The Case of the Phantom MTB and the Loss of HMCS Athabaskan

Canadian Military History

Volume 11 Issue 3 Article 2

2002

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Recommended Citation Whitby, Michael "The Case of the Phantom MTB and the Loss of HMCS Athabaskan." Canadian Military History 11, 3 (2002)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Whitby: Phantom MTB and the HMCS Athabaskan

The Case of the Phantom MTB and the Loss of HMCS A th abaskan

Michael Whitby

n the early dawn hours of 29 April 1944, the It was not unusual, therefore, for HMCS Idestroyer HMCS A th a b a ska n plunged to the H aida an d A th a b a ska n to learn during the depths of the English Channel, her hull wracked forenoon of 28 April that they had been ordered by two powerful explosions. One hundred and to screen HOSTILE 26, a minelaying mission twenty-eight young Canadians died with her. off the French coast about a 100 miles south of Fifty-two years later, in the article “I Will Never Plymouth.5 The Tribals’ role was to act as distant Forget the Sound of Those Engines Going Away: covering force for eight Motor L aunches (MLs) A Re-examination into the Sinking of HMCS of the 10th ML Flotilla that were to lay mines Athabaskan” that appeared in this journal, Peter about nine miles north of the eastern point of Dixon advanced the theory - which was the lie de Bas.6 Two MTBs were to provide close presented as fact - that the second explosion, escort to the minelayers, with Lieutenant- the one that sealed the destroyer’s fate, was Commander T.N. Cartwright, RNVR, senior caused by a torpedo fired by a British motor officer of the 52nd MTB Flotilla riding in torpedo boat (MTB).2 The most significant MTB-677, in command of both the minelaying warship loss in Canadian naval history, the group as well as the two covering MTBs. theory goes, was caused by friendly fire.3 That Cartwright led his force out through the is not so. When primary evidence overlooked by Plymouth boom at 1946 hours. H aida an d Dixon is considered and the recollections of Athabaskan, with Commander H.G. DeWolf, witnesses recorded decades after the event are RCN as senior officer, followed at 2300 hours scrutinized, it becomes abundantly clear that with orders to patrol a 12-mile, east-west ‘race A thabaskan could not have been the victim of a track’ at 49° N, 4° 10' W, about 12 miles north- British torpedo. northwest from where the minefield would be laid. Conditions were good, with a gentle Force Before getting into the specifics of the issue, 3 wind blowing out of the north, a calm sea state it is important to set out the events of that night. 2, and good visibility.7 Throughout the spring of 1944 Allied naval forces carried out anti-shipping sweeps to erode As the Canadian destroyers headed towards German naval strength in preparation for the their patrol position, abnormal atmospheric invasion of northwest Europe. They also laid conditions enabled the coastal radar at Plymouth offensive minefields at strategic locations to Command to detect two enemy vessels off the im pede Kriegsmarine sorties once the invasion French coast.8 From 0010 hours to 0130 hours was launched. Plymouth Command was the Area Combined Headquarters, Plymouth responsible for mounting a good portion of these plotted the progress “of enemy vessels operations, and Canadian Tribal class proceeding to the westward at 20 knots.” At 0258 destroyers, which had joined the command in hours contact was regained, and at 0307 hours, January 1944, were heavily involved in both.4 the C-in-C Plymouth, Admiral Sir Ralph Leatham, ordered Haida an d A th a b a ska n to

