INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI University Microfilms international A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 Nortfi Z eeb Road, Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 313,-761-4700 800,'521-0600

Order Number 9325618

The golden opportunity: A study of the Romanian manipulation of the Olympic Movement during the boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles

Wilson, Harold Edwin, Jr., Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1993

Copyright ©1993 by Wilson, Harold Edwin, Jr. All rights reserved.

UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF THE ROMANIAN MANIPULATION OF THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT DURING THE BOYCOTT OF THE 1984 LOS ANGELES OLYMPIC GAMES

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Harold Edwin Wilson, Jr., B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1993

Dissertation : Approved by

Barbara A. Co-Adviser Nancy S. Wardwell School of Health, Physical Education and Receation E. Garrison Walters

Approved by

Co-Adviser School of Health, Physical Education and Receation Copyright Harold Edwin Wilson, Jr. 1993 Dedicated to the Romanian athletes who gave their lives in the revolt of December, 1989

The time you won your town the race We chaired you through the market-place; Man and boy stood cheering by, And home we brought you shoulder-high.

To-day, the road all runners come. Shoulder-high we bring you home. And set you at your threshold down, Townsman of a stiller town.

-- A.E. Housman "To an Athlete Dying Young" (1896)*

* Richard Ellmann and Robert 0 ’Clair, eds., The Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), 98.

11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

One thing that has become evident upon completion of my graduate studies is that it is very much a cooperative effort. In recognition of this fact there are a number of people who have played a significant role

in my academic endeavors. Without them I would not have

the opportunity of writing these words.

I owe a special thank you to my advisory committee,

Drs. Barbara Nelson and Nancy Wardwell, for their

encouragement and support. Words cannot express my

sincere gratitude to Dr. E . Garrison Walters who provided

invaluable insight, suggestions and guidance. An

educational experience is much more fulfilling and

rewarding when one enjoys a mentor/student relationship.

Dr. Walters has provided such an experience for me

throughout my college career at The Ohio State

University. I would also like to thank Dr. Rodica

Botoman who instilled in me a deep admiration and

affection for , its people and culture. Other

professors who have played a significant role in this

project, and to whom I owe a debt of appreciation, are

iii Dr. Robert L. Bartels, Dr. Michael Berkowitz, Dr. Michael

W. Curran, Dr. Virginia Gordon, Dr. Thomas L. Minnick,

Dr. Charles Patterson, Dr. Daniel Z. Rosenberg and Dr.

Mac Stewart. I would also like to express a special

thank you to my colleague Peg Fabbro who was always there when I needed to test out a new idea or for moral support.

Many people outside the university community also had a strong impact on this study. I am very proud, and appreciative, that Dr. David B. Funderburk, former United

States Ambassador to Romania (1981-1985), and Mircea

Raceanu, former Chief of North American Affairs in the

Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Nicolae

Ceausescu, believed enough in my project to freely supply their rich experiences and expertise with me. It is through their cooperation that this study was made truly original. I would also.like to thank Dr. Wayne Wilson, of the Amateur Athletic Foundation, and Mr. Robert J.

Christianson for their support and encouragement. Mr. C.

Robert Paul, Jr., Special Assistant to the

General of the Olympic Committee, has also been a great source of encouragement, inspiration and

friendship over the years.

In conclusion I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my sister, Michele R. Toney, entertainment editor of the Columbus Dispatch, for her

i V support and expert editorial skills. She polished off the rough edges and made me seem much more literate than

I am. Finally I would like to thank my parents for their undying support and understanding throughout my life. This accomplishment is as much theirs as it is mine . VITA

February 16, 1954 ...... Born - Dayton, Ohio

1979 ...... B.A., The Ohio State University, International Studies

1982 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Phys. Ed./Sport History

1980-1984 ...... Teaching/Research Assistant, International Studies and Center for Slavic and East European Studies, The Ohio State University

1980 Internships, British Olympic Association; United States Olympic Committee

1987-1991 Academic Adviser/ Grad. Admin. Asst., University College, The Ohio State University

1992 P.E. Instructor, "Contemporary Issues in the Olympic Games," The Ohio State University

VI PUBLICATIONS

"Peril in the Air: The Story of a Navy Flier," Naval Aviation News. Jan.-Feb. 1987, 26-28. "The Coach Who Didn’t Beat Michigan," Ohio Magazine. August 1990, 31-34 & 62-64. The Twentieth Century: Great Athletes (Pasadena, C A : Salem Press, 1992), Biographies of Dick Fosbury (p. 783), Don Quarrie (p. 2051) and Renate Stecher (p. 2399 ) .

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Health, Physical Education and Recreation

Studies in Sport History, specializing in the Olympic Games

Vll TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA...... vi

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER I: Olympic Politics...... 9

The Ancient Games...... 9 The Modern Games...... 11 Sport in the and Eastern , 1948 to 1984...... 17 Romania and the Olympic Games...... 25 Notes...... 32

CHAPTER II: Romania - A Brief Modern History...... 37

Romania, 1877 to 1948...... 37 Gheorghe Gheorghiu- and Nicolae Ceausescu, 1948-1965...... 39 The Maverick of , 1965-1989...... 44 Notes...... 57

CHAPTER III: Prelude to the 1984 Olympic Games...... 61

The Preliminaries, 1970-1980...... 61 The Soviet Boycott Crisis, 1980-1984...... 63 The Soviet Boycott Decision, February-May 1984...... 68 The Soviet Boycott and Eastern Europe...... 74 Notes...... 79

CHAPTER IV: Romania and the Boycott of the 1984 Olympic Games...... 83

Romanian Foreign Relations, January-May 1984...... 83 The Soviet Olympic Boycott Movement...... 86 Romania and the 1984 Olympic Boycott...... 87 Romanian Foreign Relations, May-July 1984...... 97 The Games of the XXIIIrd Olympiad, Los Angeles..... 102 Notes...... 107

Vlll CHAPTER V: Conclusions...... 113

Notes...... 119

CHAPTER VI: Epilogue: Romanian Sports, 1984 and Beyond...... 120

Notes...... 131

APPENDIX A: Charles G. Cale Interview, March 2 & 8, 1993...... 134

APPENDIX B: Department of State telegram from American Embassy to Secretary of State, 7 June 1984...... 147

APPENDIX C : Dr. David B. Funderburk, former U.S. Ambassador to Romania, letter to author, 17 September, 1992...... 150

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 153

IX INTRODUCTION

"Truth, like most other commodities in Romania, has been in such short supply for so long that to this day conclusions are best treated as preliminary.

Throughout ray undergraduate, and continued, interest in

Romania I have found this statement to be very true. The is resplendent with mysteries and ambiguities. No other incident in recent Romanian annals better reflects this than Romania’s decision to participate in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games.

During the spring of 1984 the Soviets promoted a boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics. The Western press portrayed Romania as enduring tremendous amounts of

Soviet pressure to join its allies. On May

24, 1984, Romania announced it would defy the Soviet boycott and participate in the Games. The Olympic organizers and Western media praised Romania for its heroic stand. Yet, gradually, doubts surfaced challenging Romania’s motivation. In actuality Romania, suffering from a poor international image, took advantage of a golden opportunity to successfully manipulate world

1 2 opinion to portray itself as a independent nation battling unsurmountable odds for a worthy cause.

This study addressed questions concerning the

Romanian decision from a historical/political viewpoint.

It is a study of the use of sport, and more specifically the Olympic Games, as a political tool in international relations. As the research progressed it appeared that all participants in the issue attempted to use the United

States’ policy of differentiation to their best interests.

From the creation of the in 1948 U.S. administrations attempted to find the perfect policy with which to deal with the Communist world. The Eisenhower administration’s gradual effort to establish closer economic ties with the countries of Eastern Europe, especially , was called "bridgebuilding." Faced with the erection of the in August 1961

Kennedy adopted a policy of "peaceful engagement" in which the United States would never recognize the permanent dominance of over Eastern Europe.

And in the late 1960s and early 1970s Nixon’s secretary of state developed the policy of "differentiation."%

The policy, set forth in National Security Decision

Memorandum 212 on May 2, 1973,3 essentially divided the

Communist world into two camps, good Communists and bad 3

Communists. The United States subsequently rewarded good

Communists economically, and politically, for their actions against Soviet domination in hopes of inspiring other Eastern European regimes to resort to similar action. At the forefront of the differentiation policy was Romania, the maverick of Eastern Europe.

Questions addressed in this study are:

1) Was Romania pressured to join a Soviet-led boycott of the Los Angeles Olympic Games or did it act autonomously?

2) To what degree did the United States, and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, influence Romania?

3) What was the Soviet response to the Romanian decision to participate?

4) Did the Romanian decision significantly impact relations with the Soviet Union and the United States?

In discussing these topics the study used approximately 1500 pages of United States government documents released through the Freedom of Information

Act. These primary sources are part of this study’s major contribution to the body of knowledge on this subject. It required over two years of correspondence to obtain the release of the documents from the United

States Information Agency and the Department of State. A

Freedom of Information request filed with the Central

Intelligence Agency to gain access to its holdings is still outstanding after three years. Intercession by

U.S. Congressman John Kasich, Senators and

Howard Metzenbaum to expedite the request proved

fruitless.

Also contributing to the body of knowledge on the

1984 Olympics are personal correspondence and interviews with those personally involved with the Romanian decision. Dr. David Funderburk, former U.S. ambassador to Romania (1981-1985); Mircea Raceanu, former Chief of

North American Affairs, and 30-year veteran, in the

Romanian Foreign Ministry; Michael Jacki, president of the U.S. Federation and the director of the gymnastics competition at the Los Angeles Olympics; and

Charles G. Cale, vice president of the Los Angeles

Olympic Organizing Committee in charge of athletic competitions, all volunteered their expertise.

The study also utilized other government documents such as Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) summaries and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Situation

Reports. FBIS summaries are synopses of foreign media reports about and from countries in selected global areas. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Reports described and analyzed developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union using both Eastern and Western media sources. 5

Very early in my research I corresponded with

Romanian National Olympic Committee president Lia

Manoliu. After exchanging letters and faxes, in which

Manoliu expressed her willingness to assist in the study, all contact with Romanian sources ceased. Continued attempts at correspondence with other were

fruitless. Romanian publications during this period did not cover the question of the Soviet boycott and Romanian participation and therefore were worthless for this

study. Some information about Romania’s 1984 Olympic participation forthcoming from inside Romania might shed

light on personal observations but will likely not touch on government policy since the current government is comprised of members of the Ceausescu regime.

Most prominent among the books employed for background material on contemporary Romanian political history are Edward Behr’s Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite:

The Rise And Fall Of The Ceausescus. David B.

Funderburk’s Pinstripes and : An American Ambassador

Caught Between The State Department and The Romanian

Communists, 1981-1985, Stephen Fischer-Galati’s 20th

Century Rumania (second edition) and Trond Gilberg’s

Nationalism & Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall of

Ceausescu’s Personal . As for the primary books used on this period in Olympic history are David 6

Miller’s Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of

Juan Antonio Samaranch, Kenneth Reich’s Making It Happen:

Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics and Peter

Ueberroth’s Made In America. Primary journalistic

sources are The () Times. The .

The New York Times and .

The study is made up of six chapters. Chapter one provides a cursory history of Olympic politics from the

Ancient Games to 1980 with special emphasis on boycotts and sports in Eastern Europe. A political history of

Romania is given in chapter two. The Soviet boycott movement toward the 1984 Olympics, with special attention to Soviet relations with its East European allies, is in chapter three. Chapter four explains Romania’s specific

involvement with the Olympic boycott movement during the

spring of 1984. Chapter five comprises the conclusions of the study with chapter six being an epilogue presenting a brief synopsis of Romanian sports developments following 1984 through the revolution to the present.

At this point an explanation of terminology is in

order. In this study, the terms Communist bloc. , Eastern Europe, Soviet bloc, and Warsaw Pact are

synonymous and will be used interchangeably. Whenever

the above terms are used, they will refer to the 7 traditional countries of Eastern Europe, the German

Democratic Republic (East ), Poland, ,

Czechoslovakia, and, of course, Romania.

Yugoslavia and have never been considered a part of the Soviet sphere due to sharp ideological differences with the U.S.S.R. and are not part of the Warsaw Pact.

As a result they have been free from Soviet intervention and influence. , of course, will also be excluded from this study when the term Eastern Europe is used.

Romania rightly takes great pride in its Olympic participation, and success. This success was a valuable

tool in both domestic and international Romanian politics. Although this study concerns the Games, it will not examine them in an athletic context but as a political stage for Romanian foreign policy.

NOTES

1. Ted Koppel, The Koppel Report: Death Of A Dictator. ABC-TV, April 2, 1990 (Koppel Communications, Inc., 1990).

2. For a detailed examination of United States foreign policy towards Communist countries of Eastern Europe see Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United States 8 and Eastern Europe (New York: New York University Press. 1991).

3. Kovrig, 118. CHAPTER I

OLYMPIC POLITICS

THE ANCIENT GAMES

Citing the ancient Olympic Games as the ideal of amateurism and peace, many believe that the modern

Olympic Games should be just as pure and free from political intrigue. Ironically, some of those who vehemently express these views are the politicians who use the Games as a political tool.i

The first recorded reference to the Olympic Games in antiquity came in 776 B.C., though it is believed that the Games were firmly established by this date. The ancient Olympics, begun as a religious celebration, gradually became fraught with political intrigue and abuse. As the Games approached, the elders of Elis sent messengers to the city-states declaring the start of the

Olympic truce, a period during which, according to

legend, all wars stopped to ensure safe passage for competitors and spectators. 10

This is misguided. Wars continued as usual between the city-states of Greece, and only athletes and delegates en route to the games [sic] could claim immunity while traversing hostile territory. It is in fact very doubtful whether even this limited provision had much effect.z

The first recorded boycott of an Olympic Games came in

420 B.C. because of this truce. Sparta, engaged in conflict with another city-state, did not receive word of the truce until after hostilities had started. The eiders of Elis levied a fine equivalent to $40,000.%

Feeling that the fine was too severe, the Spartans decided to leave the Games.*

The ancient Games were not pure competitions in other respects as well. Contrary to popular modern beliefs, ancient athletes were not amateurs. The idea of amateurism was a Victorian creation to ensure the exclusion of the lower classes from the pastimes of the elite. In antiquity, Olympic athletes had to train for long periods, depending on their sport, prior to the

Games to the exclusion of everything else. Therefore they could not be amateurs by modern standards. Olympic champions enjoyed a life of security guaranteed by their home city-states for triumphs in Olympia. Never would they want for anything. Many others were mercenary athletes willing to compete for the highest bidder.* 11

Besides the lack of amateurism in the ancient Games, there is also ample evidence that athletes ignored rules and fair-play. With the growth of the Games over time, their importance in Greek society, and the ancient world, increased. As the value of an Olympic victory spiraled, some ancient Olympians would do practically anything to win. Athletes studied diet, used special herbs and potions and even resorted to violence on occasion to assure victory. Statues erected, and paid for, by athletes in penance for their transgressions lined the way from the sacred "altis" to the stadium.®

THE MODERN GAMES

When the founder of the modern Games, Baron , revived the Olympic Games in 1894 he did so partly for political reasons. During the later part of the nineteenth century, de Coubertin saw that the French education system was sorely in need of revitalization.

He studied the educational systems of Europe and America and saw the value of physical education and sports.

Because of his study de Coubertin saw the world-wide need

for the development of sport. Reviving the Olympic Games would provide a catalyst for this development.

As the first Games approached in 1896, the mere idea

of having athletes represent their countries was a 12 political act. In an interview before the Games, de

Coubertin commented that he purposely discouraged German participation in the Sorbonne Congress of 1894, where the

Olympic Games were officially reborn. As a result, there was a strong German movement to boycott the Games of the

First Olympiad. But de Coubertin countered this first boycott threat with a public apology in the German press.? Although these first Olympic Games were successful, the seeds of further political intervention became irrevocably planted in the movement.

Each subsequent Olympic Games had its unique political events. Many European countries stayed away from St. Louis in 1904 not for political reasons, but because of the expense of such a long trip. At the 1908

London Games, Ralph Rose, United States flag bearer and shot putter, refused to dip the American flag to the

English king. The British forgetting to raise the United

States flag at the stadium during an early ceremony triggered the incident. Thus a tradition that continues this day began. caused the 1916 Games in

Berlin to be cancelled. The International Olympic

Committee (IOC) barred Germany, and Hungary from the 1920 Antwerp Games for their roles as aggressors.

Yet, until the 1936 Berlin Games, political intrusions were somewhat minor. 13

Inspired by Nazi racial policies, the first concerted effort to organize an international boycott of the Olympics came with the Games of the Xlth Olympiad in

Berlin. Last-minute negotiations between the IOC and

Hitler averted the boycott threat. War again cancelled the next two Games in 1940 and 1944. When they resumed in

London in 1948, the world was a different place than the one the Olympic movement left in Berlin.

From the 1948 Games onward, the Olympic Movement would constantly be faced with one boycott threat after another for various political reasons. In London, the

Arab states threatened a boycott over possible Israeli participation. In in 1952, Taiwan’s one man team stayed away in response to an invitation sent to the

People’s Republic of (PRC). Helsinki also saw the

Soviets participating for the first time. Four years later in , in 1956, the China issue again was a stumbling block, as was the Suez Crisis and Hungarian

Revolution. The PRC stayed away due to Taiwan’s representation, and Taiwan protested when organizers raised the PRC flag for the Taiwan banner. The Suez crisis caused , , and to withdraw, and in response to the Hungarian Revolution, the ,

Switzerland and boycotted the Games. The president of the Dutch Olympic Committee asked, "How can sports 14 prevail over what has happened in Hungary? How would we like it if our people had been atrociously murdered, and someone said that sports should prevail?"®

The predominant political theme underlying the

Olympic Games in the 1960s was the participation of South

Africa and Rhodesia with their policies of apartheid.

The Soviet Union supported the anti-apartheid movement with its own threats of a boycott. As a result, the IOC banned from the Games after the 1964

Olympics and Rhodesia before the 1972 Games in .

Until 1976, the United States had a long history of staying out of Olympic politics. In Montreal, the

Canadian government protected its relations with the PRC by refusing to allow Taiwan to enter the country as the

Republic of China. President Ford threatened not to allow the United States to compete unless Taiwan was represented. As a compromise, allowed the

Nationalist Chinese to compete only as Taiwan, resulting in Taiwan’s refusal to compete.

Apartheid resurfaced in Montreal with African nations calling for the expulsion of after that country’s national rugby team played a South African team earlier in the year. Subsequently, when the IOC refused, 30 nations boycotted in . The boycott in

1976, over completely non-Olympic related business. 15 reinforced the fact that "Sports and the Olympics provided a convenient forum for the exposition of a social and political cause, which went far beyond sport.

The decade of the 1980s saw the most intensive influx of politics into the Olympic Movement with successive major boycotts by the two leading superpowers.

The United States boycotted the 1980 Olympics in retaliation for the December 1979 Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan. While 61 countries joined the U.S. and stayed away from Moscow, there were major .

Three strong traditional American allies, , Great

Britain and , decided to attend the Moscow Olympics, causing a major breach in the coalition. The Games took place, albeit on a reduced scale, so the question about whether the boycott was a success is still being debated.

Derick Hulme, in his political study of the 1980

Olympics, explained the necessary criteria for a successful Olympic boycott.

The symbolic significance of the Olympic Games attracts the attention of national leaders in search of alternate solutions to political problems. The globalization of the Games affords a worldwide forum in which to act, and offers the cunning, and successful, statesman a unique opportunity to develop international sympathy and support for his cause. Yet, the refusal of considerable segments of the global community to forfeit their intuitive commitment to the 'Olympic ideal’ creates serious 16

difficulties for those attempting to tamper politically with the Olympic Games. Western statesmen, in particular, must neutralize, or coopt, the idealist 'faction' before an Olympic-related boycott policy may be broached with any hope of success. The fate of attempts to manipulate the Olympics politically is predicated to a great extent upon the degree to which the symbolic meaning attached to the Games can be channeled in support of, rather than in opposition to, a state's efforts.

It would appear, on the surface, that the Carter boycott didn’t meet the above criteria. Immediately after the announcement of a boycott, many questioned the viability of the action. The gist of the 1980 boycott was that it was, at best, a symbolic act. The Carter administration didn’t recognize the importance of the

Olympic Games to the people of the world. The Games were merely a sports event.

Former West German chancellor had some confrontations with the Carter administration about its Olympic boycott program.

The American president seemed to be in a position where he could accept only black-and- white descriptions. An example was his obstinate insistence that Europe must participate in the Olympic boycott. He lacked any awareness of the difficult position in which his unilateral announcement of the boycott had placed [French president] Giscard, other European leaders, and myself. Three times before Carter made his announcement, I had put the question to Warren Christopher, his assistant secretary of state, who happened to be in . Trusting the negative answer I received each time, I had let the German 17

athletic associations know that there would be no boycott of the Olympics. It was, then, a total surprise when Carter announced the boycott after all and, without consideration of the domestic humiliation he was causing his allies, demanded that they cooperate with his decision immediately.^*

President Carter himself acknowledged that the Olympic boycott, along with other political decisions, "made me vulnerable to criticism by my political opponents."i*

The ramifications would still be felt four years later.

SPORT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1948 to 1984

To understand the politics of sport in the post-war world, one would have to understand sports in the

Communist world. The Communist bloc unabashedly acknowledged the political importance of sport. It was with this philosophy that it dominated the Olympic Games for the next 40 years.

Following World War II, out of the ashes of destruction, emerged two new spheres of influence that were unimaginable before the war. The Soviet Union had never taken part in the Olympic Games, seeing them as an example of bourgeois control over the . But now the new world power saw the benefits of international sporting contacts in establishing a new world order. 18

After the war, the countries of Eastern Europe fell under the domination of the Soviet Union. Many had strong sporting traditions banned for being decadent and western once communism took over . A few of the organizations that promoted sports participation that were now outlawed were the Sokol movement in Poland and

Czechoslovakia, the Turners in Germany, the Boy Scouts and the YMCA.i* Forced to forget long-honored traditions and to adopt alien organizations and philosophies, the countries became frustrated and hated the new order.

The socialist world used sport in several capacities. Its professed role was for the health, hygiene and well-being of the population. Yet, it had more important subliminal roles. These roles were the legitimacy of the party, international recognition, and intra-bloc conflict.

