DOCSLIB.ORG

History, Philosophy of Public Opinion and Public Opinion Research

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
History, Philosophy of Public Opinion and Public Opinion Research PART I History, Philosophy of Public Opinion and Public Opinion Research [17:13 2/8/2007 4984-Donsbach-Ch01.tex] Paper: a4 Job No: 4984 Donsbach: Public Opinion Research (SAGE Handbook) Page: 7 7–24 [17:13 2/8/2007 4984-Donsbach-Ch01.tex] Paper: a4 Job No: 4984 Donsbach: Public Opinion Research (SAGE Handbook) Page: 8 7–24 Section 1 The Nature of Public Opinion [17:13 2/8/2007 4984-Donsbach-Ch01.tex] Paper: a4 Job No: 4984 Donsbach: Public Opinion Research (SAGE Handbook) Page: 9 7–24 [17:13 2/8/2007 4984-Donsbach-Ch01.tex] Paper: a4 Job No: 4984 Donsbach: Public Opinion Research (SAGE Handbook) Page: 10 7–24 1 The Public and Public Opinion in Political Theories Vincent Price The origins of our modern conception of research might conceivably help to inform, public opinion are usually traced to lib- if not resolve.1 In view of a general model eral democratic theories of the eighteenth of democracy as collective decision making, century, with precursors reaching all the this chapter considers the variable sorts of way back to ancient Greece (Palmer, 1936). expectations democratic theories harbor for And yet the connections between empirical political leaders, news media, publics, and public opinion research and political the- citizens. ory have been remarkably loose. Despite the encouragement of leading researchers such as Berelson (1952), Lazarsfeld (1957), ENTWINED CONCEPTS: PUBLIC, and Noelle-Neumann (1979), public opinion OPINION AND DEMOCRACY researchers have only recently taken up the task of trying to integrate empirical and The concept of public opinion emerged during philosophical models (e.g., Herbst, 1993; the Enlightenment, but the separate concepts Price & Neijens, 1997; Althaus, 2006). of the public and opinion have much older This chapter explores some fundamental histories, each with a range of meanings that connections between public opinion research continue to inform their use to the present and democratic theories, with several interre- day (Price, 1992). Opinion was used primarily lated aims: (a) illustrating briefly the historical in two ways. In an epistemological sense, span of democratic theories and the wide opinion indicated a particular and to some range of views they adopt with respect to citi- extent inferior way of knowing, distinguishing zens, publics, public opinion and governance; a matter of judgment (an “opinion”) from a (b) considering some of the normative models matter known as fact or asserted on faith. In implicit in public opinion research; and a second sense, the term was used to indicate (c) exploring some of the enduring theoretical regard, esteem, or reputation (as in holding a tensions, dialectics, and debates that empirical high opinion of someone). Both senses relate [17:13 2/8/2007 4984-Donsbach-Ch01.tex] Paper: a4 Job No: 4984 Donsbach: Public Opinion Research (SAGE Handbook) Page: 11 7–24 12 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH to the notion of judgment, though in the one legitimacy, largely in rhetorical fashion and case the emphasis is on the uncertain truth- without any fixed sociological referent. Hence value of something believed, whereas in the the term remained, in some sense intention- other the emphasis is on a moral dimension ally, vague. It was linked quite explicitly with of judgment, that is, approval or censure. free and open discussion of political affairs As we shall see, political theories variously among educated men of financial means. seize upon one or the other of these senses Yet it often acquired (as in the writings of of “opinion,” at times emphasizing cognition Rousseau, 1762/1968) an abstract and almost and knowledge and at others moral sensibility super-human quality as an expression of or sentiment. The term public, from the Latin the common will, divined through reasoned publicus meaning “the people,” similarly had debate, and framed as a powerful new tribunal several discernable meanings. In some of its for checking and thus controlling, as right earliest uses it referred to common access, would have it, the actions of the state. with areas open to the general population Despite these communitarian origins, deemed public (Habermas, 1962/1989). In a however, the concept of public opinion came second usage, public referred to the common to acquire much of its contemporary meaning interest and common good, not in the sense of from its deployment in the work of later access (or belonging to) but rather in the sense liberal thinkers, particularly “utilitarian” of representing (that is, in the name of) the philosophers such as Mill (1820/1937) and whole of the people. Thus the monarch under Bentham (1838/1962). While continuing the theory of royal absolutism was the sole to argue for full publicity of government public figure, representing by divine right the affairs and strongly