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 2

search and returned to where A th a b a ska n h ad Commander-in-Chlefs 290307 and 290313 last been seen. All that was found was “a large w ere received a t 0315 a n d 0323 respectively an d group of survivors.”11 Shattered by the two it was realized that enemy plot was probably destroyers but Radar sweep to the southward explosions observed from H aida, A th a b a ska n produced no contact nor was anything sighted. was gone. At 0338 C.ln C’s 290331 was received just as [minelaying] Divisions rejoined and altered The cause of the first explosion that crippled course to N.6°E. for return passage at 14 knots. A th a b a ska n at 0417 hours is not in doubt. It At 0405 Haida’s 290402 was received and 0410 came from a torpedo fired by the German continuous star shell was sighted bearing destroyer T-24 as it turned away eastward.12 It approximately S.45°W; Haida’s 290414 was received and at 0416 an explosion was sighted is the cause of the second explosion, the one followed by a burst of flame bearing S.55°W. This that finished her off (although she probably was followed at 0427 by a very large explosion would have sunk anyway) that has been with a large white mushroom of white smoke questioned. According to official investigations on approximately the same bearing; it was feared at the time, and subsequent examination by that at the time that this explosion emanated from one of the destroyer support force. At 0505 historians, the large fire that burned out of C.in C’s 290448 was received ordering MTBs to control after the first explosion led to a chain of detach and proceed to rescue of survivors of events that caused the second, and by virtually Athabaskan; MTBs proceeded to the S.W. at 20 all accounts, more powerful internal explosion knots until C. in C’s 290537 ordering them to at 0427 hours. return to Plymouth. Contact was re-established with M.L.s at 0838 and force entered harbour Peter Dixon disagrees. He believes that at a t 0 9 5 5 .14 The Unlucky Lady. HMCS Athabaskan at anchor at Plymouth in the spring of 1944. 0307 hours, MTB-677 copied Plymouth’s signal Supplementing Cartwright’s report is a two- ordering Haida and A thabaskan to intercept the page extract from MTB-677’s deck log for 28/29 proceed southwest at full speed to Intercept. 9. The enemy laid smoke and turned away to enemy radar contact. After a 55-minute run at April 1944. This document, which details the From here, Commander DeWolfs after action the Southward. At 0417 course was altered 30° 30 knots, MTB-677 arrived at the scene in time to port, still keeping “A” arcs open and at this position, course and speed of MTB-677 over the report can be used to outline the events that to be picked up as the third radar contact course of the operation as well as the position moment Athabaskan was hit aft and a large fire detected by the Tribals at 0411 hours. The flash followed: started. She was observed to slow down and of the mine lay, was completed as the mission turned to port. The first hit on the enemy was from T-24’s torpedo hitting A thabaskan at 0417 unfolded and thus can be taken as the most .. .Commander-in-Chief Plymouth’s 290307 was obtained at 0418. hours acted as a beacon that led the MTB to the reliable account of the MTB’s movements. The received in the plot at 0322. Course was altered Canadian destroyer. Then, confused by to 225° and speed Increased to maximum. At 10. At 0419 Haida altered course 90° to port original log would have remained with the MTB and lay a smoke screen for Athabaskan who Athabaskan’s camouflage pattern, M TB-677 0332 course was altered to 205° and at 0343 to and an extract submitted so that Plymouth appeared to be stopped and badly on fire. “A" 180°. It was estimated from information mistook the Tribal for a German destroyer and Command would know the precise location of arcs were opened to starboard. At 0420 another attacked, killing a sailor on the fo’c’sle with contained in C-in-C’s 290313 and 0331 that the the new minefield.15 The deck log demonstrates enemy could be intercepted East of Isle de Vierge hit was observed on the enemy. machine gun fire and mortally wounding her conclusively that Cartwright never deviated from 6. Radar contact was gained by Athabaskan 11. At 0422 plot reported enemy steaming 160° with a torpedo. in line abreast. At about this moment the enemy his orders for HOSTILE 26. He stayed with the at 0359° bearing 133°, 14 miles and confirmed MLs over the course of the entire operation, and by Haida at 0402 when an enemy report was not being engaged was sighted broad on the For the above to be true, a document lying starboard bow steering from left to right and did not head for the location of the destroyer made. Course was altered to 160° at 0400 and in the Public Record Office in Kew, England has target was shifted. The first destroyer was action until 0505 when C-in-C Plymouth ordered back to 170° at 0408, the bearing of the enemy to be false. Indeed, it and all its parts must be remaining steady at about 125°. At 0402 plot disappearing in smoke to the Eastward. Course MTBs 677 an d 717 to rescue Athabaskan’s was altered to the starboard placing the engaged complete fabrications. This is the “Report by the estimated enemy course and speed 280°, 24 survivors.16 knots and this was confirmed by Athabaskan enemy on the bow and the other ahead. At 0427 Senior Officer, 52nd MTB Flotilla, of proceedings (278°, 23 knots). “X” gun reported star shell expended and a of Operation ‘Hostile Twenty Six.’” Dated 30 April moment later Athabaskan appeared to blow up. Conspiracy theorists will argue that both the 1944, this report was submitted by Lieutenant- 7. At 0407 the enemy bore 127°, 13000 yards, Fortunately at this black moment the engaged log and the report could have been altered or course 260°, 24 knots and plot recorded that Commander T.N. Cartwright, RNVR, senior enemy was on fire and though hidden by smoke, falsified to cover up what ‘really’ happened that we were two miles clear of [minefield] QZX 1287. officer of the 52nd MTB Flotilla, who as already the glow of the fire was bright enough to provide night.17 For that to be true, and for that cover- At 0411 Athabaskan reported 3 echoes and this a point of aim .10 noted, was riding in MTB-677 that night.13 As up to have remained air tight to this day, was confirmed by Type 271 who reported the senior officer of the minelaying force and the third echo as smaller. Cartwright, Clayton, the 20-odd crew members H aida battered this target, which proved to be two MTBs providing close protection, 8. At 0412 I gave the order “engage the enemy" of MTB-677, and the crews of MTB-71 7 an d the the German destroyer T-27, for five more Cartwright’s duty was to ensure that the and opened fire with star shell, the range then minutes before DeWolf realized it was hard ten MLs - something approaching 200 sailors - being 7300 yards. At 0414 two destroyers were minefield was laid effectively and accurately, to would have had to lie about the MTB’s absence aground on lie de Vierge. H aida then headed screen the MLs doing the work, and then to in sight, bearing 115° and were recognized as from the flotilla and then kept silent all these E lbings.9 northwest to search for the other destroyer, but escort the MLs safely home. This is his account as contact had been lost DeWolf broke off the years. Staff at HMS Black Bat, the MTB base at of MTB-677’s movements at the time Peter Dixon Plymouth who were responsible for signing off says he was torpedoing Athabaskan: 6 7

