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The Baltic's Response to Russia's Threat

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The Baltic's Response to Russia's Threat Food for thought 03-2019 The Baltic’s response to Russia’s Threat How Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania reacted to the recent actions of the russian federation AN EXPERTISE FORUM CONTRIBUTING TO EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTING TO FORUM AN EXPERTISE SINCE 1953 ARMIES INTEROPERABILITY European Army Interoperability Center This paper was drawn up by Ms. Ilaria La Torre, European Defence Researcher, under the supervision and guidance of the Head of the Permanent Secretariat. This Food for Thought paper is a document that gives an initial reflection on the theme. The content is not reflecting the positions of the member states, but consists of elements that can initiate and feed the discussions and analyses in the domain of the theme. It was drafted by the Permanent Secretariat of Finabel. SUMMARY Introduction 3 The type of threat? 5 - Military threats 7 - Non-military threats 12 How have the Baltics responded so far? 15 - National Level 16 - NATO Level 19 - European Level 21 Conclusion 24 Bibliography 25 - Books and Academic Articles 25 - Primary Sources and News Articles 27 The Baltic’s response to Russia’s Threat 2 INTRODUCTION Sharing a border with Russia has always been Russophone minorities as political instru- a major cause for concern for Baltic countries. ments against the West (Nielsen and Paabo). However, the fear of a potential invasion from Moscow has strongly increased in the past Post-Soviet Russia had one key objective: decades, due to a multitude of factors: Russia’s maintaining its international profile. Indeed, militarisation policies and the illegal annexa- the country wished to keep the legacy of the tion of Crimea. This paper aims to assess the USSR intact, just as the USSR had sought to key threats to the Baltic states coming from maintain the legacy of Tsar Russia. On the Russia. It will also look at the way the Baltic one hand, what modern Russia wanted was, states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have re- to create a buffer zone between its territory acted – both autonomously and supported by and the West, and, at the same time, to keep a the international organisations they are part strong leverage-hold on the post-Soviet terri- of –, and the necessary issues that must be ad- tory, the Baltics included. In order to do that, dressed in the future. Moscow created a strategy which involved military and non-military instruments (Ma- After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Es- liukevičius). tonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had to develop their autonomous concepts of security and To face Russia’s strategy, the Baltics had to defence. The Baltic states needed to create respond rapidly after becoming autonomous a new security policy: neutrality, trilateral states. The states had to first create a capable alliance, or joining the West were three pos- and effective Armed Forces from scratch: to do sible options (Szymański). Of these choices, so, they enforced a two-pillar scheme, based joining the Western organisations seemed to on conscription, with a large reservists list and, be the best option. It provided a guarantee and on a voluntary territorial defence force against the state the Baltic states feared most: (Szymański). The second step was guarantee- post-Soviet Russia. In the mid- 1990s, Rus- ing high-level co-operation among the three sian resurgence and revisionism was a fright- countries: BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALT- ening reality, and Russia’s wish to influence NET, BALTDEFCOL were created in the Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania began already mid-1990s to do exactly this. The areas dealt on the first day of the brand-new Federation with start from foreign deployment, to airspace (Maliukevičius). The Baltic countries feared defence, and military education. The final step most of all the possibility of a Russian inva- was approaching the Western world, in par- sion. This fear was rooted in the 50 year-long ticular the two following organisations, which previous occupation and the presence of large could ensure stability and wealth for the Bal- Russian minorities in the Baltic territories tic states: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa- (Szymański). Indeed, Russia had developed tion (NATO) and the European Union (EU). a specific policy towards the Russophone mi- Consequently, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania norities abroad – defined in the Compatriots joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace pro- Act of 1995 and in the Foreign Policy Con- gramme (1994) and signed Association Agree- cept of 2013 –, which stated that Moscow has ments with the EU (1995), in order to prepare clear responsibilities towards these minorities. future membership to the two organisations. Even if this can be seen as motivated concern for its former citizens, many Western scholars For many in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, underline that the Kremlin mostly uses the 