeronautical activities (commercial activities, rents for decision spaces, it must use both qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as data from experts. The cost-benefit approach does not offer unique answers, but it delimits the decision-making space of the possible security choices under certain conditions: The revenues of the airports are divided into two categories: aeronautics (results from the

207 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

operation of the aircraft and the processing of their cargo) and n and land related to the airport. In contrast to revenues, the structure of operating costs is more complicated, due to the lack of a standardized reporting system and the different weighting of the three major categories of costs: labor, capital, and other charges (outsourced services, outsourced services). They are consulting, utilities, travel, and repairs, etc.).

4. Conclusion

In the last century, around the world to change at a place where people have traveling international without the need of a passport, and a security screen minimum or one is allocated an amount of more and more productive resources, transport security, and aviation security, in particular. Besides, screening security against the potential for acts of terrorism or other forms of violence against citizens has become part of our daily lives. The continuing need to increase the effectiveness of combating aviation terrorism requires the development of new procedural and technological solutions in all areas of air transport security. Although there have been many problems in the process of improving air transport security, there is no doubt that some progress significant has been achieved, what you do as hijacking aircraft is now much more complicated than in the past. Furthermore, research centers and security system manufacturers continue to work intensively on new screening technologies and new methods for the rapid detection of hidden explosives. Improving the organization of the air transport security system, including increasing the effectiveness of aviation counter-terrorism, will require changes in the methods and modalities of the use of forces and measures, changes in operating procedures, as well as changes in legislation. The above statement suggests that the content of this paper is not yet a complete and exhaustive solution to the problem of effectively combating air terrorism and, therefore, the above issues require further research — difficult drunkenness, which still needs to be addressed. However, there are many avenues for research, and we hope that this issue will lead to new initiatives and discussions on this critical topic.

References:

[1]. Cioacă, C., Boșcoianu, M., 2011., An Introduction in the Risk Modeling of Aviation Security Systems, WSEAS - Mathematics and Computers in Biology, Business and Acoustics, Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania; [2]. Crowe, B., 2001., Europe's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy After Iraq, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 79, No. 3 (May, 2003), pp. 533-546; [3]. Elias, B., 2010., Security Aviation and Airports: US Policy and Strategy in the Age of Global Terrorism, CRC Press Publishing, New York; [4]. Ezell, B.C., (2007) “Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM).” Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis 27 3 (2007): 571-83; [5]. Gustavsson, N. (2011). Remote Tower Operations. Presentation in: In R. Merkert, & G. Williams (Eds.), Proceedings from the 7th forum on Air Transport in Remoter Regions (on CD), Newquay, UK April 12-14, 2011, UK: CATRR, Cranfield University;

208 THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

[6]. Halpern, N. (2010b). The marketing of small regional airports. In G. Williams, & S. Bråthen (Eds.), Air Transport Provision in Remoter Regions. Aldershot: Ashgate; [7]. Macario, R., Vieira, J., Mano, P., Renssen, S., van, Voorde, E. van der, Pauwels, T., Domingues, S., Dawkins, R., Todd, J., European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2012. The Security of Air Cargo from Third Countries. http://dx.doi.org/10.2861/80196; [8]. Pop, A., 2003. Strategies for European integration, Bucharest: Sylvi Publishing House; [9]. Schaad, D. 2011. EGNOS and WAAS — Missing their potential in remote regions Presentation in: In R. Merkert, & G. Williams (Eds.), Proceedings from the 7th forum on Air Transport in Remoter Regions (on CD), Newquay, UK April 12-14, 2011. UK: CATRR, Cranfield University; [10]. ***, Aviation Security, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP390.html; [11]. ***, Statistics on passenger transport, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php?title=Passenger_transport_statistics/en&oldid=408276; [12]. ***, Air transport: civil aviation security http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/132/airport-civil-afety- civilAviation; [13]. ***, Annual Financial Results: US Passenger Airlines, http://airlines.org/dataset/annual-results-us-passenger-airlines/;

209 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES

Ionuț - Claudiu POPA

The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract: In a competitive and dynamic market, airline companies must focus on the influence that people, groups and structures have on the behavior within the organization, as well as on the marketing products and strategies developed by competitors. The ever-increasing competition within the global airline industry forces the entities in the field to invest more and more to obtain a satisfactory market share. Selecting the optimal business model means implementing a sustainable competitive strategy. The analysis of the European competition of air transport include certain subjects specific to South- East Europe. Air transport in Romania is growing much faster compared to the maritime and land transport sectors. There is a significant structural change in the aviation market, due to the substantial increase in the share of low-cost carriers in scheduled international traffic. Through this article, a comparative study was carried out, between the main elements of the organizational behavior of an air transport company in Romania and other entities from European space. It aims to diagnose the main problems that affect the organization's framework as well as to elaborate on potential paths of action. The research was of an exploratory type, to identify the differences that exist in the level of personnel management in the air transport companies in Romania and abroad and highlight the impact that these differences exert on the results obtained by the company (notoriety, appreciation, revenues, and profits).

Key words: organizational management personnel; air transport; financial values.

1. Introduction The air transport that appeared at the beginning of the 20th century and has a network composed of airlines, which include regular transport of passengers, post and freight not only between countries, but also between the largest cities in the world - for a short time (almost 40 years) passenger transport on international lines increased approximately 42 times. Because of this, a series of problems related to the approval of technical problems and the elaboration of laws, the transfer of technical and economic information to ensure the safety and regularity of international flights appeared. The active participants who participate in solving them are the international intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations- Up to the second world conflagration, only five such organizations were operating, but in 2000 they exceeded 50 organizations. The most authoritative and represented international air transport organization International Civil Aviation Organization (OIAC) - International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) specialized UN agency, headquartered in Montreal, whose activity was started in 1947.

210 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES

2. Implications of the personnel management in airline companies

The air transport industry is one of the primary, strategic sectors of the economy of any country. The human capital industry has its own characteristics, namely the general ones: - human capital in the air transport sector should be used exclusively for air transport and this will contribute to increasing the productivity of work and the production of the respective companies, in order to improve the level of safety of aviation; - the use of human capital will, in the future, lead to an increase in the earnings (revenues) of the employees in this field; - Increasing the incomes and developing all the physical and professional skills of the employees in the field of air transport will contribute to increase their interest and investments in human capital; - the efficient human capital management system in the area of air transport is an essential element in the strategic management process of the human capital of the air transport companies The specific characteristics of the human capital of the airlines are as follows: - the availability of international standards for the certification of aeronautical personnel; - the need to maintain a high level of qualification, which is associated with working conditions; - strict requirements for the physical, moral and psychological state of the aeronautical personnel; - training / training and professional qualification at a high level in the simulation centers for pilots, according to the graph; - high level of risk for the aeronautical and administrative personnel, of management, due to the influence of the human factor and the need to comply with international aviation safety standards. We must recognize the uniqueness of human capital in air transport. Indeed, aeronautical personnel can only be used by air transport companies. The investments in human capital realized in the efficient system of strategic management of the human capital in the air transport companies will lead to an increase in future incomes. Management actions should present a leading element in safety and send a message about the appropriate level of commitment to safety and health. This will underline the relative importance of the attitudes and behaviors of management perceived within climate safety, concerning other functions such as production, selection, discipline, planning. The benefits of implementing a safety culture refer to management's commitment to establishing, maintaining, and developing robust safety; the culture will provide significant financial, operational, prognostic, and strategic planning benefits, allowing the organization to contain both costs and exploit new opportunities effectively. These benefits include enhancing elements such as: Profitability. There is considerable evidence that they are the safest companies that also deal with safety, among the most profitable (Hudson, 2001). Efficiency. Improving security as a result of the safety culture allows a company to implement resources more efficiently. Flexibility. An organization, which uses its safety culture to manage risks, can safely take risks that others do not dare to take. Adaptability. Companies, which capitalize on the learning part of their safety culture, can reconfigure themselves in the face of challenges that cause risks. Evidence shows that high-reliability organizations can reconfigure at high-speed operations or certain types of hazards (Reason, 1997). Continuity. Three elements are vital for driving the safety engine of a company, all the vision of the top managers: commitment, competence, and knowledge - the three C. However, the turnover of management is a fact of life. So how does a company maintain its commitment to safety in terms of staff turnover, volatile market forces, and economic reality? The reason suggests that the culture of safety is at stake here! Redundant systems,

211 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES which are not secure, allow higher tolerance for failure and, in turn, enable and promote entrepreneurship and risk-taking. Predictability. A culture of safety with advanced systems of advancement focused on solutions rather than mistakes and the future and not the past, will turn the unknown into the known and thus reveal to the top leadership the path to new opportunities. The human capital of the state-owned air transport companies depends on the decisions of the world aeronautical authorities. Critical areas for human capital development were taken into consideration at the GAHC Summit of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in 2011. One of these areas discussed was the involvement of the staff through the maximum use of the technologies. In this sense, we can observe the direct impact of the information society on the human capital of air transport companies. International aviation safety standards are directly connected with the development of information technologies. The aeronautical and administrative personnel of the aviation companies have a high-risk job due to the combination of the human factor and the information technologies with an impact on the development. The airline industry and governments are working together to improve safety by ensuring compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, by increasing participation in audit programs, combating the human factor and by encouraging the active exchange of information in the field of security. According to the results of the audit performed by the ICAO's Universal Security Surveillance Audit Program (USOAP), approximately 41% of the ICAO Recommended Standards and Practices (SARP) have not been implemented globally. Despite this, a significant number of accidents could be prevented by using the latest technologies and approach procedures. Modern aircraft have on-board systems that can exploit new technologies, such as Performance-Based Navigation (PBN). PBN can provide safety benefits by providing navigation systems with vertical guidance and in places where such guidance does not exist. The error of piloting in the handling of the aircraft is a factor that contributes to 20% of the accidents. Therefore, the IATA Training and Qualification Initiative (ITQI) has developed several critical training programs for pilots and maintenance technicians. Another problem for the human capital in the air transport industry is the fatigue of the crew. Its diminution is an essential element not only in the management of security but also in the management of human capital. IATA and ICAO determine the standardization process of Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS). Most Civil Aviation Authorities have adopted it. IATA has provided a series of regional FRMS workshops to ensure the implementation of these essential safety systems.

The evolution of air transport in Romania since 1990. This first moment in recent post-communist history has favored the liberalization of transport activities in Romania. There were exceptions to many segments of the economy that the state considered to be of strategic interest, such as the railways, the rest were reformed, primarily from the perspective of ownership. State policies were no longer able to influence the distribution of certain types of goods and passengers, favoring specific transports as priority modes. The first result of the involvement of specific sub-sectors was reflected in the development of these chaotic, and sometimes totally inefficient. The best example, in this regard, is that of increasing the intensities of road traffic. Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, there was an alarming increase in cars, with a third compared to 1990, mainly due to private car purchases. They were considering most of the adverse effects caused by the pollutant emissions of the vehicle on the environment and human health. Therefore, in a city like Bucharest, the levels of pollutants due to car traffic, such as carbon monoxide or lead,

212 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES decrease from two to 5 years, the life expectancy of the inhabitants, compared to the national average, much lower. In its turn, the European Union. Analyzing compared to air traffic, this is much lower than the actual market demand. There were multiple causes: lack of a coherent strategy for the development of air transport at the national level, inadequate flexibility of the national air transport company (TAROM), reduced investments in airport infrastructure, etc. 2005 was the first moment when some low-cost airline operators entered emerging markets in south-east Europe, including Romania. Analyzing from the point of view of historical landmarks, TAROM-S.C ROMANIAN AIR TRANSPORT S.A represents the oldest air entity in Romania. The company headquarters is at Henri Coandă International Airport. It is currently the second airline company in Romania, analyzing the number of international destinations in terms of fleet and passengers occupying the third position. Immediately after the Second World War, in 1945, when the Soviet Union expanded its influence over Eastern Europe, a new reorganization replaced LARES with TARS (Romanian-Soviet Air Transport), a company jointly owned by the governments of Romania and the Union. Soviet. The internal operations were started from Bucharest (Baneasa Airport) on February 1, 1946, at which time all the air services and aircraft from LARES (Romanian Airlines Operated by the State) were transferred to the new TARS entity. A few years after it was launched, TAROM has already become operational in almost all countries in the European area. 1966 was a landmark year for Tarom when the first flight across the Atlantic was made. Since 1974 the flight to Sydney via Calcutta has become a reality, with regular flights to destinations such as New York and Beijing. With a figure of almost 3 million passengers in 2018 (Tarom, 2019), the only company with state capital in Romania, as follows:  The state owns 96.95% of shares through the Ministry of Transport;  Henri Coandă Bucharest International Airport  owns 1.60% shares;  ROMATSA R.A  owns 1.36% of shares;  The Financial Investment Company "Muntenia holds 0.09% shares";  Tarom offers on the Romanian market, but also international air transport services. It flies to Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Moldova, Holland, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Egypt, Tunisia, Cyprus, Israel. Analyzing from a competition point of view, the market on which Tarom operates is that of air transport services. The market segments are the market for commercial air transport services and air passenger transport. Direct competitors in the local market are Blue Air and Wizz Air, entities that operate in the low-cost segment. The year 2016 was the time when due to the faulty management, manifested a series of consecutive years, Tarom was outpaced on the local market by Blue Air, the operator that managed to transport no less than 3.2 million passengers (Blue Air, 2016). Following the profit situation of the last 15 years, within Tarom, we notice a fluctuating situation, which had disastrous connotations at the end of 2010, when the company recorded a profitability rate of -332 million lei. Given that it is an entity that belongs to the Romanian state, it has allocated amounts from the Ministry of Transport budget, although these amounts could be found in large investment projects. Beginning in 2007, the drop in profit reached an all-time high in 2010, a time severely affected by the global crisis, when due to the recession, Tarom was forced to give

213 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES up racing to the American continent and not only, while also reducing the investment rate with the endowment and with the maintenance.

Fig.1 Evolution of profit-loss TAROM

Tarom has reached various problematic situations, which have led to the decrease of the market share, for various reasons, among which we list: • Much lower prices from direct competitors such as Blue Air, Wizz Air. If the competition policies were adapted to the current market, Tarom had some general managers, with different optics and top management teams. For example, Wizz Air, the largest low-cost carrier in Central and Eastern Europe, is investing in human capital development. The Wizz Air team, onboard and the ground, share the same passion for their business. Wizz Air uses high-level ethical standards supported by a team / player-by-team approach. Today, this company has dedicated staff from different countries throughout Europe, including France, Hungary, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Holland, Norway, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, etc. The professionalism of the Wizz Air team is ensured by the advanced training, according to the IATA and ICAO requirements (WizzAir, 2019). Wizz Air currently has no more than 1600 employees, with almost 500 fewer than Tarom. For this reason, placed with the number of flights operated and turnover, it was appreciated that a high number of employees is not a benchmark of productivity. At the same time, it is clear from the document that underlies the personnel management that it is prepared to meet at a minimum level the internationally regulated requirements (Tarom, 2016). • Problems related to the interactions with passengers within companies are a popular topic in all entities that provide air transport services. Here the problems start from the issuing of tickets, the intervals during which the checkin is carried out, the delays of the aircraft and not last but not least the luggage-related dissatisfaction (their lost, lost or stolen). The only entity mentioned above that has a significantly different policy from the others is WizzAir, which decided in 2017 to charge additional luggage over a certain weight, which has created widespread dissatisfaction on the part of passengers.

214 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES

• Maintenance. The technical problems in the air transport industry are transposed by delays, dissatisfied passengers, additional costs. From this point of view, comparing Tarom and WizzAir comparatively, we notice a wide difference. While the company headquartered in Budapest has three regional maintenance centers, operated through a Lufthansa maintenance contract, Tarom is carrying out preventive remedies, on time, through the company's Technical Directorate. A relevant aspect in this analysis relates to the aircraft used, as the higher the number of flight hours, the higher the costs incurred. • The management. If in the companies with which Tarom was compared, the capital is private, it can be noticed how the capital of the emblematic entity in Romania is majority-owned by the state. Analyzing the good practice aspects resulting from this comparison, as well as the current turnover, some passengers transported, fleet, current incomes, we notice how, within the private entities, the differences have created a favorable framework for faster evolution and wide expansion characteristics. • Fleet. From the fleet, the two entities differ exponentially: -Tarom - 27 aircraft (Tarom, 2019); -WizzAir- 100 aircraft (WizzAir, 2019); -Blueair-23 aircraft (Blueair, 2019) An important aspect to note outside the fleet that each airline owns is the number of aircraft ordered. It is between 50-100 for the entities, as mentioned above. These fleet upgrades aim to improve flight conditions, reduce costs, use smaller aircraft for inland flights, but also protect the environment. In an increasingly fierce competition, companies such as Tarom should adapt their policies so that they can become a profitable entity and have the ability to maintain this feature. By comparative analysis, Tarom can be "reinvented" by: • Reorganization from personnel structures, because such a large number is not always eloquent in market performance; Comparatively, Tarom is the employer with no less than 2000 employees, while the entity comparable to it, BlueAir has just over 1200 employees. With approximately 3600 employees, WizzAir ranks first in this ranking, but it must be borne in mind that this entity has nearly four times as many aircraft to be operated and maintained in operation; • Creating current loyalty programs that can offer real benefits to passengers; • reorganization of the maintenance system and its modernization; • adapting the options in the entertainment sphere from the operated aircraft (eg, wireless); • the creation of partnerships meant to offer promotion for Romania's tourist objectives; • rethinking marketing strategies by implementing new policies; • providing quality-related services;

3. Conclusion The period after the liberalization of the air transport sector as well as at the beginning of the last decade, represented by low-cost carriers, has placed on the market entities totally different from those until then, ie those airlines that make flights with a much lower price than the average, eliminating a large part of secondary services. Aimed at passengers. In order to highlight these new players in the air transport sector, they use expressions that are translated, meaning without the bible, ie, the absence of those services that are not imperiously needed. Analyzing the cost per passenger per kilometer offered, we can deduce that low-cost entities are trying to purchase a passenger with a lower cost volume than other traditional companies, which in many cases operate on the same courses, but often serve different airports.

215 THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES

Airlines are constantly changing, and operators in the transport market who are unable to keep up with technological advances and new passenger attraction policies are lagging. The policies that govern the companies are more important than ever, and in the case of Tarom, they managed to be reflected directly in the value of the profit. It was noted that with the changes brought by a new manager, with current views, profits began to grow. The business model of the companies, even in the case of those with low tariffs and complete services, showed apparent differences at the commercial, technical, and organizational levels. In most cases from the very low-cost model, many companies use different positioning levers and are moving towards hybrid models and middle positioning solutions between the two extremes: correct real low cost and complete services. Following future market share scenarios, companies such as WizzAir will need to maintain the competitive advantage they have created. If in some cases the flight can be supplemented by some additional services subject to a charge (internet, entertainment onboard, more seats for the passengers on the back of the traveling aircraft), the imperative is always to reduce the costs of each side (baggage hand-held only for transport, aircraft with less comfortable seats, elimination of the second pilot for short courses). This is the only way a company can be fair to passengers, avoiding using hidden aspects, as well as other aspects that passengers do not notice and for which the value, in some cases, can exceed the value of the flight ticket.

References: (Times New Roman 14 Bold) [1]. Castells, M., 1996. The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Vol. I. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, Gianasso, G. Human Capital opportunities and challenges in aviation. Human Capital Summit. Global Aviation. Singapore [2]. Chesbrough, H., & Rosenbloom, R. S. (2002). The role of the business model in capturing value from innovation: evidence from Xerox Corporation's technology spin‐off companies. Industrial and corporate change, 11(3), 529-555. [3]. Fistung F.D., 2008,.The sustainable transportation – a viable evolution perspective, C.I.D.E., Bucharest, p. 324 [4]. Hudson, P., .2001. Safety culture: the ultimate goal. Flight Safety Australia, 5(5), 29-31. [5]. Reason, J. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, ISBN 1 84014 104 2. [6]. Osterwalder, A., & Pigneur, Y. 2010. Business model generation: a handbook for visionaries, game changers, and challengers. John Wiley & Sons. [7]. ***, IATA- International air transport association. Annual Review 2012. [accesat 27 iulie 2013]. Disponibil: http://www.iata.org/about/Documents/annual-review- 2012.pdf [8]. ***,2019, Tarom, https://www.tarom.ro/despre-noi/noutati-si-presa/comunicate-de- presa; [9]. ***2019, Blue Air, https://www.blueairweb.com/ro/ro/Blue-Air-este-cea-mai- mare-companie-aeriana-romaneasca/ [10]. ***2019, WizzAir, https://wizzair.com/en-gb/information-and- services/about-us/company-information [11]. ***2016, Tarom, https://www.tarom.ro/sites/default/files/rof_2016.07.12_hca-12.pdf [12]. ***2019, Tarom, https://www.tarom.ro/despre-noi/compania-tarom/flota

216 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY

Assoc.Prof. Aurelian RAȚIU PhD.

”Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Faculty of Military Sciences, Sibiu, Romania

Abstract: The advancements in the field of security, both nationally and regionally, exacerbate the dynamic, complex and fluid character of the vulnerabilities, risks and threats that directly impact the functionality of national security institutions. The specificity of the application of the risk analysis within national security organizations is characterized by the following aspects: timely adaptation to the historical context and to the requirements of the security environment, the efficient achievement of the organizational objectives and the assurance of a permanent internal organizational control. Thus, an analysis regarding the need to use the risk management mechanisms in the case of institutions in the field of national security is justified. The present paper discusses ways to select the optimal mechanisms specific to security risk management.

Key words: security institutions; risks and threats; security environment; risk assessment; risk management; mechanisms of security risk management.

1. Introduction Security risks and threats are present in all areas of social life, and they generate effects that cannot always be anticipated and counteracted. The multitude of risks and threats in the field of security, such as hybrid aggression, terrorism, armed conflict, climate change, economic and energy resources crises affect the security of states and citizens. In this context, permanent security must be achieved, to a large extent, with the help of an efficient security risk management process.

2. Theoretical-Methodological Considerations The term risk has gained lately general connotations that allowed it to extend to various areas of modern life. As the methods of scientific risk assessment have become more and more conclusive, organizations have paid more attention to conducting risk analyzes. The research hypothesis was the following: risk management in the military organization is applied to create added value to the decision-making process. The mechanisms and methods of risk analysis are different, and the success of their application can only be determined in the light of the situational context in which the respective assessment was carried out. Critical analysis was the method by which we tried to distinguish by valid arguments what is positive, realistic and efficient from what may be wrong and harmful in approaching risk management mechanisms, in relation to the available resources, in the attempt to reach the security objectives. The analysis was mainly theoretical, based on logical argumentation, thus trying to highlight the essence of the studied phenomena, to present the reality, and to come up with

217 ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY pertinent ideas and conclusions in order to achieve efficient security risk management.

3. Risk management applied by security organization The literature in the field defines risk management as the process of identifying, evaluating, planning and controlling the various risks that endanger the good functioning of the organization. According to some authors [1], risk management means establishing which risks should be avoided and which risks should be accepted as such. Every activity is accompanied by some risks, but some should be avoided, some controlled, and others allowed to manifest. What makes things much more difficult is that there are no strict rules to determine what those risks are. Also, the risk management plan in one organization, regardless of how good and efficient it may be, cannot be transposed into another organization as such. Any plan will have to be adapted to the organization and field of activity. Risk management, along with strategic and operational management (as it can be seen in figure 1) is the main function of any organization and consists of ”all those activities that facilitate the quickest and most direct fulfillment of the organization mission”[2].

Fig.1 The model of strategic, operational and risk management Thus, risk management can include the methods and means by which one can manage the manifestation of risk factors and uncertainty, in order to achieve the objectives of the organization. But one should not forget another highly important aspect contributing to objectives achievement, namely resources (be they human, material, financial, energetic, informational and IT), like in figure 2.