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss3/2 2 Whitby: Phantom MTB and the HMCS Athabaskan

“the son of a bitch go across the bow like a shipmates by small arms fire, as claimed in banshee” appeared as a witness but mentioned Dixon’s article, why did they not report it at nothing of that incident: the inquiry? This seems especially illogical when one considers that they would have MlUr (Q) What was your action station in the assumed that such an attack would have been Athabaskan? made by an enemy vessel. Surely, they would (A) ‘A’ gun, sir. have reported what they saw. That was, after (Q) Were you Captain of the gun? all, the purpose of the inquiry. It makes no 3 * 'a a 8 P ® (A) Yes, sir. sense whatsoever, leaving one to conclude that (Q) What happened after the first explosion? they did not see what they later said they saw, leaving - again - no valid reason to think that (A) I reported the ‘A’ gun out of action and JIM immediately on checking up reported it back a British MTB participated in the action or was in action again. responsible for the second explosion.24

66Z-P6 (Q) What made you think it was out of action? Besides the evidence in M TB-677's log and (A) It gave such a jar, I reported it was out of Cartwright’s report, as well as the obvious idlAld QNQ action and then I saw it was alright. problems associated with his eye-witness (Q) D id you c a rry on firing? testimony, Dixon’s theory falls apart in other (A) Yes, sir. areas. Although he had not seen the contents of (Q) W hen did you cease firing? ADM 199/531, he was aware of a summary of (A) I got a check fire after eight rounds. M TB-677’s movements that night that Admiral A Fairmile D MTB - or ‘Dogboat’ - similar to MTB-677. (Q) When did the second explosion occur? Leatham referred to in his covering letter to the (A) The second explosion came just after this report of the Board of Inquiry: deck logs would also have recognized that the by small arms fire, killing Able Seaman Hubert and someone came up and said stand by to Since the Board of Inquiry sat. a report has been log had been altered and therefore been part of J. Peart.”19 According to the citations in Dixon’s abandon ship was given. They all started to their abandon ship stations and so we went received from the Commanding Officer of M.T.B. the conspiracy, as would the staff of the torpedo article, both claims were made in statements or back to the gun and opened fire again. 677 [sic],25 who was in command of Force office at Plymouth who would have to explain correspondence during the mid-1980s, or 40 “Hostile XXVI”, and who was returning to (Q) Did you see the second explosion? away a missing - and rather expensive - torpedo. years after the action. A more reliable source England from the vicinity of the lie de Bas on Experienced senior staff officers at the Admiralty would obviously be accounts taken immediately (A) No, sir. the early morning of 29th April, that he saw two explosions. who wrote detailed appreciations of the action after the events, and for that we can turn to the (Q) Did you fire after the second explosion? based on reports from all participants would Board of Inquiry into the loss of Athabaskan. (A) I was firing at the time. I believe I had got As he was at the time a m atter of some 30 miles to the north eastward of Haida and have had to have been fooled by the cover-up or away three rounds but I am not sure if three were away after the explosion. Athabaskan. he was not called as a witness at been part of it. And, of course, the crew of the During the war the RN and the RCN held the Board of Inquiry. MTB-677, who would have had the loss of an formal inquiries into the destruction of most Witness withdrew.22 Photo by Gilbert A. Milne, NAC PA 166532 Allied warship and the deaths of 128 Canadians warships in order to investigate the on their conscience, would have had an even circumstances of the loss. Because A thabaskan Nary a “son of a bitch,” nary greater tragedy to hide. To suggest that it could was under RN operational control, the inquiry a “b a n sh ee ,” n ary an MTB. all have been kept quiet in the first place - let was held under British auspices. Four RN Furthermore, although alone have remained a secret all these years - officers20 made up the board and on 3 May 1944 three sailors who were seems ludicrous. By accepted standards of - four days after the action - they interviewed working ‘A’ or ‘B’ turrets historical scholarship, the information in 29 witnesses, 21 of whom were from during the action testified at Cartwright’s report and the MTB’s log proves that Athabaskan. Their testimony is on record at the the inquiry, not one made MTB-677 remained with the MLs and did not Public Record Office but was not consulted by any reference to being raked go anywhere near Athabaskan. Peter Dixon.21 What he would have found would by small arms fire or to likely have given him pause. The inquiry heard seeing Able Seaman Peart Dixon’s case loses further veracity when one testimony from survivors of Athabaskan’s cut down.23 scrutinizes the eye-witness testimony he brings forward gun crews, from officers and men on forward from two survivors. One sailor from ‘A’ the bridge, from lookouts, and from radar If survivors witnessed a gun on Athabaskan’s fo’c’sle deck claims to have operators - among others. But not one made direct attack on their ship witnessed the actual attack by MTB-677: “I saw any reference to seeing an MTB or any other and the death of one of their the son of a bitch go across the bow like a small craft attack A th a b a ska n at any point in banshee. I saw the white track go into the port the action. What is most interesting is that the Vice Admiral Percy Nelles side.”18 Another describes ‘B’ gun being “raked sailor who 40 years later claimed to have seen speaks to the Ship’s Company of the Athabaskan, Plymouth, England, 14 April 1944. 8

