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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John’s Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 77 - 10,506 CHANG, Donald Heng, 1931- IN SEARCH OF TRENDS AND PATTERNS: ELITE CHANGE IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1945-1973. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976 Political Science, general
Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, M ichigan 48106
© Copyright by Donald Heng Chang 1976 IN SEARCH OF TRENDS AND PATTERNS: ELITE CHANGE IN THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1945-1973
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
by
Donald Heng Chang, B.A., M.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1976
Reading Committee: Approved By
Bradley M. Richardson Philip D. Stewart ,-fy David M. Lampton ,/U^.slJjL h' V Adviser Department of Political Science ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wish to express my sincere thanks to Professors Bradley
Richardson, Philip Stewart, and David Lampton, who are the members
of my Dissertation Committee, for their guidance in my dissertation
research. Needless to say, none of them is responsible for what
ever flaws and imperfections may be found in this dissertation. I wish also to express my appreciation for the support provided by the
Department of Political Science, which enabled me to complete
data analysis for this dissertation at the Instruction and Research
Computer Center of the Ohio State University. Last but not least,
I must express my indebtedness to my wife and child; without their
prolonged sacrifice and patience, the completion of this dissertation
would not have been possible.
Donald H. Chang
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS...... iii
LIST OF TABLES...... v
LIST OF FIGURES...... xi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
II. ELITE CHANGE: SUMMARY INDICATORS AND DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND ...... 31
III. ELITE CHANGE: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION ...... 57
IV. ELITE CHANGE: CURRENT CAREERS ...... 88
V. THE DYNAMICS OF ELITE CHANGE: A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME AND A RESEARCH METHOD...... 113
VI. THE DYNAMICS OF ELITE CHANGE: POLITICAL PROMOTION...... 130
VII. THE DYNAMICS OF ELITE CHANGE: POLITICAL PURGE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL...... 157
VIII. CONCLUSION...... 190
LIST OF REFERENCES...... 200
APPENDICES
A. LIST OF MEMBERS IN THE 7TH, 8TH, 9TH, AND 10TH CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY...... 209
iii Page
B. CODEBOOK OF DATA FOR THIS STUDY OF THE CCP ELITE...... 219
C. SCHEME FOR CONSTRUCTING CCP POSITIONAL SCORES. . . . 288
D. RESULTS OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSES PERFORMED ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE CONTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE CCP IN CONNECTION WITH POLITICAL PROMOTION...... 294
Summary Table D.l Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th CC...... 295
Summary Table D.2 Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 8th CC...... 297
Summary Table D.3 Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 9th CC...... 299
Summary Table D.4 Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 10th C C ...... 301
E. RESULTS OF DISCRIMINANT ANALYSES PERFORMED ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE CCP IN CONNECTION WITH POLITICAL PURGE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL...... 303
Summary Table E.1 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors in the 8th CC...... 304
Summary Table E.2 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 8th CC...... 306
Summary Table E.3 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the NewElite in the 8th CC. . . 307
Summary Table E.4 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors in the 9th CC...... 309
Summary Table E.5 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 9th CC. . . 311
Summary Table E.6 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the New Elite in the 9th CC. . . 313
iv LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.1 Trends in Elite Size: Membership in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees,...... 33
2.2 Trends in Membership in the Chinese Communist Party, 1945-1973...... 33
2.3 Elite Turnover Rates in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees ...... 36
2.4 Sex Representation of Membership in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 40
2.5 Non-Han Representation in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees ...... 42
2.6 Trends in Geographical Representation of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 47
2.7 Mean Rank Order of Geographical Representation of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees. . . 48
2.8 Summary Measures of Age Distribution of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 49
2.9 Trends in Age Distribution of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 50
2.10 Trends in Social Status of the Family of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 53
3.1 Trends in Date of Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 59
3.2 Trends in Age When Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 63
v Table Page
3.3 Trends in Level of Education When Joining The Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 65
3.4 Trends in Type of Work When Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees. . . 69
3.5 Trends in Special Military/Political Training of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees. . . 71
3.6 Trends in Education/Training in the USSR of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 73
3.7 Trends in Participation in Important Events of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 75
3.8 Trends in CEC Membership of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 77
3.9 Trends in Military Affiliation of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 79
4.1 Trends in Cumulative Positional Scores of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees...... 90
4.2 Trends in Concurrent Position Holding of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees...... 93
4.3 Trends in Type of Work of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 96
4.4 Trends in Place of Work of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 99
4.5 Trends inYears in Primary Position of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees...... 101
4.6 Trends in Positional Mobility of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees...... 102
4.7 Trends in Change in Positional Scores Between A Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership Among Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees...... 104
vi Table Page
4.8 Trends in Mean Value of Change in Positional Scores Between a Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership Among Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees ...... 105
4.9 Trends in Change in Type of Work Between Time of Joining the Party and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership Among Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees ...... 107
4.10 Trends in Change in Type of Work Between a Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership Among Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 107
4.11 Trends in Change in Location of Work Between A Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership Among Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees...... 108
6.1 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th Central Committee...... 132
6.2 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 7th Central Committee Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite...... 134
6.3 Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Member ship in the 7th CC into the New Elite and the Old Elite. 135
6.4 Discrimintaing Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 8th Central Committee...... 136
6.5 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Memberhsip in the 8th CC Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite...... 137
6.6 Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 8th Central Committee into the New Elite and the Old Elite...... 138
vii Table Page
6.7 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 9th Central Committee...... 140
6.8 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 9th CC Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite ...... 141
6.9 Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 9th CC into the New Elite and the Old Elite...... 142
6.10 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 10th Central Committee...... 144
6.11 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 10th CC Differentiating the New Elite from the OldElite ...... 145
6.12 Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 10th CC into the New Elite and the Old Elite...... 146
6.13 The Relative Potency of Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees. . . . 150
6.14 The Relative Potency of Four Variable Clusters of Personal Attributes in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees...... 151
7.1 Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 7th Central Committee...... 159
7.2 Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 8th Central Committee...... 160
7.3 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the 8th CC From Two Perspectives ...... 162
viii Table Page
7.4 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 8th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors...... 163
7.5 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors in the 8th CC ...... 164
7.6 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the Old Elite in the 8th CC Differentiating the Purged fromthe Survivors . . . 166
7.7 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 8 th C C ...... 167
7.8 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the New Elite in the 8th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors . . . 168
7.9 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the New Elite in the 8th C C ...... 169
7.10 The Relative Potency of Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors for Members of the 8th CC from Two Perspectives. . . . 172
7.11 The Relative Potency of Four Variable Clusters of Personal Attributes to Political Purge and Political Survival for Members of the 8th C C ...... 173
7.12 Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 9th CC...... 173
7.13 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the 9th CC from Two Perspectives...... 175
7.14 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 9th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors...... 176
7.15 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors in the 9th CC . . , ...... 177
ix Table Page
7.16 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the Old Elite in the 9th CC Differentiating the Purged and the Survivors. . . . 179
7.17 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and Survivors of the Old Elite in the 9th CC ...... 180
7.18 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the New Elite in the 9th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors . . . 181
7.19 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the New Elite in the 9th CC ...... 182
7.20 The Relative Potency of Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors for Members of the 9th CC from Two Perspectives. . . . 184
7.21 The Relative Potency of Four Variable Clusters of Personal Attributes to Political Purge and Political Survival for Members of the 9th C C ...... 185
x LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
2.1 Rate of Change Between Membership in the Central Committees and Membership in the Chinese Communist Party, 1945-1973 (ratio graph)...... 34
2.2 Rate of Change in Female Representation in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees (ratio graph). . . 41
2.3 Rate of Change in Non-Han Representation in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees (ratio graph)...... 44
5.1 Conceptual Scheme for Inquiry into Political Promotion, Political Purge, and Political Survival ...... 119
xi Chapter I
Introduction
Importance of Studying Chinese Communist Elites
One of the questions Edgar Snow asked during his revisit to
China in 1960 was "how large a percentage of the people actually made up the ruling leadership." He was told by "a man very high in the Party":
There were 50,000 of us at the start of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution in 1927. After the killings there were only 10,000 left. Today there are about 800 of us— survivors of all the years between. By and large the country is being run and for some years will be run by those 800 (Snow, 1970, p. 326).*
This was an acknowledgement from a man important in the Party not only that China was and would be ruled by the Chinese Communist
Party, but also that a small group of people was crucially important in ruling China. This small group of people may be called the elite in the Chinese Communist Party. Such a designation is merely aimed at conveying a general meaning of "elite"; in Harold Lasswell's words
(1965), "by this time most scientific observers realize that any single definition for such a key term as 'elite' is inadequate," and
"the scholar's obligation is discharged when he gives his definition in general terms and shows by specific indices what is intended in
*For list of references, see pp. 201-208. concrete situations" (p. 4). The study of Chinese Communist elites is important in that they are the prime movers in shaping China's history in general and in making China's policies in particular. Lest the studies of Chinese Communist elites should be regarded as all important, however, Robert Scalapino (1972a) has given a caveat: "To study elites— more precisely, political elites— is to cut into the political system from a particular vantage point, taking merely one element of that system.,." (p. v). One other important element in a political system is the masses in society, however authoritarian that political system may be. In the case of China, the Chinese
Communist elite may manipulate the masses, but they cannot treat the people as inanimate objects. One of the most dramatic events in
China occurred on April 5, 1976, when there was an unauthorized and hence unexpected mass demonstration in Tien An Men Square at the heart of Peking. It, for the first time, provided significant evidence that the Chinese people are not as malleable as the
Communist elite would like them to be. Thus, a study of the masses is also important in understanding the Chinese political system.
This dissertation, however, is concerned only with the study of
Chinese Communist elites. Rather than being a slight on the Chinese masses, this focus has been chosen because of the greater availability of data on Chinese Communist elites.
Focus of This Study: Elite Change
While this dissertation is concerned with the study of Chinese
Communist elites, it is more precisely focused on elite change in the Chinese Communist Party over time, that is, change in the elite composition from 1945 to 1973. As such, it is a structural, longi tudinal, and comparative analysis of the elite in the Chinese
Communist Party. The organizing concept of this study is elite change. Why study elite change? There are at least four theoretical reasons for studying elite change or elite transformation:
First, a study of elite change can indicate the extent to which the elite is rejuvenated and the types of elites that are dominant at a given time. The main thesis of Vilferedo Pareto's theory of elite circulation (1935)1-* is that the talents of elites tend to dissi pate over time. There is a gradual process of replacing the "decadent elements of the existing elite with new talents from non-elites. If this process is slowed down or blocked such that the decadent elements within the elite accumulate to a dangerous point, then there will be a revolutionary process of exchanging one elite for another. Pareto's theory also includes a notion of circulation of two different types of elites, the "fox" and the "lion," in alterating fashion. While
Pareto's social-pyschological theory of elite circulation has been criticized as non-falsifiable (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 48-53; Putnam,
1976, p. 168), it nevertheless provides some plausible explanation of elite change. Thus, elite change may serve at least as an indi cation of the personal fitness or unfitness of elite members.
*Notes are placed at the end of each Chapter. Second, a study of elite change can indicate the rise of new social interests or social forces. According to Gaetano Mosca
o (1939) , elite change reflects the rise of new interests and ideals in a society as well as that of new problems: "As soon as there is a shift in the balance of political forces— when, that is, a need is felt that capacities different from the old should assert them selves in the management of the state, when the old capacities, therefore, lose some of their importance or changes in their distri bution occur— then the manner in which the ruling class is constituted changes also" (p. 65). Based on this structural theory of elite change, elite change may serve as indication of the rise of new social forces, however these are defined.
Third, a study of elite change can indicate the changing functional needs of society. According to Joseph Schumpeter (1951), "the posi tion of each class in total national structure depends, on the one hand, on the significance that is attributed to [its] function, and on the other hand, on the degree to which the class successfully per forms the function" (p. 180). Susan Keller (1963) has taken a similar view: "strategic elites move into ascendancy when their functions do likewise... The rank order of elites, therefore, is generally determined by the types of problems confronting a society, the priority accorded to these, and the functional and moral solutions proposed to solve them" (pp. 125-126). Theories of the functional needs of society provide another explanation of elite change. As such, a study of elite change helps explain the changing functional needs of a society. 5
Fourth, a study of elite change can indicate the direct impact of political factors at work in the society, especially the processes of recruitment. As Robert Putnam (1976) has commented, "modifications in recruitment channels, selectorates, and credentials can influence the composition of political elites independently of changes in socio economic forces or functions" (p. 171). Citing a Chinese example, which was based on the works of Ping-ti Ho and Robert M. Marsh,
Putnam wrote:
For more than five centuries in Ming and Ch'ing China (1368-1912), the social composition of the Mandarin elite was closely tied to the dynastic cycle. During the war and turmoil surrounding the collapse of one dynasty and the emergence of another, the rate of upward mobility of commoners into the elite rose sharply, even though the socioeconomic structure remained essentially unchanged. (p. 172)
The impact of patterns of recruitment on elite change is indeed dir ect and immediate, and may not necessarily indicate socioeconomic changes in society.
These four perspectives provide a theoretical basis for studying elite change. Since the Chinese Communist Party now governs China with pervasive influence, it seems to be more appropriate to regard elite change in the CCP as directly reflecting changing patterns of
elite recruitment, which in turn may be due to the accumulation of
"decadent" elements within the elite in Pareto's terms, the rise of new "social forces" in Mosca's terms, or the changing "fucntional needs" of society in Schumpeter's terms. Herein lies the theoretical significance of studying elite change or elite tranformation. Defining the Chinese Communist Elite
The "elite" in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was given a general meaning previously, and it is now time to show "by specific indices what is intended in concrete situations" (Lasswell, 1965, p. 4). In this study, the elite in the CCP is operationally defined as those CCP members having full membership in the Central Committee
(CC) of the CCP. As a result, this study of elite change from 1945 to 1973 entails the study of full membership in the 7th CC of 1945, the 8th CC of 1956, the 9th CC of 1969, and the 10th CC of 1973.
As there are two kinds of membership in the Central Committee, full and alternate, it may be asked, why not include alternate members of the Central Committee?
The original plan was to include alternate members of the CC in this study and to inquire into the relationships between full and alternate members to see if alternate membership served as a gateway to higher Party status. An initial inquiry, however, points to an essentially insignificant relationship between the two types of membership.^ With the exception of membership in the 7th CC, where an overwhelming majority of alternates acquired full membership in the 8th CC, alternate CC membership did not indicate a high possibility of being promoted to full membership in the Central
Committee.^ Consequently, alternate members of the CC are not included in this study. Henceforth, membership in the CC, except when indicated otherwise, refers only to full members. While the operational definition of the elite in the CCP for this study does 7 not include alternate members per se, they become the objects of this study upon becoming full members of the CC.
Defining the elite in the CCP as members of the Central Committees employs the positional approach to identifying elites. While there are other approaches (the intuitive, the reputational, the observa tional, and the decision-making) that may be used to identify elites in western democratic societies, the positional approach is the most feasible one to take in studying elites in communist countries in most situations. That was the approach employed not only by students of Chinese Communist elites, such as Robert Scalapino (1972b) and
Derek Waller (1972, 1973)5, but also by students of the Soviet Union such as Frederic Fleron (1968). To define the CCP elite as members of the Central Committees is in line with Scalapino's position (1972b) that "membership in the national Central Committee (CC) constitutes the best available indication of high status" (p. 68). It also takes into account that membership in the Central Committee does not imply that "membership in an organization is necessarily congruent with a position of power" (Waller, 1973, p. 154). Nevertheless, that membership in the Central Committee is a valid measure of "eliteness" among CCP members can be argued from thevery selective process that determines membership in the Central Committee.
In spite of the fact that all legal documents stipulate that members of the Central Committee are elected by the delegates of the
National Party Congress, "election" in a communist country such as
China cannot be taken at its face value. As Derek Waller has 8
remarked, "for example, Article 37 of the 1956 CCP Constitution states
that 'the Central Committee elects at its plenary session the Poli
tical Bureau, (and) the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau...'
Most students of Chinese Communism would agree that this situation
is in fact reversed" (Waller, 1973, p. 194, footnote 3). The CCP
has nearly conceded since the 9th CC National Party Congress that a
fake elective process is used to select CC members. According to the
"Press Communique of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Ninth
National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (Peking Reivew,
1969),
In accordance with the rules laid down by the presidium of the congress, candidates for membership and alternate membership of the Central Committee were first nominated by the delegations freely. The presidium, after collecting the opinions of the delegations, proposed a preliminary list of candidates and handed it back to the delegations, and a list of candidates was worked out after full consula- tion. A preliminary selection by secret ballot was then conducted. After such repreated, full democratic con sultation from below and from above, a final list of candidates was decided upon, and it was submitted by the presidium to the congress for final election by secret ballot. The process of the election of the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was full manifestation of the Party's democratic centralism and mass line. (p. 44)
Presumably the same method of "democratic centralism and mass line" was used to determine membership in the 10th Central Committee; the
press communique of the 10th National Congress (Peking Review, 1973) made only one-sentence reference to the event by stating that "After
repeated deliberation and discussion, the congress elected the Tenth
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party by secret ballot"
(p. 6). As is well known to students of Chinese communism, both 9
"democratic centralism" and "mass line" mean Party leadership in
de facto control. Thus, rhetoric aside, membership in the Central
Committee reflects the result of a screening process by which the
Party leadership selects to the Central Committee those Party members most desirable at a given point in time. It is in this sense
that members of the Central Committee are the elite or the "cream"
of the CCP. As a matter of fact, the word "cream" is the most
expressive rendition of Chinese phrase n _ j§ _ used in that context.
To say that membership in the Central Committee represents the results
of selections made by Party leadership is not based on a simple-mind notion that Party leadership is always in firm control. However, it
does assume that there is always a Party leadership in existence,
and that when a decision is made to convene a National Party Congress, whose delegates "elect" members of the Central Committee, the Party
leadership must feel strong enough to control the situation instead
of being overwhelmed by it.
A Review of Relevant Literature
Before discussing the research tasks of this study, a review
of relevant literature on Chinese Communist elite studies in general
and that on elite change in the CCP in partiuclar is in order. Since
the publication of Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites by Robert
North and his associates in 1952, a number of Chinese Communist
elite studies have emerged. Not all studies of Chinese Communist
personages, however, were explicitly called studies of elites (some of these studies used the terms "leaders" or "leadership"), but they 10 may be subsumed under the rubric of elite studies for this general discussion. By and large, these Chinese Communist elite studies may be classified into three categories. First, there are studies of national elites, such as members of Central Committees (Chao, 1959;
Domes, 1971; Houn, 1957; Klein and Hager, 1971; Scalapino, 1972b; and Waller, 1973) or members of national bureaucracies such as the
State Council (Klein, 1968). Second, there are studies of sub national elites, such as Provincial Party Secretaries (Falkenhelm,
1972; Teiwes, 1967, 1974), members of municipal bureaucracies (Chamber- lain, 1972, Kau, 1969), and rural elites (Oksenberg, 1969a). Third, there are studies of functional elites, such as the military (Whitson,
1969, and 1973), minority affairs elites (Dreyer, 1972), and academic elites (Greenblatt, 1972). While this short citation of Chinese elite studies is not meant to be exhaustive, it is substantially inclusive, especially with reference to data-based research. Obviously, there has not been a great deal of published work on Chinese Communist elites. To single out those studies whose definition of elite is membership in the Central Committee, the list becomes even shorter:
1. One study of membership in the 7th CC of 1945 (North,
1952), which was a comparative study of Kuomintang and
Chinese Communist elites.
2. Two studies of membership in the 8th CC of 1956 (Chao,
1959; Houn, 1957), both of which were cross-sectional
studies, i.e., dealing with one point in time. 11
3. Two studies of membership in the 9th CC of 1969 (Domes,
197-1; Klein and Hager, 1971), which were also cross-
sectional studies.
4. One study comparing membership in the Central Executive
Councils of the Kiangsi Soviet with that in the 8th Central
Committee (Waller, 1973).
5. One study comparing membership in the 8th CC with that in
the 9th CC (Scalapino, 1972b).
All in all, there are seven studies of membership in the Central
Committee to date, and three of them are comparative studies. Among the three comparative studies, North's study compared Kuomintang elites with Communist elites, and hence might not be regarded as a comparative study of Chinese Communist elites. What is left, then, are only Waller's and Scalapino's comparative studies of Chinese
Communist elites, each of which is concerned with elite change over two different periods in time. While Waller's study (1973) compares the continuity and change of a revolutionary elite (members of Central
Executive Councils) with those of a post-revolutionary elite (members of the 8th Central Committee), Scalapino's study (1972b) compares the continuity and change of membership in the 8th CC with those of the
9th CC. Obviously, there is a discontunity in the study of elite change in that there has not yet been any study of elite change relating to the current Chinese Communist elite: the members of the
10th Central Committee. Furthermore, this discontunity is coupled with the generally discrete nature of Chinese Communist elite studies; 12 few, if any, writers make reference to the findings of previous studies, even where the operational definition of the elite under study is identical. It can be justifiably argued that a student of Chinese
Communist elites need not make reference to the findings of previous studies if the operational definition of the elite is not the same; oranges and apples are not comparable, although they are both fruits. It is puzzling, however, that in Houn's, Chao's, Domes',
Klein's, Waller's, and Scalapino's studies, the reader can hardly find any reference to previous work. Probably the lack of reference to earlier work is due to the fact that the writers are using differ ent categories, which makes comparisons meaningless, rather than to • the writers' ignorance of previous work. Nevertheless, such a state of affairs makes cumulative knowledge of Chinese Communist elites difficult. Thus, both the discontinuity in the study of elite change and the generally discrete nature of Chinese Communist elite studies indicate that there is a need for systematic studies of elite change.
The need for studying elite change, however, is stronger even than the above evidence shows. In introducing an edited volume of
Chinese Communist elite studies, Robert Scalapino (1972a) posed a question: "Do elite studies provide us with opportunities to advance middle-level theory" (p. v)? While Scalapino answers in the affirm ative, the research reports in his edited volume show that the studies of Chinese Communist elites from theoretical perspectives or aiming at theory-building are few and far between. With special reference to studying change in communist system, William Welsh 13
(1973) has characterized a majority of communist elite studies as lacking in "theoretical concern" (p. 6). By "lack of theoretical concern," Welsh refers to the essentially descriptive nature of most communist elite studies but "propose[s] neither to ignore nor attack traditional-descriptive studies" (p. 7). How valid is Welsh's criticims with respect to studies of elite change in the Chinese
Communist Party? Since there are only two studies of elite change in the CCP whose operational definition of the elite is membership in the Central Committee or its equivalent, which is the definition used in this study as well, it is both possible and desirable to discuss these two studies, i.e., Waller and Scalapino, in some detail here to see whether they do, indeed, show "lack of theoretical concern."
The purpose of Waller's study (1973) comparing membership in the
Central Executive Councils with that in the 8th Central Committee is to "examine, in a Chinese context, certain hypotheses concerning the functional relationship between the requirements of the political system and the social and career attributes of the elite" (p. 155).
On that count, it can not be said that the study has no theoretical concern. Waller's study, however, does not present his theoretical concern in a rigorous manner in several respects. In the first place, it is to be noted that Waller's use of terminology is rather strange; instead of saying to "test" certain hypotheses, he says to "examine" certain hypotheses, which is not the standard usage in the social sciences. This is not to find fault with his use of language. In fact, Waller is perfectly correct in saying that he examines certain hypotheses in that he does not test hypotheses (as that is understood
in social science) but merely displays certain data for "eye-ball"
examination. In the second place, even if Waller intended to test hypotheses, this would be an impossible task for him to perform in
that he has quantitative data on the social and career attributes of
the Chinese Communist elites under study, but no such data on the
"requirements of the political system." In the third place, there
are some difficulties in the form of certain hypotheses per se. The hypothesis under Waller's examination is that "over time, the modernization process and the concomitant task of organizing and
administering a complex industrializing society may eventually lead
to the replacement of the revolutionary intellectuals by a 'managerial
intelligentsia'" (p. 156), which was based on John Kautsky's theoriz
ing work (1968). One of the difficulties involved in that hypothesis was shortly thereafter articulated by the original formulator,
Kautsky (1969) himself, when he had a second thought on the matter:
"It would appear that we cannot distinguish sharply between revolu
tionary and managerial modernizers in terms of their experience and training, their attitudes, or even their policies" (p. 189). If what has been said is critical of Waller's study of elite change in the CCP, it is not in that his work has no theoretical concern, but in that some difficulties arise in his pursuit of a theoretical con- The remaining study of elite change in the CCP is Scalapino's study (1972b) comparing members of the 8th and 9th Central Committees.
Scalapino's study is focused on the authority structure of the CCP at two different points in time so as to detect the contiunity and change in various aspects. The inquiry is conducted in terms of three echelons, namely, members of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo, non-Standing members of the Politburo, and the remaining members of the Central Committee. While Scalapino makes no explicit statements of his theoretical concern in the study, he in fact makes innovative efforts at classification as a result of his awareness that
"old socioeconomic categories of elite identification are inadequate, and past methods of typologizing career patterns are relatively primitive" (1972a, p. vi). Fine-grained classification is pre-requisite to building empirical theory, and Scalapino's work has made contri butions in that direction. Furthermore, at the end of his study of continuity and change of the authority structure of the CCP, Scalapino poses four thought-provoking hypotheses (1972b, p. 148), although they are in the form of descriptive propositions. Scalapino's study may be pre-theoretical in the process of developing theoretical concern; it cannot be said to have lacked "theoretical concern" at all. This review of the only two studies of elite change in the CCP using the definition of elite in terms of membership in the CC leads to the conclusion that there is no "lack of theoretical concern" in the study of elite change in the CCP. The theoretical concern has not be sufficiently articulated and demonstrated, however, owing to 16 the limited number of studies. Thus, there is an additional reason for studying elite change in the CCP: to demonstrate theoretical concern in terms of scientific explanation and theory building.
The Research Tasks of This Study
In consideration of the needs for studying elite change and the availability of data in this area, two research tasks have been set for this study. The first research task will be a descriptive analy sis of elite change in various dimensions from 1945 to 1973, which will fill a gap in research on elite change in the CCP and compensate for the generally discrete nature of Chinese Communist elite studies.
As the elite in the CCP is operationally defined for this study as membership in the Central Committee, the "population" under study includes members of the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Central Committees with a total of 517 cases**, the largest "N" that has ever been used in any Chinese elite study to date. Instead of making a comparison of two time periods, as Waller and Scalapino did, this study will examine four time periods covering 28 years, 1945 to 1973, the longest time perspective that has ever been employed in the study of CCP elites. Given the relatively short existence of the
CCP (52 years at the time of the convocation of the 10th CC in 1973), the 28-year period under study represents more than half of the
Party's life span. It may be desirable to further extend the time frame to include pre-7th Central Committee members, those before
1945, but their numbers are fewer and information on them is scant. The 28-year time span that is covered in this study is not only the most extended one in the study of CCP elites to date, but also is representative of four pivotal points in the Party’s history:
(1) the 7th CC was convened in April, 1945, when the ultimate victory in the Anti-Japanese War of Aggression was in sight but the outcome of the struggle with the Kuomintang was uncertain; (2) the 8th CC, convened in September, 1956, was the first of its kind which repre sented the Party in the post-revolutionary era; (3) the convocation of the 9th CC, in April, 1969, marked the official ending of the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a turbulent movement that began in mid-1966; and (4) the 10th CC of August, 1973, was convened against the backdrop of the sensational Lin Piao's anti-Mao plot. Even with an extended time frame of 28 years that includes four important points in the Party's history, it is still not possible to do with full confidence the kind of analysis that social scientists call
"trend analysis." Given the fact that the available data are time-series, however, trend analysis is the mode to be used in this descriptive analysis of elite change. The purpose of trend analysis, as it has been used in economic, educational, and other social re search for policy palnning, is not to explain causes of change, but to give an indication of the direction and rate of change in the future by making use of what is known of the recent past and the present. Even then, trend analysis can not provide sure prediction of the future, but only of the possible future. In the study of elite change in the CCP, analysis of trends in change can have various implications for the future. Knowledge of the possible future of the 18
CCP elite is not only useful in understanding Chinese politics, but also is relevant to those foreign policy makers who have to deal with China.
The second research task of this study will be an explanatory analysis of elite change, which will pursue theoretical concerns in
the study of CCP elites. Since the CCP elite under study is defined as the members of the Central Committee, the sources or dynamics of
elite change, aside from the natural deaths of elite members, consist in the attainment of membership in the CC and the termination or
continuation of membership in the succeeding CC, which are defined as political promotion, political purge, and political survival respectively. Although attitudinal and behavioral data on the CCP elite are unavailable for this study, as they have been for other
Chinese Communist elite studies, four variable clusters— demographic and social background, initial political socialization, party political
socialization, and current careers— have been constructed from available information. These four clusters of variables may be
considered personal attributes. The explanatory analysis of elite
change, deals,among other things, with a theoretically interesting question: whether, and to what extent, differences in personal attributes might account for political purge and political survival.
It is often assumed that differences in personal attributes signal different behavior or at least different predispositions to behavior, but this proposition has seldom been tested with empirical data. The sources of elite change as defined in this study provide a way to 19 render such a proposition into a form empirically testable with avail able data. Political purge and political survival reflect, among other things, consequences of the behavior of individuals in the sense that it is behavior, or more likely accumulations of behaviors over time, that is judge by the Party leadership as desirable or undesirable so that reward or punishment can be dispensed accordingly.
Thus, political purge and political survival may be used as indications of behavioral consequences in an attempt to test the relationship, if any, between personal attributes and behavior. If there is a rela tionship, and one of significant degree, a further theoretical interest in assessing the relative potency of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political sociali zation, and current careers in affecting political promotion, poli tical purge and political survival will be pursued. This second research task not only has the theoretical concern of seeking scientific explanation and of taking steps in building empirical theory, but also has the practical concern of predicting political purge and political survival. If certain personal attributes are related to political purge and political survival in a given situation, then it is possible to predict the political fate of elite individuals whose personal attributes are known.
