Philosophical Intuitions – Philosophical Analysis A
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PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS – PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By JAMES F. MCBAIN JR. Dr. Peter J. Markie, Dissertation Supervisor AUGUST 2008 © Copyright by James F. McBain Jr. All Rights Reserved The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS—PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS presented by James F. McBain Jr., A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, And hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. ____________________________________ Professor Peter J. Markie ____________________________________ Professor Paul Weirich ____________________________________ Professor Donald Sievert _____________________________________ Professor Matthew McGrath _____________________________________ Professor Todd R. Schachtman This work is dedicated to Elizabeth I. McBain and in loving memory of James F. McBain Sr. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation has been a long time coming. I have received enormous encouragement and support from so many for so long. First, I would like to thank Dr. Peter J. Markie for his never ending support and belief in me. Dr. Markie not only has helped me through this project, but has shown me what it means to be a philosopher and a teacher. I can never adequately express my gratitude. None of this would have ever been possible if it were not for him. I would also like to thank the members of my committee – Dr. Paul Weirich, Dr. Donald Sievert, Dr. Matthew McGrath, and Dr. Todd Schactman. The feedback they gave me helped this work become what it has. Any improvements in this work are attributed to my committee, any errors are solely mine. This dissertation has also helped from the numerous conversations I have had over the years with Jared Bates, Jason Berntsen, Jesse Estevez, Darin Finke, Bruce Glymour, Amy Lara, Jordan Lindberg, Jon Mahoney, Alan Nichols, Doug Patterson, Jamie Phillips, Mark Price, Don Viney, Yeongseo Yeo, and numerous others from the University of Missouri TA corral. They have all helped me in so many ways and I am grateful to each one. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and support. In both my professional and personal life, they have been the center and the ones to give me a hand when I needed it. So to Mom, Dad, Janice, Jerry, Stephen, and Andrew, I love you and thank you. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS AKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………...ii ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………….v PREFACE – AN OVERVIEW OF AN AMBITIOUS GOAL……………………………1 CHAPTER 1. THE ROLE OF INTUITIONS IN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 1.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………..7 1.2 A Sample Philosophical Analysis: The Gettier Problem……………...…12 1.3 Robust Conceptual Analysis……………………………………………..17 1.4 Robust Conceptual Analysis-Modified…………………………………..24 1.5 Modest Conceptual Analysis…………………………………………….26 1.6 Explication……………………………………………………………….32 1.7 Reflective Equilibrium…………………………………...………………36 1.8 Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………..50 2. THE STRUCTURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS 2.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………51 2.2 Intuitions as Psychological States………………………………………..53 2.2.1 Intuitions as Specific Psychological States………………54 2.3 Intuitions as Propositional Attitudes………………………………….….56 2.3.1 On Confusing Intuitions with Perceptions and Memories.56 2.3.2 Intuitions as Propositional Attitudes, but Not Beliefs…...58 2.4 Understanding the Content of an Intuition…………………………….....62 2.5 The “Spontaneous” Nature of Intuitions……………………………...….65 2.5.1 Are Intuitions Judgments?.................................................66 2.5.2 The Theory-ladenness of Intuitions…………………..….70 2.6 Degrees of Convictions……………………………………………….….76 2.7 The Fallibility of Intuitions…………………………………………..…..78 2.7.1 A Philosophical Argument for the Fallibility of Intuitions…………………………………………………78 2.7.2 Empirical Reasons for the Fallibility of Intuitions……....80 2.8 Do Intuitions Involve an Apparent Necessity?..........................................83 2.9 Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………..86 3. THE EPISTEMIC STATUS OF PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS 3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………...………….88 3.2 A Sample of the Supposed Epistemic Status of Intuitions – The Gettier Case………………………………………………………………………91 3.3 Traditionalism about the Epistemic Status of Intuitions……………...….92 3.3.1 The Self-Defeat Argument………………………….……93 3.3.2 Worries about the Self-Defeat Argument………………..98 3.3.3 The Epistemic Autonomy „Argument‟…………………100 3.3.4 Worries about the Epistemic Autonomy‟ Argument‟….103 3.3.5 Summary of the Criticisms of Traditionalism………….105 3.4 Skepticism about the Epistemic Status of Intuitions……………………105 3.4.1 The Calibration Argument…………………………...