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002 3 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss3/2 wrote, “ the tim e of the sighting would be later later be would sighting the of e tim the “Dixon away),” wrote, miles 30 exactly was XXVT(which habaskan. n a k s a b a th A description of the explosion an d the tim e he he e tim the rate d t an a accu th proof right’s the explosion “is it artw C the of accords t a th description concludes Dixon cn fteeggment.”27 engagem the of scene NAC PA 180384 and som e bending of the basic laws of physics, physics, of laws this, basic on the of Based s.” bending claim e he som as and precise as not and ‘Hostile ith w been he “Had source: their to ear n th at m atched those given by by given those atched m at th q u a rte rs after it h ad torpedoed the h ap less less ap explosions h both for the es tim give could torpedoed right ad Cartw h it close after from rs at explosion th rte a the u q proved - oke” witnessed sm had MTB of white the ushroom m “large Cartwright’s upon based clearly is aiy m sum This this assu m p tio n on the rationale th a t su ch a a a ch - su t a explosion th second the of rationale the on description n tio p detailed though m reaches even Dixon assu away. site, miles al this 30 was actu he the at reported he as w he indicate of the n a tu re an d the tim ing of the explosion explosion the of ing tim the d description an right’s re artw tu a C n t a of logic, th the ist tw of strange concludes a In Dixon of proceedings. report 10 t moke on appr mat y t e m a s e th ly te a im x ro p p a n o e k o sm ite h w b e a rin g S. 5 5 s W. T his w as follow ed a t 0 4 2 7 by by a 7 2 bearing.26 4 on 0 t e a ed flam of follow t as s r w u his b T W. s a 5 5 by S. g rin followed a e d b te h explosion th sig 5 n “a f2 as o w 8 0416 1 t a 6 t 1 a th XXVI) d XXTV, n a XXV 1931/Ply. No. letter outh lym P ith w a very large explosion w ith a large m u sh ro o m of of m o ro sh u m large a ith w explosion large very a May, 1944, R eport on “Hostile" O p eration XXIII, XXIII, eration p O “Hostile" arded on is (forw eport rt R o p ever, re 1944, how is h May, in s te ta plosions, s ex He e th of inating. n tio illum rip sc e d ts H He a lso q u e s tio n s w h e th e r r e th e h w s n tio s e u q lso a He MTB 677 MTB Haida if he was not not was if he was at the the at was “Colum ns of fire approxim ately 200 m etres high etres m 200 ately approxim of fire ns “Colum feet h igh,” w hich he seem s to th in k doubtful. of doubtful. k diary, in east th ar w to iles m s er h seem in he ut B hich w igh,” h feet by by v isib le .”28 T h ese re p o rts - a n d th e tim es es tim e th d n a - rts o p re ese h T .”28 le isib v seen th e se co n d ex p lo sio n from 30 m iles iles m 30 525 “over from been n sio have lo to p ex have d would n it co se distance, e th seen detail. accorded the explosions - effectively refute refute effectively - at th explosions contention the Dixon’s of accorded flame clouds huge with detonation “a by hours where from west They h ad been task ed to rendezvous with with rendezvous to ed task been ad h They flam es an d clouds of sm oke,” followed at 0427 0427 at followed with oke,” sm of detonation “a clouds d an describes es action flam hours destroyer 0416 the at from and flashes gun lie of notes diary east rth o n minefield a laying were rs u o h Ouesnt(rUsat, bu 5 lss h th u so iles m 25 about shant), U (or t essan u ’O d inensuchflotille M and and explosion. Even m ore telling is the account of of account e 6th th second the the of is the of from telling e inesweepers m tim ore m s three e the h explosion t Even s a fla oke assive m sm explosion. a n of u g cloud recorded d d t e u an b rv se ent b o engagem ly n o t o n vessels operating about the sam e distance from from distance e sam the about operating vessels eastward at the time of the engagement, and they they and engagement, of the time the 24th at the of eastward eepers inesw m Six explosion. the of the action as as action the thabaskan A Dixon also claim s th a t for for t a th s claim also Dixon n at t epors f eea Gema an erm G several of rts o p re e th fact, In T-27 b u t h ad been held up, an d at 0400 0400 at d an up, held been ad h t u b MTB-677 habasan ska a b a th A to describe the explosion in such such in explosion the describe to thabaskan A Athabaskan A returningPlymouthtoon29 April Leathamandhisstaff after 1944. Dewolf discusseslosstheof were ab o u t 25-30 m iles to to iles m 25-30 t u o ab were grim, wearyHarry Commander provided sim ilar details details ilar sim provided MTB-677 T-24, a t the time, noted noted time, the t a withRalph Sir Admiral blew up. Their war war Their up. blew w hich was eight eight was hich w Minensuchflotille. MTB-677 had to be near near be to had Canadian MilitaryHistory,Vol.11[2002],Iss.3,Art.2 to have have to T-24