Summing up, the two research tasks of this study aim at achieving four objectives: to be useful to the general understanding of the
Chinese Communist elite , to be relevant to foreign policy makers, to be contributive to the study of elite change in terms of 20
theoretical concern, and to be useful in predicting the political
fate of the CCP elite.
Sources of the Data
The sources of data are crucially important to the validity of
research findings. Since an original data set has been constructed
for this study, it is all the more important to discuss the sources
of information from which the data have been extracted. In this
study, biographical information on Chinese Communist personages pub
lished or prepared in various quarters has been used.? How reliable
are these sources of biographical information? In "reliable" refers
to the proportion of "truths" and "errors" in reporting, there is no way of knowing the reliability of the sources. It would be impossible
to verify each bit of information in the sources, even if the means of verification were available, which they often are not. What can be done and has been done is to cross-check each required bit of
information against all available sources to ensure that whatever errors in reporting remain are reduced to random errors. So long as
they are random errors, their harmful effects will be cancelled out by the operation of the law of error (statistical law).
More important than errors in reporting are the possible biases
that may exist in biographical information. Michel Oksenberg (1969b) has remarked that researchers are likely to be "inescapably the
captives of the perspectives provided by their sources" (p. 580).
This comment is equally applicable to quantitative and qualitative data. Few, if any, researchers can claim that their data are free from bias. The important thing is not that there is bias in the data, but where the bias lies, what their damaging effects are, and how they may be dealt with. So far as the biographical information used as sources for this study is concerned, at least three possible kinds of bias have been detected. One kind of bias may result from the reporter's lack of information on certain periods of time or from unequal amounts of information. For instance, information on foreign
travel of Chinese Communist personages is comparatively less for the
Cultural Revolution period, and foreign travel of well known figures
is reported more than that of lesser known figures. Another kind of bias may result from intentional omissions of certain types of
information. During the early 1950's, for example, when the Chinese
Communists were "leaning to the one side"— the Soviet Union— a number of Party cadres were presumably sent to the Soviet Union for training or study; few, if any, biographical sources on the Chinese Communist personages reported that kind of information. Still another kind of bias may result from intentional distortion of fact on certain types of information. For instance, the Chinese Communists tend to de- emphasize the bourgeois and non-proletarian social origin of their
Party members, whereas the Chinese Nationalists tend to do the opposite. As a result, biographical information that is based on original sources from either side is likely to inherit the bias there
in. How can the researcher deal with various kinds of bias that may
exist in biographical information? Aside from making use of multiple sources of information and cross-checking the sources as much as 22 possible, both of which were measures taken for this study, there are few effective means of getting rid of the bias in the data. One way is to exclude certain categories of data, which has been done with foreign travel data collected for this study. Another way is to make limited use of certain categories of data, which has been done with data collected for this study on social status of the family. Still another way is to indicate in the analysis that certain categories of data may be biased, which has been done with data collected for this study on education/training in the U.S.S.R. Given the awareness of possible biases and possible errors in the biographical information used, and given the various measures taken to cope with them, those categories of data that were used in this study should prove fairly reliable in that they capture the essence of reality.
Types of Categories/Variables Used
While there are limits to the types of categories/variables that can be constructed out of biographical information, demographic and social background does not exhaust the possibilities. A heavy reliance on demographic and social background variables may cause some problems in data collection. For one thing, the reliability of certain social background information is likely to be biased. A case in point is social status of the family, which was previously alluded to. For another, no matter how ingenious a researcher may be, the number of demographic and social background variables that can be constructed is quite small. So far there has been no political theory developed that is parsimonious enough to make use of a handful 23 of demographic and social background variables to offer much explana tion. It is probably true that demographic and social background variables alone are of limited explanatory power; they need to be coupled with other types of variables. Fortunately, biographical information on Chinese Communist personages generally contains more about their political experience and careers than about their social backgrounds. Recent students of Chinese Communist elites, such as
Waller (1973) and Scalapino (1972b), have made use of some categories other than demographic and social background in their studies. But there seems to be more that may be extracted from biographical information.
In view of the neglect of certain possibilities in the biographi cal information on Chinese Communist personages, a determined effort has been made here to extract as much data as possible out of it. As a result, a total of 238 variables has been constructed (see the codebook in Appendix B) for each of the elite individuals under study. As the number of variables appears too large to be reasonable, mention must be made that a fairly large number of those variables consists of positional variables of different time periods. In terms of types, most of the 238 variables may be classified under four clusters: demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers.
To mention a few examples here, the variable cluster of demographic and social background includes date of birth, native province, and social status of the family; the variable cluster of initial political 24 socialization includes level of education and date of joining the
Party; the variable cluster of Party political socialization includes special military/political training and participation in important
Party events; and the variable cluster of current careers includes positions, type of work, place of work, and concurrent position holding.
Now that it has been indicated that the data set created for this study mainly consists of four variable clusters of personal attri butes, mention needs to be made of how those variables have been
"scaled," which involves classifying or measuring. First of all, there is a difference between classifying and measuring. If a researcher "scales a variable qualitatively, that is, without numerical relationship, then he is classifying the categories of the variable" (Simon, 1969, p. 292). But "if he scales a value quantitatively, that is, if there are numerical relationship among
the categories, the variable will be a measurement scale" (Ibid.).
One of the implications of this distinction between classifying and measuring is that the former requires less precision of information
than the latter. Given the fact that the data sources are biographi
cal and that the data to be extracted from them are non-attitudinal and non-behavioral, classifying rather than measuring is the process used here in dealing with most variables. Even then, any classifica
tion entails the loss of information and individuality. But, after
all,
The real question, however, is not whether or not the items that you lump together are different in some ways, but rather whether or not they are similar for your purposes. If they are, your classification is perfectly satisfactory. (Simon, 1969, p. 294) 25
While no claim is made that the classification schemes used in this
study (see the codebook in Appendix B) are better than others, they seem best to serve the purpose of this inquiry.
Techniques for Data Analysis
In data-based research, data analysis is a crucial part of the
research effort. The techniques for data analysis, wisely used, will
give meaning to the data and help to solve research questions. How
ever, the techniques in general and the statistical methods in particu
lar should not be sanctified. Research that employs a certain techni
que does not necessarily carry with it the sign of excellence. Nor
is research that displays the "law of the hammer," that is, aimless
demonstration of a technique, to be valued. The appropriate techniques
for data analysis hinge upon the research questions to be addressed,
and whether or not the available data meet the underlying assumptions
and requirements of the technique to be used must also be taken into
consideration. It is these basic orientations that guide the
selection of techniques for data analysis in this study. Whenever proper and fitting, simple methods will be chosen in lieu of more
sophisticated ones so that there will be no "overkill." The first
research task of this study, a systematic inquiry into elite change
in various dimensions, will make this principle evident. In coping with the second research task, the attempt to explain elite change,
however, more sophisticated techniques will have to be used. Because
of the complexity that inheres in many social phenomona, any single
factor explanation is likely to be unsatisfactory. Consequently, 26
instead of a bivariate mode of analysis, multivariate analysis, which has the capacity to take a number of variables into consideration
simultaneously, will be opted for in this inquiry. The multivariate method selected and the rationale for its selection will be fully
discussed in Chapter V.
Organization of this Study
In this introductory chapter, all essentials of this study have
been dealt with. Chapters II, III, and IV will be devoted to the
first research task, a systematic inquiry into elite change in the
CCP in various dimensions. Chapter II will analyze summary indicators
of elite change and elite change in demographic and social background,
Chapter III elite change in political socialization, and Chapter IV
elite change in current careers. Demographic and social background,
political socialization, and current careers provide substantive
indicators with which to study changes in elite composition. The
purpose of this part of the inquiry is to identify those changes and
trends in change, and to draw implications for the future. During
the analysis, reference will be made to the literature on elite change
in general and that of elite change in the CCP in particular. Chap
ters V, VI, and VII will deal with the second research task of this
study, the attempt to explain elite change. In Chapter V, a con
ceptual scheme for studying the dynamics of elite change will be
presented, and the appropriate research method for this inquiry will
be discussed. Chapter VI will be focused on political promotion,
using a multivariate statistical method to distinguish the new 27
elite from the old elite in terms of personal attributes and thereby
to demonstrate wherein lies the "newness" of the new elite. Four
sub-set data of four different time periods will be used in the
analysis; the discriminating characteristics that set the new elite
apart from the old elite are presumably different at each time period, which reflects at least the changing needs perceived by the Party
leadership. Chapter VII will be focused on political purge and
political survival, using the same multivariate statistical method to
distinguish the political purged from the political survivors in terms
of personal attributes and thereby to demonstrate the discriminating
characteristics that differentiate between the two groups. Six sub
set data of two different time periods will be employed in the
analysis so that some generalized statements may be made about poli
tical purge and political survival. The purpose of this part of the
analysis is to pursue theoretical concern in terms both of scientific
explanation and of taking steps toward building empirical theory.
Chapter VIII, the conclusion, will be mainly devoted to evaluating
how successfully the explanatory endeavor has been executed, as this
theoretical concern constitutes the main thrust of this study of
elite change in the Chinese Communist Party. NOTES
-*-On Pareto's theory of elite circulation see also Bottomore, 1964, pp. 42-48 and Parry, 1969, pp. 60-63.
^On Mosca's theory of elite change, see also Meisel, 1962, Bottomore, 1964, pp. 26-27, 50-51, and Parry, 1969, pp. 35-42.
^The data on the political fate of alternate members of the 7th to the 9th Central Committees are presented as follows:
Alternate Members of the 7th CC Alternate Members of the 8th CC
N%N %
7A to 7 = 4 (12.1) 8A to 8 = 7 ( 7.1) 7A to 8 = 23 (69.7) 8A to 9 = 12 (12.2) 7A to 8A = 3 ( 9.1) 8A to 9A = 3 ( 3.1) 7A to P = 3 ( 9.1) 8A to P = 67 (68.4) 8A to D = 9 ( 9.2) Total 33 (100.0) Total 98 (100.0)
Alternate Members of the 9th CC Symbols: A = alternate member Plain numerals = N .% full member P = no membership in 9A to 10 = 18 (16.5) the succeeding CC 9A to 10A = 62 (56.9) D = Death 9A to P = 29 (26.6)
Total 109 (100.0)
^This finding of insignificant relationship between full and alternate membership in the Central Committees of the CCP is con gruent with that of one of few studies of alternate membership in the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Shapiro, 1974).
28 29
^Derek Waller’s study of membership in the Central Executive Councils and in the 8th Central Committee was published in two places (Scalapino, ed., 1972 and Beck et al., 1973) with two differ ent titles, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Political Elite, 1931-1956," and "The Chinese Communist Political Elite: Continuity and Innovation," respectively. In substance, these two articles are different in so far as the latter article has an additional section: "The Eighth Central Committee: Cooptation and Change." Since the latter article represents Waller's latest research on the same subject matter of inquiry, henceforth references will be made to this article (1973).
^The accounting of total number of cases for this study is as follows: the full membership of the 7th CC, as was first announced by the CCP^was 44 (URI, 1966, pp. 703-704). Between 1945 and 1950, four alternate members of the 7th CC were promoted to full member ship. Thus, membership in the 7th CC was counted to be 48. The membership of the 8th CC announced in September 1956 was 97 (URI, 1966, pp. 703-704). In 1958, seven alternate members of the 8th CC were promoted to full membership. Thus, membership in the 8th CC was counted to be 104. Membership in the 9th CC was 170 (URI, 1970, pp. 797-799), without any publicly announced additions before the convocation of the 10th CC in August 1973. Likewise, membership in the 10th CC was 195 (URI, 1975, pp. 1-3), without any publicly announced additions in May 1974, when the data was collected for this research. By additing full membership in the 7th CC (48), the 8th CC (104), the 9th CC (170), and the 10th CC (195), a total number of 517 was arrived at.
^The multiple sources of biographical information on the Chinese Communist personages that were used in the data-extracting process for this study are listed as follows:
American Consulate General, Biographic Files, September 1968 to July 1974, Hong Kong. Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965, 2 Vols., U.S.A., 1971. Kuo, ed., Chung-kung Jen-ming Lu (Who's Who of Chinese Communists), Taipei, 1967. Huang, Chung-kung Chun-.jen Chih (Mao’s Generals), Hong Kong, 1968. ISCCP, Yearbook on Chinese Communism, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974, Taipei. URI, Who's Who in Communist China, 1966, 1969, and 1970, Hong Kong. , Biographical Service, September 1968 to July 1974, Hong Kong. , Hierarchies of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, 1975. 30
Full citations of these sources are in the List of References on pp. 201-208. For a discussion of some of these sources, see Klein, 1972. Chapter II
Elite Change: Summary Indicators and Demographic and Social Background
Before analyzing change in elite composition in various dimen sions, it will be useful to provide some summary measures to indicate that there has been change in the Chinese Communist elite over time and to present implications that may be drawn from the summary indi cators of change. Two summary measures of elite change in the CCP will be discussed, elite size and elite turnover. Elite size and elite turnover are primarily used here as broad-guage indicators of elite change rather than as indicators of some other concepts, so the prob lem of their validity does not arise. As a matter of fact, in this descriptive and univariate analysis of elite change, which comprises
Chapters II, III, and IV, a deliberate effort will be made to avoid saying that what is presented is an indicator of any theoretical concept, unless such a statement is warranted.
(1) Elite Size: The date on change in elite size over time, i.e., change in Central Committee membership in accordiance with the operational definition of the CCP elite in this study, are displayed in Table 2.1. While the data give clear indication of an increase in elite size, they do not necessarily mean a trend toward elite accommodation or upward mobility. In order to engage in a meaningful discussion of the degree of elite accommodation, it is necessary to make a comparison of change in membership in the Central Committee with that in Party membership in the same periods. Information on CCP mem bership in the corresponding time periods (in approximate figures) is presented in Table 2.2. A comparison of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 shows that the increase in CC membership between 1945 and 1956 was slightly over twofold (2.17), while the increase of of CCP me .p during the same period was almost ninefold (8.87). The dispa. _ty in the in crease between membership in the CC and that in the CCP at the two successive points in time is likewise apparent. A ratio graph that accentuates the different rates of increase between CC membership and
CCP membership is presented in Figure 2.1. If two curves run parallel in a ratiograph, the two rates of change are the same. In Figure
2.1, only one part of the two curves runs parallel, that between
1956 and 1969, where the rates of increase in CC membership and in
CCP membership were approximately the same. The rest of the two curves are not parallel. One implication of the disparity in increase between
CC membership and CCP membership in other time periods is that elite accommodation in those time periods was not adequate. In other words, there were acute competition fox* CC membership in the periods in which there was a disparity in the increase between membership in the CC and that in the CCP. Thus, it might not be far-fetched to see some connection between the disparity in the increases of CC membership and CCP membership from 1945 to 1956 and the subsequent revolt against the Party, the Cultural Revolution that occurred in the mid-1966.
When the dust of Cultural Revolution settled with the convocation of 33
Table 2.1. Trends in Elite Size: Membership in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
Central 7th 8th 9th 10th Committee (1945) (1956) (1969) (1973)
Membership 48 104 170 195
Ratio of 7th CC 1 2.17 3.54 4.06
Table 2.2. Trends in Membership in the Chinese Communist Party, 1945-1973
CCP 1945 1956 1969 1973
Membership3 121b 1073b 1800c 2800d
Ratio of 1945 1 8.87 14.88 23.14
^Membership in 1000.
bFrom Lewis, 1963, pp. 110-111.
cEstimated figure from Ming Pao Monthly (Hong Kong) No. 697, October, 1973, p. 12.
dFrom Peking Review, Nos. 35 and 36 (September 7, 1973), p. 6. 34
Ratio 23.14
14.88
8,87
Membership in the Chinese Communits Party
3.54
2.17
Membership in the Central Committees of the CCP
Time
1945 1956 1969 1973
Figure 2.1. Rate of Change between Membership in the Central Committees and Membership in the Chinese Communist Party, 1945-73 (ratio graph) the 9th CC in 1969, the increase in CC membership in the 9th CC corresponded with that of the increase in CCP membership up to that point. A renewed disparity in the increases of CC membership and CCP membership is seen again at the time of the 10th CC, although it is of lesser magnitude. While this may not presage that a "revolution" similar to the Cultural Revolution is likely to occur in the future, the increased difficulties in attaining CC membership may be a source of discontint among Party members.
(2) Elite Turnover: In each Central Committee, some members were carried over to the succeeding Central Committee, some were not, and some died during their tenure. Consequently, there are always new members that are brought into the Central Committee for the first time. The carry-over may be called the old elite, and the new members the new elite. Elite Turnover refers to the new members of an elite or the new elite at a given time; the elite turnover rate refers to the ratio of new members to total members of an elite in percentages.'*' The elite turnover rate in the CCP through the 9th CC, as is shown in Table 2.3, was considerable; from 52.1% at the 7th CC, upward to 60.6% at the 8th CC, and up again to 78.8% at the 9th CC.
At the 10th CC, however, the turnover rate was down to 37.4%. While there is always elite turnover through time, a high or low elite turn over is of some theoretical significance. After a review of studies of elite turnover in several political systems, Robert Putnam (1976) has concluded that "within a single system turnover seems to vary in accord with two general rules" (p. 65). The first rule is that "high 36
Table 2.3 Elite Turnover Rates in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
New elite 52.1 60.6 78.8 37.4 (.25) (63) (134) (73)
Old elite 47.9 39.4 21.2 62.6 (23) (41) (36) (122)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
turnover is associated with periods of crisis, while low turnover is associated with institutional stability and political tranquility";
the second rule is that "turnover within an elite institution tends
to decline as the institution ages" (Ibid.). Putnam's first rule of
elite turnover seems to fit the case of China. The crisis of the
Cultural Revolution was reflected by a high turnover rate in the membership in the 9th CC, and in the aftermath of LinPiao's alleged plot against Mao, institutional stability was maintained, as is
shown in the low turnover rate in the 10th CC.
What can be said about elite turnover rate and politics or policy? "This question has evoked much specualtion," remarked
Putnam, "but little hard research" (p. 66). According to him, the speculation centers on three broad hypotheses:
[I] The higher the degree of elite turnover, the greater a system's innovativeness and flexibility in terms of policy. 37
[II] The higher the degree of elite turnover, the lower the average level of elite experience, expertise, and effectiveness.
[Ill] The higher the degree of elite turnover, the greater the number of persons who will have a chance to attain elite status, (p. 66-67)
Hypothesis I seems to be highly plausible. Brzezinski and
Huntington (1963) wrote that elite turnover "does not guarantee new policies, but it makes them possible" (p. 181). Hypothesis II seems to be a rational expectation. As Raymond Hopkins (1969) remarked,
"the capacity of a political system and its ability to make effective changes...might be assoicated with stability of executive tenure"
(p. 84). Hypothesis III seems to be true by mathematical probability.
The result of more persons having chances to attain elite status would be political stability: "one of the basic questions about any system of public order is how smoothly it provides career opportunities to each successive generation" (Marvick, 1968, p. 279). It is plausible that the elite turnover rate may have manifold implications as discussed above, but without specifying what kind of politics or policy is involved, nothing can be definitely said about the general relationship between policy and the elite turnover rate. Such is the case with the elite turnover rate in the CCP.
Both elite size and elite turnover in the CCP show considerable change over time, but both are designated as summary indicators of change in that they may represent only cosmetic change. By "cosmetic change" is meant quantitative change which may not necessarily indicate qualitative change. If one person is replaced by another person who has similar personal attributes, elite composition will remain the 38 same. A better perspective on elite change, therefore, will be obtained from an inquiry into the personal attributes of elite indi viduals. For the purpose of this study, as was mentioned previously, personal attributes comprise four variable clusters: demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers. The remainder of this chapter deals with elite change in demographic and social background.
Elite Change: Demographic and Social Background
Certain external characterisitcs of a person have been labelled either as "demographic and social background" or "social background" or simply "background." There seems to be no consensus among the scholarly community as to the scope of external characteristics. Some commonly used categories include age, place of birth, enthnicity, sex, religion, education, and occupation. Interest in a person's background seems to be a daily practice; when information on an unknown person is desired, the first step we take is to look into his "background."
The underlying assumption of this interest in people's backgrounds is that their backgrounds may give at least some clues to their likely attitudes or behavior. Scholarly interest in the study of the social background of political leaders or elites has been based on, in the words of Donald Matthews (1954), "the conviction that the political decision-maker's behavior and decisions are influenced by his personal life experiences" (p. 2). Social background is seen as a shorthand expression of personal life experiences; thus there is a simplisitic model: Social background ------> behavior 39
But some categories, such as education and occupation, that have been labelled as social background are more likely indicators of socialization than of a person's origin or traits by birth. A distinction between the two results in a refined or developmental model:
social background ---- » socialization behavior
In the study of American legislators, several scholars (Wahlke, Eulau,
Buchanan and Ferguson, 1962; Barber, 1965) have found that when a person holds public office, role expectations are equally important, if not more important, than social background in understanding his behavior. Thus, there is a psychological or intervening model:
roles t social background > socialization----»■ behavior
Herein lies the theoretical interest in the study of social background of the CCP elite. In the second research task of this study a theoretical interest in the relative potency of social background, political socialization, and role variables in affecting political purge and political survival will be pursued; in this descriptive analysis of elite change, however, the variable cluster of demographic and social background will be analyzed with reference to elite representativeness.
As was mentioned previously, certain external characteristics of a person are labelled either as "demographic and social background" or "social background" or "background"; neither the term nor its scope have been agreed upon. In this study, "demographic and social background" is the term used and refers only to those characteristics 40 a person has at birth: six, date of birth, place of birth (native province), ethnicity (nationality), and social status of the family.
Elite change in the CCP will be discussed in terms of these five demographic and social background variables.
(1) Sex: No doubt there are fewer female than male Party members in the CCP, just as is the case with other political parties. Female representation in the Central Committee is clearly of minor proportion as is shown in Table 2.4. No detailed data are available on female members in the CCP,^ so it is of interest to look at female repre sentation in the Central Committee over time for a trend.
Table 2.4. Sex Representation of Membership in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7 th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Female 2.1 3.8 7.6 10.3 (1) (4) (13) (20)
Male 97.9 96.2 92.4 89.7 (47) (100) (157) (175)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
The data in Table 2.4 indicate that female representation is increas ing not only in absolute numbers, but also in proportions. Figure 2.2, a ratio graph, further demonstrates that the rate of increase of female members in the Central Committees was almost constant from the 7th CC to th 9th CC (a straight line between point data on a 41
Percentages
10.3
Time
7 th CC 8 th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Figure 2.2 Rate of Change in Female Representation in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees (ratio graph) 42 ratio graph indicates a constant rate of change), and that from the
9th CC to the 10th CC there was even a faster rate of increase. The increasing trend toward female representation in the Central Committee is unmistakable, but the available data will not permit a prediction of whether or not the increase will exhibit a faster rate than that demonstrated at the 10th CC.
(2) Nationality: "Non-Han" is used to designate all the different minorities that constitute about 6% of the Chinese population.^ A more refined classification of non-Hans is possible but rather meaningless, owing to the tiny portion that they represent in the
Central Committees. The interesting point about non-Han representa tion in the CC lies not in its minor proportion, but in its pattern of representation over time. The data in Table 2.5 indicate that non-Han representation in the Central Committees has increased in absolute numbers through time. Proportionally, however, it has
Table 2.5. Non-Han Representation in the 7th to the 10th Central Committee
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Non-Han 2.1 2.9 2.4 3.1 (1) (3) (4) (6)
Han 97.9 97.1 97.6 96.9 (47) (101) (166) (189)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) increased only slightly; the overall variation through the four points in time is within the range of 1%. Figure 2.3, a ratio graph, depicts the rate of change. With the exception of the period from the 8th CC to the 9th CC, where a decrease was shown, the two time periods, from the 7th CC to the 8th CC and from the 9th CC to the
10th CC, recorded a similar rate of increase, i.e., the two sections of the graph ran almost parallel. In this regard, it is noteworthy that non-Han representation reached a proportional decline at the
9th CC, when a large amount of "new blood" entered the Central Committee for the first time. Two possible inferences may be drawn from this phenomenon. First, it might be that not enough "qualified" non-Han
Party members could be found for the Central Committee. If that was the case, it would reflect the fact that the Party leadership had not made a special effort to recruit non-Hans in the past. If the Party leadership had perceived the need for substantially increasing the number of non-Hans in the Central Committee, they could have allowed "marginal" non-Han Party members to sit in the
CC out of political considerations. Second, it might be that during the "democratic process of consultation" for CC membership, non-Han
Party members did not voice their complaints about inadequate repre sentation in the CC, or that even if they did, the Party leadership felt safe in ignoring them. In either case, a tentative conclusion is that the non-Hans did not present a problem to the Party leader ship so far as membership in the Central Committee was concerned.
Nevertheless, non-Han representation in the CC is likely to be on 44
Percentages
3.1
2.1
Time
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Figure 2.3. Rate of Change in Non-Han Representation in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees (ratio graph) the increase at least in absolute numbers, although the magnitude of increase is likely to be within a limited range.
(3) Native Province: The term "native province" may appear vague and so need some explication. In China, "native province" is customarily used to indicate the place of origin of one's family, or at least that of one's father's generation. The Chinese do not attach much importance to the place of one's own birth; consequently, more mention is made of one's native province than of one's place of birth. This is reflected in the biographical information on
Chinese personages in general. One's native province may or may not be one's place of birth, depending on the mobility of one's family.
Because the mobility of the peasantry in China is generally low, it is almost certain that a peasant's native province is his place of birth. For a person of other social backgrounds, however, such an assumption may be a mistake. For the sake of data reliability, the variable of "native province" instead of "place of birth" is used in this study.
The current Communist division of China has twenty-one provinces, five autonomous regions, and three special cities of equal status as the largest "local" units of administration. The raw data have been coded in accordance with this classification. Although the current classification of local administrative units does not vary drastically from that which was used in the late Ch'ing era or
Republican China, there may be some discrepencies between the classi fications, depending on when a member of the Communist elite under 46 study was bom. In consideration of this possibility, the data have been aggregated in terms of six geographical regions — Northwest,
North, Northeast, East, Central South, and Southeast.^ Such a division has the added advantage of rendering current findings comparable to those of some previous studies.
Robert North (1952) has found that the Kuomintang elite came mostly from East China while the Communist elite came mostly from Central
South China. Robert Scalapino (1972b) , in a comparative study of membership in the 8th and 9th Central Committees, has found that the same is true when a comparison is made within the CCP. However, the
trend toward the decreasing prominence of the Central South China
region is visible in Table 2.6. To rearrange the data in rank order
and find the mean rank order score, the mean rank of geographical representation is shown in Table 2.7. Given the fact that Central
South China, East China, and North China constitute the main base of the Chinese population, these three regions are more likely than
the others to contribute members to the CCP. It is, therefore; no
surprise to discover that they rank as the top three regions from which the CCP elite come. This pattern of geographical representation, which may be regarded as an approximate distribution of the general
CCP membership, is likely to persist with only slight variations in
the ranks of three dominant regions in the future.
(4) Data of Birth: This is a measure of age. Age may be used to
indicate two diametrically opposite personal qualities: physical
vitality and wordly wisdom and experience. If the former quality is Table 2.6. Trends in Geographical Representation of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committee
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Central South 45.8 49.1 36.5 30.8 (22) (51) (62) (60)
East China 27.1 22.1 24.7 24.6 (13) (23) (42) (48)
North China 6.2 12.5 10.6 11.3 (3) (13) (18) (22)
Southwest 14.6 9.6 7.1 8.2 (7) (10) (12) (16)
Northeast 4.2 1.9 3.5 4.6 (2) (2) (6) (9)
Northwest 2.1 4.8 3.5 4.1 (1) (5) (6) (8)
Missing Data — — 14.1 16.4 (24) (32)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 48
Table 2.7. Mean Rank Order of Geographical Representation of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
Rank Order Mean Rank Mean Rank 7th 8th 9th 10th Order Score Order CC CC CC CC
Central South 1 1 1 1 1.0 1
East China 2 2 2 2 2.0 2
North Cina 4 3 3 3 3.3 3
Southwest 3 4 4 4 3.8 4
Northeast 5 6 5.5 5 5.4 5
Northwest 6 5 5.5 6 5.6 6
considered, younger rather than plder is desirable; if the latter is considered, olderrather younger is desirable. To capture the bene fits of both is to settle at a "middle age" as the criterion for evaluation. For a quick glance at age distribution of the CCP elite over time, summary measures are provided in Table 2.8. In terms of central tendency, the CCP elite is aging through time in spite of the change in elite composition. So far as the average or mean age is concerned, however, the average age of 46 years for members of the 7th CC can be regarded as relatively young, and the average 55.9 years for members of the 10th CC may not be con sidered quite old. In terms of variability, there seems to be a dividing line between the 8th CC and the 9th CC. In other words, the variability in age of the membership in the 7th and the 8th 49
Table 2.8. Summary Measures of Age Distribution of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC Mean age 46.0 53.3 54.4 55.9 Central Tendency Median age 44.0 51.8 56.3 59.0 Range 31 37 54 56 Variability Variance 29.84 32.45 153.01 170.89
Central Committees is of one magnitude, and that of the membership
in the 9th and the 10th Central Committees is of another.
To look into the age distribution of the CCP elite in terms of
ten-year intervals, the data in Table 2.9 shows that the members
of the 7th CC were relatively young with 68.7% of the membership belonging to the 40-49 age bracket and 14.6% to the 50-59 age bracket.
