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A Fixation on Moles James J. Angleton, Anatoliy Golitsyn, and the "Monster Plot": Their Impact on CIA Personnel and Operations:
This article is based almost against the West in general and entirely on classified studies against the United States, in and papers written by senior particular. He became con CIA offlcers who either worked vinced that the KGB had pene with James Angleton during his trated CIA at high levels and time as chiefof the CIA Coun that it had taken advantage of terintelllgence Staff or who these penetrations to success Angleton became worked in CIA Soviet opera fully run agent provocations convinced that the KGB tions at that time. These are against the Agency. In the end, '' paper files that were never Angleton took the position that had penetrated CIA at high levels and that they entered Into the CIA electronic virtually every major Soviet had taken advantage of records system and until defector or volunteer was a these penetrations to recently remained largely Inac KGB provocation. This position cessible. Supplementing these adversely affected CIA opera successfully run agent sources Is a collection oforal tional efforts against the Soviet provocations against the history interviews ofa number Union for almost two Agency.1 of the primaryplayers during decades-veterans of the period I . ' this period. L 1 say it paralyzed operations -and led to a pursuit of pene trations in CIA in the 1960s, a Introduction progr,am.codenamed HONE James Angleton was in charge TOL.i . '' of counterintelligence (CI) in CIA for 20 years, from 1954 to Buttressing Angleton's think 1974. In this position he ing was KGB defector Anatoliy wielded immense authority. Golitsyn. who from his defec particularly on operations tion in 1961 through at least against the Soviet Union, the 1965 provided analysis of KGB country's most Important Intel deception operations against ligence target at that time.! . the Western allies that meshed completely with Angleton's the Angleton became convinced ories. They called what they early in his career that the thought they saw the "Master Soviet Union's KGB for many Plan." Later, those who wit years had successfully run nessed the damage the theo- major deception operations
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as US Approved for Re lease: 2013/04/05 &ECRc~ The 'N?c:,ster Plot
An Angleton Chronology designed to undermine the Angleton's experience as an West and eventually bring it OSS officer in London during Born: 9 December 1917 under Communist domination, WW II greatly affected his there had been a relentless, approach to CI for the rest of Birthplace: Boise, Idaho multi-pronged, world-wide his career. This is particularly Father: James Hugh Angleton, former attack involving the continuing true of his knowledge of the US Cavalry officer with service in use of carefully orchestrated successful British Double Cross Mexico. Worked for National Cash political, economic, military. sci operation in which the British Register Company and was posted to entific and int~_llj~ence assets were able to identify virtually Italy earty in his son's life. and resources.!__ _j all German agents in England Mother: Mexican-born Carmen Mer a nd turn many back against the cedes Moreno. Angleton looked to Golitsyn to Germans. Those who couldn't help him unravel these pur be trusted as double agents Education: Prep school In England; ported KGB operations; he used college at Yale University (graduating were quietly arrested. This in bottom quarter of his class); Har Golitsyn as a sounding board to enabled the British not only to vard law school. weigh the bona fides of other neutralize German intelligence Soviet defectors and volun collection In England but also to Wortd War II Service: Drafted into teers; and, predictably, Gollt successfully run major decep Army In 1943; assigned to Office of syn found them all wanting. Strategic Services and assigned to tion op~r_!t_!}ons against the X-2 (counterintelligence) Angleton also arranged to give enemy.[ __ j Golitsyn access to the person Postwar: Assigned to Central Intelli nel files of CIA staff officers and In addition, many German gence Group In 1946. Hired by CIA in contractors to provide hirri the agents used wireless transmit 1948 to serve as head of operations in means to determine which were ters to communicate with their the Office of Special Operations. r· --~ From 1954 to 1974 was in charge of potential KGB moles.l ___ f case officers in Germany. a fact counterintelligence in CIA. that helped British code-break ,-., ing efforts. The British had ear Angleton is one of the most written James Angleton[ __ _) lier acquired a German Enigma about US intelligence figures ever; lit code machine and, via crypt erature about him, his life, and his Early Experiences and effects is treated in an essay in Stud Influences analysis (the ULTRA program). ies in Intelligence by CIA Chief Histo were eventually able to deci James Angleton's career and rian David Robarge. See "The James pher the bulk of German wire the future of counterintel1i Angleton Phenomenon 'Cunning Pas less communications. In later sages, Contrived Corridors': Wander gence In the US intelligence years Angleton often spoke Ing In the Angletonian Wilderness· In community began when he was about the success of Double Studies in Intelligence 53, No. 4 drafted into the Army in 1943 Cross and of the vital need to (December 2009). and assigned to the Office of have a communications intelli Strategic Services {OSS) . He This table is Unclassified. gence (COMIN'D capability as was placed in X-2 (CI). which part of any deception opera had only been established that tion.; j ries caused came to call It the year under the tutelage of the the "Monster Plot." ( __ ] United Kingdom's Secret Intel Another likely influence on ligence Service, MI6, Section V Angleton's thesis. which Angleton was the British prac (CI) . It was then that Angleton defined the plot, was that the tice of limiting to extremely few first met Harold "Kim" Philby United States and the Western people knowledge of the ULTRA as a liaison contact in MI6 world had been the targets of a and Double Cross programs and - Philby would reveal himself vast, complex conspiracy that giving the officers running in 1963 as a KGB spy. long originated in the Soviet Union these programs virtual veto after he had established a close more than 50 years previously. i . . .. ~ authority over other British relationship with Angleton. I . _i To carry out this conspiracy, intelligence activities. Angleton