Fig.2 Involvement of resources in risk management activity

218 ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY

Risk management is a ”tool” of the manager, or of the commander, in the case of military organizations, which he uses in the decision-making process to increase the degree of opportunity and the efficiency of the organization processes. Risk management is a central part of the strategic management of any organization. It is the process by which organizations methodically approach the risks associated with specific activities, in order to obtain a benefit for each field of activity, but also for the organization as a whole. Furthermore, the risk management process focuses on identifying and treating risks. This process aims to increase the chances of success and reduce as much as possible the uncertainty and the possibility of failure. Its objective is to create added value to all the activities of the organization. Risk management is a cyclical process from which lessons learned can be extracted and which is carried out during a mission, activity or project; according to some authors, it involves five stages:  “Defining the purposes and the context of risk management;  Risk determination (identification, description, estimation);  Risk analysis (quantitative and qualitative);  Risk assessment;  Risk treatment;  Risk monitoring”[3]. According to another approach, risk management is ”a continuous process, based on processes, methods and tools for risk management that provide a rigorous environment for a proactive decision-making process, by: - Continuously assessing risks; - Identifying risks to be considered a priority; - Implementing strategies to manage and diminish risks; - Managing security risks by a model tailored to organization requirements”[4]. Analyzing this approach, we can conclude that risk management mechanisms are applied to the stages referring to risk assessment and treatment. Risk assessment comes as a process subsequent to risk determination and analysis and is done by taking into account the potential degree of loss and the probability of risk. Basically, the aim is to compare the risk with the risk criteria of the organization in order to establish the importance of the risk. At this stage, it is necessary to decide which of the risks analyzed should be addressed and which do not, and to establish the priorities and treatment mechanisms. The decisions taken are usually based on the level of risk but one can also take into consideration specific aspects, which could concern: the consequences of the risk, the impact of events/incidents that may occur simultaneously, the probability of occurrence. The assessment process must be designed in such a way as to provide information that enables decision makers to achieve a risk hierarchy. Risk treatment is the process of selecting and implementing the appropriate measures to mitigate risks. The measures taken to treat security risks can include:  Avoiding/eliminating risks (it means the non-execution of an activity which generates major losses, this leading to the loss of the possibility of obtaining the potential benefits from the respective activity);  Taking risks (the level of risks is so low that the damage can be paid for when the event occurs);  Mitigating risks (the risks which cannot be accepted/taken will be reduced by appropriate measures to a level that be accepted/taken);

219 ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY

 Limitation of risks (should the security event occur, there will be implemented the necessary measures and procedures to mitigate the consequences);  Transferring risks (transferring risks to a specialized institution which obviously has high level competences in controlling risks, transferring resources/values, renting services/values/resources)[5]. Experts from around the world unanimously agree that there are no fully secure systems. However, security mechanisms can provide some protection/security, but their effectiveness will depend on the decisions of the organization management. The new realities prove, therefore, that mechanisms are needed to provide efficient risk management.

4. Applying assessment mechanisms for risks targeting national security Security risk management is a systematic application of management mechanisms, procedures and practices to establish a context, identify, analyze, evaluate, treat, monitor and inform about security risks. Within security/military structures, risk assessment creates a more accurate picture of the vulnerability of these bodies, and risk management mechanisms offer solutions to reduce the unwanted effects to levels acceptable to institutional interests and objectives. The main objective of this assessment is to obtain a better understanding of the risk in order to choose the best solutions for its management. Risk assessments do not provide sensational elements, but they constantly bring to the attention of decision-makers a diverse and realistic issue, often quantifiable and measurable, which allows them to make the most appropriate decisions to reach the proposed objectives. Appropriate mechanisms for reducing the assessed risks at an acceptable level should also be identified and selected based on the cost/benefit ratio. The already existing and designed mechanisms must be taken into consideration in the selection process, in order to avoid duplication of effort. To this end, a check must be carried out to ensure that existing or designed mechanisms work. Also, an existing mechanism may not be justified for a long time and needs to be removed, replaced with a more appropriate one or kept for cost reasons. The vulnerabilities associated with threats indicate whether additional mechanisms are needed and what form they should take. When selecting mechanisms, it is advantageous to identify their functions from the point of view of protection/speed of response, deviations from the standard and the time required to return to normal in case of incidents. Many protective mechanisms can serve multiple functions, so choosing them is more efficient financially. One of the modern principles is the reduction of security risks through mechanisms that offer ”defense in depth”[6] by integrating several functions such as:  Avoidance (avoiding or preventing an unwanted event from occurring);  Protection (defending informational goods from adverse events);  Detection (identifying the occasion of an unwanted event);  Response (reaction for or against an adverse event);  Restoration (restoration of the integrity and availability of resources at the initial point). Security domains are multiple and different, depending on the level at which we refer to. Political, military, economic, social, cultural and ecological dimension, in the view of the representatives of the Copenhagen School, regarding national/international security; if we refer to the field of information security, we can mention areas such as: security

220 ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY policy, organization and security management, personnel, physical security, communications and informatics, operations management, access control, system development and maintenance etc. The mechanisms are selected in the context of risks to provide security, functionality and trust. The selection of the mechanisms should be a parallel between the operational (non- technical) and the technical ones. Operational security mechanisms include physical, personnel, administrative or procedural mechanisms. Among the mechanisms in the field of information security we can mention:  Physical security. Physical security mechanisms include: physical protection/security (with personnel), access to areas, buildings and rooms, closing/opening of security containers, fire prevention and extinguishing systems, etc. ;  Personnel security covers the checks on the hiring (recruitment) of personnel, the supervision of the personnel and the awareness programs on information security as well as periodic revalidation;  Procedural security can include areas not covered by legislation and by departmental normative acts, materializing in operational security procedures, approval procedures, authorization and accreditation of personnel and information systems, as well as procedures for managing security incidents;  Technical security consists of hardware and software security, as well as of mechanisms of protecting communications through state cipher or other cryptographic systems. This includes: identification and authentication, access control requirements, control and audit of log files, message authentication, communications encryption, use of digital signature, network status monitoring, antivirus programs. Therefore, the factors to be considered in selecting security mechanisms could be: easy use of the protection and security mechanisms, transparency for users, proximity of the mechanism to the value to be protected, assistance offered to users for carrying out activities, cost of the mechanism, compatibility with the existing mechanisms, the relative power of the mechanisms, the protection profile and the degree to which evaluation is achieved, types of functions that it can perform (protection, avoidance, detection, response, restoration). Another important aspect to consider when selecting the mechanism is the security architecture, which describes how the security requirements will be met. Normally, security architecture includes one or more security domains. Thus, after risk analysis, when building security architecture the following aspects will be considered:  Relationships and interdependencies between security domains;  The impact or the implications of relationships or interdependencies that weaken security services;  Extra services or provisions necessary to correct, control or record any weakness. The architecture, as a method for selecting security mechanisms, can also be used when new systems are developed or when major changes are made to existing systems. Based on the results of risk analysis or the initial approach, the security requirements can be refined within some technical security services.

5. Conclusions The complexity of the issues related to risk management has required widespread awareness, in-depth study and enhancement of the results of scientific research on the ways and the mechanisms of ensuring the security of individuals, nations or international organizations.

221 ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY

The risk management approach in the field of national security involves the identification, detailing and evaluation of all risk factors and vulnerabilities specific to security fields - political, economic, military, social, cultural, and also to particular fields such as: information security, security of information and communications systems, industrial security - as well as analyzing the interdependence of threats, vulnerabilities and security risks specific to each domain. In the field of national/international security, there are specialized institutions with attributions in organizing and developing activities through which one can obtain, check and exploit the information necessary to know, prevent and counteract the risk factors, the specific dangers and threats. Therefore, risk management within the framework of national security is carried out closely following the established steps of this process. The results of the deliberate process are based on specific methods of collecting and processing information, on management teams’ accumulated experience to identify and carefully analyze vulnerabilities and risk factors and to develop and apply the most effective mechanisms and control measures. The constant evaluation of the operational stage, specific to the components of the security system, involves major responsibilities, assumed for long term in an integrative vision, which will target the entire strategic area of the state/alliance. The major objective of this complex analytical and organizational-functional rehabilitation process is the prevention of crises and of the proliferation of risks that could affect the balanced development of the social-economic life and the evolution of the society as a whole. Risk management must become part of the organizational culture, and for this it is necessary that security organizations follow a cyclical process of collecting, documenting, analyzing and evaluating experiences and knowledge in the field of risks, of developing treatment action plans and of monitoring the results relevant to national security.

References: [1] Bogdan Anastasiei, Aspecte ale managementului riscului în organizaţie. Teoria riscurilor şi aplicaţii, Iaşi, Alexandru Myller Publishing House, 2011, p. 4. [2] Ibidem, p. 4. [3] Bogdan-Dumitru Țigănoaia, Asigurarea securității informațiilor în organizații, Iași, Institutul European Publishing House, 2013, p. 91, also Institute of Risk Management (IRM), The Association of Insurance and Risk Manager (AIRMIC), The Public Risk Management Association (Alarm), A Risk Management Standard, 2002, p. 2. [4] Marin Ilie, Cătălin Mihalache, Managementul riscurilor în activitatea de informaţii militare. Rolul serviciului de informaţii militare prin celulele naţionale de informaţii în operaţiile multinaţionale, Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare ”Carol I”, Bucharest, Universității Naționale de Apărare ”Carol I” Publishing House, 2007, p. 263. [5] Bogdan-Dumitru Țigănoaia, Asigurarea securității informațiilor în organizații, Iași, Institutul European Publishing House, 2013, pp.100-101. [6] Valeriu Dornescu, Diminuarea riscurilor ca obiectiv principal al managementului afacerilor, (Întreprinzătorul, firma şi pieţele în spaţiul naţional, european şi global) Iaşi, Universității. „” Publishing House, 2009, pp. 122-126.

222 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

Sadi SADIYEV

Ministry of Defence International Military Cooperation Department, Baku, Azerbaijan

Abstract: One of the characteristic features of modern management is to understand the increasing role of humans. The knowledge, ability, practice, speciality and creativity of the employees are considered as a core resource leading to strategic development of an institution in the atmosphere of high dynamic of technological progress, increasing of competition and the globalising of economy

Key words: management; military management; human resours; personnel; professional psychological selection;

1. Introduction Besides financial, procurement and logistic resources, HR has crucial role in order to get the required level of ambition, goals or a desired end state. In the modern environment, almost in all countries theoretical and practical activities on HR management are more focused. One of the characteristic features of modern management is to understand the increasing role of humans. The knowledge, ability, practice, specialty and creativity of the employees are considered as a core resource leading to strategic development of an institution in the atmosphere of high dynamic of technological progress, increasing of competition and the globalising of economy. Nowadays, socio-economic process in the developed countries necessitates to have a new look through the traditional methodologies of approach to managerial systems, and managerial concept on scientific basis is required in order to fully explore the creative potential of an institution. Forming the human resource management system (HRMS) of professionals, increasing the status and role of services related to this sphere provide with successful performance of an institution. Terms like “manpower”, “labour sources”, “labour potential”, “cadres” and “personal” could be met in the research papers of scholars who conducted studies on “HRMS” (particularly in russian soviet authors). The content of these terms do not coincide with modern tendencies of science and theory of management. [1]. This is why, it is rather appropriate to use the term “Human Resources”, of which the first generation of practices was developed by Frederick Taylor in the late nineteenth century. He developed the theory of Scientific Management focusing on the efficiencies of production as well as the employees. [2]. Core distinguishing feature of HR is its character of individuality. Unlike material sources (machinery and raw materials), humans possess intellect and their participation in production process is cognitive. Since the creative ability of the human is infinitive, in human resources, there are a number of sources and reserves to increase the efficiency of actions. The human is

223 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

consciously willing to develop, to qualify their specialties, to innovate their knowledge, and to increase their professional skills. In the contemporary atmosphere, efficient development of an institution does not depend only on HR, but also it is linked to the forming, utilization and fair evaluation of the purposes to be achieved. One of the core factors of efficient performance of HRMS is confidence of the interests of an institution with its employees, existence of labour relations based on their constructive bilateral collaboration, self-management at institutional level, development of democracy, and collaboration among managerial fellows and managerial objects (employees). Perfection and formation of capability of HRMS and the creating of sustainable program for a long term as well as its realization requires appliance of strategic approaches. This final paper studies the HRM within military context based on case study on the Azerbaijan Armed Forces. The conceptual and generic issues of HRMS in the Azerbaijan Armed Forces are presented in order to give a clear picture of the HRMS.

1- Basics and purpose of system of human resource management 2- Section 1 Basics and Purpose HRMS, being a mechanism of a purposeful activity of leadership personnel as well as specialists working at its sections who provide with strategy, principles and methods of human resource policy consists of cadre planning, conducting of marketing for the personnel, defining cadre potential, personnel requirement of an institution, normalization of the number of the personnel and their registration. HRMS covers broad range in specters from the employing through the dismissal of employees (recruitment of employees, selection, interview, stimulation process, the evaluations of employees, defining the skill of personnel, motivation, management of disputes and stress, security for employees, retraining of cadres, improving the skills of personnel, etc.). HRMS specialists should better possess high professionality, independent decision-making, habits of mutual cooperation, responsibility for quality, being aware of machineries, organizing of production, creativity, etc. at their performance. There are subsystems of HRMS and social development of a staff, but the majority of workload on HRMS is executed by supervisors in the sections. A core structural section on HRMS in an organization is an HR section which is responsible for recruitment, dismissal, training of the staff [3]. HRMS specialists should better known an employee’s requirements, needs, interests in order to stimulate him/her to production. HRMS is one of strategic development lines which focuses on providing with high skilled and motivated labour to the all sphere of an institution, and formation of creative staff which is ready for progress and innovations. Section 2- Purpose of human resource management system in Armed Forces According to Huntington, structuralist-unidimensional/ Janowits, processual/ Van Doorn, pluralist institution versus occupation/Moskos, career strategies interactionist/Thomas, radical professionalist versus pragmatic professionalist/Larson, etc., there are six general characteristics of any social profession: -defined area of competency based on specialized knowledge; - a system of continuous training designed to preserve professional competence; -obligation/responsibility towards society, which must be served regardless of remuneration; -a system of values that perpetuates the specific of the profession and establishes/maintain a legitimate relationship with society; - an institutional framework of operation;

224 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

Control over its own system of rewards and sanctions and quality control of all those who adhere to the military profession. [4] In the military environment, HRMS has own specific and unique nature, thus the requirements of the military personnel differentiates HRM from the private, state or public sectors. HRM is a performance of a leadership in military environment that gives an opportunity to all managerial personnel to understand basics of responsibilities, the duties and interaction with the subordinates as well as with the supervisors. HRMS at an armed forces is a type of performance of cadre cell, and the core mission is staffing the armed forces with skillful, capable, high professional- motivated personnel, is to develop rules and regulations on dismissal of the personnel, the training, and to improve the level of specialty, and solve question on promotion to position as well as to ranking. The Azerbaijan Armed Forces require a range of personnel with various skills and talents as the needs and standards of modern army formation and institutions develop. Although some certain expertise or professional could be hired from the private sector, majority of the human resource must be recruited, trained and brought up in order to accomplish specific military missions and tasks. Thereby, HRMS plays crucial importance at any armed forces as a strategic performance serving to organizing security and territorial measures of a country. It is also a strategic performance to plan utilization of human resources at an armed forces. That is a core mission or role of HRM at armed forces to ensure that the personnel can accomplish tasks or rich objectives through practices, training, promotion and education. But, the aforesaid steps cannot provide with successful accomplishment without forming strategic framework or white papers. Thus, one of the terms to a successful HRMS at armed forces is availability of right promotion strategy. Strategy is a special plan on performance designed to rich a goal. Strategic goal generally covers a long period enough. Strategy is not a collection of casual performance. It is a collection of systematic and plausible performances in order to succeed goals. İt requires being realistic and precise in the strategy of development on HRMS at an armed forces, and demands objective and comprehensive diagnosis of internal and external impacts on HRMS. And, consecutive as well as concrete existence of organizational plans which are provided with all types of resources; involving professional military servicemen in developing and implementing of strategic plan on HRMS , quality control over realization of strategic plans, evaluation of efficiency of outcomes, etc. should be taken into consideration. The employees of a human resource department must follow some principals to achieve goals on HRMS at armed forces. Generally, the principals mean norms and attitudes of a theory, training, science, view, propositions and theses for defining an institution, core rules of activity, guiding ideas, internal belief of a human defining his/her approach to truth. [5]. The leaderships of HRM department should better be more active in order to rich goals assigned by the armed forces, and in addition to their capability and skills on specific fields, they must have information and be aware of the needs of the cadre cells which are under their subordination. Resources, shortfalls, they cannot fully exploit services of cadre cells. This is why the managerial officers must understand, and be aware of HRMS types and methods.

2- Planning and implementation of human resource policy in Armed Forces (case study) Section 1-Planning requirement for human resources The first of all, the staff of human resource cells must be professional in order to plan and program human resources. They should take advantage from lesson-learnt as well as HRMS

225 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

methods of well experience. No any country can get positive outcomes unless learns and taking advantage of methods and technologies applied by other countries across the world. The following stages of HR management could be elaborated: - Defining goals; means, analysis and evaluation; defining necessary performances; - analysis over resources; - designing action plan; - analyzing the version mentioned in the plan; -designing and developing broad plan (classified plan); -supervision on the implementation of the plan, and if necessary to make amendments. In this case SWOT analysis might be a very helpful instrument at the stage of analysis. By the help of SWOT analysis the following study could be conducted: Scanning internal and external resources; Strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats as well as risks could be determined; The SWOT analysis may even reveal certain new opportunities to achieve an organizations mission and vision, such as finding partnership, collaborative performance, implementation new technologies, etc.

Whilst planning human resources, the existing sources as well as future requirements (needs) are to be evaluated, and programs are to meet the current and future needs. The following steps might be carried out at planning phase: -forecasting requirement for personnel and planning; - defining required skills as well as level of professionality of the personnel; -criterion for selecting candidates; - forming the requirements; -designing training program for the personnel; -budgeting for the required personnel.

Section 2-Reqruitment or employment The second stage is to recruit or employ people with required skills and appropriate behaviour as well as those who suit to the principles and disciplines of an institution. In this case, reserved personnel, those whose contract expires might be considered eligible to appoint to positions. The Azerbaijan Army used these options as to fill up its personnel requirement. Reserved officers or men whose contract expired were invited to join the army as civilian. Employment of personnel is not excluded to an armed forces in the account of outsources. The world practice shows that employment to an armed forces for some professions is implemented in the account of outsources as well [6]. It gives an opportunity to use specialists without spending substantial means, and it brings a new spirit to an armed forces. At this stage of management of human resources, the leaderships select the most appropriate people out of reserve candidates which was formed during the selection. In this case, it is important to prefer candidates with higher skilled and capable as well as eligible people to fulfil jobs. Depending on a situation, while making a decision on the selection should be guided by the educational background his/her experience, capacity, and personal features. Skill on settlement of regional relations as well as his/ her compliance to superiors, and the people under his/her subordination must play a key role for high leadership positions (particularly for those with ranks). Efficiency of selection is a kind of pre-control over the quality of HRM. There are three necessary methods for selection decision - test, interview, and evaluation are broadly applied. Profession-specialty as well as psychological features are to be taken into consideration in the employment or recruitment process at armed forces. Employing in an armed forces of some countries is already implemented according to “Profession-Psychology” instructions [7]. Vocational psychological selection – is a type of activity conducted to evaluate compliance of individual psychological features and professionality level with the requirements of particular

226 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

military positions of military servicemen those who want voluntarily to be enlisted, of females who are not in military register, foreigners, and of those who do not have citizenship. Commissions comprising specialists from managerial departments, psychologists lawyers, representatives of human resources are founded on vocational psychological selection to conduct vocational psychological selections in an armed forces. Vocational psychological selection commission refers to lawfulness, equality, humanity and fairness in its performance. In the vocational psychological selection process, the category of professionality suitability is defined by applying methods of socio-psychological, psychological and psycho-physiological tests through considering ability and personal characteristics. Besides, newly employed or recruited people, vocational psychological selection commission may conduct evaluation and examination on psychological condition and personnel qualities of active personnel upon a commander’s recommendation or upon a report of request of an active personnel. Section 3- Cadre training Additional training, education, and specialization are required as capability, ability, specialty, and skillfulness are not equally shared among the people. Staffing all positions at armed forces with high skilled, professional, capable and morally officers is in focus at all times. Recruitment of a skilled and capable employee is a way to rich to these purposes. But, it is not enough. Concerning department of an armed forces should systematically design and develop training programs to discover potential capabilities of men employed, recruited or people are considered to be involved in military service. Training and re-training of personnel is a crucial and necessary point at military institutions. Generally, cadre training is conducted at educational schools as well as at educational-training centers founded at armed forces. Strategic research and management; military diplomacy; qualification of officers’ corps; reserved officers training; non-commissioned officers training; training courses for sergeants, various courses are implemented at the training and education institutions of the Azerbaijan Armed Forces considering new technologies, innovative systems [8]. Courses designed at the respective military training and education establishments give an opportunity to the officers to have a lifelong education and training, as well as to improve the level of excellence of the cadre potential, and help to adaptation to renewal process. Besides, training high skilled scientific-scientific pedagogical cadres is implemented at the highest level of education-ad juncture, and ends up with granting corresponding scientific degree at Azerbaijan Armed Forces [9]. Re-training of cadres are implemented in three ways- while employing, or promoting or else shifting a person to another position if he or she is lack of knowledge or practice in order to perform his/ her duty successfully. Military cadre training process being a complex process is conducted in harmony with self- evaluation of servicemen, understanding the necessity of his/her service in high state work, in homeland defense. Complexity and dynamic nature of modern service-combat performance, new information technologies utilization of weaponry and military machineries; requirement of military service information, skilled specialists; necessity of information technologies and innovative methods of teaching and learning which foster military students active participants in class environment rather than being passive, etc., all these are elements of improvement of a professional educational and training system. By applying principals such as lifelong learning, interactivity, democratization, standardization, innovation, etc., technologies, an end state could be achieved. Section 4 -Adaptation Adaptation process of newly requited or employed men at an armed forces is their gradual integration into military service process from military specialty, psychophysical, social- psychology, organizational-administrative aspects.

227 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

Whilst a military servicemen is in the process of recruitment or employment, briefing him about his/her duty (responsibilities, obligations, parameters of the performance he/she would fulfill, on time reports to the leaderships), forms of documentations and processing (written, oral), ways and means for accepting reports from those who are under his/her subordination, regime, administrative punishments for abusing service law and rules, material incentive, etc. is one of the core factors leading to his/her efficient office duty. Leaderships should evaluate main rules and responsibilities of the work (rules about the section he/she works at or characteristics of relations with personnel belonging to this section or from people from various offices, socio-psychological features of structures in service, behavior norms, working in and out the same office, weaponry and weaponry exploitation rules, competence of commanders on attitudes toward servicemen) . Efficient guiding program should better be developed for rapid and fast adaptation of a military serviceman to military life: Role of an armed forces in the society, its priorities, potentials, to be informed on the expectations of the organizations from him/her; to introduce the duty or the functions of the position to a newly appointed employee; chain of subordination in case he/she has a question to address; core professionality qualities: work ethics, methodology of proper communications, to follow attire principles, punctuality, to follow safety rules, not to consume alcohols in office.

Section 5-Evaluation process of the outcomes of performance Appropriate and efficient utilization of human resources is a principal indicator of fulfilling missions assigned to an army. In last decades, focus on human factor has been increasing, and steady steps are taken in improving combat capability, socio-economic situation, morale- psychological condition of the personnel of armed forces. And, consequently, it causes founding and developing unite, efficient and sustainable basics for human resource management in armed forces. Evaluation of service of personnel in the Azerbaijan Armed forces is conducted through attestation. The purpose and aim of attestation is objectively to evaluate the personnel’s capability and morale quality, their compliance with the positions they are on, defining level of readiness in their professions, generally efficient management of cadres. All steps taken through attestation are intended to exemplaire behaviour and service, teaching high responsibility for fulfillment of assignments, combat and mobilization readiness of the personnel, to accomplishing tasks in improvment of military disciplines, and organizational talents and abilities of the command corp. It is expedient to conducts carrier promotion, promoting to a higher position, demoting to, additional training, deploying to courses, recommendation to a higher rank, awarding, demobilizing according to the outcomes of attestations. Attestation system may play a crucial role in implementation of HRMS in any armed forces. With the help of the attestation system, aforesaid features and qualities of officers’ corps could be evaluated. There are civilians working at armed forces besides military servicemen and clerks. The evaluation of their performance is normed by the cadre strategy of either country. Section6- Carrier promotion Early 70s, some companies added “carrier promotion” program to “training managerial cadres”. “Carrier promotion line” was giving floor to enterprises to fully utilize the capability of their employees, and let the employees demonstrate their talents and capacity. Carrier promotion factor of officers’ corps plays a crucial role in gaining of prestige of military service, improvement of combat capability and professionality, qualifying managerial ability of officers, training cadres as per modern requirements, forming cadre corps of high scientific potential, etc. Qualification of the management system of cadres is mentioned as one of the priority subject in “Cadre policy concept. In military service, social fairly carrier promotion line (promotion to a higher position, rank, stretching the power of authority, etc.) leads to transparency,

228 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

prevents social conflicts, and it is considered as an element of management of cadres in cadre policy. Carrier promotion issues of people working in various institutions have been studied, broad range of researches have been conducted on carrier promotion lines, its principals and methods [1], [10]. Referring to articles and researches published in various countries, we can say that there are still gaps in military carrier management. In fact, no any country completely succeeded in forming carrier promotion pyramid. An ideal carrier promotion plan could be disturbed due to voluntarily demobilization of a personnel before his/her service duration is over; irrevocable casualties in military operations; limitation of physical abilities after a certain period of military service; insufficient promotion after a certain age level; delaying to pass required courses in time, etc. Unavailability of a method for building up carrier promotion pyramid as well as differences among the managements of armed forces ( for. example age differences for recruitment, age threshold for demobilization, durations for rank promotion, different criteria in promotion to a higher rank or a position) are the factors affecting carrier promotion pyramid. Section 7- Awarding and motivation Forms and types of awarding military servicemen is a core mean for evaluating their military service. According to the surveys, the awarding affects to decisions of men about quality of military service, efficiency, duration of being in the service, the duration of being demobilized, etc. Awarding the personnel could be efficient in collaboration of the commanders with the human resource departments. The surveys show that, worthily awarding a person for his/her performance causes high motivation and fosters him/her new achievements. Types of awards or confering orders in military service is identified with the grades and characteristics of position. Conferring, awarding or decorating with medals on military and civilian personnel are ruled through state laws and regulations on military service. Objective awarding with considering the results of the service causes satisfaction in the morale of servicemen and creates motivation towards military service. Motivation is a power fostering men move, defining the directions of the move as well as it is is men’s thought, hope, belief, need, wish and fear. Quitting, expressivity, mobility, conformity function, etc. of motivation care underlined in research papers on HRMS. Motivation based management could be successful if current and long term topical strategic purposes of an institution are taken into consideration. Motivation based management is main source for intensification of production as well as it is a mean for socio-economic development of a society. Section 8-Upbringing of corps of high ranked officers İn practice, systematic programs are used for the promotion of officers in their carrier. Detailed analysis and planning are required for successful training leadership cadres. According to the context of service of the personnel, the leaderships are to define specialty and capability compliance of a candidate to a position which had been forecasted, his/her needs for education and re-training based on analysis and evaluation of the performance of an armed forces. Based on analysis and evaluation of an armed forces, the leaderships are to define coincidence of abilities and capabilities of the personnel with their positions, and the needs for education and re-training. The need to train high level leadership is necessary as they must possess skills for realizing the end states of an armed forces as well as to be able to make a logical decisions at strategic level. At the Azerbaijan Armed Forces, training of leaderships as well as managerial staff are implemented through lectures, small group discussions, round table talks, literary review, business games and trainings. These methods have versions of annual courses and seminars on managerial issues. In addition, another way is “rotation”. During the service, the

229 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ARMED FORCES

leaderships are introduced with various fields of performance by being posted from a position to a position, and their managerial skills are improved. Consequently, the leaderships are aware of some issues of the institution and gain ability to be able to coordinate general performance fields in future. This knowledges would be necessary in future duty of high leadership.