A pparently from b u rn in g oil.” Not only did the the did only Not oil.” g in rn u b from pparently A greater th a n Dixon estim ated, b u t they also also they t u b ated, estim Dixon n a th greater (Bb) w ith a big m ushroom of heavy sm oke. oke. sm heavy of ushroom m big a ith w (Bb) w as ab o u t 26-27 knots, not the 30 th a t Dixon Dixon t a th 30 the not knots, 26-27 t u o ab as w time and origin of Time e. fram e tim his into fit the resu lt as they th en exclaim ed, “In any case at case air.’”)29 any the “In in ed, satisfaction blown exclaim foe of en th wicked they ‘One easure as source. m lt a resu internal the took an from e also even cam it (They as t w a t th a th conclude explosion n a describe ans erm G personnel caused from su stain ed pounding at at - pilots fighter pounding the ed like - stain crews su MTB from speed, high caused personnel um axim m ar w the as continuous al fitted actu ent the equipm other progressed, to and due s.30 r not Also, a te eight rad as sta w rs, Dixon n hou a signal h th g 0315 u to the later o til n u lth MTB a inutes ours, Tribals the m h d in n the a 0307 onitored m at signalled differ, and ls m a n intercept Com sig of outh to Plym t e ip tim e in c re there of got have ould w it t a th unlikely even example, For if of events. version Dixon’s ar m probably only have done so a t the 20 knots he he knots 20 the t a so done have only probably tely lu so ab inutes m n 55 a the th for not longer certainly and any for necessary, s n tio lu o rev on toll powerful eir physical th the of as well as reliability engines the because to ackard P ts a portantly, im re .31 th More of them to like ascribes MTBs D-type ile Fairm of speed ent, am arm increased from weight top additional presence.33 It m ust be understood, however, th at at th however, understood, be ust m It presence.33 proves she w as not there at all. at there not as w she proves th ese discrep an cies of tim e an d speed into into speed d an e takes tim of one If cies an survivors. discrep rescue head to to ese him th scene ordered would the Leatham to right when on t artw u C p later like officer experienced an Forces h ig h action, oastal the t C a closed had ts if he n even allotted la p Dixon er t a w o th p ir e th h s u p t o n did scene well after after well scene to appear on A -scans and PPI displays, or for for or displays, PPI and 1944, -scans A in on infancy appear to relative its in still as w r a rad Dixon m aintains th a t it was proof of of proof was it t a th aintains m Dixon and and course, th at is all speculation as her log already already log her as speculation all is at th course, account, account, n t ecor f face e c a rf u s of s rd o c this re during e th Channel English from in the in ples y ents n exam a m Two engagem occur. g n to o m a alies anom other ‘side’echoes or ‘ghost’ for al su u n u not was it and MTB-677 There are technical inaccuracies th a t also also t a th inaccuracies technical are There W hat about the third rad ar echo th at at th echo ar rad third the about hat W thabaskan A MTB-677 h ad w anted to close the action, it is is it action, the close to anted w ad h habasan’ n ska a b a th A detected at 0411 hours? Peter Peter hours? 0411 at detected could only have reached the the reached have only could TB-677.32 M s dem ise. But, of of But, ise. dem s C onsequently, onsequently, C TB-677’ M MTB-677 Haida s s