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used this approach as a model uty Director for Plans Richard known as the Monarchist Asso to establish similar, unique Helms reportedly looked on the ciation of Central Russia) and operational authorities when he Soviet Russia (SR) Division and presented it both inside and later ran CIA's Counterintelli CIS as equals in running opera outside of the Soviet Union as a gence Staff {CIS). tions against the Soviet Union. viable anti-Soviet organization. SR Division, however. had no As a result, most anti-Soviet In 1944 Angleton was trans insight into the activities of elements rallied to Trust and a ferred to Rome to work in X-2. CIS, but Angleton and his staff number of Western intelligence Within a year he became the had full access to SR opera services covertly supported it. unit's chief. Notably. in that tional files .. After maintaining this decep period. he renewed his acquain tion for several years. the tance with Philby, when the lat Indications ofMind set Cheka arrested the key leaders ter attended a meeting with Only a handful of written of Trust and destroyed the Angleton. hosted by MI6's chief records exist containing Angle· organization, effectively break in Rome. · ton's assessments of Soviet Ing the back of the anti-Soviet intelligence capabilities during forces. CounterlntellJgence in CIA the war and his early years as -Early Years CIA's senior CI officer. What lit The communist Polish govern Through the years immedi tle there is strongly suggests ment's intelligence service ately following the war. Angle that Angleton had become con (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa [UB]). ton retained his focus on CI vinced very early on that the with KGB assistance, success matters through the rapid evo KGB was an extremely capable fully carried out a similar lution of US central intelli organization and that it had deception operation from 1948 gence functions. He served in successfully penetrated West untill952.J The service infil the Central Intelligence Group ern governments at high levels trated and covertly took control and then In the new CIA's and for many years had suc of the Polish resistance organi Office of Special Operations. cessfully run strategic decep zation Freedom and Indepen where he also had foreign intel tion operations against the dence, known by its Polish ligence (FI) responsibilities. West.! initials WiN (Wolnosc i When OSO was organized into Niezawislosc). With a legacy as four staffs in 1949, he was One indicator of this is the a legitimate Polish anti-Nazi made the head of one. the Oper importance Angleton attached organization during WW II, ations Staff. which encom to the so-called Trust Opera WiN leaders obtained US anq i passed agent operations and tion as a forerunner of KGB British s~pporti defectors. • strategic deception operations. · for efforts to work Trust was a brilliantly success against Soviet domination of It wasn't until 1954, after the ful operation run in the early Poland. In 1952, the key lead CIA organization was stabi 1920s by the KGB's predeces ers of WiN were suddenly rolled lized into the familiar func sor organization, the Cheka. up by the communist govern tional directorates, that against other Russians seeking ment, and the two major WiN Angleton took control of CIA's to overthrow the new Bolshe leaders publicly stated that CI function with the creation of vik government. In this opera they had been working with the CIS. At the time the staff's tion, the Cheka created or Americans and the British. It main task was to monitor oper infiltrated (which is still an was later learned that the two ational issues regarding Soviet unsettled argument) and ulti had been working for the UB and Soviet Bloc countries and, mately took control of the Trust from the beginning and that all to a lesser extent. Israel. Dep- opposition group (formerly of WiN's activities had been
Similar activity took place in Czechoslovakia: see Igor Lukes. ·KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation with an American Dimen sion. !948-1952: Studies in intelligence 55, No. I (March 2011). Approved for Release: 201 3/04/05 / 3ECR~ The Monster Plot
Angleton described a case of a KGB penetration of OSS and went on to say that the case typified the "hundreds of cases in the time Philby left a posting in X-2 which showed [Soviet] penetrations." Beirut. Lebanon, for the Soviet Union, he had become a close contact of Angleton. especially directed by the UB with KGB In 1977, Angleton told the during 1949- 51. when Philby support. The WiN operation interview. Cleve~and was in Washington. Records I team of . contributed to the creation of Cram1 ~nd show that during the period r_ he CIS and almost certainly Richa rd Drain of his experi Philby visited CIA 113 times. affected Angleton's assessment ences in Italy uncovering KGB 22 of which involv.ed meetings of K9E3. fllethods and capabili operational activities. He with Angleton. 5 i 1 !...... 1 ties.[ described a case of a KGB pene tration of OSS and went on to Many of these meetings Some of the best insights into say that the case typified the reportedly were followed by Angleton's early views on "hundreds of cases in X-2 which long lunches over cocktails, Soviet intelligence capabilities showed [Soviet) penetrations." and, given the fact that Angle are contained in two interviews Angleton then said that ton either didn't keep or later (one in July 1976 and another "through research analysis we destroyed any record of their in June 1977) he granted after re-created over 400 cases under discussions, it seems highly his forced retirement from CIA [Felix] Dzerzhinskiy, which con likely that there were many in December 197 4. f ... . -, '- · __ ._,i trolled all information from Russia to the Western allies for i .. :;:o~e;:~~:e;~~~.F~~J at In 1976. Angleton told his some 15 to 20 years; the Trust mterviewer, John Hart- a for and everything else." He con mer senior operations offi cluded that "we were so god •:er- about his experiences in ~------·· damned proliferated {sic) with 1------.. ------·-- -- ·--- ... -- --· .... --. ------' OSS. "when OSS found that the Communist Party members.· __j Philby was also read in on Soviets were involved In major ] the VENONA Project, which espionage operations against began to point suspicion on one t heir allies." "We were living in Angleton and Klm Phllby of the later-to-be-infamous a dream world," he recounted. It seems almost certain that Cambridge Five British KGB "We had (broken) Enigma and the revelation of Kim Philby's agents. Philby warned the two could track German agents, but duplicity in 1963 and the expe in most immediate danger of when Igor Gouzenko2 defected rience since 1951 of uncovering being unmasked and arranged he opened our eyes about the four other Soviet agents in the for the departure from Wash KGB Rote Kapelle a nd Rote service of the British had a pro ington of the one, Guy Burgess. D rei operations."J Angleton found effect on Angleton and who served in the British ch e n noted that VENONA had his views of the KGB's capabil embassy an.ds..hared Philby's ' i :;howed that the KG .B. had "per ity and his propensity to believe apartment. L _) torated" the OSS. t j it likely that CIA had also been penetrated at high levels. By
!Igor Couzenko was a GRU code clerk who defected In Canada In 1945 and passed the Canadians a treasure trove ofGRU documents 1hat -uncovered extensive Soviet espionage activities In Canada. :Rote Kapelte (Red Orchestra) was the German code name for a highly effective Soviet military espionage operation of some 118 agents which was run In German-controlled Europe during the war. Rote Drei refers to three GRU agents in Switzerland who were con llected to th" Rote Kapelle network and were rolled up in 1943. - iVENONA refers to the US cryptology effort during WW II to decipher the encoded messages Soviet intelligence officers used to ,·eport to Moscow on espionage activity In the United States. VENONA lndlcaced that the Soviets had around 300 assets of various kinds tnslde the US government. ' llnsert fo otnote suggesting readings on Phil by and the other British spies.