The members of the 8th CC still consisted mainly of the same two age brackets, only in reverse proportions. The age distribution of
the 9th and the 10th CC members, however, revealed a different pattern: the predominance of the three age backets of 60-69, 50-59, and 30-39. This appears to reflect what the Chinese Communists called the triple alliance of "old-middle age-young." If the triple alli ance of age groups is the desired pattern of representation, a close look at the data indicates that only the 8th CC did not have representation of the 30-39 age group. This lack of representation of the younger age group might have contributed a source of discontent within the Party which was mainifested during the Cultural Revolution. 50
Table 2.9. Trends in Age Distribution of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees*
Age (10-year intervals) 7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
80-89 ■MS. _«■• 1.8 3.6 (3) (7)
70-79 — — 4.8 5.9 7.2 (5) (10) (14)
60-69 4.2 6.7 28.8 34.4 (2) (7) (49) (67)
50-59 14.6 63.5 36.5 23.1 (7) (66) (62) (45)
40-49 68.7 25.0 7.6 8.7 (33) (26) (13) (17)
30-39 12.5 — — 18.8 21.0 (6) (32) (41)
Missing Data ---- 0.6 2.0 (1) (4)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
*Age was calculated at the time of 1945, .1956, 1969, and 1973 for the members of the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th CC respectively.
In the future, the trend toward the maintenance of a triple respre- sentation of the three age groups is likely to prevail.
It is also predictable that members in the advanced age groups may naturally pass away rather rapidly. An intriguing phenomenon occurs in this connection; both in the 9th CC and the 10th CC, the representation of the 30-39 age group was more than double that of the 40-49 age group. When an older age group is passing away from 51 the scene, the expected and natural successors are those of the next age group. Thus, the data reflect a sort of "leap frog" pattern of succession, i.e., a bypassing of the 40-49 age group. As the date of joining the Party may have a bearing on this phenomenon, further discussion will be postponed until that variable is analyzed.
(5) Social Status of the Family: Whether it is called social status of the family or social class or social origin, this variable is of theoretical interest and has been used in various types of social science research. As was mentioned in Chapter I in the discussion of types of variables used in this study, there is reason to suspect that information on the social origin of Chinese Communist person ages may be biased. Furthermore, any theoretical interest in the variable requires a fine-grained classification of it. For instance,
Eric Wolf (1969) has maintained that in peasant societies, "middle" peasants have the highest potential for revolution among the peasantry. In order to test such a hypothesis, the researcher needs to have the peasantry classified at least into poor, middle, and rich categories. There is less problem in getting information to identify the peasant background of a person than in getting information re quired to classify confidently the peasantry into refined categories; it is difficult to get such information in enough detail to be useful.
In view of the possible bias in biographical information on the social origins of Chinese Communist personages and the lack of detailed information necessary to construct refined categories for the variable, it was decided to make use of a time-honored Chinese fourfold 52 classification of social status of the family; scholar, peasant, artisan, and merchant in descending rank o r d e r . ^ With slight modifi cation on this fourfold classification scheme, adding the categories of "official" and "gentry," the data are displayed in Table 2.10.
In traditional China, the "scholar” enjoyed the highest prestige.
By taking and passing a series of Imperial Examinations, an scholar became a high official in the Imperial Government. If the scholar failed to pass all required Examinations, but had some landed prop erties, he was regarded as belonging to the gentry. That is why the categories of "official" and "gentry" were ranked below that of
"scholar". Though the above is a crude description of the ladder of success in traditional China^ it serves to show that scholars, officials, and gentry were intellectuals of different calibres, and that they were of high social status. Thus, if the categories of scholar, official, and gentry are combined into one class, and are labelled either an intellectual class or a high social class, it can be seen that 50% of the 7th CC members belonged to this class
(Cf. North, 1952). The feature of high family social status of the
CCP elite, as reflected by membership in the 7th CC, remained in the
8th CC. However, the situation has changed since the 9th CC saw the predominance of CC members whose families were of peasant background, and to a lesser degree, of worker's. This trend is sure to persist, because without a "correct" class background, an applicant has difficulties in obtaining CCP membership in the first place (Oksenberg,
1968 and Barnett, 1966). In the future, it will be interesting to Table 2.10. Trends in Social Status of the Family of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
Rank Order 7 th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC 1 1 Scholar 4.2 4.8 1.2 3.1 I (2) (5) (2) (6) High ‘ 1 Official 8.3 3.8 2.4 1.5 (Intel- J (4) (4) (4) (3) lectual) 1 Gentry 37.5 38.5 11.1 11.8 i (18) (40) (19) (23) i i I Peasant 37.5 39.4 62.9 57.9 I (18) (41) (107) (113) i 1 Worker 8.3 5.8 15.3 14.9 Low i (4) (6) (26) (29) l (Non- ' Merchant 4.2 2.9 1.8 1.0 Intel- [ (2) (3) (3) (2) lectual) , \J Missing Data — 4.8 5.3 9.8 1 (5) (9) (19)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 54 watch the proportional change between those CC members who have peasant class background and those who have worker's class background.
The CCP has not been a worker's party to date. If a drastic increase of CC members who have worker's class background is to occur, it may be caused by special treatment of the workers or may reflect a pro portional increase of CCP members who have worker's class background.
The former can not be done excessively without harmful effects, and the latter will depend largely on the pace of industrialization.
Since both have limits, the trend is likely to be toward a steady but not drastic increase in CC members who have a worker's class background.
Meanwhile, certain categories of the traditional Chinese classifica tion, such as scholar and gentry, will become increasingly useless as older members of the CCP elite pass away from the scene.
Summary of Findings
In this chapter, two summary indicators of elite change in the
CCP, elite size and elite turnover, have been presented. There is an unmistakable trend toward the increase of elite size over time.
However, the magnitude of increase,with the exception of one time period, does not match the comparable increase in CCP membership, one implication of which is inadequate elite accommodation or acute com petition for elite status. Elite turnover in the CCP has been con siderable over time. The general rule that a high turnover rate is associated with periods of crises and a low turnover rate is associated with institutional stability seems to fit the Chinese case; the high 55 turnover rate in the 9th CC and the low turnover rate in the 10th CC reflect the operation of this rule.
With respect to elite change in demographic and social background, five variables, sex, nationality, native province, date of birth, and social status of the family, were used to detect change with special reference to elite representativeness. The major findings are summarized as follows:
1. The trend toward the increase of female representation in
the CCP elite is clear and will continue.
2. Non-Han representation in the CCP elite is on the increase,
but is not likely to increase drastically.
3. The predominance of South Central China in geographical
representation, as witnessed in the past, is losing ground,
and the trend is toward three major regions: South Central
China, East China, and North China.
4. In age representation, the trend is towardthe maintenance
of the triple alliance of "old - middle age - young."
5. The pre-1969 CCP elites mainly came from families of high
social status, but since 1969, the emergence of elites with
peasant/worker family backgrounds have been witnessed. The
trend toward increasing proletarian representation in the
CCP is a sure sign for the future. NOTES
^For an innovative attempt at studying turnover, using a formula of attrition, see Casstevens and Ozinga, 1974.
^Female members were said to constitute "roughtly 10% of the entire Chinese Communist Party membership in 1956" (Kau, 1969, p. 227, footnote number 36, no sources given).
O For the few studies of minority CCP elites, see, for example, Dreyer, 1972; for a discussion of the CCP's changing policy toward national minorities, see Schwartz, 1973.
^In the aggregation of 29 provinces, autonomous regions, and speical cities into six geographical regions, Northwest China includes Sinkiang, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, and Tsinghai; North China includes Inner Mongolia, Peking, Shansi, Tienstsin, and Hopei; Northeast China includes Heilunkiang, Kirlin, and Liaoning; East China includes Fukien, Kiangsi, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Shanghai, and Shantung (plus Taiwan, which is under the control of the Chinese Nationalists); Central South China includes Kwangtu, Kwangsi, Hunan, Hupei, and Honan; and Southwest China includes Tibet, Szechuan, Yunan, and Kweichow. 5 In a study of political mobility of the CCP members, John W. Lewis (1966) also used this time-honored Chinese traditional four fold classification of social status.
^For detailed studies of the ladder of success in traditional China, see, for example, Ho, 1962 and March 1961.
56 Chapter III
Elite Change: Political Socialization
As was previously mentioned, the biographical sources on Chinese
Communist personages are quite rich in information on their political life experiences. From the perspective of political socialization, it is possible to construct a number of political socialization variables out of these biographical materials. "Political socializa tion" has been given various definitions by various writers; in this study, "political socialization" refers to "all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political behavior"
(Greenstein, 1968, p. 551). Some literature on political socializa tion (e.g., Greenstein, 1969) stresses the enduring effects of the political orientation that a person acquires during his early forma tive years, while some other literature (e.g., Prewitt, Eulau, and
Zisk, 1966-1967) supports the statement that a person’s subsequent political learning may supercede his earlier political orientations.
The different effects of political socialization experiences acquired at different periods in life call for differentiation among the types of political socialization. As a result, within the variable cluster
57 58 of political socialization, a distinction is made between initial political socialization and Party political socialization. The former refers to those political orientations that a person acquired before he joined the Party, and the latter to political learning after he joined the Party (post-recruitment socialization). In the second research task of this study, the relative potency of initial political socializtion and Party political socialization relating to political purge and political survival will be assessed; this descriptive part of the study, however, is concerned with analyzing elite change in political socialization with special reference to elite generations, which may be conceived of in various ways.
Initial Political Socialization
Initial political socialization variables include the date of joining the Party, the age when joining the Party, the level of education when joining the Party, and the type of work when joining the Party. All these varibles indicate a certain amount of political orientation or a certain level of political consciousness that a per son possesses at the time he joins the Party. After joining the Party, a member receives political socialization exclusively related to
Party activities.
(1) Date of Joining the Party: The data in Table 3.1 shows that an overwhelming majority of the 7th CC members joined the Party during the 1921-1927 period, in the early years of the Chinese Communist movement. These individuals might be called the "early revolutionary 59
Table 3.1. Trends in Date of Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
1921-1927 97.9 77.9 25.9 22.6 (Early Revolutionary period) (47) (91) (44) (44)
1928-1935 2.1 20.2 41.1 34.3 (Long March period) (1) (21) (70) (67)
1936-1945 1.9 7.6 11.3 (Anti-Japanese War period) (2) (13) (22)
1946-1949 — 2.4 1.0 (Civil War period) (4) (2)
1950-1956 — 20.0 23.1 (Post Revolutionary period I) (34) (45)
1957-1963 — 2.4 5.6 (Post Revolutionary period II) (4) (11)
Missing Data — 0.6 2.1 (1) (4)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 60 elite." The representation of the early revolutionary elite in the
8th CC, though it declined slightly from the level of the 7th CC, is still 77.9% of the total members. The 8th CC witnessed an increasing representation of those who joined the Party during the 1928-1935 period. Because the spectacular event of the Communists' "Long March" occurred during this period, those who joined the Party during this period might be called the "Long March" elite. While this group is so designated with special reference to the time period, many of the members of this group actually participated in the Long March. At the 9th CC, the early revolutionary elite decreased tremendously in proportion; representation of the Long March elite, however, increased conspicuously at the 9th CC in absolute numbers as well as in pro portions, and then began to decrease at the 10th CC. Furthermore, the 9th CC saw the emergence of CC members who joined the Party during the 1950-1956 period, the post-revolutionary period. They might be called the "post-revolutionary" elite. The emergence of the post revolutionary elite is intriguing in that they surpassed those CC members who joined the Party during the 1936-1945 and the 1946-1949 periods in representation. These were the two periods when the anti-
Japanese War and the Civil War were fought. Thus, those CC members who joined the Party during these two periods might be called the
"anti-Japanese War" elite and the "Civil War" elite respectively.
The fact that the post-revolutionary elite predominates over the anti-Japanese War elite and the Civil War elite in the 9th CC and the
10th CC reflects a sort of "leap frog" pattern of succession. This 61 is the same phenomenon that was noted during the previous discussion of date of birth of the CC members. It will be recalled that on that occasion it was found that the 30-39 age group surpassed the
40-49 age group in representation both in the 9th CC and the 10th CC.
These two different measures, date of birth and date of joining the Party, demonstrate the same "leap frog" pattern of succession.
While the two indicators may point to a possible source of discontent, the fact that more representation was given to the post-revolutionary elite than that of the anti-Japanese War elite and the Civil War elite has far-reaching implications. Does this imply that the knowledge, skills, and experience which the anti-Japanese War elite and the Civil War elite possess are less relevant to the Party in the post-revolutionary era? Or, does it imply that there is a "crisis" in succession in the sense that there are not enough qualified anti-
Japanese and Civil war elites to replace the early revolutionary and
Long March elites? The post-revolutionary elite, those who joined the Party after the end of the revolutionary wars, have no revolu tionary experience whatsoever. They matured in an environment that was markedly different from the one in which the revolutionary elites had developed. When the post-revolutionary elite become increasingly predominant in the elite composition, what will be their impact on the policy directions of the CCP? These questions can only be raised here; they cannot be answered without additional data. So far as the trend in elite composition is concerned, it is doubtful that the anti-
Japanese elite and the Civil War elite can regain their losses in representation. (2) Age When Joining the Party: In a comparative study of age as a factor in the recruitment of communist leadership, Robert Holt (1954) has reported two findings, one of which is that "the leaders of the party joined the party or became involved in other radical movements at early ages" (p. 487). The Chinese case confirms this finding as well. The data in Table 3.2 show that those CC members who joined the Party during the 16-20 and the 20-25 age periods constitute a dominant proportion in the Central Committees, and there is a trend toward an increase of early joiners. As the ladder of success in every facet of life in Communist China is mainly controlled by the
CCP (Oksenberg, 1968), the sooner a person joins the Party the better his chance of success in life. There is a sure sign for the future of an increase of early joiners, and the rate of increase can only be constrained by the rules of Party membership, which are subject to change.
Holt's second finding about the role of age in the recruitment of the Communist party leadership is that "they [early joiners] quickly became functionaries in the party and thus while still young were a part of its militant cadres" (p. 487). This is also true in the case of the CCP, as few, if any, CCP members are members
"in name only" without engaging in various revolutionary activities.
Holt has suggested this quick assumption of functionary positions as
"indicative of relatively total commitment to the Communist party"
(p. 494). If so, there seems to be a qualitative difference in this
"relatively total commitment to the Communist party" between the Table 3.2. Trends in Age When Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
16-20 16.7 31.7 57.0 58.9 (8) (33) (97) (115)
21-25 52.1 47.1 32.4 31.3 (25) (49) (55) (61)
26-30 12.5 8.7 4.1 4.1 (6) (9) (7) (8)
31-35 12.5 7.7 3.5 2.6 (6) (8) (6) (5)
36-60 6.2 4.8 2.4 1.0 (3) (5) (4) (2)
Missing Data — - 0.6 2.1 (1) (4)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 64 revolutionary elite and the post-revolutionary elite of the CCP.
The former had free choice in joining the CCP; their joining made their chances of success in life far from certain. The later has only nominal choice about joining the Party; their joining does not guarantee success in life, but their not joining guarantees failure.
The revolutionary elite took a chance because of their dedication to a cause; the post-revolutionary elite join the Party because they have to. In other words, there are motivational differences between the revolutionary elite and the post-revolutionary elite so far as joining the CCP at early age in life is concerned.
(3) Education When Joining the CCP: If a high level of education is one of hallmarks of the elite in general, then the early Chinese
Communist elite meet this criterion. This has been well documented by the findings of previous studies (North, 1952; Chao, 1959; Houn,
1957; and Waller, 1973). What is of interest, then, is to detect any change in the level of education of the later CCP elite. Ac cording to Robert Putnam (1976), there is a trend toward the "paro- chialization of post-revolutionary elites," who are "less intellectual and often less educated and who have closer ties to the indigenuous culture and to the rural heartland" (pp. 197-198) than did revolu tionary elites. So far as education is concerned, the post-revolu tionary Chinese Communist elite shows signs of parochialization.
The data in Table 3.3 indicate that 66.7% of the members in the 7th
CC had university education, and that 42.3% of the members in the
8th CC still were college educated. However, the 9th CC saw a drastic 65
Table 3.3. Trends in Level of Education When Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
High School1 4,2 6.7 40.0 42.6 (2) (7) (68) (83)
Political/ Mili tary Training^ 22.9 35.6 32.3 22.1 (11) (37) (55) (43)
Technical^ 6.2 15.4 11.8 13.8 (3) (16) (20) (27)
Univeristy^ 66.7 42.3 15.3 20.5 (32) (44) (26) (40)
Missing DAta — — 0.6 1.0 (1) (2)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
^An aggregation of the categories of "no formal education" up to "high school".
^An aggregation of the categories of various political/military schools. For details, see the codebook in Appendix B.
^Includes normal schools and agricultural schools.
^Includes foreign universities and colleges. reduction in college-educated members. A slight increase over the level of the 9th CC was shown in the 10th CC. This slight increase in college-educated members in the 10th CC may not present a genuine improvement in the educational level of the 10th CC members, however, in that college educations in China before and after the Communist takeover in 1949 are qualitatively different. If the Western notion of liberal-arts education is used as the basis for evaluating the
Chinese higher education, the least that can be said is that Chinese higher education before the Communist takeover was moving in that direction. Since the takeover, however, it has been moving away from that direction for one basic reason: the CCP repudiates the Western notion of liberal-arts education as a matter of principle. Such being the case, the parochialization of post-revolutionary Chinese Communist elites in terms of education is clear. "Parochialization" is not a neutral word, it implies at the least something undesirable. What, then, are the adverse effects of the parochialization of the post revolutionary Chinese Communist elite?
It may be argued that the importance of a high level of formal education for the elite can be over-emphasized. If the level of formal education is meant as an indicator of intellectual sophistica tion, the worldly wisdom and practical experience that also enhance intellectual sophistication should also be taken into consideration, but these opportunities for informal education seldom count, and are also difficult to measure.^ Furthermore, a person need not possess specialized knowledge in order to assume leadership positions, since making use of other people's knowledge and skills constitutes the essence of leadership. To carry the point to an extreme, the
Chinese Communist leadership has stressed that ideological conviction may help even more than technical knowledge, or that the "red" and
n the "expert" ingredients are of equal importance. While the Chinese
Communists put a premium on ideology, there is evidence to show that it has not really been done at the expense of technical knowledge.
The development of a nuclear capability for national defense and the construction of large-scale modem oil refineries, such as
Ta Ch'ing, are but some of the better known examples of Chinese
Communist technical advances. It might well be that the Party leader ship has made use of technical knowledge without giving elite status to those who possess technical expertise or without "cooptating" technicians/scientists in the Party (in contrast with the case of the
Soviet Union, where cooptation was found to be a method of recruit ment [Fleron, 1969]). From this discussion, it may be concluded that although a trend toward a decreased level of education among the
CCP elite is seen, which may not represent a sanguine prospect for the CCP according to rational reckoning, the implications or the damaging effects of this trend cannot be understood clearly, at least in the short run.
(4) Type of Work When Joining the Party: The data for this variable were originally coded in fine-grained categories (see the codebook in
Appendix B). When this proved to be not very useful, owing to the dispersion of cases across the categories, a dichotomized scheme was 68 employed with the aim of capturing the essence of revolutionary activities. It seems that revolutionary activities inevitably reflect one of two generic types of work: one that involves the propagation of ideas and the agitation of discontent, or one that involves the use of coercion and force. The success of the Chinese Communist revolution can be viewed as a case of the successful marriage of the pen and the sword. In other words, there are both identifiable initiators and instruments of revolution.
The generic types of "Party/administration" and "commander/ commissar" are the resulting dichotomy used in this classification, although they are not impeccable categories of classification.3 For the members of the 7th and the 8th Central Committees, this dichotomy was adequate to describe the work in which the members were engaged when they joined the Party. However, since the 9th CC, there have been CC members who joined the Party only after the revolutionary wars were won; they are post-revolutionary elites. When these members joined the Party in the post-revolutionary years, many of them engaged in kinds of work distinctively different from those CC members who joined the Party during the revolutionary years. That is, they were simply peasants, workers, scientists, or technicians by profession, and were not related to revolutionary activities at all. Thus, two additional categories of "worker/peasant" and
"science/technology" were used to accommodate these cases in classify ing membership in the 9th and the 10th Central Committees. As is shown in Table 3.4, the rise of the "worker/peasant" work type has 69
Table 3.4. Trends in Type of Work When Joining the Party of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Party/Administration 77.1 72.1 34.7 40.5 (37) (.75) (59) (79)
Commander/Commissar 22.9 27.9 45.9 35.4 (11) (29) (78) (69)
Worker/Peasant — — 17.6 21.1 (30) (41)
Science/Technology — — 1.2 1.5 (2) (3)
Missing Data —— 0.6 1.5 Cl) (3)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
been steadily increasing since the 9th CC, but the representation of the "science/technology" work type has been proportionately minor.
When the CCP entered the post-revolutionary era, avenues to elite status were supposed to be different. But the data in Table 3.4 indicate that the revolutionary elite (represented by the members of the 7th CC) and the first post-revolutionary elite (represented to the members of the 8th CC) remained unchanged in terms of types of work when joining the Party. It was only after the Cultural Revolu tion that the new avenue to elite status was open to those whose starting careers were worker/peasant and science/technology. In terms of the structure of the reward system of the CCP, those who started their careers in the field of Party/administration work 70 remain in first place, though they suffered a severe reduction in representation in the 9th CC. Those who started their careers in commander/commissar work occupy a second place, though their fortunes have changed over time. Those who started their careers as workers/ peasants have a promising future, but this group is likely to be in the third place. Those who started their careers in science/technol ogy have the chance to acquire elite status, but the prospect is not encouraging; hence, this group ranks in the fourth and last place.
Party Political Socialization
Party political socialization variables include special military/ political training, education/training in the U.S.S.R., participation in important Party events, memberhsip in the Central Executive
Councils (the Kiangsi Soviet period), and military affiliation. Each of these five variables reflects certain specific opportunities for
Party socialization and is assumed to make a difference to elite members in terms of career development.
(1) Special Military/Political Training: While a Party member under goes a constant process of political socialization or politicization after joining the Party, the opportunities for special military/poli tical training provide some unique socialization experience in addi tion to the special skills and knowledge that are supposed to be acquired by the end of the training. From the viewpoint of a Party member, the advantages of having special military/political training are several. For one thing, when a Party member receives special 71 training together with some comrades with whom he was not previously acquainted, it is likely to create some continuing affinity among them which could be useful to his Party career. For another, because the opportunities for special military/political training are limited, a member who has had these opportunities might regard them as political assets which are beneficial to his Party career. The data in Table 3.5 show that 56.2% and 58.7% of membership in the
7th and the 8th Central Committees received special military/political training and that this proportion has been sharply reduced since the
9th CC. Mention must be made, however, that information on special military/political training was more available for the revolutionary periods than for the post-revolutionary periods. Therefore, the data as a whole were biased toward the revolutionary periods. Consequently, a conspicuous decline in special military/political training among
CC members since the 9th CC may not necessarily indicate that they have not received such training at all, but rather that they have not
Table 3.5 Trends in Special Military/Political Training* of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC Special Training 56.2 58.7 39.4 28.2 (27) (61) (67) (55) No Special 43.8 41.3 51.8 62.6 Training (21) (43) (88) (122) Missing Data - - 8.8 9.2 (15) (18)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
*An aggregation of various sorts of military/political schools and classes. 72 received the types of special military/political training that were characteristic of the revolutionary periods. This indicates that the revolutionary elite have declined notably in representation since the
9th CC. The trend toward a further decline in the special military/ political training that was characteristic of the revolutionary per iods is sure to persist.
(2) Education/Training in the USSR: A person's education or training in a foreign country does not necessarily orient him toward that foreign country.^ However, the possibility is greater for him than for others to be subject to foreign influence for the simple reason that he has been exposed to it while they have not. The degree of influence on a person exposed to foreign experience depends upon the duration of his stay in a foreign country, the types of education or training he received, and his general tendency to resolve value con flicts in terms of foreign adoration and national pride. It is with this notion of foreign influence that significance is attached to foreign education/training.
Many members of the CCP elite received foreign education/training in various countries, and the classification of this variable may be conducted by several schemes. In this study, it is desirable to focus on the presence or absence of education/training in the U.S.S.R.
This focus does not purport to be a measure of pro-Soviet influence, but merely serves to indicate the probability of Soviet influence.
The data in Table 3.6 show that 52.1% of the members of the 7th CC had education/training in the U.S.S.R., and that the proportion 73
Table 3.6. Trends In Education/Training in the USSR of Members of the 7th CC to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
USSR 52.1 36.5 14.1 10.3 (25) (38) (24) (20)
Non-USSR* 49.9 63.5 84.7 88.2 (23) (66) (144) (172)
Missing Data — — 1.2 1.5 (2) (3)
Total % 100 100 100 r.ioo N (48) (104) (170) (195)
*Includes the category of no foreign education/training. sharply declined from the 8th CC to the 9th CC, reaching a low of
10.3% at the 10th CC. It is to be noted that the number of CC members who had education/training in the U.S.S.R. might be understated be cause the sources from which the data were extracted contained informa tion only for the period prior to 1949. Given the fact that the CCP was "leaning to the one side" in the early 1950's, it is conceivable that many Party cadres were sent to the U.S.S.R. for training or study.
However, not one single case could be found in the biographical information on the Chinese Communist elite used for this study that made mention of education or training in the U.S.S.R. after 1949.
It could be suspected that such mention has been intentionally omitted for one possible reason: since the Sino-Soviet dispute came into the open in the late 1950's, any education or training in the U.S.S.R. in the recent past has not been a political asset to be 74 proud of, but rather a political liability to be concealed. As a result, there is reason to believe that some among the "new blood" of the 9th and the 10th Central Committees might have received education/training in the U.S.S.R. during the early 1950's that is not reflected in the data. Even if the data in Table 3.6 may under state the percentages of 9th and 10th CC members who had education or training in the U.S.S.R., the obvious trend is toward a further lowering of those percentages, barring a rapprochement between
China and the Soviet Union.
(3) Participation in Important Events: Fourteen important events-* in the history of the Chinese Communist movement were selected and were combined with the records of arrest relating to Party activities.
These were used as an indicator of the extent to which CC members have endured the trials of the Party or otherwise contributed to the revolution. The significance of participation in important Party events does not rest solely in this observer's point of view. From the subjective viewpoint of a CC member, participation in important
Party events may be perceived as a political asset with which to hedge against the Party's punitive measures in case of wrong-doing or with which to justify freedom of action in various matters.
The maximum scored on the participation in important events variable is 15, but no CC member reach that score because the designated important events occurred in different years and places.
The data in Table 3.7 show that 35.4% and 25.0%of the 7th CC members had records of participation in two and three important events 75
Table 3.7. Trends in Participation in Important Events of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
Frequency 7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
0 4.2 9.6 36.5 50.8 (2) (10) (62) (99)
1 10.4 17.3 34.1 24.6 (5) (18) (58) (48)
2 35.4 32.7 11.2 9.7 (17) (34) (19) (19)
3 25.0 25.1 9.4 8.2 (12) (26) (16) (16)
4 10.4 7.7 2.3 1.5 (5) (8) (4) (3)
5 6.3 3.8 1.8 1.0 (3) (4) (3) (2)
6 to 8 8.3 3.8 1.8 1.5 (4) (4) (3) (3)
Missing Data —— 2.9 2.7 (5) (5)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 76 respectively, and that the 8th CC members maintained substantially the same proportionate participation, but that the absolute numbers doubled those of the 7th CC members. The members of the 9th CC, however, showed a decreasing amount of participation in important events. 36.5% of the 9th CC members had no record of participation at all, and 34.1% of the 9th CC members had records of participation in only one event. At the 10th CC, those who had no record of participation in important events whatsoever comprise 50.8% of the total membership. Of course, because these important Party events are past history, new comers to the Party cannot participate in them; the inevitable trend is toward a decreasing number of CC members who have participated in important events.
There is a qualitative difference between those who had some participation in the important events and those who had no participa tion at all; the latter have experienced no revolutionary struggles, which might have had a profound influence on their political outlooks.
The fact that the record of no participation in important Party events reaches the one-half mark in membership in the 10th CC is also another indication of the passing away of the revolutionary elite generations from the political scene.
(4) CEC Membership: Several meanings may be attached to membership in the Central Executive Councils during the Kiangsi Soviet period of the CCP. For one thing, such membership is an indication of prominence and Party status at that point in the hsitory of the Chinese
Communist movement. For another, because the Chinese Communists were 77 under siege in the Kiangsi Soviet, participation in its representative body unequivocally indicates that the members identified their own fate with that of the CCP in an adverse situation. Still another significance is that participation in the Kiangsi Soviet and its work signify personal commitment to a rural and indigenous approach, in contrast to an urban and Soviet-influenced approach, to the Communist movement in China.
The Central Executive Councils had "elections" in 1931 and 1934, and there were two types of membership, full and alternate. In the second research task of this study, an explanatory analysis of elite change, CEC membership will be converted into scores to facilitate data manipulation, but for the present purpose of descriptive analysis, a dichotomy of "member" and "non-member" is used. The data in
Table 3.8 indicate that 72.9% of the members of the 7th CC had CEC
Table 3.8. Trends in CEC Membership of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Member 72.9 39.4 12.9 10.3 (35) (41) (22) (20)
Non-Member 27.1 60.6 87.1 89.2 (13) (63) (148) (174)
Missing Data "*■* 0.5 (1)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 78 membership but that this proportion was sharply reduced at each successive Central Committee, with only 10.3% at the 10th CC. As with participation in important events, there is a predictable trend toward a decrease of CEC membership among CC members as time goes by.
That is another indication of the passing away of the revolutionary generations in the CCP elite.
(5) Military Afiliation: The esprit de corps required of the fighting forces was the most demanding required of any workers of the CCP during the revolutionary periods. It could be so highly developed that fighting men attached special meaning to the units to which they belonged. This development is a plausable cause of factionalism among military units of the CCP. The literature on Chinese politics
(Whitson, 1973, Chapter 12) has it that the formation of the Field
Army system during the Civil War period led to factionalism of the People's Liberation Army into five distinctive affiliations,
First Field Army, Second Field Army, Third Field Army, Fourth Field
Army, and Fifth Field Army. This notion of the Field Army system or
Hsi Tung provides another means by which to look into the elite com position of the CCP.