When a ruling party imposes its regime on society, without support from that society, it constantly needs to prove its legitimacy to rule. After the Soviet Union imposed socialist governments on the countries of Eastern

Europe, it realized this need to provide proof of the correctness of its policies. The ideal competition for the socialist countries was one against a western, capitalist, power. No length was too far to go to 19 ensure success. Success over a capitalist country reflected the superiority of the socialist system. This argument may not have convinced a majority of the populace, though evidence suggests partial success, it provided the leadership with confidence in its right to govern.:=

When the desired result did not materialize, the participants met dire consequences. Former Soviet, and current Russian IOC member, Vitaly Smirnov remembered the

Soviet Union’s first Olympic participation.

Many athletes from the Thirties and Forties went to prison for 'failures.’ In 1952, when the Soviet Union lost to in the early stages of the football [competition], Stalin had a furious row with Tito, and when we finished on equal medals with the USA, the celebration reception for the entire Soviet team was cancelled. There are some members of that 1952 team who have still not received their Merited Master of Sport Award, which is always given to Olympic champions. Throughout the pre-war era the Olympic Games had always been considered bourgeois,

When a new state emerges, one of its first goals is to gain international recognition, for without international recognition it is not a viable state.

Without international recognition it lacks a voice in the brotherhood of nations, lacks substantial trade, and is isolated. Sport is one avenue in which this recognition can be obtained. A perfect example of this utilization 20 of sport is the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Following its creation in 1949, the Soviet dominated government was not recognized by any Western nation.

Foremost on the GDR’s mind was gaining international acceptance. With every diplomatic avenue blocked, it turned to the worldwide interest that sport held. The

East Germans patiently and systematically began to petition international sporting organizations for membership, participating in as many tournaments as possible. Its rationale was that by forcing Western nations to compete against it on the playing fields they

received de-facto political recognition. The GDR patiently obliged most sports governing bodies’ requests, with its ultimate goal - unrestricted recognition.

From 1956 until 1968, the GDR competed in the

Olympic Games on a united German team with athletes from

the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In 1968 the GDR

competed as a separate team but under the same flag and

anthem as the FRG. Finally, in 1972, the GDR gained full

acknowledgement in the eyes of the IOC and competed for

the first time as an independent nation, ironically, in

Munich. Coincidentally, the GDR’s international

diplomatic recognition grew proportionately with its.

increased sporting recognition.i? 21

As the East Germans themselves have acknowledged,

The successes obtained on the playing fields were proof for all to see of the strength of socialism. As a result the GDR became known also in countries whose governments did not maintain diplomatic relations with the GDR as a result of FRG and NATO pressure. The successes contributed to the growing international reputation of the GDR and to increasing pride in the on the part of the citizens of the GDR.i*

Erich Honecker, the former president of the GDR, put it more simply in the Report of the to the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of

Germany (Berlin, 1976), "Our State is respected in the world because of the excellent performances of our top athletes."i9

With athletic success carrying such political importance, the GDR, and the other countries of the

Soviet bloc, went to any means to ensure such success.

This extended to state sponsored medical experimentation on athletes, done mostly without the athlete’s knowledge.

The disintegration of Communist authority in these societies has released a flood of information about official government involvement in the medical mistreatment of athletes. As Rolf Donath, director of the Central Institute for Sports Medical Service in Kreischa, formerly , confessed in 1990: 'We have simply destroyed many sports by subjecting the athletes to ruinous training in defiance of the basic laws of physiology^ “ 22

As mentioned, forced repudiation of past traditions and adoption of foreign institutions and systems has led to frustration and anger in Eastern Europe. Similarly, perhaps the most important use of sport, at least in the eyes of the general populace of these countries, is for the release of these frustrations. In the Soviet sphere it was important to portray an atmosphere of comradeship and brotherhood. Outward displays of hostility toward another member of the bloc were forbidden. It is extremely unlikely that any bloc country would have invaded the Soviet Union if events presented themselves.

It is also unlikely that any other Warsaw Pact country would unilaterally have become engaged in conflict with another. Sport, therefore, becomes a substitute for intra-bloc conflict.

Sport, it would seem, enables non-Soviet socialist nations to assert a certain degree of autonomy and national dignity by victory over Soviet teams, that are denied them in other spheres. Besides serving thus as a compensatory mechanism, sport may also act as a "safety valve" for the release of pent-up feelings among participants and spectators alike.21

This characteristic has shown itself on many occasions. The 1956 Olympic match between

Hungary and the Soviet Union was one of the most violent in history. The match occurred only weeks after the 23

Soviets ruthlessly put down the revolt in . In

1968 at the Grenoble Winter Games the Czechoslovakian ice

hockey team handed the Soviets their first international

defeat since 1963. The Soviets ultimately won the with the Czechs taking the silver, but the defeat

would haunt the Soviets months later. While the Soviets

invaded Czechoslovakia in August to end the Spring

and "communism with a face," Czech citizens

taunted their invaders by writing the final score, 5-4,

on buildings and Soviet vehicles. The list of incidents goes on.

This "safety valve" also pertains to conflict between other members of the bloc besides Soviet

opponents. Traditional rivalries such as Romania-

Hungary, Poland-Germany, Romania-Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia-Germany all become enhanced during athletic competitions due to historical and nationalistic differences. Just as Marx felt that religion was the opiate of the masses, it appeared that sport filled that

role in contemporary Eastern Europe. Displays of intra­ bloc conflict continued until the fall of communism in

Eastern Europe.

Throughout the period of Communist bloc participation in the Olympic Games, 1948-1988, the

Soviet Union and its allies proclaimed their support and 24 adherence to the principles of the Olympic Movement, always championing the cause of peace. Still, as they were proclaiming their support, they were fighting the

IOC’s authority at every step. From the 1960s to 1980s, the Soviet Union, with its Warsaw Pact and Third World allies, used the United Nations Education, Scientific and

Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to usurp the power of the

IOC. The goal was to replace the IOC with a Soviet- dominated sports governing body .22

Proof exists that the Soviet Union and its allies even played pivotal roles in the murder of the Israeli athletes in Munich, 1972. Following the Munich incident, rumors started to surface that the Palestinian "Black

September" terrorists received support in many ways from

Warsaw Pact members. It is widely known that the Soviet

KGB partially financed, supplied and trained the

Palestine Liberation Organization.2 a In Sofia, Bulgaria,

PLO official "Hassam Salameh met with Black September leaders to perfect plans for the Olympic Games massacre."2 4 , the head of the PLO, visited

Moscow in July 1972. As a result "East Germany was . . . instructed to become the Warsaw Pact’s aid center for

Palestinian guerrillas abroad."2 s Since the fall of the

GDR in 1989, new information is becoming available on the role the GDR played in international terrorism and 25 sports. In the Munich Olympic Village, the East German athletes occupied Connollystrasse 26, the Israelis 31

Connollystrasse.2* According to German sources, the

Palestinian terrorists acquired weapons from the East

German Olympic Team dormitory after their entry into the

Olympic Village and before their attack on the Israeli team. * ’’

ROMANIA AND THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Romania's relationship with the modern Olympic Games is secondary only to Greece’s, but much more dubious.

During the mid-nineteenth century, before Pierre de

Coubertin was born, many groups and individuals attempted to renew the Olympic Games. In 1856, Evangelis Zappas, a wealthy Greek merchant and landowner living in Bucharest, wrote to King Othos of Greece promising to underwrite all expenses for a revival of the Olympic Games and their subsequent celebrations every four years. This support also included the awarding of cash prizes for the w i n n e r s . 2 8 King Othos refused Zappas’ offer, feeling that the time just was not right, but left open the idea of a revival of the Games in the future. Zappas died in

1865 without realizing his dream of renewing the Olympic

Games. But in his will, he arranged that his legacy be used for a future revival of the Games. His cousin 26

Constantine Zappas adopted the cause. Yet, in 1892, the

Romanian government withheld the will, keeping the

Zappas* fortune in the country.*® Still, the name of the

Zappas family was represented at the 1896 Games. Some

events were held in the Zappeion, a hall named in honor

of the family.

Romania’s next association with the modern Olympics

would come in 1899 with the election of its first IOC

representative. Prince Georges Bibesco. Not until 1914

did Romania form its own national Olympic committee.*®

Bibesco became better known in history as the husband of

his young wife, Marthe, a famous writer in turn-of-the-

century .Bibesco served for two years until

1901. Romania was again represented on the IOC from

1908 through 1949 when Georges A. Plagino served a 41-

year term, one of the longest tenures of an IOC member.

Alexandru Siperco, Romania’s current IOC member and IOC vice president, came to the IOC in 1955, the country’s

first and last Communist member.** Romania participated

for the first time in Olympic competition at Paris in

1924. Since then Romanians have accumulated 202 medals,

all during summer Games competition.**

Romania’s first post-World War II participation, in

the Olympic movement was just as ominous as its

participation leading up to the 1896 Games. Following 27 the war the Soviet Union investigated the possibility of

Olympic participation with the encouragement of the

International Olympic Committee. Almost immediately, the

Soviets made unrealistic demands that Russian become an official language of the IOC, that Soviet officials be placed on the executive board and that sports

"federations revoke affiliation with 'representatives of profascistic organizations of Franco-Spain.’ < The

Soviets also demanded that Soviet and East European representatives be placed on the organizing committee of the 1948 London Games. "Finally, because of the failure of the Olympic organizing committee to accede to Russian and East European requests for seats on the committee,

Rumania [sic] pulled out of the Games."3*

The structure of Romanian sports took much the same form as sports in other Warsaw Pact countries. As a rule, Romanian leaders did not use sports to promote international relations as much as other Communist countries such as the GDR. Romania concentrated more on using sport to prove internal legitimacy to its citizens and as a "safety-valve" factor. Romania has had many legendary Olympians, but outside Romania only a few sport historians and dedicated fans know of them. The government did not exploit sports for overt international 28 political purposes until after the Games of the XIX

Olympiad in Montreal, 1976.

During the Montreal Olympic Games, the performance of Romania’s Nadia Comaneci and her teammates brought their country to the eyes of practically every person in the world. More than any other single event the victories made people investigate the little country in the Carpathian Mountains. No government act brought as much attention to Romania. This unbridled curiosity in

Romania fell right into the megalomaniacal plans of

Ceausescu, and he used it for all it was worth.

Upon returning from Montreal, the Romanian Olympic

Team received a hero’s welcome in Bucharest. Ceausescu awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor to Comaneci, the youngest recipient of that honor. Within months she was the subject of a prime time CBS television special, filmed in Romania, hosted by Flip Wilson.In 1977

Comaneci led the Romanian gymnastics team on a successful tour through the United States. In the process, they set a world record attendance record for a gymnastics event

- 20,463 at the New Orleans Superdome.s? The Romanians would succeed with another American tour two years later following the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Every tour, brought Romania to the attention of fans across the country, and the world. 29

An example of the "safety-valve" theory of sport in

Communist countries, as explained earlier, came during the 1977 European Gymnastics Championships in Prague.

During the competition, Comaneci finished second to the

Soviet Union's Nelli Kim in the vault and tied another

Soviet, Elena Moukhina, in the uneven bars. Suddenly the television transmission in Romania ceased with the announcement that the team had withdrawn from the competition due to "biased refereeing and unproper sports conditions."3 8 It was obvious that the decision to withdraw came from Ceausescu himself.

Proof came after the of Ceausescu’s head of intelligence, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa. During a meeting, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan

Andrei and Ceausescu were discussing information about

the possibility of a Soviet plot against Ceausescu. As

for the reason, Ceausescu asked.

'Because I withdrew Nadia from the World Gymnastics Championship in Moscow in protest against the Soviet and East German judges?' Andrei replied, 'That's not Communist fundamentals. That's sports. That was nothing but public relations to gain popularity with the capitalist media. Nobody got hurt.'39

Pacepa's, or Ceausescu's, memory must have failed on one

aspect of the conversation. Since the 1977 European

Championships were the only competition in which the 30

Romanians withdrew, Ceausescu and Andrei must have been

discussing the Prague incident. In either case this is

an example of another use of sport as an international

tool by Ceausescu, as a public relations vehicle to

enhance his reputation with western countries as a

"maverick" in the Soviet bloc.

Ceausescu, realizing the political benefits of

international sports contacts, took a more personal role.

Comaneci's original coaches, Bela and Marta Karoly, were

Romanians of Hungarian ancestry. "I don’t want to share

Nadia’s fame with a couple of dirty 'boanghen,’" said

Ceausescu. "We have to find Romanian coaches for her.

People of Romanian blood." By the end of 1977

Comaneci’s coaches changed.<0

Following the Romanian women’s gymnastics team

upset of the Soviets at the 1979 World Championships in

Fort Worth, Texas, the rivalry with the Soviet Union

intensified. It reached a fevered pitch at the 1980

Moscow Olympic Games. The championship of the women’s

gymnastics all-around competition came down to Comaneci

and the Soviet Elena Davidova and one event - the balance

beam. Comaneci completed what most in the arena felt was

a near flawless routine and needed a 9.95 to win the all-

around title. The event judges deliberated for over 40 31 minutes before reaching a decision. Maria Simonescu, the

Romanian head judge on the event, refused to record the score. Finally the Soviet referee pressed the scoring button signifying a score of 9.85, giving the gold medal to Davidova.4 1

In 1981 Romania, and more specifically Ceausescu, suffered a set-back when Comaneci’s former coaches, Bela and Marta Karoly and Geza Pozsar, defected during the

1981 Romanian gymnastics tour of the United States.

Citing dissatisfaction with government interference in gymnastics to gain international political benefits, the coaches defected in New York on March 30, 1981, the day they were to return to Romania. Bela Karoly explained that,

The state left us alone until we were successful. But once we produced a superstar, they wanted to take her away from us. When Nadia slipped, the state rushed back to us, asking us to take her back. This exercise took place on three separate occasions, and it made us very unhappy.42

Although Romania showed increased international athletic success in a wider variety of sports after the defection of the gymnastics coaches, the government relaxed the political role of sport. Gradually government interest in sport increased but never reached 32 its previous level until the Los Angeles Olympics in

1984. To understand the Romanian governmental actions concerning sports and the Los Angeles Olympic Games one must have, at least, a cursory understanding of Romanian political history.

NOTES

1. "The ancient games were held in the city-state of Elis. They marked a 'truce of the gods.’ During this truce, open warfare against or by the host city-state was forbidden." - statement by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, concerning the appropriateness of Moscow hosting the 1980 Olympic Games, before the opening of the 82nd session of the International Olympic Committee, Lake Placid, New York, February 9, 1980, Department of State Current Policy No. 137. (This citation is merely one of many that can be found.)

2. Noel Robertson, "The Ancient Olympics: Sport, Spectacle, and Ritual," in Jeffrey 0. Segrave and Donald Chu, eds., The Olympic Games in Transition (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Books, 1988), 24.

3. Bill Henry, An Approved History of the Olympic Games (Sherman Oaks, C A : Alfred Publishing Co., Inc., 1984), 1 1.

4. John Hoberman, The Olympic Crisis: Sports. Politics and the Moral Order (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Publishing Co., Inc., 1986), 5.

5. For a detailed study of this aspect of athletics in Ancient Greece read David C. Young, "Professionalism in Archaic and Classical Greek Athletics," Ancient World. 1983, #7, 45-51; and David C . Young, The Olympic Myth of Greek Amateur Athletics (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1984). 33

6. For a traditional study of professionalism in ancient Greek athletics see chapter seven, "Professionalism," in E. Norman Gardiner, Athletics of the Ancient World (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 99-116. David C. Young’s The Olympic Myth of Greek Amateur Athletics presents a more contemporary view of this subject. The evolution of athletes’ diets at Olympia is explored in Jane M. Renfrew’s "Food for Athletes and Gods: A Classical Diet," in Wendy J. Raschke, ed., The Archeology of the Olympics: The Olympics and Other Festivals in Antiquity (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 174-181.

7. John J. MacAloon, This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 202.

8. . 7 November 1956 as quoted in Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 54.

9. Espy, 158.

10. Derrick L. Hulme, Jr., The Political Olympics: Moscow. Afghanistan, and the 1980 U.S. Boycott (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 126.

11. Espy, 197.

12. Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (New York: Random House, Inc., 1989), 206.

13. , Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 544.

14. James Riordan, "Commentary: A Bright Future Shrouded in Mist, Sport in Eastern Europe," Journal of Sport History. Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), 70.

15. For two studies of this subject see: James Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 363-379, and N. Norman Shneidman, The Soviet Road to Olympus: Theory and Practice of Soviet Physical Culture and Sport (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979) , 13-17.

16. David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of (London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1992), 97. 34

17. For a more detailed examination see Andrew Strenk’s study of the GDR’s political use of sport, "Diplomats in Track Suits: Linkages Between Sports and Foreign Policy in the German Democratic Republic," in Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin and Andrew Strenk, eds., Sport and International Relations (Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishers, 1978), 347-369.

18. Heinz Heitzer, GDR: An Historical Outline (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1981), 162.

19. Benjamin Lowe, "Educational Objectives for International Sports Studies,” in Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin and Andrew Strenk, Sport and International Relations (Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishers, 1978), 574.

20. John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 3. (Hoberman’s book is an interesting detailed historical, and philosophical, look at the interference of science and drugs in sport. There are numerous references to the illegitimate use of drugs and science in sport by the Eastern Bloc, as well as by the west, besides the one mentioned above. For a more thorough examination of this subject see Hoberman’s Chapter 6 in Mortal Engines: "The Myth of Communist Sports Science," 193-228.)

21. James Riordan, "Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin and Andrew Strenk, eds.. Sport and International Relations (Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co., 1978) 332.

22. "The Other Olympic Games," ABC Television, December 1987 .

23. Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, : A Secret Passage into the Kremlin (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 125.

24. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1981), 274.

25. Sterling, 341.

26. Serge Groussard, The Blood of : The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes. The Olympics. 1972 (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1975), 463. 35

27. "The Munich Tragedy," NBC Olympic Coverage, 4 August 1992.

28. Cleanthis Palaeologos, "First Thoughts and Acts for the Revival of the Olympic Games in Greece," Report of the Sixth Summer Session of the International Olympic Academy. Olympia, Greece. 1966 (Athens: the Hellenic Olympic Committee, 1967), 122.

29. Palaeologos, 125.

30. "The Romanian NOC Celebrates Its 75th Anniversary," Olympic Review. December 1990, No. 278, 543-544.

31. Hannah Pakula, The Last Romantic (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986), 141.

32. March L. Krotee, "An Organizational Analysis of the International Olympic Committee," in Jeffrey 0. Segrave and Donald Chu, eds.. The Olympic Games in Transition (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Publishers, Inc., 1988), 126, 127 and 132.

33. David Wallechinsky, The Complete Book of the Olympics: 1992 Edition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), xiii-xvii.

34. Letter from to IOC President Sigfrid Edstrom, 4 March 1947, Brundage Papers, Box 42, as quoted in Espy, 27.

35. The New York Times. 28 July 1948, as cited in Espy, 30.

36. "Nadia - from Romania with Love," CBS Television, 18 November 1976.

37. Nadia *81. 1981 tour program, 6.

38. , "Romanian Gym Team Claims Bias," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 15 May 1977.

39. Ion Mihai Pacepa, Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae & Elena Ceausescus' Crimes. Lifestyle and Corruption (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1991), 215.

40. Pacepa, 205. 36

41. Baruch A. Hazan, and Propaganda Games : Moscow 1980 (New Brunswick, N J : Transaction, Inc., 1982), 184.

42. "Nadia’s Coach, 2 Others Defect To United States," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 8 April 1981. CHAPTER II

ROMANIA: A BRIEF HISTORY

ROMANIA, 1877 TO 1948

From Romania’s unification in 1877 until World War

II there was a long list of interesting characters - a powerful queen, a womanizing gigolo and an adolescent prince who grew into a respected figure in Romanian history. Beginning in 1877, a comprised of the

Hohenzollen-Sigmarigen family ruled Romania -- Germans, not Romanians. The Romanians wanted it this way because they did not trust themselves, with their petty rivalries and bickering, to rule their own country. By installing a powerful established European ruling family as the monarchy they felt prestige and security would be insured.*

"Even by East European measures, interwar Romanian politics were tumultuous and c h a o t i c .Following World

War I, Prince Carol, the son of King Ferdinand and Queen

Marie, showed little interest in being a ruler. He spent his time traveling and openly flaunting his

37 38 relationship with his mistress, Magda Lupescu, although married to Princess Helen of Greece. Because of his flagrant indiscretions, Carol was forced to renounce all claims to the throne and went to live with Lupescu in

Paris. At Ferdinand’s death in 1927 the throne went to

Carol’s son, six year old Michael I. In 1930, in defiance of his abdication, Carol returned to Romania to reclaim his throne, becoming King Carol II. He ruled until 1938 when he dissolved the monarchy and established himself as dictator. Ultimately Carol II and Magda

Lupescu fled Romania in 1940 finally leaving the throne to his son Michael.^

In 1944, King Michael was merely a 23-year-old figurehead ruler under the Nazi occupation. However, on

August 23 he participated in a coup that overnight saw

Romania switch alliances from the to the

Allies. After first suffering intense attacks by the

Allies before the coup, Romania anguished under extreme

Nazi bombardment beginning on August 24, the day following the coup. Bucharest, once hailed as the "Paris of the ," became a virtual shadow of its pre-war elegance.

Just as was its pre-war history, the Communist history of Romania was very unusual. Through political

infighting, instigated and supported primarily by the 39 presence of "liberating" Soviet troops on Romanian soil, the Romanian (HOP) obtained increasing influence over the country’s government. Deposed in

1948, King Michael went into exile, not to return for over 40-years. The Communists were now in total control,

GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ AND NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, 1948-1965

In post-war Eastern Europe, there were conflicts between the "Home Communists," and "Moscow Communists."

The former were those Communists who chose to endure the war on their home soil. The latter survived the war in the relative safety of the Kremlin. Elsewhere a "Moscow

Communist," or "Muscovite," came to power when the

Soviets "liberated" an East European country. Just the opposite was the case in Romania.

Exemplary of the Romanian "Home Communist" was

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, First Secretary of the Romanian

Communist Party following King Michael’s exile,

a position that he had appropriated without the explicit consent of the Kremlin . . . His political strength and future rested on his maintaining the position of First Secretary against challengers closely identified with Moscow. His principal source of strength was his own identification with a Rumanian Communist tradition. Gheorghiu-Dej was a 'man of the people,’ a potential 'hero’ of the Rumanian working class movement because of his role in the uprising of 1933, his uncompromising attitude toward fascism, and his close contacts with the Rumanian railwayman. 40

who comprised the hard core of the Rumanian Communist Party.*

Gheorghiu-Dej ultimately succeeded to the post of

Premier following a very brief reign by , a

"Muscovite." Gheorghiu-Dej and the other "Home

Communists" were successful in gaining control, ironically because they were staunch Stalinists. While

Stalin was in control of the Soviet Union, relations among the Communist neighbors proceeded quietly with

Romania’s leaders acting as willing servants.s But with the death of Stalin in 1953, and subsequent power struggle in the Soviet Union, the seeds of trouble began to take root.