Conclusion In order to achieve in optimal management of human resources at an armed forces, it is necessary to - define role of management in performance of military personnel; - increase theoretical knowledge of the personnel; - improve humanist approach in human resource management; - to track the capability building and qualification improvement of personnel; - succeed in coincidence between military servicemen and military service; - advance methodological basics of military management

References:

[1] Кибанов А.Я., Дуракова И.Б. Управление персоналом организации: отбор и оценка при найме, аттестация. - 2-е изд., перераб. и доп. - М.: Экзамен, 2005. [2] Harold R. Pollard, Developments in Management Thought (New York: Crane, Russak & Company,Inc., 1974), 3-4. [3] Кибанов А.Я. Основы управления персоналом: Учебник. - 2-е изд., перераб. и доп. - М.: ИНФРА - М, 2008. - 447 с. (высшее образование). [4] Dorel BADEA, Analysıs of human resource management ın the mılıtary organızatıon from the perspectıve of peter drucker's vısıon, Revista Academiei Fortelor TerestreNr.2(78), 2015, p. 198-202. [5] Rəsulov M.M. Silahlı Qüvvələrdə insan resurslarının idarə edilməsi prinsiplərinin təhlili. H Əliyev adına AAHM. Elmi əsərlər məcmuəsi. Baku, 2017. N 1(28) s.11-15. [6] Дуракова И.Б. Управление персоналом: отбор и наем. Исследование зарубежного опыта. - Воронеж: Изд. - во Воронежского гос. ун - та, 2006. [7] Azərbaycan Respublikası Silahlı Qüvvələrində bağlaşma əsasında hərbi xidmətə qəbulla bağlı peşə-psixoloji seçim qaydaları haqqında Təlimat. Bakı, Hərbi nəşriyyat, 2015, s.16. [8] Xüsusi təyinatlı təhsil müəssisələrində təşkil olunan kurslarda tədris fəaliyyətinin təşkili haqqında Təlimat. Bakı, Hərbi nəşriyyat, 2015, s 25. [9] Azərbaycan Respublikası Silahlı Qüvvələrində elmi və elmi pedaqoji kadrların hazırlanması haqqında Təlimat Bakı, Hərbi nəşriyyat, 2015, s.32. [10] Кулешов С. М. Управление профессиональной карьерой офицерского корпуса ВС РФ (социологический анализ). Автореферат диссертации на соискание ученой степени кандидата социологических наук, Москва-2011.

230 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

Gheorghe SAVU Associated Profesor

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration

Abstract: Sharing strategic interests and facing the same security challenges, NATO and the EU are determined to enhance their cooperation on issues of common interest and are working together to improve their political consultations and cooperation in crisis management, capability development and information-sharing. They seek a coordination of the support provided to their common partners in the East and South, especially in capacity building. For both organisations, close cooperation is an important element in the development of a comprehensive and integrated approach to crisis management, with the application of both military and civilian instruments.

Key words: security; strategy; cooperation; consultation; crisis management;

1. Introduction In the current strategic environment, shaped by complex and dynamic security challenges emanating from both the South and the East, the cooperation and complementarity between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are becoming more important for the security and defence of Europe. The security of EU and NATO continues to be inter-connected: they share 22 EU Member States and, together, can mobilise a broad range of tools and resources and take the most efficient actions to address challenges and enhance the security and defence of the Euro Atlantic Area. Moreover, according to the Treaties, the EU has not been envisaged from the beginning as an important European defence actor; it was meant to provide security of its citizens. So, just from the beginning, the developments of the two organisations have always had in attention their complementarity in providing internal security (EU) and defence (NATO), despite conjectural national political interests, much to often rather subjective than objective. Sharing strategic interests and facing the same security challenges, NATO and the EU are determined to enhance their cooperation on issues of common interest and are working together to improve their political consultations and cooperation in crisis management, capability development and information-sharing. They seek a coordination of the support provided to their common partners in the East and South, especially in capacity building. For both organisations, close cooperation is an important element in the development of a comprehensive and integrated approach to crisis management, with the application of both military and civilian instruments. When talking about NATO-EU cooperation we have to start from the common values they share: commitment to democratic principles, respect and protection of the rule of law and human rights, market economy etc. These are the bonds that tie EU and NATO

231 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION? countries further together than their strict national interests do. And by extension, it means that both the EU and NATO must cooperate to defend Europe and provide security to its citizens, as the founding treaties of both organizations ask for.

2. European Security and Defence Nowadays, cooperation with NATO constitutes an important part of the EU’s work aimed at strengthening European security and defence, as part of the implementation of the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy1 approved by the European Council in June 2016. It also contributes to Trans-Atlantic burden sharing according to the requirements of the Defence Investment Pledge initiative approved by the NATO Summit (2014, United Kingdom). Thus, a stronger EU and a stronger NATO are mutually reinforcing and the Trans-Atlantic link keeps being as relevant as ever. The Implementation Plan of the EU’s Global Strategy is focusing on both security and defence and has as a main goal the raising of the level of ambition of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy2 (CSDP). The aim is to mobilize different EU tools and policies, in a comprehensive and integrated approach, including hard and soft-power and military and civilian capacity, by achieving three main core tasks, including by a close cooperation with NATO: - responding to external conflicts and crises when they arise; - building partners’ capacities; - protecting the Union and its citizens through external action. So, it is clear that the EU is not planning to build capabilities for the defence of its territory. The level of ambition of CSDP is not planned to duplicate NATO and will be achieved following concrete actions: - deepening defence cooperation among Member States; - will enhance its work on incentives and enablers aiming at strengthening European defence cooperation; - establishing the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) will enhance defence cooperation among Member States through greater transparency on their national defence plans; - EU and its Member States will continue to identify which capabilities are needed, notably through the Capability Development Plan (CDP). The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence has been agreed by the Member States and is shaping the work of the EU’s institutions on security and defence for the years to come. The Plan defines a joint level of ambition for the EU, it is both ambitious and pragmatic, and has several main strategic initiatives, as follows: - Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) through which, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States can enter into more binding commitments to one another with a view to be ready to perform more demanding missions under the EU’s umbrella. Member States that are willing and able to join PESCO could jointly develop capabilities, invest in shared projects or create multinational formations. Currently, around 80% of defence

1 The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, Source: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf 2 The Common Security and Defence Policy, founded in 1999, is an essential tool in the EU’s foreign policy. It gives the EU the possibility to intervene outside the EU for civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, aimed at peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security.

232 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION? procurement is run on a purely national basis, leading to a costly duplication of military capabilities3; - rapid response will identify options for more flexible, faster and targeted actions in civilian crisis management; - military rapid reaction capability (the EU’s Battlegroups – EUBG). The EUBGs have never been deployed due to political, technical and financial constraints. It is necessary to improve their modularity so that they can be used more flexibly including by increasing the common funding through the Athena Mechanism; - planning and conduct of missions. The EU is currently deploying sixteen military (6) and civilian (10) missions and operations. Until recently, there was a permanent structure within the EEAS to run only civilian missions, namely Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). For the non-executive military missions, a permanent operational planning and conduct capability was recently established within the EEAS (Military Planning and Conduct Capability – MPCC); - taking forward CSDP Partnerships so that third countries that share the EU’s values can actively participate in EU CSDP missions or operations. It can also strengthen the resilience of the EU’s partners and enhance the cooperation with NATO, UN, AU and OSCE. Even though the EU adopted a very ambitious plan to increase its defence and security potential, there is no real danger to NATO. According to the EU official documents, the defence capabilities will be used only in areas where the EU decides to launch a military mission and the Alliance is not interested to act. More than that, in every strategic document adopted by the EU on defence and security it is mentioned the relevance of both NATO and transatlantic link. Initiatives like PESCO are meant not only to increase the European military capabilities but, most importantly, to spend money better. Lack of cooperation between Member States in the field of defence and security is estimated to cost between €25 billion and €100 billion every year4. Due to the lack of coordination among EU’s Member States, the defence expenditures are not efficient as it is the case of the USA (Figure No. 1).

Figure No 1, The cost of current European fragmentation and inefficiencies5

3 Munich Security Report, 2017 4 EPRS, European Parliament, 2013 5 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu-delivers-security-and- defence_en

233 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

3. EU-NATO Cooperation In practical terms, the two institutions have improved their cooperation in a number of domains. Three levels of cooperation can be identified: - political informal dialogue between the NATO Secretary General (SG) and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) has become normal practice, including by attending the , respectively Nord Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings. It is about the presence of the NATO SG and EU HR/VP in the other organisation’s foreign and defence ministerial meetings, briefing on the latest developments in their respective organizations. There is regular interaction at the level of the NAC and Political and Security Committee (PSC), both formally (Berlin Plus format) and informally. EU Military Representatives are double headed, being the same individuals in the EU and NATO and play an important role in NATO-EU cooperation on defence and security; - the majority EU and NATO institutions responsible for the identified areas of cooperation have extensively integrated the NATO-EU dimension to their work. Points of contact have been identified and staff-to-staff dialogue facilitates exchanges and information- sharing. Cross-briefings on issues of mutual interest take place frequently and representatives from each institution sit in meetings of the counterpart; - EU and NATO have made progress in their operational cooperation, be it in thematic areas such as hybrid threats, cyber security/defence, , or on the ground when deploying missions simultaneously, as is the case in the Balkans, Iraq or in the Mediterranean Sea. As noted in the Progress Reports on EU-NATO cooperation6, these steps need to be considered from a long-term perspective through a ‘process of continuous engagement’ so that progress is facilitated on longer term. Cooperation with NATO is of a paramount importance for the EU as it needs NATO’s contribution to the European defence, including by preserving the transatlantic link. Both NATO and the EU realize how important their cooperation and complementarity are for the European security and defence and signed the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation (NATO Summit, Warsaw, 08 July 2016)7 with a view to giving new impetus and substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership. The two organizations decided to enhance their cooperation in seven areas: countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation; cyber security and defence; defence capabilities; defence industry and research; exercises; and supporting Eastern and Southern partners’ capacity- building efforts. On the basis of the Joint Declaration, the EU and NATO identified 74 concrete actions to be implemented that are permanently evaluated through progress reports. As a consequence, the cooperation between the EU and NATO is now the established norm that functions on the basis of key guiding principles: openness, transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organizations without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State (Figure No 2).

6 The EU and NATO, “Third Progress Report on the implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,” May 31, 2018, p.2, https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_180608-3rd-Joint-progress-report-EU- NATO-eng.pdf 7 In 2018, a second Joint Declaration was signed, calling for swift progress in four key areas: military mobility; counter- terrorism; resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks; and women, peace and security.

234 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

Figure No. 2, EU-NATO Cooperation8 Among the seven areas of cooperation between NATO and the EU, the most relevant one for the topic of this paper is the Defence Capabilities. It is the area where the two organizations work to ensure coherence of output between the EU planning instruments and processes (PESCO, European Defence Fund - EDF9, CARD) and NATO processes (NATO Defence Planning Process - NDPP and the Planning and Review Process). Coherence and synergies between NATO and EU efforts are being made to improve military mobility as well, especially on legislation on borders crossing in Europe.

4. EU-NATO Complementarity The EU-NATO partnership has become a central pillar of the Euro Atlantic security architecture for a series of reason that have their origin in the very nature of the two institutions and of the threats they face. Being confronted with the same security challenges and sharing 22 Member States, NATO and the EU have acted for the division of labor in relation to: geography, the connection between defence and security, the link between internal and external security and the resources allocated for security and defence. Nowadays, NATO and the EU face similar security threats: Russia’s military aggression in the East, hybrid threats, terrorism, cyber threats, arms proliferation and instability at their Southern flank. As a result, both organizations must work together to draw on their potential, create synergies, and, in the end, to share the financial burden and maximize the impact on their security and defence. First, geographically speaking, there are some obvious constraints on the complementarity of NATO and the EU. Theoretically, and in accordance to its main mission to provide collective defence of its Member States against external military aggression, NATO can only operate in the North Atlantic Area. Yet the 1990s out-of-area

8 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35358/security-and-defence-infographics_en 9 The European Defence Fund, launched in June 2017, will promote cooperation and cost savings among Member States to produce state-of-the-art defence technology and equipment.

235 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION? debate and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have de facto called into question that geographical restriction. As for the EU, the focus on the periphery or the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ needs to be completed with what the EU Global Strategy calls a ‘global security provider’. These global ambitions and overlapping areas of responsibility have led to a certain division of tasks between the two institutions that are partly geographically driven. The geographical area covered by the NATO and the EU missions and operations seems to be commonly agreed in order to provide protection of the Euro Atlantic area against the instability in the arch of fire that spreads from Central Asia to the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, there are six EU-led civilian and military missions and operations deployed in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the absence of the Alliance in the area. The EU also runs civilian missions in sensitive areas as the Palestinian territories, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, while NATO mission in these locations would prove more challenging due to national and geostrategic sensitivities. The most obvious examples of geographical complementarity are NATO’s forward presence in the three Baltic States and in Poland and its tailored forward presence in Romania and Bulgaria in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilizing activities in Ukraine. This stands in contrast to the absence of the EU as a defence actor on the territory of its Member States. Keeping all these in mind, it is obvious that either EU or NATO mostly operates in places where the other does not. This creates a strong complementarity between the two organizations and allows the Euro Atlantic Community to tailor its security and defence efforts and to share the financial burden. Second, it is quite significant that there is a connection between security and defence that exploits the advantages that both NATO and the EU could bring in order to provide defence and security of the Euro Atlantic area, including by missions and operations out of the area. According to the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO is the collective defence organization and does not provide internal security. On the other hand, the EU does not do defence, but it is best placed to do security. This division of responsibility is obvious, as Figure No 3 shows: NATO is engaging in Kosovo via KFOR while the EU has EULEX; NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan while the EU runs a civilian police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan); NATO undertook Operation Unified Protector in Libya while the EU is involved in a border mission (EUBAM Libya). More than that, nowadays NATO is implementing reassurance measures on its Eastern flank following the 2014 Ukraine crisis while the EU enacted sanctions against Russia. Back in 2003, this distribution of tasks between the two organizations was the rationale for the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, by which the EU could draw on NATO assets for EU-led operations, as it is the situation of the operation EUFOR Althea10.

10 EU-led in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only operation under Berlin Plus arrangements

236 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

Figure No 3, EU and NATO missions and operations11 Third, the close connection between internal and external security gives the EU a comparative advantage that further underlines the importance of the EU-NATO partnership. Through its regulatory role in home affairs and justice, the EU has the legal framework and the resources needed to become an important actor in the fields of counter- terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber security/defence or military mobility. All these have an important internal security dimension, as the EU leaves to the Member States the authority to regulate CSDP. In the defence domain, NATO can operate inside its territory as the response to the Russian threat demonstrates. The EU can only operate outside its territory through CSDP. This makes NATO the ‘external actor’ while the EU plays the role of the ‘internal actor’. Overall, the way that the two organizations function and the principles and values they share and the common security and defence challenges they face make the EU and NATO essential partners. Fourth, the way NATO and the EU allocate resources for security and defence is quite different. While NATO has common defence capabilities that are financed from the common budget, the EU does not have any common defence capability. The NATO budget for 2019 is about €1.645 billion that is supposed to cover the operations as well. Excepting for common funding under the Athena Mechanism (approx. €30 million a year) for the military missions and operations, the EU does not have a defence budget; it allocates 3.8% to security and citizenship from its €165 billion yearly budget. EU has a large budget for its civilian missions and operations, using different budgetary chapters. When it is about

11 Sources: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/natos-post-cold-war-missions https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and- operations_en

237 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION? defence research and development, the EU will allocate €13 billion for 2021-2027 under EDF. So, even in terms of financial burden, NATO and the EU have to complement each other: NATO can do better defence missions because it has the defence capabilities and the resources needed while the EU is better prepared for civilian missions and operations. So, the two organizations should better coordinate their efforts through a comprehensive and joint approach as it happens in Afghanistan.

NATO has a clear comparative advantage when it comes to military capabilities, especially in ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture, as the Readiness Action Plan12 proves. On the other hand, the EU has a clear comparative advantage when it comes to civilian capabilities, which are wide-ranging and include: economic sanctions, building resilience of its Member States in areas such as energy and cyber security, hybrid and cyber threats, capacity building of partners, humanitarian and development assistance, transport infrastructure. Given the increasingly diverse security challenges against Europe, there is a need to draw from a wide pool of different competences that EU and NATO together have, whether civilian, military, or a combination of both.

5. Challenges to the EU-NATO Partnership NATO-EU relationship is important because they share 22 Member States, the same values, threats and challenges. They are essential partner to each other and they should remain the same for the sake of the security and defence of Euro Atlantic Area. Decisions taken by individual nations have a direct impact on the two organisations. If a nation that belongs to both EU and NATO decides to spend more on defence and develop its operational capabilities, or faces an external security threat, this has an impact on both organisations. NATO and the EU Member States cannot afford two armed forces and two defence budgets, one for each organisation. They have a single set of forces and efforts undertaken within each organisation need to be complementary with the efforts of the other. This, sometimes it is not easy to be done due to different agenda that some Member States have in the two organisations. More than that, much too often, conjectural political interests from both sides of the Atlantic put some strain on the NATO-EU defence and security cooperation. While the EU-NATO partnership is an indispensable component against internal and external security threats, it is also confronted with several difficulties that undermine its efficiency. First, the division of geostrategic tasks and the connection between defence and security and between internal and external threats have never been officially conceptualised. The comparative advantage of the EU in internal security or of NATO in hard defence is understood. Yet, neither institution is keen to engage in a debate about ‘who does what, when and where’ beyond NATO’s collective defence primacy as codified in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty13. As a consequence, the division of tasks lacks the strategic direction and the common interests of the 22 Member States are the most important driving force of NATO-EU cooperation.

12 At the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, Allied leaders approved a Readiness Action Plan to ensure the Alliance is ready to respond to new security challenges. The plan provides a comprehensive package of measures to respond to the changes in the security environment in and near Europe. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and to threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. “ 13 Article 42§7 of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) states that “Commitments and cooperation” in the area of defence “shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”.

238 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

Second, although the 2014 momentum has been pushed by the two NATO-EU Joint Declarations, the political will within Member States is different. States that belong to only one of the two institutions do not always necessarily see cooperation with the other as a top priority. Even though the 22 Member States of both institutions facilitate cooperation, yet some of the non-EU and non-NATO states have divergences with the idea of mutually- beneficial partnership, as it is the case of Cyprus for example. A third category of states (as Austria, Sweden or Finland) are important NATO partners and represent a key determinant of the EU-NATO relationship. Even among the 22 common members, there are countries that show little enthusiasm about the benefits of cooperation as one or the other organisation prevails in their own security policy. Third, the number of EU entities involved in EU-NATO relations makes the partnership a multi-level exercise rather than a two-player game. The European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission, the European Council, the Council of the EU, and the European Defence Agency are simultaneously engaged in a dialogue with NATO. This creates different layers of dialogue that tend to alter the bilateral nature of the relationship, while the EU internal coordination mechanism also complicates cooperation with any third party. Fourth, inter-institutional cooperation is hindered by the unresolved dispute over Cyprus, the relationship of the EU with Turkey and the historical disputes between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus, as a non-NATO EU and Turkey as a non-EU NATO Member States have so far blocked any legally-grounded rapprochement between the two institutions. Practically, this means that there can be no review of the existing legal arrangements between the EU and NATO outside of the implementation of the 2003 , which does not meet the current challenges any longer. As a consequence, information-sharing suffers and NATO’s NAC – EU’s PSC meetings can only be informal and EU-NATO cooperation limited to staff-to-staff exchanges and informal information sharing at the level of Military Representatives. Finally, the EU-NATO partnership takes place within the context of the EU’s efforts to develop its defence policy and the debate it generates in terms of compatibility with NATO. With the creation in 2017 of PESCO and EDF, the EU is supposed to enhance its defence profile, which in turn changes the nature of the EU-NATO dialogue. In principle, the EU defence impetus should enable the EU to better tackle threats in cooperation with NATO. In practice, it has raised concerns on the NATO side on issues like restrictions on third states’ participation in PESCO and EDF-funded projects. NATO insists that three issues be given prominence: 1-the priorities and outputs of EU and NATO capability development should be coherent; 2-capabilities built under the EU should be made available to NATO; and 3- non-EU NATO allies should be associated to EU defence activities to the extent possible. On the EU side, EU-NATO cooperation has to take place ‘in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations, and ‘without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State’14. The narrative over EU strategic autonomy (which is sometimes linked to the question of an European Army) has stirred concerns about consequences for NATO and the transatlantic link. From an EU perspective, an appropriate level of EU strategic autonomy contributes to more effective burden-sharing across both institutions and strengthens

14 Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, December 2016, Annex, p.2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/121581/ST_15283_2016_INIT_EN.pdf

239 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. Yet the fact that the aspiration towards strategic autonomy might reflect a certain mistrust vis-à-vis the Alliance or the USA has also led to some tension. When thinking about the fundamentals of EU-NATO cooperation, we shall take into account that there are not official joint working groups/committees. The contacts between the two organizations are mostly informal and politically driven, especially at the levels of Head of States or ministers. Informal talks do take place at the ambassadorial and Military Representatives levels. As a consequence the real essence of NATO-EU cooperation is about what they can do independently of each other in a coordinated and complementary way to achieve the same objectives with minimum of resources to preserve the peace and security in Europe and to promote the stability and prosperity. For this reason, the very foundation of EU-NATO relations should be considered to be 30 August 1954, when the National Assembly of France failed to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, which contained concrete provisions for the establishment of an European Army. From that moment on, NATO became the sole provider of deterrence and defence in Europe, under whose protective umbrella; the EU was established and prospered. Since the creation of the EU, the two organizations provided peace, security and prosperity on the continent in a complementary manner. NATO has provided defence, while the EU has built economic prosperity, which in turn allowed European nations to gradually increase their contribution to the European security and defence. Since the end of Cold War, NATO and the EU coordinated their efforts in counteracting threats and risks to their security and stand together in difficult situations as Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilizing activities in Eastern Ukraine, The EU’s Global Strategy (2016), states that external and internal security are converging. The Strategy points out that the peace inside the borders of the EU is dependent on the situation outside its borders. Furthermore, concepts and institutional arrangements traditionally aimed at addressing internal security challenges (law enforcement agencies, national and local information providers, administrative authorities), are being challenged to address matters traditionally reserved for external security professionals (military and international policy forces etc.). Today’s security environment, dominated by hybrid threats, shows that civil and military components need to be better integrated. Cooperation between the military and civilian sectors is essential when it comes to countering hybrid threats. EU and NATO Member States constitute a heterogeneous grouping with multiple political and security cultures where the understanding of the role of the military in strategy-making differs. Despite the mutual differences, their common values and shared threat assessments mean that the EU and NATO are becoming increasingly aligned and cooperation between the two organisations is constantly deepening.