The Field Armies were derived from their predecessors: the
115th, 120th, 129th Divisions, and the New Fourth Army during the period of the anti-Japanese War. These military designations of the anti-Japanese War period were used in conjunction with the Field
Army designations of the Civil War period to display the data on military affiliation in Table 3.9, with the former for the 7th CC 79
Table 3.9 Trends in Military Affiliation of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
120th Division/ 8.3 11.5 4.1 6.2 1st Field Army (4) (12) (7) (12)
129th Division/ 10.4 16.4 15.9 14.8 2nd Field Army (5) (17) (27) (29)
New 4th Army/ 20.8 10.6 8.8 10.8 3rd Field Army (10) (11) (15) (21)
115th Division/ 8.3 22.1 21.7 10.3 4th Field Army (4) (23) (37) (20)
5th Field Army 10.6 6.5 5.6 (11) \ (11) \ (11) > 43.9 12.5 8.9 (21) (13) (15) Central Military 1 . 9 / 2 . 4 / 2.6 (2) (4) (5)
Non-Military 8.3 26.9 38.8 44.1 (4) (28) (66) (86)
Missing Data — — 1.8 5.6 (3) (11)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) 80 members and the latter for the 8th to the 10th CC members. As a matter of fact, in the Field Armies there was no official designation of the
Fifth Field Amy, which is a label used by some scholars such as
William Witson to refer to those armed forces that were under the direct command of the central CCP leadership. The category of
"central military” is used here to refer to those military personnel who have worked in the central military headquarters and who have no
traceable affiliations with any field Armies.
Two major observations may be made from this data, the first of which is concerned with the CCP elite during the revolutionary war period, and the second of which with the post-revolutionary period.
During the revolutionary war period, the CCP elite, represented by members of the 7th CC, overwhelmingly had military affiliations.
43.9% of the revolutionary elite was affiliated with the Central
Military, and so the Party leadership itself could be considered a military force; those affiliated with the four major wartime military
units (the 120th Division, the 129th Division, the New Fourth Amy,
and the 115th Division) constituted another 47.8%. The military
character of the CCP elite at the time of the 7th CC of 1945 might
have been necessary because of the War of Anti-Japanese Aggression;
this should not, however, obscure the fact that the CCP was essentially
an armed forces in rebellion, as a U.S. foreign service officer
reported as early as 1932 (Clubb, 1968). In contrast, the CCP elite
of the post-revolutionary era, as represented by membership in the
8th, 9th, and 10th Central Committees, showed a declining trend in 81 military affiliation. In examining the representation of Field Armies in the post-revolutionary era, it is interesting to note that the representation of the 2nd and 3rd Field Armies was rather stable over time within a limited range of variation, whereas the representa tion of the 1st and 4th Field Armies had its ups and downs. The 1st
Field Army suffered from a sharp decline in representation at the
9th CC but made a slight recovery at the 10th CC, while the 4th
Field Army had a significant proportion in representation at the 8th and 9th Central Committees hut sustained a one-half loss at the 10th
CC. The concept of the CCP military as being composed of factions may help make clear these shifts. Prior to the 9th CC, the prominent leader of the 1st Field Army, Ho Lung, was purged because of alleged anti-Party activities, and likewise, prior to the 10th CC, the promin ent leader of the 4th Field Army, LinPiao fell politically (and physically) because of an alleged anti-Mao plot. The loss of their leading figures may account for the political misfortune of the 1st and 4th Field Armies at the 9th and 10th Central Committees respective ly. The rather stable pattern of representation of the 2nd and 3rd
Field Armies might be attributable to the-Chinese political wisdom which their leaders kept in mind. The Chinese seem to have long discovered the applicability of the Law of Gravity to human affairs, as they assert: "When one climbs high politically, one is likely to fall down heavily." The fact that the 2nd and 3rd Field Armies enjoyed a stable proportion in representation over time might well be 82 a reflection of the less aggressive posture that their leaders took on advancing their members to elite status. As a final remark, the
Field Army designations have long been abolished by the CCP, and their leading "backbone" members are gradually passing away from the scene.
It will become increasingly irrelevant as well as difficult to identify military affiliations in terms of Field Armies; consequently, the usefulness of Field Army system as a conceptual scheme to comprehend
Chinese politics is likely diminishing.
Summary of Findings
In this chapter, elite change in political socialization has been analyzed in terms of two sub-categories of initial political sociali zation and Party political socialization. The former aims at giving some indication of the political orientation that elite individuals might have had at the time of their joining the Party, and the latter at giving some indication of post-recruitment opportunities for poli tical socialization. This descriptive analysis of elite change in political socialization attempts to bring to light that there are different elite generations in the CCP elite in terms of different opportunities for political learning.
With respect to initial political socialization, four variables, i.e., date of joining the Party, age when joining the Party, educa tion when joining the Party, and type of work when joining the Party, were examined. The major findings can be summarized as follows:
1. In terms of age when joining the Party, five elite generations are identifiable, namely, the early revolutionary elite, the Long 83
March elite, the anti-Japanese War elite, the Civil War elite, and the post-revolutionary elite. The trend toward the passing away of the early revolutionary and Long March elites is clear. There may be a "crisis" of elite succession in that a leap frog pattern has been found in the rise of the post-revolutionary elite at the expense of the anti-Japanese War elite and the Civil War elite since the 9th CC in 1969.
2. The Chinese case confirmed the finding of previous studies of recruitment of Communist party leadership that the Communist elite are those who joined the Party early in life. Because the ladder of success in every facet of life in China cannot be divorced from the CCP, the trend toward joining the Party as early as possible in life appears irreversible.
3. A majority of early CCP revolutionary elites had a univer sity-level education, but the trend toward the lowering of the educational level among post-revolutionary elites is discernible. A lower level of education is sometimes said to be a sign of parochiali zation of post-revolutionary elites. But the adverse consequences of the lower level of education among the post-revolutionary elite of the CCP are not readily apparent, in view of the fact that the Party leadership may utilize the technical knowledge of those who possess it without giving them elite status.
4. For the revolutionary elite and the early post-revolutionary elite, two generic types of careers, Party/administration and com mander/commissar, were adequate to capture the essence of their work 84 when joining the Party. Beginning with the data for the 9th CC, however, there has been a need for adding two other types of work to accommodate the newly emerged elites who started their careers as workers/peasants or in the field of science/technology. While the path to elite status is seen to have been broadened, the structure of the reward system of the CCP is and will be in favor of professional
Party functionaries.
In inquiring into Party political socialization, five variables-- special military/political training, education/training in the USSR, participation in important events, membership in the Central Execu tive Councils, and military affiliation— were employed. The following are the major findings:
1. Since the 9th CC, there has been a decreasing proportion of the CCP elite who received the special military/political training that was characteristic of the revolutionary periods. Because this special military/political training is too much a matter of past history to allow the late comers to share in it, the trend toward further decline is inevitable. This gives an indication of changes in elite generations.
2. The 9th CC of 1969 served as a dividing line between those elite members who had education/training in the USSR and those who had not. A considerable proportion of pre-Cultural Revolution elites received education/training in the USSR, whereas the proportion of post-Cultural Revolution elites who received such training has 85 sharply declined. So long as the Sino-Soviet rapprochement is not renewed, the trend toward a further decline is predictable.
3. Important Party events were related to the hardship and ordeal of the revolutionary periods of the CCP. Such being the case, the number of participants in important events among the CCP elite is decreasing as an inevitable result of the passing away of the older revolutionary elite. The trend toward this decrease is irreversible.
4. Membership in the Central Executive Councils during the
Kiangsi Soviet period is an unique experience. As such, CEC member ship is of a restrictive and closed-ended nature. It is inevitable that a decreasing trend has been shown over time, most noticeably since the 9th CC of 1969.
5. A majority of revolutionary elites had military affiliations, and even the Party leadership constituted a sizable military force per se. Post-revolutionary elites showed a trend toward declining military affiliations, which reflected the changing environment of the Party. Factionalism of the CCP military units as conceived in terms of Field Armies may outlive its usefulness as time goes by. NOTES
^"During U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger’s visit to Peking in December, 1974, when he met with the then PRC's acting Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing for the first time, Teng reportedly told Kissinger that he had no formal education, but was a graduate of the university of "the world." Practical work experiences are something that the CCP leaders emphasize and take pride in.
^The red vs. expert controversy is a topic of interest to many students of Chinese politics. For an early discussion of the topic, see Schurmann, 1968. For recent research, see Kringen, 1975.
■^In China, there is a conventional classification of official work, which has been used by both the Communists and the Nationalists. That is a triplet of Tung - Cheng - Chun, which may be translated as Party work, administrative work, and military work, or simply as Party, State, and Military. However, the lines of demarcation among the three are hard to distinguish, especially that between Party and administrative work. To dichotomize all types of work into military and non-military appears to be an easier way out of the situation. Even with this dichotomy, however, a problem arises with the category of the military. Party workers in the military are called "commissar". As specialized Party workers, commissars should be classified under the category of non-military. However, the sources give numerous instances in which military commanders and political commissars freq uently exchanged positions, especially during the revolutionary war periods. To resolve this problem, we decided to classify political commissars as military personnel.
^For a study of foreign contacts and attitude change, see, for example, Merritt, 1967.
% h e 14 important events that were selected from the history of the Chinese movement are as follows:
1/ Chinese Revolution of 1911 2/ May 4th Movement (1914) 3/ Peasant Movement Institute in Canton (1924-1926)
86 87
4/ May 30th Incident (1925) 5/ Northern Expedition (1926) 6/ Nanchang Uprising (1927) 7/ Autumn Harvest Uprisings (1927) 8/ Ching-kang-shan (1927-28) 9/ Canton Commune (1927) 10/ Ping-Chiang Uprising (1928) 11/ Fu-Tien Incident (1930) 12/ Long March (1934-1936) 13/ Other armed uprisings 14/ Other student/worker's demonstrations
^This maximum score on participation in important events includes the record of arrest in connection with Party activities. For brevity "participation in important events" is the phrase to be used henceforth with an understanding that the score might include a record of arrest. Chapter IV
Elite Change; Current Careers
The current careers of Chinese Communist elite members is another type of information that can and has been extracted from the biographical information on the CCP elite under study. Why inquire into the current careers of elite members? On practical grounds, current careers are those Party activities that elite indi viduals are engaged in and that constitute the whole of the political life of the CCP elite. It is on those political activities that the ladder of success in Chinese life depends. On theoretical grounds, the current careers involve certain role expectations from the Party leadership and certain role performance to be judged by the Party leadership. From the perspective of role theory; (e.g., Biddle and
Thomas, ed., 1966) a political institution, such as a political party, is viewed as a set of behavior patterns associated with roles. In view of the practical and theoretical significance of the current careers, eight variables have been constructed to give some indica tion of the different role expectations and role performance demanded of elite individuals, although these variables are not purported to measure the concepts of role expectations and role performance as 89 such. While in the second research task of this study, an explanatory analysis of elite change, the relevance of current career variables relating to political purge and political survival will be tested,
this descriptive part of the study is concerned with analyzing change in each of the current career variables taken individually and with
indicating the implications of change.
(1) Positional Scores: Positions are expressed in the form of scores
in order to make the different positions that an elite member has held
comparable and in order to handle the holding of concurrent positions
(see the scheme for constructing positional scores in Appendix C).
The positional scores were constructed cumulatively with the founding
of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, as the baseline
for computation. Consequently, the data for positional scores were not available for members of the 7th CC, which was "elected" in
April, 1945. It would have been desirable to move the baseline for
constructing positional scores back to April, 1945, but because the positional classification of the CCP during the wartime years was in
a state of flux, this was not feasible. Computing positional scores
cumulatively has the additional advantage of making positions compar
able over time. Since the positional scores are computed cumulatively,
it is inevitable that positional scores are increasing over time.
Nevertheless, the trend is clear, as is shown in Table 4.1, the membership in the 9th and the 10th Central Committees includes more
persons who have low positional scores than that of the 8th Central 90
Table 4.1. Trends in Cumulative Positional Scores of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
0 - 50* 10.6 48.2 44.6 (11) (82) (87)
51 - 100 54.8 16.4 21.0 (57) (28) (41)
101 - 150 23.1 14.1 13.8 (24) (24) (27)
151 - 200 9.6 9.4 10.3 (10) (16) (20)
201 - 250 1,9 5.9 3.6 (2) (10) (7)
251 - 300 — 1.8 2.1 (3) (4)
301 - 350 — 1.8 3.1 (3) (6)
351 - 400 — 1.8 1.0 (3) (2)
401 - 450 — 0.6 0.0 (1)
451 - 484 — — 0.5 (30
Total % 100 100 100 N (104) (170) (195)
*It is possible for a CC member to have a positional score of zero, if he has not held any position that is on the specified posi tion list. For that list, see Appendix C. 91
Committee. For instance, 10.6% of the members of the 8th CC had positional scores that fell within the 0-50 category, and the pro portion increased to 48.2% in the membership in the 9th CC. It decreased slightly to 44.6% in the membership in the 10th CC, while the absolute number of Party members in this category increased about eightfold (from 11 to 87) over time. Since positional scores are cumulative, a low positional score means fewer positions have been held. Because the positions specified for constructing positional scores are necessarily selective and are confined to certain key positions in the Party, the administration, the military, and the
*1 "non-governmental" organizations, the lower the score for an elite individual, the fewer key positions he has held in these fields. In other words, the emergence of "new blood" who are characterized by having held fewer key positions in various fields is evident since the 9th CC. As such, these members may be called "non-strategic elites." In contrast, those who have held more key positions in various fields may be called "strategic elites."^ The emergence of non-strategic elites in the Central Committees opens up a new path to elite status, and, at the same time, indicates that the newer members of the CCP elite are less experienced in governing. The trend toward the increase of non-strategic elites is likely to persist.
More will be said about the usefulness of differentiating strategic and non-strategic elites when the type of work variable is discussed later in this chapter. 92
(2) Concurrent Position Holding: The holding of concurrent positions is not a practice that is unique to the Chinese political system; instances can be found in other communist systems such as those of the East European countries. However, the trends in those countries have been toward decreasing practice of concurrent position holding
(Welsh, 1969, p. 324). The literature on comparative politics (Almond and Powell, 1966, p. 22) has it that role differentiation or structural differentiation is one sign of political development. Viewed from this perspective, the pattern of concurrent position holding may give some indication of role differentiation or structural differentiation, which in turn reflects political development. It is of interest, therefore, to examine the extent to which the Chinese Communist system is developed in terms of role differentiation or structural differenti ation.
The data on concurrent position holding is presented in Table 4.2.
Just as the positional scores were computed only for the period after the establishment of the Communist regime, so it was with the variable of concurrent position holding for the same reason. As a result, the available data included only members of the 8th to the 10th Central
Committees. The data show that at the 8th CC, those who held two and three concurrent positions had an equal proportion of 30.8%; at the 9th CC, the percentage who held two concurrent positions increased more than twice as much as the percentage who held three concurrent positions (48.2% vs. 19,2%). This changed pattern of the holding of concurrent positions in the 9th CC does not really indicate a decreasing 93
Table 4.2. Trends In Concurrent Position Holding* of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
Concurrent Positions 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
1 14.5 26.5 26.2 (15) (45) (51)
2 30.8 48.2 26.2 (32) (82) (51)
3 30.8 19.4 38.9 (32) (33) (76)
4 21.2 5.9 8.7 (22) (10) (17)
5 2.9 — — (3)
Total % 100 100 100 N (104) (170) (195)
*Five functional categories, namely, party, administration, military,"non-governmental organizations," and legislative bodies, were used to define concurrent positions. That is, in order to be counted as concurrent positions, the positions held must be in different functional categories. trend in concurrent position holding. Rather, it reflects the fact that because the rebuilding of the Party in the wake of Cultural
Revolution was not completed at the time of the 9th CC, the data for one of the functional categories of positions, "Party," was not available. Consequently, the data for the 9th CC reflect an overall pattern of decline in the number of concurrent positions held by elite members. When the rebuilding of the Party was completed by the time of the 10th CC, the data for the 10th CC show that the holding of two and three concurrent positions is 26,2% and 38.9% respectively. In comparison with the data for the 8th CC, where the holdings of two 94 and three concurrent positions are of equal proportion (30.8%), the data for the 10th CC show that the number of concurrent positions held by elite members is increasing rather than decreasing. Although nothing definitive can be said about the pattern of concurrent posi tion holding with such comparison, a warranted statement is that the practice of concurrent position holding still exists in the CCP and shows no sign of abatement. In terms of role differentiation or structural differentiation, then, the Chinese Communist political system has not developed much.
Aside from being an indicator of political development, con current position holding may be viewed from the perspective of governing. On the one hand, concurrent position holding facilitates the exercise of control for the higher authorities. It also reduces the need for coordination among officials of the same level and increases efficiency in the performance of tasks. On the other hand, the concentration of several positions in one person helps promote arrogance in the privileged person. It also blocks the path to ad vancement for other Party members, as the concurrent position holdings reduce "job openings" considerably. The Party leadership must be aware of the merits and flaws of concurrent position holding, which are much more than has been sketched here. From the fact that the concurrent position holding system persists in spite of a revolt against the Party, manifested in the Cultural Revolution, several inferences may be drawn. For one thing, concurrent position holding might not have been a source of discontent among the rank and file of the Party. For another, the Party leadership that rebuilt the
Party after the Cultural Revolution might have seen more advantages
than disadvantages in retaining the concurrent position holding
system. This system reflects the traditional Chinese notion that men who are suitable for certain positions are indispensible; if a man is the most suitable person for a post, he must, in the Chinese view, occupy that post. Apparently this traditional view has not been repugnant to the Party leadership in spite of a Chinese Communist
dictum to get rid of "old Chinese habits" since the Communist take
over in China. So far as the available data under study is concerned,
the concurrent position holding in the Party elite is one of the few
aspects that exhibits no noticeable change over time. The trend for
the future is hard to predict, and is dependent upon whether or not
the rank and file of the Party as well as the Party leadership see
a need for abolishing the concurrent position holding system.
(3) Type of Work: In terms of functional types of work, the CCP elite
can be conceived of as being composed of Party/adrainistrion elites,
commander/commissar elites, worker/peasant elites, and science/
technology elites. The rationale for adopting this fourfold classi
fication was mentioned in Chapter III, in the discussion of the
variable of type of work when joining the Party, and needs no repeti
tion here. It is interesting to note from the data in Table 4.3 that
at the 7th CC, on the eve of the full-blown Civil War with the
Kuomintang, the Party/administration elite and the commander/commissar
elite shared the membership equally. At the 8th CC, the first 96
Table 4.3. Trends in Type of Work of Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
Party/Administration 50.0 66.3 35.3 38.9 (24) (69) (60) (76)
Commander/Commissar 50.0 33.7 43.5 35.9 (24) (35) (74) (70)
Worker/Peasant — — 20.0 23.1 (34) (45)
Science/Technology — — 1.2 2.1 (2) (4)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
post-revolutionary gathering, the Party/administration elite comprised an almost two-thirds majority in the membership, an unmistakable sign of "politics in command." The 9th CC, which marked the official ending of the Cultural Revolution, saw the emergence of the worker/ peasant elite, and, to a lesser extent, the science/technology elite.
In the discussion of positional scores of CC members, it was noted that there was an emergence of new CC members who had low positional scores, and they were labeled non-strategic elites. Since the 9th
CC, it has been the newly emerged worker/peasant and science/technology elites who have had low positional scores and have been non-strategic elites.
What are implications of the emergence of non-strategic elites?
There is reason to believe that the newly emerged worker/peasant and 97
science/technology elites do not pose a real threat to Party/admini
stration elites and commander/commissar elites; the former are not
in a position to compete with the latter for political power precisely
because they have not held key positions, and their current rise to
key positions does not provide them with a solid base for political
influence. On the contrary, the non-strategic elite may serve at
least one useful purpose to the Party leadership, which is largely
composed of the strategic elite, in that the non-strategic elite are
imitable^ while the strategic elite are not. The longtime holding
of key positions in various fields, as is done by the strategic
elite, is a prospect that no ordinary Party member can aspire to
achieve. In contrast, the striving for professional distinction as worker/peasant or as scientist/technician is a prospect that is imitable
and achievable by ordinary members of the Party. Thus, the emergence,
or rather the creation, of non-strategic elites allows the Party
leadership to offer an incentive to the rank and file of the Party
to work toward the desired directions, be those what they may. Up
to now, the rise of the science/technology elites has been insignifi
cant, and is not likely to be impressive in the near future. The
rise of technocrats, especially in the form of "dual executive,"
i.e., both "red" and "expert," as was found in the Soviet and East
European Communist elites (e.g., Blackwell, 1972, and Beck, 1973),
shows no appreciable trend in the case of the Chinese Communist
elite. Putting it another way, there is no sign that the "revolutionary
modernizers" are going to be replaced by "managerial modernizers"; 98 this conclusion confirms Waller's study (1973), which compared a post-revolutionary elite with a revolutionary elite. The trend in elite recruitment in the CCP is toward the maintenance of the "triple alliance" of Party/administration, commander/commissar, worker/ peasant elites.
(4) Place of Work; This variable was dichotomized into "capital" and
"provinces," corresponding to the concepts of center and periphery.
Several scholars (e.g., Shils, 1961) have made theoretical expositions of this pair of concepts. Indeed, center and periphery are useful concepts in that they may be used to conceptualize various states of affairs, depending on the perspective taken. From the perspective of role-playing, the center assumes the leadership role, the periphery that of the followers. From the perspective of policy-making, the center is looked upon as the initiator, and the periphery as the implementer. From the perspective of resources, the center is the spender, and the periphery the provider. From the perspective of political outlook, the center may be regarded as representing the cosmopolitan, and the periphery the parochial. It is of interest, therefore, to note elite representation in terms of capital and provinces, becasue this reflects the degree of importance that the
Party leadership attaches to the center and periphery.
The data in Table 4.4 show that 68.8% of the 7th CC members worked in the capital, and that this proportion reached its high mark of 81.7% at the 8th CC. The dominance of the center until that time is unmistakable; the trend was reversed at the 9th CC. The 99
Table 4.4. Trends in Place of Work of Members of 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7th CC 8 th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Capital 68.8 81.7 40.6 39.0 (33) (85) (69) (76)
Provinces 31.2 18.3 59.4 61.0 (15) (19) (101) (119)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195) percentage of CC members who worked in thes center was down to 40.6% in the 9th CC, a one-half reduction from the level of the 8th CC, and it reached a low mark of 39.0% in the 10th CC. Since the 9th CC more members have worked in the provinces than in the capital. What is the trend for the future? Viewed from whatever perspective, there is no likelihood of equality between the center and the periphery.
The dominance of the center in representation for any prolonged period of time, such as from the 7th CC of 1945 to the 8th CC of 1956, however, might well have been one of the sources of discontent that culminated in the revolt against the Party manifested in the Cultural
Revolution. The representation of center and periphery involves striking a balance between the two, but there is no fast rule to guide the attainment of this balance.4 The current proportions, as they stand in the 10th CC, approach the balance. In other words, elite representation in the capital is likely to fluctuate, within a limited range, around 39.0% in the future. 100
It is important to note that the next four variables to be dis
cussed, namely, years in primary position, change in positional
scores, change in type of work, and change in location of work, have
been deliberately constructed for and are primarily intended for use
in the explanatory analysis of elite change, which will be the
second research task of this study. They are presented here in this
descriptive part of the study for the purpose of familiarization: to
show what each of these four variables may indicate and what implica
tions may be inferred from them.
(5) Years in Primary Position: An elite member may hold several
positions concurrently; an individual's primary position is defined
as the highest position among all those that he holds. It is computed
from the time of assignment to the time of acquiring CC membership
for each Central Committee. Since the baseline used for computing the
positional scores variable began with the founding of the Chinese
Communist regime on October 1, 1949, the same baseline was used to
compute years in primary position. Consequently, the data on member
ship in the 7th CC was not available for this variable.
Years in primary position may serve as an indicator of positional
mobility, which in turn reflects certain aspects of the personnel management of the CCP. As can be seen in Table 4.5, there were one
distinctive group in terms of proportion in representation in each
of the three Central Committees. All members of this group held their
same primary positions for a 0-2 period; this group constitutes 43.2%
and 42.9% of the membership in the 8th and the 9th Central Committees, Table 4.5. Trends in Tears in Primary Position of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
Years in Primary Positions 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
0 - 2>> 43.2 42.9 18.0 (45) (73) (35)
3 - 4 13.5 15.9 14.3 (14) (27) (28)
5 - 6 13.5 8.8 30.2 (14) (15) (59)
7 - 8C 27.9 2.9 12,8 (29) (5) (25)
9 - 1 0 4.7 4.6 (8) (9)
1 1 - 1 2 2.9 0.0 (5)
13 - 14 5.3 2.1 (9) (4)
15 - 16 7.1 2.6 (12) (5)
17 - 18 1.8 2.6 (3) (5)
19 - 20^ 6.5 5.6 (11) (11)
21 - 22 __ 1.5 (3)
23 -24e 3.6 (7)
Missing Data 1.9 1.2 2.1 (2) (2) (4)
Total % 100 100 100 N (104) (170) (195)
a0ver six months is counted as one year.
'’Zero years is possible if a person does not hold any position that was within the list of specified positions.
cThe maximum possible number of years from October, 1949, to the 8th CC of September, 1956 is 7.
^The maximum possible number of years from October, 1949, to the 9th CC of April, 1969 is 20.
eThe maximum possible number of years from October, 1949, to the 10th CC of August, 1973 is 24. 102 but only 18.0% of the membership in the 10th Central Committee. This
gives some indication that positional mobility for members of the
8th and the 9th Central Committees was quite high, but that it was much lower for members of the 10th Central Committee. If the data
on years in primary position are re-arranged in terms of high, medium,
and low positional mobility, as is shown in Table 4.6, the same conclusion is reached. Tenure in the primary position is used here to indicate pos itional mobility; the shorter the tenure, the higher the positional mobility
and vice versa. That the Party leadership tends not to allow an elite
member to hold a primary position for long years may be inferred from
the high positional mobility of members of the 8th and the 9th Central
Committees. This policy may in part compensate for the disadvantages
Table 4.6. Trends in Positional Mobility of Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
High Positional Mobility 56.7 58.8 32.3 (0-4 years tenure) (59) (100) (63)
Medium Positional Mobility 41.4 11.8 43.0 (5-8 years tenure) (43) (20) (84)
Low Positional Mobility — 28.2 22.6 (9-24 years tenure) (48) (44)
Missing Data 1.9 1.2 2.1 (2) (2) (4)
Total % 100 100 100 N (104) (170) (195) 103
of concurrent position holding that were previously discussed.
Whether or not the comparatively low positional mobility of members
of the 10th Central Committee means a change in the policy of personnel management cannot be known and must be seen from further
evidence.
(6) Change in Positional Scores; This variable may serve as an
indicator of change in official responsibilities. Change is measured between a reference point in time prior to acquiring CC membership and the time of acquiring CC membership. Because positional scores were not available for membership of the 7th CC,
the data for constructing this variable were likewise not available
for the membership of the 7th CC. The data on change in positional
scores for members of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Central Committees
are displayed in Table 4.7. It is noticeable that in terms of
the magnitude of change in score intervals, the 9th and 10th
Central Committees had the same three proportions ranking highest
and these were lower than the three top-ranking proportions for the
8th CC. This is an indication that change in positional scores
is greater for members of the 8th CC than for members of the 9th CC
and the 10th CC. Furthermore, viewed from the mean value of change
in positional scores, which is shown in Table 4.8, the mean value 104
Table 4.7 Trends in Change in Positional Scores Between a Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership* and the Time of Acquiring CC Member ship Among Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
Change in rank rank rank Positional Scores 8th CC order 9th CC order 10th CC order
0-10 Scores 11.5 25.9 30.3 (12) (44) 2nd (59) 2nd
11-20 Scores 15.4 36.4 35.9 2nd 1st 1st (16) (62) (70)
21-30 Scores 27.9 21.2 20.0 3rd 3rd (29) 1st (36) (39)
31-40 Scores 14.4 10.0 8.7 3rd (15) (17) (17)
41-50 Scores 12.5 1.2 4.1 (13) (2) (8)
51-60 Scores 10.6 3.5 1.0 (11) (6) (2)
61-70 Scores 3.8 0.0 0.0 (4)
71-80 Scores 1.9 1.2 0.0 (2) (2)
81-90 Scores 1.0 0.6 0.0 (1) (1)
Missing Data 1.0 (1)
Total % 100 100 100 N (104) (170) (195)
*The reference point in time prior to acquiring CC membership for the 8th CC members was September, 1954, when the CCP made a reshuffle in governmental organizations after the conclusion of the first National Party Congress; that for the 9th CC members was January, 1965, when the CCP made another reshuffle after the conclu sion of the third National Party Congress; and that for the 10th CC members was April, 1969, when the 9th CC was convened. 105
Table 4.8. Trends in Mean Value of Change in Positional Scores Between a Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership* and the Time of Acquiring CC Member ship among Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Mean Value of Change in Positional Scores 31.9 19.7 17.7
*The reference point in time prior to acquiring CC membership for the 8th, 9th, and 10th CC members were the same used in Table 4.7. of change in positional scores is much higher for the 8th CC members than for the 9th CC and the 10th CC members. That is another measure to show that change in positional scores is greater for members of the 8th CC than for members of the 9th CC and the 10th
CC. One implication of this difference in the change in positional scores between members of the 8th CC and members of the 9th CC and the
10th CC; is that a Party member would have to take on more positions before acquiring membership in the 8th CC than he would before acquiring membership in the 9th CC or the 10th CC. In other words, one of the de facto decision rules of membership in the Central
Committee, as can be inferred from this finding, is changing toward a relaxation of demand in Party hierarchies; for membership in the
8th CC, a Party members would have to climb up the Party hierarchies
to a certain level, whereas this climbing in the Party hierarchies
is less demanding for membership in the 9th CC and the 10th CC.