advocating freedom of entirety of the kingdom in his person (Baker, expression, these analysts saw the polity less 1990). as the coming together of separate minds The compound concept public opinion reasoning together toward a shared, common came into widespread use only in the will than as a collection of individuals eighteenth century and as the product of attempting to maximize their own interests several significant historical trends, primarily and utilities. The harmonization of these the growth of literacy, expansion of the conflicting interests was best achieved not merchant classes, the Protestant Reformation, through public reasoning to any consensual and the circulation of literature enabled by conclusion, but instead through rule by the printing press. An ascendant class of majority, requiring regular election and literate and well-read European merchants, plebiscite, with the state functioning as a congregating in new popular institutions such referee to individuals and groups vying to as salons and coffee houses and emboldened achieve their economic and political ends. by new liberal philosophies arguing for basic “A key proposition,” writes Held (1996, individual freedoms, began to articulate a p. 95), “was that the collective good could critique of royal absolutism and to assert be realized only if individuals interacted in their interests in political affairs (Habermas, competitive exchanges pursuing their utility 1962/1989). In early usage, public opinion with minimal state interference.” Thus public referred to the social customs and manners opinion was wedded to the liberal idea of of this growing class of prosperous “men of an unregulated “marketplace of ideas,” with letters” but by the close of the century it was the majority view, ascertained through a free being used in an expressly political context, popular vote, as its operational definition. often in conjunction with cousin phrases such The early development and use of the as “common will,” and “public conscience.” concept of public opinion, then, were part and Baker (1990) argues that with the dissolution parcel of the Enlightenment project to replace of absolute monarchical power, both the European monarchies with civil democra- crown and its opponents alike invoked public cies. What the Enlightenment accomplished, opinion as a new source of authority and according to Peters (1995), was to transform [17:13 2/8/2007 4984-Donsbach-Ch01.tex] Paper: a4 Job No: 4984 Donsbach: Public Opinion Research (SAGE Handbook) Page: 12 7–24 THE PUBLIC AND PUBLIC OPINION IN POLITICAL THEORIES 13 the classical assembly of the people—in of direct democracy, predicated on complete Athenian democracy a physical, face-to-face economic and political equality. forum—into a mass-mediated, fictive body These were then supplemented and constituted by newspapers bringing people expanded by twentieth-century models, together, not in physical space but in shared drawing in various ways upon all four stories and conversations at a distance. “The basic formulations but principally from the imagined public is not, however, imaginary: republican and liberal traditions (Habermas, in acting upon symbolic representations of 1966). Among these are theories Held ‘the public’ the public can come to exist (1996) names competitive elitism, neo- as a real actor” (p. 16). Implicitly, notions pluralism, legal democracy and participatory of the public and public opinion followed democracy. Each in various ways resulted the complete arc of thinking about just what from grappling with perceived problems of forms such “imagined assemblies” might take, the public in the face of modern industrial life. from highly communitarian formulations of These perceived ailments of the body politic the public as a fluid and amorphous group included: a poorly informed and emotional of freely associating citizens willing to think mass citizenry subject to demagoguery and debate in consideration of the good of and manipulation; widening inequalities in the whole community, to highly individualist private economic, and hence political, power; formulations equating it with the mass of expanding centralization of government citizens freely pursuing their personal and and bureaucratic regulation; a growing group interests as they wished, and by and pervasive lack of citizen concern for majority vote aggregating those interests to the collective welfare; and the political choose wise political leaders. withdrawal of citizens who feel inefficacious and effectively disenfranchised. Worry over the emotionality and irra- tionality of ordinary citizens, and a near NOT ONE, BUT MANY, DEMOCRATIC complete lack of confidence in their ability THEORIES to discriminate intelligently
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Logical Fallacies Moorpark College Writing Center
