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The Final Fight: the 2008 Battle of Sadr City

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The Final Fight: the 2008 Battle of Sadr City The Final Fight: The 2008 Battle of Sadr City The Honors Program Senior Capstone Project Student’s Name: Geoffrey Ensby Faculty Sponsor: Prof John Dietrich April 2010 Table of Contents Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Part I .......................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 2 Importance of the Battle ........................................................................................................ 4 Research and Methodology ................................................................................................... 5 Background to the Battle and Lead-Up ..................................................................................... 8 Sadr City ............................................................................................................................... 9 A Brief Overview of Iraqi History, Culture, and Society ................................................... 11 Part II ....................................................................................................................................... 12 Moqtada al-Sadr ...................................................................................................................... 12 Biographical Information .................................................................................................... 12 The Rise of Moqtada al-Sadr .............................................................................................. 14 The Sadr Party and the Mahdi Army (JAM) ........................................................................... 16 Political and Military Wings ............................................................................................... 16 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 18 A Splintering Organization ................................................................................................. 19 Iranian Involvement ............................................................................................................ 22 Part III ..................................................................................................................................... 25 Iraq and the US Involvement .................................................................................................. 25 Iraqi Politics ........................................................................................................................ 25 US Military Strategy in Iraq ................................................................................................ 27 The Beginning of the End ................................................................................................... 29 The Spark ............................................................................................................................ 30 US Military and Iraqi Security Forces .................................................................................... 32 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) .................................................................................................. 32 US Military ......................................................................................................................... 35 Part IV ..................................................................................................................................... 37 Coalition Forces’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ......................................................... 37 Working with the Populace ................................................................................................. 38 Rules of Engagement (ROE) ............................................................................................... 40 Striking the Source .............................................................................................................. 43 Lessons Learned, Lessons Applied ..................................................................................... 46 Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ...................................................................... 49 Civilian Interaction and Considerations .............................................................................. 49 Guerilla Warfare.................................................................................................................. 50 Part V ...................................................................................................................................... 53 The End of the Battle .............................................................................................................. 53 Public Perception ................................................................................................................ 54 Rebuilding ........................................................................................................................... 57 Impact on Iraq ......................................................................................................................... 59 Risks Going Forward .............................................................................................................. 62 Key Findings ........................................................................................................................... 65 Final Thoughts ........................................................................................................................ 70 Appendices .............................................................................................................................. 73 Appendix A – Maps ............................................................................................................ 73 Appendix B – Chronology .................................................................................................. 77 Appendix C – Key Players .................................................................................................. 81 Appendix D – Glossary ....................................................................................................... 83 Appendix E – Summaries of Key Resources ...................................................................... 86 References ............................................................................................................................... 90 The Final Fight: The 2008 Battle of Sadr City Senior Capstone Project for Geoffrey Ensby ABSTRACT Iraq following the US invasion in March of 2003 was a dangerous place, and one in which the national government struggled to maintain control while unsanctioned and unauthorized strongmen and their militias controlled wide swaths of territory. This analysis will thus look at the 2008 Battle of Sadr City between the militia of radical Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the military forces of Iraq and the US conducting the operation in concert. Utilizing a number of newspaper accounts and editorials, journal articles, recent books, and freelance journalists’ writings, several key aspects will be considered regarding how Iraq was changed for the better. Important elements of the battle to be examined include the perilous power play before the battle between Mr Sadr and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as well as the increasing competency of the Iraqi Security Forces. This analysis will also evaluate how additional Coalition military units and newly-developed tactics were employed to effect a combined military and political defeat of Mr Sadr and his private army. Lastly, this is an assessment of the results of the battle, ranging from micro-level impacts on daily life in the area of operations all the way up to the changing nature of US policy in Iraq. At the end of the fight, the Iraqi state came out as the victors, with a stronger popular backing in addition to greater control over much of its territory brought about by breaking the power of these stateless armed groups. More so, the US has been able to begin a drawdown of its presence with the victory by the Iraqis over their extremist menace. In conclusion, the combination of both the soft and the hard power that won over the populace permitted a split between them and the radical fringes of the militias that then became marked for destruction. The achievement of this goal led to a more stable security situation in this tumultuous country and established the state as the sole and preeminent governing authority. - 1 - The Final Fight: The 2008 Battle of Sadr City Senior Capstone Project for Geoffrey Ensby PART I Build-Up INTRODUCTION “Things were going to hell in a handbasket. When I left in 2005, people were complaining more and more about the militia problem, but at the same time there was a drawdown of American forces in the south, which was the real seat of power for the Iraqi government. I remember driving to Karbala in a convoy and being stopped by a supposed Iraqi police unit dressed in green uniforms. I e-mailed General Petraeus to ask if he knew who they were, and he did not know anything about it. It was another new militia, roaming freely.” -Seth Moulton, former US Marine Corps officer “Security
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