This is another indication of a widening of the path to elite status. This finding corroborates a previous one— that since the 9th CC
there has been an emergence of non-strategic elites in the Central
Committess. Membership in the Central Committee tends to be less
rigorously controlled now in terms of the need for climbing Party hierarchies.
(7) Change in Type of Work: This variable may serve as an indicator of functional mobility in terms of two generic types: Party/admini-
stration and commander/commissar. Two measures were used to assess
functional mobility, the first of which was a comparison between
the type of work in which a person was engaged when joining the
Party and that when acquiring CC membership. The second measure was a comparison between the type of work in which a person was engaged at a time prior to acquiring CC membership and that at the time of acquiring CC membership. Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 provide the data on these two measures, both of which point to the same conclusion:
so far as the two generic types of Party/administration and
commander/commissar work are concerned, there has not been much
change among members of the CCP elite over time. In other words>
functional mobility of these two generic types of CCP elite members
is not high; this is an expected finding in that their two types of work involve the use of two different types of skills and knowledge.
(8) Change in Location of Work: This variable may serve as an
indicator of locational mobility in terms of the central and the provincial. Change is measured between a reference point in time prior to acquiring CC membership and the time of acquiring CC 107
Table 4.9. Trends in Change in Type of Work Between the Time Joining the Party and the Time Acquiring CC Member ship Among Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
No Change 72.9 84.6 86.5 86.2 (35) (88) (147) (168)
Change 27.1 15.4 12.9 12.3 (13) (16) (22) (24)
Missing Data — — 0.6 1.5 (1) (3)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
Table 4.10. Trends in Change in Type of Work Between A Referenci Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership* and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership among Members of the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
7 th CC 8th CC 9 th CC 10th CC
No Change 87.5 92.3 95.3 85.7 (42) (96) (162) (167)
Change 12.5 6.7 4.1 5.1 (6) (7) (7) (10)
Missing Data — 1.0 0.6 9.2 (1) (1) (18)
Total % 100 100 100 100 N (48) (104) (170) (195)
*The reference point in time prior to acquiring CC membership for the 8th CC members was September, 1954, that for the 9thCC members was January, 1965, and that for the 10th CC members wasApril, 1969. These are the same time references used in the change in posi tional scores in Table 4.7. 108 membership. The data for this variable were not available for members of the 7th CC, which was convened in April, 1945, because no common point in time prior to April, 1945 was found appropriate as a base line reference from which to measure change. The data for membership in the 8th to the 10th Central Committees, displayed in Table 4.11, show that an overwhelming majority of CC members did not exhibit locational mobility prior to acquiring CC membership. What can be inferred from the data is that locational mobility is not conducive to acquiring elite status, i.e., membership in the Central Committee.
This trend is likely to continue.
Table 4.11. Trends in Change in Location of Work Between a Reference Point in Time Prior to Acquiring CC Membership* and the Time of Acquiring CC Membership Among Members of the 8th to the 10th Central Committees
8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
No Change 93.3 82.9 90.8 (97) (141) (177)
Change 6.7 17.1 8.7 (7) (29) (17)
Missing Data —— 0.5 (1)
Total % 100 100 100 N (104) (170) (195)
*The reference point in time prior to acquiring CC membership for the 8th CC members was September, 1954, that for the 9th CC members was January, 1965, and that for the 10th CC members was April, 1969. 109
Summary of Findings
In this chapter, eight variables were used to inquire into elite change in current careers, which provide the only political arena in which the CCP elite may strive for success in life in contemporary China. Moreover, differences in current careers may indicate different role expectations and rule performance as perceived and desired by the Party leadership. The major findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Since the 9th Central Committee of 1969, there have emerged
"nori-strategic" elites, who are characterized by having held fewer positions, i.e., who were low in positional scores. Before 1969, the CCP elite were "strategic" elites, who were identifiable by their having held key positions. The continuing accommodation of non-strategic elites is the trend for the future.
2. While no clear indication of trends in the holding of concurrent positions is discernible, the data do show that the holding of concurrent positions is a practice of the CCP that per sists with no sign of abatement.
3. The emergence of worker/peasant elites, and, to a lesser extent, science/technology elites since the 9th Central Committee marks a significant departure from elite composition in previous years. However, the rise of science/technology elites is barely recognizable, and the prospect of a dominance of technocrats is far from likely in the foreseeable future. Instead, a "triple alliance" of Party/administration, commander/commissar, and worker/peasant elite types is the pattern that will persist. 110
4. The CCP elite who worked in the capital predominated in
the 7th and the 8th Central Committees. However, such representation has been sharply reduced since the 9th Central Committee. The current elite representation in terms of center (capital) and periphery (pro vinces) , as reflected in the 10th Central Committee in the proportions of 39% and 61% respectively, seem to have approximated the balance between the two.
5. Members of the 8th and the 9th Central Committees have shown high positional mobility in terras of primary position; they do not hold positions for long, which might be a means by which the Party
leadership compensates for certain disadvantages of the prevailing
concurrent position holding practice. The low positional mobility
of members of the 10th CC cannot be confidently interpreted as a
change in the policy of personnel management and such interpretation must await further evidence.
6. Based on the finding that change in positional scores is greater for members of the 8th Central Committee than for members of
the 9th and the 10th Central Committees, it may be infered that prior
to acquiring elite status, climbing up the Party hierarchies was more demanding for pre-Cultural Revolution (pre-1969) elites than for post-Cultural Revolution (post-1969) elites.
7. So far as the two generic types of Party/administration and
commander/commissar work are concerned, there has been not much
functional mobility among the CCP elite over time. Given the fact
that these two generic types of work require different kinds of skills
and knowledge, however, the finding is no surprise. Ill
8. In terms of capital and provinces, there has been not much locational mobility among the CCP elite over time, which may indicate that locational mobility is not conducive to acquiring elite status, i.e., membership in the Central Committee. NOTES
■'-"Non-governmental" organizations, as they are found in Western democracies, hardly exist in a communist country like China. All friendship associations, trade associations, women’s associations, peasant associations, and the like, though non-governmental in name, are staffed and directed by Party cadres. For lack of better terminology to describe these organizations, "non-governmental" is the term used in this study with quotation marks. The commonly used term "mass organization" would have been a better one to use but for the fact that it does not indicate the inclusion of various Sino-foreign friendship and trade associations.
2The use of "strategic elites" was borrowed from Keller, 1963.
2The quality of imitability that is embodied in the concept of elite has been expounded by S. F. Nadel, 1956.
^Center and periphery may be viewed from the perspective of decentralization. Some theoretical efforts have been made in this area. See, for example, Kochen and Deutsch, 1969, and Levy and Truman, 1971.
112 Chapter V
The Dynamics of Elite Change: A Conceptual Scheme and A Research Method
In Chapters II, III, and IV, elite change in terms of demo graphic and social background, political socialization, and current careers was analyzed descriptively by looking at each variable individually with a univariate mode of analysis. The purpose of this first research task was to detect trends in change, rate of change, and implications of change. The findings are useful in understanding elite change in the Chinese Communist Party in various dimensions, but are not explanatory, in that no relational statements can be made from a univariate analysis of data. Thus, a much more meaningful use of the four variable clusters— demographic and social background, initial socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers— in an attempt to explain elite change consti tutes the second research task of this study.
A Conceptual Scheme
Given our operational definition of the CCP elite as members of the Central Committee, it is obvious that there are two sources of elite change, aside from the natural deaths of elite members. First, more on the selective side, is the conferment of membership in the
113 114
Central Committee on Party members, which will be called political promotion. Second, more on the evaluative side, is the termination or continuation of membership in the succeeding Central Committee, which will be called political purge or political survival. The natural death of elite members is a phenomenon which is, more often
than not, uninteresting to political scientists, and is excluded
from further discussion. Consequently, it may be said that the dynamics of elite change consist in political promotion, political purge, and political survival. How the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization,
Party political soialization, and current careers can be related to political promotion, political purge, and political survival is
the central concern of this attempt to explain elite change.
There are many factors or variables that affect political pro motion, political purge and political survival. Numerous as they may be, nevertheless, these factors or variables can be categorized into two broad types. First, there are those factors that are beyond the control . of an individual or that are not of his own doing,
such as the prevailing political situation in general and the preoccupations of the selectorate in particular, which vary from one
time to another, and hence may be called contextual variables.
Second, there are those factors that are within the control of an
individual or that are of his own doing, such as personal actions or utterances, which, likewise, vary from time to time and person
to person, and hence may be called personal variables. Given the
fact that we do not have data on contextual variables, this 115 inquiry into political promotion, political purge, and political survival has to be confined to personal variables, and, even then, it is of limited scope. In so limiting our scope, we cannot emphasize too strongly that we do so because of research feasibility and not becasue we are ignorant of the importance of contextual variables.
With our focus limited to personal aspects of individuals, we conceive that it is the behavior of individual members, be it formal or informal behavior in the Party organization, that leads to their political promotion, political purge, and political survival. The importance of behavioral data in the study of these phenomena cannot be denied. In the absence of behavioral data on the CCP elite, it is difficult, but not necessarily impossible, to study political promotion, political purge, and political survival. Precisely be cause behavioral data are unavailable, the researcher must take a somewhat retroactive approach to behavior; he must probe into the antecedents of behavior (this term is used here as a shorthand expression for all variables which bear on behavior). If certain antecedents to behavior are available, they can be used to infer behavioral consequences without a necessary inquiry into the behavior itself, which, because of lack of data, is unknown. In other words, behavior can be "blackboxed" as in the following diagram:
Antecedents to behavior --- Behavior Behavioral consequences 116
In this instance, the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers are regarded as behavioral antecedents; political promotion, political purge, and political survival are regarded as behavioral consequences. It must be pointed out that the four variable clusters of personal attributes which are used in this study are but some of the antecedents to behavior.
So far as this inquiry is concerned, however, the "system" is con sidered closed so that the relationship, if any, between the four variable clusters of personal attributes and political promotion, political purge, and political survival can be tested.
It is believed not only that the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization,
Party political socialization, and current careers have bearing on political promotion, political purge, and political survival, but also that the four variable clusters differ in their relative potency.
While the relative potency of the four variable clusters may ja priori be dismissed as an empirical question, it is possible at least to assign some time sequence to the variable clusters before exam ining the data. This is not only conducive to conceptual thinking, but also relevant to data analysis, as will be seen later. From a developmental viewpoint, the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers may be conceived as coming into being in that temporal sequence. Based on this time 117 sequence, the relative potency of these four variable clusters may be discussed. Because a Party career is the only career that a CCP
elite member may have, current careers pinpoints the arena in which
the behavior of an elite individual unfolds. Specifically, there
are certain role expectations and role performance to be judged by
the Party leadership. Thus, it can be posited that the variable
cluster of current careers is of the first order in potency in
relating to political promotion, political purge, and political
survival. With respect to the relative potency of demographic and
social background and political socialization in relating to behavior,
there have been conflicting views with no definitive answer, as was discussed in Chapter II. In view of the fact that a majority
of early revolutionary CCP elite members came from high social status
families, it can be convincingly argued that so long as a person
joins the CCP, his subsequent behavior is more likely to be shaped
or affected by his political experiences in the Party (Party political
socialization) than by his demographic and social background. Thus,
it can be posited that the variable cluster of political socialization
is of the second order, and that of demographic and social background
is of the third order in potency in relating to political promotion,
political purge, and political survival.
In this connection, it is important to recall that in the dis
cussion of political socialization in Chapter III, a distinction was
made between initial political socialization and Party political
socialization or pre-recruitment and post-recruitment political
socialization. The relative potency of pre-recruitment and post- 118 recruitment political socialization is again an unsettled question in political socialization research. In general, "different expecta tions are made of the individual at different times and often the individual needs to make important personal changes to cope with
these changed expectations" (Marsh, 1971, p. 456). Given the pervasive influence of the CCP, on which the political fate of the elite member hinges, there is reason to believe that, in the case of the CCP at least, post-recruitment political socialization has a greater impact on the behavior of elite members than does pre recruitment political socialization. Thus, in terms of the relative potency of the four variable clusters, current careers ranks first,
Party political socialization second, initial political socializa
tion third, and demographic and social background fourth. In other words, the relative potency of the four personal-attribute variable clusters is seen to be the reverse order of the time sequence of their coming into being. A conceptual scheme with which to inquire into the dynamics of elite change is presented in
Figure 5.1.
Research Questions
Within this conceptual scheme, research questions can be formu
lated. Political promotion having been operationally defined as
the acquisition of membership in the Central Committee, our research
interested in it is twofold. First, we would like to compare those who aspired to CC membership in each Central Committee with those who succeeded in acquiring it in terms of personal attributes. Relative Potency of the Time Sequence Conceptualization* Variables Used in Research Pour Variable Clusters
t ^Demographic & Scoial Backgrounds Low 1 S S * ' Initial Antecedents t o ------Political Socialization Behavior Party \ NCurrent Careers High
Behavior — Behavioral: Unknown
Behavioral ^Political Promotion, Political Consequences < Purge, or Political Survival
*Since contextual variables that may affect political promotion, political purge, and political survival are not available, they are not included in conceptualization for the purpose of this inquiry. 119 Figure 5.1. Conceptual Scheme for Inquiry Into Political Promotion, Political Purge, and Political Survival. Second, we would also like to compare the new elite with the old elite in each Central Committee. The new elite refers to those who had no membership in the preceding Central Committee; the old elite refers to those who had had membership in the preceding Central
Committee. Because information on those who aspired to CC member ship, an initial name list of candidates, is not available, the first research interest cannot be satisfied, and only the second research interest can be pursued. Although our two research interests, for pragmatic reasons, have to be reduced to one— the second one, which is focused on a comparison of the new elite and the old elite in each Central Committee, this does not mean that this second research interest is less significant than the first one. It is only that our inquiry into political promotion is less inclusive than it otherwise would have been. Based on the theoretical perspectives on elite change discussed in Chapter I, the new elite may either reflect the changing needs of the Party or initiate the needed changes in the Party. Assuming that there are certain common attri butes or qualifications that are shared by both the new elite and the old elite, observing the differences between them may illuminate the attributes desired in the new elite. With regard to political promotion, our research question, therefore, is whether, and in what aspects, there are differences between the new elite and the old elite. So long as there are significant differences in personal attributes between the new elite and the old elite, personal attri butes can be used to account for the rise of the new elite. 121
Political purge and political survival having been operationally defined as the termination and continuation of membership in the succeeding Central Committee, our research question here lies in distinguishing the purged from the survivors in each Central
Committee. Because after excluding the consideration of contextual variables, political purge and political survival have been con ceptualized as reflecting the behavioral consequences of elite individuals, and also because personal attributes are assumed to have various effects on behavior, personal attributes may be used to infer behavioral consequences. This is a succinct statement of the conceptual scheme presented above; political purge and political survival can be explained to the extent that there are differences in personal attributes among elite members. With regard to political purge and political survival, our research question, therefore, is whether, and to what extent, the four variable clusters of personal attributes can be used to differentiate those who were purged from those who survived.
If our research effort to differentiate between the new elite and the old elite or the political purged and the political survivors in terms of personal attributes is successful, it has an important implication: given the known personal attributes of elite members, it is possible to predict their group membership, the new elite vs. the old elite, or their political fate, purge vs. survival, if these are unknown. It may be objected that the use of the term
"prediction" in this instance is misleading, if not deceptive, in that prediction is generally understood to refer to the future. 122
Why to the future? Because the future is unknown. If so, then, deducing the unknown is the object of prediction. While things unknown often lie in the future, they do not necessarily do so.
Certain states of affairs that exist at present or that existed in
the past may be unknown to certain persons; it is legitimate for
them to say "to predict" something unknown to them, whether those
things exist at present or existed in the past. This is a technical albeit restricted use of "prediction," but not an erroneous one.
Hopefully, this discussion will expel doubts as to the appropriateness of using the term "prediction" throughout this inquiry.
Technique of Data Analysis: Discriminant Analysis
In terms of data analysis, the two research questions posed above can be reduced to one problem, which is concerned with assess ing the relationship between a dichotomized dependent variable— the new elite and the old elite or the political purged and the political survivors— and multiple independent variables— the four variable
clusters of demographic and social background, initial political
socialization Party political socialization, and current careers.
Obviously, multivariate statistical methods are required to cope with
the problem. An initial search for an appropriate technique points
to three possibilities: multiple regression analysis, probit analysis, and discriminant analysis. Although these three techniques
are all applicable to problems involving one dependent variable and multiple independent variables, the appropriateness of each depends
upon the nature of the dependent variable.^ If the dependent 123 variable is continuous, multiple regression analysis is appropriate; if the dependent variable is ordinal data, probit analysis suits it best; if the dependent variable is discontinuous, discriminant analysis is most suitable. Because our research questions involve two dichotomized dependent variables of new elite vs. old elite and political purged vs. political survivors, both of which are discon- tinuous variables , discriminant analysis is the most appropriate statistical method among the three discussed and is used here.
Discriminant analysis, which is not a new statistical method, has found many applications in the fields of business and educational research, although only recent years has seen its application in political science. Formal mathematical and statistical treatment of discriminant analysis may be found in several places (Anderson,
1958; Cooley and Lohnes, 1971; Tatsuoka, 1970, 1971; and Van de
Geer, 1971), and will not be presented here. In order to make subsequent interpretation of the results of data analysis easier, however, the basic features of discriminant analysis and the term inology used can be briefly stated here. If two or more groups are to be differentiated in terms of their characteristics, an intuitively appealing way of doing it is to compare these groups on each chara cteristic/variable or, to be specific, on the mean value of each variable. Such an approach, however, causes two major problems.
First, there is a problem of intercorrelation among the variables.
As correlations among the variables become larger, comparisons made on each variable will lead to a distorted picture. Second, when the number of characteristics/variables increases, the interpretation of differences between two or more groups on each variable taken individually will become increasingly difficult. An alternative method of comparison is to construct a linear combination, i.e., a weighted sum, of the set of variables that will maximize the differ ences among the groups under study. By looking into the differences among groups in terms of this linear combination and by examining the relative weights assigned to the different variables forming the linear combination, differences among groups can be seen and meaningfully compared. Discriminant analysis is one of the statistical methods of arriving at the linear combination (or combinations) of a set of characteristics/variables. The linear combinations derived from discriminant analysis are called "discriminant functions"; the characteristics/variables employed in forming discriminant functions are called "discriminating variables," which are the independent variables in discriminant analysis; and the weights assigned to dis criminating variables in forming the discriminant functions are called
"discriminant function coefficients," of which the useful form for interpretation is the "standardized discriminant function coefficient."
The discriminant function (of which there may be more than one) derived from discriminant analysis, being non-intercorrelated statistically, summarizes the differences among groups into "dimensions," which can be "named" in the same way that "factors" derived from factor analysis can be named. The groups to be differentiated are called the
"criterion variable," which is the dependent variable in discriminant analysis. Discriminating Varibles Used
In discriminant analysis, there is no limit to the number of discriminating variables that can be used in one analysis. In view of the fact that discriminant analyses are mostly performed by computer nowadays, the temptation is great for the researcher to act like a "barefoot" empiricist by throwing all available discrim inating variables into the analysis. This is not the approach taken in this study. Furthermore, contrary to a common-sense notion, more discriminating variables do not necessarily yield better results.
There is a need for selecting discriminating variables on theoretical grounds. The four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political social ization, and current careers were constructed for this study, and were purposefully designed for their theoretical significance. Con sequently, all variables in the four clusters of personal attributes discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV, with the exception of three variables in the cluster of demographic and social background,^ will be used in this analysis of elite change to account for political promotion, political purge, and political survival. For a quick reference, all variables to be used as discriminating variables in the discriminant analyses are listed as follows:
I. Demographic and Social Background
Date of birth Social status of the family
II. Initial Political Socialization
Date of joining the Party Age when joining the Party Education when joining the Party Type of work when joining the Party 126
III. Party Political Socialization
Special military/political training Education/training in the USSR Participation in important events Membership in the Central Exeuctive Councils Military affiliation
IV. Current Careers^
Positional scores Concurrent position holding Type of work Place of work Years in primary position Change in positional scores Change in type of work Change in place of work
In order to meet the data requirements of discriminant analysis, variables used as discriminating variables must be at least interval data. Therefore, all the listed variables, if not originally coded as interval data, either are dichotomized (hence can be regarded as interval data) or are constructed as several dummy variables from each nominal or categorical variable.
Methods of Entering Discriminating Variables
In addition to the selection of appropriate discriminating variables for discriminant analysis, a choice also has to be made as to the way in which the relationship between the dependent, cri terion variable and the independent, discriminating variables is to be specified. Two methods of specification are available, the first of which is a direct method which enters all discriminating variables simultaneously into the analysis, and the second of which is a stepwise method which allows for specifying certain variables to be entered in the analysis at given times. If the direct method 127 is used, all discriminating variables entered into the analysis will be retained in the derived discriminant function or functions. In addition to producing a long-drawn variable list, the direct method may not derive the best discriminant functions possible. If the stepwise method is used, there are two further possible procedures.
One is to specify certain variables as belonging to the same level and to enter them all into the analysis at the same time; the other is to specify one variable within a level to be entered into the analysis at a time.
From this discussion, it is obvious that the choice of methods and procedures to test the relationship between the dependent, criterion variable and the independent, discriminant variables in the analysis is not merely technical, but depends on the researcher's conceptualization of the relationship among variables. As was mentioned previously, the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers are conceived of having different potencies in relation to the dependent, criterion variables in which we are interested. We have assigned time sequences to the four variable clusters in the order of their coming into existence, i.e., demographic and social background , first; initial political social ization, second; Party political socialization, third; and current careers, fourth. We have theorized that that the relative potency of the four variable clusters is in the reverse order of the time sequence of their coming into being. As a result of this conceptual ization, we have chosen to use the stepwise method by entering 128 the discriminating variables into the analysis at four different levels in the reverse order of their coming into existence, and by entering one variable within a level into the analysis at a time. NOTES
■^For a methodological comparison of multiple regression, probit analysis, and discriminant analysis performed on the same data, see Aldrich and Cnuddle, 1975.
^Political purge and political survival may be regarded as ordinal data, much dependent on the researcher's conceptualization and the specific research questions. For research that regarded political purge and political survival as ordinal data and that employed probit analysis, see McHale and Paranzino, 1975.
^The three exceptions are the variables of sex, nationality, and native province. We do not believe that such incidental personal attributes as sex, nationality, and native province would affect political promotion, political purge, and political survival, though this is based solely on rational reckoning. Moreover, in comparison with other variables in the four clusters of personal attributes, six, nationality, and native province are theoretically insignificant. As a result of these considerations, sex, nationality, and native province will not be used in the analysis as discrimina ting variables. With regard to the two remaining variables in the cluster of demographic and social background, date of birth will be used in all the analyses, and social status of the family only occasionally. This decision has been made not because the theore tical significance of the social status of the family is ignored, but because we are skeptical about the sources from which the data were extracted, as was mentioned in Chapter I. A further consider ation is that the social-status variable is most useful when a more refined categorization can be applied. However, that is not possible here because the data sources are not sufficiently detailed to per mit fine-grained classification with any confidence.
^All variables in the cluster of current careers are listed in their generic forms, i.e., without specifying the time periods. Different time periods will be used for different sub-set data in discriminant analysis, as will be seen in Chapters VI and VII when the discriminant analyses are performed and discussed.
129 Chapter VI
The Dynamics of Elite Change: Political Promotion
This chapter inquires into political promotion, the acquisition by Party members of membership in the Central Committee. As mentioned in Chapter V, our research interests with regard to political pro motion would ideally have included a comparison of those who aspired to CC membership for each Central Committee and those who succeeded in acquiring it, as well as that of the new elite and the old elite in each Central Committee; unfortunately, however, information on those who aspired to CC membership could not be obtained. Since such information is not available, our research questions are reduced to one: whether the new elite differs from the old elite in terms of personal attributes, and if so, how. Such comparison will serve the dual purpose of detecting substantial change in the elite com position and of highlighting the "newness" in the new elite. Since membership in the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Central Committees consti tutes the "population" of this study, four sub-set data are available for analysis. Discriminant analysis has been performed on the member ship in each Central Committee, with the new elite vs.the old elite as the dependent, criterion variable, and the variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization,
130 131
Party political socialization, and current careers as the independent, discriminating variables.
(1) Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th CC
The 20 discriminating varibles used in the analysis are presented in Table 6.1. The 7th CC was the only instance in which five vari ables in the cluster of current careers— positional scores, con current position holding, years in primary position, change in positional scores, and change in place of work— were not available for the reason mentioned in Chapter IV. The results of discrimi nant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table D.l, are in Appendix D. Ten of the 20 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function that can be used to distinguish the new elite from the old elite in the 7th CC, as is shown in Table 6.2. To understand how much each of the ten discriminating variables contributed to the resulting discriminant function requires interpretation of the standardized discriminant function coefficients. The plus or minus sign before each coeffi cient indicates the contribution that each variable made in the positive or negative direction. By "positive or negative direction 11 is meant that the direction descriptive of the group has higher or lower mean score on this discriminant function. Setting the plus or minus sign aside, the absolute value of the coefficients indicates the relative contribution of each variable to the derived discriminant function. In assessing the relative contribution that each variable makes to the discriminant function, it is only 132
Table 6.1. Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th Central Committee
Level 1: Demographic and Social Background
V5 — Date of Birth V7 — Social Status of the Family
Level 2: Initial Political Socialization
V13 — Date of Joining the Party V14 — Age When Joining the Party V10 — Level of Education When Joining the Party V15 — Type of Work When Joining the Party
Level 3: Party Political Socialization
Vll — Special Military/Political Training (0=no, l=yes) V12 — Education/Training in the U.S.S.R. (0=no, l=yes) TOTEVET — Total Participation in Important Events TOTCEC — Total Membership scores in the Central Executive Councils *MA120TH — 120th Division. *MA129TH — 129th Division *MA4THN — New 4th Army Military Affiliation *MA115TH — 115th Division *MACRTL — Central Military^ *MANONE — Non-Military
Level 4: Current Careers V26 — Type of Work in April, 1945 V161 — Place of Work in April, 1945 (0=Local/other areas, l=Central/Yenan area) WCHAGE7J — Change in Type of Work between the Time of Joining the Party and April, 1945 (0=No Change, l=Change) WCHAGE45 — Change in Type of Work between 1927-1937 period and 1937-1945 period (0=No Change, l=Change)
Total Variables: 20
*Each is a dummy variable that was constructed out of the cate gorical variable of wartime military affiliations in order to meet the required level of measurement in the discriminant analysis. 133 necessary to pay attention to the coefficients that have higher values. From Table 6.2, it is clear that the variable of date of joining the Party made the largest positive contribution and the variable of non-military made the largest negative contribution to the derived discriminant function . As a result, this discrim inant function can be interpreted as representing a Party seniority and a non-military affiliations dimension that differentiates be tween the new elite and the old elite in the 7th Central Committee.
In other words, the new elite had less seniority in the Party but more military affiliations than the old elite. This conclusion about differences between the new elite and the old elite in the
7th CC, it is important to be noted, is not based solely on com parisons of the two variables of date of joining the Party and military affiliation. Rather, it was the result of comparing 20 variables in combination, which is the very feature of discriminant analysis that makes it suitable for our purposes.
How do we know that the derived discriminant function that is claimed to distinguish the new elite from the old elite in the 7th
CC is valid? While there are several statistical indicators that could be employed,! the acid test of the validity of a derived discriminant function is its ability to differentiate between or classify membership into different groups— in this instance, the new elite and the old elite— as correctly as possible. The degree of success in differentiation/classification, as is shown in Table
6.3, reached 93.75%, or 45 out of 48 cases. The misclassified 134
Table 6.2. A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 7th Central Commit tee Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1*
V13 — Date of joining the Party 0.47426
V15 — Type of work when joining the Party -0.33278
V12 — Education/Training in the USSR -0.17272
TOTEVET — Total Participation in Important Events 0.12556
TOTCEC — Total membership scores in the CEC -0.25652
V26 — Type of work in April, 1945 0.05726
V161 — Place of work in April, 1945 -0.09262
MA120TH — 120th Division -0.36270
MACTRL — Central military -0.27593
MANONE — Non-military -0.52202
*The maximum number of discriminant functions that can be derived from a discriminant analysis equals the number of groups to be differentiated minus one. In this study, the dependent, criterion variable used— the new elite vs. the old elite or the purged vs. the survivors— consists of two categories/groups, so the derived discriminant functions is always one. 135
Table 6.3. Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 7th CC into the New Elite and the Old Elite
Prediction Results Predicted Group Member Actual Group No. of Cases Group 1 ship Group 2
Group 1: Old Elite 23 23 0 100.0% 0.0%
Group 2: New Elite 25 3 22 12.0% 88.0%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 93,.75% cases were 3 out of 48, or 6.25%. This high degree of success in differentiating the new elite from the old elite in the 7th CC demon strates the high validity of the discriminant function. Moreover, it indicates that there were substantial changes in the elite com position of the CCP in April, 1945, when the 7th CC was convened.
The new elite in the 7th CC was characterized as a whole by less seniority in the Party and more involvement in the military, which seems to reflect the functional needs of the Party at that time— the closing days of the War of anti-Japanese Aggression and on the eve of a civil war with the Kuomintang.
