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James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the "Monster Plot": Their Impact on CIA Personnel and Operations

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James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the for 2013/04/05 A Fixation on Moles James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the "Monster Plot": Their Impact on CIA Personnel and Operations: This article is based almost against the West in general and entirely on classified studies against the United States, in and papers written by senior particular. He became con­ CIA offlcers who either worked vinced that the KGB had pene­ with James Angleton during his trated CIA at high levels and time as chiefof the CIA Coun­ that it had taken advantage of terintelllgence Staff or who these penetrations to success­ Angleton became worked in CIA Soviet opera­ fully run agent provocations convinced that the KGB tions at that time. These are against the Agency. In the end, '' paper files that were never Angleton took the position that had penetrated CIA at high levels and that they entered Into the CIA electronic virtually every major Soviet had taken advantage of records system and until defector or volunteer was a these penetrations to recently remained largely Inac­ KGB provocation. This position cessible. Supplementing these adversely affected CIA opera­ successfully run agent sources Is a collection oforal tional efforts against the Soviet provocations against the history interviews ofa number Union for almost two Agency.1 of the primaryplayers during decades-veterans of the period I . ' this period. L 1 say it paralyzed operations -and led to a pursuit of pene­ trations in CIA in the 1960s, a Introduction progr,am.codenamed HONE­ James Angleton was in charge TOL.i . '' of counterintelligence (CI) in CIA for 20 years, from 1954 to Buttressing Angleton's think­ 1974. In this position he ing was KGB defector Anatoliy wielded immense authority. Golitsyn. who from his defec­ particularly on operations tion in 1961 through at least against the Soviet Union, the 1965 provided analysis of KGB country's most Important Intel­ deception operations against ligence target at that time.! . the Western allies that meshed completely with Angleton's the­ Angleton became convinced ories. They called what they early in his career that the thought they saw the "Master Soviet Union's KGB for many Plan." Later, those who wit­ years had successfully run nessed the damage the theo- major deception operations All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as US Approved for Re lease: 2013/04/05 &ECRc~ The 'N?c:,ster Plot An Angleton Chronology designed to undermine the Angleton's experience as an West and eventually bring it OSS officer in London during Born: 9 December 1917 under Communist domination, WW II greatly affected his there had been a relentless, approach to CI for the rest of Birthplace: Boise, Idaho multi-pronged, world-wide his career. This is particularly Father: James Hugh Angleton, former attack involving the continuing true of his knowledge of the US Cavalry officer with service in use of carefully orchestrated successful British Double Cross Mexico. Worked for National Cash political, economic, military. sci ­ operation in which the British Register Company and was posted to entific and int~_llj~ence assets were able to identify virtually Italy earty in his son's life. and resources.!__ _j all German agents in England Mother: Mexican-born Carmen Mer­ a nd turn many back against the cedes Moreno. Angleton looked to Golitsyn to Germans. Those who couldn't help him unravel these pur­ be trusted as double agents Education: Prep school In England; ported KGB operations; he used college at Yale University (graduating were quietly arrested. This in bottom quarter of his class); Har­ Golitsyn as a sounding board to enabled the British not only to vard law school. weigh the bona fides of other neutralize German intelligence Soviet defectors and volun­ collection In England but also to Wortd War II Service: Drafted into teers; and, predictably, Gollt­ successfully run major decep­ Army In 1943; assigned to Office of syn found them all wanting. Strategic Services and assigned to tion op~r_!t_!}ons against the X-2 (counterintelligence) Angleton also arranged to give enemy.