Wilfrid Laurier University Scholars Commons @ Laurier Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 2016 A Sickly Season: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy Commission Keith D. Calow Wilfrid Laurier University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd Part of the Canadian History Commons, Legal Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Calow, Keith D., "A Sickly Season: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy Commission" (2016). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1878. https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1878 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Sickly Season: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Mainguy Commission By Keith Douglas Calow B.A., Wilfrid Laurier University, 1988 LLB, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1991 M.A. Wilfrid Laurier University, 2005 THESIS/DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of History in partial fulfilment of the requirements for Doctor of Philosophy in History Wilfrid Laurier University © Keith Douglas Calow 2016 ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the proceedings of the Mainguy Commission, which was established in 1949 to investigate and report on a series of three “incidents” of collective disobedience which had taken place aboard Canadian warships in the early months of that year. The “incidents” were the culmination of a series of challenges that the senior staff was already endeavouring to address internally. Media and political attention to the indiscipline, however, brought the minister to insist that there be a public enquiry. Historians who have examined the report of the Mainguy Commission have generally accepted that in calling for the Canadianization of the RCN it represents a break between the RCN and its British traditions. As this thesis demonstrates, the idea that there was a groundswell of nationalist sentiment in the RCN, and particularly on the lower deck, that required a break with Britain is incorrect. In fact the RCN had been attempting to address morale issues for at least the two years prior to the “incidents” and had a very good idea of the issues that had to be dealt with. This dissertation compares the transcripts of the hearings of the Mainguy Commission and the report that it produced. It will argue that the transcripts in fact do not reveal any particular concern on the part of RCN personnel that the navy was insufficiently Canadian. The issues facing the RCN, as disclosed in the transcripts, were related to the failure of the government to spend the money required to ensure a happy and effective fleet. In focusing on the issue of the Canadianization of the RCN, it will be argued, the government was attempting to draw attention away from the real issues facing the RCN and to exert control over the naval staff. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No project of this magnitude is completed in a vacuum an there are a large number of people who have had a role in making it happen. Most of them know who they are. While there is not room to acknowledge everyone, there are a few people whose contribution deserves particular mention. First and foremost I owe endless gratitude to my parents Ken and Brenda Calow. Their love and support has been unstinting throughout my academic and professional endeavors. They continued to believe in me even when I didn't and never failed to offer words of encouragement and support regardless of circumstances. I would not be where I am today were it not for them and for that I am eternally grateful. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my advisor Roger Sarty. His patience and understanding have been exemplary and his suggestions throughout the research and writing of this thesis have been invariably excellent. He has provided a thoughtful sounding board for ideas and arguments and moral support when it seemed like there was no end in sight. Without his help none of this would have been possible. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Chapter 1 ` 41 Chapter 2 64 Chapter 3 93 Chapter 4 127 Chapter 5 159 Chapter 6 205 Conclusion 230 Bibliography 242 iii INTRODUCTION “Mutiny.” It is a word to conjure with. In the popular view it brings to mind visions of Captain Bligh, Fletcher Christian, and the Bounty of historical, and Hollywood, fame. In naval circles, it calls forth images of mass insubordination and the loss of discipline and control over ships in service. In either case, the very word has become synonymous with the most serious of naval offences. It came as quite a shock to the Canadian people and government, then, when, in the early part of 1949, it appeared that the spectre of mutiny had reared its head in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). In fact not one but three apparent mutinies in the RCN occurred in 1949. While one such incident could be regarded as unfortunate and isolated, three in rapid succession was a matter of concern for the senior officers of the RCN and the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton. Historians are undecided on the significance of the Mainguy Commission, which was struck to investigate the three "incidents," and the report that it produced. Some maintain that it marked the end of the RCN as a British institution. The reality is more complex. This study seeks to place the "incidents" and the report within a wider context, for the report was a product of a diverse set of strategic, political and budgetary agendas. It examines the development of the RCN in peace and war and then within the strategic uncertainty of the Cold War. Ultimately this thesis argues that the Mainguy Commission sought to divert attention from the Liberal government's post-war plans for the RCN, plans that were dramatically different from what the naval staff had long envisioned. The Commission did this by appealing to a nationalist sentiment that 1 was in reality a non-issue for the RCN but did serve to distract attention from the more significant issues facing the navy. The first of the apparent mutinies took place aboard HMCS Athabaskan on 26 February 1949. While on exercises in company with a number of other ships as part of Task Group 215.9, Athabaskan had been ordered to detach and proceed to Manzanillo, Mexico to refuel. After she had arrived there, and after the ordinary morning routine had been observed, the hands refused to respond to pipes calling them to duty stations after lunch. After a meeting with the captain, during which a number of grievances were aired by the crew, the pipes again sounded, and the crew returned to their duties.1 On 15 March 1949, less than a month later, the second apparent mutiny took place aboard HMCS Crescent. She had originally been dispatched from Esquimalt on a special mission in late January 1949. She proceeded, during February 1949, to Nanjing, making several stops along the way, where she replaced HMS Cossack as the senior naval vessel there. On 15 March, a Tuesday, the hands had breakfast at 0700 and were piped to duty at 0800. As was the case aboard Athabaskan, the hands refused to obey the call to work stations, and remained in their mess decks, having locked the doors. Upon learning of the situation, and after speaking to one of the disaffected seamen, the captain of Crescent went to the mess deck and spoke to the men there. After his meeting with the men, “hands fall in” was again piped at 0950 and the crew resumed its duties.2 The final incident took place aboard HMCS Magnificent, the only light fleet aircraft carrier in the RCN, and the lynch-pin of its post-war aspirations towards a balanced fleet. At the time of the apparent mutiny, Magnificent was engaged in flying 1 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board, Annex II,” MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5. 2 “Appointment Composition and Terms of Reference of Board, Annex IV,” MG31 E18 Vol. 13 File 5. 2 exercises in company with the Pacific Squadron3 of the United States Navy. On 20 March 1949, while participating in these operations, the aircraft handlers refused to obey pipes calling them to duty after breakfast. Again, as with Athabaskan and Crescent, the men met with the captain, after which they obeyed the pipes for “flying stations” at 0900.4 None of the apparent “mutinies” lasted longer than two hours, and all three were resolved efficiently by the captains of the respective ships. There were no instances of violent confrontations between the ratings and the officers. None of the sailors were punished in any way for taking part in the incidents. From the point of view of the Royal Canadian Navy, the crisis seemed to have been averted and order restored with a minimum of fuss. The senior leadership, then, could be forgiven for believing that the RCN had done well in the circumstances and that the matter was behind them. If the senior leadership of the RCN did harbour this belief, however, they were, at least in the eyes of the Canadian press, sadly mistaken. While more will be said about the public reaction to the incidents in subsequent chapters, suffice it to say that across the country, newspapers reported on the apparent mutinies in stories tinged with fear and alarm. The chief focus of the fear, given the era in which the incidents occurred, was of subversion within the RCN by communist agents. If an institution as essentially conservative as the RCN could be infiltrated by communists then no institution was safe.