6. Final Remarks What the EU and NATO have achieved since 2016 should not be underestimated. There is an on-going consultation process across both organisations, and the level of information- sharing has never been so high. Even though there are already tangible improvements in the NATO-EU partnership in various areas, it is obvious that the current level of cooperation is inherently constrained. Interaction is still informal and limited to very few areas. A qualitative shift towards more effective cooperation is unlikely to happen as long

240 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION? as some of the obstacles remain unaddressed officially as it is the sharing of classified information. We may wonder what kind of cooperation is possible between two institutions that cannot share information through a formal mechanism? In addition, how can the EU and NATO become ‘strategic partners’ if some of their Member States either block any attempt or do not realise the relevance of one or the other organisation working together to better defend and secure Europe? In the long run, a lot will depend on the extent to which states want to push the agenda further, and whether they agree on what the two organisations must do together. The current level of ambition and areas of cooperation represent the lowest common denominator, it is what the Member States are ready to accept now. Looking ahead, a facilitating factor will be the level of political dialogue between both and the EU, as formal as possible. For this reason, it is an encouraging sign that political dialogue intensified across both formal and informal settings, with a substantial increase in the number of cross-briefings at all levels starting from June 2016. Overall, all these are invitations to realism in the assessment of current state of the EU-NATO partnership and, more important, its potential. The two institutions are indeed essential partners but, in security and defence, this reflects rather an ambition than a reality. And as security and defence is in the hands of all Member States, it is up to them to overcome historical rivalries and their pure national interest vis-à-vis one or the other organisations. And, from this perspective, not only Turkey and Cyprus have to be blamed. The cooperation between the EU and NATO is not just what the two organizations do together but also what they do in parallel, acting in coordinated and complementary ways. This is an important lesson for the EU’s ambitions to develop a common European defence in the long term. This effort should not be seen as a substitute to NATO but rather as a mutually reinforcing and complementing. Neither NATO nor the EU can address the whole spectrum of security challenges alone and complementarity is needed. Calibrating such cooperation has been challenging since the birth of the CSDP. The EU’s growing role in international crisis management is in principle welcome, yet the political context has always limited to what the two organizations can do together. The emerging threats show how internal and external security issues are intertwined and how barriers need to be overcome in order to foster the emergence of a new culture of cooperation in Europe. Constructive thinking is needed and old ways of doing things for the European defence and security need to be challenged. The three years since the EU- NATO Joint Declaration have shown, through increased EU-NATO cooperation on hybrid threats and cyber defence, that civil-military cooperation is possible. This is not an easy task, especially given the ambiguous, devious and treacherous character of the emerging threats, especially hybrid ones. EU-NATO cooperation has moved forward despite the difficulties generated by the situation where both organisations need to undertake fundamental internal reorganisation while trying to create a flexible and coherent cooperation framework. Furthermore, the disparities between both organisations’ Member States’ political and security cultures are a challenge for EU-NATO cooperation. There are obstacles and structural difficulties but both organisations have shown that there is strong mutual will to enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic space and fight together against threats, either conventional or asymmetrical. For this, to be fully successful, both sides need to develop a better understanding of each other’s internal processes and the different Member States also need to learn more about each other’s distinctive political and security cultures.

241 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

Even in the absence of further institutionalisation (in part due to the deadlock caused by the political dispute between Turkey and Cyprus), coordination between the EU and NATO is likely to intensify, at least informally. The Euro-Atlantic defence and security challenges ask for it. The progress will probably be rather slow than fast. National interests, short term subjective interests of national political leaders, historical disputes and lack of understanding will still be serious obstacles against a substantial cooperation between EU and NATO. For instance, mid-level or senior officials are more likely to collaborate if they know and trust each other from prior interactions. Similarly, staff can develop creative or innovative policy ideas or proposals for institutional cooperation, if they have previously worked in the other institution or are familiar with its specific decision-making processes. And this has happened in Brussels in the last decade. With a bit of strategic planning, the two institutions could move towards a level of ambition and cooperation that will meet their interests and of the Member States. For this, political leaders of both NATO and the EU and of their Member States must see over their current mandates and act for a strategic institutionalised relationship between the two organisations at both military and civilian level. This is the only solution for providing defence of Europe and security of its citizens.

References: [1] The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, Source: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf. [2] The Common Security and Defence Policy, founded in 1999, is an essential tool in the EU’s foreign policy. It gives the EU the possibility to intervene outside the EU for civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, aimed at peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. [3] Munich Security Report, 2017 [4] EPRS, European Parliament, 2013 [5] https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/47517/implementing-global-strategy-eu- delivers-security-and-defence_en [6] The EU and NATO, “Third Progress Report on the implementation of the Common Set of Proposals Endorsed by NATO and EU Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,” May 31, 2018, p.2, https://www.nato.int/ nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/20180608_180608- 3rd-Joint-progress-report-EU-NATO-eng.pdf [7] In 2018, a second Joint Declaration was signed, calling for swift progress in four key areas: military mobility; counter-terrorism; resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear- related risks; and women, peace and security. [8] https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35358/security-and-defence- infographics_en [9] The European Defence Fund, launched in June 2017, will promote cooperation and cost savings among Member States to produce state-of-the-art defence technology and equipment. [10] EU-led operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only operation under Berlin Plus arrangements [11] Sources: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/natos-post-cold-war-missions https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian- missions-and-operations_en [12] At the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, Allied leaders approved a Readiness Action Plan to ensure the Alliance is ready to respond to new security challenges. The plan provides a comprehensive package of measures to respond to the changes in the security environment in and near Europe. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and to threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. “

242 THE ROLE OF THE EU AND NATO IN PROVIDING EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY. COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION?

[13] Article 42§7 of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) states that “Commitments and cooperation” in the area of defence “shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation”. [14] Council Conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration, December 2016, Annex, p.2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/121581/ST_15283_2016_INIT_EN.pdf

243 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES

LTC Andrzej SOBOŃ, PhD

National Security Faculty, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract: The end of the Cold War changed the identification of national security. In fact, non-military factors also shape security. One of the elements of democracy is a civil society characterized by the activity and the ability to self-organize independently of state institutions. Independence does not mean rivalry with democratic power, but a sense of community and responsibility for specific social problems. Self-realizing groups taking part in various areas of activity are the source of an unlimited number of initiatives: cultural, sporting, educational and other enabling the development of broadly understood values. In civic society, associated groups, unrestricted by the pressure of state power, establish civic organizations or initiatives in which they implement specific ideas and values. Considerations over the essence and regularities of social organizations are necessary for the realization of the common good, understood as the defence of the state.

Key words: social organization; pro-defence; defence resources; national security

Introduction Features of the modern world carry a lot of contradictions and make difficulties for people, especially young people, to find their own identity and determine their place in the world. They are, in a way, doomed to the constant search for their own identity, resulting from the growing variety of behavioural patterns, competitive values and lifestyles. Elements of identity are often mutually exclusive. The basic concepts that characterize the modern world are speed and change. These terms define the way of life of modern society and the phenomena that occur around him. It concerns both lifestyle, social contacts, work and education. They come from economic and business changes related to the development of modern technologies, improving and accelerating methods of communication [Domalewska, 2017, p. 6]. As a result, information has become a basic commodity and a particularly valuable intangible asset, and the methods of its processing and speed of communication are the basic tasks for the development of modern technology. Zygmunt Bauman - an excellent Polish sociologist, claimed that we live in a world of deregulation, whose main feature is uncertainty combined with fear and anxiety about the future. Most people support their actions and thoughts of unlimited freedom. According to Bauman, "the charm of freedom dazzles the most when it is necessary to place freedom on the altar of security." [BAUMAN, 2000, p. 9]. Human safety has always been a matter of his concern, and with the formation of scientific methods of knowing and changing reality - it also dominates in scientific research. Contemporary society is also described in terms of a risk society. This designates many phenomena (e.g. illness, unemployment, armed conflicts, security threats, including intellectual threats) that are a source of fears and anxieties [Beck, 2004]. Piotr Sztompka (a Polish sociologist-auth. note) indicates that contemporary culture has features that are difficult to accept and overcome by an individual. The features allow it to be defined as the culture of cynicism (lack of trust), manipulation (using the trust of others) and indifference

244 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES

(selfishness and indifferentism). Living in a society with such messages does not allow anybody to feel safe. A man must have qualities that will help him deal with it somehow. The situation of modern people implies an irreducible level of risk. Each action, choice made, paving the trail results from necessity and raises uncertainty. In times of "late" modernity, risk is a permanent element of activity undertaken by people. In times of "late" modernity, risk is a permanent element of activity undertaken by people. Therefore, risk is inscribed in the life of modern man and accompanies him in everyday life [Sztompka, 1999, pp. 265- 282]. An "instant man" has appeared in contemporary culture - a man who subordinates his actions, choices and decisions to the need for immediacy. Modern man does not want and cannot wait. The psychological ability to postpone gratification is not a feature that makes up its characteristics. The basic need and kind of human freedom has become the need for consumption. Today, a special opportunity that people should use to realize the ideals of freedom, peace and social justice is education. It is one of the basic ways of shaping human security. Affects his attitudes, values, knowledge and skills necessary to prevent, cope with emergency situations and remove their effects [Pieczywok, 2019, pp. 8-11]. The general purpose of this article is to present the areas of activity of social organizations in Poland, which are a source of state defence resources. The specific objectives relate to the identification of social organizations useful for national defence, including their impact on security. To this end, the author sought answers to the following problem questions: 1. What are the most important types of social organizations in Poland? 2. How can organizations affect national security? The structure of the article was subordinated to the goals and formulated research problems. The article is addressed to people interested in security issues and education for security. Due to the special importance of the problems elaborated, each of them has a reference to the Polish environment and, in a comparative situation to other countries, requires in-depth studies and another reflection.

1. Types of social organizations in Poland Defence is one of the fundamental interests of the state. Ensuring state security is one of the basic duties of citizens. National defence requires the use of the entire military and non-military potential of the state to counteract threats. It should be stated that contemporary problems of human safety and education are directly related to the problem of responsibility [Domalewska, 2018, p. 250]. This problem in the current extremely complicated reality takes on a special meaning. New situations put very high demands on man, and often excessive obligations, which he is not always able to meet. These are civilization and existential challenges, social movements and new economic, political and social threats, etc. In addition, Poland's political transformation after 1989, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the process of accession negotiations to NATO, as well as many other economic transformations, contributed to the fall of civil defence and the disappearance of national defence. As a conclusion, there is still a lack of coherent law on civil defence, and many aspects have not been subject to new regulations. For example, the potential of social organizations is not noticed and its use in defence preparations of the state is hindered. And yet, the activities of social organizations aimed at preparing the defence of the state in all states of emergency should be consistent with the statutory tasks of civil defence. An analysis of pro-defence in civil defence indicates that this is not the case in Poland [Trocha, 2014, p. 199]. Civil society is one of the elements of democracy. It is characterized by activity and the ability to self-organize independently of state institutions. Independence does not mean rivalry with democratic power, but a sense of community and responsibility for specific

245 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES social problems [Urych, 2016, p. 29]. Self-realizing groups taking part in various areas of activity are the source of an unlimited number of initiatives: cultural, sports, educational and other enabling the development of broadly understood values. In civil society, associated groups, unrestricted by the pressure of state authorities, form civic organizations or initiatives in which they implement specific ideas and values. The possibility of associating groups of citizens in non-governmental organizations to carry out public benefit activities is one of the canons of democracy in Poland. Along with political changes, NGOs were guaranteed this right in The Constitution of the Republic of Poland [Soboń, 2019, p. 14]. Non-governmental organizations, including pro-defence, paramilitary, operate in Poland mainly on the basis of The Law on Associations announced in 1989, other provisions and decisions. The regulations create legal conditions for establishing and operating of non-governmental organizations, but the activities of pro- defence organizations are not specified in a separate act. The easiest legal form of activity of pro-defence organizations is an association. The Law on Associations defines an association as a voluntary, self-governing and permanent association with non-profit purposes based on the social work of its members. Thanks to this act, establishing and running an association is simple and does not require financial resources. Work in pro- defence organizations is necessary to realize a common good understood as the good of others, not your own. Founders can operate in many ways, such as common security organizations, environmental and educational organizations, youth organizations, associations of sports and interests, associations of veterans and reserve soldiers, reconstruction associations and paramilitary organizations [Szafraniec, 2016. p. 52]. The legal form of the foundation is the second, much less often used when establishing pro-defence organizations. Pursuant to The Act on Foundations, they can be created in order to achieve socially or economically useful goals, consistent with the basic interests of the Republic of Poland. Although the law does not mention defence as a field for achieving the foundation's goals, there are no obstacles for foundations to deal with defence- related issues. The main benefit of The Act on Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism is the opportunity to obtain the status of a non-governmental organization. A pro-defence organization that meets the requirements of the act and conducts statutory activities in the field of support may, by means of a competition, receive funds for the implementation of public tasks in the form of supporting or implementing a public task. To sum up this stage of considerations, it should be emphasized that public tasks should include shaping pro- defence attitudes, e.g. preparing young people for professional military service and supporting the activities of young people studying in military classes [Soboń, 2019, p. 42]. The phenomenon of Polish pro-defence organizations on a global scale requires that 30 years after the creation of the first associations, a law on pro-defence organizations should be established in Poland. In addition, the act should specify in detail the cooperation of state organs with organizations, tasks of paramilitary organizations in states of emergency, rules for the mobilization of members to Territorial Defence Forces, as well as the militarization of paramilitary organizations. Pro-defence organizations are important not only for the implementation of tasks related to civil protection and rescue, but also for educational, training and patriotic activities aimed at strengthening national identity and education for security. Therefore, in the context of the classification of pro-defence organizations, the division into: 1. Common Security Organizations, 2. Environmental and Educational Organizations, 3. Youth Organizations, 4. Associations of Sports and Interests,

246 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES

5. Associations of Veterans and Reserve Soldiers, 6. Reconstruction Associations, 7. Paramilitary Organizations [Soboń, 2019, p. 83]. Moreover, it should be assumed that in some areas they play a leading role or contribute to the performance of tasks which the state is unable to undertake. For example, The Mountain Volunteer (GOPR), Tatra Volunteer Search and Rescue Emergency Service (TOPR), Volunteer Water Rescue Service (WOPR), Volunteer Fire Service (OSP) and others. They are a noteworthy example. Their example illustrates the involvement of NGOs, social and rescue organizations in the national emergency system. Some experts believe that the potential of social organizations should not only be considered necessary for the development of the state's defence capabilities, but also necessary for the armed forces in the implementation of joint defence tasks [SRSBN RP, p. 30].

2. The potential of social organizations for national security In the previous chapter, the author characterizes social organizations. Many of them conduct interdisciplinary activities, which translates into the difficulty of classifying them into one of the categories. It should be noted that it is not possible to clearly classify defence organizations. For the purposes of this classification, the organization's statute or main event profiles organized by the entity were considered.

2.1 Common Security Organizations This group includes all organizations that ensure the integrity of life, health and property. The activities of the universal security organization are based on the social work of its members on a voluntary, self-governing, permanent and non-profit basis. This category of organizations does not include uniformed and armed formations serving the public and aiming at maintaining public safety and protecting people such as a police force, guards and other services. Volunteer Fire Brigades (OSP) have the greatest potential among common security organizations, with almost 700,000 members. The operation of the OSP is of exceptional importance for maintaining local safety in order to protect life, health and property against fires, natural disasters and ecological or other local threats. Equipment, training and social activities of the OSP is a very important role for the National Firefighting and Rescue System (KSRG). In 2018, 16,404 Volunteer Fire Brigades were registered. 4404 units are included in the National Firefighting and Rescue System, in which about 193,000 rescuers are in readiness. For comparison, the potential of the State Fire Service has 501 units and about 30,000 rescuers. In daily operational readiness National Firefighting and Rescue System has at its disposal approximately 10,600 rescue and fire-fighting and special vehicles [Wywiał, 2017, p. 11]. Common security organizations also include, but are not limited to, Emergency Medical Services. In the context of the problem, The Mountain Volunteer Search and Rescue is the most recognizable (GOPR) (whose purpose is to help people in the mountains whose health or life is at risk, preventing accidents in the mountains, protecting the mountain environment. GOPR carries out its tasks in 7 Regional Groups: Beskidzka, Bieszczadzka, Jurajska, Karkonoska, Krynicka, Podhalańska and Wałbrzysko-Kłodzka. The Mountain Volunteer Search and Rescue employs about 100 full-time rescuers, who are supported by about 900 volunteer rescuers and candidates for rescuers [Soboń, 2019, p. 86]. Tatra Volunteer Search and Rescue Emergency Service (TOPR), whose purpose is to conduct mountain and ski rescue and help victims of natural disasters, environmental protection, social assistance, vocational rehabilitation, student education as well as scientific

247 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES and technical activities, dissemination of physical culture and sport, tourism and sightseeing. TOPR has 281 rescuers, candidates and members. Another, significant for pro-defence is Volunteer Water Rescue Service (WOPR), having about 70,000 rescuers. WOPR has a structure consistent with the administrative division of the country at the following levels: central, voivodship and field ensuring rescue operations in water areas. Other common security organizations, e.g.: (1) Polish Hunting Association in 49 regions with 127k hunters, (2) Polish Red Cross (PCK). The PCK Rescue Groups operate within the structures of the Polish Red Cross at the District PCK, (3) Transporters Sobriety Society (TTT) [Soboń, 2019, p. 86].

2.2 Environmental and Educational Organizations Social organizations in this category work for a selected initiative or several converging concepts. Environmental and Educational Organizations bring together interested natural and legal persons. Both their classification and forms of pro-defence activity include specific environmental groups, children, young people and adults. For example: The Polish Aero Club as a central association of persons practising air sports or recreational flying, The Polish Automobile and Motorcycle Association an automobile club and the governing body of motorsports in Poland, The Polish Sport Shooting Federation for sport shooting under the International Practical Shooting Confederation and the International Shooting Sport Federation, The Polish Amateur Radio Union who is a organization for amateur radio enthusiasts in Poland, Country Defence League, etc.

2.3 Youth Organizations They are not strictly youth organizations, but organizations that contribute to the participation of young people in public life. Youth organizations have in their mission activities targeted at various social groups, with particular emphasis on youth. They care about raising the level of knowledge to improve security and defence. The Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP) is the largest youth organization with approximately 105,000 members - children and youth. ZHP is a patriotic association shaping attitudes and characters in accordance with values such as patriotism, friendship, service, faith, work, justice, freedom and peace. The Scouting Association of the Republic is the second largest scout organization with approximately 17,500 members. He was appointed as an alternative to ZHP, hence the goals and methods of their implementation are similar to those of ZHP. Other youth organizations: The Polish Gymnastic Society “Sokół” (i.e. “Falcon”), Polish Hand Combat System HALLER and Association “Fundacja K2”.

2.4 Associations of Sports and Interests An important category from the point of view of the issues raised are the relationships between sport and extreme interests. The definition of extreme sports comes from the risks involved with doing them. The risk determination is based on the nature of the sports involved. Extreme sports include air, water and land sports. Extreme sports are practiced to achieve maximum experience, i.e. mountain and rock climbing, speleology, motor or motorboat sports, motocross, hunting, and defence sports, mountain biking, skiing off marked ski slopes, ski jumping, diving using equipment specialist or apnea, canyoning, rafting, sailing, ballooning, bungee, BAS E. jumping, surfing, kitesurfing, paragliding, parachuting, gliding and car rallies. Associations of Sports and Interests offer these sports [Soboń, 2019, p. 89].

248 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES

2.5 Associations of Veterans and Reserve Soldiers The radical political changes that took place after 1989 allowed the independent activity of veteran associations, suppressed people and reserve soldiers. Many organizations recognized by the communist authorities in The Polish People's Republic (Polish: Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) as illegal, e.g. soldiers of the independence underground, people repressed by communism, Siberians and prisoners of the Stalinist period gained the opportunity to associate, enjoy the privileges and privileges of veterans.

2.6 Reconstruction Associations In the pro-defence activity, propagating history and cultivating the defence traditions of the state, the method of the message used is the most important. Already in the sixth century BC, the Chinese philosopher Confucius constructed the theorem: " I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand.", which illustrates the opinion that conscious perception requires the activation of various types of stimuli. The use of visual, auditory, tactile and emotional stimuli allows watcher to build images of reality. Therefore, the reconstructions are an attempt to transfer historical events to the present day. Reconstructions allow watcher to permanently remember images. A faithful reconstruction of historical events helps build historical awareness, popularize knowledge, but also a proper understanding of patriotism, especially in youth education [Trejnis Z., Trejnis P., 2016, pp. 36-41].

2.7 Paramilitary Organizations Paramilitary organizations are registered associations that voluntarily associate uniformed and designated members. They conduct military activities and training for own members. Paramilitary organizations go beyond the training standard offered by national education. They are distinguished by continuous training of their members, using intensive practical classes, so that each of them acquires the required soldier and civic qualities. These organizations are aware that training must be based on solid patriotic attitudes. Therefore, referring automatically to the traditions of pre-war Polish paramilitary organizations, it is necessary to emphasize the importance and defence value of the emerging shooting organizations. Most of the paramilitary organizations have signed agreements with the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration or even the Ministry of Education. The voluntary association of uniformed and designated members together with conducting military training for them refers to the education of youth from uniformed classes. In the 2016/2017 school year there were about 2,000 uniformed classes, in which almost 57,000 students were registered. Other groups of paramilitary organizations form the so-called shooting movement [Soboń, 2018, p. 303]. In Poland, liberated after the fall of communism, in 1989 Polish Riflemen's Associations known (Polish: Związek Strzelecki) was reactivated. The current structure of the Riflemen's Associations is very complicated. Several organizations exist which trace back their roots to the traditions of the Riflemen's Association but do not cooperate each other’s. The reason is the lack of agreement on program issues, strategies and activities. There are many other paramilitary organizations, such as: (1) operating since 2013 in the modern academic community of the Academic Legion. It refers to the Academic Legion founded in 1918. During first edition (2018) joined the program 61 universities with 5558 students. 2719 students completed practical training; (2) „Fideles et Instructi Armis –FIA”, (3) National Defence Association - Territorial Defense Movement (Polish: Stowarzyszenie Obrona Narodowa.pl); (4) Association (Polish: Stowarzyszenie „Gwardia Narodowa”).

249 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES

Conclusion In summary, it can be unequivocally stated that regardless of the membership in the structures of social organizations, each of them cares for security. The basis of this security is, among others an appropriate education and training system that covers most members in the characterized organizations. That is why in many social organizations the training system is perceived as an important process of educating members regardless of their age. Each of the social organizations tries to solve training problems in different ways, using a whole range of forms and methods. It is worth noting that the quality of security is the strength of state institutions, complemented by the involvement of NGOs and social initiatives. Exploiting the potential of social organizations is an important security challenge. The current dynamics of the development of pro-defence organizations is an opportunity to build a defence model containing a high ability of territorial defence and counteracting contemporary national security threats. At this point it should be emphasized that in recent years certain pro-defence organizations have obtained the right to receive a weapon certificate entitling them to purchase a specific type and number of weapons. Obtained weapons can be used by the organization only for training and shooting exercises. The problem of untapped defence resources of social organizations has been noticed by the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland. Various forms of support provided by the Ministry of National Defence serve as confirmation. Signed a cooperation agreement with the Ministry of National Defence grants members of some pro-defence organization the right to wear a uniform without military badges and distinctions. The Ministry of National Defence aims to intensify cooperation with pro-defence organizations. Therefore, from one hand in 2019, MoD allocated significant financial resources of approximately PLN 17 million (ab. 4 million euro). On the other hand, soldiers and employees of the Ministry of National Defence will work for almost 200,000 hours. They represent nearly 200 military units and institutions of the Ministry of National Defence. The forces and resources will ensure that over 1,700 projects for social organizations are carried out. The presented conclusions confirm that the purpose of the article has been achieved and the formulated research problems have been solved.

References: [1] Bauman Z., Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień (Post-modernity as a source of suffering), Warszawa 2000. [2] Beck U, Społeczeństwo ryzyka w drodze do innej nowoczesności (Risk society: towards a new modernity), Warszawa 2004. [3] Domalewska, D. Approaches to studying across culturally contrasting groups: Implications for Security Education. Security and Defence Quarterly, 3(16), 2017. [4] Domalewska, D. Problematyka migracji wyzwaniem edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa (The issue of migration as a challenge of education for security) [in:] Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. Współczesne kategorie (Education for security. Contemporary categories), Urych I. (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, Warszawa 2018. [5] Pieczywok A., Introduction, [in:] Przestrzeń edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (Education Space for Security in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe), Pieczywok A., Soboń A., Wydawnictwo ASzWoj, Warsaw 2019. [6] Soboń A., Needs of non–military defence resources in scope of education– dilemmas of XXI century, Brasov 2018. [7] Soboń A., Proobonność RP. Teraźniejszość i przyszłość (Pro-defensiveness of the Republic of Poland. Present and Future), Wydawnictwo ASzWoj 2019.