As emerged as the new Soviet leader, strong differences of opinion between the two governments surfaced. While Stalin was alive Gheorghiu-

Dej downplayed the importance of nationalism in favor of unity within the Soviet bloc. As Khrushchev moved to destroy Stalin’s position in Soviet history, Gheorghiu-

Dej accentuated the importance of Romanian individuality in hopes of distancing himself from new Soviet policy.

Purges occurred at a rapid pace to rid Gheorghiu-Dej of potential enemies. Some opponents, such as the

"Muscovite" Ana Pauker, suffered imprisonment and later internal exile, while others endured labor camps and 41 execution. At the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), during the spring of 1956,

Khrushchev denounced Stalin and exposed the tragic results of his policies. It the mind of Gheorghiu-Dej, it is reasonable to surmise, with Khrushchev’s secret speech the schism was definite. "(Gheorghiu-Dej’s) own association with Stalin and was irrefutable, and Gheorghiu-Dejism itself was a Rumanian variant of

Stalinism."®

Gheorghiu-Dej retaliated by making overtures to the

Soviet Union’s two rivals in the Communist world, the

People’s Republic of China and Yugoslavia, all the while accentuating Romania’s national tradition and individuality. Gradually Gheorghiu-Dej appealed to various western countries for economic support of

Romania’s plan for industrialization. This Western economic experimentation culminated in the building of the Galati steel mill, with French investment, in blatant disregard for Soviet demands that Romania concentrate on agricultural development. Thus were sown the seeds of

Romania’s reputation as a maverick within the Soviet

Bloc.7 It should be noted that some now contend that this role of Romania as a maverick was an elaborate ruse to benefit the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc.® 42

During the early 1960s, Gheorghiu-Dej’s control over

Romania solidified to such a point that his leadership was almost unchallengeable. In 1958 Gheorghiu-Dej made his first move to physically separate Romania from Soviet domination. With the support of the Chinese, Gheorghiu-

Dej convinced the Soviets, who had stationed troops on

Romanian soil since the end of World War II, to withdraw.9 Soviet troops never again crossed Romanian borders, even in transit. Gheorghiu-Dej eliminated his

enemies, or intimidated them to the point of inactivity

and surrounded himself with a group of loyal supporters

that he placed in high government positions. Perhaps the

most loyal of his followers was Nicolae Ceausescu.

Both joined the small, and illegal, Romanian

Communist Party in the 1930s. They were imprisoned

together during World War II, and it was during this

period that Ceausescu’s complete devotion took root.

Ceausescu became Gheorghiu-Dej’s "trusted servant-

bodyguard who brought him his meals, shined his shoes,

slept outside his bedroom door, and in general acted as .

. . an obedient, silent watchdog totally devoted to his

master."i°

Ceausescu was never a great intellect. He was not a

successful student and was terribly self-conscious about

a nervous stutter that overtook his speech in times of 43 stress or excitement. After dropping out of school at age 12 he left his village of Scornicesti for Bucharest to become a cobbler's apprentice. Unsuccessful at this profession he shortly afterward began a long line of encounters with the law. Soon after joining the

Communist party Ceausescu was imprisoned for street fighting and other acts of violence. It was during his imprisonment that he fell under the tutelage of older

Communist prisoners, but never gained their respect. In

1943 he met and practically enslaved himself to

Gheorghiu-Dej. From that point on Ceausescu would ride

Gheorghiu-Dej’s coattails up the ranks of the Communist hierarchy.ii

The year 1964 was a pivotal point in communism, both in the Soviet Union and for Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej put into writing Romania’s right to self-determination with the creation of the April Declaration, which declared that the main decisions affecting Romania will be made in

Bucharest, not Moscow.1% Frustrated with failed economic programs in the Soviet Union, and a diminishing world reputation, high ranking members of the CPSU removed

Khrushchev from power and replaced him with a hardliner named . In that same year Gheorghiu-Dej learned that he was suffering from terminal lung cancer and had but a short time to live. Almost immediately 44

members of the Romanian power elite began jockeying for

position to succeed the ailing premier.

Along with Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu idolized Stalin,

even claiming early in his Communist career that he would

ultimately be Romania’s Stalin. "He had no

'’ doubts about Stalin . . . and those . . .

who voiced concern at Stalin’s brutal methods were

treated scornfully."is Ceausescu’s climb to the position

of First Secretary paralleled Stalin’s ascension to the

Kremlin very closely. Just as Lenin had unsuccessfully

tried to oust Stalin from the power elite just before his death, so did Gheorghiu-Dej unsuccessfully try to

eliminate Ceausescu.i* And, consequently, just as Stalin eliminated his opponents by playing one against the other, so did Ceausescu.

THE MAVERICK OF EASTERN EUROPE, 1965-1989

Two days after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death on March 20,

1965, Ceausescu, supported by old party hard-liners whom he had promised would be the power behind the position, became the First Secretary of the Romanian Communist

Party. In a short time Ceausescu eliminated his supporters and consolidated total control in his h a n d s . is

Some, both inside and outside Romania, believe that the political in-fighting was all a ploy. They maintain that 45

the Soviets orchestrated Ceausescu's climb to power

following Gheorghiu-Dej’s death to control the "maverick"

state and afford the Soviet Union a conduit to the

West.1®

Within days after Gheorghiu-Dej’s burial, Ceausescu

began to discredit his idol. Romanian "independence" and

nationalism were hallmarks of Ceausescu’s strategy, just

as they were trademarks of Gheorghiu-Dej’s tenure, only

now Ceausescu claimed them as his original ideas. For a

short time Romania seemed to prosper under the leadership

of Ceausescu and his group of advisers. "A period of

openness" prevailed from 1965 to 1968.1? Still,

internationally, Ceausescu was just another untested

leader of an undeveloped East European country, that was

until 1968.

Early in 1968 Czechoslovakia was going through

changes that promised to transform communism forever. In

a short period Czechoslovakian president Alexander Dubcek made sweeping reforms collectively known as "The Prague

Spring." It was a unique event for Eastern Europe, but a danger to what the Soviet Union saw as a tranquil group

of obedient allies. If the Soviets let the reforms

spread to the volatile populations of Poland, Hungary

and the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet sphere could crumble before their eyes. 46

Although Ceausescu was one of the most repressive of

Communist leaders, he embraced the changes in

Czechoslovakia. He saw the transformation as an example of a country choosing its own path to communism, a policy

Ceausescu appeared to champion. On August 13, 1968,

Ceausescu was the only East European leader to visit

Prague in support of Dubcek's policies. A few days later, Soviet tanks, with military units from the other

Warsaw Pact countries, crushed the reforms and returned

Czechoslovakia to the Soviet fold. The Soviets claimed they had the right to intervene through the Brezhnev

Doctrine that obliged Warsaw Pact members to intercede in the politics of another when the situation threatened the existence of communism.

Ceausescu immediately denounced the invasion as brutal interference in the independence of another country's right to choose its own path to communism.

Before a huge crowd in Palace Square, on August 21,

Ceausescu spoke about the Czechoslovakian invasion. It was the brightest point of his career.

The penetration of the troops of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia is a great mistake and a grave danger to peace in Europe, to the fate of socialism in the world. It is inconceivable in the world today, when the peoples are rising to the struggle for defending their national independence, for equality of rights, that a socialist State, that socialist States, should transgress the 47

liberty and independence of another State. There is no justification whatsoever and no reason can be accepted for admitting for even a single moment the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist State.1®

The speech surprised many, both inside and outside the bloc. Ceausescu gained respect as a champion for human rights and self-determination. Yet, within seven days, after a reassessment of the situation, Ceausescu stated that, "The Romanian people considers that nothing can hinder the good cooperation and friendship between

Romania and the Soviet Union . . ."i® One year later, in August 1969, visited Bucharest, becoming the first American President to visit an East European country. Two years earlier, in 1967, the year before becoming president, Nixon first travelled to Bucharest as

Ceausescu’s guest and appreciated his warm welcome.*®

Nixon’s 1969 visit enhanced Ceausescu’s world reputation.

Over the next decade Ceausescu made two official state visits to the United States. He instantly became the

West’s favorite Communist.

In actuality Ceausescu did not support Dubcek’s reforms. Some believed that, "it is likely that he used the crisis of 1968 to promote himself as the indispensable leader of Rumania and champion of national 48

interests."2 1 Still others, members of his inner circle,

felt

the reason . . . that Ceausescu backed Dubcek in 1968 was . . . that he knew that sooner or later his own maverick behavior would tempt the Soviets to intervene in Romania. It was the principle of Soviet intervention, rather than . . . the cause of it, that made him speak out.2*

Alexander Dubcek, acknowledging his appreciation of

Ceausescu’s visit and support, realized that the Romanian

leader’s motivation was not to support the actual changes being made.

Ceausescu was . . . very warmly received by the crowds in Prague. During our talks, he assured me that Romania would not change her position or take any steps against us. I briefed him about our domestic programs, political as well as economic, and he simply took notice, saying that all that was our own concern. I knew he was no great reformer himself; for him it was a matter of pragmatic politics, which he had also applied in recognizing China and I s r a e l . 2 3

Always conscious of what he felt his role in history should be, Ceausescu saw the propaganda benefits of portraying the maverick, both domestically and

internationally.2 *

Although the Soviet Union did not condone

Ceausescu’s independent rhetoric they were not so concerned as to be urged into action as they had been in

1956 and 1968. 49

It was not a secret that Ceausescu's regime was very stable from the Soviet Union’s point of view (very rigid and totalitarian) and in no way was it a threat to the Communist system. By his independent foreign policy Ceausescu never had in mind, not even in his dreams, to break with communism. He strongly believed in the superiority of the Communist system. At the same time Ceausescu was of the opinion that each socialist state, according to its own interest had the right to promote its own internal and foreign policy, which ultimately . . . would serve the interest of the whole Communist system. If we look at Romania from this perspective, Bucharest under Ceausescu, even in foreign policy, was never a threat to Moscow, or the Communist system.

Fortunately for Ceausescu, his 1968 debut on the world diplomatic stage coincided with the development of the U.S. policy of differentiation cultivated by Nixon and his Secretary of State, .

For the six Warsaw Pact members, differentiation results in rewards for some and no rewards for the others. In the eyes of the State Department/U.S. government, differentiation means rewarding the so-called good Communist regimes while not rewarding the so-called bad Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.* ®

This policy of differentiation continued until the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989. As Vice President

George Bush mentioned in 1983, "The United States will engage in closer political, economic and cultural relations with those countries such as Hungary and 50

Romania which assert greater openness and independence. ?

Romania exaggerated its independence to benefit itself and the Soviet Bloc. As Ceausescu promoted and relished in his reputation as a maverick, he strengthened ties with the Soviet Union and the rest of the Warsaw

Pact.

The Romanian emphasis on foreign policy autonomy in ideological matters as well as state policies represents not only a genuine concern, but also a well conceived set of imagery that appears to represent more independence than actually exists.2 s

Mircea Raceanu*, Chief of North American Affairs in the

Romanian Foreign Ministry under Ceausescu, endorsed this belief.

* Mircea Raceanu, a 30-year veteran of the Romanian foreign service, was imprisoned for 11 months in 1989 after having been convicted of treason for alleged spying for the U.S., Soviet Union and Israel. Ceausescu reportedly said that Raceanu "betrayed me personally." Sentenced to death and awaiting execution, Raceanu was released from prison the day after the dictator’s downfall, December 23, 1989. Raceanu’s case was the first one of treason by a high government official in Ceausescu’s 24-year reign. Despite his personal feelings about Ceausescu, Raceanu has made amazingly well- balanced contributions to this study. For more information on Raceanu’s experiences during his last year in Romania, see David Binder’s three articles, "Rumania Accuses One of Its Diplomats of Spying," The New York Times. 20 August 1989, L19; "The Old Guard in a New Government," The New York Times. 26 January 1990, All; and "Romanian Diplomat Pushed Into Exile in U.S.," The New York Times, 9 October 1990, AlO. 51

Romania was not as independent from Moscow as President Nicolae Ceausescu wanted to project to the world . . . There are enough elements to prove the existence of collaboration between Bucharest and Moscow.

While realizing the benefits of playing the

"maverick," Ceausescu also understood the dangers of playing such a role. Tighter coherence to Warsaw Pact policies and stricter domestic control were the result.

"Romanian espionage abroad was stepped up, and Bucharest became an active partner in the sharing of intelligence inside the Soviet alliance system."so

Domestic policies earned Romania a reputation as one of the most repressive countries in the world. Every citizen owning a typewriter had to register it with the

Securitate, the Romanian , so the type face could be recorded to trace literature.si

Romanians at all levels feared Ceausescu, even those living outside the country. Ceausescu attempted to control exiled Romanians through intimidation and even m u r d e r .s2 He also expanded into clandestinely

supporting international terrorism.

For nearly ten years Ceausescu personally gave

extravagant shelter, and several million dollars, to

Illich Sanchez Ramirez, better known as the international

terrorist "." Carlos’ primary residence 52 during his ten years in Romania was Ceausescu's 30 room

summer palace on the . In return he did

Ceausescu’s bidding to rid the Romanian leader of his

enemies.

He tracked one dissident broadcaster to a parking garage and stabbed him 26 times. He wounded three other with letter bombs and he slipped into the Romanian embassy in Paris and pushed one prominent Ceausescu critic three stories to his death.3 3

Following a February 21, 1981, attempt to destroy the

Munich headquarters of Radio Free Europe for Ceausescu,

Carlos left for Berlin. Although he caused over $2- raillion damage and injured more than 12 people, Ceausescu

felt the attack was a failure because it didn’t silence his most vocal critics. "Carlos knew that disappointing

Ceausescu was a life-threatening proposition."3<

Each new flash of "" in Eastern Europe concerned Ceausescu. Protecting Romania’s borders, and

showing the Soviets they had nothing to fear about

Ceausescu breaking with bloc solidarity, were of primary

importance. Mircea Raceanu witnessed this apprehension

f irsthand.

It is true that the situation in Poland was very much on Ceausescu’s mind. But his fear was related both to the internal situation (to avoid a similar situation in Romania, though in 1983 there were no signs in that respect) and 53

also to a possible Soviet intervention in Poland.® 5

As Ceausescu nurtured his place within the bloc he conversely increased stronger economic ties with the

West. Similarly a major goal was the acquiring of Most

Favored Nation (MEN) status with the United States. The primary benefits of MEN to the recipient "are (1) credits and tariff reductions, (2) greater access to American technology, and (3) high level visits.To a country without hard currency, operating in a non-market economy and seeking increased political validation, the values of

MEN status are immense. By granting or denying MEN to

Communist regimes the U.S. hoped it would hold leverage over the recipient in human rights and emigration cases.3 7 According to Mircea Raceanu, the granting of

MEN was primarily more a political goal for Ceausescu than an economic necessity.

The MEN status was vital for Ceausescu for the following main reasons: the continued recognition of his regime and of Romanian independent foreign policy; to symbolize the existence of special and close relations between Romania and the U.S.; and to help to repay Romania’s foreign debt (in the last years of the Ceausescu regime the trade balance between Romania and the US was constantly in favor of Romania).38

Romania became a member of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) in 1972 and was awarded MEN status in 1975.39 54

With these two acquisitions Ceausescu’s economic

viability in the West grew. "In 1980 Romania became the

first (the Warsaw Pact’s economic organization)

nation to reach an agreement with the European Economic

Community (EEC)."*"

Soon after taking control, with his increased

popularity among world leaders, Ceausescu began to test

his wings. He was the first success of former German

chancellor ’s program of openness to the

Eastern bloc, "Ostpolitik." On January 31, 1967, Romania

established diplomatic relations with , the

first Warsaw Pact nation to do so. He also established

relations with Israel and travelled the world expanding

links with Western, Third World and other Communist

countries, especially the People’s Republic of China.

But as each new conquest brought increased recognition

from the West, Ceausescu became increasingly more

ruthless at home, again to insure the Soviets they had nothing to fear. As Brandt noticed, "They were

naturally at pains, despite their boldly independent

attitude, to avoid unnecessary clashes with 'Big

Brother.’"*i

During the 1970s and 1980s increased megalomania and paranoia caused Ceausescu to surround himself with loyal

supporters. To accomplish this Ceausescu, developed a 55 policy called rotation. "Rotation shunted officials between national and local posts, thereby removing

Ceausescu’s potential rivals before they were able to develop their own power bases."4* This also included filling key government positions with family members, including his wife, Elena, who became the second most powerful person in the country. As time moved on

Ceausescu concentrated more power in his own hands, making "most of the decisions concerning Romanian internal and foreign policy, especially during his last

10 years."4 3

Economically, the country’s relations with the West suffered during the late 1980s. Ceausescu blamed the

"high" interest charged by the IMF on loans Romania had accumulated. In 1988 the United States seriously discussed suspending MEN status in an attempt to force

Ceausescu to improve . "Rather than make concessions, however, Ceausescu renounced MEN status before the U.S. administration had time to act."4 4 The next year the EEC refused to deal with

Romania.4 5 With the decline in Western trade partners

and economic support, Ceausescu became a more active member of Comecon. Trade with Warsaw Pact countries

increased and "he also tried to improve the economic

cooperation with the Soviet Union in view of repaying 56

Romania’s foreign debt."*® By April 1989 Ceausescu announced he had eliminated the national debt,

"proclaiming that Romania had finally achieved full economic and political independence."*? But he did so by bankrupting the country and reducing the population to the verge of starvation, exporting all of Romania’s food and energy products to pay off the debt. Once a great oil producing country, Romania became dependent on others for sources of energy due to mismanagement and poor planning.* ®

The one-time proponent of spent the later years of his reign destroying countless historical villages and moving the inhabitants into concrete apartment buildings near industrial centers.

One of the final straws of Ceausescu’s massive rural and urban renewal program was the destruction of the most elegant and historic to build his

"People’s Palace," the largest building in the world.*®

It remained unfinished at the time of his death.

During the spring of 1984, Romania’s relations with the West were good. MFN status with the U.S. was up for renewal during the summer of 1984. The Soviet leadership was in transition, and there was a question of Communist

Olympic participation in Los Angeles. 57

NOTES

1. Edward Behr, Kiss The Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescus (New York: Villard Books, 1991), 35.

2. E. Garrison Walters, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 226.

3. For an overall history of Eastern Europe before World War II read E. Garrison Walters, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945. Chapter 11 (219-236) is a concise history of Romania during the interwar years. For a more popular interpretation of this period of Romanian history read Hannah Pakula, The Last Romantic (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1985), the biography of Queen .

4. Stephen Fischer-Galati, 20th Century Rumania, second edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 96.

5. Trond Gilberg, Nationalism & Communism: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1990), 47.

6. Fischer-Galati, 145.

7. For a clear, concise and complete discussion of this period in modern Romanian history, during the reign of Gheorghiu-Dej, see chapters 5-8 in Stephen Fischer- Galati ’s 20th Century Rumania, second edition.

8. Anatoliy Golitsyn, a former KGB agent, is a proponent of the theory that Romanian "independence," along with the Sino-Soviet, the Albanian-Soviet, the Yugoslavian- Soviet schisms, the "evolution" of changes in the Soviet Union, the "democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968," and Soviet relations with Euro-Communist Parties were all machinations perpetrated on the West by the Soviets in concert with other communist countries to spread . In recent years Golitsyn’s credibility, along with his assertions, have come under close scrutiny. This theory of disinformation is more thoroughly explained in Golitsyn’s New Lies For Old 58

(Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1984) and to a lesser extent in David B. Funderburk’s Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists. 1981-85 (Washington, DC: Selous Foundation Press, 1989).

9. Ronald D. Bachman, ed., Romania: A Country Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 54.

10. Behr, 86.

11. "The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu," (London: BBC, 1991) Public Broadcasting System television broadcast, 2 July 1991.

12. Mircea Raceanu, letter to the author, 10 February 1992.

13. Behr, 63.

14. Behr, 137.

15. "The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu," BBC-TV.

16. Funderburk, 44, and Golitsyn, 205-206.

17. Behr, 145.

18. Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania: On the Way of Completing Socialist Construction. Vol. 3 (Bucharest: Meridane Publishing House, 1969), 382.

19. Ceausescu, 394.

20. Funderburk, 97.

21. Fischer-Galati, 187.

22. Behr, 156.

23. Alexander Dubcek, Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek (New York: Kondansha International, 1993), 172.

24. Gilberg, 210.

25. Mircea Raceanu, letter to the author, 22 September 1992. 59

26. Funderburk, 28.

27. Speech by Vice President George Bush, "U.S. Policy Toward Central and Eastern Europe, " September 21, 1983, , Austria, as quoted in Funderburk, 29.

28. Gilberg, 209.

29. Mircea Raceanu letter to the author, 10 February 1992.

30. Gilberg, 121. Romanian intelligence programs against the west, and the subsequent sharing of this information with other members of the Warsaw Pact, is the central theme of Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa’s Red Horizons (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1990). It is also an underlying theme of David B. Funderburk's Pinstripes and Reds .

31. Associated Press, " under siege in Romania," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 1 May 1983, A4.

32. "Romanian assassin defects to West, receives asylum in France," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 1 September 1982, AS.

33. "Days of the Jackal," Prime Time Live - ABC News. Show #174, 3 January 1991.

34. "Days of the Jackal."

35. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 27 April 1992.

36. Funderburk, 30.

37. Funderburk, 31.

38. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 10 February 1992.

39. Bachman, 163.

40. Bachman, 164.

41. Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960- 197 5 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 173.

42. Bachman, xxii.

43. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 6 January 1992. 60

44. Robert R. King, "Romania: Projections," in Richard F. Starr, éd., United States-East European Relations in the 1990a (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 199.

45. Bachman, 164.

46. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 27 April 1992.

47. Bachman, 165.

48. Lawrence Minard, "A Balkan despotism," Forbes, 11 Mav 1981, 132.

49. Behr, 221-225. CHAPTER III

PRELUDE TO THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES

THE PRELIMINARIES, 1970-1980

The political turmoil in the Olympic movement during the 1970s set the stage for even greater political conflict in the future. In the early 1970s cities bidding for the 1980 Games began their campaigns. The only bidders for the Games were cities representing the world’s two superpowers, Moscow and Los Angeles. The path to the decision of a host city, made in 1974, was fraught with political intrigue.