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Reflecting on the defection of Little beyond the 7 June Burgess in 1951. Angleton memo reveals what Angleton wrote a detailed memo to the thought about Philby during DD/P on 7 June in which he the extended period he was described the relationship of under investigation. The one Burgess to Philby and to him piece of evidence that does exist In January 1961 the volun self. s Angleton said he knew is Angleton's observation teer defected to CIA in West Burgess weH, having encoun recorded in I 956 that although Berlin. He was Michal Gole tered him regularly in many Philby may not have been a niewski, a senior UB officer social engagements with Philby. KGB mole, his dose association who had worked closely with He described Burgess as a with Burgess might have the KGB. Goleniewski's infor "close and old friend" of Philby. resulted in the Joss of secrets to mation led to the uncovering as He noted that Burgess was the KGB-essentially an echo KGB spies ofMI6 officer George present "at almost every social of the 1951 memo. There is no Blake. British Admiralty offi function which the Philby's record of Angleton's reactiont.o cer Harry Houghton, and West German intelligence officers gave for CIA personnel." He Philby's defection in 1963. 1 · wrote that throughout, Bur Heinz Felfe and Hans Clemens. gess had "always evidenced con In addition, he identified KGB siderable knowledge regarding Angleton 3' Early Views of illegals officers Gordon Lons the SIS and Philby's intelli kr~jorSorietAgentCases dale and the husband and wife gence activity." Angleton ended team Peter and Helen Kroger. the memo by writing, "If Sub Even before the defection of All in aU, Goleniewski provided ject [Burgess) has defected to Anatoliy Golitsyn. Angleton's CI information that was highly the Soviets he will be capable of conviction that the KGB was damaging to the KGB. Even so, supplying them with a great successfully running deception Angleton never accepted Gole number of secrets which involve operations against the US gov nfewski as a bona flde defector. CIA/SIS accords.*) '""i ~ ... J ernment was apparent in a number of major Soviet and Shortly after the defections of Soviet Bloc agent cases in the Oleg Penkovskiy[ .... 1 Burgess and Donald Maclean, late 1950s and early I960s.f J another member of the ring. In December 1960, GRU Col. CIA formally asked that Philby Oleg Penkovskiy volunteered to be withdrawn as MI6 represen a British businessman in Mos tative because of suspicions cow after several failed that he too was a KGB mole. attempts to contact CIA. The Philby returned to London and businessman informed MI6. resigned from MI6 in July 1951. which brought CIA into the Over the following years, the operation. Penkovskiy was run investigation of Philby contin jointly until his arrest in the ued, but not particularly autumn of 1962. As is well aggressively. As result, there known, Penkovskiy provided was no resolution of the case tremendously valuable informa unt!J 1963, when Philby tion, including information on defected to Moscow from Bei- ' Soviet intentions during the ""1 rut .. : Berlin Blockade in 1961 and during the Cuban Missile Cri-
'"'flJRie<•on did not actually sign the memo, hut it is almost certainly from hlm, given the way in which the relationships were
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Even in this most widely acknowledged and accepted of cases, Angleton came to have doubts, largely as a result of Golitsyn's much less been able to con influence. vince Stalin to reinstate ban ished KGB leaders. In any event, the Golitsyn's recount sis in 1962. Penkovskiy, who ily. He entered the Soviet army ing of these events is consis ;vas executed in May 1963, is in 1944 and was assigned to a tent with his later demands for .:onsidered to be one of the most military CI unit in 1945. After personal audiences with Presi valuable agents CIA ever han the war, his unit was trans dent John F. Kennedy and FBI dled.! ferred to the KGB, and In 1951 Director J. Edgar Hoover so Golitsyn moved to the CI that he could offer recommen Even in this most widely Department of the First Chief dations for changes in US pol .1cknowledged and accepted of Directorate (Anglo-American icy toward the USSR i I• cases, Angleton came to have operations) of the KGB, where doubts, largely as a result of he was involved in running Golitsyn was assigned to the Golitsyn's influence. At first, operations against the United Soviet embassy in Vienna from Angleton seemed to accept Pen States.! 1953 to 1955. He then spent kovskiy as legitimate, but after four years in a KGB school. Golitsyn was allowed to review Golitsyn claimed that In 1952 From there. in August 1960, he :.he Penkuvskiy files in the UK he and another KGB officer was sent to Helsinki. ; m 1963, Angleton came to secretly sent a letter to the accept Golitsyn's conclusion Central Committee of the Com On 15. December.196 L Golit; chat even Penkovskiy was a munist Party of the Soviet svn1 provocation.: Union (CPSU) outlining their criticism of the KGB and pro I posing changes. According to ·aefe!::ted.As tfie pre A.natolly Golltsyn! Golitsyn, he and his KGB com dpitatingj factor in his decision, patriot were then summoned to he cited disagreements with the Background and Early KGB resident in Helsinki. He Handllng a meeting with Joseph Stalin himself. There, Golitsyn person went on to say that he wanted No one played a greater role ally presented his recommenda to fight «the evil inherent in the than Anatoliy Golitsyn in tions. including the proposal KGB and the Soviet system." cementing Angleton's predispo that two former senior KGB and he asked for $10 million for sition to believe the KGB was