[ __ j Golitsyn access to the person­ Postwar: Assigned to Central Intelli­ nel files of CIA staff officers and In addition, many German gence Group In 1946. Hired by CIA in contractors to provide hirri the agents used wireless transmit­ 1948 to serve as head of operations in means to determine which were ters to communicate with their the Office of Special Operations. r· --~ From 1954 to 1974 was in charge of potential KGB moles.l ___ f case officers in Germany. a fact counterintelligence in CIA. that helped British code-break­ ,-., ing efforts. The British had ear­ Angleton is one of the most written James Angleton[ __ _) lier acquired a German Enigma about US intelligence figures ever; lit­ code machine and, via crypt­ erature about him, his life, and his Early Experiences and effects is treated in an essay in Stud­ Influences analysis (the ULTRA program). ies in Intelligence by CIA Chief Histo­ were eventually able to deci­ James Angleton's career and rian David Robarge. See "The James pher the bulk of German wire­ the future of counterintel1i­ Angleton Phenomenon 'Cunning Pas­ less communications. In later sages, Contrived Corridors': Wander­ gence In the US intelligence years Angleton often spoke Ing In the Angletonian Wilderness· In community began when he was about the success of Double Studies in Intelligence 53, No. 4 drafted into the Army in 1943 Cross and of the vital need to (December 2009). and assigned to the Office of have a communications intelli­ Strategic Services {OSS) . He This table is Unclassified. gence (COMIN'D capability as was placed in X-2 (CI). which part of any deception opera­ had only been established that tion.; j ries caused came to call It the year under the tutelage of the the "Monster Plot." ( __ ] United Kingdom's Secret Intel­ Another likely influence on ligence Service, MI6, Section V Angleton's thesis. which Angleton was the British prac­ (CI) . It was then that Angleton defined the plot, was that the tice of limiting to extremely few first met Harold "Kim" Philby United States and the Western people knowledge of the ULTRA as a liaison contact in MI6 world had been the targets of a and Double Cross programs and - Philby would reveal himself vast, complex conspiracy that giving the officers running in 1963 as a KGB spy. long originated in the Soviet Union these programs virtual veto after he had established a close more than 50 years previously. i . .. ~ authority over other British relationship with Angleton. I . _i To carry out this conspiracy, intelligence activities. Angleton 40 SEC~ Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2011) Approved for Release: 2013/04/05 for Release SECRE./ The ';/onster Plot used this approach as a model uty Director for Plans Richard known as the Monarchist Asso­ to establish similar, unique Helms reportedly looked on the ciation of Central Russia) and operational authorities when he Soviet Russia (SR) Division and presented it both inside and later ran CIA's Counterintelli­ CIS as equals in running opera­ outside of the Soviet Union as a gence Staff {CIS). tions against the Soviet Union. viable anti-Soviet organization. SR Division, however. had no As a result, most anti-Soviet In 1944 Angleton was trans­ insight into the activities of elements rallied to Trust and a ferred to Rome to work in X-2. CIS, but Angleton and his staff number of Western intelligence Within a year he became the had full access to SR opera­ services covertly supported it. unit's chief. Notably. in that tional files .. After maintaining this decep­ period. he renewed his acquain­ tion for several years. the tance with Philby, when the lat­ Indications ofMind set Cheka arrested the key leaders ter attended a meeting with Only a handful of written of Trust and destroyed the Angleton. hosted by MI6's chief records exist containing Angle· organization, effectively break­ in Rome. · ton's assessments of Soviet Ing the back of the anti-Soviet intelligence capabilities during forces. CounterlntellJgence in CIA the war and his early years as -Early Years CIA's senior CI officer. What lit­ The communist Polish govern­ Through the years immedi­ tle there is strongly suggests ment's intelligence service ately following the war. Angle­ that Angleton had become con­ (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa [UB]). ton retained his focus on CI vinced very early on that the with KGB assistance, success­ matters through the rapid evo­ KGB was an extremely capable fully carried out a similar lution of US central intelli­ organization and that it had deception operation from 1948 gence functions. He served in successfully penetrated West­ untill952.J The service infil­ the Central Intelligence Group ern governments at high levels trated and covertly took control and then In the new CIA's and for many years had suc­ of the Polish resistance organi­ Office of Special Operations. cessfully run strategic decep­ zation Freedom and Indepen­ where he also had foreign intel­ tion operations against the dence, known by its Polish ligence (FI) responsibilities. West.! initials WiN (Wolnosc i When OSO was organized into Niezawislosc). With a legacy as four staffs in 1949, he was One indicator of this is the a legitimate Polish anti-Nazi made the head of one. the Oper­ importance Angleton attached organization during WW II, ations Staff. which encom­ to the so-called Trust Opera­ WiN leaders obtained US anq i passed agent operations and tion as a forerunner of KGB British s~pporti defectors. • strategic deception operations. · for efforts to work Trust was a brilliantly success­ against Soviet domination of It wasn't until 1954, after the ful operation run in the early Poland.
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