In June 1974, during his final months in office,

Richard Nixon took one last trip to the Soviet Union as

President of the United States. British

Christopher Booker reported that Nixon and Soviet leader

Leonid Brezhnev discussed a personal matter of utmost importance to the Soviet premier. The Games were extremely important to the Soviets. Rejected once, in

1970, when the 1976 Games went to Montreal, the aging

61 62

Brezhnev urgently wanted the Games for Moscow. Nixon, according to Booker, assured Brezhnev that, "Los Angeles could wait. There were ways and means of arranging these things. Moscow would get the Games."*

During the IOC’s 75th Session in Vienna, on October

23, 1974, at 9:00 am, IOC President Lord Michael Killanin named Moscow as the host city for the Games of the XXIInd

Olympiad. Killanin lent little credence to Booker’s argument, yet did acknowledge that most of the Western

IOC representatives voted for Moscow.% On August 31,

1978, the second event that would decide the fate of the

Olympic Movement in the 1980s took place. It was then that the IOC named Los Angeles as the host of the 1984

Olympic Games. From then on both Games, representing the two major political philosophies in the world, would be compared and contrasted.

The awarding of the Games to Moscow in 1974 caused minor calls for a boycott based on human rights violations in the USSR. None was taken seriously until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

When the United States Olympic Committee’s House of

Delegates voted in April 1980 not to participate in

Moscow, people wondered what would be the effect in Los

Angeles four years later. Although the Soviets vehemently promised that they would be at the 1984 63

Olympic Games, in spite of the boycott, serious doubts persisted.

A common charge made by both the Soviet Union and the United States against the other, was the intrusion of politics into the Games. There seems to be evidence to support both sides. The Soviet Union never hid its government involvement in sport, always accentuating its political importance since the Soviets’ first involvement in international competitions during the early 1950s.

THE SOVIET BOYCOTT CRISIS, 1980-1984

As happened with Moscow, the first calls for a boycott of Los Angeles came immediately after it was awarded of the Games in 1978. Just as the West claimed that the Soviets politicized the Games, the Soviets countered with the same claims about Los Angeles. The

United States always practiced a hands-off approach to sport, at least on the surface. The 1980 boycott dramatically changed all this. As the Los Angeles Games approached, the Soviets claimed that the United States would use the Games for political purposes. Many felt this argument was ludicrous coming from the Soviets.

The first substantial threat to the Los Angeles.

Games came in September 1981 when the Springbok Rugby

Team from South Africa conducted a three-game tour of the 64

United States. Immediately, Monique Berlioux, lOC

Executive Director, foresaw the trouble to come.

They’ve taken leave of their senses . . . We’ve seen the Africans boycott Montreal because of New Zealand’s chumminess with the South African rugbymen. Now it’s the host country that’s inviting them. If this tour isn’t cancelled, the damage to Los Angeles may be enormous.3

When the IOC strongly suggested the United States government should reconsider issuing visas to the visiting ruggers, the Reagan administration claimed there were no grounds to do so. But, in reality, there were precedents since the State Department had refused visas to other South African representatives.# African nations immediately threatened repercussions in 1984. The

Soviets, true to their long standing support of the

African independence movement, also threatened to bring up the subject at the IOC Congress in Baden-Baden, West

Germany. The congress convened a few days after the tour’s debut.5 As Manchester Guardian journalist John

Rodda wrote.

Ever since Misha the Bear danced across Lenin Stadium and the died to close the games of the 23rd Olympiad, the Russians have been waiting to make a hawkish move against Los Angeles. Not for them . . . a boycott . . . Moscow just wants the Games removed from Los Angeles, and yesterday the plane which brought the beaten Springboks from Auckland to the United States was just the peg they needed.® 65

Whether the Soviets broached the subject in closed

Executive Board meetings is still not known.» The question of Soviet participation in Los Angeles resurfaced periodically after the Baden-Baden Congress, but in general it was a moot issue.

The first actual mention of a boycott made by a

Soviet official came in 1982. Sports Minister Sergei

Pavlov announced then that the Soviets would avoid Los

Angeles unless better security could be promised.? On

January 15, 1983 the Soviet sports hierarchy replaced

Pavlov with Marat Gramov, providing optimism that the

Soviets would attend.®

During the summer of 1983, the Soviets felt assured enough of their participation to sign a $3-million television contract to broadcast the Games in the Soviet

Union. Sports contacts between the United States and

USSR, increased, adding more confidence that Soviet teams

» The minutes of International Olympic Committee meetings, in addition to the behind the scenes daily operations of the organizations, are closely guarded secrets. Numerous attempts have proven fruitless in gaining information from the IOC. Employees have non­ disclosure clauses in their contracts which prohibit them from discussing IOC business even after the termination of their employment. Such is the case with former executive director Monique Berlioux. "This condition is said to have impeded Berlioux's publication of her memoirs." [David Miller Olympic Revolution (London: Pavilion Books, Ltd., 1992), 35.] 66 would be in Los Angeles. Until September 1983, approximately 10 months before the opening ceremonies in

Los Angeles, the idea of a Soviet boycott was becoming more remote. Yet, the events of September 1, 1983, shattered all faith in a boycott free Games.

During the early hours of September 1, Korean Air

Lines’ flight 007 from New York to Seoul, flew over the sensitive Shakhalin Peninsula of the USSR. Soviet

interceptors engaged the airliner as it violated Soviet air space. After failing to acknowledge repeated warnings the KAL flight was shot down by Soviet pilots, killing all 269 passengers and crew aboard. Immediate were heard around the world. One peripheral victim of the incident was the Olympic Games in Los

Angeles.

Without delay groups formed to protest the Soviets’ participation in the upcoming Olympics. The most vocal, and visual, was the "Ban the Soviets Coalition."* Co- founder, Anthony Mazeika, in explaining the goal of the organization stated that.

We would be remiss in our responsibility as a people if we did not raise the issue of the massacre of 269 at the Olympics in 1984, where the issue of the allied ideological war between the West and the Soviet Union takes focus in the Games themselves.i* 67

The movement spearheaded the unanimous passage of

California state legislation calling for the banning of the Soviets from the Olympic Games. In support of the bill, California State Senator John Doolittle said,

The Soviet Union can be here and participate in the Olympics. But let them make some legitimate response to our request for an apology, to our request and insistence that there be some discussion, at least some movement, to rectify their policy which resulted in the deaths of 269 innocent men, women and children.

As a result, American institutions cancelled international exchanges with the Soviet Union. The

Soviets, in turn, fearing security problems, cancelled their participation in an ice hockey tour against the

United States Olympic Team in December. Ultimately the

California Legislature rescinded the resolution and the

Reagan administration made it clear they would not prohibit Soviet participation in the Olympics.

Soon afterward, the movement to ban the Soviets abated so much that the Soviets reinstated their hockey tour against the Americans. Whereas calls to exclude the

Soviets subsided drastically, it did not disappear entirely. During the early part of 1984, there were sporadic protests by the Soviets about access to Los

Angeles, but the protests were somewhat minor. 68

THE SOVIET BOYCOTT DECISION, FEBRUARY-MAY 1984

There was a direct correlation between the intensity of Soviet boycott threats and the Soviet leader in power at the time. The 1980 Olympic boycott extremely upset

Brezhnev. After his death in November 1982, and the ascension of KGB chief Yuri Andropov to the Soviet top post, talk of a boycott became less frequent. Andropov lacked loyalty to Brezhnev since his rise to power was not due to Brezhnev’s favor.i* At the time the

Politburo felt a need to move away from Brezhnev’s policies of 18 years. There was no real threat of a boycott until after the death of Andropov on February 9,

1984.

There is ample evidence that the 1980 boycott affected Brezhnev greatly, but did not bother Andropov at all. In fact, Andropov, as head of the KGB, reportedly welcomed the boycott. Since it was his responsibility to control western infiltration and Soviet dissidents during the Games, the boycott made his assignment easier.

Therefore, during his short reign, a retributive boycott was not among his political priorities.is

Konstantin Chernenko, who succeeded Andropov on

February 13, 1984, was an old Party "apparachnik" who moved up through the party hierarchy via the sponsorship of Brezhnev, his old friend. He owed his political life 69 to Brezhnev and upon coming to power immediately set out to restore his friend’s reputation. Enforcing a small piece of revenge for the 1980 Moscow Olympics would be one avenue. Paul Ziffren, chairman of the board of directors of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing

Committee (LAOOC), felt the change in Soviet leadership immediately.

When he [Andropov] died and Chernenko came to power, the whole thing changed. Chernenko was always Leonid Brezhnev’s man. Brezhnev never forgave the United States for the '80 boycott. And the change in the Russian attitude in my mind was a change between Andropov and Chernenko, and once Chernenko came in there, we started getting completely opposite signals.i*

Evidence supports the claim that until Chernenko took control the Soviets were planning to attend. In early February, before the death of Andropov, the Soviets signed another broadcasting pact with the LAOOC, hardly an act of a nation planning to boycott the G a m e s . is Yet, beginning on April 3, the Soviet press stepped-up strong attacks on the LAOOC and Los Angeles as the choice as a host city. According to the Soviets, the city was an

inappropriate site due to high violence and the LAOOC’s

inability to guarantee security for Soviet athletes.i®

By April 14 the IOC felt the situation so serious that

they called for a special meeting between the LAOOC and 70 the Soviets. The meeting took place on April 24 at IOC headquarters in .n

IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch, the former

Spanish ambassador to the USSR, feels that the main architect behind a Soviet boycott was not Chernenko, but

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Andropov always had the resistance of Gromyko, the strong man of foreign affairs within the Soviet Communist Party, and in some ways the real boss . . . Chernenko was sick, and was dominated by Gromyko, who hated the US . . . I could never discover precisely why he disliked the Americans. With this man it was impossible to get on friendly relations. If Andropov had survived, I think we would have been OK in 1984, but he was in the hospital for much of the previous year, and his death did not come as a surprise. What was immediately apparent, with the arrival of Chernenko, was the change in attitude of the IOC's two Soviet members, Andrianov and Smirnov. You could feel their new uncertainty. ‘ ®

According to some reports Gromyko's renewed hatred of the Americans stemmed from the Korean Airlines incident of September 1983. Shortly after the tragedy,

Gromyko was to attend a meeting of the United Nations.

Refused permission to land at New York area airports, he was instructed that he would have to arrive at a military field.

Deeply offended, Gromyko called off the trip. Washington analysts believe he raised his increasingly influential voice in favor of a 71

stick-it-to-the Americans line during debates over the Olympics.

At least one Soviet IOC member, Anatoly Smirnov, wanted the Soviets to attend the Games. But the decision was out of the hands of Soviet Olympic officials. The edict came from one of the highest levels of the Soviet government, the Central Committee. Smirnov felt that.

By 1984, we were at liberty to express an opinion to a degree . . .My opinion was that we should go to Los Angeles, and I had been campaigning for that. Then Andrianov and I were invited to meet the Central Committee. What was our view regarding the Games? I said I considered we ought to go. The Committee said that politically it would be wrong to do that. I said: 'If we don’t go, w e ’ll win nothing. If we want to achieve the political effect of sporting success, we should send our athletes. If we send six hundred young men and women, some of them will be heroes. They will be happy we went, and the country will celebrate. Why sacrifice the athletes?’ That’s interesting, the Committee said, but it’s already been decided. Later that year I was offered a political promotion, but stayed with sport because that has been my life . . .Yet I have to say that in the security scare was genuine.20

Groups such as the Ban the Soviets Coalition, and even the United States government, did not help the IOC and LAOOC quest to sidetrack a Soviet boycott. The week the IOC called for an LAOOC/Soviet meeting the United

States Immigration and Naturalization Service confirmed they had established a "special unit . . . to deal 72

instantly with asylum requests" during the Games. Two

days before the Lausanne meeting, Anthony Mazeika, the

co-founder of the Coalition and vice president of the

Baltic American Freedom League, announced he wanted to

help the 40 Baltic members of the Soviet team to

defect.21

Some felt the real turning point in the Soviet

decision to attend the Games came on March 1 when the

State Department refused a visa for Oleg Yermishkin, the

proposed Soviet Olympic Attache. Yermishkin was a high

level KGB official at tne Soviet Embassy in Washington

for many years before becoming the Olympic Attache. The

day he was to leave for the United States the Reagan

administration denied his request. William Hussey, a

retired American diplomatic and military officer who was

a diplomatic consultant for the LAOOC, felt the action deeply upset the Soviets.

I think the KGB were outraged that this man was turned down. He had been hand selected for the job. He had been put through the most grilling training to produce in a rather short time a sports professional that could come here and do a good job, and to have him cast aside without, from their viewpoint, any apparent reason wasn’t taken lightly by them.22

During the April 24 meeting, the Soviets reiterated

their previous grievances concerning security, visas,

Olympic identity cards, the docking of a Soviet vessel in 73

Los Angeles harbor, and the adherence of the Olympic

Charter by the United States government. The LAOOC in turn restated its assurances that it had settled these problems, or was correcting them. After the meeting,

Samaranch and the IOC felt optimistic about the boycott situation.23 Although Samaranch hoped that the meeting had solved many disputes, Soviet Olympic Committee president Marat Gramov still hinted that they might still stay away from the Games.2 ♦ Samaranch was "outraged" over Gramov's remarks.2 s

Attacks on the LAOOC's security plans increased throughout the days following the Lausanne meeting.

Finally, on May 8, 1984, the National Olympic Committee of the USSR announced it would not attend the Games of the XXIIIrd Olympiad in Los Angeles.

The practical actions of the American side . . . indicate that it has no intentions of ensuring the safety of all the athletes, respecting their rights and human dignity, and creating normal conditions for holding the Games.26

The same day the Czechoslovakian press announced that.

Political demonstrations hostile to the Soviet Union are being prepared [in the United States], undisguised threats are made against the Soviet delegation, including physical liquidations. 2 74

Other bloc countries published similar attacks in the days following with the exception of Romania.

Peter Ueberroth, president of the LAOOC, felt the announcement was the result of the Americans’ actions in

1980. "We were very disappointed to learn of the

Soviets’ decision. It appears we’re paying for the price for 1980."*® Yet, Ueberroth also believed the Soviets had other ulterior motives for boycotting the Games.

I believe completely without question that before , the week before, the day before, all systems were go for their competing in the Games. Two dramatic things happened during the Winter Games. Obviously, the death of Andropov, a very severe thing, remembering that Andropov had brought Gramov [Soviet Sports Minister and Olympic Committee president] in and was Gramov's power. Second thing, they didn’t do well, and this is way underestimated in the eyes of the West. And they were severely criticized at home because they didn’t perform well . . . They had sold their public in 1980 that their eighty gold medals truly reflected their Summer Games power, and that the few countries that didn’t come were not significant in terms of medal winning.*®

THE SOVIET BOYCOTT AND EASTERN EUROPE

Gradually the countries of the Soviet bloc followed the lead of the USSR, and announced their decisions not to participate in the Los Angles Olympics. To a certain degree many countries in the bloc merely "rubber-stamped"

Soviet policy. However, just as it was difficult for the

United States to persuade allies to join the boycott of 75 the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980, the Soviets found complications in persuading their allies to voluntarily join the 1984 boycott. Consultations leading to the

Soviet decision on May 8 took different forms in the various countries of the Soviet bloc.

Bulgaria, as always, was the most loyal Soviet ally.

Immediately following the Soviet announcement the

Bulgarians reiterated the Soviet stand. Yet, earlier that day, the president of the Bulgarian Olympic

Committee (BOC), Ivan Slavkov, announced "that everything was going well for the Games." This lends credence to the belief that "the decision . . . was taken by [Bulgarian president Todor] Zhivkov and announced to members of the BOC later.

The other staunch supporter of Soviet policy in the

Warsaw Pact was the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a country in which sport is a major tool in foreign policy.

The night before the decision GDR officials found allegations of a Soviet boycott hard to believe.si

Following the decision. East German representatives expressed regret to American diplomats about the outcome and felt that "the Soviets forced the GDR’s hand."s2

Another East German official put it more clearly. "We are politically too dependent on the Soviet Union to envision any other decision."s3 76

After 1968, Czechoslovakia routinely fell in line behind Soviet policies without much discussion. A

Czechoslovakian Olympic official echoed the same sentiments as the East Germans to an American government official on May 30, 1984. "He said . . . 'This was a political decision made by political leaders,' [and that] the [Czechoslovakian Olympic Committee] had no option but to go along with the decision of the Soviet political establishment."3 4

Journalist Kenneth Reich, however, claims that

Soviets consulted the East Germans much earlier on an

Olympic boycott.

East German officials . . . told Los Angeles officials that the actual Soviet decision was taken at a Politburo meeting in Moscow April 30, although they also reported that the Soviets had first broached the possibility of boycotting the Games with them the previous November, about the time the new American missiles were sent to Europe. The East Germans said that the Soviets indicated then that they would launch a campaign of complaints in their press about the plans for the Games, see which arguments were the most effective and then come to a final decision on the boycott sometime in the spring. This, if true, would seem to weaken the argument that Andropov’s death had been an important factor.3 5

Poland, with a large emigrant population in the

United States that supported its homeland with considerable influxes of hard currency was in a difficult situation. Support the boycott and risk losing valuable 77 backing from Polish-Americans or fight the boycott and risk Soviet retaliation. A secret Department of State document stated that, "The reported agreement of early

May that Moscow would allow Warsaw to delay repayment of its trade deficit until 1990 apparently assured (Polish

President) Jaruzelski’s compliance with the boycott."3*

Hungarian officials, perhaps the most vocal of East

European representatives in showing their dissatisfaction, shed light on the Soviet boycott process. The claimed that there was a Warsaw

Pact meeting in "late March or early April"** where

Soviet officials voiced complaints about the Los Angeles

Games and United States government actions. The Soviets then held a meeting of bloc party and sports officials in

Moscow from May 9 to 11, following the announcement, "at which they applied pressure for a uniform s t a n c e . "3 6

Dissatisfaction with the Soviet decision came from the highest levels of the Hungarian government. On May 14,

1984, just six days following the Soviet boycott announcement. Deputy Prime Minister Jozsef Marjai met with the American ambassador to explore ways in which

* * "According to reports, there was a meeting April 5 of Eastern-bloc nations in Moscow where non­ participation in the 1984 Summer Games was discussed, but no decision was reached," George Vecsey, "Rumanians Walk the Tightrope," The New York Times. 23 July 1984, C6. 78

Hungary could be represented at the Los Angeles Games in spite of the Soviet boycott.

Marjai summed up the dilemma of the small european states when he asked rhetorically what Hungary can do in the present situation. It was obvious that he was referring to their inability to resist Soviet pressure on its allies to close ranks behind a boycott.s?

Two days following the May 14, 1984, Hungarian decision to join the boycott, Politburo member Miklos Ovari held a briefing for Hungarian . Ovari, who was also the propaganda and press officer for the Central

Committee Secretariat,

made no attempt to describe the Politburo’s decision as other than one forced on Hungary by the Soviets who made it a question of alliance solidarity. He said that the media should avoid elaboration on the basic fact of non­ participation. It should avoid heavy criticism of the U.S. and make no attempt to suggest any Hungarian enthusiasm for the boycott decision. Ovari said that 'When the ceiling falls on our head, we should not pretend to enjoy it.’^s

Protests, real and rumored, prevailed throughout

Hungary following the Politburo's decision. One protest came from Hungarian Olympic Committee President Istvan

Buda who resigned. , who also held the government title of State Secretary, stated that

after he had spoken so strongly and optimistically about Hungarian participation, 79

both publicly and privately in recent months, his credibility with Hungarian athletes and with international bodies would be destroyed.**

The Politburo refused his resignation for fear that it

would be too blatant of a protest against bloc

solidarity.*i

The Hungarians claimed that their only support came

from Romania, which had already acknowledged it would

attend the Olympic Games. The Hungarians said the

Romanians were also coming under severe Soviet pressure

to follow the Soviet boycott policy.*% The Hungarian

Politburo felt that "clearly the Romanians wanted to go

to Los Angeles . . . [but] that the Romanians will probably accede to heavy Soviet Pressure to stay away

from the Los Angeles Games."**

NOTES

1. Christopher Booker, The Games War: A Moscow Journal (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1981), 21-22.

2. Lord Killanin, My Olympic Years (London: Seeker & Warburg Ltd., 1983), 168.

3. Jerry Kirshenbaum, ed., "SCORECARD: Is This Tour Necessary?," Sports Illustrated. 3 August 1981, 8.

4. Kirshenbaum, 8. 80

5. Bart Burns, "Protesters of Springboks Claim Victory: Rugby Match to be Played in Secret," The Washington Post. 19 September 1981, A 5 .

6 . Clive Gammon, "A Game They May Remember," Sports Illustrated. 28 September 1981, 37.

7. UPI, "Russians may boycott 1984 Olympic Games," The Ohio State (University) Lantern. 29 January 1982, 9.

8 . The Los Angeles Times. 15 January 1983, II-l.

9. For a more in depth study of the activities of this organization see Kenneth Reich Making It Happen: Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics (Santa Barbara, CA: Capra Press, 1986), 213-215; and Bill Shaikin, Sport and Politics: The Olympics and the Los Angeles Games (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 50-51.

10. "1984 Olympics: Ban the Russians?," ABC News Nightline. Show #637, 18 October 1983.

11. ABC News Nightline. 18 October 1983.

12. For an account of Andropov’s ascension to power see Chapter 9 in Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage into the Kremlin (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 218-237.

13. Solovyov and Klepikova, 184.

14. Reich, Making It Happen. 209.

15. Los Angeles Times. 8 February 1984, 1-3.

16. The New York Times. 3 April 1984, II-9.

17. The New York Times, 14 April 1984, 1-21.

18. David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of Juan Antonio Samaranch (London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1992), 88.

19. George J. Church, et al., "A Soviet Nyet To The Games," Time. 21 May 1984, 21.

20. Miller, 91.

21. John Barnes, "Olympic defections Inc.," The (London) Sunday Times. 22 April 1984, 11. 81

22. Reich, Making It Happen. 217.

23. "STOP PRESS: Lausanne - Tripartite Meeting," Olympic Review ’84. No. 198, April 1984, frontispiece.

24. The New York Times, 25 April 1984, II-9.

25. Peter Ueberroth, Made in America: His Own Story (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), 267.

26. "Statement of the USSR National Olympic Committee," 8 May 1984, Sport in the USSR. 6/1984, 2.

27. "U.S. Threats to USSR," FBIS Daily Report Contents: Eastern Europe, Vol. II, No. 091, 9 May 1984, D 2.

28. Ueberroth, 268.

29. Reich, Making It Happen. 222.

30. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Sofia to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 10 May 1984, subject: " Join Olympic Boycott," 1 .

31. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Berlin to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 09 May 1984, subject: "Demarche On Olympics," 2.

32. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Berlin to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 15 May 1984, subject: "GDR Treatment of Olympic Decision," 1.

33. Church, 17.

34. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Prague to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 30 May 1984, subject: "Views of Olympic Boycott," 1.

