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Dispelling Disinformation SOVIETOLOGY Dispelling Disinformation Tr IM 1^ hisis Part Oneof an interview ably all other publications in that our about GolitS)Golitsyn is that he has been "out I by William F. Jasper, Senior analysis shows that the apparent "Break of theloop" since defecting to Finland JL1 Editor of The New American, with thePast" is a deception, and that with his wife and daughter in 1961, so with Christopher Story, editor of the "perestroika" and post-"perestroika" how could he possibly know what was London-based Soviet Analyst, an intel represent further stages of the Leninist going on? People who say this reveal a ligence commentary, and editor of The World Revolution. failure to understand Golitsyn's signifi Perestroika Deception by Anatoliy Q. From Oxford to Stanford to the cance, and what he has to offer the Golitsyn, the Soviet defector and fa Rand Corporation to London, Paris and West. mous author of New Lies for Old. The Berlin, there are hordes of Soviet In summary, Golitsyn's importance is interview was conducted on August 16 ologists and Soviet defectors who are that, unlike all other defectors, Golitsyn 1995 in the Presidio, San Francisco, busily informing the West about what is discusses and elaborates upon Soviet outside the headquarters of the Gor strategy. By contrast, defectors like bachev FoundationAJSA. Oleg Gordievsky discuss mundane mat ters concerning the manner of their "es Q. Whydid you start publishing Soviet cape" from the Soviet Union, perhaps Analyst, and how does that publication revealing valuable operational informa differ from other sources concerned tion in order to gain the confidence of with Soviet Russia, Communism, etc? (in Gordievsky's case) Britain's MI6, A. Soviet Analyst had been published before inserting strategic disinformation since 1972 by a group of people in Lon in their output. Golitsyn is different. He don with long-established connections has spent his years in the West explain with the British Foreign Office. Around ing patiently that the Soviets follow midsummer 1991, they approached me, Leninist strategic principles, and are en knowing that I might be interested in gaged in a deadly long-term war against buying the paper, and revealed that they the West. The Soviet revolutionaries wanted to sell it. Their reasoning was have followed Lenin's advice to "work that "it was all over"; the Soviet Union by other means." was finished. Interestingly, they thought Q. If we examine Golitsyn's record this well before the "August coup," since 196], do we have reason to place which took place on August 19, 1991. faith in his analysis and his analytical Since these people had Foreign Of methods? fice connections, they had essentially A. At a superficial but easily explained reflected the Foreign Office line. At the level, Golitsyn's public fame derives time, the Foreign Office was busily rec Story In front of Gorbachev Foundation. from the fact that in 1980, he completed ognizing the alleged political "indepen a work called New Lies for Old, which dence" of the Soviet Republics, one by "really happening" in the so-called was in fact pubHshed in 1984.This book one, and generally appeared to be doing "former" Soviet Union. You have singled contained explicit predictions concern everything possible to reinforce the il out the work of the Soviet defector ing the future course of Soviet strategy, lusions of "change" which were being Anatoliy Golitsyn. Why do you think he which events subsequently proved to staged by the Soviet strategists in pur is unique? have been correct. In his recent book, suit of their objectives. We have inher A. Golitsyn is probably the most im published in 1994, entitled Wedge: The ited old issues of Soviet Analyst going portant Soviet defector ever to have Secret War between the FBI and CIA, back to 1972, from which it is very clear reached the West. The reason for this is Mark Riebling explained that after car that SovietAnalyst was an "arm's length" that he revealed the details of a long- rying out a careful analysis of Goli vehicle for Foreign Office opinion range deception strategy of which the tsyn's predictions in New Lies for Old, about the Soviet Union. In acquiring West previously had no knowledge. he had found that out of a total of 148 thistitle,I saw an opportunity to counter When debriefed, he emphasized, as he falsifiable predictions, 139 had been disinformation about Soviet develop has done ever since, that because of his verified by 1993 — "an accuracy rating ments. We started publishing Soviet background of working within the "in of 94%." This achievement places Goli Analystin November 1991,stressing the ner KGB" — a super-secret strategic tsyn in a league of his own, putting most Soviets' Leninist use of strategic decep planning department of which not even other observers to shame. tion, and explaining it to our readers. ordinary KGB officers were aware — Q. And the predictions he made con We started from the assumption that he was uniquely qualified to inform the cerned very significant, "earth-shatter there had been no true discontinuity. West about Soviet strategy. One of the ing" developments... Hence Soviet Analyst differs from prob superficial criticisms frequently made A. Golitsyn's main predictions included '''HENEWAMERICAN / SEPTEMBER 16. 