officials who had been ban the effort. Golitsyn brought 23 aggressively. and successfully, ished from the service be KGB documents with him. The cunning provocations and major brought back to run the First only substantive CI lead he pro deception operations against CD. According to Golitsyn, vided up front was his "knowl US intelligence. A mid-level these proposals were accepted, edge of a penetration of CIA in KGB officer who defected in but they were not acted on by Germany." This turned out to be Helsinki. Finland. in December the time Stalin died the follow- the "Sashan lead. (See facing l961. Golitsyn offered "analy • I . mgyear.l page.) Unfortunately, Golitsyn :;;is" of the KGB and how it made this the cornerstone of his operated that ultimately led to It is not clear whether any hypothesis about multiple Angleton's belief in the Master independent corroboration of senior-level penetrations of Plan. It was an idea consistent this incident was ever obtained. CIA.; 'illith Angleton's OSS experi On the face of it, It seems ence and one he became totally highly unlikely that Golitsyn, Go1itsyn was basically cooper invested in. • at the time a 26-year-old junior ative until September 1962. He officer in the KGB. would have submitted to exhaustive Golitsyn was born in 1926 in gotten an audience with Stalin, debrieftngs by the CIA, FBI. rhe Ukraine of a humble fam- Approved for 2013/04/05
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Igor Orlov aka Sasha;
Golitsyn told debnefers that he knew of a "penetration of CIA who worked in Germany at least as early as 1953. • Golilsyn recalled that he had seen "Sasha's" true name, his date and place of birth, and the area in which his relatives or parents lived In the USSR He thought the name was Pollsh·soundlng and began with a "K" and ended with a "ski." Shown a list of names of CIA staff and con· tract employees with "Slavic" names, he immediately pointed to the name Klibanskl as Sasha's true name. Klibanski was the birth name of a CIA officer who had changed his name to Serge Peter Karlow. In part because of this Identification, Karlow became the !lrstlnnocent victim of Golitsyn's testimony. ·
Kartow had served In Germany In the late 1940s or early 1950s. The Kartow lead was turned over to the FBI, which mounted a full investigation. At the end of It, in 1963, the FBI concluded that Karlow was not identifiable with "Sasha: Nonetheless. reportedly at the urging of Angleton, the decision was made to pressure Karlow to resign, which he did. (Karlow was ultimately compensated for his forced resignation by a special act of Congress.)!
Meanwhile, in February 1964 Golitsyn provided additional information on the Sasha lead. This led to the firm identifiCation of an Igor Orlov as Sasha. Ortov hed worked for CIA-apparently as a contract agent-against a Russian emigre organization In Munich and had used the name Aleksandr Kopatskiy. (Sasha Is a common nickname for Aleksandr, and the last name Kopatskly fit Golitsyn's original description of the agent's surname.) However, by 1964, the case was moot Orlov had stopped working for CIA In 1961.: and the newly minted Defense any agent placed as high as a formation operation. Not long IntelHgence Agency (DIA). On country desk in CIA." . after, Golitsyn began to espouse the other hand Golitsyn was that position.; · very demanding and very much Golitsyn did provide leads to a prima donna from the begin other American agents of the Handllng Problems and ning. Although he never met KGB. but none of these was Early Theories of Soviet Kennedy or Hoover, at his insis new or timely. He identified Deception Operatlons tence he did meet twice with William Weisband as a KGB By September 1962 things Attorney General Robert Ken penetration of the US Army began to go south with Golit nedy and multiple times with Security Agency. but Weisband syn. At that point he "went on DCI John McCone (a total of 11 had already beeqidentifiedanrl, strike" and refused to be times starting in July 1962). arrested in 19501 · debriefed. He asked for another Golitsyn also demanded access meeting with McCone. getting to CIA and FBI files. At first., it in December 1962. At this his renuest was cfuniedJ ! meeting he began to elaborate on his theory of the existence of a KGB strategic deception pro gram. He stated that Khrush chev's de-Stalinization program was a myth and that the pur ported Soviet splits with China and Yugoslavia. as well as the During this period, Golitsyn Cuban Missile Crisis, were all made no claim to having infor deception operations-while mation regarding KGB penetra McCone might have been sym tions of CIA beyond Sasha. In Oddly, in light of his later con pathetic to the idea of strategic his early debrieflngs, he spiracy theories, in August deception. the last claim would asserted that Western intelli 1962, Golitsyn reportedly told have strained the credulity of gence was well penetrated by debriefers that the Sino-Soviet the DC I. who was one of the few the KGB, but he said nothing split was reaL However. tn dis to have expected to find Soviet about CIA. In fact, at one point cussing the matter with Golit missiles in Cuba. ' he said that he "excluded the syn. one of the debriefers possibility that the KGB had speculated on the possibility In February 1963 Golitsyn that the Sino-Soviet split might seemed to have given up help be a sophisticated Soviet disin- ing the United States and for Release: 201
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personnel and operational files).
• He would apply his KGB background and experience to analyze these. materials.
• He would combine his analy sis with what CIA or other Western intelligence services knew about the KGB and its operations.