35. Reich, Making It Happen. 224.

36. U.S. Department of State: "East European Highlights: May 1984," Bureau of Intelligence and Research Current Analyses. Report 859-CA, 19 June 1984, 3.

37. State Department telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 05 July 1984, subject; "Soviet Boycott of Olympics -- 82

Coordination Within the Warsaw Pact As Seen From Budapest," classification: confidential, 1-2.

38. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 14 May 1984, subject: "Deputy PM on Hungarian Olympic Participation," 1.

39. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 17 May 1984, subject: "More Hungarian Information on the Olympic Boycott," 1.

40. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 22 May 1984, subject: "Olympic Boycott -- Information on Alternate Games and Hungarian Unhappiness," 2.

41. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 22 May 1984, subject: "Olympic Boycott -- Information on Alternate Games and Hungarian Unhappiness," 2,

42. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 14 May 1984, subject: "Olympic Boycott -- Hungary is Playing for Time," 2.

43. U.S. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 17 May 1984, subject: "More Hungarian Information on the Olympic Boycott," 3. CHAPTER IV

ROMANIA AND THE BOYCOTT OF THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES

ROMANIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, JANUARY-MAY 1984

Ceausescu, a devoted Stalinist throughout his

Communist life, always felt more comfortable with a strong "conservative" Communist in the Kremlin. While still First Secretary of the

(RCP) under Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu rejected the path

Khrushchev was leading the Communist world, and embraced

Brezhnev’s rise to power in 1964. Yet, after Ceausescu assumed power in 1965, disagreements began to surface between the two Communist leaders over China, Comecon policies, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Following Brezhnev’s death on

November 9, 1982, Ceausescu backed hard-liner Konstantin

Chernenko as the heir apparent.i But with Yuri

Andropov’s subsequent ascension to power, Ceausescu again felt insecure.

Andropov’s first major assignment in the Soviet political hierarchy came in 1954 as ambassador to Hungary

83 84 where he remained during the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

As the highest ranking Soviet official in the country,

Andropov indisputably played a major role in the Soviet repression of the uprising. During the revolt, Romania secretly cooperated with the Soviets by imprisoning the deposed Hungarian leader on Romanian soil before returning him for execution in June 1958. The

Romanian official placed in charge of the operation by

Gheorghiu-Dej was Ceausescu. During his rule Ceausescu denied any Romanian complicity in suppressing the

Hungarian revolt.% Andropov would have known the truth.

In 1957 Andropov became chief of the Central

Committee’s department of liaison with the Socialist bloc, and then moved on to the KGB. With his appointment as head of the KGB in 1973, Andropov became a full member of the ruling Politburo.3 The combination of Andropov's promotion, his knowledge of Ceausescu’s complicity in the death of Nagy, together with a volatile Hungarian minority in the province of , understandably caused Ceausescu great concern.

After Andropov assumed power he started several changes that worried hard-line Communists, such as

Ceausescu. Soviet historian Roy Medvedev felt the changes were apparent from the beginning of Andropov’s reign of power. 85

He had a definite program in front of him. [He] started implementing a number of substantial foreign-policy and domestic-policy changes, and he envisaged going on with even bigger reforms. They would not have solved all of the problems facing the country today, but they would at least have solved some of them . . . He improved the economy in some respects, and he dealt a strong blow to the Mafia-style leadership that came into being under Brezhnev, which was characterized by corruption and inefficiency.*

A long line of physical ailments impeded Andropov’s leadership. He died of kidney failure, caused by diabetes, on February 9, 1984, during the Winter Olympic

Games in Sarajevo. Chernenko, Andropov’s successor, returned the Soviet leadership to a more conservative form of communism. Ceausescu, according to former

Romanian government official Mircea Raceanu, was more content with the 72-year old Chernenko in charge.

Ceausescu was very uncomfortable with Andropov, not only for his association with Hungary, but also because of Andropov’s desire for some internal reforms. Chernenko was viewed by Ceausescu as a traditional conservative Communist ruler.s

With this fact in mind, Ceausescu conceivably would have readily embraced Chernenko's policies, including the

Olympic boycott.

"At the same time, with the greater emphasis (from the United States) on human rights and domestic 86 liberalization, Romania’s repressive policies began to cause increasing problems in its relations with

Washington."® Even with Most Favored Nation (MEN) status in jeopardy during 1983, due to the emigration tax on individuals attempting to leave the country,’ Romania still hoped to benefit from the State Department’s differentiation policy.® Also, with the elevated tension between the United States and the USSR after the death of

Andropov, the United States wanted to keep an influential hand in Eastern Europe, and Romania was the perfect vehicle.

THE SOVIET OLYMPIC BOYCOTT MOVEMENT

As stated in the previous chapter, representatives of the IOC and LAOOC noticed a marked difference in the

Soviet attitude regarding participation in Los Angeles

following Andropov’s death. The Soviets answered the

question of participation with their boycott announcement of May 8. As also shown in the previous

chapter, Soviet allies quickly joined the boycott, some

more readily than others. The one exception being

Romania.

Soviet pressure to boycott the Games even extended

to Africa. At a Supreme Council for Sport in Africa

(SCSA) meeting, on June 16, Soviet representatives "were 87 playing a strong behind-the-scenes role to foster African non-participation in the Olympics through their Ethiopian surrogates."® The grounds promoted by the Soviets were

British sports associations with South Africa and the

Springbok rugby tour of the United States. But their arguments fell mostly on deaf ears as was the only African country choosing to stay away from Los

Angeles. Suzanne Kakou, Congolese Olympic Committee director, who admitted that she and her colleagues were under Soviet pressure to boycott, hinted at why the

Soviet effort failed. "There is no reason not to attend.

After all, the Soviets did not support the African boycott of the Montreal Games in 1976."i® As will be discussed later, there is ample evidence of Soviet pressure placed on Warsaw Pact countries to join the boycott, but there is one East European country where it is difficult to find proof that the Soviets exerted any persuasion - Romania.

ROMANIA AND THE 1984 OLYMPIC BOYCOTT

Until the Soviet boycott announcement on May 8,

Romania conducted a program of "business as usual" concerning the Games. Domestically, the Romanian media never mentioned the possibility of a Soviet boycott. As

May 8, 1984, approached, and it became evident that 88

Romania was not wavering in its stand on participation, reports of Soviet pressure began to circulate. The first mention in Romania of a boycott came over Radio Moscow’s

Romanian service. The broadcast announced that the

Soviets would not be attending the Games of the XXIIIrd

Olympiad in Los Angeles.Following the official Soviet announcement, the Romanian media conducted a news blackout on any mention of the Olympic Games. In retaliation, Radio Moscow increased reports, broadcast into Romania, accusing

the USA as being incompetent, hypocritical, and treacherous organizers of the games, who had produced the inevitable boycott by 'socialist states’; all of which was alongside, of course, praise for the Soviet stance in the context of bloc unity and its assistance to its allies.12

Radio Free Europe (RFE) announced that further

Soviet pressure came during four meetings, held in six weeks from March 31 to May 14, between Soviet ambassador to Romania Evenji Tyazhelnikov and Ceausescu. The meetings, according to RFE, were "described only as

'comradely,’ a euphemism that suggests a tough exchange of views."2 3 The Western press saw the final meeting between Ceausescu and Tyazhelnikov, on May 14, as the first sign of Soviet pressure placed on Romania.i*

However former Romanian foreign ministry official Mircea

Raceanu remembers the encounters in a different light. 89

The meetings between Ceausescu and Ambassador Tyajelnicov [sic] of March 31, April 20, May 5 and May 14, should be viewed from the perspective of the high level meeting which took place between Ceausescu and Chernenko at the beginning of June 1984 concerning the overall relations between Romania and the Soviet Union, especially (involving) cooperation in the economic area, and not as related directly to the Romanian attendance at the Los Angeles Olympic G a m e s . is

On May 5, 1984, following his first meeting with

Tyazhelnikov, Ceausescu met with IOC president Samaranch who was in Bucharest to present a medal to former gymnast

Nadia Comaneci. Samaranch and Ceausescu discussed the

Soviet situation concerning the Los Angeles Games.

Ceausescu apparently convinced Samaranch that he knew, three days before the official announcement, that the

Soviets were definitely going to boycott. He also assured Samaranch that the Romanians would participate

"regardless of whether or not the Soviets decide to stay away."i®

Gradually media reports increased of the brave stand taken by Romania in the face of mounting Soviet pressure.

But never, in any press report, was the type of pressure explained.17 In fact, when asked more than once,

Romanian officials denied that they were under any pressure.18 The Romanians themselves helped build such suspense by withholding any comment on what their 90 decision would be until the last minute. As an official of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told American

Embassy staff, "It would serve no Romanian interest to declare its intentions earlier."i*

One group that believed Romania was under intense

Soviet pressure was the LAOOC. Peter Ueberroth, LAOOC president, met with Alexander Siperco, IOC vice president from Romania, at Siperco's request on May 18 in Lausanne.

The next day the IOC Executive Committee would be meeting to discuss the boycott with LAOOC and Soviet officials.

We visited Siperco in his room. 'I think my country can hold out,' he said, 'but it will be very difficult.’ As hard as Siperco was trying, I didn’t believe Romania had the strength to withstand the pressure. One of the poorest nations in the Eastern bloc, Romania was largely dependent for its existence on its Socialist allies . . . Siperco . . . was reluctant to ask for financial help, even though his country now needed it. Romania had counted on East Germany to provide the transportation for its athletes and equipment, specifically rowing shells and canoes . .'Would it help if the LAOOC sent a delegation to meet with your sports leaders in Bucharest?’ I asked. 'I would think so,’ he said . . . 'You have my word that the LAOOC will do whatever is necessary to allow your athletes to compete. If that means transportation for your athletes and equipment, we will help. If it means getting a television signal into the country so your people can watch the games, we will work something out.’^o 91

During the Executive Committee meeting, Siperco left the room to take a phone call from Bucharest. According to Ueberroth,

Moments later . . . [Siperco] returned, gathered his belongings, and made a quiet farewell to Samaranch before leaving in tears. Samaranch said Siperco had been summoned home by his government, which was being leaned on by the Soviet Union to boycott the Games.21

News of Siperco’s unexpected departure spread rapidly through the international media. Later Siperco said he regretted the "press reports indicating that he was

'totally broken’ by the summons home . . . This was not the case, he said, and it 'made a bad impression’ in

Romania."22

True to its policy of differentiation, the Reagan administration attempted to entice Romania into independent action. President Reagan sent a letter to

Ceausescu, just before the Romanians’ Olympic announcement, stating that he was recommending a year extension to Romania’s MEN status and "extending the bilateral commercial agreement" for an additional three years. As a final thought, he extended his wish "that the Romanian Olympic team will participate in the games this summer."23 Although the letter only spent one paragraph discussing the topic, its sole intention was

"to encourage Romanian Olympic participation in part by 92 stressing the progress achieved in many areas of our bilateral relations over the past year."*#

Not everyone in the United States foreign service felt that it was in America's best interest for Reagan to encourage Romanian participation. The United States ambassador to Romania, David Funderburk, believed it was playing into Ceausescu's hands to advocate his defiance of the Soviet boycott.

Ceausescu knows perfectly well what the U.S. wants him to do, and he knows what a beating his 'independent' image is going to take if he knuckles under to Chernenko. It is our view not only superfluous, but ill-advised for the U.S. to importune Ceausescu to do something he is probably going to do anyway. We believe it is the Romanian game plan to get as much as they can out of a decision that will be made on criteria to which a letter from the U.S. will be irrelevant. If he goes to Los Angeles, as we think he will, excellent. We have invested nothing, and Ceausescu's petard gets a workout. If he yields to irresistible Soviet pressure or inducements, better not have a failed U.S. effort to turn him around on the record.*®

Mircea Raceanu's remembrance of Ceausescu during this period supports Funderburk's position.

President Nicolae Ceausescu, who was aware that boycotting the Games would badly damage his reputation as an independent leader, could not afford to make the decision of non- participation» At the same time, for tactical reasons (and not that he waited for an approval from Moscow), he considered that it was not necessary to announce Romania's decision from the beginning. He liked to be begged and also he wanted to get, at the right moment, as much 93

as possible out of Romanian participation in the Los Angeles Olympic Games, including publicity.2 «

On May 24-25, five days following the IOC Executive

Council meeting, sports officials from 11 Communist countries met in Prague to discuss the Los Angeles Games.

As the meeting commenced, various delegates took turns attacking the LAOOC and its supposed lack of security for Communist athletes. In the middle of the attacks,

Romanian minister of sports Haralambie Alexa announced that "Romania has always helped the Olympic movement and that he was making an official declaration that Romania would attend the Los Angeles Olympic Games."22 According to one diplomatic source, the announcement,

. . . was greeted by stunned silence from those attending the meeting, and was followed by a request for a five-minute adjournment which ran on for a half hour. Upon resumption of the meeting, the GDR representative took the floor and strongly criticized the Romanian decision . . . However, this was the only speech to do so and no other delegations, including the Soviets, thereafter made reference to the Romanian decision. Informally, the Czechoslovaks later complained to the Romanians that their decision to participate would make it more difficult to explain Czechoslovak non­ participation to their own people.2 a

Afterward Samaranch again supported the contention that

Romania was not pressured at any time during the meeting. 94

"It was a quite friendly meeting. There were no rough

words and they were very kind. But it was not easy."**

Mircea Raceanu remembered that the decision to

attend was never an issue in the Romanians’ mind.

To my knowledge it was always accepted in high circles of Bucharest that Romania would take part in the Los Angeles Olympic Games. I remember well (in fact I was the interpreter of that meeting) when Counselor Edward Derwinski [U.S. State Department] asked, in May 1984, Romanian Foreign Minister, Stefan Andrei if Romania would take part in the Los Angeles Olympic Games, he did not answer 'yes’ or 'no,’ but he smiled and replied that to his knowledge the Romanian athletes 'never stopped preparing for the Games.’ In fact it was more than a positive reply. It meant that the question of participation was never in doubt in the Romanian leadership’s mind.**

On May 29, five days after the Romanians announced

their intention to participate, the LAOOC delegation that

Ueberroth had promised Siperco traveled to Bucharest to

meet with Romanian officials. Making the trip was Agnes

Mura, the LAOOC liaison with Romania; Charles Cale, LAOOC

vice president; Willy Reich, LAOOC Judo commissioner; and

Mike Jacki, executive director of the United States

Gymnastics Federation and director of the 1984 Olympic

Gymnastics competitions. Delegation leader Charles Cale

remembered that he had special instructions from

Ueberroth. "Before we left Peter said, 'You make the deal, we want them there. We have to get them there. 95

You do what you have to do to bring them.'"si According to Jacki, the trip took on a clandestine personality.

Interestingly enough, the whole 'mission' seemed to be very secretive. I was in Lausanne, at an IOC meeting representing gymnastics . . . Upon returning late one evening from dinner with a number of representatives of our international [gymnastics] federation, there was a note attached to my hotel room door at the Palace Hotel indicating that I was to see Peter Ueberroth before I retired. It was well after 1:00 AM. I went to Mr. Ueberroth's room and was informed directly by him that I should be in the lobby the next morning at 7:00 AM prepared to leave on a trip. I was told that I would be gone approximately four days. In the morning, I met my other three traveling companions. We were given sealed envelopes and were told to study the information during the trip. It was only then that I found out where I was going and what the purpose of the 'mission' was. I did have an indication from a number of the people that we talked to that there was pressure being placed on the Romanians by the Russians not to participate in the Games and that certain 'threats' were being made such as restrictions on food and heating and fuel oil for the coming winter. There were significant details that had to be worked out such as the transport of equipment (specifically boats and other high tech or specialized equipment utilized by specific sports) as well as athletes and officials. There was also a fair amount of discussion about the way that the television signal could be brought into the country in order to make sure that the Romanian people had the opportunity to see their athletes participate in the Games.3%

The Romanian hosts treated their guests like royalty, which helped the negotiations go smoothly.

"Virtually everything the Romanians wanted was 96 arranged.”33 The LAOOC and IOC agreed to pay $60,000 each for two thirds of the cost of bringing the Romanian team to Los Angeles. The Romanians paid the other

$60,000 for their part of the $180,000 cost of two charter flights on the Romanian state owned airline,

Tarom.3 *

Cale remembered that the Romanians used the threat of Soviet pressure to their advantage during the negotiations.

They told us that they were under tremendous pressure from the Soviets not to come. They said, ’A major problem for us is that we would be coming with Aeroflot in a shared situation with the GDR, the Poles, etc. All of a sudden we don’t have hard currency and we want to come, but if you’re going to have us you’re going to have to get us there.’3*

In addition to the $60,000 LAOOC payment originally agreed to. Cale revealed that other perks were delivered to the Romanians. The LAOOC chartered a cargo plane to transport the equipment of participating European countries. Each country paid a small portion of the cost of the charter. To Cales’ memory the Romanians didn’t have to pay. Following the Games, the LAOOC also acted as agent in selling equipment for the Romanians for hard currency.3 6

It was very clear . . ., having been there and seen the pitiful economic situation that they 97

were faced with, that they were trying to use leverage as much as they could financially. I don’t know in the overall scheme of things if we were over reaching or not, but we gave in on an awful lot of things. A lot of it was nickel and dime sort of things that really didn’t make a difference to us or not. It was pretty important because at that juncture they were clearly our showpiece as far as the breaking of the boycott.3 7

ROMANIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY-JULY, 1984

It did not take long for Ceausescu to reap the

rewards of his decision. The day following the Romanian announcement in Prague, Ueberroth wrote to Secretary of

State George Schultz urging the government to "kindly offer them every possible support and assistance."3s

Romania’s payoffs were already being discussed by the

Reagan administration. The State Department suggested

the President’s intervention in many trade issues that concerned Romania.

Under the circumstances, and in support of our policy of differentiation toward the countries of Eastern Europe, it is important for us to demonstrate that there are benefits for Warsaw Pact members who break with the Soviets. Regarding Romania, there are several longstanding export licensing cases which deserve prompt resolution.3*

Concerning one case, earmarked for special presidential attention, to be heard before the Export 98

Administration Review Board (EARB) on 12 June 1984,*

Charles Hill, executive secretary - Department of State, wrote to White House adviser Charles McFarlane that, in light of Romania's decision to attend the Games, "the outcome of that meeting assumes even greater importance in our relations with Romania and the President’s overall policy of trying to encourage greater distance between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. "<<> A month later Romania was still looking for results. Following the start of the Games, a report to the Secretary of

State stated that "Ceausescu is now looking for signals from the U.S., particularly approval for the long­ standing Rom-Control Data exporting licensing case, which would keep the only U.S.-Romanian joint venture commercially viable.

Besides support for trade cases favorable to

Romania, the administration strongly promoted the extension of MFN status for Ceausescu. An interesting stance since Ceausescu's emigration tax, which was to be paid only in hard currency, threatened MFN the year before (1983). The United States renewed MFN when

* Participants involved in EARB cases are kept strictly confidential to ensure the accuracy of information supplied by companies seeking arbitration before the EARB. Repeated attempts to discover the companies involved in the 12 June 1984 EARB hearing proved fruitless. However, a strong implication can be found in citation 41 of this chapter. 99

Ceausescu promised that the tax would not be enforced.**

On June 1, 1984, eight days following the Romanian announcement on its participation in the Los Angeles

Olympic Games, the United States once again renewed MFN

for another year.

One case that did not go as Ceausescu, nor the State

Department, wanted was the sale of Landsat satellite monitoring equipment to Romania. Landsat could detect

objects on earth as small as 100 feet. The deal,

originally proposed by Reagan in 1981, now gained renewed

support by the Departments of State and Commerce. The

Department of Defense opposed the sale because of the

potential military benefits to the Warsaw Pact.**

Former head of the , the Romanian secret

police. Ion Mihai Pacepa "has said that the government of

Romania had an agreement with Moscow on the transfer of

Landsat technology."** Because of the objections of

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and of Ambassador

Funderburk, the project did not go through.

By June, the State Department acknowledged that

there was little doubt in its mind as to Ceausescu’s

plans concerning Romanian Olympic participation. A

secret Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyses

document dated June 19th, summarizing East European

developments during the month of May, stated that. 100

Moscow may have tried to bring Bucharest on board, but it could not have been surprised that Ceausescu demurred. Ceausescu presumably expects to burnish Romania’s independent image in the US and elsewhere in the world . .

On June 4, three days following the extension of

MFN, Ceausescu traveled to Moscow for private meetings with Chernenko. The topic of conversation was the upcoming Comecon** summit, the first in 13 years. One reason given in the press for why there had not been a

Comecon summit for that length of time was Romania’s resistance to take part.<6 it seems unlikely then that, after 13 years of resistance, Romania would decide to choose this time, while defying the Soviets on a major

foreign policy decision, to participate enthusiastically

in a Comecon summit. The (London) Times claimed on May

26 that the real reason for the Ceausescu trip was that

he was summoned "to Moscow for talks on Romania’s refusal

to join the Soviet Bloc boycott of the Olympic Games and

other issues."4 7 In reality, Romania had begun calling

** Comecon (the acronym for Communist Economics) is also known as CMEA, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The organization is the coordinating economic body for Warsaw Pact nations. The theory is to coordinate each country’s economic policy so that they all work together for the common good of the Pact. However, more times than not, the benefits leaned more towards the Soviet Union. 101

for a Comecon summit meeting in 1980, four years

earlier. Ceausescu's visit to Moscow prior to

. . . the summit meeting had served the important if not main purpose of trying to find a Soviet platform for the summit talks; and it seems that Ceausescu agreed to adopt a constructive attitude at the summit meeting in exchange for rather vague promises of more Romanian-Soviet trade and industrial cooperation agreements.**

At the conclusion of the meeting, Chernenko awarded

Ceausescu the Order of the October Revolution, one of the highest awards granted by the Soviet Union. Mircea

Raceanu, citing Ceausescu’s uneasiness with former Soviet leader Andropov, summed-up the meeting more succinctly.

"I would characterize the meeting between Ceausescu and

Cernenko [sic] in June 1984 as a good one, a step forward

for improving the relations between Bucharest and

Moscow."** During the Comecon summit, Romania, while agreeing with the need for more intra-bloc cooperation, again steadfastly held to the right of national .* *

Shortly after the Comecon summit. Ambassador

Funderburk met with Dr. Teodor Popescu, the chief researcher at the Institute for the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. Popescu confided to

Funderburk [Appendices B and C] that Romanian policy toward Olympic participation was not as it seemed. 102

[Popescu] said Romania is to remain a channel to the West (despite its movement toward Moscow) and hence the Soviets early on agreed to the Romanians going to the Olympics; otherwise (the Romanians) they would have had no credibility at all in the West . . . [Popescu] said Romania tried a policy of orientation westward during 1983 to gain economic aid and political support. It was not successful and together with Ceausescu's fear of a Solidarity type situation here, it was a reason for closer orientation toward Moscow beginning January 1984.si

By the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games on

July 28, there were signs that some people began

questioning the legitimacy of Romania's motivations.