1995 details of the forthcoming false liberal rationally, nevertheless chooses to live gin). This is important, in the light, for ization of the wholeof EasternEurope, in disguise, with a new identity andper instance, of an article by William Safire followed by similar developments in the sonality, out ofdirect contact with those which appeared on July 10th in the In Soviet Union. He predicted the removal he wishes to influence, and subjects ternational Herald Tribune, which ac of the Berlin Wall, the unification of himself to open-ended inconvenience in cused me of being an "acolyte," and Germany, the restructuring (if not abo living out his paranoia. This scenario is also stated, as matters of fact, that lition) of NATO. He even went so far manifestly absurd. In The Perestroika "AnatoliyGolitsyn, the longtime Soviet as to specify that a "Break with the Deception, Golitsyn clearly acknowl defector... turns out a newsletter in the Past" process would start in East Ger edges that his life is in danger.If this is United States, SovietAnalyst, and I am many, with the opening of its borders — so, it proves that he is a living threat to on his mailing list." This mis- or dis-in- as it turned out, to neighboring Conunu- the Soviet strategists — since he has re formation —SovietAnalyst ispublished nist countries. That was quite remark vealed the essence of their long-range by my fiim — seems to have been in able: Golitsyn knew that the process strategy. Incidentally, Golitsyn explains tendedto implicateGolitsyn in anymis would start in East Germany; and it did. that a strategy differs from a policy in takeswhichI mightinadvertently make Q. For34 years, GolitsynMs remained the following respect: Whereas a policy in successive issues of Soviet Analyst. in hiding. He has never been seen in is overt, a strategy contains within it a The International Herald Tribune has public; his whereabouts are a closely secret maneuver or dimension which is since a^eed to publish aletter from me guarded secret. Meanwhile, other de not revealed, the purpose of which is to containing an appropriate correction. fectors are conducting national tours, ensure the realization of the strategy. By trying to portray me as an "aco appearing on television, or writing in Q. And Golitsyn's moderate, careful lyte," Safire, who has "connections," the press. I recently saw Yuri Svets on predictions in New Lies for Old have sought to convey die impression that I C-Span, hawking his new bookdealing been amply validated by the course of am a "follower" of Golitsyn, who basi with his KGB activities while stationed events in recent years, as we have seen. cally reproduces what he says and in Washington. Is Golitsyn's secrecya re A. Absolutely correct. New Liesfor Old writes. But as I have explained, the de flection ofhisprudence, or ofparanoia? is an outstanding predictive document fector approached me, nottheother way A. Well, those who seek to discredit — which of course suggests that the se around. The significance of all this is him routinely accuse him of paranoia. quel, The Perestroika Deception, pro that Golitsyn is not alone in having That is, of course, a mistake. Golitsyn vides further significant guidelines for reached the conclusion that the Soviet/ was condemned to death in 1962, after understanding Soviet strategy today and Russian strategists and implementers Semichastniy, then head of the KGB, how it will evolve in the future. areallLeninist revolutionaries. Golitsyn's hadformally asked the Partyfor its ap Q. Were you surprised when Golitsyn enemieswouldlike it to be thought that proval that he should be liquidated. A contactedyou? the only analyst who holds this view is Soviet defector who I am advised is re A. I was very surprised. What hap Golitsyn himself, and that he is in a mi liable, reported to me that he had seen a pened was that after we had been pub nority ofone. bookon displayin the Lubyanka[KGB lishing Soviet Analyst — re-angled In his first letterto me, Golitsyn also headquarters] in Moscow, listing the towards the truth — for six months, and wrote that "I think of sending you names and details of Traitors to the explaining-in successive issues that the through my lawyer more extracts from Motherland, complete with photographs. Soviets were engaged inglobal strategic my memos to CIA for possible publica Golitsyn features in this book, which deception operations,I received a letter tion in Soviet Analyst after this year's statesthat thoselistedareto be reported dated May 1992 from Anatoliy Goli US presidential elections." I spent the or killed.
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