2004 was perceived as “the end of history” The Baltic’s response to Russia’s Threat 3 (Lawrence and Jermalavi). Indeed, in this soon appeared in Estonia and Latvia. In Es- year the three countries had become part of tonia, probably due to the geographic posi- the world’s strongest economic block – the tion of the country, being farthest from the EU – and had joined the world’s most im- Allies, a total defence approach was adopted, portant security community – NATO. Baltic focused on the necessity to protect the territo- leaders were convinced that after joining these ry (Szymański). The population was required organisations, a prosperous future would arise to support a high degree of involvement in for their countries. Article 5 of the North At- defence and security, and conscription was lantic Treaty guaranteed, that legally an attack maintained and reinforced. A voluntary par- on one of the Baltic states, would cause the amilitary armed branch, the Defence League, intervention of the Allies and, at the same supported the traditional forces. Despite in- time, the European Community’s economic volvement in NATO, the country devoted support would grant new life to the weak and considerable attention to its autonomous ca- Russian- dependent Baltic economy. pabilities of defending its territories. In Lat- via, where the population feared Russia less as Focusing on the military aspect, the rap- a potential attacker, the security and defence prochement to the West implied increased approach was more general, and global, and cooperation in the acquisition of military involved the civilian population less directly. equipment, and in the sharing of best prac- Conscription was abolished, with the creation tices, deployment, and the training of troops. of a solely professional army, and the expend- This had a substantial political consequence, iture on security and defence decreased. In as it affected the so far shared path for Bal- 2012, the spending reached its lowest point, tic states, who then started to develop more amounting to only 0.88% of GDP (Figure 1). specific national strategies. As underlined by Moreover, the involvement in NATO strong- Andžāns and Veebel, two different models ly influenced Latvia’s foreign policy and its Figure 1: Defence expenditure in Baltic States 2004/16. The Baltic’s response to Russia’s Threat 4 relations with Russia. Indeed, the post-Cold ways maintained higher spending for defence War NATO raison d’être, which included a purposes. However, the situation for the three wide-ranging concept of threats and consid- countries changed after Russia’s illegal occu- ered Russia more as a partner than a rival, pation and annexation of Crimea. This event required normalization of relations with Mos- altered the priorities for the Baltics, as they cow. To demonstrate good will to the Allies, perceived an increased need for investment Riga renounced, for example, its rights to the in their security and defence sectors, as well Russian-controlled Abrene District in 2007, as the involvement of the NATO Allies. Per- for the sake of closer relations with the Krem- tinent questions are then, what is the nature lin (Andžāns and Veeber). of Russia’s threat today for Baltic states? How will the Baltic countries decide to respond to Lithuania on the other hand, chose a mixed this threat? scheme for its defence and security strategy: compulsory military service remained manda- After having assessed the evolution of the se- tory until 2008, which was then substituted curity and defence policies of the Baltic states, by selective conscription which supported the the next chapter presents the key threats com- professional military scheme (Szymański). In ing from Russia towards Estonia, Latvia, and, 2005 around 3,330 soldiers were called upon Lithuania. Chapter two will give an insight for basic compulsory military service. In 2013 to the response of the Baltic states, taken there were only 634 soldiers (Andriškevičius). singularly, as well as to the collective action Undoubtedly, funding strongly influenced the of NATO and the EU, especially following organisation of the Lithuanian Armed Forc- Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. In the es. The command of the AF strongly pushed concluding section, a final glimpse of the real for a bigger share of the budget allocated for nature of the threats will open up some sug- the state’s defence capabilities. As noted by gestions on what needs to be improved and Andriškevičius, in the first years of the new how. Republic of Lithuania, it was expected that the country would allocate a large share of its GDP – around 6% – for national defence THE TYPE OF THREAT? and security. However, in 1995 only 3.7% of the GDP was assigned, and, even after join- Ulman defines a threat to national security as: ing NATO, the country maintained a low “an action or sequence of events that threatens level of defence and security expenditure. In drastically and over a relatively brief span of time 2003, the share became even lower – 1,48% to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of GDP – while in 2013 only 0.77% of GDP of a state, or threatens significantly to narrow the was allocated.
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