El Partido, Una Revolución En La Revolución

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El Partido, Una Revolución En La Revolución Compilaciones: Investigadores del Departamento del Pensamiento de Fidel Castro del Instituto de Historia de Cuba: Dolores Guerra López, Yolanda González Plasencia, Amparo Hernández Denis e Ivette García González. Edición: Iraida Aguirrechu, Martha Brancacho y Guillermina Speck Diseño: José Papiol y Emilio Gómez Corrección:Digna Martínez, Olga M. López y Ana C. Cabrera Composición: Margioly Lora y Waldo Mesa © Dolores Guerra López Yolanda González Plasencia Amparo Hernández Denis Ivette García González © Sobre la presente edición ampliada: Editora Política, 2011 Primera edición: Editora Política, 2004 Todos los derechos reservados. Se prohíbe la reproducción, total o parcial, de esta obra sin la autorización de la Editora. ISBN 959-01-0556-4 Primera edición ISBN 978-959-01-0753-5 Segunda edición ampliada Editora Política Email: [email protected] Internet: www.editpolitica.cu Belascoaín No. 864, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba PRESENTACIÓN El Instituto de Historia de Cuba pone a disposición esta com- pilación de discursos, comparecencias, conferencias de prensa y llamamientos del primer secretario del Comité Central, Fidel Castro Ruz, acerca del Partido Comunista de Cuba (1961-2005). En sus exposiciones, el máximo líder de la Revolución Cuba- na, señala un lugar importante a la acción rectora y organizativa del partido de la clase obrera, donde valora altamente a sus prestigio- sos dirigentes. Al seguir esta vía, el Departamento del Pensamiento de Fidel Castro, se puso en contacto con materiales que reflejan el carácter activo de su lucha por integrar al pueblo, despertando en nosotros gran admiración, por su profundo dominio de la teoría marxista- leninista en el terreno partidista, sus importantes aportes teóricos, su maestría para desarrollarlo con espíritu creador y su interpreta- ción del lugar y papel en la sociedad socialista. En estas páginas hemos recogido, en forma total o en frag- mentos, las ideas en las cuales el Comandante en Jefe se refirió a esta temática, esto explica por qué fue necesario en la estructu- ra del texto, tomar como base los principales pronunciamientos que transcurren en orden cronológico, aunque en el ordenamien- to del material prevalece el principio lógico, junto a la sucesión temporal. La presente selección no aspira a reflejar todas las manifesta- ciones de su pensamiento. Este es solo un intento de presentar un acercamiento al tema y un empeño en ofrecer un instrumento de trabajo que permita valorar el caudal teórico y práctico de sus re- flexiones. Consideramos que esta recopilación es una de las mejores formas de perpetuar su actividad orientadora, al contribuir a la difusión y profundización de sus ideas y accionar, pues por sus profundos análisis acerca de la realidad nacional y los proble- mas más relevantes de la contemporaneidad, constituye un idea- rio que estamos urgidos de estudiar y aplicar en la batalla de ideas a que estamos convocados. Si este libro se convierte en un instrumento para el trabajo ideo- lógico de cuadros, especialistas y pueblo en general, nuestros pro- pósitos se verán materializados. Instituto de Historia de Cuba 6 1961 EL PARTIDO UNIDO DE LA REVOLUCIÓN SERÁ UNA ORGANIZACIÓN DE SELECCIÓN Inauguración de la escuela nacional de instrucción revolucionaria Sierra Maestra, para obreros de las granjas del pueblo, en El Calvario. La Habana, 30 de octubre de 1961 [...] El Partido Unido de la Revolución1 será una organización de selección, donde se encuentren los mejores elementos revolu- cionarios del país. No será como aquellos partidos tradicionales que andaban reclutando gentes dondequiera, afiliando gentes don- dequiera, porque lo que les interesaba era hacer número. Lo que a un partido revolucionario le interesa no es el número sino la cali- dad. Para ostentar el honor de pertenecer a un núcleo revoluciona- rio, es necesario ganarse ese derecho, con su trabajo, con su con- ducta, con su espíritu, con su entusiasmo, con su conciencia revolucionaria. Esto quiere decir que los jóvenes que pasan por esta escuela tendrán una gran oportunidad de pertenecer al Parti- do Unido de la Revolución, si después, con su conducta y con su esfuerzo, demuestran que son acreedores a ese honor. 1 Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba (PURSC). 