(2) Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 9th CC
The 24 discriminating variables used in this analysis are listed in Table 6.4, and the results of discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table D.2, are in Appendix D. Nine of the 24 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function that can be used to distinguish the new elite 136
Table 6.4. Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 8th Cen tral Committee
Level 1: Demographic and Social Background
V5 — Date of Birth
Level 2: Initial Political Socialization
V13 — Date of joining the Party V14 — Age when joining the Party V10 — Education when joining the Party V15 '— Type of work when joining the Party
Level 3: Party Political Socialization
Vll — Special military/political training (0=no, l=yes) V12 — Education/training in the U.S.S.R. (0=no, l=yes) TOTEVET — Total participation in important events TOTCEC — Total membership in the Central Executive Councils *FA1 — The 1st Field Army *FA2 — The 2nd Field Army *FA3 — The 3rd Field Army *FA4 — The 4th Field Army Military Affiliation *FA5 — The 5th Field Army *FA6 — The Central Military *FA7 — No military affiliation
Level 4: Current Careers
CUMPOS54 — Cumulative positional scores in October, 1954 V29 — Type of work in September, 1956 (0=Party/ administration, l=commander/commissar) V164 — Place of work in September, 1956 (O=provincial, l=central) V156 — Concurrent position holding in September, 1956 V151B — Years in the primary position WCHAGE56 — Change in type of work between 1954 and 1956 (0=no change, l=change) V168 — Change in location of work between 1954 and 1956 (0=no change, l=change) RCHAGE56 — Change in positional scores between 1954 and 1956 (0=no change, l=change) Total Variables: 24
*Each is a dummy variable that was constructed out of the vari able of military affiliation. 137 from the old elite in the 8th CC. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 6.5, the variable of total membership scores in the Central Executive Councils and the variable of cumulative positional scores in October, 1954> made the first and second largest negative contributions, but no variable made a significant positive contribution to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discriminant function can be inter preted as representing a lower CEC membership scores and a lower cumulative positional scores dimension that differentiates the new elite from the old elite in the 8th CC. In other words, the new elite had less participation in the Central Executive Councils during the Kiangsi Soviet period and held lower or fewer positions
in the Party hierarchies, whereas the old elite was the opposite.
Table 6.5. A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 8th CC Differ entiating the New Elite from the Old Elite
Standardized Discriminant Functions Coefficients
Variables Function 1
V10 — Education when joining the Party -0.11505 V12 — Education/training in the USSR -0.01672 V13 — Date of joining the Party 0.10721 V14 — Age when joining the Party -0.11978 V15 — Type of work when joining the Party -0.10783 TOTCEC — Total membership scores in the CEC -0.30929 FA1 — The 1st Field Army 0.15929 V164 - - Place of work in September, 1956 -0.06871 CUMP0S54 — Cumulative positional scores in October 1954 ’-0.30220 138
Again, the validity of the derived discriminant function that differentiated the new elite from the old elite in the 8th CC can be tested by how well it can be used to differentiate between or classify membership into these two groups correctly. The results of differentiation/classification, shown in Table 6.6, indicate that the degree of successful differentiation/classification reached
90.38%, or 94 out of 104 cases; the misclassified cases were 10 out of 104, or 9.62%. This high degree of success in differentiation between the new elite and the old elite in the 8th CC demonstrates that the validity of the derived discriminant function is high. In addition, the results of successful differentiation between the new elite and the old elite in the 8th CC show that there were substantial changes in the elite composition of the CCP in September, 1956, when the 8th CC was convened. As a whole, the new elite in the 8th CC was
Table 6.6. Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 8th Central Committee into the New Elite and the Old Elite
Prediction Results: Predicted Group Membership Actual Group No. of Cases Group 1 Group 2
Group 1: Old Elite 41 33 8 80.5% 19.5%
Group 2: New Elite 63 2 61 3.2% 96.8%
Percent of "Grouped" cases correctly classified: 90.38% 139 characterized by less participation in the Kiangsi Soviet period and the holding of lower or fewer positions in the Party, whereas the old elite was the opposite. The differences between the new elite and the old elite in terms of personal attributes, while sta tistically significant, do not seem to show anything special about the first new elite of the post-revolutionary era. From the vantage point of hindsight, the rather unrepresentative new elite of the post-revolutionary era might have contributed to the sources of the revolt against the Party manifested during the Cultural Revolution.
(3) Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 9th CC
The 24 discriminating variables used in this analysis are listed on Table 6.7, and the results of discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table D.3, are in Appendix D. Twelve of the 24 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function that can be used to distinguish the new elite from the old elite in the 9th CC. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 6.8, the variable of type of work when joining the Party and the variable of cumulative positional scores in January, 1965,made the largest positive and negative contributions respectively to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discriminant function can be inter preted as representing an original career in the military and a holding of a fewer or lower positions dimension that differentiated the new elite from the old elite in the 9th CC. In other words, more of the new elite members had originally worked in the military and had held fewer or lower positions; more of the old elite 140
Table 6.7 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 9th Central Committee
Level 1: Demographic and Social Background
V5 — Date of birth
Level 2: Initial Political Socialization
V13 — Date of joining the Party V14 — Age when joining the Party V10 — Education when joining the Party V15 — Type of work when joining the Party
Level 3: Party Political Socialization
Vll — Special military/political training (Q=no, l=yes) V12 — Education/training in the U.S.S.R. (0=no, l=yes) TOTEVET — Total participation in important events TOTCEC — Total membership in the Central Executive Councils *FA1 — The 1st Field Army.. *FA2 — The 2nd Field Army *FA3 — The 3rd Field Army *FA4 — The 4th Field Army Military Affiliation *FA5 — The 5th Field Army *FA6 — The Central Military *FA7 — No military affiliation'
Level 4: Current Careers
CUMPOS65 — Cumulative positional scores in January, 1965 V30 — Type of work in April, 1969 (0=Party/administration, l=commander/commissar) V165 — Place of work in April, 1969 (0=provincial, l=central) V157 — Concurrent position holding in April, 1969 V152 — Years in the primary position in April, 1969 WCHAGE69 — Change in type of work between 1965 and 1969 (0=no change, l=change) V221 — Change in location of work between 1965 and 1969 (0=no change, l=change) RCHAGE69 — Change in positional scores between 1965 and 1969 (0=no change, l=change)
Total Variables: 24
*Each is a dummy variable that was constructed out of the vari able of military affiliation. 141
Table 6.8 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 9th CC Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
V13 — Date of joining the Party 0.06897
V14 — Age when joining the Party 0.06749
V10 — Education when joining the Party 0.03335
V15 — Type of work when joined the Party 0.10146
TOTEVET — Total participation in important events -0.08555
FA1 — The first Field Army 0.02324
TOTCEC — Total membership scores in the CEC -0.08627
CUMPOS65 — Cumulative positional scores in January, 1965 -0.15121
V165 — Place of work in April, 1969 -0.03358
V157 — Concurrent positions holding in April, 1969 -0.06769
V152 — Years in the primary position in April, 1969 -0.04678
RCHAGE69 — Change in positional scores between 1965 and 1969 0.02311 142 members had done the opposite. This finding supports the general observation that the Chinese military was in the ascendancy after
the Cultural Revolution.
The validity of the dervied discriminant function that differ
entiated the new elite from the old elite in the 9th CC can be
tested by the degree to which it classifies the newelite and the
old elite groups correctly. This has been done and is shown in
Table 6.9. The dgreee of successful differentiation/classification
reached 95.29%, or 162 out of 170 cases, and the misclassified cases were 8 out of 170, or 4.71%. This high degree of success in differentiating the new elite from the old elite in the 9th CC indi
cates the high validity of the derived discriminant function. It
also indicates that there were substantial change in the elite
composition of the CCP in April, 1969, when the 9th CC was
convened. As a whole, the new elite in the 9th CC was characterized
Table 6.9 Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 9th CC into the New Elite and the Old Elite
Prediction Results: Predicted Group Membership Actual Group No. of Cases Group 1 Group 2
Group 1: Old Elite 36 29 7 80.6% 19.4%
Group 2: New Elite 134 1 133 0.7% 99.3%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 95.29% 143 by having had original careers in the military and having held fewer or lower positions in the Party, which gives some indication of the ascendency of the military after the Cultural Revolution, as noted above.
(4) Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 10th CC
The 24 discriminating variables used in this analysis are listed in Table 6.10, and the results of discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table D.4, are in Appendix D. Nine of the 24 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function that can be used to distinguish the new elite from the old elite in the 10th CC. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 6.11, the variable of date of joining the Party and the variable of concurrent position holding made the largest positive and negative contributions respectively to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discriminant function can be interpreted as representing a seniority in the Party and a fewer concurrent positions dimension that serves to differentiate between the new elite and the old elite in the 10th
CC. In other words, the new elite had less seniority in the Party and held fewer positions concurrently than the old elite. Lesser seniority in the Party is a normal expectation of any new elite, but less concurrent position holding by the new elite seems to reflect a new political style.
The validity of the derived discriminant function can be and has been tested by the degree to which it differentiates between or classifies membership in the 10th CC into the new elite and the old elite 144
Table 6.10 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 10th Central Committee
Level 1: Demographic and Social Background
V5 — Date of birth
Level 2: Initial Political Socialization
V13 — Date of joining the Party V14 — Age when joining the Party V10 — Education when joining the Party V15 — Type of work when joining the Party
Level 3: Party Political Socialization
Vll — Special military/political training (0=no, l=yes) V12 — Education/training in the U.S.S.R. (0=no, l=yes) TOTEVET — Total participation in important events TOTCEC — Total membership in the Central Executive Councils *FA1 — The 1st Field Army^ *FA2 — The 2nd Field Army *FA3 — The 3rd Field Army *FA4 — The 4th Field Army Military Affiliation *FA5 — The 5th Field Army J *FA6 — The Central Military / *FA7 — No military affiliation
Level 4: Current Careers
CUMP0S69 — Cumulative positional scores in April, 1969 V31 — Type of work in August, 1973 (0=Party/administra tion, l=commander/commissar) V166 — Place of work in August, 1973 (0=provincial, l=central) V158 — Concurrent position holding in August, 1973 V153 — Years in the primary position in August, 1973 WCHAGE73 — Change in type of work between 1969 and 1973 (0=no change, l=change) V222 — Change in location of work between 1969 and 1973 (0=no change, l=change) RCHAGE73 — Change in positional scores between 1969 and 1973 (0=no change, l=change)
Total Variables: 24
*Each is a dummy variable that was constructed out of the vari able of military affiliation. 145
Table 6.11 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 10th CC Differ entiating the New Elite from the Old Elite
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Functions 1
V13 — Date of .joining the Party 0.11535
V10 — Education when joining the Party 0.09313
Vll — Special military/politicaltraining -0.08713
FA3 — The third Field Army 0.06702
FA4 — The fourth Field Army -0.06880
V31 — Type of work in August, 1973 0.05347
V158 — Concurrent position holding in August, 1973 -0.13948
V153 — Years in the primary position in August, 1973 -0.06665
CUMPOS69 — Cumulative positional scores in April, 1969 -0.03508 146 correctly. The degree of success in differentiation/classification, as is shown in Table 6.12, was 76.11%, or 149 out of 195 cases, and the misclassified cases were 46 out of 195, or 23.59%. This degree of successful differentiation of the new elite from the old elite in the 10th CC was not very high in comparison with that for the 7th,
8th, and 9th Central Committees. The misclassified cases in the 10th
CC must be scrutinized.
A close look into the data in Table 6.12 reveals' that most misclassified cases occurred in the new elite group— members of the new elite group were wrongly classified as members of the old elite group. Two mitigrating circumstances, however, were found to account for 17 of the 29 misclassified cases in this group. First, six of the 29 members had previously been members of the 7th CC or the 8th
Table 6.12 Degree of Success in Differentiating/Classifying Membership in the 10th CC into the New Elite and the Old Elite
Prediction Results: Predicted Group Membership Actual Group No. of Cases Group 1 Group 2
Group 1: Old Elite 122 105 17 86.1% 13.9%
Group 2: New Elite 73 29 44 39.7% 60.3%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 76.41%
CC or both, but had not been members of the 9th CC; they were rein- stated in the 10th CC.^ These members were actually members of the old elite; our definition alone (a member of the new elite is one 147 who was not in the preceding Central Committee) classes them with the new elite in the 10th CC. Second, another eleven members had had alternate memberhsip in one or more of the preceding Central Commit tees.^ Though these eleven members had no previous full membership in the Central Committee, it is reasonable to expect that their personal attributes are more simliar to those of the old elite than to those of the new elite. Thus, if we deduct these 17 "excusable" cases from the misclassified cases of 46, the total misclassified cases will be reduced to 29 or 14.8%. Putting it another way, the degree of success in classification will rise from 76.14% to 85.13%.
Nevertheless, the validity of the derived discriminant function must be tested by what it actually classifies correctly, and not by what would have been if the mitigating circumstances were taken into consideration. For this reason, the derived discriminant function should be judged inadequate to differentiate the new elite from the old elite in the 10th CC, and especially inadequate to classify the members of the new elite correctly; the degree of success in identifying the new elite was only 60.3%. This is not due to the inadequacy of the technique of discriminant analysis per se, but rather it reflects certain unusual circumstances under which the mis classified cases occurred. In other words, there are limits on the use of personal attributes alone to differentiate different groups.
The Relative Potency of Personal Attributes in Affecting Political Promotion
Four discriminant analyses have been performed on membership in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees in an inquiry into political 148 promotion. The focus was on differentiating the new elite from the old elite in each Central Committee. The results were quite suc cessful, with the exception of one instance which involved certain mitigating circumstances. One important implication of this generally successful differentiation between the new elite and the old elite, as pointed out in Chapter V, is that given the known personal attributes of elite members, it is possible to predict their group membership, if unknown, with considerable success.
Such being the case, we have a theoretical interest in acquiring a generalized view from these four discriminant analyses of the relative potency of the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers as they relate to political promotion. This theoretical interest in assessing the relative potency of variable clusters arises from, and parallels, that of
James Rosenau (1971) in his conceptualization of the pre-theory of foreign policy, but it goes beyond the theorizing stage and will be grounded on empirical findings. In other words, we are interested in formulating "empirical pre-theory" (so labelled because rela tional statements of variable clusters rather than specific variables are aimed at). However, since we are not able to compare those who aspired to CC membership with those who succeeded in acquiring it, and because what we actually compared are the new elite and the old elite, both of which are elites, the relative potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes thus discovered relates to the elite groups and does not relate to the 149 elite and the non-elite. In this instance, we may not be able to
formulate an empirical pre-theory of political promotion in the sense that nothing can be said about the elite vs. the non-elite.
What can be derived from comparing the new elite and the old elite, however, are the presumptive decision rules of the Party for selecting
the new elite in the context of the existing elite.
How can we assess the relative potency of the four variable
clusters of personal attributes in differentiating the new elite from
the old elite, based on the results of discriminant analyses per
formed? The basic approach is to find out that what variables were useful in deriving the discriminant functions and to which cluster
they belong. Because the discriminating variables that were found useful in deriving the discriminant function were different in each instance, one way of acquiring a generalized view of the relative potency of each useful discriminating variable is to count the frequency of its presence in the derived discriminant functions and then to get its mean frequency score. By identifying the cluster
to which the useful discriminating variables belong, the relative potency of the discriminating variables within that same cluster
can be seen from the mean frequency score of each. The mean frequency scores for useful discriminating variables have been calculated and are shown in Table 6.13. By averaging the mean frequency scores of all useful discriminating variables within each cluster, the relative potency of each variable cluster is indicated by the
rank order of the mean frequency score of each cluster. The data are displayed in Table 6.14. Based on these two sets of calculations, a Table 6.13 The Relative Potency of Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
Mean Frequency Score of the Variable Used in Variable Variables Useful in Deriving Deriving the Dis Cluster The Discriminant Functions criminant Functions
Demographic & Social status of the family! .00 Social Background Date of birth .00
Initial Political Date of joining the Party 1.00 Socialization Education when joining the Party .75
Type of work when joining the Party .75
Age when joining the Party .50
Party Total CEC membership .75 Political Socialization Education/training in the U.S..S.R. .50
Total participation in important events .50
120th/FAl .75 129th/FA2 . o o \ . Military ' jjew 4th/FA3 .25 \ affiliation 2 H5th/FA4 .25 .35 V /FA5 .00 / Cetr1/ FA6 •25 y S Non-Mil./FA7 .25
Special mil./pol. training. .25
Current Careers^ Cumulative positional scores 1.00
Place of work .75
Concurrent position holding .67
Years in primary position .67
Type of work .50
Change in positional scores .33 Change in type of work .00 Change in location of work .00
■^This variable was used in the analysis of membership in the 7th CC only. Q A set of six and Severn dummy variables were constructed for "military affiliation " for the data on membership in the 7th CC and in the 8th to 10th CC respectively. 3A11 variables under this category involve different times periods, which cannot be indicated in this Table. The specified time periods are contained in the Tables 6.1, 6.A, 6.7, and 6.10, which provide the lists of discriminating variables used in four discriminant analyses. 151
Table 6.14 The Relative Potency of Four Variable Clusters of Personal Attributes in Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees
Mean Frequency Score Relative Potency Variable Cluster of the Variable Cluster* in Rank Order
Initial Political Socialization .75 I
Current Careers .65 II
Party Political Socialization .47 III
Demographic and Social Background .00
Calculations were based on the mean frequency score of each variable as displayed in Table 6.13. generalized view from the four discriminant analysis performed is that initial political socialization variables are most frequently useful in distinguishing the new elite from the old elite, current
career variables rank in the second place, Party political socializa tion variables rank in the third place, and demographic and social background variables are not useful at all.6 This finding of the relative potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes in relating to political promotion does not conform to that which was
theorized in the conceptual scheme in Chapter V. We posited there
that the relative potency of the four variable clusters would be
current careers, first; Party political socialization, second;
initial political socialization, third; and demographic and social background, fourth. 152 Why there is a discrepency between what was theorized and what was empirically found? The reasons may not be difficult to find.
In the first place, the two groups compared were not those who aspired to CC membership and those who succeeded in acquiring it, as has been mentioned. If such a comparison had been possible, the data would have revealed the Party's decision rules for who should be granted elite status and who should not. Since the comparison was made between the new elite and the old elite, both of which were elites, the data has revealed the Party's decision rules for retaining elite members as well as those for granting elite status to Party members. This suggests that the relative potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes in differentiating between the elite groups is likely to be different from that in differentiating between the elite and the non-elite; it can be expected that the former involves more inclusive decision rules than the latter. In the second place, when we posited in the conceptual scheme that current careers would rank first, we were assuming that the functional performance of political roles would be the primary consideration in the Party's recruitment of the new elite. But since our finding is that initial political sociali zation ranks first in potency, it may be inferred that the repre- sentativness of elite generations, as partially indicated by the fact that initial political socialization ranks first, is more potent than current careers in the Party's recruitment of the new elite. We may call outstanding differences in initial political socialization between the new elite and the old elite reflections 153 of a representative model of elite recruitment, and, in contrast, we may call such differences in current careers reflections of a functional model of elite recruitment. In the case of the CCP, the pattern of recruitment of the new elite tends to be more representa tive than functional. In this connection, however, mention must be made that while in terms of rank order, the variable cluster of initial political socialization is higher than that of current careers, in terms of mean score, the difference between the two variable cluster is small (0.75 vs. 0.65, as shown in Table 6.14). Thus, it may be concluded from an inquiry into the data of four time periods that both the representativeness of elite generations and the functional performance of political roles were found to be salient features in the pattern of recruiting the new elite of the CCP, although the former is weighted a little more than the latter.
Summary of Findings
In this chapter, political promotion has been analyzed with a focus on the new elite and the old elite. Four variable clusters, demographic and social background, initial political socialization,
Party political socialization, and current careers, were used as the discriminating variables in discriminant analysis to differentiate the new elite from the old elite in the 7th to the 10th Central
Committees. The degree of success in differentiation was high, with the exception of the 10th CC, which involved certain mitigating circumstances. As a result, known personal attributes of elite members can be used to predict their group membership, the new elite 154 or the old elite, if unknown, with considerable success. Based on the four discriminant analyses performed, the relative potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes in relating to political promotion has been assessed. The finding is that initial political socialization variables are most frequently useful in deriving discriminant functions that serve to differ entiate the new elite from the old elite, current career variables rank in the second place, Party political socialization variables rank in the third place, and demograhic and social background variables (which were confined to the variable of data of birth, and in one instance, to the variables of date of birth and social status of the family) are not useful at all. This indicates, among other things, that the representativeness of elite generations, as partially indicated by the primary importance of the variable cluster of initial political socialization, tends to be the Party's first and foremost consideration in recruiting the new elite. NOTES
^For instance, the eigenvalue and its associated canonical correlations, as are shown on the left side of Summary Table D.l in Appendix D, give indication of the discriminating power of the derived discriminant function; the higher the eigenvalue and its associated canonical correlation, the greater the discriminating power of the derived discriminant function.
^Actually, "the procedure for classification involves the use of separate linear combination of the discriminating variables for each group. These produce a probability of membership in the respective group, and the case is assigned to the group with the highest probability" (Klecka, 1975, p. 436). In order not to dwell on the details of statistical procedures, what was presented in the text is a simplification.
^The following are six members of the 10th CC who were pre- 9th CC members:
Names:____ Membership in the Previous Central Committees_____
Li Ching-ch’uan 8th full
Liao Ch'eng-chih 7th full, 8th full
Tan Chen-lin 7 th full, 8th full
Teng Hsiao-p'ing 7 th full, 8 th full
Ulanfu 7 th alternate, 8th full
Wang Chia-hsiang Pre-7th, 7th full, 8th full
155 156
^The following are 11 members of the 10th CC who were alter nate members of preceding Central Committees;
Previous Alternate Membership in the Names Central Committees
Chang P'ing-hua 8th
Chang Tsung-hsun 7th 8th
Chia Lin-yi 9th
Chin Tsu-min 9 th
Kuo Yu-feng 9th
Liang Chin-tang 9th
Su Chen-hua 8th
T'an Ch'i-lung 8th 9th
Ts'ui Hai-lung 9th
Yang Yung 8th
Yu Tai-chung 9th
^Since the variables of sex, nationality, and native province were not used in the analysis as discriminating variables, and the variable of social status of the family was used in only one instance (membership in the 7th CC), the finding that the demographic and social background variables were not useful at all in deriving the discriminant functions should be construed as that the variable of date of birth, which was the only vari able used in all four discriminant analyses, was not useful in deriving the discriminant function. Chapter VII
The Dynamics of Elite Change: Political Purge and Political Survival
This chapter inquires into political purge and political
survival, i.e., the termination or continuation of membership in the succeeding Central Committee. Why are some CC members purged
and why do others survive? Based on the conceptual scheme which
was developed in Chapter V (excluding the consideration of con
textual variables for the purpose of this study), political purge
and political survival reflect behavioral consequences of elite
individuals and can be explained in so far as there are differences
in personal attributes among elite individuals. In this inquiry,
the research question is whether, and to what extent, the four
variable clusters of demographic and social background, political
socialization, and current careers can be used to account for the
political purge or political survival of CCP elite members. If
the purged and the surviving members of the CCP elite can be differ
entiated successfully by means of the four variable clusters of
personal attributes, then known personal attributes can be used to
predict political purge and political survival, if unknown.
157 Each Central Committee presents an occasion for appraising the
changing needs of or the desired changes in the elite, as well as an
opportunity for evaluating the existing elite by the Party leader
ship. Thus, each Central Committee is looked upon as a situational
variable but will be held as a parameter in this inquiry. In the
discriminant analyses to be performed, political purge vs. political
survival is the dependent, criterion variable; the four variable
clusters of demographic and social background, initial political
socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers
are the independent, discriminant variables. Three sub-set data are
available for analysis--membership in the 7th, 8th, and 9th Central
Committees. The analysis will proceed from the two different
perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group. The term
"elite individual" is meant to focus on the members of a specific
Central Committee. "Elite group," on the other hand, is meant to
focus on either the new or old elite group in a Central Committee.
Political Purge and Political Survival of 7th CC Members
Almost all the 48 members of the 7th CC had renewed membership
in the 8th Central Committee. The exceptions were two members,
Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who were publicly condemned for the
anti-Party crime of building "independent kingdoms" prior to the
convocation of the 8th Party Congress. Because only two members were purged, it would not be very meaningful to perform discriminant
analysis on the membership to differentiate the purged from the
survivors, either from the perspective of the elite individual or 159 the elite group. Nevertheless, the data are presented in Table 7.1 for examination. It may be asked what possible inferences could be drawn from the data about the de facto decision rules of the Party leadership with regard to membership in the 8th CC. It is to be re called that the 7th Party Congress, which "elected" members to the
7th CC, was convened in April, 1945, on the eve of the Civil War with the Kuomintung; the 8th Party Congress, however, which "elected" the
8th CC, was convened in September, 1956, and was the first of its kind after the CCP's takeover in China. The fact that the 7th CC members were returned to the 8th CC on a nearly wholesale scale does not seem to imply much evaluation of the existing elite on the part of the Party leadership. Rather, it seems to reflect one of the syndromes of the victorious: "Let us reward generously those who have
Table 7.1 Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 7th Central Committee
Survived Total in the % Perspective 8th CC Purged (Death)* (N)
Elite Individual 95.3 4.7 100 (41) (2) (5) (48)
Old Elite 100 0 100 (18) (5) (48) Elite Group New Elite 92.0 8.0 100 (23) (2) (0) (25)
*Deaths prior to the 8th CC were not included in the percentage calculation. 160 participated!" This can be taken In conjunction with the fact that the number of members in the 8th CC was more than double that of the
7th CC (it grew from 48 to 104). This laxity in assigning member ship in the 8th CC may have contributed to the heavy purge of
8th CC members, which is the matter of interest in our next analysis.
Political Purge and Political Survival of 8th CC Members
The number of members in the 8th CC was 104. The data on the political purge and political survival of the 8th CC members from the perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group are presented in Table 7.2. The 8th CC members suffered considerable political purge, which might reflect the anti-Party revolt mani fested in the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1969. In terms of elite groups, the old elite fared much better than the new elite.
Discriminant analysis has been performed on the membership in the 8th CC from the two perspectives of the elite individual and
Table 7.2 Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 8th Central Committee
Survived Total in the % Perspective 9 th CC Purged (Death)* (N)
Elite Individual 60.4 39.6 100 (55) (36) (13) (104)
Old Elite 56.8 43.2 100 (21) (16) (4) (41) Elite Group New Elite 27.8 72.2 100 (15) (39) (9) (63)
*Deaths prior to the 9th CC were not included in the percentage calculation. 161 the elite group; the 24 discriminating variables used are listed in Tabe 7.3, which will serve as a common list for all subsequent discriminant analyses performed on the membership in the 8th CC.
(1) Elite Individuals: As is shown in Table 7.2, without any differentiation among the members of the 8th CC, 36 members of the
Committee were purged and 55 survived (39.6% and 60.4% respectively of members who were alive prior to the 9th CC). The 24 discrimina ting variables used in this analysis are listed in Table 7.3, and the results of discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data,
Summary Table E.l, are in Appendix E. Twelve of the 24 discrimin ating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function to distinguish the political purged from the political survivors. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coef ficients in Table 7.4, the variable of type of work in January, 1965, and the variable of total membership scores in the Central Executive
Councils made the first and second largest negative contributions, and no variable made a significant positive contribution to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discriminant function can be interpreted as representing a greater prior involve ment in Party/administration work and a lower CEC membership scores dimension that serves to differentiate the purged from the survivors. In other words, the purged had been more involved in
Party/administration work and had held fewer or lower positions during the Kiangsi Soviet period, whereas the political survivors were just the opposite. 162
Table 7.3 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged and the Survivors of the 8th CC From Two Perspectives
Level 1: Demographic and Social Background
V5 — Date of Birth
Level 2: Initial Political Socialization
V13 — Date of joining the Party V14 — Age when joining the Party V10 — Education when joining the Party V15 — Type of work when joining the Party
Level 3: Party Political Socialization
Vll — Special military/political training (0=no, l=yes) V12 — Education/training in the U.S.S.R. (0=no, l=yes) TOTEVET — Total participation in important events TOTCEC — Total membership in the Central Executive Councils *FA1 — The 1st Field Army^ *FA2 — The 2nd Field Army *FA3 — The 3rd Field Army *FA4 — The 4th Field Army Military Affiliation *FA5 — The 5th Field Army *FA6 — The Central Military *FA7 — No military affiliation
Level 4: Current Careers
CUMPOS65 — Cumulative positional scores in January, 1965 V194 — Type of work in January, 1965 (0=Party/administra- tion, l=commander/commissar) V220 — Place of work in January, 1965 (O=provincial, l=central) V218 — Concurrent position holding in January, 1965 V216 — Years in the primary position in January, 1965 WCHAGE65 — Change in type of work between 1959 and 1965 (0=no change, l=change) V170 — Change in location of work between 1959 and 1965 (0=no change, l=change) RCHAGE65 — Change in positional scores between 1959 and 1965 (0=no change, l=change)
Total Variables: 24
*Each is a dummy variable that was constructed out of the variable of military affiliation. 163
Table 7.4 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 8th CC Differ entiating the Purged from the Survivors
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
V10 — Education when joining the Party 0.06787
V15 — Type of work when joining theParty 0.07654
V5 — Date of Birth -0.03177
TOTEVET — Total participation in important events -0.08139
TOTCEC — Total membership scores in the CEC -0.12346
FA1 — The first Field Army 0.09715
FA4 — The Fourth Field Army 0.07093
FA5 — The Fifth Field Army 0.04443
FA7 — No military affiliation -0.02717
CUMPOS65 — Cumulative positional scores in January, 1965 -0.00099
V194 — Type of work in January, 1965 -0.16867
V220 — Place of work in January, 1965 -0.01285 How much confidence may one have in the derived discriminant function that differentiates the purged from the survivors? As was done before, the validity of a discriminant function can be tested by the degree to which it correctly classifies the "population" into the designated groups— the purged and the survivor groups in this instance. The results of classification/differentiation, as is shown in Table 7.5, indicate that the degree of success was
84.62%, or 77 out of 91 cases, and that the misclassified cases were
14 out of 91, or 15.38%. A further look into the data in Table
7.5 reveals that the misclassified cases were evenly distributed between the purged and the survivor groups in absolute numbers, though this represents a slightly higher percentage of the survivor group. As a whole, 84.62% in correct differentiation/classification is a fairly high figure; the validity of the derived discriminant function need not be doubted. This finding signifies that the
Table 7.5 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Suvivors in the 8th CC
Prediction Results: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases Group 0 Group 1
Group 0: Purged 55 48 7 87.3% 12.7%
Group 1: Survived 36 7 29 19.4% 80.6%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 84.62% four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers in combination can be used to distinguish the political purged from the political survivors with a considerable degree of success in the absence of the other types of variables. Putting it another way, given the known four variable clusters of personal attributes, it is possible to predict the probable political purge or political survival of elite members, if unknown, with considerable success. Next, we turn to a more demanding question: if membership in the 8th CC is conceived of as being composed of a new elite group and an old elite group, is it possible to differentiate be tween the purged and the surviving members within each group?