Athabaskan, - th e c ru is e r HMS HMS r e is ru c e th - April - two nights before before nights two - April period provide evidence of this. On the night of of night the On this. of evidence provide period three G erm an destroyers on the night of 25 / 26 / 26 25 of night the on On destroyers arships!34 an w erm the y G enem three shell, not r ta s islands, by ary n ated statio in m illu nine hen at W south ts. o heading n k range miles eight at plotted thabaskan, A ymout i udi g in d lu c in , th u o m ly P ol aebe lte ya es n fte .37 of them one least at by plotted been have would destroyers destroyers further reinforced by the fact th at neither neither at th fact the by reinforced further detected four radar contacts, although only three three only although contacts, radar four detected an o th er sweep th a t led to an engagem ent with with ent very engagem of an to led t group a th a sweep be er th to o an revealed as w tact n co 2 5 /2 6 February 1944 a group of ships from from ships of group a 1944 February 6 /2 5 2 third echo identified it as a “side echo.”36 This is is This echo.”36 “side a a as it saw ever acknowledged identified only who echo they t a fourth third a th while echoes, reported two subsequently contact a t 0411 h o u rs on 29 April. After th a t t a th After of April. e 29 re on th rs u , o h n tio c 0411 a t a contact ‘ghost’ or ‘side’ echo. This is also the m ost likely likely for ost a m as w the also explanation is fourth t.35 The This resen echo. ‘side’ p or were ‘ghost’ ships an erm G present.’” Dixon’s insertion of the word ‘w hether’ ‘w hether’ word of the insertion Dixon’s present.’” o st y i s t y, xon alo lso a n o ix D , ry o e th is h in ly g n o tr s so an actual contact never existed in the first place. first the in at th existed never suggests contact which actual an vanished, it simply it contact, Instead, firm a been of ad h it if hereas w echo, nor two G erm an destroyers were at the scene of of scene the at were its ed g destroyers n they t a a an ch th erm G lly ere ta reporting two w n e m a s board d ip n the h s fu s a h He r te e o u th q o eaning. m e y th n a not ‘did to in er] board eth h the [w of inquiry’s r bers e em the id m in s t n o the en c t a th statem the report by pounded com over w hich ship should get credit for sinking sinking for credit get confusion should to ship the of referring hich hen report w W the over from Inquiry. of evidence Board isrepresented m present. This is proved by the w itnesses they they itnesses w the by proved is This present. th a t they did not th in k any other vessels vessels other any k in th saying not were did they the fact, they in t a when, th besides ent, vessels engagem the any if investigate not did hen quetone or adar rt s rm from rs erato p o They r a d ra present. four he were ed s n hether ip w sh Haida d estio u an q the other t n a e DeWolf contact th any ar t ander h posed rad m g u om o ird C th th they the s asked n t u o ard estio ab bo u q The the inquiry. d an called hi act3 (h saior rm from rs ilo a s (The t.38 c ta n o c d ir th itie tee ee wa a hid contact, ird th a as w never there aintained m thabaskan A Unfortunately, perhaps because he believes believes he because perhaps Unfortunately, an d another from from another d an aida H picked up a rad ar contact th at was was at th contact ar rad a up picked he wrote, “Yet th is confusion is is confusion is th “Yet wrote, he seem s to have tracked the third third the tracked have to s seem aida H an d HMS HMS d an da’ a id a H a d an ack Prince k c la B habasan ska a b a th A thabaskan A da, uron H , a id a H radar oper or rs to ra e p o r a d a r s habasan’ n ska a b a th A shanti A all initially initially all he e th d n a wss k n su was about the the about s third third s da id a H Haida d n a were 11