250 SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN POLAND AS UNTAPPED DEFENCE RESOURCES

[8] Strategia Rozwoju Systemu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022 (Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022), M. P. z 2013 roku, poz. 377, Warsaw 2013. [9] Szafraniec T., Sytuacja prawna paramilitarnych organizacji proobronnych w Polsce (Legal Situation of Pro-defence Organizations in Poland) [w:]. Tomczak A., (red.), Rola organizacji proobronnych w systemie bezpieczeństwa państwa (The Role of Pro-defence Organizations in the National Security System), Warszawa 2016. [10] Sztompka P. (red.), Imponderabilia wielkiej zmiany: mentalność, wartości i więzi społeczne czasów transformacji, Warszawa-Kraków 1999. [11] Talaga A., Raport – Powszechna Obrona Terytorialna (Report - Common Territorial Defense), Związek Przedsiębiorców i Pracodawców Fundacja Warsaw Enterprise Institute, Warszawa 2015. [12] Tomaszewska N., Organizacje proobronne w polskim systemie prawnym – stan obecny i perspektywy. Analiza politologiczna i prawna (Pro-defense Organizations in the Polish Legal System - Current State and Perspectives. Political and Legal Analysis), Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem 2016, nr 2(7), Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski 2016. [13] Trejnis Z., Trejnis P., Przygotowania proobronne ludności w Polsce (Pro-defense Preparations of the Population in Poland) [w:] Bezpieczeństwo Europy – bezpieczeństwo Polski, Szwed-Walczak A., Lewkowicz Ł., Jędrzejski Ł., (red.), t. 3, Lublin 2016. [14] Trocha J., Obrona Cywilna – system ochrony ludności na przykładzie gminy Gozdowo (Civil Defense - Civil Protection System Based on the Example of the Gozdowo Commune), Część II, Obronność. Zeszyty Naukowe 2(10)/2014, Warszawa 2014. [15] Urych, I., Military class in Poland – experiences and perspectives, Security and Defence Quarterly, 2(11) 2016, Warsaw 2016. [16] Wywiał P., Potencjał organizacji pozarządowych w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa narodowego (The Potential of NGOs in the Field of National Security), Kośmider T., Wywiał P., (Praca n–b), Organizacja i funkcjonowanie społecznej bazy bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP. Rola organizacji proobronnych. Raport z badań (Organization and Functioning of the Social Base of National Security of the Republic of Poland. The Role of Pro-defense Organizations. Research Report), Warszawa 2017.

251 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING

Liviu-Daniel STRÂMBEANU

Ministry Of National Defense, Romania

Abstract: Considering the various constraints of political, economic and social nature, as well as the availability of limited resources, a reliable defence planning system should ensure the achievement of the defence policy objectives in the most effective and efficient way, seeking to make the best use of available resources. Additionally, taking into account that the defence planning process has a long-term horizon, appropriate consistency and continuity of policy objectives must be ensured in order to avoid undesired consequences on the long run that might translate in future unacceptable security risks.

Key words: planning; risks, efficiency, resources, objectives

1. Introduction The defence component is the centrepiece of the security construct for any state. Based on the values, aspirations, interests, geopolitical context and threat assessments, the defence policy provides the generic coordinates for ensuring the defence of one country in the form of defence policy objectives. Defence planning is the process designed for translating defence policy objectives into military and non-military capabilities. Moreover, the defence planning process has the role of ensuring the matching between the defence policy objectives and defence budget allocation, therefore ensuring the required balance between ambition and ability. In practical terms, defence planning seeks to ensure that a nation has the necessary forces, assets, facilities and capabilities to fulfil its defence-related tasks throughout the full spectrum of its missions, in peacetime, crisis and war. Considering the various constraints of political, economic and social nature, as well as the availability of limited resources, a reliable defence planning system should ensure the achievement of the defence policy objectives in the most effective and efficient way, seeking to make the best use of available resources. Additionally, taking into account that the defence planning process has a long-term horizon, appropriate consistency and continuity of policy objectives must be ensured in order to avoid undesired consequences on the long run that might translate in future unacceptable security risks.

2. The evolution of national defence planning The national defence planning in Romania was considered an exclusive military responsibility until the end of the 20th century. The political-military context of the 1990s brought up the need for addressing defence planning from a different perspective. This was required by the democratic evolution of the country, implying the civil control of the armed forces, the first deployment of Romanian forces in expeditionary operations, the Partner status of Romania in relationship with NATO, since the establishment of the Partnership

252 ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING for Peace (PfP) framework in 1994, and Romania’s aspirations to join the Alliance. Among other efforts Among other adaptations, the new approach to defence planning required an adequate legal framework which evolved progressively throughout the following two decades. The first step in this regard was done in 1998 when the Government issued an Order addressing the defence planning [1]. The initial legal framework was later approved by the Parliament in 2000 with some amendments. [2] The 1998 document referred to the “national defence planning of Romania” without defining an actual process. Instead, it established the main responsibilities for defence planning and identified the main documents representing the foundation for the national defence planning: the National Security Strategy, the Governing Programme, the Government White Paper on national security and defence, the Military Strategy of Romania and the strategies and directives of other governmental institutions with responsibilities for defence, public order and national security. The most significant amendment of the Parliament in 2000 was the inclusion of the Governing Programme among the national documents driving the defence planning. While the document did not provide any necessary guidance on how the defence planning should be performed, it introduced the term “programme” and delegated to the relevant departments the responsibility to issue internal instructions on how the defence planning will be actually performed. The new legal framework for defence planning allowed for the first National Security Strategy to be issued by the president and adopted by the Parliament in 2001. [3] For Romania, the transition from the NATO Partner status to the NATO Ally status in 2004 required a series of institutional adaptations and legal framework revisions, prior and even after the actual accession. Among the most relevant changes it is worth mentioning the revision of the Constitution, in 2003 aimed at ensuring the necessary legal basis for the future NATO membership and the later integration in the European Union. These changes made possible the transitioning to fully professional armed forces by suspending the conscription, participation to NATO collective defence and harmonising the national defence planning with the NATO defence planning process. Therefore, the revision of the Constitution implied the appropriate adaptation of the legislation on defence planning, which resulted in the adoption of a new law on defence planning in 2004. [4] The most evident change was noticed in the title of the new law. While the previous law was titled “The National Defence Planning of Romania”, the new law was titled simply “Defence Planning”. Defence planning was no longer defined as “activity” but a “complex of activities and measures aimed at promoting the national interests, defining and achieving the national security objectives related to defence”. The new definition implies the complexity of defence planning but does not define it as a process. Nevertheless, the document includes the term “defence planning process” without actually describing defence planning as a process. Another significant improvement was the introduction of six defence planning domains , in line with the existing planning domains identified by the NATO defence planning process at that time. Moreover, the intent to synchronise the national defence planning with the corresponding NATO process is demonstrated by other new elements. The term “NATO collective defence” is included in the document and the NATO Strategic Concept is mentioned among the foundation documents for defence planning. These new elements justify the title change, recognising that the defence planning was now extended beyond the national defence as it was previously the case. The foundation documents for defence planning are now classified on two levels: national and departmental. The National Defence Strategy is the capstone document for

253 ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING defence planning, complemented by the Governing Programme as the other national level reference for defence planning. At departmental level, besides the White Paper on Defence and the Military Strategy, the Defence Planning Guidance and the Major Programmes are explicitly mentioned among the department level instruments. By providing the periodicity of issuing the relevant documents, the legal framework suggests to some extent the cyclical nature of a defence planning process. However, if the initial law ensured a certain level of synchronisation and sequence of releasing the main documents (every four years), the new law seemed to make the synchronisation difficult as the provided deadlines had different references (inauguration of the president versus the inauguration of a new cabinet). Moreover, the Defence Planning Guidance and the Major Programmes had to be issued annually, in line with the annual budget cycle. In terms of responsibilities, the 2004 law identified the role of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC) regarding the endorsement of the relevant documents. Notwithstanding the overarching role and composition of the SDC, its coordinating role for ensuring the unity of effort of all government institutions with responsibilities related to the defence sector was no longer included in the Law on Defence Planning. Other changes aimed the time horizon for the documents driving the defence planning. While the time horizon for the former National Security Strategy and the subsequent documents, including the Programmes, was 4 years (considered medium term), but allowing for provisions on longer term, the time horizon for the National Defence Strategy introduced by the 2004 law was increased to 5 years. As opposed to the previous consistency in this regard, the other documents had different time horizons: 4 years for the White Paper on Defence and the Military Strategy and 6 years for the Defence Planning Guidance and the Major Programmes. In comparison, the NATO defence planning process at that time was a 4-years cyclic process with a time horizon of 10 years and beyond. Another worth-mentioning step ahead was made in 2006 through formalising the Defence Planning Council as the key decision body at the MOD level on matters of defence planning. [5] The most recent revision of the legal framework on defence planning resulted in a new law on defence planning in 2015 [6], aiming to incorporate the developments that occurred in the past decade. Since the adoption of the 2004 law, Romania became a NATO ally and a member of the European Union, the Romanian armed forces went through a significant transformation process, NATO revised its own defence planning process [7] and adopted a new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon summit in 2010 [8]. Meanwhile, the evolution of the security environment urged for a renewed approach for the Euro-Atlantic security resulting in a shift of focus back to collective defence for the Alliance. The new law defines defence planning as a process, recognising its transformational importance for the armed forces. Additionally, it brought several improvements and advances to the national defence planning. By introducing the “capabilities-based panning” concept, in accordance with the renewed NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), the law aimed to ensure better alignment and synchronization with the corresponding planning processes of NATO and EU. This change came in contrast with the previous approach in the NATO defence planning, when the process was focused exclusively on force planning addressing conventional forces, in complementarity to the nuclear planning which was subject to a separate process. Focusing the defence planning on capabilities rather than on formations and force elements, NDPP demonstrates a shift from the mainly quantitative aspects of the conventional power to the qualitative aspects of these forces and the desired effects that they are expected to produce. Therefore, defining the term “capability” in the national legal framework was a logical consequence.

254 ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING

Moreover, the 2015 law describes the components of the capability development efforts (doctrine, organisation, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability), recognising the complexity of the capability development effort and allowing for alignment with the NATO capability development methodology. Recognising the recent evolution in the military affairs, the changes in the security environment and the nature of modern military operations, as well as exploiting the experience from the recent and current deployed operations, the need for non-military capabilities was included in the new law. This was in line with the expanded list of planning domains , also included in the new law, some of which refer to components of the defence planning which are not necessarily related to military forces but rather to non- military capabilities. For this reason, the document provides the need to involve other institutions besides the Ministry of Defence (MoD), in the defence planning effort, in accordance with their respective responsibilities related to defence. The relationship between defence planning and operations planning was neither defined, nor clear in the previous versions of the law. This time, together with the introduction of the “capability-based planning” concept, where the capability is seen as the glue between the two inter-related processes, more clarity is provided with regard to this relationship. The Military Strategy is seen as the linking document between the two processes. Evaluation of defence is another new feature of the national defence planning process described by the 2015 law. No evaluation instruments were mentioned in the previous versions of the planning process. Nevertheless, the NATO defence planning process included a solid review component in both the old process - through Defence Requirements Review (DRR) overseen by the Defence Review Committee (DRC) - , as wellas in the new NDPP which dedicated the final step of the process to the review (Step 5 – Review Results). Besides the new elements introduced by the law as described above, some adaptations of the existing provisions provided more flexibility for defence planners. Firstly, the planning horizon for the Defence Planning Guidance and the Major Programmes was extended to 10 years, somehow in line with NDPP which is mostly focused on medium term. Secondly, the programming phase of PPBES was now provided with a 3 year budget estimate, allowing for a sustainable multi-annual programming. Additional flexibility is now ensured ast the legal provisions allow for the out-of-cycle review of the main defence planning documents, whenever conditions require.

3. - Enhancing The National Defence Planning Following the iterative evolution of the relevant legal framework and the inherent adaptations to the similar allied process, the national defence planning process continuously improved itself during the past two decades. Notwithstanding the improvements and benefits described in the previous chapter, some relevant shortfalls of the defence planning process and its associated legal framework persist. One first element that would be beneficial for the further improvement of the national defence process is the clear definition of a structured process. Obviously, this would not be subject to another update of the legal framework but rather a result of a department level effort of the MOD. A structured defence planning process should allow for the identification of national capability requirements, closely correlated with the national operations planning, ensuring appropriate synchronisation with NDPP. Certain NDPP elements could be also applied “as is” in a national planning process (e.g. Capability Hierarchy Framework, Capability Codes and Capability Statements). Moreover, such a process might trigger a change in mindset for the national planners, still focussed more on forces than on capabilities.

255 ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING

After the first introduction of the defence planning domains in 2004, the MOD was able to integrate all the planning domains with the exception of civil emergency planning which was regulated separately. Moreover, the MOD established the necessary entities to ensure this integrated approach to defence planning (Integrated Defence Planning Directorate and the Defence Planning Council). The expanding of the defence planning domain implied by the introduction of NDPP, materialised through the 2015 defence planning law, introduced several new planning domains that involve other governmental bodies. However, no dedicated body is designated as the overarching integrator of the defence planning domain. Considering its composition and responsibilities, the SDC would be in the best position to be assigned this role, as decision-making body. Subsequently, appropriate expert level inter-institutional mechanisms would be necessary to support this integration effort at the working level. Another mandatory improvement of the national defence planning process would be te introduction of an end-of-cycle review. Currently, the 2015 law describes the evaluation of defence planning, conducted annually, at the Major Programme level. This is reflected in the annual reports of the MOD in front of the SDC. Additionally, the conclusions of the biennial review conducted within the NDPP cycle are also presented to the SDC. Nevertheless, an end-of- cycle review to take stock of the status of national defence planning at the end of one cycle, informing the next cycle as essential input, is not conducted. A defence review mechanism to include all the institutions involved in various defence planning domains, could be the final stage of a structured national defence planning process as described in the previous paragraphs.

4. Strategic Defence Review Besides the regular defence review required to be conducted as part of the defence planning process at the end of each cycle, a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) could be conducted whenever necessary, as an out-of-cycle review. A Strategic Defence Review conducted with a whole-of-government approach and led by the MOD would have to look at the following aspects: - The strategic approach to defence - Security priorities in a changing world - Defence missions and tasks - Deterrence and defence posture - The future shape of the armed forces - Outline of the defence policy - Strategic approach to procurement and resources - Human capital of the armed forces. The results of a Strategic Defence Review would serve as a vehicle to ensure the political buy-in of the Parliament, Presidency, Government and the social buy-in of the citizens. It could also serve as an excellent transparency instrument towards the allies and strategic partners, as well as the large public. Obviously, the defence planning would benefit the most from a Strategic Defence Review, since it would provide a baseline for the following defence planning cycles and formulation of clear objectives for the next ten years. Therefore, the transformational role of an SDR for the defence sector must not be disregarded. A Strategic Defence Review should be conducted when certain conditions are met, in a similar way to the outstanding review of the defence planning documents, provided by the 2015 law. While an SDR could be requested by the high-level bodies (Parliament, Government, President, SDC), it should normally be a pro-active initiative of the MOD. In order to cover all the defence planning domains described by the legal framework, the SDR

256 ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING should involve in a holistic manner all the institutions involved in the process with various levels of responsibilities. The existing geostrategic context, together with certain conditions that are being met throughout 2019, indicate a window of opportunity for conducting an SDR. Some of the most relevant arguments supporting this idea are: - The recent evolution of the security threats and challenges in the region; - The end of a national defence planning cycle (a new cycle will start in 2020); - The requirement to develop and release a new National Defence Strategy in early 2020; - The end of an NDPP cycle with the results of the review available in 2019; - The release of a new NATO Political Guidance, triggering a new NDPP cycle; - The approval of the very first NATO Military Strategy; - New national strategies related to defence; - The review of some essential national and allied operational plans and documents; The need to define the security profile of Romania for the next decade and its relevance for the Black Sea Region

5. Conclusion The current national defence planning process is the result of an evolution stretched throughout the past two decades. This evolution was largely influenced by the political- military transformation of Romania until reaching its maturity as a NATO ally and the need to synchronise the national defence planning with NDPP. While the existing legal framework ensures the prerequisites for conducting the national defence planning, a structured capability-based defence planning process, at national level, is yet to be defined. In spite of its successive revisions and updates, the national defence planning process can be further improved. Focusing the process on capabilities rather than forces, better integrating the defence planning domains in a whole of government approach, and including an end-of-cycle review phase at the end of each planning cycle would be some of the necessary improvements. When conditions require, a Strategic Defence Review could be conducted as an out-of-cycle comprehensive review. The SDR would provide a baseline for the future defence planning cycle and would have a transformational importance by generating meaningful long-term objectives. Considering the existing geostrategic context, together with certain conditions that are being met, the year 2019represents a window of opportunity for conducting an SDR for Romania.

References: [[1] Ordonanța Guvernului nr. 52 din 12 august 1998 privind planificarea apărării naționalea României, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României nr. 302 din 18.08 1998. [2] Legea nr. 63 din 24 aprilie 2000 pentru aprobarea Ordonanței Guvernului nr. 52 din 12 august 1998 privind planificarea apărării naționalea României, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României nr. 185 din 28.04 2000. [3] Hotararea Parlamentului Nr. 36 din 18 decembrie 2001 privind adoptarea Strategiei de securitate nationala a Romaniei, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României nr. 822 din 20 decembrie 2001. [4] Legea nr. 473 din 4 noiembrie 2004 privind planificarea apărării, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României nr. 1052 din 12.11 2004.

257 ENHANCING NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING

[5] Legea nr. 346 din 21 iulie 2006 privind organizarea și funcționarea Ministerului Apărării Naționale, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României, Partea I, nr. 654 din 28 iulie 2006. [6] Legea nr. 203 din 16 iulie 2015 privind planificarea apărării, publicată în Monitorul Oficial al României nr. 555 din 27.07 2015. [7] Outline Model for a NATO Defence Planning Process) approved by the North-Atlanic Council on 2 April 2009. [8] “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon - Active Engagement, Modern Defence.

258 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” th th Braşov, November 7 -8 2019

THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Halina ŚWIEBODA, Assoc. Prof.

National Security Faculty, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract: Forecasting techniques can be helpful in planning the future for various business entities, administrations and for creating a state vision. Among the many available techniques, only a few are needed for strategic planning of the state. Other forecasting methods may be useful for other more specialized entity functions. There are no forecasting techniques that could predict the future in any way. They are useful in narrowing the scope of future entity options to make decisions about the future. In the context of strategic planning, the following forecasting models are used: time series forecasts, scenario writing and Delphi technique. Scenario planning, scenario thinking, or scenario analysis is an approach used in strategic planning, which is used as a tool to develop more robust and flexible long- term plans. Used in forecasting, it is sometimes referred to as scenario writing and is used to generate different imagined results, based on different sets of initial conditions and anticipated trends in key strategic factors. The decision maker then makes the decision on the most likely outcome from the many scenarios presented.

Key words: forecasting methods; strategic planning; scenario; decision;

1. Introduction “Who predicts, draws conclusions about the past based on data not determined by future decisions and his utterances are statements claiming that probably, it should be this or that way. In turn, utterances of the planning person are not at all statements but proposals to act in this or that way, proposals to do something that is determined by future decisions.” [Kotarbiński, 1961, p. 47] This quotation contains the difference between the forecasting and planning processes. Oftentimes, these processes are confused. It is worth to emphasise that a plan is not a forecasting tool but a management tool where the desired level is determined, and not the forecast one. [Świeboda, 2017, p. 218] In a forecast, we seek the answer to the question about the possible and probable phenomena (processes, trends, events) in the future determined by the forecast horizon. In strategic planning, we seek the answer to the question hot to act today to ensure the best preparation for the future. The strategic approach is characteristic of the so-called soft system analysis. [Sienkiewicz, 1994] This approach is dominated by the pragmatics of using forecasting, foretelling the future for clearly formulated goals and undertaking specific actions aimed at facing the challenges of the future of the safety environment. The forecast level and time of goal implementation are determined owing to forecasts, often based on scenario options. Both these processes are tightly interconnected. The high number of entities and their complex interrelations, the fast pace of information exchange that often proves confusing, determine the difficulties and limitations in forecasting and planning processes. Forecasting methods are extremely important for the quality of planning processes. From among numerous research tools one can reach for anyone that is considered accurate by us, researchers. In strategic planning, it is essential to reach for both classic forecasts and scenarios that ensure an analytical approach to causes and effects of phenomena and allow one to understand why this happens. Forecasts can be verified at the moment when it is executed. Scenarios cannot be confirmed in a way conventional forecasts

259 THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING are confirmed. The advantage of scenarios lies in presenting the range of uncertainty that results from the set of possible perspectives. At present, which is the best solution according to the Author and, at the same time, also points to the complex nature of substantive and methodological issues in prognostics is the possibility to compile various research approaches. This opinion stems from the Author’s own research experience. Errors caused by wrong assumptions of a single method, sometimes incomplete or erroneous data were reduced by advantages of another method. The rise in the number of methods and employment of various types of data in research improves the accuracy of forecasts. [Batchelor, Dua, 1995, pp 1-187] In this approach, an essential condition is the stage in which results are averaged [Armstrong, 2006, pp. 583-598], meaning that the overall forecasting error cannot be bigger than the mean of errors from prognoses devised using other methods.

2. Conditions of forecasting and strategic planning in modern security environment Strategic planning is a process that usually covers a period of 3 up to 5 years, yet the time perspective is by far longer since the temporality prism is long-term. We look at planning in a prognostic perspective of 10, 20 and 30 years, and sometimes even longer. For a period that is this log we design long-term future scenarios trying to guess based on the present data the phenomena that will follow as a result. The modern security environment and that of any business activity is characterised by dynamics that has not been seen before. [Davis, 2014] This exceptional pace has been caused primarily by information communication technologies (ICT) that ‘took over’ any space that could be digitalised or adhered to the needs of effective and efficient management. Modern technologies support the development of forecasting and planning and allow one to address planning-related problems based on forecasting and modelling of possible and probable phenomenon development scenarios on a national, regional and global level. The modern security environment is characterised by features such as complexity, which means that we are dealing with a high number and a great diversity of interoperable elements and uncertainty that is expressed as a limited capacity to predict future functioning conditions and dynamics of events. The knowledge and also the answer to questions what processes that alter the arrangement and nature of selected identifiable phenomena (megatrends, trends) occur in it and the participants and the strength of their interaction provides a rudiment for creating scenarios. Uncertainty is determined by the dynamics of changes, the quantity of elements and their interrelations. This obviously changes security conditions and distorts many forecasting and planning processes. Despite numerous imitations and difficulties, both forecasting and planning processes act as the basis of effective and efficient management of any system. This is evidences by results obtained by, e.g. some companies and organisations where anticipation/anticipatory and prospective approach is widely used (e.g. Royal Dutch Shell). Sometimes, organisations experience difficulties with developing alternative strategies for coping with adverse conditions (hazards). One of the techniques that might help is the use of scenarios.

3. Modern forecasting and strategic planning In practice, forecasting and planning processes intertwine, resulting in difficulties in determining the border between them. They are like two complementary tracks with the exception that planning refers to acting while a forecast reflects possible activities. Effective and efficient administration or management of a state including management of security systems require planning aimed at organising the future activity under the condition of

2

260 THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING uncertainty. This refers to forecasting in the meaning given by, e.g. H. Fayol [Fayol, 1947], that forecasting means both to assess the future and to prepare for it. In prognostics, it is necessary to employ anticipatory thinking, that is, to have the ability to notice unordinary events and coincidence of independent phenomena and also the ability to foresee further consequences of proposed solutions. Another essential competence is the ability to think prospectively that is characterised by designing activities with the future in mind, which has certain features of planning. The ability to notice events, processes and their consequences in the stage of the so-called ‘weak signals’ [Świeboda, 2017, p. 176] that in the interconnectedness of many others may turn into a trend that gives the phenomenon dynamics of growth or demise is a valuable competence. It pertains to the situation of designing system- preserving activities even more (e.g. the political, social or the economic systems) with the future in mind to evade hazards or to minimise their consequences. A clear dependence of anticipatory thinking and prospective thinking takes place with regard to the process of planning system activities that require both short-term and long-term forecasting. System solutions for strategic prognostic activities indicate the choice of approach in which scenario forecasting is combined with a policy of the selected public area in the meaning of distant future (a long-term forecast) and another type of a scenario applicable in hazard assessment. [Świeboda, 2017, p. 191] Hence, forecasting of phenomena, processes, evets significant for security of, e.g. the state should cover the following two stages: (1) strategic forecasting; (2) short-term hazard analysis. Transformations in the modern world render the prospective approach essential as the necessary dimension of thinking and decision-making, as a requirement of rationality involved in future consequences of today’s choices. [Zacher, 2013, p. 5] It is assumed that anticipation constitutes an economic and epistemic value, whereas prospective speculation is important for the dynamics of processes that create new socio-technical networks of cooperation. [Sienkiewicz, 1983, p. 27] We cannot forget that we operate in a world ridden with uncertainty. Scenario forecasting should ensure (Table 1).