(2) Elite groups: The old elite in the 8th CC originally had 41 members; the new elite had 63,as shown in Table 7.2. By the time of the 9th CC, the old elite was reduced through death to 37 members and the new elite to 54 members. Discriminant analysis has been performed on these two sub-set data so that the different variables that differentiate the purged from the survivors in each group can be determined.
The 37 Members of the Old Elite Group: There were 16 purged and 21 surviving members of this group, as is shown in Table 7.2.1 ^he results of the discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table E.2, are in Appendix E. Three of the 24 discrim inating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function to differentiate between the purged and the survivors. As 166 indicated by the standardized discriminantfunctibn coefficients in
Table 7.6, the variable of place of work in January, 1965, and the variable of concurrent position holding in January, 1965, made the largest positive and negative contributions respectively to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discriminant function can be interpreted as representing a work in the central and a fewer concurrent position holding dimension that serves to differentiate the purged from the surviving members in the old elite group. In other words, more of the purged members had worked in the provinces and had held more concurrent positions than the surviving members.
The validity of the derived discriminant function has been tested by the degree to which it can correctly classify the purged and the surviving members in the old elite group. The results
Table 7.6 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on the Old Elite in the 8th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
V194 — Type of work in January, 1965 0.48126
V218 — Concurrent position holding in January, 1965 -0.36427
V220 — Place of work in January, 1965 0.62996 167 of this classification/prediction, as is shown in Table 7.7, indicate that the degree of success was 62,16%, or 23 out of 37 cases, and that the misclassified cases were 14 out of 37, or 37.84%. A further look into the data in Table 7,7 reveals that most misclassified cases occurred in the purged group, where the misclassification was 10 out of 16 cases. The ten members who were purged but were wrongly identified as surviving including such well-known CCP figures as
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Peng Te-huai, Huang K'e-ch'eng, Po I-po, Wang
Chia-hsiang, Change Wei-t'ien, and Tan Chen-lin. The political downfall of these men was indeed unexpected. While these persons might be regarded as "deviant" cases, the derived discriminant function, nevertheless, proved not to be adequate to identify the purged members correctly in this instance. This is one situation in which the attempt to make use of personal attributes to account for political purge is less than satisfactory.
Table 7.7 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 8th CC
Prediction Results: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases Group 0 Group 1
Group 0: Purged 16 6 10 37.5% 62.5%
Group 1: Survived 21 4 17 19.0% 81.0%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 62.16% 168
The 54 Members of the New Elite Group: There were 39 purged and
O 15 surviving members of this group, as is shown in Table 7.2.
The results of the discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table E.3, are in Appendix E. Seven of the 24 discriminating variables were found to be useful in deriving one discriminant function to distinguish the purge from the survivors.
As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 7.8, the variables of change in positional scores between
1965 and 1969 and cumulative positional scores in January, 1965, made the largest positive and negative contributions respectively to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discrimin ant function can be interpreted as representing a greater change in positional scores and a lower cumulative positional scores dimension
Table 7.8 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on the New Elite in the 8th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
Vll — Special military/political training -0.07784 TOTEVET — Total participation in important events 0.13869 FA2 — The second Field Army 0.07368 FA7 — No military affiliation 0.16769 RCHAGE65 — Changes in positional scores between 1959 and 1965 0.28708.
C0MP0S65 — Cumulative positional scores in January, 1965 -0.21715
V194 — Type of work in January, 1965 0.16891 169 that serves to distinguish the purged from the surviving members of the new elite. In other words, more of the purged members of the new elite group were those who had held lower or fewer positions in the Party but whose responsibilities in the Party had increased prior to their purge (as indicated by a greater change in positional scores), whereas more of the surviving members were just the opposite.
The validity of the derived discriminant function that differentiates between the purged and the surviving members of the new elite group has been tested by the degree to which it correctly classifies the purged and the survivors. The results of classification/ prediction, as is shown in Table 7.9, indicate that the degree of success was 88.89%, or 48 out of 54 cases, and that the misclassified cases were 6 out of 54, or 11.11%. This high degree of success demonstrates the high validity of the derived discriminant function.
Table 7.9 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the New Elite in the 8th CC
Prediction Results: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases Group 0 Group 1
Group 0 = Purged 39 37 2 94.9 % 5.1%
Group 1 = Survived 15. 4 11 26.7% 73.3%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 88.89% 170
Moreover, it provides another instance in which a combination of the four variable clusters of personal attributes can be used to pre dict probable political ourge or political survival of elite members, if unknown, with a considerable degree of success in the absence of other types of variables.
The Relative Potency of Personal Attributes to Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 8th CC
Three discriminant analyses have been performed with varying degrees of success on the membership in the 8th CC to differentiate the purged from the survivors from the two perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group. The results of this analysis indicate that personal attributes can be used to account at least partially for political purge and political survival. Putting it another way, known personal attributes of elite members can be used to predict their probable political purge or political survival, if unknown, in the absence of other types of varibles.
Thus, we have a theoretical interest in assessing the relative potency of the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers in relating to political purge and political survival. As was done previously in assessing the relative potency of the four variable clusters in relating to political promotion, one way of assessing the relative potency of each useful discriminating variable is to count the freauency of its presence in the derived discriminant functions and then to find its mean frequency score. By identifying the variable cluster 171 to which the useful discriminating variable belongs, the relative potency of each discriminating variable within the variable cluster can be seen from its mean frequency score. This has been calculated and is shown in Table 7.10. By further averaging the mean frequency scores of all useful variables within each cluster, the relative potency of each variable cluster is indicated by the rank order of the mean frequency score of each cluster, which is displayed in Table
7.11. Based on these two sets of calculations, a generalized view from the three discriminant analyses performed is that, in so far as membership in the 8th CC is concerned, the current career variable cluster is most frequently useful in distinguishing the purged from the survivors, the Party political socialization variable cluster ranks in the second place, and the initial political socialization variable cluster and the demographic and social background variable cluster share the third place. This finding of the relative potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes in affecting political purge and political survival is congruent with that which was theorized in the conceptual scheme presented in Chapter V.
Political Purge and Political Survival of 9th CC Members
In contrast to members of the 8th CC, the 170 members of the 9th
CC suffered relatively little political purge. The data on the poli tical purge and political survival of 9th CC members from the two perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group are pre sented in Table 7.12. In terms of elite groups, the old elite in the 9th CC had a better survival rate than the new elite, as was the case in the 8th CC. In the inquiry into political purge and 172
Table 7.10 The Relative Potency of Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors for Members of the 8th CC from Two Perspectives*
Mean Frequency Score Variables Useful of the Variable in in Deriving the Deriving the Discrim Variable Cluster Discriminant Functions inant Functions
Demographic & Social Background Date of Birth .33
Initial Political Education when joining Socialization the Party .33 Type of work when joining the Party .33
Party Political Total participation in Socialization important events .67
Total CEC membership .3,3
Ll .33 i2 .33 .33 N. Military FA4 .33 .40 Affiliation FA5 .33 s ' FA7 .67 Special mil./pol. training .33
Current Careers Type of work in 1965 .67 Cumulative positional scores in 1965 .67 Place of work in 1965 1.00 Concurrent position holding in 1965 .33 Change in positional scores between '59 and '65 .33
*Based on the three discriminant functions derived from three discriminant analyses, the results of which are displayed in Tables 7.4, 7.6, and 7.8. 173
Table 7.11 The Relative Potency of Four Variable Clusters of Personal Attributes to Political Purge and Political Survival for Members of the 8th CC
Mean Frequency Score of the Variable Relative Potency Variable Cluster Cluster* in Rank Order
Current Careers .60 I
Party Political Socialization .43 II
Initial Political Socialization .33 — ___ _ 111 Demographic and Social Background .33 .-- —
*The calculations were based on the mean frequency score of each useful discriminating variable as displayed in Table 7.10.
Table 7.12 Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 9th Central Committee
Survived Total in the % Perspective 10th CC Purged (Death)* (N)
Elite Individual 76.2 23.8 100 (122) (38) (10) (170)
Old Elite 81.2 18.8 100 Elite (26) (6) (4) (36) Group New Elite 75.0 25.0 100 (96) (32) (6) (134)
*Deaths prior to the 10th CC were not included in the per centage calculation. 174 political survival of members of the 8th CC, discriminant analysis proved to be quite successful in differentiating the purged from the survivors; the same has been done for members of the 9th CC from the two perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group, and the 24 discriminating variables used in the analyses are listed in Table 7.13.
(1) Elite Individuals: As is shown in Table 7.12 without differentiation among the members of 9th CC, 38 members were purged and 122 survived
(23.8% and 76.2% respectively of members who were alive prior to the
10th CC). The results of discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table E,4, are in Appendix E. Nine of the 24 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function to distinguish the purged from the surviving members of the
9th CC. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 7.14, the variable of cumulative positional scores in April, 1969, made the largest positive contribution to the derived discriminant function; the variables of change of work between
1965 and 1969 and place of work in April, 1969, made the first and second largest negative contributions. As a result, this discrimin ant function can be interpreted as representing a higher cumulative positional scores and a little change of work and a little work in the provinces dimension that serves to differentiate between the purged and the surviving members of the 9th CC. In other words, more of the purged members had held lower or fewer positions in the
Party, had changed their types of work and had worked in the provinces, whereas more of the surviving members did the opposite. 175
Table 7.13 Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the 9th CC from Two Perspectives
Level 1: Demographic and Social Background
V5 — Date of birth
Level 2: Initial Political Socialization
V13 — Date of joining the Party V14 — Age when joining the Party V10 — Education when joining the Party V15 — Type of work when joining the Party
Level 3: Party Political Socialization
Vll — Special military/political training (0=no, l=yes) V12 — Education/training in the U.S.S.R. (0=no, l=yes) TOTEVET — Total participation in important events TOTCEC — Total membership in the Central Executive Councils *FA1 — The 1st Field Army *FA2 — The 2nd Field Army *FA3 — The 3rd Field Army *FA4 — The 4th Field Army Military Affiliation *FA5 — The 5th Field Army *FA6 — The Central Military *FA7 — No military affiliation
Level 4: Current Careers
CUMPOS69 — Cumulative positional scores in April, 1969 V30 — Type of work in April, 1969 (0=Party/administration, l=commander/commissar) V165 — Place of work in April, 1969 (O=provincial, l=central) V157 — Concurrent position holdings in April, 1969 V152 — Years in the primary position in April, 1969 WCHAGE69 — Change in type of work between 1965 and 1969 (0=no change, l=change) V221 — Change in location of work between 1965 and 1969 (0=no change, l=change) RCHAGE69 — Change in positional scores between 1965 and 1969 (0=no change, l=change)
Total Variables: 24
*Each is a dummy variable that was constructed out of the variable of military affiliation. 176 Table 7. 14 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on Membership in the 9th CC Differ entiating the Purged from the Survivors
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
V10 — Education when joining the Party 0.04466
FA3 — The third Field Army 0.02542
CUMP0S69 — Cumulative positional scores in April. 1969 0.07565
V30 — Type of work in April, 1969 -0.04735
V165 — Place of work in April, 1969 -0.08500
WCHAGE69 — Change in type of work between 1965 and 1969 -0.09440
RCHAGE69 — Change in positional scores between 1965 and 1969 -0.05951
V221 — Change in place of work between 1965 and 1969 -0.04388 177
The validity of the derived discriminant function that differentiates between the purged and the surviving members of the
9th CC has been tested by the degree to which it correctly classifies membership in the 9th CC into the purged and the surviving groups.
The results of classification/prediction, as is shown in Table 7.15, indicate that the degree of success was 83.12%, or 133 out of 160 cases, and that the misclassified cases were 27 out of 160, or 16.88%.
While the overall success in differentiation, 83.12%, is not low, a further look into the data in Table 7.15 reveals that most misclassi
fied cases occurred in the purged group, where the missclassification was 18 out of 38 cases. This indicates that the derived discriminant
function, while adequate to identify the surviving members of the
9th CC, was inadequate to identify the purged members correctly.
This is another instance in which the four variable clusters of personal attributes cannot be used to predict political purge with
a high degree of success.
Table 7.15 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and Survivors in the 9th CC
Prediction Results: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases Group 0 Group 1
Group 0: Purged 38 20 18 52.6% 47.4%
Group 1: Survived 122 9 113 7.4% 92.6%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 83.12% 178
(2) Elite Groups: When membership in the 9th CC is conceived as being composed of an old elite group, which had had membership in the 8th CC, and a new elite group, which had no membership in the
8th CC, the former group has 36 members and the latter 134, as is shown in Table 7.12. Through deaths before the 10th CC, the old elite group was reduced to 32, and the new elite to 128. Discrim inant analysis has been performed on these two groups respectively so that the different variables that differentiate between the purged and surviving members of each group can be determined.
The 32 Members of the Old Elite Group: There were 6 purged and 26 surviving members in this group (Table 7.12).3 The results of the discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary Table
E.5, are in Appendix E. Five of the 24 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function to distinguish the purged from the surviving members in the old elite group. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 7.16, the variable of change in the place of work between
1965 and 1969 and the variable of years in primary position made the first and second largest positive contributions to the derived discriminant function; none made a significant negative contribution.
As a result, this discriminant function can be interpreted as representing a no change in type of work and a longer years in the primary position dimension that serves to differentiate between the purged and the surviving members of the old elite in the 9th CC.
In other words, more of the purged members of the old elite had had 179
Table 7.16 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on the Old Elite in the 9th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
FA4 — The Fourth Field Army 0.32334
V152 — Years in the primary position in April, 1969 0.44804
WCHAGE69 — Change in type of work between 1965 and 1969 0.24763
RCHAGE69 — Change in positional scores between 1965 and 1969 0.24888
V221 — Change in place of work between 1965 and 1969 0.62972 changes in their types of work during a period prior to their purge and had had fewer years in their primary positions than the surviving members.
The validity of the derived discriminant function that differentiates the purged from the surviving members of the old elite has been tested by the degree to which it correctly classifies the old elite into the purged and the surviving groups. The results of classification/prediction, as is shown in Table 7.17, indicates that the degree of success was 93.75%, or 30 out of 32 cases, and that the misclassified cases were 2 out of 32, or
6.25%. This high degree of success in differentiation demonstrates the validity of the derived discriminant function. Moreover, it provides another instance showing that the four variable clusters 180
Table 7.17 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 9th CC
Prediction Results: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases Group 0 Group 1
Group 0: Purged 6 5 1 83.3% 16.7%
Group 1: Survived 26 1 25 3.8% 96.2%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified; 93.75%
of personal attributes in combination can be used to predict probable political purge and political survival of elite members, if unknown, with a high degree of success in the absence of other types of variables.
The 128 Members of the New Elite Group: Thirty-two of the new elite were purged; 96 survived to the 10th CC (Table 7.12). The results of the discriminant analysis performed on this sub-set data, Summary
Table E.6, are in Appendix E. Six of the 24 discriminating variables were found useful in deriving one discriminant function to distinguish the purged from the survivors within the new elite group. As indicated by the standardized discriminant function coefficients in Table 7.18, the variable of type of work in April, 1969, and the variables of years in the primary position made the largest positive and negative contributions respectively to the derived discriminant function. As a result, this discriminant function can be interpreted 181 Table 7.18 A Portion of the Results of Discriminant Analysis Performed on the New Elite in the 9th CC Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
Variables Function 1
FA5 — The Fifth Field Army 0.07269
FA6 — The central military 0.14463
V30 — Type of work in April, 1969 0.29035
V165 — Place of work in April, 1969 0.20471
V152 — Years in the primary position in April, 1969 -0.23602
WCHAGE69 — Change in positional scores between 1965 and 1969 0.16214 as representing a work in the military and a shorter tenure in the primary position dimension that serves to differentiate between the purged and the surviving members of the new elite in the
9th CC. In other words, more of the purged members had engaged in Party/administration work and had had shorter tenure in their primary positions than the surviving members.
The validity of the derived discriminant function that differentiates between the purged and the surviving members of the new elite group has been tested by the degree to which it correctly classifies the new elite into the purged and the surviving groups. The results of classification/prediction, as is shown in Table 7,19, indicate that the degree of success was
79.69%, or 102 out of 128 cases, and that the misclassified cases 182
Table 7. 19 Degree of Success in Classifying/Predicting the Purged and the Survivors of the New Elite in the 9th CC
Prediction Results: No. of Predicted Group Membership Actual Group Cases Group 0 Group 1
Group 0: Purged 32 14 18 43.8% 56.3%
Group 1: Survived 96 8 88 8.3% 91.7%
Percent of "Grouped" Cases Correctly Classified: 79.69%
were 26 out of 128, or 20.31%. The overall success in classification,
79.69%, is fairly high, but most of the misclassified cases occurred in the purged group— purged members were wrongly identified as survivors in 18 out of 32 cases. This indicates that while the derived discriminant function was adequate to classify the surviving members correctly, it was not adequate to do so with the purged members. It is another instance in which the four variable clusters of personal attributes cannot be used to predict political purge with a high degree of success.
The Relative Potency of Personal Attributes to Political Purge and Political Survival of Members of the 9th CC
Three discriminant analyses have been performed with varying success on the membership in the 9th CC to differentiate the political purged from the political survivors from the two perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group. Again, known personal attributes of elite members can be used to predict their probable 183 purge or political survival, if unknown, in the absence of other types of variables. To satisfy our continuing theoretical interest in acquiring a generalized view from the three discriminant analyses performed, the relative potency of the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization,
Party political socialization, and current careers in differentiating or predicting political purge and political survival has been assessed, using the same procedures as were used in the assessment of membership in the 8th CC. The results of calculation are presented in Tables 7.20 and 7.21. Thus, a generalized view from the three discriminant analyses performed is that, in so far as membership in the 9th CC is concerned, the variable cluster of current careers is most frequently useful in deriving discriminant functions that serve to differentiate between the purged and the survivors, the Party political socialization variable cluster ranks in the second place, the initial political socialization vari able cluster ranks in the third place, and the demographic and social background variable cluster is not useful.
The relative potency of these four variable clusters in affecting political purge and political survival for the 9th CC members was practically the same as that for the 8th CC members.
It has been assumed that each Central Committee is a situational variable, which implies that different sets of factors affecting political purge and political survival of elite members are at work; nevertheless, the findings in both situations point to practically 184
Table 7.20 The Relative Potency of Discriminating Variables Used in Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors for Members of the 9th CC from Two Perspectives*
Mean Frequency Score Variables Useful of the Variable in in Deriving the Deriving the Discrim Variable Cluster Discriminant Functions inant Functions
Demographic & Date of birth .00 Scoial Background
Initial Political Education when joining Socialization the Party .33
Party Political Socialization FA1 FA2 FA3 Military FA4 Affiliation FA5 \ FA6 X FA7
Current Careers Change in type of work between '65 and '69 1.00
Change in positional scores between *65 and '69 .67
Type of work in 1969 .67
Place of work in 1969 .67
Years in the primary position in 1969 .67
Change in location of work between '65 and '69 .67 Cumulative positional scores in 1969 .33
*Based on the three derived discriminant functions of the three discriminant analyses performed, the results of which are displayed in Tables 7.14, 7.16, and 7.18. 185
Table 7,21 The Relative Potency of Four Variable Clusters of Personal Attributes to Political Purge and Political Survival for Members of the 9th CC
Variable Cluster Mean Frequency Relative Potency Score of the in Rank Order Variable Cluster*
Current Careers .67 I
Party Political Socialization .42 II
Initial Political Socialization .33 III
Demographic and Social Background . 00
*The calculations were based on the mean frequency score of each variable as was displayed in Table 7.20. the same order of potency of the four variable clusters that was theorized in the conceputal scheme presented in Chapter V. Thus, an empirical pre-theory^ of political purge and political survival can be offered: in so far as personal attributes are concerned, current careers is of the first order in potency; Party political socialization is of the second order in potency; initial political socialization is of the third order in potency; and demographic and social background is the least in potency (in our findings, it either shares the third rank or is not useful) in affecting political purge and political sruvival. This empirically grounded formulation confirms in a Chinese setting a previous finding in a Western context that political role variables are more potent than political socialization variables in affecting political behavior (Prewitt,
Eulau, and Zisk, 1966-1967). Furthermore, it lends support to the doubts entertained by some scholars, such as David Marsh (1971), 186 that the assumptions and claims of the impact of childhood political socialization on adult behavior may be open to question.
Summary of Findings
This chapter dealt with the research question of whether, and to what extent, the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers can be used to account for poli tical purge and political survival of the CCP elite. These four variable clusters of personal attributes were used as independent, discriminating variables in discriminant analysis to differentiate between the purged and the surviving members of the CCP elite.
The inquiry was conducted from the two perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group on membership in the 8th CC and the 9th CC. Consequently, six discriminant analyses were performed, the results of which can be summarized in two parts.
The first part is concerned with memberhsip in the 8th CC.
In one of the three discriminant analyses performed, the derived discriminant function, while adequate to identify the survivors correctly, was not adequate to identify the purged members, although the degree of successful classification in 10 out of 16 cases was not entirely insignificant. A generalized view of the relative potency of the four variable clusters in affecting political purge and political survival was obtained from the three discriminant analyses. The variable cluster of current careers ranks first, that of Party political socialization ranks second 187 and those of Initial political socialization and demographic and social background share the third rank.
The second part is concerned with membership in the 9th CC. In two of the three discriminant analyses performed, the derived discriminant functions, while adequate to identify the survivors correctly, were less than adequate to identify the purged members, the degrees of successful classification being 18 out of 38 cases and 18 out of 32 cases. These results indicate that our attempt to use personal attributes to account for political purge and poli tical survival was only partially successful.
A generalized view of the relative potency of the four variable clusters in affecting political purge and political survival in the
9th CC was obtained from the three discriminant analyses. The finding was the Same as that of the three discriminant analyses performed on membership in the 8th CC, with one slight difference: the vari able cluster of demographic and social background was not found use ful in deriving the discriminant functions at all. Two sets of findings, each of which was based on three discriminant analyses point to practically the same order of potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes in relating to political purge and political survival. This virtually conforms to the order of relative potency that was theorized in Chapter V: current careers ranks first, Party political socialization second, initial political socialization third, and demographic and social background fourth
(in our findings* it shares the third rank in one instance and is not useful in the other). Thus, an empirical pre-theory of political purge and political survival is presented, a broader theoretical
implication of which lies in confirming in a Chinese setting a previous finding in a Western context that political role variables are more potent than political socialization variables
in affecting political behavior. For a practical concern, the
findings indicate that known personal attributes of elite members can be employed to predict their probable political purge or political survival, if unknown, with varying success. NOTES
In discriminant analysis, there is a technical problem of the appropriateness of the sample or population size to under study and the number of discriminating variables to be used. While "there are good reasons to insist that the size of the smallest group be no less than the number of [discriminating] variables used" (Tatsuoka, 1970, p. 38), the technique of discriminant analysis is very "robust," which means that certain assumptions need not be strongly adhered to (Klecka, 1975, p. 435, footnote 2). So we do not worry about the less than ideal situation of the group size and the number of discriminating variables used with respect to this sub-set data.
See note 1.
•^See note 1.
^As previously mentioned, an "empirical pre-theory" is used to refer to empirically grounded relational statements about variable clusters rather than specific variables. We call this kind of statement an empirical pre-theory, but others may call it simply an empirical theory.
189 Chapter VIII
Conclusion
In this study of elite change in the Chinese Communist Party from 1945 to 1973, two types of analyses have been conducted.
First, there has been a descriptive and univariate analysis of elite change in various dimensions in an effort to detect trends in change, rate of change, and scope of change in elite composition.
The findings, which were summarized at the ends of Chapters II,
III, and IV, need not be repeated, but one general comment may be made here: change in the elite composition of the CCP has been substantial, and various implications can be drawn from the changes in elite composition. Second, there has been an explanatory and multivariate analysis of elite change in an effort to explain the dynamics of elite change, i.e., political promotion, political purge, and political survival. We believe that these phenomona reflect, among other things, the behavioral consequences of elite individuals, which can be explained to the extent that there are substantial differences in personal attributes among them. Consequently, a conceptual scheme with which to inquire political promotion, political purge, and political survival was presented. Discriminant analysis, a multivariate statistical method, was selected for data
190 191 analysis. Four variable clusters of demographic and social back ground, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers, which are all personal attributes, were used as the independent, discriminating variables, and the new elite vs. the old elite or the political purged vs. the political survivors was used as the dependent, criterion variable in the analysis. The findings were summarized at the ends of Chapters VI and VII. The attempt to explain political promotion, political purge, and political survival in terms of the four variable clusters of personal attributes constitutes the main thrust of this study of elite change in the CCP, so the remaining part of this concluding chapter will be devoted to a comprehensive review of how successfully this research effort has been executed and to a discussion of future research tasks in the study of elite change in the CCP.
In the inquiry into political promotion, the acquisition of membership in the Central Committee, our research interest was in distinguishing the new elite from the old elite in each Central
Committee. To the extent that there are substantial differences in personal attributes between the new elite and the old elite, the rise of the new elite can be explained. The method of discriminant analysis employed and the four variable clusters of personal attri butes used as the discriminating variables proved to be highly suc cessful in differentiating between the new elite and the old elite in three out of four instances. As a result, known personal attri butes of elite members can be employed to predict group membership, 192 if unknown, with considerable success. The relative potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes, however, does not conform to what was theorized in our conceptual scheme. This reflects that the representativeness of elite generations, as was empirically found, rather than the functional performance of political roles, as was expected, tends to be the first and foremost consideration in the Party's recruitment of the new elite.
This primacy of the representativeness of elite generations was indicated by the finding that the variable cluster of initial political socialization was the most potent one in differentiating the new elite from the old elite. If the functional performance of political roles were primary, it would have been indicated by the variable cluster of current careers being the most potent one in differentiating the new elite from the old elite.
In the inquiry into political purge and political survival, the termination or continuation of membership in the succeeding
Central Committee, our research interest was in the extent to which the political purged and the political survivors can be differentiated by their personal attributes. Six discriminant analyses were performed on membership in the 8th and 9th Central
Committees to differentiate between the purged and the survivors from the two perspectives of the elite individual and the elite group. In one of the three discriminant analyses performed on membership in the 8th CC, the derived discriminant function was adequate to identify the political survivors with a considerable degree of success, but was less adequate to do so with the purged 193 members. This inadequacy of the derived discriminant function to identify the purged members correctly was more pronounced with membership in the 9th CC; in two of the three discriminant analyses performed, the derived discriminant functions were not adequate to identify the purged members correctly. All in all, in three of the six discriminant analyses performed, the derived discriminant functions, while adequate to identify the survivors correctly, were not adequate to identify the purged members. This indicates that the inadequacy of the derived discriminant function in each instance is partial and is confined to the purged members.
Why is this so? To make use of the four variable clusters of personal attributes to differentiate between the political purged and the political survivors, we assume that personal attributes of various sorts will have impacts on behavior, although their impacts were not directly measured, and that it is the behavior that leads to political purge or political survival (contextual variables, as stated at the outset, are not included in conceptualization for the purpose of this study). Probably, it is easier to predict from personal attributes behavior which conforms to the norms and values of the Party than behavior which deviates from such norms and values.
This is more of a conjecture than an explication, of course. In any event, the inadequacy of the derived discriminant function to identify the purged members correctly in three out of six instances does not signal the deficiency of the technique of discriminant analysis per se, but rather that of the sole reliance on personal attributes as the discriminating variables. 194
Personal attributes alone proved insufficient as discriminating variables; nevertheless, in three of the six discriminant analyses performed, the derived discriminant functions were adequate to identify the political purged as well as the political survivors with considerable success. Thus, it may be concluded that, in the absence of other types of variables, such as attitudinal and behavioral ones, variables of personal attributes can be put to good use to account for political purge and political survival.
In other words, given the known personal attributes of elite members, it is possible to predict their probable political purge or political survival, if unknown, within a given political context with some success. This empirical finding and its prag matic implications may be counted as one modest contribution of this research to the study of Chinese Communist Party elites.
The theoretical concern of this study goes beyond the endeavor of making use of personal attributes to account for political purge and political survival of elite members. It also has a theoretical interest in assessing the relative potency of the four variable clusters of demographic and social background, initial political socialization, Party political socialization, and current careers in relating to political purge and political survival. Two sets of findings, each of which was based on three discriminant analyses, point to practically the same order of potency of the four variable clusters of personal attributes: current careers ranks first, Party political socialization ranks second, initial political socializa tion ranks third (in the three discriminant analyses performed on 195 membership in the 8th CC, demographic and social background shares the third rank), and demographic and social background either shares the third rank or is not useful (in the three discriminant analyses performed on membership in the 9th CC). This empirical finding virtually conforms to the relative potency of personal attributes that was theorized in our conceptual scheme. In addition, it con firms in a Chinese setting a previous finding in a Western context that political role variables are more potent than political socialization variables in affecting political behavior. Thus, an empirical pre-theory of political purge and political survival can be offered: within the confines of personal attribues, the relative potency of current careers, Party political socialization, initial political socialization, and demographic and social background is in descending order. Although this theoretical formulation is tenta tive and is subject to revision against future evidence, it may be counted as another modest contribution of this research to the study of Chinese Communist elites in terms of empirically grounded theory.
