Security Implications of EU Enlargement By Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach* I. Introduction of conflicts, the democratization of state II. Political Aspects structures, and the modernization of 1 The introduction of the Euro on Janu- economies and societies. However, the The Treaty on European Union ary 1, 2002 was a defining moment for old member states do not yet seem to many people in the participating coun- be fully aware of the challenges that come The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came tries. The new currency has drawn atten- with the entry of 12, perhaps even 18 into force on 1 May 1999, referred for the tion to the European Union (EU) and new members.2 The debate in the gen- first time to the territorial integrity of the stimulated the debate on the future of eral public has largely focused on finan- EU and the preservation of its external the Union. It has become clear that after cial issues. borders. According to Article 11, paragraph the introduction of the Euro the next The accession of the new members will 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), big project which EU members will have have not only economic and financial the Union shall define and implement a to deal with is the admission of a number consequences, but will also affect security common foreign and security policy of new members. policy. The following analysis concentrates (CFSP), whose objectives include: The enlargement of the EU, which will on the implications of EU enlargement - to safeguard the common values, probably begin in 2004, creates many in the field of security policy. In particu- fundamental interests, independence and opportunities for the European conti- lar, it will highlight some of the prob- integrity of the Union in conformity with nent. Officials in European capitals hope lems that may arise in a Union consisting the principles of the United Nations that it will lead to the peaceful resolution of up to 33 members. Charter; (...) * Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach, Research Fellow, Bundeswehr Office for Studies and Exercises. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. 7 - to preserve peace and strengthen in- quences5 after enlargement, as a task force defense policy (ESDP) since 1999 should ternational security, in accordance with of the European Parliament has pointed not obscure the fact that the national in- the principles of the United Nations out. It remains to be seen to what extent terests of the EU member states still differ Charter, as well as the principles of the EU member states will comply with the significantly. The more members the EU Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of principle of solidarity in an enlarged Un- has in the future, the more difficult the the Paris Charter, including those on exter- ion if - to give but one example - rela- task of fashioning a coherent foreign nal borders (...).3 tions between Russia and the Baltic States policy for the Union will be. The neces- This comes close to an at least indirect were to sharply deteriorate. sity of making most decisions unani- definition of the Union as a security Another source of friction in case of a mously has proved to be a time-consum- 4 space. crisis might be the different membership ing procedure, which hampers quick po- Furthermore, EU member states have structures of the EU and the WEU. Only litical action. Despite this, barely any committed themselves to solidarity. Arti- ten of the fifteen EU states are currently progress was made in Nice by the EUs cle 11, paragraph 2 TEU stipulates that full members of the WEU; five countries heads of states and governments towards the members shall support the Unions (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and extending qualified majority voting. Ar- external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and Sweden) have partly strong reservations ticle 23 TEU states that decisions with mutual solidarity. EU members shall about military co-operation with the EU. military and defense implications will be 6 refrain from any action which is contrary A transferral of the Article 5 military as- taken unanimously by the Council. This to the interests of the Union or likely to sistance commitment of the WEU treaty system of decision-making will continue impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force does not presently seem to be politically to provide individual member states with in international relations. feasible although a common defence the option of vetoing the majoritys in- These provisions do not of course have would provide a good basis for co-opera- terests.7 the same value as the Article 5 mutual as- tion in crisis management operations. In the future, it will thus be absolutely sistance clauses of the treaties of the North necessary to renounce the narrow, national Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Co-operation mechanisms perspectives in the field of foreign and the Western European Union (WEU). Nev- security policy in order to find forms of ertheless, the principle of territorial in- The remarkable progress achieved in flexible integration. It is widely acknowl- tegrity might have very serious conse- the field of the European security and edged that an EU consisting of 25, 30 or 8 even more states cannot be governed with often appears that it is mainly the EUs the mechanisms created for the six found- The Future of Integration prosperity which has attracted the candi- ing members. There are already several dates, not the notion of co-operation and modes of differentiation existing in to- However, there is an ongoing contro- integration (although this is a key pre- days EU: the Schengen agreement (to versy between the old members as to the requisite for the EUs economic success). which only 13 of the 15 members ac- future of the EU. Between Berlin and Brusselss demands for an improvement ceded), the economic and monetary un- Paris, the two self-proclaimed engines of the co-operation among the states of ion (only 12 of the 15), the WEU mu- of the EU, profound differences exist South-Eastern Europe, for example, are tual military assistance commitment (only about the direction which the European sometimes regarded in that region, occa- 9 10 of the 15), a number of opt-out project should take. In an open letter sionally even by high government offi- 12 clauses and other exceptions such as in published in October 2001, Jacques cials, as a dirty trick to keep the Bal- Delors, Felipe Gonzalez, Helmut Kohl and kans away from Europe. In none of the environmental policy.8 In principle, the Jacques Santer criticized continuing ma- candidate countries can a sense of proposals for the formation of a core jor weaknesses10 within the EU which supranational eros13 be observed, as Europe (as espoused by German Chris- could be exacerbated by enlargement: Werner Weidenfeld said, the candidate tian Democratic politicians Wolfgang Divided over Economic Monetary states do not comprehend the Western Schäuble and Karl Lamers), a centre of Union as well as over defence, Europe can European founding notion - gaining com- gravity (German Foreign Minister agree neither on the objectives and meth- mon sovereignty by relinquishing national Joschka Fischer) or an avantgarde ods of integration, nor on what more is sovereignty.14 (French President Jacques Chirac) all pur- needed in order to make a success of en- Against this background, an increas- sue the same objective: the preservation largement.11 ing number of voices can be heard de- of the ability to act effectively in an en- The entry of new EU members might manding a consolidation of the Union larged Union. EU members must create well deepen the differences. Those new before enlargement takes place. Helmut the necessary conditions which will allow members in Central and Eastern Europe Schmidt, a former German chancellor, and the process of integration to continue, if which until 1991 belonged to the East- Valéry Giscard dEstaing, a former French need be on several tracks and in different ern bloc are likely to defend vigorously president, have been warning that [h]aste varieties. their still young national sovereignty. It to enlarge the Union can lead it into a 9 sequence of severe crises in the first dec- of Luxemburg, said after the lengthy ne- Department of Defense believe that Tur- ade of the new century.15 Full integra- gotiations at the European Council in key might even try to blockade the is- tion is not a realistic goal for 30 coun- Nice, Never before have I realized so land.19 tries that are very different in their po- clearly how fragile Europe is.18 If, as most observers expect, no settle- litical traditions, culture and economic ment on the future of the country can be development, the two elder statesmen reached before the conclusion of the en- maintain. They conclude that [t]o attempt III. Security Aspects largement negotiations, the EU will find integration with that many countries can itself in a complicated position. If no agree- only lead to complete failure.16 Alongside the political ramifications of ment has been reached, the accession of Furthermore, scepticism towards enlargement, the EU will face a range of the Greek part is likely to trigger a crisis. Brussels is growing among the popula- security challenges. The possibility of a war between the two tion in the current member states. On NATO allies cannot be excluded either. average, only 48% of EU citizens support Cyprus However, if the EU were to decide to their countrys membership. Merely 41% postpone extending membership to Cy- of EU-Europeans say they tend to trust The accession of the Republic of Cy- prus, Brussels might run the risk that the Unions institutions and bodies; al- prus will most likely pose serious diffi- Greece will stymie the entire enlargement most the same percentage of people (40%) culties.