Advantages Description Decisions taken on the strategic level of the state governing Reducing the risk of system and their consequences of key importance for secure erroneous decisions and stable socio-economic development; In order to prevent cases of the so-called physical and temporal coercion that stands for the necessity to take decisions under time pressure when the possibility to engage in scrupulous Creating space for future reflection, discussion and research is restrained, with the risk activities of taking poorly thought-out actions that might result in the occurrence of various new hazards, particularly with the domino effect; Reducing the system Owing to recognition, identification and diagnosis it is possible complexity and its to implement stabilisation methods of acting in long term, relations with the integrate specific decisions with due regard to factors that environment restrict how the state operates in areas significant for security. Table 1. Advantages of scenario forecasting

Strategic planning is a process of formulating a set of alternative paths or options for achieving a specified ser of goals including the procedure of systematic comparison and assessment. [Ayres, 1969, p. 162] In the traditional approach, efforts have been made to eliminate uncertainty from planning, assuming that there are experts capable of identifying the most probable future; at present, uncertainty is considered an unavoidable element, which requires ongoing strategy modification. [Bogdanienko, 2005] Planning in which forecasting with the use

3

261 THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING of scenarios is employed constitutes a way more convincing means for implementing goals of an organisation or a state. It forces people to reflect on the future. The process of a strategic approach to the future comprises eight stages of acting correlated with the forecasting process, namely: 1. Determining a multi-variant vision of the future. 2. Setting the goal for every analysed option. 3. Choosing the way (method) of implementing the goal of overarching priority in the said option (the so-called roadmap). 4. Selecting priorities that ensure effective implementation of the adopted goal. 5. Allocating available developmental measures to specific goals (in accordance with priorities). 6. Designing comprehensive strategic actions necessary for implementing the goal. 7. Scheduling, that is, determining the order of actions. 8. Assigning responsibility to performers of the said actions together with the implementation schedule. Meeting requirements set out for strategies is not easy. For strategies are oriented at adjusting to future needs of trends. [Świeboda, 2017, p. 70] Formal planning should begin with determining the ‘final’ goals. Goal analysis and determination have long been considered an important step in formal strategic planning. Unfortunately, goal identification is a difficult step for an organisation. One of the methods for ensuring that a goal analysis is comprehensive is to use the stakeholders’ approach. Stage one concerns making an output base for the necessary information acquired in the course of a diagnosis by distinguishing a set of conditions that exist in the present. It is the so-called environment scanning, which provides knowledge on the current situation; various indicators, legal provisions, regulations, prognoses and reports are collected. Also, identification and assessment of the own security system are performed. Scenarios constitute a set of potential strains of events created based on a set of information extracted during the diagnosis of the environment and the interior of any system (organisation, state) supported by imagination and intuition. The main principle is to combine research of the existing trends (megatrends) with a set of desired values and an analysis of possible and probable hazards. Specific scenarios vary in terms of assumptions concerned with uncertain events. Scenarios have to meet certain criteria, namely: - They have to be probable, which is obviously a result of a subjective assessment of the team who creates scenarios and borders between what seems possible can be perceived differently; this means that it has to logically stem from a past or present situation; - They have to be consistent and logical, that is, they should interconnect phenomena in the course of a cause-and-effect analysis; - They have to provide the knowledge necessary for taking strategic decisions; - They have to be structurally variable, meaning that differences between them have to be significant and cannot be barely a variation of one base case; - They should constitute a challenge for the traditional way of thinking to evoke creativity and expand mental horizons. [Ralson, Wilson, 2006, p. 121]

4

262 THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Fig. 1. Relations in the planning and forecasting processes

Various methods can be applied in the planning process. Planning processes are based on the information extracted during a diagnosis that is collected in a data bank and also in the course of forecasts concerned with foreseen phenomena in the future. The two-way arrow from “data, information” to “Planning processes” indicates that a planning process determines to a large extent the type of required information. It is recommended to commence formal planning from the planning process setting goals) and not from the data. A planning process forms a set of plans. It is in these plans that goals and alternative strategies are described. One strategy is selected as the basis for action. It might happen that in practice, actions may vary from the intended strategy. This is why evaluating a strategy is necessary. The process should be monitored, and the record of results should complement the data set. [Armstrong, 1983, pp. 339-352] An equivalent process is forecasting. Making forecasts requires familiarity with the information about the proposed strategies (hence the arrow from “Plans” to “Forecasting process - methods”). Therefore, analysing forecasting methods may help determine which data are required (and hence the two-way arrow from “Data and information” to “Forecasting methods”). Information on the proposed strategies allows one to prepare forecasts and answer the following questions: - Will the event “Z” occur under specific conditions and what is the probability of its occurrence? - Will the event “Z” occur in a specific timeframe “Tz” and what is the probability of its occurrence? - Will the event “Z” precede the event “Z2”? - When will the event “Z” occur? - If it occurs in the timeframe “Tz”, when will “Z2” take place? - When will “Z” and “Z2” occur simultaneously (coincidence)? What is the certainty we get from the formulated forecast? These are obviously examples of questions about the future. Next, the formulated forecasts are used as input data for the planning process.

5

263 THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING One should pay attention to differentiate between forecasting and planning. Planning ensures strategies with due account of specific forecasts, whereas forecasting estimates the results with due account of the plan. Planning is related to that which we should do. Forecasts/scenarios pertain to that which will happen if we make an attempt to implement a given strategy in a “possible” (predictable) environment. Forecasting also facilitates determining the probability of possible environments. Alternative strategies may improve the capacity and flexibility of any system to adapt to the changing situation in the security environment in two ways. 1. Choosing from among alternative strategies one that exceeds the current one; 2. Owing to alternative plans, in the case of a change of conditions in the environment, react faster and more effectively and adapt the system in a flexible manner to new conditions. Considerations as part of the process of making scenarios are, for instance, a scenario that describes a situation at the moment when a specific hazard occurs with the question: what will happen with the security system given the current strategy? Another scenario is the image of the desired future. The question we are looking for an answer to is a question about the actions one has to take to attain the set goal in the future. It is the moment when one should consider changing, e.g. resources (type, size, quantity, origin) or apply alternative strategies.

3. Conclusion From a methodological point of view, there is no great difference regarding how methodological principles are approached by various authors who represent research trends in forecasting and strategic planning. Great disputes regarding methodological foundations have already taken place before circa 1980s. At present, there still is competition in the field of a more ambitious application, creation of oftentimes highly sophisticated prognostic models for the use and verifiability of forecasts, and in strategic planning a tighter interrelation of processes. [Świeboda, 2015] The scope of forecast phenomena is impressive. The main factor that differentiates approaches and methods is, in fact, the forecast horizon, i.e. time for which a forecast is made. In line with the classification determined by temporality, there are works related to the classical forecasting of economic and commercial phenomena that are functioning, which deal with predicting based on micro and macro econometric models and time series, as well as works that present forecasting in the meaning of studies on the future aimed at diagnosing (identifying) and foreseeing global, regional and national trends, tendencies and phenomena. Scenarios selected on the basis of research identify uncertainties, hazards and also challenges and opportunities. It should be stressed that the paradigm for reflecting on the future has changed; at present, it does not concern speculations that might accidentally prove true but a reliable scientific analysis whose results will allow one to design alternative stories (scenarios) and properly adapt to them, since theorization on the subject of the future serves a specific idea, for instance: - to form a strategy, - to provide long-term planning, - to design a long-term and a medium-term strategy, - to create operational strategies. If we base the scenarios we create on a thorough statistical analysis of phenomena (processes, trends), the images will be roughly consistent, whereas if we assign meaning and we can identify the so-called weak signals, we can prepare for the so-called “black swans”.1 Planning ensures strategies with due account of specific forecasts, while forecasting estimates results with due account of the plan. Planning is related to that which we should do. Forecasts

1 The term was coined by N. N. Taleb in the book Czarny łabędź. O skutkach nieprzewidywalnych zdarzeń, Kurhaus Publishing, 2015; it refers to exceptionally rare events located at the very end of the distribution of probability that exerts enormous impact on the environment and the world, causing, e.g. global financial crises. 6

264 THE IMPORTANCE OF FORECASTING IN STRATEGIC PLANNING pertain to that which will take place if an entity undertakes an attempt to implement a given strategy in a possible environment. Forecasting also facilitates determining the likelihood of possible environments. Practice shows that effective operation is characteristic of entities who can forecast changes in the environment and develop plans for responding to problems in a flexible manner. Critics of the formal approach to forecasting and planning refer to limitations and error of both processes. The main accusation is the overly dynamic pace of changes in the international environment and also internal instability of systems, which make conventional strategic planning virtually impossible. The observations and the case analysis indicate a possibility to reconcile the ‘design-oriented’ approach and the ‘process-oriented’ approach with strategy formulation. In turn, in forecasting there are proposals to avoid this type of errors by improving the efficiency of forecasting and thus that of planning.

References [1] Armstrong J.S., Findings from evidence-based forecasting: methods for reducing forecast error. International Juornal of Forecasting 22, 2006. [2] Armstrong, J. S., Strategic Planning and Forecasting Fundamentals, 1983, Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/ marketing_papers/123; Oliver, J. J. and Parrett, E. (2018), “Managing future uncertainty: reevaluating the role of scenario planning”, Business Horizons, Vol. 61 No. 2. [3] Ayres Robert U., Technological Forecatsting and Long-Range Planning, McGraw - Hill, 1969, USA. [4] Batchelor R. & Dua P., Forecaster Diversity and the Benefits of Combining Forecasts, Management Science, Volume 41, Issue no. 1, January 1995. [5] Bogdanienko J., W Pogoni za nowoczesnością – Wybrane aspekty tworzenia i wprowadzania zmian, Towarzystwo Naukowe Organizacji i Kierownictwa - Stowarzyszenie Wyższej Użyteczności “Dom wewnętrznie Organizatora”, Toruń 2008. [6] Davis P.K., Analysis to Inform Defense Planning Despite Austerity. USA: RAND Corporation 2014. [7] Fayol H., Administracja przemysłowa i ogólna. Księgarnia Wł. Wilak, Poznań 1947. [8] Kotarbiński T., Walory dobrego planu, Nauka Polska issue no. 1, 1961. [9] Ralson B., Wilson I., The Scenario Planning – Handbook, Developing Strategies in Uncertain Times, Cengage Learning Inc, Mason, Ohio, 2006. [10] Sienkiewicz P., Analiza systemowa. Podstawy i zastosowania, Bellona, Warsaw 1994. [11] Sienkiewicz P., Inżynieria systemów, Wyd. MON, Warsaw, 1983. [12] Świeboda H., Prognozowanie scenariuszowe w analizie systemowej [w:] Nie - bezpieczny świat, systemy – informacja – bezpieczeństwo, redakcja naukowa: P. Sienkiewicz, H. Świeboda, E. Szczepaniuk, Wyd. AON Warsaw 2015. [13] Świeboda H., Prognozowanie zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, ASZWoj, Warsaw 2017. [14] Zacher L., Transformacje świata ludzi (próba rozpoznania i interpretacji), TRANSFORMACJE” 1-2 (76-77) 2013.

7

265 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

Professor Ileana TACHE PhD

Transilvania University, Brasov, Romania

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the Security and Defense Policy of the European Union (EU) and to identify its present and future challenges in the context of the tense international climate. Using an explorative policy analysis of the main stages of the EU Security and Defense Policy and the main findings discovered in the relevant literature overview, this paper is structured as follows: it presents first a brief history of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), then it investigates the role of the Lisbon Treaty in consolidating EU’s crisis management apparatus and comments the EU Global Strategy as an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; in the end, the paper concludes by averting the future challenges of the European security and defense and by stressing the need of a thorough reform of the EU security and defense policy, including a European Defense Union, the creation of a European army, a better pooling of EU member states military resources and a stronger EU-NATO cooperation.

Key words: EU-NATO cooperation; Common Security and Defense Policy; Lisbon Treaty

1. Brief history of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU The military aspects and the idea of a common security and defense policy were not included in the founding Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957 and effective from 1 January 1958 and forming, together with the , the constitutional basis of the EU. All the foreign and security policy issues were discussed under NATO’s larger umbrella and the Marshall plan, designed to shape Europe’s future by impeding the spread of communism in Western Europe and favoring the developing of free market economies. NATO represented, in the post-war period, a solid organization opposing the Warsaw Pact - signed the by the communist countries (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and German Democratic Republic) in 1955. The Schuman Plan itself, proposed by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 in order to create a single authority to control the production of resources used in the arms production (coal and steel) was a response to US insistence. A first step in creating a common security and defense policy is the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) by the French Prime Minister René , again following the US call for West Germany’s rearmament. This community was thought to include France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Unfortunately, it could not be realized because of lack of ratification by the French Parliament. The Gaullists rejected the plan – considering the EDC as a threat to France’s national sovereignty, and the Communists as well – because of the tying of France to the

266 SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY capitalist US. Meanwhile, Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, and the end of the Korean War in the same year, faded the concerns regarding conflicts and military aspects. Only in 1969, with the occasion of Hague Summit, the European leaders expressed a stance more interested in foreign policy and, as a result, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was promoted a year later, in 1970. This was intended to coordinate foreign policy of the European Community, but having an intergovernmental character, was overseen by the members of the Council of Ministers. Much later, the Single European Act of 1986 gave an EPC official recognition. A coordination of member states foreign policies was considerably helped by the foundation of the European Council in 1974. However, cooperation in this field was impeded by different positions the European Community states, such as those regarding the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 and, generally, all the Middle East issues. The years 1970 and 1980 witnessed a Western Europe of “civilian power”. According to Duchêne (1973) – one of the most famous scholars of civilian power in Europe – the European Economic Community should continue to remain as a civilian group, long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces. This idea corresponds to the general orientation of the early 1970’s, when the significance of military power was diminishing at the same pace as economics were growing. Twichett (1976) also argued that the European Community impact on the international arena had been via diplomatic influence and trade, rather than via military power. This is the reason why security and defense issues could not be put on the European agenda, Western Europe emphasizing diplomatic, rather than coercive, instruments during this period (Tache, 2015). Cooperation in the foreign policy field proved then necessary in the context of some worrying external events, such as: Iranian revolution of 1979, Polish crisis and Solidarity mass movement of 1980-1981 or Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Afterwards, the foreign and security policy really restated its importance in 1989, with the German unification and anti-communist revolutions of Central and Eastern Europe. The post-cold war period was to bring the European enlargement, with newly resulted external borders and new divisions on the European continent, that called a radical transformation of the EU strategic priorities. The need for a common foreign and security policy was also triggered by the quite different stances of EU countries as regards Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Yugoslavian crisis of 1990-1998. In June 1992 ministers of Western European Union1 (WEU) met at Hotel Petersberg, near Bonn in Germany and adopted the , which defined some military tasks of a humanitarian, disarming, peacekeeping and peacemaking nature that the WEU would be empowered to do (, 1992). The

1 The Western European Union was the international organization and military alliance that followed the (WU) after the 1954 amendment of the 1948 . The WEU implemented the Modified Brussels Treaty. During the Cold War, the Western Bloc included the WEU member states and the United States as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the turn of the 21st century, after the end of the Cold War, WEU tasks and institutions were gradually transferred to the EU, providing central parts of the EU's new military component, the European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This process was completed in 2009 when a solidarity clause between the member states of the EU, which was similar (but not identical) to the WEU's mutual defense clause, entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon. The states that had signed the Modified Treaty of Brussels consequently decided to terminate that treaty on 31 March 2010, with all the WEU's remaining activities to be ceased within 15 months. On 30 June 2011, the WEU was officially declared defunct.

267 SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY contents and responsibilities arising from the declaration, known as the Petersberg Tasks, were later transferred to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), presently known as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was finally established by the Maastricht Treaty signed in February 1992 and entered into force in November 1993. This policy replaced EPC and became one of the three pillars of the EU, the others being the European Community and Justice and Home Affairs. The Maastricht Treaty stated the following objectives of the CFSP (Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities, 1992): - To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the EU - To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states - To preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Act (which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: a forum for all the nations of Europe as well as the United States and Canada) - To promote international cooperation - To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. As the Maastricht Treaty’s objectives failed to be accomplished during the Bosnia- Herzegovina war, the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 2 October 1997 and effective from 1 May 1999, tried to improve the CFSP by introducing the following policy instruments: - Principles and guidelines (adopted by the European Council) to provide general political direction - Common strategies (adopted by the European Council) to provide an umbrella under which the Council could adopt actions and common positions by qualified majority voting (except those with military and defense implications). Common strategies would set out “the objectives, duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the member states” in areas of mutual interest - Joint actions (adopted by the European Council) were refined to address specific situations requiring “operational action”, including a revised list of their possible contents. The Council could request that the Commission submit proposals to ensure the proper implementation of joint actions. - Common positions (adopted by the European Council) were also refined to “define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature”. The importance of the CFSP was then enhanced by the Nice Treaty signed in 2001 and the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 (European Communities, 2009). But, in the early 1999 Serbia’s president Milošević placed his military forces in Kosovo and the European leaders, in order to avoid another disaster, decided to create the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which focused mainly on international crisis and conflict management and constitutes an integral part if CFSP. The last EU Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon) brought significant implications for CFSP/ESDP, which will be fully described in the next section. Box 1 presents a chronological list of the main important European defense events. Box 1: Chronology of EU Security and Defense Policy 1949 - The U.S., Canada and European countries set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a U.S.-led military alliance.

268 SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

1950 - The European Defense Community is proposed as a European alternative to NATO to incorporate West Germany and create a European army, a joint budget and shared arms. 1954 - The French parliament rejects the European Army plan. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and UK form the Western European Union, a common defense group with a shared air force and joint command. 1993 - The EU’s Maastricht Treaty redefines European integration and introduces a Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of its goals, allowing European governments to take joint action in foreign policy. 1998 – UK and France agree to common defense in the Saint-Malo Declaration, and London pledges to play a central role in the security and defense policy of the European Union. 2003 - The European Union launches its first independent military mission outside of Europe, , with United Nations backing, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2004 - The European Defense Agency is formed to help EU governments develop their military capabilities. 2007 - Rapid-reaction forces of about 1,500 soldiers, called EU Battlegroups, are formed under control of the Council of the European Union. However, they are never used. 2009 - The EU’s Lisbon Treaty strengthens the Common Foreign and Security Policy, creating an EU foreign policy chief. 2011 - France and UK lead a campaign to oust Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi but cannot impose no-fly zone without U.S. aircraft, munitions. 2017 - More than 20 EU governments sign a defense pact to integrate military planning, weapons development and operations that will rely on a 5 billion-euro ($5.83 billion) defense fund. The Role of Lisbon Treaty in consolidating EU’s crisis management apparatus Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009. Its purpose was to make the EU more democratic, more efficient and better able to address global problems, such as climate change, with one voice. The main changes brought by Lisbon Treaty were: more power for the European Parliament, change of voting procedures in the Council, citizens' initiative, a permanent president of the European Council, a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, a new EU diplomatic service. The Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe (2004) – with aims similar to the Lisbon Treaty – was signed but never ratified. After the proposal for the EU Constitution failed, the Lisbon Treaty took the formulation of common defense, incorporating it to the Article 42.7. Another improvement for deepening defense cooperation among the EU member states is called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and it is designed to make European defense more efficient and effective. Once PESCO is established, it develops into the permanent institution of the EU and decisions made within this framework become obligatory. A novelty brought by the Lisbon Treaty in the field of security and foreign affairs was that of introducing the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High Representative (HR) was to be double-hatted as a Vice President of the European Commission and be supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS)2. This combination of the functions of HR and Vice-President of the European Commission is indeed one of the key innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. As Wessel (2016) notices, the potential impact of this combination on the role of the EU in international

2 EEAS comprises staff from the Council, the Commission and national diplomatic services.

269 SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY affairs lies in the fact that there could be a more natural attuning of different external policies, in particular where borders between policies are fuzzy, such as in crisis management. Another notable change brought by the Lisbon Treaty is the implementation of a mutual assistance clause which reads like a mutual defense clause in that it states “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power…” (European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, 2010). At the same time, the ESDP was replaced by the CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy), with the following new tasks: joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and tasks in post-conflict stabilization. In the CSDP implementation, Lisbon Treaty acknowledges the potential intervention of multinational forces, which are the result of the military alliance between certain EU member states and their decision to combine capacities, equipment, and personal strength (Tache, 2015). The main “Euroforces” are presented in Box 2.

Box 2: The main “Euroforces” acknowledged by the Treaty of Lisbon  Eurofor, regrouping land forces between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal  , regrouping land forces between Germany, Belgium, Spain, France and Luxembourg  Euromarfor, regrouping maritime forces between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal  The , regrouping air forces between Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Even though the Lisbon Treaty introduced major institutional reforms in the field of security and defense, authors like Charalampous (2010) addressed the question: “does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text?” This is because, despite all innovations, CSDP goes on with having an intergovernmental character and defense still remains a national, rather than a European issue.

2. EU Global Strategy and the integrated approach to conflicts and crises In June 2016, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy was launched in order to build a stronger Europe. This great initiative was determined by the challenges faced by the EU in the tense international climate, when the purpose, even the existence of the EU is being questioned. The strategic priorities of the EU Global Strategy were decided by EU Foreign ministers in October 2016 and they concern: security and defense, building state and societal resilience, taking an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, strengthening cooperative regional orders and a rules-based global governance. They were triggered by the tensions of the present period. As stressed by Federica Mogherini in the foreword to the EU Global Strategy3, the European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy is being questioned. To the East, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global Growth,

3 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (June 2016), available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

270 SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships- enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. The main achievement of the EU Global Strategy is an integrated approach to conflicts. The EU is assumed to engage in peacebuilding and fostering human security through an integrated approach. The European leaders acknowledged that implementing a comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. But the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ are to be expanded. According to the new Global Strategy, the EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding decisively to crises, investing in stabilization, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis appears. The EU will also act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster and support (European Union Global Strategy, pp. 9-10). As regards collective defense issues, the EU Global Strategy considers NATO as remaining the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations are viewed as to not prejudicing the security and defense policy of those EU members states which are not in NATO. The EU cooperation with NATO will be developed in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. All the aspects presented above demonstrate that the EU Global Strategy was conceived as a pledge to remain together as a Union in order to contribute to the global security and defense.

3. Instead of conclusions: the future challenges of the European security Taking into account the overarching view on the current state of EU security and defense presented in this paper and the challenges of the international climate, including all the last political events, such as Brexit, conflicts in the European neighborhood, terrorism, migration, foreign policies of the US and Russia, a thorough reform of the EU security and defense policy results as necessary. The historical survey of the EU common foreign and security policy evolution shows that, despite being a major global actor, the EU still fails to exert its influence in the field of security and defense. As long as the member states have the veto right in making decisions linked to military forces, the EU cannot speak with a single voice in international conflicts. At present, it seems that the traditional role of the EU as a soft power should be replaced by that of hard power. A military integration and a viable European defense community, even the creation of a European army, could significantly help this process. All these are important issues to be included on the agenda of the new European leaders – members of the European Parliament and of the European Commission, president of the European Council and EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. An EU-NATO stronger cooperation could also contribute to an enhanced European security and defense, taking into consideration that the recent security problems like terrorism, cyber attacks or hybrid threats need to be tackled together. A joint action of the two groups is called, at the same time, by the fact that there are 21 EU countries who are also NATO members.

271 SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY

A European Defense Union represents, undoubtedly, an ambitious project and the idea of a European army is largely seen as non-feasible in the relevant literature (Bugyi, 2017). Nonetheless, the tense international political context requires a new approach in the near future focused on creating a security and defense community and a better pooling of EU member states military resources.

References: [1] Bugyi, L. (2017), Rethinking European Defense – The Future of the EU CSDP, Master Thesis, Master of International Security and Law, University of Southern Denmark, available at file:///C:/Users/Tache%20Ileana/Desktop/Rethinking_European_Defence_The_future_o.p df, last accessed September 2019. [2] Charalampous, M. (2010), “From a European to a Common Security and Defense Policy”, Institute for European Studies (IES), IES Working Paper 5/2010, available at: https://www.ies.be/node/1063, last accessed September 2019. [3] Council of the European Communities, Commission of the European Communities (1992), Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Commission. [4] Duchêne, F. (1973), The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, in Kohnstamm, M. and Hager, W. (eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the European Communities, London: Macmillan. [5] European Communities (2009), European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, DGF – Communication/Publications. [6] European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies – Policy Department (2010), The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for CFSP/CSDP, Policy Briefing 2009.

272 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” th th Braşov, November 7 -8 2019

ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION”

Ilona URYCH

National Security Faculty, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract: The aim of this article is to characterize defense education for school-age students in Poland with particular emphasis on the genesis and essence of the subject security education. However, in order to achieve the narrative goal, first a description of defense education of young people in the Second Polish Republic and in the period 1945-89 was given. Next, the defense education of school-age students in Poland after the political transformation in 1989 was discussed. The last part of the article describes the essence and conditions of the change from civil defense training to security education. The article ends with a summary and conclusions indicating the need for scientific research to determine the direction and type of changes in the content of security education.