Reports surfaced that members of the IOC speculated that

Romania's participation might not be as dramatic

politically as first thought. One high ranking IOC

official went so far as to ludicrously suggest that "the

Soviets secretly wanted the Romanians to come, perhaps

for reasons of attracting hard currency into Eastern

Europe."52 With the opening of the Games attention

started to turn more to the impending competitions. But

underlying the interest in athletics was still the

motivation of Romanian participation.

THE GAMES OF THE XXIIIrd OLYMPIAD, LOS ANGELES

On June 20, 1984, LAOOC vice president Charles Cale

offered an invitation, through Romanian Olympic Committee 103

president Haralambie Alexa, to Nadia Comaneci to be a

member of the LAOOC as an adviser. Her task would be "to

review the gymnastics program arrangements and make any

suggestions or comments she believes would be

appropriate, as well as assist in handling any problems

that arise for the LAOOC staff."sa The Romanians agreed

to Comaneci’s participation, and she was on her way to

Los Angeles at the organizing committee’s expense.

Immediately upon Comaneci's arrival, rumors

circulated that she would be considered as the final

torch bearer during the opening ceremonies. At a press

conference welcoming her to Los Angeles, LAOOC president

Ueberroth would neither confirm nor deny Comaneci’s role

as torch bearer. Still he added that, "It’s not our business to rub people’s noses in anything . . . We

won’t do anything that’s damaging to the 14 countries

that haven’t come to the Games."s# A year later

Ueberroth acknowledged that Nadia had never been an

option. " had been selected the week

before [Comaneci’s arrival], but it was a tightly kept

secret and the rumors about Nadia heightened the

suspense."5 5 Ensuring Comaneci’s appearance was seen as

a major coup for the LAOOC, which took "special efforts

to recognize Miss Comaneci and her country because of its 104 defiance of Moscow, but scoffed at the idea that she had been exploited.®

The invitation for Comaneci’s participation came from Cale late one night during his May trip to Romania.

I said, 'She is one of the greatest symbols of the Olympic Games. She is one of the greatest symbols of your country and we need to bring her to the United States.’ The Secretary General was quite enthralled by it, but in the course of it they told us, 'Well, you know she’s caused us a lot of problems.’ Their Olympic people were very excited and wanted to know how we would do this. We said we would get her over. Once she was here we would pay her a per diem and make her an official of our committee.® ?

Throughout the weeks before, and during, the Games the Romanian delegation participated in several welcome celebrations. News reports portrayed Romania as taking a brave stand by resisting Soviet pressure to boycott the

Games. However, at press meetings, Romanian officials assured the press that Soviet pressure had not been a factor in their decision. One official admitted that,

"Had we felt the pressure was too great and the risks too high, even at a late date, we would not have come."®®

During the opening ceremonies, it became apparent that the spectators, and especially the media, anticipated the entrance of the 127 member Romanian delegation in the parade of nations. As the Romanians 105 entered the Coliseum, they received an ovation surpassed only by that for the American contingent.

It unquestionably meant a great deal to the Romanians. As their team paraded around the peristyle and onto the north straightaway of the Coliseum track, people sitting in those sections noticed that many of the Romanian athletes were crying with joy, overwhelmed by the crowd’s reception.®®

As the Games progressed, Romanian athletes gave inspired performances. The LAOOC had the television signal transmitted to a West European country, taped and sent into Romania for daily broadcast. Five hours of

Olympic coverage were televised throughout Romania each evening.

Government broadcasters boasted that victorious Rumanians had 'dedicated’ their victories to their President, or were inspired by . . . (the) 40th anniversary of Rumania’s liberation from fascism.®®

In the total medal count, Romania placed third (53) behind the United States (174) and West Germany (59).

Romania placed second only to the United States in gold medals, 20 to 83, edging out West Germany by three medals. Los Angeles was by far the greatest Olympic performance in Romanian history.

On August 14 the Romanian team returned to

Bucharest. Family members, sports and government 106 officials, and fans met the team at the airport.

Following the team's 1976 Olympic success, large crowds greeted them at the airport and Ceausescu personally awarded medals to many athletes at a majestic reception given by the Communist hierarchy. The athletes expected more following the country's greatest Olympic showing.

The welcome "... was cordial, but not the grandiose reception they had anticipated."si Later that evening, the team sent a telegram to Ceausescu, dedicating their victories to him.

We are happy and honoured to dedicate our victories at the most important international sports competition to you, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the party, president of the Republic, to the 40th anniversary of the antifascist and anti­ imperialist revolution of the social and national liberation and to the great forum of Romanian Communists, the 13th congress of the party.« %

On August 21, 1984, Romania celebrated the 40th anniversary of the overthrow of the Nazi puppet government. At a ceremony, Ceausescu conferred titles and awarded special medals to myriad individuals for contributing to building Romania's "multilaterally developed socialist society."sa Nowhere in the lists of the occupations released did any mention of Romanian athletes, Olympians, or the general Romanian Olympic success, occur. 107

Romanian celebrations following the Los Angeles

Olympics, the country’s most successful sporting

appearance to date, paled compared to the receptions held

for any previous returning Olympic Team. It appeared

that the Romanian Olympians had served their purpose, to

show Ceausescu’s regime in a positive light and curb

anti-Romanian feelings around the world. As the final

crescendos of the closing ceremony’s firework display

echoed off into the distance so did the value of

Romania’s Olympians.

NOTES

1. Ronald D . Bachman, ed., Romania: A Country Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991) 239.

2. Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Facepa, Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae &. Elena Ceausescus’ Crimes. Lifestyle, and Corruption (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1990) 360.

3. Associated Press, "Andropov began reform, but impact is still unclear," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, 10 February 1984, A2.

4. Robert B. Cullen, "A Time of Mutual Wait and See," Newsweek. 20 February 1984, 28.

5. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 10 February 1992. 108

6. Robert R. King, "Projections," in Richard F. Staar, ed., United States-East European Relations in the 1990s (New York: Crane Russak, 1989) 195.

7. Daniel N. Nelson, Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1988) 206.

8. For an explanation of differentiation see Chapter Two, page 35.

9. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Ouagadougou [Upper Volta, currently ] to USIA Washington, DC, 18 June 1984, subject: "Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, Executive Bureau Meetings, June 16- 17," 2.

10. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Brazzaville to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 22 May 1984, subject: "Congolese Resist Soviet Pressures to Boycott Olympics," 2.

11. Aurelia Leicand, "Romania and the Olympic Games," Radio Free Europe Research: Situation Report. Romania/9, 13 June 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), 6.

12. Aurelia Leicand, 8.

13. Aurelia Leicand, 8.

14. "Romania Delays Decision, Is Likely to Join Boycott Today," The Washington Post. 23 May 1984, C5.

15. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 6 January 1992.

16. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, 11 May 1984, subject: "Romanian Olympics Participation," 2.

17. The most prolific news reporter covering every aspect of the Los Angeles Games was The Los Angeles Times’ Kenneth Reich. Reich referred to Soviet pressure on Romania in many articles through the period prior to, and during, the Games. Following the Games he published a detailed account of the development of the Los Angeles Olympics [Kenneth Reich, Making It Happen: Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics (Santa Barbara, CA: Capra Press, 1986)]. In the 267 pages of text there was only one reference to Soviet pressure being exerted on the 109

Romanians. "They (the Soviets) claimed it (the boycott) was not for political reasons, and they were not influencing others, even though they clearly influenced their satellites and sought to pressure the Romanians who, alone among the Warsaw Pact members, announced they would send their team to the Games." (p. 211)

18. Kenneth Reich, "Romanians on Peace Mission at L.A. Games," The Los Angeles Times. 23 June 1984, I-l.

19. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, 14 May 1984, subject: "Romanian Participation in Los Angeles Olympics," 2.

20. Peter Ueberroth, Made In America (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985), 289-290.

21. Peter Ueberroth, 291. (Although this story is recounted in a number of newspaper and magazine articles Ueberroth’s description is used here because his was the only account from an eyewitness present at the meeting in question.)

22. Kenneth Reich, "Defiant Romania to Send Team: Bucks Soviet Pressure to Join Games Boycott," The Los Angeles Times. 25 May 1984, 1.

23. Department of State Action Memorandum, 17 May 1984, Subj: Proposed letter from the President to President Ceausescu of Romania.

24. Department of State Memorandum, 18 May 1984, from Charles Hill, Executive Secretary, to Robert C. McFarlane, White House; subj.: "Proposed Letter from President Reagan to Romanian President on Olympic Participation."

25. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 24 May 1984, subject: "Proposed Presidential letter to Ceausescu," 2.

26. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 10 February 1992.

27. Reich, "Defiant Romania. . .," 1.

28. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Prague to Secretary of State, 5 June 1984, subject: "Romanian Decision to Attend Olympic Games," 1-2. 110

29. "Rumania Decides to Take Part in Games," The New York Times. 25 May 1984, A3.

30. Mircea Raceanu, letter to author, 10 February 1992.

31. Charles Cale, telephone interview [Appendix A], 2 March 1993.

32. Mike Jacki, to the author, 25 January 1993.

33. Reich, Making It Happen. 230.

34. Kenneth Reich, "LAOOC, IOC Helped to Pay for Romanians’ Trip," The Los Angeles Times. 31 July 1984, 1-3.

35. Cale, 2 March 1993.

36. Charles Cale, telephone interview [Appendix A], 8 March 1993.

37. Cale, 8 March 1993.

38. Letter from Peter V. Ueberroth to George P. Schultz, 25 May 1984, contained in Department of State Action Memorandum from Edward J. Derwinski to George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, 30 May 1984.

39. Department of State Memorandum for Robert McFarlane, The White House, from Charles Hill, Executive Secretary; "Subject: Romania’s Decision to Attend the Olympics - The U.S. Response," 4 June 1984.

40. Department of State Memorandum for McFarlane from Hill, 4 June 1984.

41. Department of State Information Memorandum to The Secretary, from Richard Burt, subj: "Romania: Ceausescu Looks to the U.S."; 26 July 1984.

42. Nelson, 213.

43. "Rumanian Landsat Use Seen: Defense Dept. Opposes Sale," The New York Times. 28 June 1984, D24.

44. David B. Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds (Washington, DC: Selous Foundation Press, 1987), 46. Ill

45. "East European Highlights: May 1984," Bureau of Intelligence and Research Current Analyses, U.S. Department of State, 19 June 1984, 3.

46. Richard Owen, "Chernenko refuses to separate cruise from other arms issues," The (London) Times. 5 June 1984, 6 .

47. Richard Owen, "Ceausescu 'summoned to Moscow over Games,’ The (London) Times. 26 May 1984, 1.

48. Anneli Maier, "Romanian Reaction to the CMEA Summit Meeting," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Situation Report. Romania/10, 17 July 1984, 13.

49. Mircea Raceanu, letter to the author, 10 February 1992.

50. Anneli Maier, 15-16.

51. State Department telegram from American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 7 June 1984, subject: "Romanian decision to attend Olympic Games: Soviets and Romanians move closer together," classification: Secret. (NOTE: The document in question [appendix B] has the Romanian source’s name excised for security reasons. In a letter to the author, dated 17 September 1992 [appendix C], Dr. Funderburk mentioned that "this document does refer to the conversation I had with Dr. Teodor Popescu." The "Solidarity type situation" mentioned is a reference to the Solidarity movement in Poland that ultimately led to the downfall of the communist government. Ceausescu’s intense fear of internal revolt has been verified in many sources. For one citation in support of this fact see note 31, page 37. Prophetically, a popular uprising ultimately did lead to Ceausescu’s demise.)

52. Kenneth Reich, "For Romanians, Gold Medals Came Second," Los Angeles Times. 10 August 1984, 1-7.

53. Kenneth Reich, "Romanian Gymnast L.A. Guest: Nadia Comaneci, Legend of '76, Coming to Games," Los Angeles Times, 21 July 1984, I-l.

54. "Lighter of Flame Remains a Mystery," The New York Times. 27 July 1984, A15.

55. Peter Ueberroth, Made In America (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985) 339. 112

56. Robert Lindsey, "Nadia Comaneci Still Glows As Image of 1976 Recede," The New York Times. 29 July 1984, 812.

57. Cale, 2 March 1993.

58. Reich, "For Romanians, Gold Medals Came Second."

59. Reich, Making It Happen. 230.

60. Lloyd Garrison, et al., "Rise of an East Bloc Maverick: Rumania finds splendor in solitude," Time. 20 August 1984, 75.

61. "Return Home of Olympic Team Downplayed," (Mainz ZDF Television Network broadcast, 14 August 1984, 5:45pm GMT) FBIS: Daily Report. Eastern Europe. 16 August 1984, Vol. II, No. 160, H-1.

62. "Olympic Squad Sends Telegram to Ceausescu," FBIS: Daily Report. Eastern Europe. 17 August 1984, Vol. II, No. 161, H-1.

63. "Ceausescu Awards Medals," FBIS: Daily Report. Eastern Europe. 23 August 1984, Vol. II, No. 165, H-1. CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Just as the first sentence in the introduction suggests, what seems on the surface to be true in Romania is usually not the case. The Romanian decision to attend the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics is a perfect example of this statement. The Romanians successfully used public opinion and United States foreign relation policies to reap the benefits of playing its longstanding role as the maverick of Eastern Europe.

The first question that the study addressed was whether the Soviet Union actually pressured Romania to join the boycott of the 1984 Olympic Games. On many occasions Romanian officials categorically denied that the Soviets exerted pressure on them to join the boycott.

Only when the Romanians were in private consultation with

representatives from the LAOOC and the IOC did they claim

they experienced pressure from the Soviets. Why was this

so? The LAOOC and IOC were the two organizations of most immediate benefit to Romania. Faced with economic

hardships in the face of Ceausescu’s drive to eliminate

113 114

Romania’s foreign debt, and the poor state of Romania’s international reputation, both organizations provided financial support to ensure Romanian attendance.

Romania had to participate in the Olympic Games to garner greater economic and political benefits from the West, but first it had to get to Los Angeles. When asked for financial help, both the LAOOC and the IOC were willing benefactors.

It is easy to find specific examples of Soviet pressure placed on other members of the Eastern bloc, but it is impossible to find tangible proof of Soviet pressure on Romania. If Soviet pressure existed, it would have been to Romania’s benefit to publicize the fact since it would enforce Romania’s independent reputation. In actuality, the Soviets did not coerce the

Romanians. Mircea Raceanu believed that.

. . . though [the] Soviet Union preferred that Romania would stay away from Los Angeles, they expected the decision of Romanian participation. I would go even further in saying that if the decision had been not to attend [the] Los Angeles Olympic Games that certainly would have surprised Moscow.i

Of prime importance to the United States government was that the Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Games be broken. The weakest link in the Eastern bloc was

Romania, the State Department’s "good Communists." 115

Noticing Romania suffering from a weak economy and a discouraged populace, the Reagan administration actively enticed Ceausescu with trade inducements and a renewal of

MFN. Ceausescu, ever the opportunist, and experienced in seeking Western economic support, saw an excellent opportunity. In this situation Romania held the upper hand primarily because of the State Department's policy of differentiation. In essence, the United States needed

Romania more than Romania needed the United States and

Ceausescu took full advantage to increase his, and

Romania’s, status in the world.

According to Charles Cale, LAOOC vice president, the organizing committee did not actively recruit Romania to come to the Olympic Games. Yet, once Romania made it clear that there was a possibility it would attend, the

LAOOC was at its disposal. As Peter Ueberroth, LAOOC president, said to Cale before dale's trip to Romania,

"You make the deal, we want them there. We have to get them there. You do what you have to do to bring them.

The LAOOC supplied the Romanians with hard currency, transportation of their equipment and even acted as agent to sell their equipment after the Games. The pragmatic Romanians gained valuable public relations points and financial rewards. The LAOOC also shared in 116

the public relations bonanza, and more than recouped its

expenses to get the Romanians to Los Angeles.

Evidence of an official Soviet reaction to the

Romanian decision cannot be found. During the May 24,

1984, meeting of Eastern bloc sports ministers, the East

German delegate verbally attacked the Romanian

representative. Following this brief reaction to the

Romanian position, the meeting proceeded as planned. It

was a common Soviet practice to use various members of

the bloc as mouthpieces for Soviet ideas. The Soviets

employed this routine often to give the illusion of bloc

solidarity. However, the East Germans, who put so much

value on sports success, were very upset at having to

join the boycott. According to a State Department

document, the Czechoslovakians "twice complained to the

Romanians that their decision to participate would make

it more difficult to explain Czechoslovak non­

participation to their own people.It is

understandable that the members of the Warsaw Pact would

be angry with the Romanian ability to play the maverick,

thus making their lives more complex. Therefore it is

hard to interpret the German tirade as a Soviet maneuver, or a genuine expression of anger.

Romania’s decision did not surprise the Soviets.

Since the Soviets believed in Ceausescu’s staunch 117 commitment to communism, and his ruthless control of the

Romanian population, they let Romania have its momentary victories. Evidence of the Soviets’ attitude toward the

Romanian decision came during Ceausescu's June 4, 1984,

Moscow visit and subsequent Comecon summit. Romania cooperated and increased trade with the Soviet Union and

Warsaw Pact countries. That would not have happened if the Soviets were intent on punishing Romania for its

Olympic participation.

Romanian/Soviet relations did not suffer from

Romania’s Olympic decision. With the death of Andropov the political climate warmed tremendously for Ceausescu.

Because of the Comecon summit Romania became more

integrated economically with its Warsaw Pact allies, an unlikely event if the Soviet Union and Romania were

feuding over the Olympic Games. Romania’s rewards were many and its punishments few, if any.

Relations with the United States also were on the

increase. The United States, in need of a tear in the

Iron Curtain during the Soviet boycott threat, courted

Ceausescu. This appealed to Ceausescu, who enjoyed

holding the trump card, especially against an opponent

who had chastised him only months earlier. Romania

prolonged the announcement of its participation to the

last possible moment to gain the most from the situation. 118

As a Romanian diplomat told an American official, "It would serve no Romanian interest to declare its

intentions earlier."# Although the Reagan administration knew the outcome of the Comecon summit it still renewed

MFN and expedited stagnated Romanian trade cases.

During the first few months of 1984 Ceausescu was

suffering from a miserable international reputation.

Contacts with western financial institutions and governments were severely strained. Due to repeated human rights violations, and repressive domestic policies, international investment in Romania rapidly evaporated.

Forced to turn toward the Soviet Union for assistance, Ceausescu recognized a golden opportunity.

This opportunity was the threatened Soviet boycott of the

Los Angeles Olympic Games. By successfully manipulating public opinion, international sports organizations, and western governments, Ceausescu turned the tables and nurtured the image of a small independent nation standing up for the lofty humanistic principles of Olympism in the

face of unsurmountable odds. As a result, he reaped the

rewards of a rejuvenated position in the eyes of the world.

Romanian actions concerning the 1984 boycott now

lead to doubts about the motivations behind past Romanian 119 foreign policy decisions. Were they genuinely the actions of an independent "maverick," or were they calculated manipulations to accomplish some hidden

Romanian agenda? One must also question the United

States’ policy toward Romania. Did the U.S. actually believe in Romania’s independence, or was it worth portraying this belief in order to depict a crack in the

Iron Curtain, thus showing the fallibility of the Soviet system?

NOTES

1. Mircea Raceanu, letter to the author, 6 January 1992.

2. Chuck Cale, telephone interview with author, 2 March 1993.

3. Department of State telegram from the American Embassy in Prague to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, 05 June 1984, subject: "Romanian Decision to Attend the Olympic Games," 2.

4. Department of State telegram from American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, 14 May 1984, subject: "Romanian Participation in Los Angeles Olympics," 2. CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE : ROMANIAN SPORTS, 1984 AND BEYOND

One year after Romania’s triumphal entry into the

Los Angeles Coliseum for the Games of the XXIIIrd

Olympiad, Ceausescu was still reaping the rewards of his

decision to participate. During the summer of 1985 IOC

President Juan Antonio Samaranch traveled to Romania to

present Ceausescu with the in recognition

of his contribution to the Olympic Movement. It was an

event that Samaranch regretted four years later during

the overthrow of Ceausescu.i

At the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988 Romania fell to

eighth place in the total medal count (24) from its

third place finish in 1984. It placed behind three of

its Warsaw Pact allies who boycotted Los Angeles, the

Soviet Union, East Germany and Bulgaria. The Soviets and

East Germans finished first and second respectively.%

Also in 1988, the United States threatened to suspend MFN status for Romania again due to human rights violations. Ceausescu however rejected MFN on his own

120 121 before the United States could act on the threat. Within the year, the European Economic Community refused to deal with the Romanians. Its trade partners intensely decimated, Romania became more active in Comecon policies. Throughout the later years of Ceausescu’s reign drastic cuts occurred in domestic economic policies. Government policies severely curtailed electricity and heating oil. Food shortages, the worse since World War II, caused malnutrition of severe epidemic proportions. But, by the spring of 1989,

Ceausescu announced that he had completely eradicated

Romania’s national debt.3 Still, the people, inspired by the gradual failure of one Eastern bloc regime after another during 1989, became increasingly agitated with

Ceausescu.

Every day brought news of another incident directed against Communist regimes. In May, Hungary dismantled the barrier on its border with Austria. On June 5, 1989, voters elected a Solidarity majority in the Polish senate in the country’s first free elections in 40 years.

The same day, Chinese students began pro-democracy protests in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. At midnight on

November 9, 1989, the East German government unexpectedly opened the Berlin Wall to free travel, essentially destroying the single most significant symbols of the 122

Cold War. On November 25, during the early days of the

"," Czechoslovakians welcomed former

Czech president Alexander Dubcek from internal exile. By the end of the week, the Communist regime announced that opposition representatives, led by dissident playwright

Vaclav Havel, would be part of a new cabinet. The move basically relinquished the Communist party’s 41 year control in Czechoslovakia. But in Romania, Ceausescu stubbornly held onto power vowing never to follow the reform path of other Communist countries.

On November 28, 1989, the Romanian government suffered worldwide embarrassment when Nadia Comaneci, with six other Romanians, escaped to Hungary. Rumors had

Comaneci involved, presumably involuntarily, with

Ceausescu’s son Nicu. During his trip to Romania in

1984, and again in 1985, Charles Cale recalled that

Romanian officials confided, "Well, you know she’s caused us a lot of problems."* Immediately after her escape,

Comaneci announced, "I could not stand life in Romania any longer. I have wanted to leave for some time."s

With the world’s attention focused mostly on the imminent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Comaneci’s defection brought added attention to Ceausescu’s repressive regime. 123

Early in December protests occurred in the Romanian

frontier town of Timisoara near the Hungarian border.

