Defense Resources Management in the 21St Century

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Defense Resources Management in the 21St Century NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I” REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT STUDIES DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY THE 14TH SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ATTENDANCE ORGANIZED BY THE REGIONAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT STUDIES 7th- 8th November 2019, Braşov Coordinators:. Lecturer Brînduşa Maria POPA, PhD Associate professor Vlad DUMITRACHE, PhD NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,,CAROL I” PUBLISHING HOUSE BRAŞOV, 2019 The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019 Moderators: Professor Ileana TACHE, PhD Professor Cezar VASILESCU, PhD, eng. Asociate Professor Dorel BADEA, PhD Associate Professor Vlad DUMITRACHE, PhD Lecturer Brînduşa Maria POPA, PhD Liliana FILIP, PhD Candidate International Scientific Committee: Gheorghe CALOPĂREANU Stelian PÂNZARU Teodor FRUNZETI Virgil ENE-VOICULESCU Emilian DOBRESCU Vasile CĂRUŢAŞU Ghiță BÂRSAN Mihai ALEXANDRESCU Constantin – Iulian VIZITIU Alexandru STOICA Octavian TĂRĂBUŢĂ Liviu FILIP Ioan Vasile ABRUDAN Edith Mihaela DOBRESCU Ileana TACHE Mărioara PATEȘAN Mary S. McCULLY Anca DINICU Fahri ERENEL Ioan Gabriel POPA Mustafa Kemal TOPCU Dumitru IANCU William BARTLETT Luminița GIURGIU Eleftherios THALASSINOS Daniel-Sorin CONSTANTIN Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET Dănuț-Eugeniu MOȘTEANU Andrzej SOBON Aurelian RAȚIU Maciej MARSZAŁEK Dorel BADEA Elzbieta Jadwiga SRYMASISKA Lucian ISPAS Agnieszka BRELIK Cezar VASILESCU Ramona RUPEIKA– APOGA Florin Eduard GROSARU Ebru CAYMAZ Maria CONSTANTINESCU Vladan HOLCNER Aura CODREANU Igor SOFRONESCU Brînduşa Maria POPA Svetlana CEBOTARI Cristina ANTONOAIE Larisa PLOP- Vlad DUMITRACHE Ion ROCEANU Editor: Lecturer Brînduşa Maria POPA, PhD ISSN: 2248 - 2245 (CD-ROM) ISSN: 2248 - 2385 (online) The content of the papers is the entire responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Scientific Committee. The authors take full responsibility for the contents and scientific correctness of their papers. The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019 CONTENTS 1. OPTIMIZING HUMAN RESOURCES UTILIZATION ALHOSANI Abdulla, UAE Armed Forces_______________________________ page 1 2. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK DEDICATED TO THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES, BADEA Dorel, Associate Professor, PhD, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu, Romania_________________________________________________________ page 13 3. A SEA OF TROUBLE. BLACK SEA SECURITY POLICIES BETWEEN NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, BRÂNDA Oana-Elena, University Lecturer, PhD, “Titu Maiorescu” University, Bucharest, Romania ________________________ page 18 4. MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE ROBOTIC WARFARE ERA, CAYMAZ Ebru, PhD., Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey, ERENEL Fahri, Associate Professor, Ph.D., Department of Business Administration, Istinye University, Istanbul, Turkey, UMUT Batuhan Dokuz Eylul University, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Izmir, Turkey ________________________________ page 26 5. THE BLACK SEA REGION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GEOPOLITIC INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS, CEBOTARI Svetlana Doctor habilitate, associate professor, "Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy State University of Moldova, Faculty of International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations , Chisinau , Republic of Moldova, PLOP Sergiu "Alexandru cel Bun" Military Academy Commander (Rector)/ Chisinau/ Republic of Moldova _________________________________________________________ page 31 6. KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPIs) THEIR IMPORTANCE AND USE IN EVALUATION PHASE A DASHBOARD APPROACH FOR DEFENSE RESOURCES, CHAUDHARY Muhammad Amir Pakistan Air Force ________ page 45 7. THE VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYBER THREATS, COMAN Marian, ”Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania _____________________________________ page 57 8. SECURITY SECTORS OF VENEZUELA, COZMEI Andreea Ștefania, Masters Student, National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Department of International Relations and European Integration, MA - Security and Diplomacy, Bucharest, Romania ________________________________________________ page 66 9. MANAGEMENT OF GENDER POLICY IN POLISH SECURITY SECTOR, DRAPIKOWSKA Barbara Faculty of National Security, War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland ___________________________________________________ page 72 . The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019 10. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES INSIDE THE PPBEES MODEL, DUMITRACHE Vlad Ionuț, Associate Professor, PhD, Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies – NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre, Brasov, Romania ________________________ page 85 11. SWOT ANALYSIS – MANAGERIAL TOOL FOR ORGANIZATION’S STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT, GHEORGHE Alin, Romanian Armed Forces, Romania_________________________________________________________ page 91 12. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN-CHINESE COMPETITION, GROCHMALSKI Piotr, Associate Professor, PhD, Faculty of National Security War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland __________________________________ page 100 13. ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A KEY FACTOR IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES MANAGEMENT, IANCU Dumitru, Associate Professor, PhD, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu, Romania, DINICU Anca, Assoc.prof. PhD, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy of Sibiu, Romania________________________________________________________ page 109 14. SKILLS AND TRAITS OF THE HUMINT OPERATOR, KIS Alexandru, PhD, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania, ARHIP Vasilică, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania, TARCALA Oliver, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, Oradea, Romania _______________________________________ page 114 15. THE NEW DIMENSION OF THE WARS OF OUR AGE: TAKING THE PLACE OF MANPOWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, SEZGİN Orhan PhD, KORKUT Cüneyt Master Student, AYGÜN Salih Master Student, Atatürk Strategic Research Institute, Defence Resources Management, National Defence University, İstanbul, Turkey__________________________________________________________ page 124 16. PRIVATE RURAL PROPRETY IN NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT, MANCIA Mircea Sebastian PhD Lecturer Dipl., MANCIA Aurora PhD, University Professor Eng., Faculty of Construction, Cadaster and Architecture, Department of Cadaster , University of Oradea, Oradea, Romania ______________________ page 130 17. WHY MILITARY ADVANTAGE DOES NOT GUARANTEE VICTORY IN CONTEMPORARY IRREGULAR CONFLICTS? EXPERIENCES AND CONCLUSIONS FROM 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, MARSZAŁEK Maciej, Professor, PhD, Dr Cyprian Aleksander KOZERA, The War Studies University, National Security Faculty, Warsaw, Poland_____ page 134 . The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019 18. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN THE MILITARY, MICHINICI Lucian, Romanian Air Forces, Bacău, Romania_______________________________ page 142 19. EUROPOL AND INTCEN SECURITY PROVIDERS FOR THE EUROPEAN SPACE, PĂDURARU Mihail, MA, VOICU Claudia-Iohana, MSc. Candidate, Center for Strategic and Competitive Analysis, Chamber of Commerce and Industry Romania- Turkmenistan____________________________________________________ page 149 20. STUDIES REGARDING THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUTERED IN ACCESING COHESION FUNDS FROM THE OPERATIONAL PROGRAM-HUMAN RESOURCES, PAIU Andrei, Ministry of National Defense, Romania _______ page 158 21. ECONOMICS BEHIND DEFENCE POLICY: DID BOXER PROCUREMENTS FORCED GERMANY FOR NATO EFP MISSION IN LITHUANIA?, PALAVENIS Donatas, Institute of University Studies in the Department of Political Science, The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania __________________ page 165 22. LEVEL OF ENERGY SECURITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER, PARCHUKASHVILI Kakhaber, Ministry of Defense, Georgia_________________________________________________________ page 181 23. TASK BUDGET - A NEW CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN POLAND, MILIAN – POGONOWSKA Malgorzata PhD, The War Studies University, National Security Faculty, Warsaw, Poland ____________________________ page 188 24. THE PECULIARITIES OF THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS, POPA Brîndușa Maria, PhD University Lecturer, Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies – NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre, Brasov, Romania ________________________________________________________ page 197 25. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS ON THE SECURITY OF AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES, POPA Ionuț Claudiu, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania _______________________________ page 203 26. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE COMPANIES ON THEIR FINANCIAL COORDINATES, POPA Ionuț Claudiu, Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania____________ page 210 27. ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS OF RISKS TARGETING NATIONAL SECURITY, RAȚIU Aurelian, Associate Professor PhD,”Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Faculty of Military Sciences, Sibiu, Romania________________________________________________________ page 217 . The 14th International Scientific Conference “DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN THE 21st CENTURY” Braşov, November 7th-8th 2019 28. HUMAN
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