4 Whitby: Phantom MTB and the HMCS Athabaskan

therefore, appear to have been caused by a catastrophic explosion that devastated torpedo fired by the enemy when they turned A th a b a ska n that April night were there. at about 0414. This agrees approximately with the running time of a 40 knot torpedo so fired. This shot stopped the ship, which had just altered course 30e to port, and ten minutes later Notes she sustained a second and much heavier explosion, i.e. at 0427. This may have been caused by 1. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Kate Tildsley of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) a) a torpedo, or Naval Historical Branch in London, England, as well b) the explosion of the after 4" magazine. as Steve Harris and Bill Johnstone at the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH). Although the author In support of (a) the radar plot shows an is an official historian with the Department of National apparent jink to the southwards between 0420 Defence, the views expressed in this article are entirely and 0422 of the Elbing destroyer who was not h is own. engaged by Haida. A torpedo fired on this jink 2. Peter A. Dixon, “'I Will Never Forget the Sound of Those at the stationary and burning Athabaskan would Engines Going Away’: A Re-examination into the Sinking One hundred and twenty- have arrived at about 0427. The Elbing engaged eight young Canadian of HMCS Athabaskan, 29 April 1944,” C anadian by HMCS Haida was also in a position from Military History, Vol 5, No 1, Spring 1996, p p .16-25. volunteers died with which she might have fired torpedoes, although The article is also available on the Canadian Tribal Athabaskan. This is an early this would entail a long shot fired well abaft her Association web site at www3.sympatico.ca/hrc/haida/ grave marker erected in beam . g71ost.htm Plouescat, France. In s u p p o rt of (b) th e after 4" magazine had 3. This version of events has subsequently appeared in the television docum entary “Unlucky Lady: The Life and been close to a very serious fire for a period of Death of HMCS Athabaskan"and was repeated in the ten minutes. The explosion of this magazine 16 April 2001 issue of M aclean’s m agazine. would have thrown burning oil up and far 4. Between 16 and 29 April alone, H aida particip ated in enough forward, to have caused the flames which four ‘Hostiles’ and two ‘Tunnel’ offensive sweeps. See, were experienced by the ship’s company HMCS H aida, Report of Proceedings, 26 May, 1944. while the one from A th a b a ska n said that his deck at the time, were queried about the second amidship and near the bridge. National Archives of Canada (NAC), RG 24 (Acc 8 3 -84/ set broke down after the first explosion.) Why explosion. The board in particular wanted to In view of the evidence of men who were in 167), Box 694, 1926-DDE-215, vol 1 else would they call radar operators from Haida know if any sea water was thrown up with the No.2 boiler room, which they left intact, the 5. HMCS H aida, Report of Action, 29 April 1944. Public unless they were interested in finding out what blast, evidence that it may have been caused by second explosion m u s t have occurred in or abaft Record Office (PRO), ADM 199/263. Copies of this the engine room. report are also held at the NAC. ships were present? The evidence they heard a torpedo. No witness recalled any sea water, 6. Fourteen mines were laid by one ML at 48°51’39" N, led them to conclude - or, to use another word, they mostly refer to large amounts of flame. Only We do not consider that any other enemy 03°57’18"W on course 319°, and another 14 by the other consider - that no ships beyond the two one witness, Lieutenant J.W. Scott, RCNVR, ships were present, besides the two Elbing division at 48°52’42" N, 03°53’24" W on course 010°. Canadian and two German destroyers were thought a torpedo hit caused the second destroyers mentioned the Haida’s report, and LCDR F. Cartwright, “Report by Senior Officer, 52nd that the torpedo or torpedoes which hit the MTB Flotilla, of proceedings of Operation ‘Hostile involved in the action.39 explosion: Athabaskan were fired by them .42 Twenty Six’, PRO ADM 199/531 7. H aida, Report of Action, 29 April 1944. In discussing the inquiry, Dixon also writes Q: The second explosion, do you remember There is no question that events on the night 8. It was a condition of anomalous propagation known as “Eyewitness accounts have A th a b a ska n being seeing it? super-refraction. There was also signal intelligence that of 28 / 29 April 1944 were confused. But we know the German destroyers would be at sea. See, The A: Yes, sir. torpedoed twice on the port side. This now through the examination of German records Admiralty Manual of Navigation, Vol I, (London, 1955), explanation seems to have been discounted by Q: Do you know which side? th at T-24 and T-27 did not fire any additional pp.229-234, and F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Board.” Dixon is correct in that conclusion, A: On the starboard side. That was a definite torpedoes after their initial salvo, and we also the Second World War, Vol III p t 1, (London, 1984), p.287 but it is important to recognize that the board torpedo because the whole ship just seemed to know that no other German vessels were in the 9. Elbings was the name given by the Allies to small fall apart.41 did examine the possibility of two torpedoes immediate vicinity of the action. That eliminates German destroyers. The Kriegsmarine referred to them h ittin g Athabaskan. In doing so they were a second German torpedo as the cause of the as torpedo boats (which sometimes leads to confusion The other witnesses corroborate only Scott’s following up a preliminary investigation by massive explosion at 0427 hours. Searching with the term Motor Torpedo Boats). observation that the second explosion was 10. H aida, Report of Action, 29 April 1944. Captain D Plymouth, Commander R.A. Morice, further for the source of a second torpedo, Peter devastating but descriptions of its precise origin 11. Ibid. RN based on his informal conversations with Dixon chose to blame M TB-677, but when his vary. 12. T-24 War Diary, 29 April 1944, PG 70209, DHH, SGR 25 survivors. “Shortly after the first damage,” case is examined closely, it is clear that the II 340 he wrote, “ a heavier and more violent explosion evidence against it is overwhelming, leading one 13. Dixon apparently was unaware that Cartwright was Taking this evidence into account, the riding in MTB-677 and attributes her actions to the CO, was felt amidships. This is believed to have been to conclude that the theory is flat out wrong. board reached the following conclusion: Lieutenant A. Clayton, RNVR. This is not completely either the blast of a torpedo or heavy calibre That leaves an internal explosion as the cause his fault as Leatham’s summary of the report that shell fire.”40 The board pursued this matter at appears in his covering letter for the Board of Inquiry The fact that this hit stopped the ship and caused of the second explosion, and no one can deny the inquiry. Nine of A th a b a ska n ’s survivors, erroneously states that the report from the MTBs was a heavy jar all over the ship seems to show that that with heavy structural damage, a massive written by the CO of MTB-677, Lieutenant Clayton, all of whom had previously talked with Morice it must have been caused by something more fire burning out of control, and volatile instead of the SO for the operation. Just to avoid any and who all appear to have been on the upper than hits from 4.1 projectiles and would, materials close by, the elements for the possible misinterpretation about different reports, the

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Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002 5 Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 2