• He would provide his analy sis and recommendations for action.:
Enter Yuriy Nosenko moved his family to the UK, sion of Hungary in I 956 was a Background and Flrst officially becoming a defector to deception operation intended to Contact the British. At first, he give the West the impression If a single event could have appeared to be content with that the Soviet Bloc was broken through Angleton's British handling. but he gradu divided. By this time Golitsyn mindset, it might have been the ally became disenchanted and was also arguing that Oleg Pen arrival on the scene in June l'eturned to the United States kovskiy, who had played such 1962 of KGB Capt. Yuriy in August. When he returned an important role in the Cuban Nosenko, who knew enough to he elected to live in New York crisis, was actually a KGB dou at least create doubts in Angle City rather than in the Wash ble agent. In addition, he postu ton's mind about the skill of ington area to have more pri lated that through the Trust Soviet intelligence. Instead, vacy and separation from CIA operation the KGB had been with the help of Golitsyn, the able to develop penetrations of chief of counterintelligence Western intelligence-even descended even more deepJy Golitsyn returned to find thought the Trust operation into Master Plan theology. [ James Angleton and CIS in full had ended in the mid-1920s.i control of his case. He was Nosenko volunteered his ser granted another meeting with Golitsyn also began to insist vices In Geneva that month, but McCone. In the session, Golit that he be accepted as an equal he would not defect to CIA until syn told the DCI that British by CIA and FBI, not as a Soviet January 1964. He embarked on Prime Minister Harold Wilson defector, and be given full an ordeal tte could never have was a KGB agent and he access to appropriate CIA and imagined. [ repeated his claim that the FBI files to uncover high-level Sino-Soviet split was a disinfor KGB penetrations of the US Nosenko was born in October mation operation. He went on government and other Western 1927 in the Ukraine. His father to stipulate that the same was inteiJigence services. He out had been a minister of ship true to some degree in the pub lined his plan of action for building, a member of the Cen liC relationships of the USSR defeating the KGB as follows: tral Committee of the CPSU. with Albania, Romania, and and a deputy to the Supreme Yugoslavia. Finally. Golitsyn • He should have total access to Soviet of the USSR. After sev insisted that the Soviet lnva- relevant materials (i.e., CIA eral career false starts, Nosenko, through the influence
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of his father. landed a job in Tennent "Pete". Bagley was the arrest and execution in 1953 with the KGB. He was one of two case officers who 1959 ofGRU Col. Petr Popov. given a job in the First Depart debriefed Nosenko in Geneva. who had volunteered to CIA in ment of the Second CD (inter Bagley reportedly believed 1953 in Vienna. The two rea nal counterintelligence) to work Nosenko was a legitimate vol soned that the same penetra against the US target, an unteer until Angleton, using tion would have told the KGB assignment he held until his information from Golitsyn, con that Nosenko had contacted defection. Despite a reputation vinced him that Nosenko had to CIA in 1962, thus, the argu for drinking and carousing, be a provocation. 7 ment went. the KGB wouldn't Nosenko was promoted to cap have let Nosenko travel out of tain in 1959. Angleton arranged to have the USSR again unless he was Nosenko's reporting passed to under its control.i In June 1962, Nosenko was Golitsyn almost immediately. dispatched to Geneva as the Golitsyn quickly suggested that Another factor that contrib security officer for a Soviet dis Nosenko's appearance was uted to their judgment was armament delegation. There he somehow part of a scheme to Nosenko's reporting on the so contacted a State Department arrange a "kidnapping [presum called Cherepanov Papers. In officer. who arranged a meeting ably of a CIA case officer] to November 1963. an official with a CIA case officer. arrange an exchange for me" or working for the Soviet interna Nosenko said he needed $250 intended to divert attention tional book distribution agency (the amounts vary by account) from Golitsyn's leads by "throw passed some l 03 pages of cop in Swiss francs to replace ing up false scents." Angleton ies or summaries of secret and money that had been stolen told John Hart in 1976 that he top secret KGB documents to from him (presumably official and Golitsyn had immediately an American couple from a US funds lost to a prostitute or to seen a provocation in Nosenko's university who were in the alcohol). In return, Nosenko defection in Geneva during a Soviet Union to buy books. CIA provided what was described as second assignment there in later learned the official was "two pieces of good CI Informa January 1964. Angleton said it Alexandr Cherepanov, a former tion.· One piece identified a was not credible that Nosenko KGB Second CD officer who KGB penetration of the British would volunteer and provide had worked against the Ameri Admiralty named William Vas valuable CI information simply can target in Moscow before saiL Thi~ item nromoted a cable for "getting drunk and needing being forced out of the KGB in in which reported, $300."! : 1961.: "Subject conclusively proved his bona fides." Nosenko insisted at Although SR Division was for Cherepanov had instructed first that he was neither will mally responsible for handling the couple to give the papers to ing to work in place for CIA nor Nosenko, Angleton-as suspi the US embassy. which they interested in continuing a rela cious of Nosenko as he was at did. Unfortunately, the charge tionship. He soon relented. but the beginning-remained heav d'affaires decided the act was a he insisted that he not have ily involved. and he brought Soviet provocation and ordered any contact with the Agency in Division Chief David Murphy the documents turned over to Moscow. He ultimately returned around to his point of view. the Soviet Ministry of Foreign to the Russian capital with the Contributing to Angleton's Affairs. Photocopies of the Soviet delegation. argument (and Golitsyn's) was papers, however, were made by the conviction that a CIA pene CIA's station chief before they tration had been responsible for were sent to the ministry. The
1 That he ever believed in Nosenko as a defector is an assertion Bagley vigorously denied in his book Spy Wars: Moles. Mysteries, and Deadly Games (New Haven. CN: University Press. 2007). Approved for Release: 2013/04/05