Security education; defense education; military classes; military education

1. Introduction

The traditions of defense education in Poland date back to the distant past, but an organized form was possible only once Poland regained its independence. Bearing in mind that the shaping of national identity was a process with a complex historical background, especially related to National-Democratic and Sanation educational ideas represented by a number of figures such as Zygmunt Miłkowski, Roman Dmowski, Zygmunt Balicki or Józef Piłsudski, Walery Sławek, Adam Koc, and that these educational ideals were shaped by various entities, the area of exploration was limited to the experiences of that period, resulting from the initiatives of building the foundations of independent Poland. Therefore, this article regards the institutional form of defense education for young people in Poland and describing it beginning in the Second Polish Republic1. The aim of this article is to characterize defense education for school-age young people in Poland with particular emphasis on the genesis and essence of the subject security education. However, in order to achieve the narrative goal, first a description of defense education of young people in the Second Republic of Poland and in the period 1945-89 was given. Next, the defense education of school-age students in Poland after the political transformation in 1989 was discussed. The last part of the article describes the essence and conditions of the change from a civil defense training to security education. The article ends with a summary and conclusions indicating the need for scientific research to determine the direction and type of changes in the content of security education. The analysis presented here is located in the area of the social

1 The content of this article is an expanded and revised fragment of the monograph I. Urych, Potencjał obronny klas wojskowych. Studium teoretyczno-empiryczne [The defense potential of military classes. A theoretical and empirical study], Warsaw, 2019.

273 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” sciences in the field of the security sciences and was developed using the diagnostic survey method with the technique of content analysis and document analysis.

2. Defense education for young people in the Second Polish Republic

The historical experience of Poland proves that the defense of the country’s sovereignty is not only the responsibility of the military and other uniformed services, but also the duty of all citizens of the country. Therefore, in the Second Polish Republic, after independence was regained, care was taken to educate young people in defense, which was treated mainly as the universal preparation of the widest range of society possible for military service. What was important was the potential defense of the Polish state or support for those in combat, as well as ensuring it would function properly in the event of an imminent danger of armed conflict. These actions were an important element in the development and improvement of citizens' defense skills, understood as the preparation of young people for military service prior to conscription and maintenance of the effectiveness of reservists at an appropriate level [17]. In accordance with this concept, in the state and military authorities began to pay attention to the military preparation of conscripted soldiers and those who had already been conscripted into the army, but also to the pre-conscription youth, who were to strengthen its ranks in the future [51]. In addition, many civilian organizations resumed their activities, which provided defense education within the framework of military training. University students were also included in the whole process with the formation of the Academic Legion in 1918. This made it possible for the government to implement the “Nation under Arms” program somewhat later, which assumed the involvement of the largest possible part of society in the defense of the country. This postulate was supported by the specific objectives of the program, such as developing active patriotism, developing the strength of will, duty and punishment, increasing physical strength and fortitude, learning basic military skills, and awakening a taste for military service [16]. In 1921, summer camps for military training began to operate, preparing young people for the defense of the country, supporting their physical development. These camps usually lasted six weeks from July 1 of each year, gathering school, academic and school troop leaders. On the other hand, summer camps were organized for out-of-school youth after August 15 [17]. In the period of the Second Polish Republic, organizations whose origins date back to the turn of the twentieth century were actively involved in the defense education of young people. These included the Riflemen’s Association, the Active Combat Association, Riflemen’s Teams and the Sokół [Falcon] Gymnastic Society. These organizations conducted elements of military, cultural, educational and athletic training, and the Ministry of Military Affairs established rules for cooperation between the army and these organizations. In order to improve the preparation of conscripts for military service, on December 1, 1922 the Ministry of Military Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Education issued a regulation on the organization of civil defense training in secondary and vocational schools [33], under which military training was introduced to general and vocational secondary schools and voluntary military training school troops were organized. Military training was an extra-curricular subject and included three levels of training:  I – training of infantry recruits,  II – basic training of future non-commissioned officers,  III – training at the level of reserve cadet [20]. Moreover, the satisfactory results of the summer camps were an encouragement to start winter courses in military education starting in 1923, addressed mainly to rural youth, who had much more free time at this time of year than in the summer [17].

2

274 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” In interwar Poland, the forms of civil defense training were transformed, but their basic task – to increase the state's defense capabilities by shaping the attitude of the young citizen as a future soldier – did not change. In the area of defense education, three basic courses were indicated:  civic education – carried out by family, school, pro-defense organizations and the military;  physical preparation – carried out by schools, youth organizations, sports clubs and the military;  military training – carried out by the army and military preparation organizations – and supplementary specialist training [20]. Thus, in the period 1918-1925, following the idea of preparing young people for defense in the Second Republic of Poland, attempts were made to combine physical education with military training. Next, in 1927, following an ordinance of the Council of Ministers, the General Council for Physical Education and Military Training and lower level structures were dissolved. The military training classes included both young males (consisting of military training of adolescents, pre-conscription training including physical and civic education, field games, field studies, gas and air defense, marksmanship) and young females (educated in the areas of physical and military training in the parts concerning work in education, communications and personal reserves). Moreover, the program of military training also included some state employees, e.g. foresters, railway and postal workers. Another action aimed at the further development of defense education was the establishment – on the initiative of Józef Piłsudski – on March 24, 1927 of the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training. According to the provisions of the instructions for the schooling of military training units, the main purpose of military training was to prepare young people for military service. At the same time, it sought to instill in the members of this organization the traits needed to be a good soldier in the future, as well as national and state consciousness. The classes in the program included physical education, civic education, military education and military training. The aim was to make the training system compatible with the functioning of the military, which had a significant impact on both the organization of institutions and on questions of personnel. Apart from general military training, defense education was also provided by organizations operating in the , such as the Strzelce Riflemen’s Association, the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association, the Junar Labor Corps, the Women’s Military Training Corps, the Railway Military Training Corps, the Cavalry Military Training Corps, the Association of Polish Unions of Defenders of the Homeland, and the Naval Training Corps [9]. Important for the defense education of young people was the possibility of carrying out military training in schools at all levels of education. The training was divided into military training of secondary school students, seminars for teachers, vocational schools and others, and military training in lower, vocational and trade schools. Participation in classes was voluntary, and work was carried out in school troops. In the 1930s, the military training school troops operated on three levels:  I – students of the third grade of middle school,  II – students of the fourth grade of middle school,  III – students of the first and second grades of high school. The objectives of defense education were achieved in the following areas: civic education, military education and military training together with physical education. The state encouraged young people to attend military training, which gave them specific benefits. Students who completed the first level of military training with very good results during the

3

275 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” training had priority in enrollment in non-commissioned officer schools. On the other hand, those who completed the second level and served in the military could benefit from a three- month reduction in the length of service [34]. In the mid 1930s in the face of the inevitability of war, postulates appeared with increasing frequency regarding the need to defend the country. Consolidation of the people was essential, meaning recognition of the primacy of the national interest and submission to it. Both boys and girls were required to attend military training, which, in the face of the war, was replaced in the spring of 1936 by training for war. Preparation of society for war was removed from civilian institutions for fear of security being compromised. The military was responsible for the whole of defense education of the society. Until the outbreak of World War II, the military authorities returned several times to the idea of a universal training for war. While it was not possible to fully implement this concept, such training was gradually extended to include other social groups [25]. The above demonstrates how during the Second Polish Republic, Poles made every effort to educate and prepare the whole of society to defend the country – especially young people, both those in and out of school – within the framework of military education. Patriotic and civic education, military education and training, physical education, as well as the system of associated organized activities were important elements of education in support of the state.

3. Defense education of young people in the period 1945-89 During the Second World War, after the September defeat, the education of Polish young people had two dimensions. The first was training in cadet schools or reserve cadet schools abroad, and the second was training in war cadet schools in the occupied country. Cadet schools abroad operated in Italy, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, Palestine, Iran, Iraq and Egypt. The cadet schools accepted privates with secondary education. Polish defense education centers established abroad drew their knowledge from and were supported by the capabilities of the armed forces of France (the basic point of formation of the Polish Armed Forces), Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, in occupied Poland, both right-wing and left-wing underground camps formed, which conducted military training separately, in their own right, in various forms and at various levels. The right-wing organizations was staffed by officers and non- commissioned officers who had experience in organizational activities and numerous contacts abroad. The social base of these organizations consisted of former military, civil servants, the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. They acquainted cadets with combat procedures, topography, weapons and diversionary techniques. The Left did not have any military personnel, so the proper training of the trainees became more important. Theoretical training, which concerned the basics of military discipline, combat tactics, topography, military training, training in marksmanship, drill and the principles of partisan fighting in cities and in the field, was combined with practical participation in combat operations in Warsaw. In addition, great importance was attached to ideological and political education, popularizing the Polish Workers’ Party. However, regardless of the underground camp, the system of military education in occupied Poland during the war was one of the best among all resistance movements in the whole Europe [9]. It is worth pointing out that there was no universal approval for all defense education programs. Therefore, from the point of view of a contemporary researcher, there is an objective necessity to rely on sources more from the left than on the right. The defense education of young people began in the course of active warfare. On February 14, 1945, the Minister of Education approved Decision No. 6, which resumed compulsory education within the framework of military training, introducing it as a compulsory

4

276 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” subject in secondary schools, in the programs for middle and high schools as well as in teacher training programs [3]. The education process was supervised by the ministries of national defense, education, internal affairs, agriculture and agrarian reform. That same year, the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training was established. In towns and villages troops and centers for military training and physical education were established. In villages, agricultural training was added to the program, and the troops were named the Military and Agricultural Training Corps. Military training was obligatory for all citizens 16 years of age and over [9]. On March 14, 1947, an order of the Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and the Minister of National Defense introduced a new educational program for rural youth, called agricultural-military training, which combined agricultural training with lessons from military training. The new system of training young people in rural areas was obligatory for young people aged 15 to 18 years and starting April 1949, the program, Service to Poland, was also obligatory for university students [12]. On February 25, 1948, the Sejm passed the Act on the Universal Obligation of Professional Training, Physical Education and Military Training of Young People, as well as on the Organization of Physical Culture and Sport. [49]. This act provided for the establishment of the universal organization Service to Poland, whose task was to organize the participation of young people in the achievement of economic plans, vocational training, development of their physical fitness, as well as preparing them to defend the country. From April 1949, the Polish Service also included students of institutions of higher education. In terms of the universal training of young people, the project was able to  ensure the participation of young people in the achievement of plans for reconstruction the country,  shape national consciousness,  prepare young people to defend the Polish Republic,  train qualified construction detachments for all areas of national life,  develop physical fitness. Young people were subject to compulsory vocational, military and physical training. The universal obligation of vocational training included education and the performance of temporary or occasional work. The time of temporary work of young people not yet of conscription age could not exceed six months, whereas the length of service for young people of conscription age or older was equal to the length of basic military service. The amount of time devoted to occasional work could not exceed three days within a month. Young people could not work more than six hours a day – the remaining time was to be devoted to education, physical education, military training and rest. The universal obligation of military training and physical education included performance of exercises and athletic training, training for service in the military and auxiliary services. The obligation of military training and physical education was carried out together with the general obligation of vocational training. This obligation applied to boys and girls from 16 to 21 years of age and to persons up to 30 years of age if they had not completed basic military service. There were also persons exempt from this obligation, including married women, pregnant women (also mothers nursing their children), persons unable to perform manual labor, the only breadwinners in the family and men who had completed basic military service, Catholic priests and clergy from other Christian denominations, as well as persons whose livelihood came from agriculture. Detailed guidelines and programs for military training and physical education were issued by the Commander-in-Chief of Service to Poland. Persons who entirely fulfilled their obligation of military training and physical education were entitled to shorten the term of their

5

277 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” basic military service. An additional benefit was being given priority in admissions to military schools, scholarships and work referrals by employment offices. Moreover, young people serving in Service to Poland for a period longer than six months were entitled to have their military service shortened by a period equal to that spent in vocational training and were exempt from the obligation of basic military service if the duration of vocational training was equal to that of military service.

Service to Poland was an organization that was intended to prepare young people to defend the country. Unfortunately, in practice, young people were exploited, often working in difficult conditions – draining the Vistula delta, rebuilding Warsaw or on other construction sites. It did occur that young people living in the countryside worked in brigades on state farms, leaving their parents without help on family farms. This organization also served to provide political indoctrination of the young generation. It did not enjoy the respect of young people because of its compulsory nature. Part of the society saw its creation as a harbinger of the outbreak of another world war. At present, however, it is regarded as an organization that served to implement a specific political formula. The implementation of the planned military preparation did not produce the expected results, and so in 1952, the school troops of Service to Poland were dissolved. In their place, military training, was introduced in secondary schools as a compulsory subject [40]. The Act on the Universal Obligation to Defend the Republic of Poland of November 21, 1967 [48] transformed this subject into civil defense training for young people and universal self-defense for the population, which from 1969 was made compulsory in primary and vocational schools [15]. The Ministry of National Defense determined the content of the education program within the framework of civil defense training for young people, while the Ministry of Education and Higher Education was responsible for the development and organization of detailed curricula for this subject. The legislator also decided that during the summer holidays, young people would be able to participate in defense training summer camps. All persons were obliged to participate in training and practical exercises, except for those not fit for military service [17]. Starting in 1969, the obligatory training of the general population was fulfilled by extending civil defense training to all young people. Thus, the obligatory subject in secondary schools, with the ability to expand this to other non-secondary schools, was the beginning of the creation of a system of patriotic and defensive education in the Polish People’s Republic [9]. In 1970-1974, civil defense training was introduced in primary schools, basic vocational schools, agricultural training schools and post-secondary schools. Starting in 1972, students capable of military service were also subject to military training, and the rest, civil defense training. Civil defense education in institutions of higher education varied, depending on the structure of the institution. Polytechnics and other technical universities provided training mainly in general and special emergencies, while universities, as well as agricultural and economic academies focused on sanitary and civil defense education. For full-time students, compulsory military service was performed in the form of military lessons or training in military units [9]. The main aim of civil defense training for young people was for them to develop skills and habits in the area of defense against weapons of mass destruction, necessary for individual and group action, in cells and self-defense services. The knowledge and skills acquired during the course were preliminary preparation for basic military service. The objectives of civil defense training at particular stages of education were as follows:

6

278 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” – grade 8 of primary school – achievement of the basic level of the preparation of society for individual self-defense in case of war; – basic vocational school – improvement of the individual self-defense skills developed at primary school and elementary preparation of students for basic military service; – secondary school – practical teaching of essential teamwork activities. Teaching in secondary school was the next stage of preparing students for action in times of peace and the threat of war; – post-secondary schools – preparing students to serve as junior commanders in some self-defense formations [2]. The content of the training carried out within the framework of the civil defense training revolved around issues related to patriotic and civil defense education, organization and general tactics of civil defense, protection of the population against the effects of modern means of destruction, sanitary training, fire protection, shooting training, communications, field studies, drill, regulations, and for methodological training as instructors. Until 1989, school superintendents also organized youth camps for military training. Their main objective was to prepare students to act as assistant teachers in military training in school classes, as well as to provide participants with conditions for their wider psychophysical development. In the main, they played a recreational and training role and were intended to intensify the patriotic and defense education of young people. The camps were co-educational in nature and were open to students who had completed the first grades of secondary school and were organized in the summer. Civil defense training camps were organized on two levels:  civil defense training instruction camps - the aim was to prepare participants for the role of assisting teachers of civil defense training in conducting practical classes,  specialized civil defense training camps - the aim was to develop a taste for military service and to develop interests and skills in sports and defense (glider, parachute, scuba diving, motor and other camps). The scope of subjects covered at the civil defense training camps included regulations, drills, marksmanship training, sanitary training, topography, communications, and defense against means of destruction. During the camps, school-age students also participated in various forms of cultural, educational, recreational, and sports activities [2]. Starting in 1987, changes were introduced to the curriculum of civil defense education, abandoning the typically military content, reducing the number of hours in this subject and limiting the financial resources budgeted for its implementation. Despite many changes made to the content of civil defense training, its importance in the security structure of the country was not appreciated. Subsequent analyses of military training programs, and then of civil defense training programs, which were in effect from 1952-1990, show how unstable the content of civil defense education was at that time [35]. From a researcher’s point of view, it should be pointed out that the availability of literature, especially after the Second World War, on the one hand facilitates, and on the other hand makes it difficult to describe civil defense education of young people in Poland. It facilitates the analysis of the ideas, values and views that were propagated. However, the rather selective literature makes a broader view of the defense education of young people difficult, especially regarding organizations stood in opposition to the established ones.

4. Defense education for young people in Poland after the political transformation in 1989

7

279 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” The social and political transformations in Poland, which took place after 1989, brought about further changes in the objectives and content of defense education for schoolchildren. Until that time, defense training, among other parts of the curriculum, played an important role in the achievement of the educational mission of schools, especially in patriotic and defense education. However, as in the past, these classes had an ideological foundation. Although the primary goal of the defense training was to prepare young people top defend themselves against the consequences of threats to peace and of war, and to manage small civil defense teams, they were dominated not only by military but also political topics. Therefore, one of the manifestations of political change was the abandonment of the provision of strictly military preparation of school-aged students [25]. In 1990, the subject of civil defense training was withdrawn from primary schools, introducing instead topics in universal self-defense, the actual teaching of which turned out to be illusory and ineffective. The unsatisfactory results of universal self-defense were caused by the lack of appropriate legal regulations, appropriate organization, cooperation of teachers and supervision on the part of school directors. In 1991, military classes were removed from university curricula. On the other hand, secondary schools introduced new programs in civil defense training, the content of which referred exclusively to the protection of life and health against various threats in peacetime [13] After the political changes in Poland, there was a growing conviction that it was necessary to introduce program and organizational changes in the area of defense education. An important document that regulated these issues legally was Ordinance No. 36 of the Minister of National Education of October 29, 1992 on the types of schools in which students were obliged to undergo civil defense training and the rules for the organization of civil defense classes in schools [52]. The ordinance obliged students of all types of public and private secondary schools to undergo civil defense training. It is worth mentioning that in this period, Silver Muskets shooting competitions, the Fit as Soldiers sporting and defense competitions, as well as the Knowledge about Civil Defense competitions were very popular among school-age students. The aim of the Silver Muskets competitions was to educate school-age students about national defense, improve the physical fitness of students, as well as team competitions in sport shooting - in the form of individual and team rivalry. The aim of the Fit as Soldiers competitions was education school-age students about the contemporary Polish Armed Forces, issues related to national defense and improving the physical fitness of the young generation. The competition was a form of competition among three-person teams in the areas of sports, defense and rescue skills. Both were held at four levels: the school, district, voivodeship and national levels, and the level of national competitions was prepared by the Ministry of National Defense. A Knowledge about Civil Defense competition was also organized, the aim of which was to raise awareness of issues of civil defense among secondary school students, prepare young people to behave rationally in the face of civil threats, develop habits and skills in providing first aid in emergencies, and spread knowledge of road traffic regulations, shaping pro-defense awareness and attitudes, and most of all preparing the young generation to counter real and potential threats related to the occurrence of natural disasters and other dangers caused by natural forces or human activity, and providing first aid to the victims of these events [25]. The Silver Muskets shooting competition and the Fit as Soldiers sports and defense competition are still held today, although it is now called the Knowledge of Civil Defense Olympiad. Until the introduction of the education reform of 1999, secondary schools implemented a program in the area of civil defense training consisting of one hour per week in the first and second grades, with a total of 76 hours over two years of schooling. The main objective of teaching civil defense training in secondary schools was still to prepare young people for

8

280 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” individual and group self-defense against the effects of threats to peacetime and to manage small civil defense teams [1]. After the year 2000, further changes in the how this subject was implemented appeared. The principles of the new program also concerned shaping ability of society at large to cope with various threats affecting the security of the whole country, as well as the ability to ensure a chance of survival in such situations. Hence, there was a justified need to extend the scope of the content of the civil defense training to include issues related to the culture of politics and security of the country and society [21]. In 2002, another regulation was introduced concerning the types of schools whose students were subject to the obligation to undergo civil defense training and how this was to be organized [28], pursuant to which the obligation to undergo civil defense training applied to students of public and private high schools, i.e. basic vocational schools, general high schools, specialized high schools and technical high schools for young people. This task was carried out in the form of one hour of classroom instruction per week in the first and second grades. If the number of students in a class was over 30, the provisions of the Regulation also defined the mandatory division into groups for classes covering first aid, topography, the fundamentals of planning and organizing activities and sports shooting. In addition, during the summer holidays, specialized civil defense training and recreational camps could be organized for students who had completed the first grade of school, in accordance with the rules laid down in the regulations on the organization of holidays for schoolchildren and youth. Until the introduction of changes in the educational system in 2009, one hour per week of civil defense training as a subject was completed by high school students in the first and second grades [9]. However, the change in the type of threats from military to non-military, with the simultaneous increase of factors constituting indirect threats to human life and health, as well as the dangers to the ecological and cultural environment, public and national security, made it necessary to modify the program and organizational framework of defense education. The basis for the creation of a new system of defense education, supported by previous experience, was the principle that the most rational, effective and cheapest way to prepare the society for defense is to educate young people [11]. Therefore, it was decided to introduce security education at all stages of teaching, thanks to which a young person, and later as an adult, would be able to avoid contemporary dangers and acquire the skills needed to take effective action in extreme situations [25]. As a consequence, military training was addressed to students of military classes [38, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47].

5. The change from civil defense training to security education Taking into account the above premises, and thus the necessity of the revision of the school curriculum - abandoning less important and detailed areas, with a simultaneous emphasis on areas of prime importance for security - on September 1, 2009, the Ministry of National Education, in consultation with the Ministry of National Defense, introduced a new subject into the basic curriculum, education for security, which replaced the previous one, civil defense training [32]. The essence of the course was a comprehensive approach to security issues with a focus on the issue of threats to peace, as well as how to behave in crisis situations at any time and place. The objectives of this security education, as Barbara Wiśniewska-Paź points out, included creating appropriate attitudes and values among children, youth, and adults, as well as developing knowledge and skills in the area of coping with difficult and conflict situations and counteracting these threats [50]. In terms of curriculum changes - at the stages of middle-school and high school education, the content of the newly introduced subject was a departure from the traditional understanding of security, which was seen as the ability to counteract external threats, usually

9

281 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” associated with warfare. Instead, the emphasis was placed on the development of skills for dealing with many threats, different in nature than typical external threats. The direction of educational activities was shifted from a pro-defense stance to security in general and preparation for potential threats to life and health [7, 44]. In view of the accepted axioms of the educational content included in the core curriculum for the subject, security education was oriented towards developing the ability to behave property when confronted with various hazards, such as fires, floods, road and other accidents, which may occur in the immediate vicinity of the student, as well as the ability to provide first aid in these situations. This was complemented by the topic of the operation of the national defense system [19]. On the other hand, in the fourth stage of education, i.e. in high school, the curriculum of security education included, among other topics, threats to peace, their sources, countering their effects in case these arise and after they subside [24]. The content covered, among others, contemporary health risks, lifestyle diseases, such as alcoholism, nicotine addiction, drug addiction or aggressive behavior [36, 39]. Following Janusz Ropski, it should be noted that the term “security education” emerged in the course of research on the security system of the Republic of Poland conducted at the National Defense University2 in the 1990s [27]. In those years, there were significant changes in the interpretation of the traditionally understood defense education of society, which made it possible to replace it with the term “security education.” This term covers a very wide range of content, as it is connected with patriotic, civic, moral and defense education. As an educational component, it is intended to direct and integrate those educational efforts that foster patriotic and pro-defense attitudes. Security education is in particular connected with politics, the educational system, the state, its authorities and the entire system of governance, topics that are important both for society as a whole and for individuals [4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 22, 37]. Thus, security education is the process of educating the human being, that is, his or her education and training, in order to ensure his or her sense of security. According to the definition proposed by Krzysztof Drabik, security education covers all the personal and structural arrangements that occur in the socio-political structure. Therefore, educational activities concern both the individual cognitive activity of the individual as well as institutional didactic and educational efforts (...). Security education is an important element in the process of promoting security in general. If the creation of the desired conditions for the endurance, survival and development (life security) of a person is definition of security, then security education is one of the methods (ways) of creating these [5]. Moreover, on September 1, 2017, another reform was introduced to the Polish educational system, under which middle schools were abolished and the time spent in primary and in high schools was extended [30]. The reform also influenced the teaching of the subject of security education, which was conducted not only in high school, but also as an obligatory subject, for one hour per week in the eighth grade of primary school [29]. The subject is to prepare students to react and behave properly in situations posing a threat to their health or life. The subject also includes various contents in the area of national security, the organization of rescue operations, health education and first aid. Thus, as part of security education, the following general requirements have been introduced in the eighth grade:  introduction to the fundamentals of national security,  preparation to respond to emergencies (disasters and large-scale accidents),  development of basic first aid skills,  development of individual and social skills conducive to health [30].