Ceausescu wanted to send a message that he was not going to tolerate what had happened in other bloc countries.

Before leaving on an official visit to Iran, Ceausescu gave orders to shoot the demonstrators. On December 16 and 17, 1989, the Securitate, Romania’s secret police, reportedly opened fire on Timisoara protesters, causing many fatalities. Upon his return, Ceausescu addressed a crowd in Bucharest’s Palace Square on December 22,

ironically from the same balcony that he denounced the

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 21 years earlier. As the speech progressed the crowd began to repeatedly chanted "Timisoara." When the crowd became uncontrollable, Ceausescu and his wife fled from the balcony of the Communist Party Headquarters. They escaped from the rooftop by helicopter moments before the rampaging crowd reached them. Days of bloody fighting between Ceausescu supporters and protesters, joined by the military, followed. The bloodshed culminated in the execution of Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, on December

25, 1989.

During uprisings in other bloc countries, protesting civilians attacked athletes as representatives of the regime. Revelations that the East German government 124 spent $590-million on sports in 1988 alone incited attacks on many well-known athletes.® The demonstrators caused several athletes to flee their homelands in fear of their lives.

Such events have demonstrated that sport in such countries has been identified in the popular consciousness . . . with privilege, coercion, hypocrisy, distorted priorities and, in the case of the non-Russian states and republics, with an alien, Soviet imposed institution.?

This was not so in Romania. Romanian athletes, except for a few isolated cases, did not receive the rewards offered to other Communist athletes. Romanians viewed their athletes more favorably than in other

Communist countries. Current president of the Romanian

Olympic Committee, Lia Manoliu, explained that Romanian athletes tolerated the same hardships as their countrymen under Ceausescu.

To be honest, the suffering endured by our people also affected the athletes. Things such as the buildings and the antiquated equipment, the lack of heat, insufficient or even unbalanced diets, the athletes’ lack of preparation for travelling and the life abroad, the lack of information, of books and magazines.®

Romanian Olympic pistol team trainer Tiron Costica added that athletes were, sometimes, scrutinized more than the average citizen. 125

Our athletes feel they have been persecuted by the system too. We didn’t get any special advantages. We would have been thrown in prison the next day if we said anything while out of the country.®

Many well known athletes battled on the front lines

of the uprising, playing a pivotal role. Some, including

Romanian rugby captains Radu Durbac and Florica Murariu,

gave their lives in the struggle.i® Others won adulation

for heroic stands against Ceausescu’s Securitate forces.

In one case, a group of Securitate officers were

"annihilated . . . by Romania’s Olympic and World

shooting champions Ion Corneliu, Sorin Babii and Gratian

Calota. The marksmen made their three-day stand in a military cemetery in Bucharest.

In Communist countries, branches of the government, universities and trade unions sponsored sports clubs.

The strongest club in every country was Dinamo. Its sponsors were the security forces in each country.

Mircea Petrescu, a former Romanian soccer player, felt that the association between the two was absolute. "I don’t think that those who play for Dinamo are villains, but I am convinced that, in view of public opinion, the club will be at risk."12 The connection, once desirable, was now a liability. 126

Immediately, proposals of aid came to Romania’s athletes from all areas of Europe. Italy offered

Romania’s soccer team free accommodations for the 1990

World Cup competition, "to allow the Romanian national soccer team to contest (the Cup) in the greatest tranquility."13 Yugoslavia invited Romanian athletes to train at its Adriatic training site, and France placed a one franc surcharge on rugby championship tickets to aid the Romanian rugby program.n

Other athletes chose different ways to shape the country. Los Angeles Olympic gold and silver medalist in the 800-meter and 1500-meter run, Diona Melente, was the most prominent athlete who chose to work from within for change. After addressing a crowd of over 30,000 she

received 80 percent of the vote in her native Bacau county for election to the National Assembly.is

As a new year, and a new decade, emerged, so came a

restructuring of values with the new governments of

Eastern Europe. Less was to be spent on sports, with an

even smaller percentage spent on high-level competitive

sports. Some athletes who benefited from the previous

policy saw the reality in the new philosophy.

'I think sports and the Olympic movement will now be placed in the proper order,’ [said] Sergei Beloglazov of the Soviet Union, a two- time Olympic wrestling gold medalist . . . 'I don’t think we will have a tremendous decline 127

(in the Olympics), but we have to strive for more even goals. Five medals more or less really doesn’t matter.’i*

This new trend concerned International Olympic

Committee president Samaranch. He saw the change in priorities as a potential danger to the Olympic movement.

They must be very careful not to destroy the sports of high competition. To build those teams is very, very difficult. We agree they must work for sports for all (people). But there is nothing against working in these two fields at the same time.i?

In response to this threat, Samaranch called for a meeting in Lausanne of sports representatives from the new East European regimes. The meeting, held on April

21, 1990, attempted to encourage the new emerging governments to continue their interest in the development of high level sports. "In the period of waiting for private financial support, financial help from the government for education and training remains indispensable,"i s

IOC assistance came in many forms besides pleas not to forget high-level sports. Romanian Olympic Committee president Lia Manoliu came back from the meeting in

Lausanne with "a vehicle and various indispensable machines (telefax, photocopying machine, modern typewricers, etc.)" all compliments of the lOC.i® But 128 what Romania actually needed was large-scale economic assistance. Taking a page from Ceausescu’s book, Manoliu turned to the West for financial support, this time to bolster sports.

We are still far from being in the same situation as other European countries. Nevertheless, it is clear that as large foreign companies begin to invest in Romania, under conditions which have changed at [the] international level, things will progress. We will be able to help these companies through our sports and benefit from their financial support in return.

Faced with the increased migration of coaches and athletes to the West in search of riches the Romanians quickly learned what had to be done to survive. In

September of 1991 it became clear how Romania decided to deal with the necessities of life without communism. At that time the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) investigated its president, and IOC executive board member, on charges of conflicts of interest. One of the charges was that Helmick represented Romania in several sporting and trade issues.

The inquiry revealed that Helmick officially registered as a foreign agent with the United States Department of

Justice to represent Romanian interests. In 1990 he received $75,000 129

. . . as first payment in an agreement to represent Romania in the USA. [The] deal contained an option for an additional $175,000 in 1991 and $250,000 in 1992 for as many as 700 hours of work in each year, but the option was not exercised.2 1

Faced with overwhelming evidence, Helmick resigned as

USOC president on September 18, 1991. Persistent pressure from additional disclosures ultimately took their toll on Helmick and he resigned from the IOC on

December 4, 1991.

The difficulty that Romanian sports faced following the revolution showed in the results from the 1992

Barcelona Olympic Games. Romania dropped from eighth in

Seoul to 16th place in Barcelona.22 Since Seoul, many of

Romania’s top athletes and coaches have either retired or emigrated to the West. This depletion of a strong sporting tradition is a set back for the future of

Romanian sports. The future remains uncertain for

Romania, in both politics and sports.

There were persistent rumors, shortly after the

December revolution, that the uprising was actually a coup orchestrated by former and current members of the

Ceausescu regime.

Many of the initial perceptions have changed; question marks have replaced certainties; what seemed clear has turned foggy, and what was foggy has turned impenetrable.23 130

The plotters were planning an overthrow and took advantage of the popular uprising to seize control. As time passed, and the new regime faced its own crises, it became apparent that the government was, in some respects, as repressive as Ceausescu’s.

Gradually, the old-line politicians prevailed, and, by the time of the 1990 elections, this category, which included a large number of former 'Ceausescuists’ . . . held the country in a firm grip politically.z*

The question now is, do those in charge really know what democracy is, or do they actually want to achieve democracy? The other emerging countries of Eastern

Europe, although faced with tremendous obstacles, are being much more successful than the Romanians. The one difference is that most of them had some semblance of democratic tradition before communism.

As for the future of Romania, an analogy can be drawn between the plight of Nadia Comaneci and that of her homeland. After her escape to the West, mystery and misunderstanding surrounded her every step. She was no

longer the innocent gymnast everyone remembered from her competitive days. Not knowing what to expect, or how to act on her own in a new world, she was brash, abrasive

and self-centered. But after she became accustomed to

her new surroundings, received sound advice and worked on 131 her image, success soon followed. She now enjoys lucrative endorsement contracts, participates in gymnastics exhibitions and the renewed respect of her admirers.

The same comparison can be made for Romania, where democracy is still an alien concept. Until the government stabilizes, and becomes more conducive to foreign investment, corporations will not be willing to expand into the Romanian market and governments will be hesitant to lend their support. Likewise, the Romanian

Olympic Committee and national sports federations, need to show stability or a viable "product," in order to entice necessary corporate sponsorship to ensure its survival.

NOTES

1. David Miller, Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of Juan Antonio Samaranch (London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1992), 130.

2. Lisa H. Albertson, ed., Seoul/Calgary 1988: The Official Publication of the U.S. Olympic Committee (Sandy, UT: Commemorative Publications, 1988) 242.

3. Ronald D. Bachman, ed., Romania: A Country Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), X X V . 132

4. Charles Cale, telephone interview with author, 2 March 1993.

5. Ernest Beck, "Fears over Comaneci kidnapping," The (London) Times. 30 November 1989, 1.

6. Randy Harvey, "Eastern Bloc Finding Sports Success Costly," The Los Angeles Times. 24 March 1990, Cl.

7. Jim Riordan, "Commentary: A Bright Future Shrouded in Mist, Sport in Eastern Europe," Journal of Sport History. Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), 70.

8. Noel Tamini, "Great Voices of Sport: Lia Manoliu," Olympic Review. May-June 1990, No. 271-272, 265.

9. Elliott Almond, "Romanian Olympic Shooter Downplays His Role in Revolution," The Los Angeles Times. 14 April 1990, CIS.

10. , "Belodedici receives the all-clear," The (London) Times. 1 January 1990, 28.

11. "Olympic champions in shoot-out," The (London) Times. 28 December 1989, 1.

12. Reuters, "Police link could doom soccer club," The (London) Times. 28 December 1989, 7.

13. "Police link could doom soccer club."

14. "Sports extend offers of aid to Romanians," The (London) Times. 29 December 1989, 36.

15. NBC Olympic Broadcast, Barcelona, Spain: 6 August 1992 .

16. Steve Woodward, "Communist reform alters focus," USA Today. 24 April 1990, 1C-2C.

17. Harvey.

18. "IOC Support For Countries In Transition," Olympic Review. May-June 1990, No. 271-272, 240.

19. Tamini, 260.

20. Tamini, 263. 133

21. "Business deals dravj attention," USA Today. 6 September 1991, 8C.

22. Lisa H. Albertson, éd., Barcelona/Albertville: The Official Publication of the U.S. Olympic Committee (Salt Lake City, UT: Commemorative Publications, 1992) 240.

23. Nestor Ratesh, Romania: The Entangled Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991) xxii.

24. Trond Gilberg, "Romanians and Democratic Values: Socialization After Communism," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Romania After Tyranny (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1992), 84. APPENDIX A

134 135

Charles G. Cale Interview March 2 & 8, 1993

Charles G. Cale, Los Angeles Olympic Organizing

Committee vice president in charge of sports, was interviewed, via telephone, on two separate occasions,

March 2 and 8, 1993, by the author. The following discussion questions were sent to Mr. Cale a few weeks prior to the interviews. The text of his comments follow on the subsequent pages.

1) What were the feelings of the LAOOC staff, specifically of the delegation to Romania, concerning the topic of Romania being pressured by the Soviets?

2) Did you know, through any of your conversations with Romanian contacts, of any Soviet pressure being exerted on Romania? What were your personal feelings about Romanians resistance to Soviet pressure, was it real, connived, or imagined?

3) Would you share your remembrances and thoughts of that trip to Romania, of its importance, and of what was accomplished? Did you meet with any U.S. governmental official, such as U.S. Ambassador David Funderburk, either immediately before, during or after the trip?

4) Mr. Jacki mentioned that the mission to Romania took on secretive qualities - namely being summoned to Mr. Ueberroth’s room in the early morning hours, given sealed orders not to be opened until in the air, etc. Would you comment on when it was decided to send a delegation to Romania, who was the Romanian contact, and what the objectives were.

5) What was the motivation for extending the special invitation to Nadia Comaneci? Would she had received such special treatment if the Soviets had decided to attend? How real were the chances of her being the final torch bearer? 136

CHARLES G. CALE INTERVIEW VICE PRESIDENT - LAOOC, SPORTS DIRECTOR MARCH 2 & 8, 1993, 6:00 pm (EST) PACIFIC PALISADES, CALIFORNIA

Everyone knew that Ceausescu was a maverick and that

they had been seeking most favored nation status (MFN).

We kept hearing rumors that the Romanians wanted to come.

The fact that they hadn’t announced it was certainly beneficial.

I got in there (Lausanne) about 8 o ’clock or 9 o ’clock at night and got called up to Peter’s room.

There was a bunch of people and Peter said it looks like we have a break through with the Romanians. We hope we

have an opportunity to go to Romania. He said, "I’d like

you to head-up our group. It’s a sports issue and w e ’d

like to keep it in sports and keep it as non-political

as possible." We didn’t know whether the trip was on or

not. He said, "This is what I would like to do. We have

to go through some sessions tomorrow and tomorrow we will

find out from Siperco what is going on." It was really kind of amusing because we tried to keep it low-key about

the whole thing. 137

Monday night Siperco said, "We have to go off and

talk and I will let you know what is going to happen."

Two or three or four of us, I can’t remember, went with

Siperco to some restaurant where we were trying to be

very, very, inconspicuous and incognito. After about

half the dinner about everybody from the Olympic

organization came trooping in to have dinner at the same place! My recollection then is that Siperco, I don’t know if he was waiting for a phone call, or had gotten a phone call, or he had gone out to get a phone call, but at that point he said that it looks like everything is all set and you can go tomorrow. Concerning the trip.

The impression I had at that point was that they clearly wanted to come, certainly the decision had not been made to not come, I wasn’t sure that the decision had been made to come, but at worst it was up in the air, and they wanted to talk hard on what was going to be

involved. So we finished the dinner and went home and packed.

We did not tell anybody where we were going. We all kind of snuck down because the other meetings were going on and went around the corner to a limousine that they had arranged for us. It sped to Zurich, and from Zurich we took a Hungarian flight. We changed planes in

Budapest. 138

One of the big questions was who was the new president. Haralambie Alexa. So we went in. We got there in the afternoon and went for a walk around the

lake at Snagov where the rowers trained. It was really beautiful. They made it very clear they wanted to come.

They told us that they were under tremendous pressure

from the Soviets not to come. But they felt from their relationship with the United States, from the fact that there were many Romanians here, that they felt that they had such a good relationship with the United States, that they wanted to do everything to make arrangements for coming.

Then it sort of got into a horse trading situation.

First thing they said was, "A major problem for us is that we would normally be coming with Aeroflot in a shared situation with the GDB, the Poles, etc. All of a sudden we don’t have hard currency and we want to come, but if you’re going to have us you’re going to have to get us there." This was one of the things we started negotiating on and what would we do and how would we get

them here. We talked in terms of the fact that if they could fly their plane in, what could we do as far as gas.

They said, "We could fly our athletes in but it would be

expensive for gas. But what is even more of a problem is what do we do with all of our boats and those kind of 139 things." We later made arrangements to charter a plane, essentially a cargo plane. We put together a charter and anyone of the european countries that wanted to take part could and the Romanians got their stuff on there. I think that the charter was separate (from the reported

$60,000 paid by the LAOOC to the Romanians.). As I recall, we told a number of (countries) that, "We will make arrangements for a charter. If you want to come aboard you pick up part of the cost and we would do a low ball figure on it to help cover the cost." It was a cooperative thing. The Romanian's may have paid something for the charter but my recollection is that no they didn’t.

They talked about the economic aspects (of Soviet pressure). I think the one thing that they felt helped

them a great deal was the fact that they did have petroleum. That gave them some kind of independence.

They couldn’t be completely shut off. It was also a hard

currency issue with them. I d on’t think that they ever

truly felt that the Soviets were going to invade them.

They said there was no way they were going to invade them

over this. But they did say, "They’ll make life awfully

difficult for us." They hated them, God did they hate

them. There was a great deal of pride from their

standpoint that they were standing up to them. They 140 really didn’t like them and they didn’t like being told what to do. They were fiercely independent and they talked about the days going back to the Romans and how they got their name. They were feeling very good but they wanted a lot of help and support. They weren’t sure what was going to happen.

We were there a couple of days and but somewhere there was an enormous amount of brandy and liquor. It was like in Patton where the Soviets were swigging down vodka. It was surrealistic in that sense. There was something akin to that as we were there very late in the evening. We had a lot of items on paper. Before we left

Peter said, "You make the deal, we want them there. We have to get them there. You do what you have to do to bring them."

In the course of all of this, very late in one of the evenings, I came up with the idea that we needed to bring Nadia Comaneci to the United States as part of everything. I said, "She was one of the greatest symbols of the Olympic Games. She is one of the greatest symbols of your country and we need to bring her to the United

States." The Secretary General was quite enthralled by it, but in the course of it they told us, "Well you know she’s caused us a lot of problems." At the time I did not know, but Peter later told me, that she was dating. 141

depending on what story you hear, that she was either

dating or held captive by Ceausescu’s son Nicu. He may

have learned that from Siperco. I did not know that at

the time. Their Olympic people were very excited and

wanted to know how we would do this. And we said we

would get her over. Once she was here we would pay her a

per diem and make her an official of our committee. This

whole thing just came into my head as we were talking one

evening. I think they thought it was a good idea but

they said, "She’s difficult for us." I went back about a

year later and I asked about her and they said, "She

causes us real difficulty." But the Nadia thing was just

one of those things that hung in my head very late at

night after much food and libation.

At that time there was a lot of speculation as to who will be the final torch bearer. Some of them were

right and some of them were wrong obviously. The thought was the pot was simmering and it’s quite exciting. I

told them at the meeting, "If your team comes remember

that when they walk into the stadium they will be treated

like no other Romanian team has ever been treated, or ever will be treated again." 142

Monday, 8 March 1993, 6:00 p.m.**************************

They (the Romanians) thought that was a pretty good

idea. Finally in the end we wrote out a hand written protocol, memorandum or understanding on what we were going to do. We divided up the whole thing. I was in charge of everything but Willy Reich was going to take care of dealing with the trans-shipment of equipment, shells, boats and that sort of thing. Mike Jacki was going to take care of international federations and doing what he could to help us in his role of executive director of the U.S. Gymnastics Federation. Agnes Mura was going to do her part in keeping in touch with the

Romanians since she spoke their language so she was assigned to deal with the day to day protocol of it all.

I had the overall responsibility of it all. So we filled this whole thing out and the rest of the people came back to the U.S.

We had been dealing with these people and there had been a change and we didn’t know who the new NOC president was. None of us had met the new NOC president.

He reportedly came out of the economic department and was very tight with Ceausescu. Now we didn’t know if all of this was true, or not, but we had never met him. By the time we left we still had never met him. But it was 143 decided by Ueberroth that I travel to a big Olympic function at the Sorbonne, in Paris, which was the 90th anniversary of Coubertin’s speech calling for the revival of the Olympic Games. He said, "Would you be our representative there?" And I said yes. Somehow it

turned out that Haralambie Alexa was going to go and as

it turned out we were introduced at the airport in

Bucharest. We flew on a Tarom plane to Paris together.

It was amazing, they even had a little first class

section. He and I tried to talk a little through a person on board who had worked with us and had a

smattering of english and acted as a translator. So that

is how I met Haralambie.

I think we had a discussion with Samaranch when we

got in Paris. I had a recollection that he had know that

I had been in Romania and so at one of the formal

functions where we were all at where we spoke. As I

recall he asked, "Did it go well? I am hearing reports

back that it went well." And I said that I think it did

and that we were very anxious and excited that all of

this was going to go off alright. He expressed great

pleasure at that because obviously that was a major

issue. He had been flying to the Soviet Union and going

places trying to shore things up so, I think, it was a 144 very positive for him to hear. I then, in turn, flew home.

In the next few weeks we had many telexes back and

forth. So we worked very hard. We worked with many people like the Tarom representative in New York and everything. One thing became very clear that the

Romanians, at this point, made the commitment to come.

There was a lot of question whether they really would

stick or walk at the end. We knew there was a lot of

question about it. Others said they can’t with all the

sanctions and all. But there was a lot of question and concern about what would happen. It was very clear at

that point, having been there and seen the pitiful

economic situation that they were faced with, that they

were trying to use leverage as much as they could

financially. I don’t know in the overall scheme of

things if we were over reaching or not, but we gave in on

an awful lot of things. A lot of it was nickel and dime

sort of things that really didn’t make a difference to us

or not. It was pretty important because at that juncture

they were clearly our showpiece as far as the breaking of

the boycott. They increased demands a little. There

were all kinds of odds and ends that came up. To give

you an example like, how many people would accompany

Nadia Comaneci. We said we would pay her way and then 145 all of a sudden she had to fly first class with her translator. Those kinds of things. In the overall scheme of things I don’t thing any of the demands were big, big ticket items. For them they were bigger items than they were for us.

Anybody that came that otherwise would have been included in the boycott we felt was positive from the viewpoint of the Games, we felt it would be positive for what the spectators would be seeing and it was positive for the competition. The Romanians had a lot of great athletes. It wasn’t just a numerical thing. The numerical thing was important to us but being able to say that we at least got someone from the eastern bloc then that lent a bit more credence to the Games. The State

Department, I am told, always said that they were unhappy because they felt we were trying to run our own foreign affairs department. Especially since we had all these connections with the eastern bloc that just normally didn’t happen.

One of the things that did come up that I know was of big interest was how to get the television signal there. They were going to pick it up from the eastern european consortium but they couldn’t because of the boycott. So it turns out that we eventually ran a signal with only a half a day delay. We did this through ABC 146 and I am pretty sure that some ABC, or freelance,

technicians went to the state owned radio and television

facilities in Bucharest to assist and augment in that whole thing.

We did a lot through the Friendship Fund and the

USOG. A lot of efforts were made to institute sports related activities. We made arrangements for boats to be sold and help get hard currency to the NOC. This way no one had to worry about paying to get things shipped back and they had the currency to buy new upgraded equipment.