    Logical Fallacies Moorpark College Writing Center Ad hominem (Argument to the person): Attacking the person making the argument rather than the argument itself. We would take her position on child abuse more seriously if she weren’t so rude to the press. Ad populum appeal (appeal to the public): Draws on whatever people value such as nationality, religion, family. A vote for Joe Smith is a vote for the flag. Alleged certainty: Presents something as certain that is open to debate. Everyone knows that… Obviously, It is obvious that… Clearly, It is common knowledge that… Certainly, Ambiguity and equivocation: Statements that can be interpreted in more than one way. Q: Is she doing a good job? A: She is performing as expected. Appeal to fear: Uses scare tactics instead of legitimate evidence. Anyone who stages a protest against the government must be a terrorist; therefore, we must outlaw protests. Appeal to ignorance: Tries to make an incorrect argument based on the claim never having been proven false. Because no one has proven that food X does not cause cancer, we can assume that it is safe. Appeal to pity: Attempts to arouse sympathy rather than persuade with substantial evidence. He embezzled a million dollars, but his wife had just died and his child needed surgery. Begging the question/Circular Logic: Proof simply offers another version of the question itself. Wrestling is dangerous because it is unsafe. Card stacking: Ignores evidence from the one side while mounting evidence in favor of the other side. Users of hearty glue say that it works great! (What is missing: How many users? Great compared to what?) I should be allowed to go to the party because I did my math homework, I have a ride there and back, and it’s at my friend Jim’s house.
    [Show full text]
  • Bias and Critical Thinking
    BIAS AND CRITICAL THINKING Point: there is an alternative to • being “biased” (one-sided, closed-minded, etc.) • simply having an “opinion” (by which I mean a viewpoint that has subjective value only: “everyone has their own opinions”) • being neutral and not taking a position In thinking about bias, it is important to distinguish between four things: 1. a particular position taken on an issue 2. the source of that position (its support and basis) 3. the resistance or openness to other positions 4. the impact that position has on other positions and viewpoints taken by the person Too often, people confuse these four. One result is that people sometimes assume that taking any position on an issue (#1) is an indication of bias. If this were true, then the only way to avoid bias would be to not take a position but rather simply present what are considered to be facts. In this way one is supposedly “objective” and “neutral.” However, it is highly debatable whether one can really be objective and neutral or whether one can present objective facts in a completely neutral way. More importantly, there are two troublesome implications of such a viewpoint on bias: • the ideal would seem to be not taking a position (but to really deal with issues we have to take a position) • all positions are biased and therefore it is difficult if not impossible to judge one position superior to another. It is far better to reject the idea that taking any position always implies bias. Rather, bias is a function either of the source of that position, or the resistance one has to other positions, or the impact that position has on other positions and viewpoints taken.
    [Show full text]
  • Lessons from the History of UK Science Policy
    Lessons from the History of UK Science Policy August 2019 2 Science Policy History Foreword The British Academy is the UK’s national body for the humanities and social sciences. Our purpose is to deepen understanding of people, societies and cultures, enabling everyone to learn, progress and prosper. The Academy inspires, supports and promotes outstanding achievement and global advances in the humanities and social sciences. We are a fellowship of over 1000 of the most outstanding academics, an international community of leading experts focused on people, culture and societies, and are the voice for the humanities and social sciences.1 The British Academy aims to use insights from the past and the present to help shape the future, by influencing policy and affecting change in the UK and overseas. Given this, the Academy is well-placed to bring humanities and social science insight from the past into policymaking for the present and the future. One way to do this is in using historical insights to inform policymaking – ‘looking back to look forward’. To support these efforts, the Academy’s public policy team in collaboration with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, has undertaken a new programme of work on policy histories. The policy histories series develop historical analyses for individual policy areas. These analyses are used to provide: • a structured, rigorous and objective account of the history of a given policy area and the significance of key milestones in context, • an informed basis for analysis and insights from the timelines as well as dialogue and discussion about what history can tell us about the future.