file number on the report cited by Leatham (Plymouth 25. Actually from Cartwright. letter No. 1931 / Ply. 1618 of 25 May) matches the one 26. Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, “Report of Action on submitted by Cartwright. Night of 28th/29th April, 1944 Between HMC Ships 14. LCDR F. Cartwright, “Report by Senior Officer, 52nd Haida and Athabaskan and Two Enemy Destroyers”, 1 MTB Flotilla, of proceedings of Operation ‘Hostile June 1944, 2. PRO ADM 199/263. Twenty Six', PRO ADM 199/531 27. Dixon, p.24 15. The original deck log has not survived but this is not 28. The evidence and analysis about the 6th and 24th the result of any conspiracy or cover-up. After the war, Minensuchflotille was kindly provided by Kate Tildsley. It was decided - in the interests of storage concerns - The war diaries can be found at PG 72054-PG 72057 that only a 10% sampling of deck logs for ships of and PG 72630-72633 of the NHB German Naval destroyer size and smaller would be preserved by the Microfilm collection, NHB file number FDSN57/2000. Public Records Office. Their activities that night are confirmed by the war diary 16. LCDR F. Cartwright, “Report by Senior Officer, 52nd of the 3rd Security Division held at DHH. MTB Flotilla, of proceedings of Operation ‘Hostile 29. T-24 War Diary, 29 April 1944, PG 70209, DHH, SGR Twenty Six’, Appendix I, “Extract of Deck Log of M.T.B. II 340. My thanks to Dr. Jean Martin for translating 677, 28/29 April, 1944,” PRO ADM 199/531. A this document. transcript of the above was provided to the author by 30. Dixon, p.21 Ms. Kate Tildsley of the Naval Historical Branch, MOD. 31. Ibid. London. Like the other ADM documents cited in this 32. See, for example, J. Lambert and A. Ross, Allied Coastal article, a copy of the original PRO document is held at Forces of World War II: Vol. I, Fairmile Designs and DHH. US Submarine Chasers, (London, 1990), pp.90-93, 17. Peter Dixon now seems aware of the log extract but App VIII. There are m any sources th a t discuss RN MTB rejects its authenticity. See “Maritime Mystery,” tactics during the war, but among the most useful are M aclean’s, 16 April 2001, p.34. th e Coastal Forces Monthly Review, DHH, 84/7, Peter 18. Dixon, p.22. The source cited for this are comments D ickens, Night Action: MTB Flotilla at War, (London, m ade to Mr. E. Stew art in J u n e 1985. 1974), and Peter Scott, The Battle for the Narrow Seas, 19. Dixon, p.20. The source for this is a letter to Mr. E (London, 1945). Stewart dated 13 October 1986. Although Peter Dixon 33. Dixon, p .21 does not say the small arms fire came from the MTB, 34. Captain W. Norris to C-in-C Plymouth, 27 February that is certainly the impression gained from the article. 1944. PRO ADM 199/532 20. They were Captain N.C. Moore, Chief of Staff to C-in-C 35. HMS Black Prince, HMS A sh a n ti, HMCS H aida. Plymouth and President of the inquiry; Commander B. R eports of Action, NAC, RG 24 (Acc 8 3 -8 4 /1 6 7 ) Box Jones, Captain D of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla (the unit 694, 1926-DDE-215, Vol 1 to which the RCN Tribals were attached); Commander 36. Inquiry Report, “Minutes of the Witnesses”, p.26. In his (E) E.H. V incent from HMS Alaunia: and Lieutenant- testimony at the inquiry DeWolf confirmed the three Commander J. J.S. Rusher from the Gunnery School at echoes he mentioned in his after action report but also Plymouth. said he never saw anything other than the two 21. ADM 199/263 has been open since at least 1987 when destroyers. this historian looked at it during the course of doing 37. HMCS Haida, Report of Action, 29 April 1944. This is research for his MA thesis. also borne out by charts of the action, which track no 22. Inquiry Report, “Minutes of the Witnesses", pp.31-32. third German contact. PRO ADM 199/263 38. These were AB F. Gorseworth, AB P.P. Wispinski, AB M. 23. The other sailors from Athabaskan's forward turrets Williams and LS R.E. White from Haida, an d AB J.F who testified were AB A. Audet, PO B ackus and AB J. J. Kane from Athabaskan. See Inquiry Report, “Minutes Carr, See Inquiry Report, “Minutes of the W itnesses”, of the W itnesses,”p p .l6-17, 23-26. PRO ADM 199/263 pp.8-9, 21-23, and 30-31. PRO ADM 199/263. Other 39. Report of the Board of Inquiry, 3 May 1944, 1. PRO survivors who were forward with bridge or damage ADM 199/263 control parties also made no mention of an MTB or 40. Captain D Plymouth, “Report on the Loss of The HMCS small arms fire. Athabaskan”, 30 April 1944. PRO ADM 199/263. It is 24. One possible explanation for the mistaken eyewitness clear from Morice’s opening paragraph that his report account may lie in the action that took place on 25/26 was intended for use by the inquiry. April. In his report Commander DeWolf mentions a 41. Inquiry Report, “Minutes of the Witnesses”, pp.12-13. vessel, which he thought may have been an E-boat, PRO ADM 199/263 racing through the Allied formation close by H alda. 42. Report of the Board of Inquiry, 3 May 1944. PRO ADM John Watkins, HMS A sh a n ti’s navigator at the time, 199/263 later established that the craft was actually the British MGB-502. She was returning from a special operation off the coast of France only to find herself in the midst Michael Whitby is chief of the team at the of a violent, fast-paced destroyer action. Although Directorate of History and Heritage that is Athabaskan’s report makes no mention of the incident, preparing the three-volume official history she was steaming in close proximity to Haida and some of her sailors may have seen the MTB or heard of it of the Canadian navy 1867-1968. He is co later. See, HMCS H aida, Report of Action, 26 April author of the upcoming official volume of the 1944. NAC, RG 24 (Acc83-84/167) Box 694, 1926-DDE- RCN in the Second World War, and has 215, Vol 1; and John Watkins, “Actions Against published widely on Canadian naval history. Elbings, April 1944,” The Mariner’s Mirror, Vol 82, No 2 (May 1995), p.200

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