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Following the polygraphs, Nosenko was isolated while Golitsyn served as a behind-the-scenes adviser for his interrogation by Nosenko's ordeal began in others. April 1964, when he was administered his first poly graph; five more would eventu documents contained very Nosenko and Lee Harvey ally follow. The polygrapher detailed and valuable informa Oswald said he was told ahead of time ::ion about the KGB's opera Nosenko's bona fides were of that Nosenko was a provoca dons against the US embassy particularly critical importance tion and that the purpose of the and station in Moscow. Asked when he defected because of testing was to break his story. dbout the affair after he information he offered in the Who was responsible for this defected. Nosenko said he had wake of the assassination of instruction is not entirely clear. been directly involved in the President Kennedy in Novem Angleton insisted later that it KGB investigation after the ber 1963. Nosenko claimed that was SR Division Chief Mur ·~mbassy returned the materi· he was responsible for KGB phy's idea. Angleton said he aJs to the foreign ministry. handling of Lee Harvey Oswald would first have heard Nosenko According to Nosenko. when Oswald received political out and looked for inconsisten Cherepanov was a legitimate asylum in the Soviet Union in cies. Reviews of the polygraph volunteer and the materials he 1959. Nosenko said the KGB charts years later would show provided genuine. He went on never trusted Oswald and had that Nosenko had not shown 10 explain that Cherepanov had sent him to Minsk, where he deception in response to a num IJeen arrested and executed./ labored In a factory. to keep him ber of key questions-though he isolated. While Oswald was in was accused of deception in all Angleton and Golitsyn would Minsk, Nosenko claimed, the his answers. Nosenko did lie l1ave none of it. Angleton told KGB had no contact with him· about some things, his KGB John Hart that he believed the and was. in fact, pleased when rank and other relatively minor :\losenko defection was, in Oswald Insisted on returning to issues, for example; other state effect, a result of the the United States.• · .. ments that had been Judged to Cherepanov case. The docu be lies turned out to have been ment delivery to the US Nosenko stated categorically the prodt~ct of poor transla- embassy. he held, had been an that the KGB had not recruited tions. · effort to establish a bogus line Oswald and was not involved in of reporting from Moscow to US the Kennedy assassination. Following the polygraphs, 1ntelligence that had failed in Given Angleton's conviction Nosenko was isolated while Soviet eyes because the docu that Nosenko was a provoca Golitsyn served as a behind ments were returned (and pre tion. it followed in his mind the-scenes adviser for his inter sumably not believed by US that Nosenko's claims could not rogation by others. mtelligence). In this hypothe be taken at face value. The sis, Nosenko's mission fit in as then-deputy director for plans, an attempt to carry on the Richard Helms, later was Golitsyn and Angleton's deception in another way. Years quoted as saying that it was Fantasies Grow · · later, an exhaustive CIA review because of the importance of GoJitsyn outlined hisjudg of all reporting on Cherepanov verifYing or disproving ments on Nosenko in a memo indicated that without ques Nosenko's apparent knowledge randum Angleton sent to tion Cherepanov had been a that he and DCI McCone McCone in July 1964. In it legitimate volunteer. approved having Nosenko kept Angleton quoted Golitsyn as in isolation and interrogated for asserting that Nosenko was a more than three years. 1 • KGB provocation sent out "for the salvage and protection of very sensitive KGB penetra- 201 I sek:Rell, The Monster Plot
tions In the State Department they would automatically be Golitsyn contended that the and CIA itself; dlsinforma- exposed to the KGB by these KGB had sent out multiple tion ... regarding Soviet intelli penetrations and would eventu provocation agents to carry out gence and security ally come under KGB control. this plan. Further, such provo organization, operations and cations could not be successful potential: and the physicalllq· unless there were penetrations uidation of Golitsyn himself.· In To operate thus and to man of the target services to provide this memorandum Angleton age CIA penetrations, Bagley feedback on the effect of the stated that Golitsyn "wanted to would later explain, required a efforts. Thus, it was not a ques work closely with the Agency, highly secret KG? element tion of whether the KGB had the State Department and the independent of the known First penetrated CIA but rather of FBI" to identify and neutralize and Second Chief Directorates. identifying the penetrations KGB penetrations and provoca This would have be run by a that were certain to exist.) teurs. To do so, Golitsyn "made KGB deputy chairman. In order a strong appeal for access to the to support and protect Soviet In April 1966, Angleton files and case materials on our penetrations, KGB and GRU offered a window on Golitsyn's agents and on our personnel provocations would be dis logic in a presentation he made engaged in operations against patched to volunteer to CIA to his officers after he and the USSR." Angleton strongly with information designed to Golitsyn returned from a trip to supported Golitsyn's requesti cover the penetrations. Nosenko Europe. Angleton discussed I. was one such provocation, the how much emphasis Golitsyn In October 1964, Golitsyn was analysis held, and thus it stood had put on the Trust operation granted another meeting with to reason that any KGB or GRU and how it had served as a McCone. In this meeting Golit volunteer who verified model for Shelepin's plans for syn for the first time named Nosenko's bona fides was by strategic deception operations five CIA staff employees as definition just another provoca in the future. (Angleton's KGB moles. Golitsyn also told tion. Since Golitsyn was the review of the Trust operations McCone that "there could well only KGB defector to report of the 1920s consumes two full be 30 penetrations of CIA." At otherwise, he was the only KGB pages of a 24-page transcript of Golitsyn's request, personnel ·source telling the truth.! the meeting.) Angleton went on and related operational files on to stress the importance of these CIA employees were Golitsyn's analysis flowed COMINT as an essential part of passed to hifllSOthat he could from a 1959 presentation by the feedback loop in the British pursue leads. i then-new KGB Director Alexan Double Cross operation. In this der Shelepln In which Shelepln case, the British ability to read By this point, Angleton's laid out an initiative to politi German communications with acceptance of the Master Plan, cally attack the West through German agents in the UK supported by Golltsyn's analy KGB dlsinformation opera allowed the British to manipu sis, had matured, and Angleton tions. (Another source had late their agents and feed and his CIS acolytes had, in reported similar information deception information back to effect, come to see the KGB as previously.) From this, Golitsyn the Germans with the assur "1 0 feet tall," head and shoul reasoned that a super-secret, ance that the agents were ders ahead of CIA in the intelli powerful dislnformation depart· transmitting what the British gence profession. This, in turn. ment had been created to carry wanted the Germans to get. In led Angleton to conclude that out these policies. Also created, the case of the KGB, Angleton no CIA operation against the he suggested, was a super argued. it was the presumed USSR could be valid because secret COMINTERN organiza penetrations of CIA that pro CIA had been penetrated and tion that included as members. vided the KGB its equivalent of that US intelllgence could not among others, Nikita Khrush- COMINT.· ' 1 recruit any Soviets because chev and Che Guevara. • Approved for 2013/04/05