I took a trip back to Romania in October of 1985, where I was treated rather warmly. It was absolutely incredible. I was literally treated like a hero. APPENDIX B

147 TEAT OF telegram 64BUCHARO 03378 tHtlSt ADPW52 SECRET PACE 01 BUCHAR 03378 080913Z ACTION SS-OO

INfO OCT-OO0CÎ-O0 copy-oi COPY-OI AOS-00ADSOO TNR-IO EUR’OO NSCE-00 SSO-OO SY-06 PA-01 MCT-03 VO-06 lNRE-00 CA-02 A-02 SYE-00 USIE-00 PRS-01 /032 W ...... 225326 080931Z /52 0 07I700Z JUN 64 FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST y Y f •-* -4 TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 7998 INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE Oc.pan; I. rj; 1 «iC DEC 3 0 1991 y -AMEMBASSY BERLIN ISfFl'CjCDB dC Dêlo AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST ! LLAr.U I I DECLASSIFY AMEMBASSY MOSCOW MR C u a . Only: AMEMBASSY PRAGUE EXCISE p() DuCLASCIFY EO CiUliona AMEMBASSY SOFIA M l d e n y IN PANT AMEMBASSY WARSAW ( ) DELETE Non-Rtisiipn.lv. Inlq Ta wuiority «o. FOIA Ex.muliùn: f i l ( I CLASSIFY M I ) S o r t I c OADR S £ C R £ T BUCHAREST 03378 PA pampUon*. I I DOWNQRAOE T3 to I ) 9 St { 1 C OADR E.G. I23S6: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL. KOLY, RO. UR SUBJECT: ROMANIAN DECISION TO ATTEFA) OLYMPIC GAMES; SOVIETS AND ROMANIANS MOVE CLOSER TOGETHER 1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT.) î . r OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST fXRlY AND CC MEMBER. PAID A CALL FRIDAY, JUNE 1. ON THE AMBASSADOR. ^MAIN POINTS DURING THE CALL WERE ;,rTHAT BOTA THE SOVIETS AND ROMANIANS AGREED THAT B/ ROMANIA GO TO THE OLYMPICS. (2) SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CEAUSESCU KEEPS AN UPRISING FROM OCCURING HERE IN SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 BUCHAR 03378 0809122 THE MIDST OF INCREASING TENSION, AND (3) CEAUSESCU CAVE THE CC SECRETARIAT INSTRUCTIONS IN JANUARY TO MOVE CLOSER TO MOSCOW. 4.1 ,^AID ROMANIA IS TO REMAIN A CHANNEL TO THE WEST ToESPITE ITS MOVEMENT TOWARD MOSCOW) AND HENCE THE SOVUTS EARLY ON AGREED TO THE ROMANIANS 00 GOING TO THE OLYMPICS; OTHERWISE (TME^ ROMANIANS) THEY WOULD HAVE HAD NO CREDIBILITY AT ALL IN THE WEST. TEXT OF TELEGRAM 84BUCHAR 00337a 303 5 ME SXIO SOVIET SUPPORT AND BACKING FOR CEAUSESCU KEEPS A SOLIDARITY TYPE OCCURENCE FROM HAPPENING IN ROMANIA. HE DESCRIBED THE REGIME AS TOTALLY CORRUPT. 6 i j>AIO ROMANIA TRIED A POLICY OF ORIENTING WESTWARD DURING 1983 TO GAIN ECONOMIC AID ANO POLITICAL SUPPORT. IT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL ANO TOGETHER WITH CEAUSESCU'S FEAR OF A SOLIDARITY TYPE SITUATION MERE, IT WAS A REASON FOR CLOSER ORIENTATION TOWARD MOSCOW BEGINNING JANUARY 1984. 7. COMMENT: THIS ROMANIAN OFFICIAL SEEMED GENUINELY TO BELIEVE WHAT HE WAS REPORTING. HE IS IN A POSITION TO KNOW. HE HAS. OVER THE PAST YEAR. INDICATED INCREASING LACK OF SYMPATHY WITH THE REGIME ANO CONSIDERS HIMSELF A FRIEND OF THE U.S. FUNDERBURK

SECRET

NNN

CO APPENDIX C

150 151

S } a / v ù ^

17 Sepcember 1992

Mr. Ruscy Wilson 4092 Virginia Circle East Columbus, OH 43213-2825 j jjj ggp 21 -jgg?

Dear Rusty:

In response to your letter of September 4th, I have the following comments to make:

The background to the telegrams (cables) you refer to is that virtually all cables from the embassy to the Department of State go out with the Ambassador's name at the end. This is true even if (which was usually the case) some other embassy officer drafted and wrote the cable. Typically the Ambassador would check off on (initial general approval of) the hundreds of cables that would be sent from the embassy weekly.

Some of the cables you mentioned and included were probably drafted by DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission, No. 2 person in embassy) Frank Corry (who had been the chief Political Officer). The involvement by the embassy's Commercial section is clear in the cable of June 5th 1984 to the USDOC (Department of Commerce). 14 May 1984. Tplygfam from Bucharest to SecState: Embassy and Department of State conventional wisdom (which later proved invalid) was behind the phrase "might be under considerable Soviet pressure." Personally I do not know of any actual pressure from the Soviets concerning the boycott. 17 May 1984. Telegram from Bucharest to SecState., Doc. //XI13: I do not know of any "fragmentary information" indicating "that Bucharest may be elaning against participant" (if it existed it may have been disinformation). This document was sent prior to my full understanding of the truth about Romania's plans for the Games! Romania always appeared to try to have it both ways : to convince the West she was acting independently (easy enough to do) and to give the signals of assurance to the Soviets that decisions were coordinated. If in fact— as I believe— decisions were coordinated with the Soviets on the Romanians going to the Olympics from the beginning, it was incumbent upon Romanian officials to project the "acting independently" policy to gain the maximum benefits of Western praise and aid for the action, (this is the essence of disinformation the GOR excelled in, as Pacepa has pointed out often) 152

%^a£it Aj^S ^ rtsrtw ' 17 September 1992

24 May 1984. Teleeram from Bucharest to SecState. Doc.tfXIAI: All I can do is refer you back to my comments on the first two cables. I know of no "i. astible Soviet pressure or inducements." I do not remember the specific documents, if any, upon which the cable drafter based his statements. To my knowledge there was no unusual response from the Department of State, thus indicating general concurrence. 5_Juræ 1984. Telegram from Bucharest to USDOC. Doc. #X189: I checked my diary to confirm that the May 29th meeting between US company representatives and Ceausescu was the usual meeting of "US-Romanian Economic Council members," i.e. a normal occurrence. Nothing new or concrete came out of this meeting, as US-Romanian economic exchanges were generally in decline (& less & less in our favor). FYI, the government (US-Romanian Economic Commission) as opposed to the private companies US-Romanian Economic Council, met in Washington, December 3-4, 1984, in Washington, DC. 7 June 1984. Telegram from Bucharest to SecState. Doc. //X199: I must say that I did receive similar information from a source, which even today, I am not at liberty to divulge. This document does refer to the conversation I had with Dr. Teodor Popescu (with whom I talked at length this summer in Bucharest).

I am hurriedly getting this off to you before I leave for a nationwide speaking tour. If I think of something else, I will of course let you know. I hope this helps. Good .

Yours sinqere

David^B-«^underburk, Ph.D. Former US Ambassador to Romania BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS :

Albertson, Lisa H ., ed., Barcelona/ Albertville: The Official Publication of the U.S. Olympic Committee. Salt Lake City, UT: Commemorative Publications, 1992.

______, ed., Seoul/Calgary 1988: The Official _ Publication of the U.S. Olympic Committee. Sandy, UT: Commemorative Publications, 1988.

Bachman, Ronald D ., ed., Romania: A Country Study. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991.

Behr, Edward, Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescus. New York: Villard Books, 1991 .

Booker, Christopher, The Games War: A Moscow Journal. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1981.

Brandt, Willy, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978.

Carter, Jimmy, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.

Ceausescu, Nicolae, Romania: On the Way of Completing Socialist Construction, vol. 3. Bucharest: Meridane Publishing House, 1969.

Dubcek, Alexander, Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek, New York: Kodansha International, 1993.

Espy, Richard, The Politics of the Olympic Games. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981.

153 154

Fischer-Galati, Stephen, 20th Century Rumania, second edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Funderburk, David B., Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists. 1981-85. Washington, DC: Selous Foundation Press, 1989.

Gardiner, E. Norman, Athletics of the Ancient World. London: Oxford University Press, 1930.

Gilberg, Trond, Nationalism & Communism: The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1990.

Golitsyn, Anatoliy, New Lies For Old. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1984.

Groussard, Serge, The Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes. The Olympics. 1972. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1975.

Kazan, Baruch A., Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, Inc., 1982.

Heitzer, Heinz, GDR: An Historical Outline. Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1981.

Henry, Bill, An Approved History of the Olympic Games. Sherman Oaks, CA: Alfred Publishing Co., Inc., 1984.

Hoberman, John, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

______, The Olympic Crisis: Sports, Politics and the Moral Order. New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Publishing C o ., Inc. , 1986 .

Hulme, Jr., Derrick L ., The Political Olympics: Moscow, Afghanistan, and the 1980 U.S. Boycott. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.

Killanin, Lord Michael, My Olympic Years. London: Seeker & Warburg, Ltd., 1983.

Kovrig, Bennett, Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe. New York: New York University Press, 1991. 155

MacAloon, John J ., This Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984.

Miller, David, Olympic Revolution: The Olympic Biography of Juan Antonio Samaranch. London: Pavilion Books Limited, 1992.

Nelson, Daniel N ., Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1988.

Pacepa, Ion Mihai, Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae & Elena Ceausescu’s Crimes. Lifestyle and Corruption. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1990.

Pakula, Hannah, The Last Romantic. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986.

Ratesh, Nestor, Romania: The Entangled Revolution. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991.

Reich, Kenneth, Making It Happen: Peter Ueberroth and the 1984 Olympics. Santa Barbara, CA: Capra Press, 1986.

Riordan, James, Sport in Soviet Society. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Schmidt, Helmut, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective. New York: Random House, Inc., 1989.

Shaikin, Bill, Sport and Politics: The Olympics and the Los Angeles Games. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988.

Shneidman, N. Norman, The Soviet Road to Olympus: Theory and Practice of Soviet Physical Culture and Sport. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1979.

Solovyov, Vladimir, and Elena Klepikova, Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage into the Kremlin. New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1983.

Sterling, Claire, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1981.

Ueberroth, Peter, Made in America: His Own Story. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985. 156

Wallechinsky, David, The Complete Book of the Olympics. 1992 edition. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991.

Walters, E . Garrison, The Other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988.

Young, David 0., The Olympic Myth of Greek Amateur Athletics. Chicago: Ares Publisher, 1984.

ARTICLES IN COMPILATIONS:

Gilgerg, Trond, "Romanians and Democratic Values: Socialization After Communism," In Romania After Tyranny. ed. Daniel N. Nelson, 83-94. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1992.

Krotee, March L ., "An Organizational Analysis of the International Olympic Committee," In The Olympic Games in Transition, eds. Jeffrey 0. Segrave and Donald Chu, 113-148. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Books, 1988.

King, Robert R . , "Romania: Projections," In United States-East European Relations in the 1990s. ed. Richard F. Starr, 193-205. New York: Crane Russak, 1989.

Lowe, Benjamin, "Educational Objectives for International Sports Studies," In Sport and International Relations, eds. Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin and Andrew Strenk, 572-585. Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co., 1978.

Renfrew, Jane M . , "Food for Athletes and Gods: A Classical Diet," In The Archeology of the Olympics: The Olympics and Other Festivals in Antiquity, ed. Wendy J. Raschke, 174-181. Madison, W I : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.

Riordan, James, "Soviet Sport and Soviet Foreign Policy," In Sport and International Relations, eds. Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin and Andrew Strenk, 316-346. Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co., 1978.

Robertson, Noel, "The Ancient Olympics: Sport, Spectacle, and Ritual," In The Olympic Games in Transition. 157

eds. Jeffrey 0. Segrave and Donald Chu, 11-25. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Books, 1988.

Strenk, Andrew, "Diplomats in Track Suits: Linkages Between Sports and Foreign Policy in the German Democratic Republic," In Sport and International Relations. eds. Benjamin Lowe, David B. Kanin and Andrew Strenk, 347-369. Champaign, IL: Stipes Publishing Co., 1978.

PUBLISHED PROCEEDINGS:

Palaeologos, Cleanthis, "First Thoughts and Acts for the Revival of the Olympic Games in Greece," In Report of the Sixth Summer Session of the International Olympic Academy. Olympia. Greece 1966. Athens: The Hellenic Olympic Committee, 1967, 121-125.

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Riordan, James, "Commentary: A Bright Future Shrouded in Mist, Sport in Eastern Europe," in Journal of Sport History. Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1990), 69-74.

Young, David C ., "Professionalism in Archaic and Classical Greek Athletics," Ancient World. 1983, #7, 45-51.

MAGAZINE ARTICLES:

Church, George J., et. al., "A Soviet Nyet To The Games," Time. 21 May 1984, 14-21.

Cullen, Robert B . , "A Time of Mutual Wait and See," Newsweek. 20 February 1984, 28.

Gammon, Clive, "A Game They May Remember," Sports Illustrated. 28 September 1981, 36-37.

Garrison, Lloyd, et. al., "Rise of an East Bloc Maverick: Rumania finds splendor in solitude," Time. 20 August 1984, 74-75.

"IOC Support For Countries In Transition," Olympic Review. No. 271-272, May-June 1990, 240. 158

Kirshenbaum, Jerry, éd., "SCORECARD: Is This Tour Necessary?," Sports Illustrated. 3 August 1981, 8.

Minard, Lawrence, "A Balkan despotism," Forbes, 11 May 1981, 131-136.

"The Romanian NOC Celebrates Its 75th Anniversary," Olympic Review. December 1990, No. 278, 543-544.

"Statement of the USSR National Olympic Committee," 8 May 1984, Sport in the USSR. 6/1984, 2.

"STOP PRESS: Lausanne - Tripartite Meeting," Olympic Review '84. No. 198. April 1984, frontispiece.

Tamini, Noel, "Great Voices of Sport: Lia Manoliu," Olympic Review, No. 271-272, May-June 1990, 262-264.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Almond, Elliot, "Romanian Olympic Shooter Downplays His Role in Revolution," The Los Angeles Times. 14 April 1990, C16.

Associated Press, "Andropov began reform, but impact is still unclear," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 10 February 1984, A 2 .

Associated Press, "Romanian Gym Team Claims Bias," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 15 May 1977.

Associated Press, "Typewriters under siege in Romania," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 1 May 1983, A4.

Barnes, John, "Olympic defections Inc.," The (London) Sunday Times. 22 April 1984, 11.

Beck, Ernest, "Fears over Comaneci kidnapping," The (London) Times, 30 November 1989, 1.

Binder, David, "The Old Guard in a New Government," The New York Times. 26 January 1990, All.

______, "Romanian Diplomat Pushed Into Exile in U.S.," The New York Times, 9 October 1990, AlO.

., "Rumania Accuses One of Its Diplomats of Spying," The New York Times. 20 August 1989, 19 159

Burns, Bart, "Protesters of Springboks Claim Victory: Rugby Match to be Played in Secret," The Washington Post. 19 September 1981, 37.

"Business deals draw attention," USA Today. 6 September 1991, 80.

Harvey, Randy, "Eastern Bloc Finding Sports Success Costly," The Los Angeles Times. 24 March 1990, Cl.

"Lighter of Flame Remains a Mystery," The New York Times. 27 July 1984, A15.

Lindsey, Robert, "Nadia Comaneci Still Glows As Image of 1976 Recede," The New York Times. 29 July 1984, S12.

The Los Angeles Times, 15 January 1983, II-l.

The Los Angeles Times. 8 February 1984, 1-3.

"Nadia’s Coach, 2 Others Defect To United States," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 8 April 1981.

The New York Times, 3 April 1984, II-9.

The New York Times. 14 April 1984, 1-21.

The New York Times. 25 April 1984, II-9.

"Olympic Champions in shoot-out," The (London) Times. 28 December 1989, 7.

Owen, Richard, "Ceausescu 'summoned to Moscow over Games," The (London) Times. 26 May 1984, 1.

______, "Chernenko refuses to separate cruise from other arms issues," The (London) Times. 5 June 1984, 6 .

Reich, Kenneth, "Defiant Romania to Send Team: Bucks Soviet Pressure to Join Games Boycott," The Los Angeles Times. 25 May 1984, 1.

______, "For Romanians, Gold Medals Came Second," The Los Angeles Times, 10 August 1984, 1-7.

, "LAOOC, IOC Helped to Pay for Romanians’ Trip," The Los Angeles Times. 31 July 1984, 1-3. 160

"Romanian Gymnast L.A. Guest: Nadia Comaneci, Legend of '76, Coming to Games," The Los Angeles Times. 21 July 1984, I-l.

, "Romanians on Peace Mission at L.A. Games," The Los Angeles Times. 23 June 1984, I-l.

Reuters, "Belodedici receives the all-clear," The (London) Times, 1 January 1990, 28.

______, "Police link could doom soccer club," The (London) Times. 28 December 1989, 7.

"Romania Delays Decision, Cuba Is Likely to Join Boycott Today," The Washington Post, 23 May 1984, C5 .

"Romanian assassin defects to West, receives asylum in France," The Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch. 1 September 1982, A6.

"Rumania Decides to Take Part in Games," The New York Times. 25 May 1984, A3.

"Rumanian Landsat Use Seen: Defense Dept. Opposes Sale," The New York Times. 28 June 1984, D24.

"Sports extend offers of aid to Romanians," The (London) Times. 29 December 1989, 36.

UPI, "Russians may boycott 1984 Olympic Games," Ohio State (University) Lantern. 29 January 1982, 9.

Vecsey, George, "Rumanians Walk the Tightrope," The New York Times. 23 July 1984, C6 .

Woodward, Steve, "Communist reform alters focus," USA Today. 24 April 1990, 1C-2C.

INTERVIEWS:

Charles G. Cale, Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee vice-president in charge of sports, telephone interview with author, March 2 and 8, 1993.

CORRESPONDENCE :

Funderburk, David B ., former U.S. Ambassador to Romania, letter to author, 17 September 1992. 161

Jacki, Mike, President of the United States Gymnastics Federation, letter to author, 25 January 1993.

Raceanu, Mircea, former Chief of North American Affairs Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letter to author, 6 January 1992.

Raceanu, Mircea, former Chief of North American Affairs Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letter to author, 10 February 1992.

Raceanu, Mircea, former Chief of North American Affairs Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letter to author, 27 April 1992.

Raceanu, Mircea, former Chief of North American Affairs Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letter to author, 22 September 1992.

U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS:

U.S. Department of State, Action Memorandum, 17 May 1984, subj., "Proposed letter from the President of the United States to President Ceausescu of Romania."

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research Current Analyses. Report 859-CA, 19 June 1984, "East European Highlights: May 1984."

U.S. Department of State, Information Memorandum from Richard Burt to Secretary of State, 26 July 1984, subj., "Romania: Ceausescu Looks to the U.S."

U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Charles Hill, Executive Secretary, to Robert C. McFarlane, White House, 18 May 1984, subj., "Proposed Letter from President Reagan to Romanian President on Olympic Participation."

U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Charles Hill, Executive Secretary, to Robert C. McFarlane, White House, 4 June 1984, subj., "Romania’s Decision to Attend the Olympics - The U.S. Response."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Berlin to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 9 May 1984, subj.: "Demarche On Olympics." 162

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 10 May 1984, subj.: "Bulgarians Join Olympic Boycott."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1984, subj.: "Romanian Olympics Participation."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1984, subj.: "Romanian Participation in Los Angeles Olympics."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1984, subj.: "Deputy PM on Hungarian Olympic Participation."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 14 May 1984, subj.: "Olympic Boycott -- Hungary is Playing for Time."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Berlin to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 15 May 1984, subj,: "GDR Treatment of Olympic Decision."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 17 May 1984, subj.: "More Hungarian Information on the Olympic Boycott."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 22 May 1984, subj.: "Olympic Boycott -- Information on Alternate Games and Hungarian Unhappiness."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Brazzaville, (Congo) Central African Republic, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 22 May 1984, subj.: "Congolese Resist Soviet Pressures to Boycott Olympics."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, 163

Washington, D.C., 24 May 1984, subj.: "Proposed Presidential Letter to Ceausescu."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Prague to Secretary of State, Washington, B.C., 30 May 1984, subj.: "Views of Olympic Boycott."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Prague to Secretary of State, Washington, B.C., 5 June 1984, subj.: "Romanian Decision to Attend Olympic Games."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Bucharest to Secretary of State, Washington, B.C., 7 June 1984, subj.: "Romanian decision to attend Olympic Games: Soviets and Romanians move closer together."

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta [currently Burkina Faso], to Secretary of State, Washington, B.C., 18 June 1984, subj.: "Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, Executive Bureau Meetings, June 16- 17 . "

U.S. Department of State, telegram from the American Embassy in Budapest to Secretary of State, Washington, B.C., 5 July 1984, subj.: "Soviet Boycott of Olympics -- Coordination Within the Warsaw Pact As Seen From Budapest."

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS:

"Ceausescu Awards Medals," FBIS Daily Report: Eastern Europe. Vol. II, No. 165, 23 August 1984, HI.

Leicand, Aurelia, "Romania and the Olympic Games," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Situation Report, Romania/9, 13 June 1984, 6.

Maier, Anneli, "Romanian Reaction to the CMEA Summit Meeting," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Situation Report, Romania/10, 17 July 1984, 13.

"Olympic Squad Sends Telegram to Ceausescu," FBIS Daily Report: Eastern Europe. Vol. II, No. 161, 17 August 1984, HI. 164

"Return Home of Olympic Team Downplayed," FBIS Daily Report: Eastern Europe. Vol. II, No. 160, 16 August 1984, HI.

"U.S. Threats to USSR," FBIS Daily Report: Eastern Europe. Vol. II, No. 091, 9 May 1984, D 2 .

Cyrus Vance, "Statement on Olympic Games," Department of State Current Policy. 9 February 1980, No. 137. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division.

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS:

Nadia *81. 1981 Romanian Gymnastics Team Tour Program

TELEVISION BROADCASTS:

"Nadia - From Romania With Love," CBS Television. 18 November 1976.

"Days of the Jackal," Prime Time Live - ABC News. Show #174, 3 January 1991.

Koppel, Ted, "The Koppel Report: Death Of A Dictator," ABC-Television. 2 April 1990.

"The Munich Tragedy," NBC Olympic Coverage, 4 August 1992.

NBC Olympic Coverage. 6 August 1992.

"1984 Olympics: Ban the Russians?," ABC News Nightline, Show #637, 18 October 1983.

"The Other Olympic Games," ABC News Closeup. Show #133, 28 December 1987.

"The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu," (London: British Broadcasting Company, 1991) Public Broadcasting System. 2 July 1991.