    [Show full text]
  • Science and Public Policy: What's Proof Got to Do With
    Environmental Science & Policy 7 (2004) 369–383 Science and public policy: what’s proof got to do with it? Naomi Oreskes Department of History and Science Studies Program, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0104, USA Abstract In recent years, it has become common for opponents of environmental action to argue that the scientific basis for purported harms is uncertain, unreliable, and fundamentally unproven. In response, many scientists believe that their job is to provide the “proof” that society needs. Both the complaint and the response are misguided. In all but the most trivial cases, science does not produce logically indisputable proofs about the natural world. At best it produces a robust consensus based on a process of inquiry that allows for continued scrutiny, re-examination, and revision. Within a scientific community, different individuals may weigh evidence differently and adhere to different standards of demonstration, and these differences are likely to be amplified when the results of inquiry have political, religious, or economic ramifications. In such cases, science can play a role by providing informed opinions about the possible consequences of our actions (or inactions), and by monitoring the effects of our choices. © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Environmental policy; Science policy; Scientific proof; Uncertainty; Values; Politics; Lomborg 1. Introduction centive for manipulation and misrepresentation of informa- tion. This is particularly true in the domain of environmental The heart of Bjørn Lomborg’s recent critique of envi- policy. ronmentalism is that many assertions of the environmen- Lomborg assures us that everyone is for the environment— tal movement are unproven and therefore provide no good just as everyone is for world peace and against hunger—but grounds for sensible public policy.
    [Show full text]
  • An Introduction to Philosophy
    An Introduction to Philosophy W. Russ Payne Bellevue College Copyright (cc by nc 4.0) 2015 W. Russ Payne Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document with attribution under the terms of Creative Commons: Attribution Noncommercial 4.0 International or any later version of this license. A copy of the license is found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 1 Contents Introduction ………………………………………………. 3 Chapter 1: What Philosophy Is ………………………….. 5 Chapter 2: How to do Philosophy ………………….……. 11 Chapter 3: Ancient Philosophy ………………….………. 23 Chapter 4: Rationalism ………….………………….……. 38 Chapter 5: Empiricism …………………………………… 50 Chapter 6: Philosophy of Science ………………….…..… 58 Chapter 7: Philosophy of Mind …………………….……. 72 Chapter 8: Love and Happiness …………………….……. 79 Chapter 9: Meta Ethics …………………………………… 94 Chapter 10: Right Action ……………………...…………. 108 Chapter 11: Social Justice …………………………...…… 120 2 Introduction The goal of this text is to present philosophy to newcomers as a living discipline with historical roots. While a few early chapters are historically organized, my goal in the historical chapters is to trace a developmental progression of thought that introduces basic philosophical methods and frames issues that remain relevant today. Later chapters are topically organized. These include philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, areas where philosophy has shown dramatic recent progress. This text concludes with four chapters on ethics, broadly construed. I cover traditional theories of right action in the third of these. Students are first invited first to think about what is good for themselves and their relationships in a chapter of love and happiness. Next a few meta-ethical issues are considered; namely, whether they are moral truths and if so what makes them so.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
    Where Can PPE Take You? By facilitating a multidisciplinary approach to practical problems, the PPE major offers a liberal arts education that prepares students for leadership roles in a variety of fields. The major prepares students for careers in public policy and business. It is a good preparation for law school and for a variety of graduate programs in the humanities and social sciences. Moreover, it helps students become PHILOSOPHY, informed and engaged citizens. POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS For more information contact: Professor Frank Howland [email protected] wabash.edu About the Major Courses Offered Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) majors learn to Common PPE Requirements: Economics Courses: investigate the social phenomena that philosophy, political PPE-200: Introduction to PPE PPE-251: Law and Economics science, and economics address from different perspectives. (every spring) PPE-252: Public Policy Philosophy fosters clear and creative thinking, ethical PPE-400: Senior Seminar PPE-254: Environmental Economics reflection, and the capacity to interrogate received opinion. (every fall) Political science offers both theoretical and empirical PPE-255: Health Economics approaches to studying governing institutions and political relationships. PPE-256: The Global Economy Philosophy Courses: By studying economics, students learn to analyze the role of incentives, PPE-264: Development Economics PPE-213: Philosophy of Law markets, and governments in the allocation of scarce resources and PPE-265: History of Economic Thought distribution
    [Show full text]