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In this discussion, Angleton that of Yuriy Klotkov, a KGB Dlmltrly Pofyakov (aka repeated arguments he made officer who defected to the Brit TOPHAT/SCOTCH) dsewhere that the Sino-Soviet ish in 1963. Both were sent to ~;plit was a KGB deception, as wmutilate" Golitsyn's informa Dimitri Polyakov was a GRU colonel were the purported differences tion about KGB penetrations. serving in the Soviet UN Mission in between the USSR and East New Yor1c when he was recruited by ern Bloc countries "such as the FBI in January 1962. He wort
' (U) The name ls a compound of Hoover and Anatolly. The FBI quit the project In February 1965 after concluding that Golitsyn was unre~ liable. for 2013/04/05
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(see page 45) were based not on Aleksey Kulak . (aka FEDORAIBOURBON)i : sensitive information he had acquired as a KGB officer but Aleksey Kulak was a KGB science from postulations based on his and technology officer assigned to knowledge of KGB modus ope the Soviet UN Mission in New York randi and his review of CIA at the same time as Polyakov. Kulak volunteered to the FBI in 1962 and personnel and operational files. was run by the Bureau in New York Moreover, in view of the fact from 1962 to 1967 and again, when that upon his defection, Golit he returned to New York, from 1971 syn had claimed to be unaware to 1976. Kulak was an extremely of any penetration of CIA productive source. and the F61 was beyond Sasha, it seems reason convinced of his credibility. able to speculate that Angle From almost the very beginning of ton's own predilections about !he case, however, Angleton viewed KGB deception operations and Kulak as a KGB provocation. In penetrations were the founda~ 1978 Edward Jay Epstein published No information was ever Legend: The Secret World of Lee tion of Golitsyn's assertions. Harvey Oswald, in which Epstein developed to support the case described Kulak's relationship with against Kovich, and the FBI the FBI In some detail, using infor HONETOL Victims i formally concluded there was mation that most likely was leaked Golitsyn and Angleton's con no basis for an investigation. to Epstein by a former FBI deputy voluted logic and tortuous rea Nonetheless. Angleton's accusa director, who shared much of Angle tions put a freeze on Kovich's ton's analysis. Nonetheless, Kulak soning are apparent in the was never arrested, and reportedly cases they made against the career. Ultimately a special act died of natural causes around 1986. suspects. of Congress compensated l Kovich's family. I Richard Kovich was an SR Division case officer. Like all of had served in Berlin in the late Golitsyn's suspects. he had 1950s. served in Berlin in the late 1950s. Golitsyn's circumstan Throughout the life of the tial case against Kovich grew HONETOL investigations, out of his search through CIA Golitsyn Insisted that he was operational files for leads to 100 pfrrPnt rnnvinrPd that, Sasha. who he had come almost Orlov.: from the begin nina to suspect Kovich, andi ;were KGB was lllor Orlovi. agents. but he vacillated about Murphy. GoHtsyn also contin ued strongly to suggest there had been or still were other KGB moles in CIA and that the penetrations went back to 1950. In the end, the FBI agreed about Orlov but dismissed the other claims. '
Remarkably and tragically, all of Golitsyn's "leads" to KGB moles in CIA except for Orlov for 201
SEI::RET The Monster Plot
Despite the fact that Murphy had been cleared, Angleton con tinued a distrust of him. vices now working against the USSR. principally CIA." SB Division was also on record in 1966 as strongly supporting the thesis that Nosenko was a prov ocation and believing that at least 12 other "Soviet intelli gence cooptees or volunteers" were the same. ,
Despite the fact that Murphy had been cleared, Angleton con tinued a distrust of him that Davld Murphy was chief of may have precipitat~ thP r:T SR Division when Golitsyn chiefs' fall from c I~I. ' defected. Golitsyn said he sus pected Murphy "might be a KGB agent.~ apparently par tiaiiy out of pique that Murphy would not give Golitsyn access to certain CIA operational files. Golitsyn had nothing but specu lation to support his thesis. The FBI determined in 1965 that there was no reason to launch an investigation of Murphy. In 1970, a thorough review of Murphy's background and oper ational history conducted by Angleton's own Counterintelli gence Staff cleared him. '
Ironically Murphy had been a Hien-newDCI convert to the AngJeton-Golit William Colf5Y, Who ordered syn theology. As late as 1967. another complete and vain SB Division under his leader rev lew of Murphy's file. This ship produced a 125-page study incident was apparently the entitled "The Soviet Penchant final straw for Colby, who for Provocation." which dis shortly thereafter forced Angle- • l cussed early Tsarist provoca ton to ret1re. J tion operations as well as the Trust and WiN operations and In addition to those named concluded that "Soviet provoca above, reportedly "scores~ of tion ... always involved penetra CIA officers had their files tion of the staff and/or agent reviewed as a result of the sus networks of the opposition." It pici~ns of Golitsyn and Angle went on to state, "The targets of ton.; most important provocations today are the intelligence ser- SECRET: rhe Monster Plot .
Nosenko's Ordeal!
By the summer of 1964. Nosenko's situation had dramatically worsened. He was held a virtual prisoner In the Washington area While continuous efforts were made to convince him to •confess" his KGB role. In August 1965, Nosenko was moved to ;where he remained until October 1967 In near totallsolatlon.l
In December 1965 the first protest of his treatment came from senior SB Division Reports Officer Leonard McCoy, who had been given access to Nosenko materials. concluded that Nosenko was a valid defector. McCoy then wrote a 31-page paper In which he detailed the unique value of the Cl information Nosenko had provided, which stood in contrast to many of Golitsyn's vague leads. He also strongly attacked !he analysis by Which Nosenko had been judged. SR Division Chief Murphy rejected McCoy's paper. but McCoy jumped the chain of command and in April 1967 sent(lmemo directly to OCI Helms making his case that Nosenko was a valid defector.[ ...