…106 3.4.2 Worries about the Calibration Argument……………….107 3.4.3 The Unreliability of Intuitions………………………….110 3.4.4 The Legitimacy of the Unreliability Criticisms……...…114 3.4.5 Hales‟ “Problem of Intuition”………………………..…116 3.4.6 Worries about the “Problem of Intuition”……………....117 3.5 The Moderate Stance on the Epistemic Status of Intuitions……………120 3.5.1 Informed Intuitions……………………………………..121 3.5.2 Intuitional Degrees – The Hierarchical Status of Intuitions…………………………………………..……125 3.5.3 Responding to the Unreliability Worries…………….…131 3.6 Concluding Remarks………………………………………………..….132 4. PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF THEORY-LADEN INTUITIONS 4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………….……133 4.2 Revisiting the Methods……………………………………………..…..134 4.2.1 The Task and Goals of Conceptual Analysis………..…134 4.2.2 The Task and Goal of Explication…………………..….134 4.2.3 The Task and Goal of Reflective Equilibrium……….…136 4.3 The Problem of Disagreement……………………………………...…..137 4.3.1 The Problem of Disagreement – Empirical Version…....138 4.3.2 The Problem of Disagreement – Philosophical Version……………………………………………….....143 4.3.3 Intuition-Based Philosophical Methods and Disagreement……………………………………...……146 4.4 The Charge from Psychology………………………………………..…150 4.4.1 Can Intuition-Based Philosophical Methods Avoid the Charge?............................................................................152 4.5 Evaluating Reflective Equilibrium…………………………………..…154 4.6 A Methodological Proposal – Practical Explication……………………156 4.7 Practical Explication and the Ambitions of Philosophy – A Few Brief Remarks…………………………………………………………...……160 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………163 VITA……………………………………………………………………………………169 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS – PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS James F. McBain Jr. Dr. Peter J. Markie, Dissertation Supervisor ABSTRACT This work is a defense of philosophical intuitions and the use of them in philosophy. First, I survey the main forms of intuition-based philosophical methods – conceptual analysis, explication, and reflective equilibrium – and demonstrate how each treats philosophical intuitions as basic evidential sources. Next, I will develop and argue for a conception of what a philosophical intuition is. Third, I will provide an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of a philosophical intuition. Finally, I will argue that if philosophy wishes to use intuitions in philosophical theorizing, then it must engage in practical explication. To this end, I will be developing an account of philosophical intuitions that correctly captures the nature of the intuitions used in philosophy and demonstrating how philosophers best can use those intuitions to justify their analyses of philosophical concepts. v Preface – An Overview of an Ambitious Goal This work is a defense of philosophical intuitions and the use of them in philosophy. There has been much in the way of addressing this topic particularly in the last 10 years. In that ever-growing literature, two main positions have formed. On the one side there are those, mostly rationalists, who hold vigilant to a conception of philosophical analysis which makes use of a priori intuitions and maintain that the only legitimate philosophy is so intuition-based. Their opponents are those, mostly naturalists, who maintain the use of intuitions in philosophy is what ultimately plagues philosophy. These naturalists maintain we ought to give up all use of intuition-based philosophical methods altogether. The ever-raging debate has largely followed these demarcated lines. What is surprising about this debate is that little has been said about the middle ground. And it is this largely ignored middle ground where I believe a solution to the debate lies. To that end, I will be developing an account of philosophical intuitions (a non-a priori account) which correctly captures the nature of the intuitions used in philosophy and demonstrating how philosophers best can use those intuitions to justify their analyses of philosophical concepts. This work is divided up into four chapters. In chapter one I survey the various philosophical methods used in philosophy and show how they all make use of intuitions. To that end, I will look at three main methods – conceptual analysis (of which I will break into the further more refined versions of robust conceptual analysis, modified robust conceptual analysis, and modest conceptual analysis), explication, and reflective equilibrium. Each of these methods makes use of intuitions although they make use of 1 different conceptions of intuitions as I will show. Furthermore, I will show not just that each of these philosophical methods