  • Subjective Logic Draft, 18 February 2013
    Subjective Logic Draft, 18 February 2013 Audun Jøsang University of Oslo Web: http://folk.uio.no/josang/ Email: [email protected] Preface Subjective logic is a type of probabilistic logic that allows probability values to be expressed with degrees of uncertainty. The idea of probabilistic logic is to combine the strengths of logic and probability calculus, meaning that it has binary logic’s capacity to express structured argument models, and it has the power of probabilities to express degrees of truth of those arguments. The idea of subjective logic is to extend probabilistic logic by also expressing uncertainty about the probability values themselves, meaning that it is possible to reason with argument models in presence of uncertain or incomplete evidence. In this manuscript we describe the central elements of subjective logic. More specifically, we first describe the representations and interpretations of subjective opinions which are the input arguments to subjective logic. We then describe the most important subjective logic operators. Finally, we describe how subjective logic can be applied to trust modelling and for analysing Bayesian networks. Subjective logic is directly compatible with binary logic, probability calculus and classical probabilistic logic. The advantage of using subjective logic is that real world situations can be more realistically modelled, and that conclusions more correctly reflect the ignorance and uncertainties that necessarily result from partially uncertain input arguments. Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Elements of Subjective Opinions 7 2.1 Motivation . ............................................. 7 2.2 Flexibility of Representation . .................................. 7 2.3 The Reduced Powerset of Frames .................................. 8 2.4 Belief Distribution over the Reduced Powerset .
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy in Contemporary Time: Relevance Vs. Public Perception
    Mgbakoigba, Journal of African Studies. Vol.6 No.1. July 2016 PHILOSOPHY IN CONTEMPORARY TIME: RELEVANCE VS. PUBLIC PERCEPTION C.O. Abakare & V.C. Okeke Abstract What is the relevance of philosophy in this contemporary time? Philosophy is viewed by many people as an irrelevant discipline- one of no social and/or practical significance. It is sometimes seen also as an abstract and drab enterprise fit only for the intellectuals. Overtime also, philosophy has come to be perceived as having enjoyed its relevance in the past and no longer has any relevance in this era of “science and technology”. However, certain questions arise: Given this perception, is philosophy actually of any relevance to the contemporary society? In practical terms, what are the roles of philosophy to society? Using the traditional philosophical method of analysis and exposition, this paper finds that philosophy plays and continues to play a vital role in contemporary society. The paper submits that philosophy is essential for an all- encompassing human development. As philosophy trains the human mind to reason correctly and rationally, the paper recommends a little bit of philosophy for all in the different levels of the educational sector. This proper training of the human mind with the tool of philosophy translates to human cum societal enhancement. Keywords: Philosophy, Contemporary, Reason, Public Perception, Societal Development Introduction Philosophy, as an area of study is nowadays attracting a lot of lack of patronage for the singular reason that it does not put “food on the table nor does it build bridges”. This is a manner of describing the common place opinion that philosophy is an abstract “speculative reasoning or exercise about cosmos or reality and thus has no direct relevance or contribution to make in practical issues of human existence”1.
    [Show full text]
  • Public Policy Priorities
    THE SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION’S Public Policy Priorities www.SouthernEducation.org THE SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION’S Public Policy Priorities ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Southern Education Foundation (SEF) would like to thank Center for Community Organizing and Engagement at New York University, Communities for Just Schools, Education Counsel, the Learning Policy Institute, and SEF’s Racial Equity Leadership Network Fellows for offering thoughtful feedback and advice in preparation of this document. We appreciate your willingness to share your time and insights as we developed a comprehensive set of policy priorities for policymakers, community advocates, and families. This would not have been possible without your valuable input and feedback. Thank you once again. © 2019 Southern Education Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Portions of this work may be reproduced without permission, provided that acknowledgement is fully given to the Southern Education Foundation. Limited permission is also granted for larger portions to be reproduced by nonprofit and public agencies and institutions only, solely for non-commercial purposes so long as full acknowledgement to the Southern Education Foundation as the source is prominently given. Reproduction or storage in any electronic form for any commercial purpose is prohibited without the express written permission of the Southern Education Foundation. SOUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword.…………………….............................…………………………….....................