!n October 1967, based on the recommendation of OOCI Adm. Rufus Taylor (and possibly as a result of McCoy's memo to the OCI), Nosenko was turned over to the Office of Security (OS) for handling. OS immediately removed him from solitary confinement and through August 1968 conducted its own polygraph examinations, which concluded that Nosenko had been substantially truthful on all relevant ques tions. In September 1968 the FBI concluded after its own interrogations of Nosenko and collateral inquiries that there were no Indications of deception by Nosenko and no good reason to doubt his bona fides.[ . · -i
Finally, in October 1968. OS officer Bruce Solie wrote a memorandum which con cluded that Nosenko was the person he claimed to be, that he served in the KGB In the positions that he claimed to serve in, that he was not dispatched by the KGB, and that previous inconsistencies In his debriefings were not of material signifi... cance. T\te.OSraoort went.oo.. b::udta voluminous..valuabla Cl information Nosenko QfQ\IidedJ
Angleton never accepted Nosenko's rehabilitation. In January 1969 he continued to Insist that Nosenko was a provocation, since to judge otherwise would have repu diated Golitsyn, ·a proven reliable KGB source:; j
Nosenko died in August 2008. According to his obituary in the Washington Post, he had lived under an assumed name. The obituary asserted that In 1975 he found Angleton's telephone number and called him; the conversation apparently led nowhere.f ·~ 1 t---·~-J Golitsyn's Slide into Irrelevance[
After his involvement In the HONETOL Investigations, Gofitsyn became increas Ingly removed from operational activities. In July 1965. the FBI broke off all contact with him. From then on, Golitsyn became immersed in writing books with his anal ysis of Soviet government behavior and goals and what he thought the West needed to do to defend itself. For the most part, he withdrew from contact with CIA or other intelligence services. He has produced two books that maintain his conspir acy and deception theories. A Facebook page is kept In his name; 38 people have "liked" the page as of the end of 2011.' ·· · for 201 SECREt Th~ Monster Plot
Concluding Remarks: In addition, counterintelli gence units should contain a CIA's operations against the mix of long-time staff and per critically important Soviet tar sonnel who rotate in and out get were adversely affected in from other parts of an intelli the 1960s and 1970s as the gence organization. Continuity result of Angleton's insistence at the working level is invalu that the KGB controlled virtu able. but at the senior level ally every source that CIA han fresh eyes are periodically dled. This made difficult~even needed to ensure balance. i paralyzed, said veterans of period-efforts to recruit Soviet Another, perhaps rather obvi agents and diminished CIA ous, lesson is that no defector. ability to produce intelligence no matter how valuable and from human sources on the sub loyal he may seem, should ever ject of most importance to US I ] be allowed access to organiza policymakers. • 1 tional information beyond that which the defector himself There are a number of les reported.[ l sons that can be derived from this history. The first is that no Finally, this history illus counterintelligence officer trates the fallacy of making should be allowed to have firm intelligence judgments unfettered authority in an based solely on analytic reason intelligence organization. Coun ing and In the absence of hard terintelligence is a vitally facts, a lesson that we only Important part of the Intelli recently relearned when it was gence business, and it is posited in 2002 ,without factual ignored at great peril. But in support that Saddam Hussein the end it should only be part of had an active weapons of mass a process of oper('ltional deci destruction program. ! 1 sion making.: •••
Bibliography and Suggested Readings
The primary sources used in this paper are major studies (marked below with an asterisk) that were compiled following the retirement of Angleton. These studies were written by senior CIA officers who were seeking to document and explain Angleton's tenure as C/CIS as well as the infamous "Monster Plot" theory and Its ramifications for CIA. These studies, and the memoranda cited below, were stored as paper files and never entered into the official NCS record system. All are classified~
•rhe Monster Plot: Counterintelligence in the Case of Yuriy lvanovich Nosenkof pecember 1976) •Anatolly Michaylovich Golitsyn- Review, CIS Study No. 3 (Bronson Tweedy- March 1976}
Sl in Intelligence 55, for 2013/04/05 SECREl ·. The Monster Plot
Some Observations on the Nosenko Case l December 1965) Yuliy lvanovlch Nosenko .October 1968)
Memorandum: "The OSWALD Cas& -Section I" (tmdated/unsigned -description of polygraph administered to Nosenko regarding his knowledge of Oswald's time in the Soviet Union and of contacts with the KGB)
Memorandum tor the OCI from C/CIS James Angleton ~ ~Golilsyn's) Conclusions on the Nosenko Defection (8 July 1964) Transcript of Remarks of James Angleton made to CIS Staff Mooting held "ca. March [April} 1966"
Interview with James Angleton : July 1976) Interview with James Angleton (Richard Cram- June 1977)
Letter from W. G. Wyman, Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations, CIA to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (25 June 1951)
The Cherepanov Affair (Author/Date unknown)
Memo to: DO/Plans; Subject: Guy Francts De Money Burgess: date June 7, 1951 {Author unnamed but from context clearly it is James Angleton)
Interview: (9 March 2011) Contribution from (11 March 2011) Published Products
Cleveland C. Cram, Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Uteraturo, 1977·92 (Center for the Study of Intelli gence, 1993}
_cRusseU Jack Smith, RICHARD HELMS As Diroctorof Central Intelligence, 1966-1973 (Center for the Study of Intelligence, History Staff, 1993) (Classified Secret)
John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klahr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999)
Richards J. Heuer, "Nosenko: Five Paths to Judgment• Studies in Intelligence (Fall1987)
Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior-James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) David Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper and Row, 1980)
J. C. Masterman with Introduction by Nigel West, The Double Cross System: 1939- 1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995)
David Robarge, "The James Angleton Phenomenon-'Cunning Passages, Contrived Corridors': Wandering in the Ang!etonlan Wil derness· in Studies in Intelligence 53, No 4 (December 2009). --. John McCane as Diroctor of Central Intelligence 1961-1965 (Center for the Study of Intelligence, History staff, 2005) (Clas- sified \ + + +