7 La importancia del núcleo revolucionario en cada centro de tra- bajo es grande, porque ese núcleo tiene que luchar incansable- mente por el cumplimiento de los planes y de los programas de la Revolución en cada centro. Ese núcleo será como un pilar sobre el cual se asienta la fuerza de la organización política de la Revolu- ción. Debe velar por el cumplimiento de las metas, debe luchar por el cumplimiento de las metas. Naturalmente que en el orden políti- co, como en el orden técnico, no vamos a tener desde el primer día lo que queremos. Lo que queremos tener para el futuro es necesa- rio que lo sepamos hacer pacientemente, porque si queremos te- ner técnicos, si queremos tener administradores, si queremos te- ner revolucionarios, revolucionarios verdaderos es decir; revolucionarios conscientes, revolucionarios de vanguardia, es necesario que los preparemos pacientemente. Y así como no se organiza un ejército de la noche a la mañana, así como no se orga- niza un cuadro de oficiales de la noche a la mañana, no se organi- za un gran aparato político revolucionario si no se forman pacientemente los cuadros de ese aparato [...] Obra Revolucionaria, No.43, 1961, pp. 5, 16-17. NO SE PUEDE LLEVAR ADELANTE UNA REVOLUCIÓN SIN UNA FUERTE Y DISCIPLINADA ORGANIZACIÓN REVOLUCIONARIA Comparecencia en el 9° ciclo de la Universidad Popular: Los organismos de la Revolución. La Habana, 1ro de diciembre de 1961 [...] El Partido Unido de la Revolución era, en primer lugar, una necesidad. ¿Por qué era una necesidad? En primer lugar, no se puede hacer una Revolución sobre todo, no se puede llevar ade- lante una Revolución, sin una fuerte y disciplinada organización revolucionaria. Esta necesidad se hace cada vez más evidente a medida que el proceso revolucionario avanza, a medida que el proceso 8 revolucionario va entrando por cauces, por normas, y se va enfren- tando a tareas cada vez más difíciles [...] ¿Cómo estaban representadas las fuerzas revolucionarias? ¿Cuáles eran las fuerzas revolucionarias, las fuerzas sociales re- volucionarias? La clase obrera, los campesinos, los estudiantes, y capas más o menos amplias de la pequeña burguesía. Eso era lo que podía llamarse fuerzas revolucionarias, cuyos intereses se oponían a los intereses de la gran burguesía. En primer lugar a los intereses del imperialismo y de la gran burguesía financiera, co- mercial, industrial. Pequeños propietarios, pequeños comercian- tes, toda esa capa de la pequeña burguesía, sectores intelectua- les, sectores estudiantiles, sectores campesinos y sectores obreros. Esas eran las fuerzas, las clases revolucionarias [...] [...] ¿Qué organizaciones representaban esas fuerzas? La cla- se obrera, los elementos más avanzados, más desarrollados de la clase obrera, de los obreros industriales y de los obreros agríco- las. ¿Cuál era la organización política que representaba esa cla- se? y no a toda la clase, porque dentro de estas clases había sectores que tenían una mentalidad pequeño-burguesa, sobre todo sectores de más altos ingresos, y, desde luego, la pequeña bur- guesía estaba contra Batista,2 no se puede negar. El Partido Socialista Popular representaba los elementos más avanzados de la clase obrera, lo mismo en el campo que en la ciudad. Tenía también algunos elementos del campo; en los pe- queños campesinos nosotros nos encontramos unos cuantos mili- tantes del Partido Socialista Popular en la Sierra Maestra. Pero, fundamentalmente, representaba a la clase obrera. El Movimiento 26 de Julio representaba, en primer lugar, a los campesinos. Es decir, todo el movimiento campesino que se orga- nizó alrededor del Ejército Rebelde. Se aglutinaron alrededor del Movimiento 26 de Julio mucha gente, también, de la clase obrera, que no militaban en ningún partido. Es decir: sectores obreros sin partido. Núcleos obreros que habían militado en algún partido de 2 Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar. 9 la pequeña burguesía, algún partido político, gente honrada, se su- maron también al Movimiento 26 de Julio. Se sumaron también sectores profesionales, intelectuales, elementos juveniles, estudian- tes, y también elementos de la pequeña burguesía, los elementos más progresistas y más revolucionarios de la clase media y de la pequeña burguesía. Se puede decir que esa fuerza era la que re- presentaba el 26 de Julio. Similarmente, el Directorio Revolucionario representaba más o menos los mismos sectores, pero fundamentalmente el sector estudiantil, que es donde surge, con José Antonio Echeverría, Faure Chomón, y los demás compañeros. Surge de los centros estudian- tiles el Directorio Revolucionario, que a su vez hace también un trabajo de captación entre los sectores obreros, los sectores inte- lectuales y los sectores campesinos. Es decir, que las fuerzas revolucionarias de la sociedad esta- ban representadas en tres organizaciones [...] Esas tres organizaciones distintas tenían contactos, por supues- to. Se prestaron ayuda durante la Revolución, durante la lucha re- volucionaria, pero orgánicamente eran tres organizaciones com- pletamente distintas, cada una de las cuales tenía su dirección, tenía su táctica, tenía su esfera de acción. [...] [...] ¡Qué absurdos lucen hoy, en realidad, aquellos problemas! ¡Qué distinta fuerza, seguridad y confianza las de la Revolución de hoy, a aquellos primeros días iniciales, en que la Revolución tenía que enfrentarse a los momentos más difíciles! Tenía que enfrentar- se al poder, a la iniciación de un programa revolucionario, a una gran parte del gobierno, a toda la prensa, a todos los vehículos de información y, sobre todo, a una fuerza una fuerza que yo creo que era la más grande que era la fuerza de que hablaba Lenin,3 es decir, la fuerza de la costumbre, de la manera y de los hábitos de pensar y de enfocar las cosas que tenía una zona vasta de la población. Es decir, la fuerza de la costumbre, una serie de prejui- 3 Vladimir Ilich Lenin.
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