2 Pursuant to Art. 3 of the Act of May 20, 2016 on the establishment of the War Studies University, as of May 30, 2016, the National Defense University was abolished. Pursuant to Art. 1 of this act, the War Studies University was established as of October 1, 2016 (Journal of Laws 2016 item 906). 10

282 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” Moreover, the teaching of security education in the eighth grade consists of:  the need to focus on key problems, in particular in practical terms, devoting the most time to these,  the use of multimedia aids that make students familiar with the fundamentals of security and the nature of threats,  the need to visit public security institutions,  fostering patriotic attitudes and a sense of responsibility for the achievements of past generations,  participation of students in school evacuation drills,  encouraging students to care for their own security and that of others while teaching how to find help from trustworthy persons and rescue services,  developing a sense of responsibility for the quality of first aid provided,  preparation to respond to emergency situations,  emphasis on practical skills,  taking into account the actual health, educational and informational needs of a given group of students, e.g. the problem of obesity [26]. It should also be noted that the content of the security education curriculum is also present in higher education. In the area of security education, such fields of study as national security, internal security, security engineering or European studies have been developed, which offer this type of knowledge to their students. Security education is also a subject of interest for many post-graduate courses of study (adult education), specialist courses, qualification courses (vocational training and lifelong learning), which emphasize this area in the content and skills they teach. This subject is also represented in doctoral studies in the field of security studies. The content of security education in various types of studies and courses for adults covers the whole spectrum of theoretical and practical elements of contemporary security, crises and prevention. After completing this course, students not only possess a wide range of knowledge and skills in security. They also acquire competences necessary to plan, organize and lead (manage) people in emergencies. They also know how to act in order to counter them well in advance, before they occur [21]. It is worth noting that the current obligation to provide security education is imposed by Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which states that the Republic of Poland ensures the security of its citizens, and Article 166 of the Act of November 21, 1967 on the universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws 2017, item 60), in which it is written that “students of primary schools and secondary schools: general high schools, technical high schools and first-degree vocational schools, with the exception of students of adult schools, are subject to the obligation to complete security education.” [48]. Therefore, it may be understood that security education - as a subject of instruction in primary schools and as curriculum content implemented at various levels of institutional and non-institutional education in Poland – serves to prepare students for actions ensuring individual, social and national security. In such a way, security education is a series of processes in the field of education and training of young people in particular, which prepare them for survival and versatile development. The ability to survive refers in particular to life- or health- threatening situations, while development refers to when there are no external threats (military or non-military), and the higher-level needs of each person are to be met. The new model of security education requires a change in the approach to education based on a “new culture of learning.” According to paradigms of contemporary education, it should be rooted in the process of arriving at knowledge independently as a result of research. A modern educational institution, at every stage of education, should be an institution that uses

11

283 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” the intellectual potential of both teachers and students, enabling them to effectively study, learn and understand contemporary reality. The skills taught today, and the ideas and values accompanying them, may be obsolete in the reality to come [22]. Therefore, the challenges of the future mean that security education should prepare people not only to take part in civilization, but also to participate creatively in the process of its continued existence and development [14]. Individual categories of education for security must meet the expectations of the future, preparing present generations for various situations and threats that life will bring. Therefore, the list of topics in security education is still open and requires further exploration and research to identify unambiguous links with the process of creating (education) a safe space for human beings [22].

6. Summary and conclusions This article describes the characteristics of defense education of school-age students in Poland with particular emphasis on the genesis and essence of the subject security education. Thus, an analysis of institutional forms of defense education of young people in Poland from the Second Polish Republic to the present day was made. Not only was a description offered, but also an attempt was made to evaluate this education, recognizing its main ideas and values. It should be remembered that this description was based on available sources and despite all efforts to maintain scientific objectivity and a holistic view of the issue, it most likely is not free from certain biased aspects. The considerations presented here lead to the following conclusions: 1. The defense training of young people in the Second Polish Republic revolved around civilian organizations that provided defense training as part of military training, such as the Academic Legion, the Riflemen’s Association, the Active Combat Association, Riflemen’s Teams and the Sokół Gymnastic Society. In order to improve the preparation of conscripts for military service, military training was introduced in 1922 to general and vocational high schools and voluntary school troops for military training were organized. Additionally, starting in 1923, winter courses in military training were organized for rural youth. Moreover, in 1927, the State Office of Physical Education and Military Training was established, whose aim was to prepare young people for military service. Subsequently, defense education was provided at all stages of education in the following areas: civic education, military education and military training together with physical education. 2. Defense education of youth in the period 1945-89 was provided by military training, which was introduced in schools as a subject of instruction on the basis of the Decree of the Council of State of January 16, 1946 on the universal obligation of physical education and military training. In 1948, the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic enacted the Act on the Universal Obligation of Professional Training, Physical Education and Military Training of Youth, as well as on the Organization of Physical Culture and Sport within the framework of the universal organization Service to Poland. In 1952, a compulsory subject was introduced in secondary schools - military training. In 1967, the Act on the Universal Obligation to Defend the Polish People's Republic introduced civil defense training for young people and universal self-defense training of the population. It was a compulsory subject in secondary schools with the possibility of extending it to other schools. In 1970-1974, this obligation was extended to primary schools, basic vocational schools, agricultural training schools and post-secondary schools. 3. Defense education for school-age students in Poland after the political transformation in 1989 was characterized by the abandonment of the provision of strictly military

12

284 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” preparation of school-aged students. In 1990, the subject of defense training was withdrawn from primary schools, introducing topics in universal self-defense, the implementation of which did not bring the expected results. In 1992, the decision was made on the basis of which students were obliged to complete a civil defense training course and the rules established for the organization of civil defense training courses in schools. Civil defense training, although with a various number of hours and subject matter, was carried out in secondary schools until 2009. 4. In 2009, a new subject, security education, was introduced to the Polish educational system, replacing the previous one, civil defense training. The essence of the change was the reorientation of threats covered from those of a typically military nature to a focus on the issue of threats to peace, as well as proper behavior in crisis situations. 5. The content of the curriculum for the school subject security education mainly concerns introduction to the fundamentals of national security, preparation to respond to emergency situations, development of skills in the basics of first aid, and fostering attitudes conducive to health. The content of the curriculum of safety education is currently implemented in primary and secondary schools, as well as in university courses of study and specialized courses. 6. Security education serves to prepare students for actions ensuring individual, social and national security. In such a way, security education for safety is a series of processes in the field of education and training of young people in particular, which prepare them for survival and versatile. The ability to survive refers in particular to life- or health- threatening situations, while development refers to when there are no external threats (military or non-military), and the higher-level needs of each person are to be met. It well worth noting that the dynamics of change in the field of defense education of school-age students in Poland today demands analysis and exploration. The modern subject of security education seems to be a response to the current demand for knowledge and skills in the field of security, but this change is certainly not sufficient. It therefore seems important - by way of scientific research – to define the direction and type of changes in the educational content, which should be considered in order to increase the effectiveness of the teaching processes in this subject.

References: [1] Araucz-Boruc A., Bezpieczeństwo i obronność w edukacji młodzieży, Siedlce, 2015, 172. [2] Bieniasz T., Siuda T., Problemy obronności w systemie szkolnym, Warszawa, 1978, 150- 158. [3] Dekret z dnia 16 stycznia 1946 r. o powszechnym obowiązku wychowania fizycznego i przysposobienia wojskowego (Dz. U. 1946 nr 31 poz. 195). [4] Domalewska D., Żakowska M., Immigrant integration policy and practices in Poland, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2019, vol. 25(3), 3-14. [5] Drabik K., Bezpieczeństwo personalne i strukturalne, Warszawa, 2013, 325. [6] Drabik K., The subjective dimension of security education, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2018, vol. 21(4), 23-37. [7] Drapikowska B., Student’s opinions about the subject of security education in upper secondary schools, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2018, vol 21(4), 108-123. [8] Elak L., Determinants of Army Structures Development in the Context of Middle Sized Country Experiences in Contemporary Tactical Operations, „Jurnal of Baltic Security”, 2017, vol. 2, 129-156.

13

285 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” [9] Falkowski Z., Zarys problematyki edukacji obronnej młodzieży w latach 1946-1990, in: Klasy mundurowe. Od teorii do dobrych praktyk, A. Skrabacz, I. Urych, L. Kanarski (ed.), Warszawa, 2016, 57-58. [10] Grenda B., Soboń A., National defence training of public administration personel in Poland, „Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2018, vol. 21(4), 89-107. [11] Kaliński M., Kształcenie wojskowe młodzieży. Stan obecny i perspektywy, „Poglądy i Doświadczenia. Zeszyty Naukowe WSO im. T. Kościuszki”, 2000, vol. 4. [12] Kaliński M., Przysposobienie Rolniczo-Wojskowe (1947-1948). Zarys historii. Dokumenty i materiały, Warszawa, 2002. [13] Kaliński M., Tradycje i współczesność przysposobienia wojskowego młodzieży szkolnej, Toruń, 2005, 30. [14] Kamińska M., Szanse edukacji w XXI wieku, „Życie Szkoły”, 2000, vol. 2, 125. [15] Kardas J.S., Edukacja obronna w Polsce. Zarys historii, stan obecny i perspektywy rozwoju, „Biblioteczka Edukacji Obronnej”, 1999, vol. 1, 33. [16] Kęsik J., Naród pod bronią. Społeczeństwo w programie polskiej polityki wojskowej1918- 1939, Wrocław, 1998. [17] Kośmider T., Edukacja obronna młodzieży w kontekście kształtowania bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, in: Perspektywy bezpieczeństwa narodowego w XXI wieku, M. Kubiak, A. Smarzewska (ed.), Biała Podlaska, 2014, 26. [18] Kuczabski M., The basic health care system in a crisis situation after the use of weapons of mass destruction. Security and Defence Quarterly, 2019, vol. 25(3), 70-85. [19] Makowski P., Komentarz do podstawy programowej przedmiotu edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, in: Podstawa programowa z komentarzami, Vol. 8, Wychowanie fizyczne i edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum, Warszawa, 2012. [20] Odziemkowski J., Armia i społeczeństwo II Rzeczpospolitej, Warszawa, 1996, p. 99. [21] Pieczywok A., Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa wobec zagrożeń i wyzwań współczesności, Warszawa, 2012, 151, 169-179. [22] Pieczywok A., Kategorie edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, in: Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. Współczesne kategorie, I. Urych (ed.), Warszawa, 2018, 42-43. [23] Pieczywok A., Security education in dangerous time, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2018, vol. 21(4), 7-22. [24] Podstawa programowa – edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa – gimnazjum i liceum, w: Podstawa programowa z komentarzami, Vol. 8, Wychowanie fizyczne i edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum i liceum, Warszawa, 2012. [25] Prognostyczność eksperymentu z klasami o profilu wojskowym w szkołach ponadgimnazjalnych w latach 1998-2003, Praca naukowo-badawcza Akademii Obrony Narodowej, kierownik pracy Ryszard Stępień, Warszawa, 2003, 23. [26] Przybysz B., Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa jako przedmiot nauczania, in: Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. Współczesne kategorie, I. Urych (ed.), Warszawa, 2018, 196. [27] Ropski J., Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa w polskiej szkole i możliwości jej doskonalenia, Katowice, 2015. [28] Rozporządzenia Ministra Edukacji Narodowej i Sportu z dnia 27 czerwca 2002 r. w sprawie rodzajów szkół, których uczniowie podlegają obowiązkowi odbywania przysposobienia obronnego oraz organizacji jego odbywania (Dz. U. 2002 nr 113 poz. 987). [29] Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 14 czerwca 2017 roku zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie sposobu realizacji edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 1239). [30] Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 14 lutego 2017 r. w sprawie podstawy programowej wychowania przedszkolnego oraz podstawy programowej kształcenia ogólnego

14

286 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” dla szkoły podstawowej, w tym dla uczniów z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną w stopniu umiarkowanym lub znacznym, kształcenia ogólnego dla branżowej szkoły I stopnia, kształcenia ogólnego dla szkoły specjalnej przysposabiającej do pracy oraz kształcenia ogólnego dla szkoły policealnej (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 356). [31] Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 14 lutego 2017 r. w sprawie podstawy programowej wychowania przedszkolnego oraz podstawy programowej kształcenia ogólnego dla szkoły podstawowej, w tym dla uczniów z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną w stopniu umiarkowanym lub znacznym, kształcenia ogólnego dla branżowej szkoły I stopnia, kształcenia ogólnego dla szkoły specjalnej przysposabiającej do pracy oraz kształcenia ogólnego dla szkoły policealne (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 356). [32] Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji z 28 sierpnia 2009 roku w sprawie sposobu realizacji edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa (Dz. U.2009 nr 139 poz. 1131). [33] Rozporządzenie Ministra Wyznań Religijnych Oświecenia Publicznego z dnia 1 grudnia 1922 r. w sprawie organizacji przysposobienia wojskowego w szkołach średnich i zawodowych (Dz. Urz. MWRiOP z 1923 r. nr 1 poz. 2). [34] Rozwadowski P., Państwowy Urząd Wychowania Fizycznego i Przysposobienia Wojskowego 1927-1939, Warszawa, 2000, p. 102-105. [35] Siuda T., Kształcenie obronne w systemie oświatowym, in: Modelowy system edukacji obronnej społeczeństwa RP. Diagnoza, R. Stępień (red.), Warszawa, 1996, 158. [36] Słoma J., Żyję i działam bezpiecznie. Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, Warszawa, 2012. [37] Soboń A., Studies for security in the context of international reforms in the European Union, „Нов български университет” 2017, vol. 4, 39-47. [38] Soboń A., Edukacja obronna – próba standaryzacji, w: Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa. Współczesne kategorie, I. Urych (ed.), Warszawa, 2018, 153-170. [39] Tomaszkiewicz S., Kaczmarek A., Samól J., Edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa, Poznań, 2012. [40] Uchwała nr 95/52 Prezydium Rządu z 1 marca 1952 roku w sprawie organizacji przysposobienia wojskowego; Zarządzenie Ministra Oświaty z 9 sierpnia 1952 roku w sprawie organizacji przysposobienia wojskowego w szkołach podległych Ministrowi Oświaty (Nr DW- 254/52). [41] Urych I., Military classes as an area of interest for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. Experience and perspectives, “Defense Resources Management in the 21st Centaury”, 2018, vol 13(13), 339-353. [42] Urych I. Students of military classes concerning selected aspects of Poland’s national security. An empirical study, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2017, vol 4(17), 21-47. [43] Urych I., About civilian military education in secondary schools in Poland. Axiological aspects of the functioning of military class students based on an analysis of the results of own studies, “Journal of Defense Resources Management”, 2018, vol. 9, No. 2 (17), October 2018, 109-134. [44] Urych I., On security education in Poland. The essence and content of the subject of education, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2019, vol 4(26). [45] Urych I., Student’s opinion on the academic curriculum in military classes, “Security and Defence Quarterly”, 2018, vol 1(18), 26-44. [46] Urych I., Wartości uczniów klas wojskowych – analiza wyników badań, „Zeszyty Naukowe ASzWoj” 2017, nr 4(109), 148-177. Urych. I., Military class in Poland – experiences and perspectives, “Security and Defence Quarterly” 2016, vol 2(11), 112-134. [47] Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 roku o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Dz. U. 1967 nr 44 poz. 220).

15

287 ON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR SCHOOL AGE STUDENTS IN POLAND – THE GENESIS AND ESSENCE OF THE SUBJECT “SECURITY EDUCATION” [48] Ustawa z dnia 29 lutego 1948 r. o powszechnym obowiązku przysposobienia zawodowego, wychowania fizycznego i przysposobienia wojskowego młodzieży oraz organizacji spraw kultury fizycznej i sportu (Dz. U. 1948 nr 12 poz. 90). [49] Wiśniewska-Paź B., Sens edukacji dla bezpieczeństwa, czyli dlaczego warto zajmować się tą problematyką. Tytułem wstępu, in: Edukacja a bezpieczeństwo w różnych wymiarach i kontekstach. Formacje militarne i paramilitarne wobec wyzwań edukacyjnych, B. Wiśniewska- Paź (red.), Wrocław, 2015, p. 17. [49] Wyszczelski L., Działalność oświatowo-wychowawcza w Wojsku Polskim w latach 1918- 1939, Warszawa, 1995. [50] Zarządzenie nr 36 Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z 29 października 1992 roku w sprawie rodzajów szkół, w których uczniowie podlegają obowiązkowi odbywania przysposobienia obronnego i zasad organizacji zajęć przysposobienia obronnego w szkołach (D.U. MEN nr 8 poz. 38 i z 1993 r. nr poz. 15).

16

288 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019

INFRASTRUCTURE USE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Petrică ZAHARIA, PhD candidate

National Defense Academy „Carol I”, Bucharest

Abstract: The real estate heritage faces a number of challenges and opportunities. All indications show that, depending on how it is argued, infrastructure development will become increasingly important. Challenges and opportunities include the management of real estate, the sustainable development of the infrastructure and the need to increase the cooperation between the services for the structures. Use and development plans could be valuable tools for program managers through assistance in performing functions, assisting communication along the chain of command and resolving conflicts, and could include a long-term infrastructure work program. contains all current and planned projects, which should be implemented during this time. This should be the basis for long-term program managers for infrastructure costs..

Key words: heritage; infrastructure; use and development plans; directors of program.

1. Introduction Programming documents in the field of national defense have established guidelines for ensuring national defense by developing an optimal defense capacity and they aim, among others, to modernize the military infrastructure, to improve the methods and practices of management of the resources for defense, to improve the efficiency of the system of planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation, reducing the size of the forces, moving from threat-based planning to capacity-based planning. In order to improve the activities and the degree of insurance in infrastructure, these documents follow: - standardization of the infrastructure required for large units and units of the same type to ensure training and building of forces; - creation and development of the necessary infrastructure for the dislocation and preposition of technique belonging to the allied states; - correlating the plans for the rehabilitation of the existing military infrastructure with the missions, the structure of forces and the process of developing the military capabilities; - creation and development of the real estate facilities necessary to restore the personnel's fighting capacity; - ensuring at the required level the support of the host nation for which they are in transit, station or carry out operations on the territory of Romania; - the realization of a training area for urban struggle and the shared use, at an interinstitutional level, of the training facilities; - development of the housing stock for the military and the establishment, as far as possible, of the military bases.

289 INFRASTRUCTURE USE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Defense planning requires an integrated management of defense resources, adapted to actions subordinated to the main objectives that will lead to the transformation of the country's defense capacity, including: developing an integrated missile defense system, based on detection and interception capabilities; development of the infrastructure elements that will lead to ensuring the displacement, stationing and training capacities for the national and allied forces; restructuring, efficiency and profitability of the national defense industry.

2. Infrastructure use and development plans

Analyzing the requirements imposed by the development environment of the military structures, a conceptual approach is required that will lead to the reconfiguration of all the infrastructure elements, so that the necessary facilities for building, training, training, recreating their own and / or allied forces are taken into account, taking into account so much the new operational requirements of the deployable forces, as well as the fact that we have an old and unsupported military infrastructure for almost 30 years, and the execution of the current repairs and maintenance, as well as the operating expenses suppose the allocation of quite important financial funds. Infrastructure project management should describe the procedures and mechanisms for the realization of the use and development plans of the real estate heritage. We could consider these plans for use and development as tools that could be essential and designed to provide the necessary support to heritage management structures so that they avoid an ad-hoc or fragmented approach to planning the execution of infrastructure or construction rehabilitation works. new goals. In essence, these plans could consider how a military base (barracks) or military installation should be developed over an average period of up to 15 to 20 years. Infrastructure utilization and development plans could be products that would support development decisions in a rational manner and could be essential tools in rationalizing heritage and provide a broader perspective on issues related to the future use of existing land, buildings and facilities, taking into account all the requirements that could be included in the infrastructure. Infrastructure project management could provide explanations for the total value, the components, the factors that should be involved, the resources and actions needed to produce, implement, monitor and revise a use and development plan. Maintaining and developing the real estate heritage will face a number of challenges and opportunities in the coming years. All indications show that infrastructure development will become increasingly important depending on how it is argued. Challenges and opportunities could include infrastructure management, security strategy review, use of public-private partnerships or private funding initiatives, sustainable development, accountability for public spending, increased quality of life, recruitment, maintenance and assurance of staff security or need for increased cooperation between services for structures. Use and development plans could be some of the most valuable tools for program managers by providing them with the necessary assistance in performing their functions, assisting communication along the chain of command and resolving conflicts, and these plans will include a work program. in the medium and long term infrastructure, which will contain all current and planned projects, and which should be implemented during this time period, regardless of the personnel or custom changes that take place during this period. This should be, for the program directors, the basis for the long-term preparation of the costs required to build or rehabilitate the infrastructure. Also, a plan of use and development foresees a program to be followed for the implementation of the new works, which must be taken into account in the planning of the

290 INFRASTRUCTURE USE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

budgetary credits and the programming of the works of investments, capital repairs or current repairs. In the case of the revision of the security strategy some fundamental questions could be asked, with a quite important impact on the plans of the program directors and implicitly on the facilities offered by the existing infrastructure: - what will happen to the infrastructure that has become surplus as a result of the restructuring process? - what will be the new operational needs that will need to be planned? - how and where will these needs be met? - will it be necessary to eventually expand the infrastructure? - will it be necessary to close or rationalize part of the infrastructure? We consider that the plans for use and development could be a means that could contribute to determining the capacity and potential of the existing infrastructure to meet the new operational needs, to establishing a logical and robust framework in which the decisions regarding the rationalization of the barracks or installations could be taken. military and land use or post utilization, including identifying the real possibilities of reducing the costs of use and maintenance through the more efficient use of construction and land. The use and implementation of such a plan will determine the budget planning structures to present better informed and reasoned decisions about spending by focusing on the resources that will be consumed, to treat the expenses with the current and capital repairs. - a way that better reflects their economic significance and will encourage discipline, with a greater emphasis on results and achieving goals and objectives. In order to strike a balance between operational needs and the costs of operating and maintaining buildings and land, it is necessary that the impact of resource accounting and budgeting on real estate be fair and real, and a key role could be played by the use and development plans. . The military infrastructure, in our country, is usually developed within or on the outskirts of the localities and this can lead to a significant contribution to the local economy and to the vitality of the community and can also have a positive impact contributing to the increase of the quality of the environment. A use and development plan could demonstrate the positive development benefits of establishing how to reuse surplus land or reorganizing the use of a barracks. Sustainable development will always have an impact on operational requirements and a balance will be needed that can be provided by the development of a coherent use and development plan. For the purpose of recruiting and maintaining staff there must be an increasing awareness of the need to provide both staff and members of their families with a reasonable quality of life. The plan of use and development could provide a mechanism in which these types of problems would be systematically reviewed and opportunities for improving the quality of life could be identified. One of the key aspects of a use and development plan is that it will not only take into account the existing situation, but also foresees the future, taking into account the number of staff, its fluctuation and that their needs will change according to the evolution of the company and thus a such a plan could be used to justify the expenses intended to improve the quality of life and, finally, it could help to maintain the personnel structures and activity. No plan of use and development can be taken as a standard, each plan should be adapted according to the requirements of the structures of forces, so it is increasingly important that these requirements are clearly defined from the beginning or according to the characteristics of the infrastructure located at mood. To emphasize the above, the use and development plans could be divided into two basic categories: - plans that refer in detail to a single location; - plans that include multiple locations or a military installation - these could be called strategic development plans.

291 INFRASTRUCTURE USE AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Use and development plans must be viewed and accepted as living documents. Implementation of a plan may take several years, but it is important that, over time, no major development or change is allowed, which could undermine the strategy established at the initiation of the plan, unless a deviation from the plan is complete. justified. For example, the infrastructure allocated for the long-term expansion of a particular activity should be maintained for this purpose; this approach is not always valid today. The right of use and administration I think will be the key to the successful implementation of any plan. In most cases where a plan will be designed and implemented by a particular person, there will be a danger that the plan will be forgotten, once the resettlement person moves or leaves the system. That is why we consider that for designing and following the implementation of a plan it is necessary to form a group, using the plan as a project management tool, which will be an additional way to ensure that the document achieves its goals for which it was designed. . The composition of the group may vary depending on the specific circumstances. The group could include the personnel who were responsible for the implementation of the plan or another group that will fulfill the role of coordinating the implementation of the plan and who may also be responsible for implementing it. The personnel of the structures should be aware of the provisions of the plan of use and development and therefore it should be disseminated as widely as possible to all structures with implications for its development and implementation.

3. Conclusions

From our point of view, the plans of use and development could be leading documents for the program managers through the help granted in the fulfillment of the tasks, in establishing the priorities in the chain of command and in resolving the possible conflicts that could arise in the implementation of a work program. long-term infrastructure, which can contain all current and planned projects, and which will have to be implemented throughout this period. Use and development plans could be the technical means by which it can contribute to determining the existing capacity and potential of the infrastructure to adapt to the new requirements required by the faster evolution of society and military structures.

References: [1] Bruce Andy & Langdon Ken, Essential Managers Project Management, Dorling Kindersley Kindle Edition, New York, 2000. [2] Frame J.D., Managing Projects in Organizations, Jossey-Bass, 2003. [3] Minculete Gheorghe, Modern approaches to logistics management, 2nd edition revised and added, UNAp Publishing House, 2015. [4] Romanu Ion, Vasilescu Ion, Investment Management, Mărgăritar Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997. [5] Minculete Gheorghe, Elements of management of the logistical support, UNAp Publishing House, 2005. [6] Puşcaşu Mirela, Evaluation of the quality of defense resources management, Bucharest, UNAp Publishing House, 2009. [7] *** Strategy of transformation of the Romanian Army, Bucharest, 2007. [8] *** Real Property Master Plannig Technical Manual, 4th Edition, March 2014 [9] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Base camp developmet in theater of operations - EP 1105-3-1, Washington, 2012.

292