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 8: Economics, Economists and Public Policy in Australia
    Economics, economists and public policy in Australia* The topic for the 2011 Symposium, ‘Does Australian public policy get the economics it deserves?’ has been partitioned into two questions. One asks ‘whether public policy gets the economics it needs?’ The other, no doubt inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous observation about people and their elected governments, is ‘whether Australian economics gets the public policy it deserves’. My answer to the first question came readily: in short, no — or at least not often. The answer to the de Tocquevillian one required reflection, however, not only about the state of public policy in Australia, but also about that of Australian economics. And my answer to that one is: I’m not sure! Much could be said from both perspectives. In setting the scene, I will confine myself to some observations about what might be called the ‘contextual’ influences on public policy and its use of economics (or information generally). My key message, which should not be surprising, is that systems determine outcomes. Public policy will only get the economics it needs, or indeed that society needs, if the processes, the institutions and the individuals responsible for developing it are receptive to good economics, and responsive to it. Equally, I’d argue that how ‘deserving’ Australian economics or economists might be — in other words, the health of the supply-side — is not independent of the incentives generated by the policy system — the demand side. What sort of ‘economics’? Now the term ‘needs’ might suggest that it is challenging to discover and apply this necessary economics.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophical Intuitions – Philosophical Analysis A
    PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS – PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By JAMES F. MCBAIN JR. Dr. Peter J. Markie, Dissertation Supervisor AUGUST 2008 © Copyright by James F. McBain Jr. All Rights Reserved The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS—PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS presented by James F. McBain Jr., A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. ____________________________________ Professor Peter J. Markie ____________________________________ Professor Paul Weirich ____________________________________ Professor Donald Sievert _____________________________________ Professor Matthew McGrath _____________________________________ Professor Todd R. Schachtman This work is dedicated to Elizabeth I. McBain and in loving memory of James F. McBain Sr. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation has been a long time coming. I have received enormous encouragement and support from so many for so long. First, I would like to thank Dr. Peter J. Markie for his never ending support and belief in me. Dr. Markie not only has helped me through this project, but has shown me what it means to be a philosopher and a teacher. I can never adequately express my gratitude. None of this would have ever been possible if it were not for him. I would also like to thank the members of my committee – Dr. Paul Weirich, Dr. Donald Sievert, Dr. Matthew McGrath, and Dr. Todd Schactman. The feedback they gave me helped this work become what it has.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Schools of Thought on “Public Opinion” Measures Literalism Nihilism
    Articles Three Schools of Thought on “Public Opinion” Measures David W. Moore* Tags: survey practice Survey Practice Vol. 4, Issue 6, 2011 Three Schools of Thought on “Public Opinion” Measures Responses to my article in the August 2011 issue of Survey Practice, “Contemporary Issues with Public Policy Polls,” suggest there are possibly three general schools of thought with respect to measuring opinion. These are somewhat arbitrary classifications, and I don’t hold to them tenaciously, but I think they may be useful as a heuristic device to stimulate discussion about the various views that scholars and practitioners have about “public opinion.” literalism At one end of the spectrum is Literalism , what Howard Schuman (in the article in this issue) refers to as “survey fundamentalism” – “the belief that some polls tell us the literal truth about public opinion.” I believe that most public policy polls reported by the major news media outlets fall into this category. Associated with this school is the implicit, though prevalent, view that public opinion is what the pollsters say it is – regardless of whether pollsters measure intensity of opinion, non-opinion, or hypothetical opinion (see my Survey Practice article for an elaboration of these points). Often times, pollsters asking about the same issues will produce conflicting results, but rather than assessing which results might be more valid, the effort is to harmonize the results – to explain that differences occur because of legitimate differences in question wording, questionnaire context, and timing, but that essentially all are valid measures of a complex issue. Rarely are judgments made that perhaps one approach is more valid than another.
    [Show full text]