Why do the data support this relative potency of these four variable clusters of personal attributes in relating to political purge and political survival? To recapitulate what has been stated in the conceptual scheme presented in Chapter V, an elite member's current career pinpoints the political arena where his behavior is to be judged; it is no surprise to find out that the variable cluster of current careers, which implies role expectations and role performance, is of utmost importance to political purge and political survival. As for the relative potency of Party political socializa tion and initial political socialization, the pervasive influence of the CCP dictates that the elite member would do well to learn the norms and values cherished by the Party in order to climb the ladder of success; hence the potency of Party political socializa tion surpasses that of whatever political orientation a person might have had when he joined the Party— initial political social ization. With regard to the variable cluster of demographic and social background, in one set of findings, this cluster shared the third rank with the initial political socialization; in another set of findings, it was found not useful at all in deriving the discriminant functions. The insignificance of the demographic and social beckground variable cluster among the four clusters in affecting political purge and political survival may be attributed to the probability that the impact of demographic and social back ground variables on political purge and political survival, if any, has been absorbed into the political socialization variables.
In other words, if political socialization variables are available, demographic and social background variables may be dispensible.
The possibility that the impact of demographic and social background variables has been absorbed into political socialization variables may simply result from the classification of variables used in this study: a narrower definition of demographic and social background, which is confined to sex, nationality, native province, date of birth, and social status of the family. As a further 197 remark, a selective use of the narrowly defined demographic and social background variables, which include only the date of birth (age) in the analysis, may also contribute to the insignificant impact of demographic and social background variables. In this regard, such a possibility can be discounted for good reasons. First, the exclusion of sex, nationality, and native province as discriminating variables is based on the belief that these three variables are not theoretically significant. Second, the exclusion of social status of the family, a theoretically significant variable, is based on the suspicion of the reliability of the data collected. Although this is an unfortunate omission and not a dereliction of duty, it is not really as regrettable as it appears to be. We have argued that no matter what the social status of the family of an elite
Party member may be, so long as he joins the Chinese Communist Party he has gotten rid of the burden of social status. Consequently, we have no doubt that if the inclusion of social status of the family as a discriminating variable were feasible, it would not have altered the overall research finding.
From this discussion, it can be seen that the conceptual scheme we presented in Chapter V is a useful one with which to inquire into political promotion, political purge, and political survival. Like wise, discriminant analysis has proved to be an appropriate as well as a powerful statistical method with which personal attributes can be used to differentiate between the new elite and the old elite or the political purged and the politically surviving members of the CCP elite. (In this connection, one may feel that the results of discriminant analysis are not descriptively rich, but if detailed description is the purpose of inquiry, then, case-by-case study is a more appropriate mode of analysis.) Since the success in differentiation is of the varied degrees, it may be suggested that future research tasks lie in finding out how to add on types of variables other than personal attributes as the discrim inating variables. In this regard, obviously the most useful additional types of variables are attitudinal and behavioral.
It is generally acknowledged that attitudinal and behavioral data on the CCP elite are difficult to obtain, which is precisely why the data base of this study did not include those two types of data. The problem, however, is not simply one of unavailability of attitudinal and behavioral data, which in principle can be extracted by making use of the technique of content analysis on statements made by the CCP elite. A specific kind of attitudinal and behavioral data is needed, however; such data would have to be related to certain specific issues or policies so that the impact of the given attitudinal and behavioral variables on political purge and political survival could be tested. In this regard, even if a researcher is not interested in political purge or political survival, but is interested in what effects it will have on policies or policy output if CCP elite members have these or those personal attributes, he still needs to acquire certain specific attitudinal and behavioral data. This demand for specific attitudinal and behavioral data on the CCP elite 199
seems to pose a tremendous obstacle in data-based research, for it may be difficult to obtain any kind of attitudinal and behavioral
data on, say, a 100-member CCP elite, but it would be much more
difficult to obtain attitudinal and behavioral data on certain
specific issues or policies for these 100 elite members. Conceivably,
this demand for specific attitudinal and behavioral data would be
eased if interviews or opinion surveys of the CCP elite members could
be conducted. Unfortunately, such opportunities are unlikely in the
foreseeable future. This writer has not yet found an alternative way to obtain specific attitudinal and behavioral data on a sizable number of CCP elite members. Hopefully, he will have the ingenuity
to do so in times to come.
Finally, we may mention briefly on the possibility of alternate
research designs of studying elite change with special reference
to political purge and political survival. It is possible to focus
on political longevity of elite members in terms of their survival
ability or "staying power" through time, as has been done by McHale
and Paranzino (1975) in their study of membership in the consecutive
Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If
one had an interest in the relationship between political longevity
and elite background characteristics, political longevity could be
conceived as a rank-order (ordinal) variable, and probit analysis
instead of discriminant analysis would be the most appropriate
statistical method to use. In that case, prediction of future
political longevity by means of elite background characteristics 200 would be aimed at. Such a focus on political longevity has its attraction, but there seems to be a problem; it does not take each Central Committee into consideration as a situational variable.
It would be interesting to compare the results of this study, which deals with political purge and political survival in each Central
Committee, with those of a study of political longevity in con secutive Central Committees. The findings of such a comparison would shed light, among other things, on whether or not each
Central Committee is important as a situational variable in the study of political purge and political survival or political longevity, as we believe that it is. Although this writer has not been able to pursue this line of inquiry up to this point, he hopes and plans to do so in the future. List of References
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Appendix A List of Members in the 7th, 8 th, 9th, 10th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
The following is a comprehensive list of the full membership in the 7th to the 10th Central Committees in English alphabetical order.
Those who had previous alternate membership are indicated by the letter
"a" after the numeral, and those who died before a Central Committee was
formed are indicated by the letter "D",
Member 7th CC 8 th CC 9th CC 1 0 th
An P'ing-sheng 1 0
An Tzu-wen 8 Chang Chi-ch'un 7a 8 Chang Chih-ming 9 1 0 Chang Ch'un-ch'iao 9 1 0 Chang Fu-heng • 9 1 0 Chang Fu-k'uei 9 1 0 Chang Heng-yun 9 1 0 Chang Hung-chih 1 0 Chang Kuo-hua 9 D Chang P'ing-hua 8 a 1 0 Chang Shu-chih 1 0 Chang Ta-chih 8 a 9 1 0 Chang T'i-hsueh 9 D Chang T'ien-yun 9 Chang Ting-ch'eng 7 8 9 1 0 Chang T'sai-ch'ien 9 1 0 Chang Tsung-hsun 7a 8 a 1 0 Chang Vei-min 1 0 Chang Ven-t1ien 7 8 Chang Yen-ch'eng 9a 1 0 210
Member 7th CC 0th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Chang Yi-h3 iang 9 1 0 Chang Yun-yi 7 9 9 1 0 Chao Erh-lu 8 D
Chao Tzu-yang 1 0 Ch'en Ch'i-han 8 a 9 1 0 Ch'en Hsi-lien 8 a 9 1 0 Ch'en Hsien-jui 9 1 0 Ch'en Kang 9 1 0 Ch'en Keng 7a 8 D Ch'en Mu-hua 1 0 Ch'en Pa-ta 7 a to 7 8 9 Ch'en Shao-min 7a 8 Ch'en Shao-yu 7 8 Ch'en Shih-chu 9 1 0 Chen Tan-chiu 7 D Ch'en Yi 7 8 9 D Ch'en Yu 7a 8 9 1 0 Ch'en Yun 7 8 9 1 0 Ch'en Yung-kuei 9 1 0 Ch'eng Shih-ch'ing 9 Ch'eng Tzu-hua 7a 8 Cheng Wei-san 7 8 Cheng Wei-shan 9 Chi P'eng-fei 1 0 Chi Teng-k'uei 9 1 0 Chia T'o-fu 8 Chiang Ch'ing 9 1 0 Chiang Hsieh-yuan 9 1 0 Chiang Li-yin 9 1 0 Chiang Yung-hui 9 1 0 Ch'iao Kuan-hua 1 0 Chiao Lin-yi 9a 1 0 211
Member 7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Ch'ien Cheng-ying 10 Ch'ien Chih-kung 10 Ch'ien Ying Ch'in Ch'i-wei 10 Ch'in Pang-hsien Chin Tzu-min 9a 10 Ch'iu Chuang-ch'eng 9 Ch'iu Hui-tso 9 Ch'iu Kuo-kuang 9 Chou Chien-jen 9 10 Chou Ch'ih-p'ing 9 Chou Ch'un-lin 10 Chou En-lai 10 Chou Hung-pao 10 Chou Hsing 10 Chou Li-chin 10 Chu Chia-yao 10 Chu Ku-chih 10 Chu Te 10 Chuang Tse-tung 10 Fan Te-ling 9a 10 Fan Wen-lan 8 a 9 D Fang Yi 8 a 9a 10 Feng Hsuan 10 Fu Ch'uan-Tso 9a 10 Han Hsien-ch'u 8 a 9 10 Han Ying 9a 10 Ho Lung 7 8 Hsi Chung-hsun 7a 8 Haia Pang-yin 10 Hsiao Ching-kuang 7a 8 10 Hsia Hua 8 212
Member 7th CC 8 th CC 9th CC 1 0 th Cf
H&iao K'e 8 1 0 a Hsieh Chla-hsiang 9 1 0 Hsieh Ching-yi 1 0 Hsieh Fu-chih 8 9 D Hsieh Hsueh-kung 9 1 0 Hsien Heng-han 9 1 0 nsing Yen-tze 1 0 Hsu Ching-hsien 9 1 0 Hsu Hai-tung 8 9 Hsu Ksiang-ch1ien 7 8 9 1 0 Hsu Kuang-ta 8 Hsu ahih-yu 6 a 9 1 0 Hsu T ’e-li 7 8 Hu Chi-tsung 9 1 0
Hu Ch'ao-mu 8
Hu Yao-pang 8 Hua Kuo-feng 9 1 0 Hua Lin-sen 9a 1 0 Huang Chen 9 10 Huang Ching •8 Huang Hua 1 0 Huang K’e-ch’eng 7a to 7 8 Huang Yung-sheng 8 a to 8 9 Ismayil Aymat 1 0 Jao Hsing-li 9 1 0 Jao Shu-shih 7 Jen Pi-shih 7 B Jen Ssu-chung 9 1 0 K'ang Sheng 7 8 9 1 0 Kao Kang 7 Kao Wei-sung 9 Keng Ch'i-oh'ang 9a 1 0 Keng Fiao 9 1 0 213
Member 7th CC 8 th CC 9th CC 10th CC
K'o uh'ing-shih Ku Mu 10 Kuan Hsiang-ying K'uang Jen-nung K'ung Chao-nien 10 K'ung Shih-chuan 9 10 Kuo Hung-chieh 9a 10 Kuo Mo-jo 9 10 Kuo Yu-feng 9a 10 Lai Chi-fa 9 Lai Jo-yu D Li Chen 9 10 Li Ch'iang 9 10 Li Chih-min 6 a 10 Li Ching-chuan 8 10 Li Fu-ch'un 8 9 10 Li Hsien-nien 8 9 10 Li Hsueh-feng 8 9 Li Jen-chih 10 Li Jui-shan 9 10 Li K'e-nung 8 D Li Li-san 7 8 Li Pao-hua 7a 8 10 Li Shui-ch'ing 10 Li Shun-ta 10 Li Su-wen 10 Li Szu-kuang D Li Ta 10 Li Ta-chang 8 a 10 Li Te-aheng 10 Li Tien-yu L Li Tso-p'eng 214
Member 7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Li Wei-han 8 Liang Chiu-t'ang 9a 10 Liang Hsing-ch’u 9
Liao Ch'eng-chih 7a to 7 8 10 Lin Peng 7 8
Lin Li-yun 1 0 Liri Pao 7 ® 9 Lin Po-c'hu 7 8 D
Lin T'ieh 8 Liu Ch'ang-sheng 7a 8 D Liu Chieh-t'ing 9 Liu Chien-hsun 8 a 9 10 Liu Chun-yi 9 10 Liu Feng 9 Liu Hsi-ch'ang 9 1° Liu Hsiang-ping 1 0
Liu Hsiao 7a 8 Liu Hsien-ch'uan 9 10 Liu Hsing-yuan 9 1° Liu Ke-p'ing 8 9
Liu Lan-t'ao 7a 8 Liu Ning-i 8 Liu Po-ch'eng 7 8 9 10
Liu Shao-ch'i 7 8 Liu Sheng-t'ien 9 10 Liu Tzu-hou 8 a 9 10 Liu Wei 9 10 Liu Ya-lou 8 D Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang Lo Hsi-K'ang 9a 10
Lo Jui-ch'ing 7a 8 Lo Jung-huan 7 8 D Lo Kuei-po 8a to 8 215
Member 7th CC 8 th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Lu Cheng-t’sao 7a 8 Lu Jui-lin 9 10 Lu T'ien-chi 9 10 Lu Ting-i 7 8 Lu Yu-lan 9 10 Lung Shu-chiu 9 Na Fu-ch'uan 9 Ma Mlng-fang 7a 8 Ma Ming 10 Ma T'ien-shui 9a 10
Mao Tse-tung 7 8 9 10 Mo Hsien-yao 9 10 Nan P 'ing 9 Ni Chih-fu 9 10 Mi eh Jung-chen 7 8 9 10 Mien Chi-jung 9 10 Ou-yang Ch'in 8 Pa Sang 10 Pal Ju-plng 10 Pan Fu-sheng 8 a 9 Pan Shih-kao 8 a Pao-jih-le-tai 9 10 Peng Chen 7 8 Peng Shao-hui 9 10
Peng Te-huai 7 8 P'i Ting-chun 9 10 Po I-no 7 8 Saifudin 8 a 9 10 Shen Mao-kung 9 10a
Shu T'ung 8 Su Chen-hua 8 a 10 Su Ching 9 10 2 1 6
Member 7th CC 8th 00 gth CC 10th CO
Su Yu 7a 8 9 1 0 Sung Jen-ch'iung 7a 8 Sung P'ei-ehang 1 0 T'an Ohen-lin 7 8 1 0 T'an Cheng 7a 8 T'an Ch'i-lung 8 a 9a 1 0 Tan Fu-jen 9 D T'ang Ch'i-shan 9 1 0 T'ang Chung-fu 9 1 0 Tao Ohu 8 Tao Lu-chia 8 a 1 0 T'eng Hai-ch'ing 9 Teng Hsiao-p'ing 7 8 1 0 Teng Hua 8 9a T'eng Tai-yuan 7 8 9 1 0 Teng Tzu-hui 7 8 9 D Teng Ylng-eh'ao 7a 8 9 1 0 Tien Hua-kuei 9 1 0 Tien Wei-hsin 1 0 Tien Fao 8 a 9 1 0 Ting Ke-tse 1 0 Ting Ku-yu 1 0 Ting Sheng 9 1 0 Ts’ai Ch’ang 7 8 9 1 0 Ts'ai Hsieh-pin 9 1 0 Ts'ai Haiao 1 0 Ta'ai Shu-mei 9 1 0 Ts'ao Yi-ou 9 1 0 Ts'ao Li-huai 9 1 0 I’s'en Kuo-jung 9a 1 0 Tseng Hsi-sheng 8 Tseng Kuo-hua 9 217
Member 7th CC 8 th CO 9th CC 10th CC
Tseng Shan 7 8 9 Tseng Shao-shan 9 10 Tseng ssu-yu 9 10 Ts'ui Hai-lung 9a 10 Tsung Hsi-yun 9 10 Tu P'ing 9 10 Tuan Chun-yi 10 Tung King-hui 9 10 Tung Pi-wu .7 8 9 10 Ulanfu 7a 8 10 Wang Ch'ao-chu 9 10 Wang Chen 7a 8 9 10 Wang Cheng 10 Wang Chia-hsiang 7a to 7 8 10 Wang Chin-hsi 9 D Wang En-mao 8 a to 8 9a Wang Hsiao-yu 9 Wang Hsin-t'ing 9 'Wang Hsiu-chen 9 10 Wang Hual-hsiang 9 10 Wang Hui-oh'iu 9 Wang Hung-k'un 9 10 Wang Hung-wen 9 10 Wang Jo-fei 7 D Wang Kuo-fan 9 10 Wang Pai-tan 9 10a Wang Pi-ch'eng 10 Wang Ping-chang 9 Wang Shou-tao 7a 8 9 10 Wang Shu-chen 10 Wang Shu-sheng 8 9 Wang Ts'ung-wu 7a 8 Wang Tung-hsing 9 10 218
Member 7th CC 8th CC 9th CC 10th CC
Wan Wei-chou 7a 8 Wei Feng-ying 9 10 Wei Kuo-ch'ing 8 a to 8 9 10 Wei Ping-kuei 9 10 Wen Yu-ch'eng 9 Wu Chih-pu 8 Wu Pa-hsien 9 V/u Hsiu-ch'uan 8 Wu Jui-lin 9 Wu Kuei-hsien 9 10 V/u Ta-sheng 9 10 V/u T'ao 9 10 V/u Te 8a to 8 9 10 Wu Yu-Chang 7 8 D Yang Ch'un-fu 9 10 Yang Fu-chen 9 10a Yang Hsien-chen 8a to 8 Yang Hsiu-feng 8
Yang Shang-k'un 8 Yang Te-chih 8 a to 8 9 10 Yang Yung 8 a 10 Yao Wen-yuan 9 10 Yeh Chi-chuang 8 Yeh Chien-ying 7 8 9 10 Yeh Chun 9 Yu Ch’iu-li 9 10 Yu Hui-yung 10 Yu Hung-1iang 10 Yu Sang 9 10 Yu Tai-chung 9a 10 Yuan Sheng-p'ing 9 219
Appendix B Codebook of Bata for This Study of the CCP Elite
The following is a copy of the computer printout of the codebook of the data used in this study of the CCP elite. It is the original coding scheme, but has undergone considerable change by means of data transformation during the phase of data analysis.
DOCUMENTATION FOR THE 238 VAR 1APLES IN THE F IL E »CCP i
RFL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL M lSSING PRT PCS N A ME ‘ VACXTFS- E MT
1 SFONUM NONE 0
2 SUB FILE NONE A
3 CASWGT NONE 4
4 VI IDENTIFICATION CODF NCNF 0
5 V 3 SFX e . 0 V . 1 . MALE 2 . FEMALE MI c c V . MISS INC DATA
6 V4 NATIONALITY 8 . 0 9 . 1 . HA N r. MONGOLIAN 4 . MUSLIM j . TIBETAN o • •"CI'fUAWC------7 . OTHFP MISS 9 . MISSING OATA
7 V5 "" DA'TF OF 51 \ WVV • 0
8 V6 NATIVE PROVINCE 9 9 . 0 ID. S1NKIANG 1 1 . KANSU " 1 2 . m n g h s i a 1 3 . SHEMS I 16. ISIMGHAI 15 . 1 BNF P "iONOOT I A 1 6 . PFMNG 17 . SHANSI 1? . TIENTSIN ------j-*_.-UlTMtrl------220
■ CCP FT LF......
DOCUMENTATION FOR THE 238 VARIABLES IN THF F IL L 'CCP 1
RFL VAR IAHLF VARIA3LE LABEL MI S S I MG PR T PDS NAME VALUES FMT
8 V6 CQNT 2 1 . FI"-' I f \ 2 2 . KIAN'CSI ------r»rap1. ---- | 2 4 . CHEKIANG 2 5 . K.1 AN Ci SU 2 6 . SHANGHAI 2/. SKmrrnNir 3 1 . KVIANGTU 3 2 . KWANGS I 1 5 . Ill IV A M .:H. hump r ...... —- 25 . HONAN 4 1 . MB1LUNK1ANG A? . K 1 l I \ A ' . LI A ON1 JG 5 1 . t i f. r i 62 . SZFCHWAN R3 . YD NAN >*-» » KWr IwHiji’V MISS Rp . M S S IMG DATA 2 8 . TA I Vi AN ... . -a -----\ n ------PTTKrui c- F'-rtA i n — c . — , .. n 11. POUR PFASANT 1?. ! 1 ll*.DUE PFASANT 1 3 . R I O 1 P c A c A N T TAT Drrjrrcr'A,li-G l:NTP Y IP . PF11Y LANDLORD 15. OFFICIAL 16. ART 1 SA N-iJCR KFR J "T’TTFnrFC I I'A 'L ...... 19. PH1V IN1FLLECTUAL 2A . M ILITARY C-FFICFR 21 . SMALL MERCHANT / y . E I h M E R C H A N 1 MISS 9 9 . M ISSING DATA
10 V8 PHYSICAL STATUS NONE 0 1. OF A|) A U E R 7 IH CC 2 . DEAD AFTER PTH CC .* • OF AD AFTER 9TH CC A . INCAP AFTER 7TH CC 221
CCP— FTtir
DOCUMFNTATIC.V FOR TUP ?3P VAR I A!-' LF5 IN THF FILE ’CCP i
RFL VARIA PLF VAR IA RL SI- LABFL MIS51NG DRT PUS NAME VAL'.JFS FMT
10 VP CON T 6 . INCAP AFTER 9TH CC 7 . LI V P (■ AT P TM CC L I V I . v L» ^ T 0 T M C C 0 . LIVING AT 10TH CC
11 Vo SCOPE OF EDUCATION 9 . 0 i . CIVIL ? . MILITARY 3 . Cl VI L + P1L 1TAP.Y •5 . l i t t l e i-i I s s *7 . i 1 ? S 1, n.7 PA I A
12 V10 LEVEL OF EDUCATION 9 . 0 1 . NO FORMAL 6 . I L r. MI. r: 1 AMY 3 . PRIVATE TUTOR 4 . HIGH SCHOOL 5 . SPECIAL TRAINING 0 . NTvvr-rAir"TCnor!L" ------7 . 1ECH-AGPIC 8 - UNIVGRSI 1Y MISS 9 . MISSING DATA
13 V l l SPECIAL PPL-MIL TRAINING 9 9 . 0 1 1 . NONE ? 6 . SOV+UFAMPOA I . M j V i I- 1 2D . SO V 1. VI VERS 1 TY 2 2 . SC V PARTY-SPECIAL 31 . CCP •< 1 AND S I +POST-WAP • “ I'lH'MsrP’frA’FK"! "A'X 0 SI !tTD' ->- £r.• • RED ARMY +RUS SIAN MI 3? . POSTWAR CCP MIL 36 * K. I ANG SI .YEN AN AND PO ----- 32"; *iE '< A i t PC S T-iJA R u l • T.C N KMT 42 • WHAMPOA 63 . YENAN PARTY 69 • “ ici'ANG'S'i HTtr rT'A*nr" 66 . OTHER SHORT TRAINING 4] . CHUNSHAN! M ILITA R Y 6 6 . YE NAN MIL-POL —n is s ------(7*7^- - NTS-StNG- I ta-T-A™*...... 222
"CCP FT OF......
DOCU MFNTATION FOR THE 22 8 VAR I ARLES IN' THE F1LF 'CCP i
REL VAP. 1AELE VAR IABL E LA pFL MISS IMG DPT POS NAME VA LUFS FMT
13 V I 1 CONT
1A VI 2 PLACE OF EDUCATION “P. 0
1 2 . CM J N'A-UJSSR 1?. CHINA+JAPAN 1A . L W 1 N A +Pr. ANC I: T5^ c Fn 'r/ T^r^-^vNY ------16. CH 1NA + ENGLAN0 1 7 . CH1NA+USA 18. (;wi\A+nrnsp f nr 15 V I 3 DATE JO I MED PARTY OR# 0 16 V V4 AG F ARTY YV . i. 17 V I 5 TYPE OF WORK Wh FN JO I NFL PARTY PP. 0 11 . SI UDE NT-YOU TM ORG 1/ . LAlrCk OK‘ i- 13 . r-'FASANT ORG 1A. WOMEN ORG 15. PARTY WORK —if.i-m n* lie - a c no ------‘31 . SI UOY 5 2 . 0 F N F A R L 6PM 8 3 . CULTURAL AMP EPUCATI t^-T—P'-yr-t~r.~:L -PC rF!?Ct^=TFCH' A ?. WORKER A 3. PEASANT 17. MILITARY ------iB T - r r r r p o L'I r r c A V ~ — MISS 90. MISSING f a t a 18 V 16 OCCUPATION WHEN JOINED PAP.1Y 9 8 . 0 '■<9. 11. STUDENT 12. WORKER 1 2 . P'-A SANT ------H " * nr n'TTB------223 “CCP FI Lb DOCUMFNT AT ION FOR THF 2 3 P VAR1AOLFS IN THE F IL E 'CCP I RFL VAR I AtLF VAR 1ABLF LAFFL MISSING P p T POS NAME VALUFS FMT 18 Vlfa CONT 19. only party work Jfl. to T-Cl.'LTU=E-f O'JCATIO 3ft. PROFESSOR 37. KMT I'FFICUL 3 8 . KMT MIL f ;FC I C FR ■39 icr-rr_ F T r _rr:MT-n'STA'!T------53 . WRITE* ??. . M F. K C H A N T 3 9 . SC 1 f-MCE . A\'0 TFCHNICA • ■PE VOLT" "I •‘.TTTATCR...... M ISS 9ft. IMAP MISS 9 9 . MI S SI MG OAT A 19 V 17' 1°3 1 CFC "MFMFF'R 8 . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . ALTERNATE -.I- LULAK MIS S 8 . IMAP MISS 9 . MISS 1 KG PATA 20 Vits 19.->A CFC MFMFrR. f! . 0 9 . 1 . •NO 2 . ALTERNATE Ku b U L AK . MIS S fi I IMAP M ISS 9 . MI SSI.NG DATA 21 V 19 l C MfcNotk TC< 19^5 8 . 0 9 . 1 . NO • ? * YF S F I S S b . I A P MISS 9 . MI S S I NG I'MTA 22 V 20 MEMBER 7TH CC 7 . 0 {! . 9 . 1 . NO 2 . a l t f r n a t f p . Kb 'oUL 224 CCP-PTtf DQC.OMENT AT ION FOR. THE 2 3 1? VARIABLES 1M THE E IL F 'CCP RFL VARIABLE VARIASLT LABEL MISSINC- PPT POS N A. HE VALUES FMT 22 V20 CONT M15 5 B . INAP MISS o . MISSING OATA 23 V21 MEMBER RTH CC 7 . 0 8 . 9 . 1 . ?. ALTERNATE DFGULAR MISS 8 ! IS AP !■' I S S o . .-! I S I i-.G HAT A 24 V22 MFMBFR 9TH CC 7 . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . a l t e r n a t e ^ • REGULAR < 11 . A * MISS 9. MISSING OATA 25 V2 3 MEMBER 10TI1 CC 7 . 0 E . 9 . 1 . NO 2 . ALTFPNATE R r GULA R MISS 6 INAP MISS 9 . MISSING PATA "26 V24 i t v t ut- hi. ha: j . - r u 2 / FA . 0 ■99. 9 9 . 1 1 . MIL COMM ANOFR l c. « ^ t. i. hi. ’*■*' i 1 ?. COMMAND♦AOMIN 1 4 . MI L + AP'-’ I N + PARTY 15 . CPMNISSAP+APMIN 16 . MI L’".VA.N'A'CF ME N T — 1 7 . cni-;m a NO' +c vmm i ss ar 1°. . MIL A C'V 1 SOp 36 • WOMAN LABOR ORGANIZE -prVM-rrf-rR—A"Vfr— PTr'y^T!------225 "CCP FI CE ..... DOCUMENTATION FOR THF 22 & VAR 1ABLFS IN THF FILF. 'CCP I RFL VARIABLE VAR IA5L6 LABEL MISSING PR T PCS NAVF VALUES FMT 26 V24 CONT 24 . WClc K P 9 2 6 . PFASANT " "TO . ■ pa ”t y +■ com :-! r s s a t - " 5 9 . CP&AN 1ZATION OR CCNT 8 4 . NOG j:\AL MILITARY WOR 84 . Nfv. | NAL P O LITIC A L WC1 / • *■’ I L I S A I 1 E 3. MIL TFCMNrLCGY 85 . I-’IL + PARTY WORK 22 . NT vc jnr NTIFIFO 1 1 'G 1 H Li'< L- A >1 1 1. FR 32 . L A Q D \ ORGANIZER 3 2 . K pv.pv p»c/,\il2FR 34 . F F A 5 A f ORGANIZER r. “> . Ur.'D!-F OTGCOID " P'A’R TY f: 1 . GENFKAL PA9 TV WORK 3? . IC FOLCGY-P.RCPACAMDA A " u M T F p FRONT WORK 3 4 . in te rn a tl l i a s c n ...... 55 . I \ T E L LIG F N C E - S F C U R I T 5 0 . K'ECO I IATLR 62 . FOREIGN AFFAIRS <-■3 . T I r.VA'L" PLANNING 6 4 . SC 1 FNC F-TFC HiNOLfiGY 66 • MINORITY AFFAIRS 67 . AG AND FDRESTP.Y.- Oi- . I > t ■ 0 6 T A Y 69 . ECO AND FINANCE 71 . EOF FI ON TRAf'F 72 . FDL‘0 A TI u \-C CL TUR F —73 . CC 0 AND T R A4 SPORT 7 4 . OVERSEAS C" 1N1: S F 7 5 . FrNFlG N C.COP E R AT I ON 76 . STATE AON IN IS T° ATCJR 1 7 . 70 . GrNEPAL POLITICAL 7 9 . LEGISLATION K l . AI.’N IN AND PARTY ------N* I 5 S KO. [';f AD MIS? MISSING DAT A 226 ■ ' CCP F IL E ■ DOCUMENTATION FOP THF 238 VARIABLES IN THE F IL E 'CCP 1 REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LAP.FL y 1S S 1NG PR T POS NAME VALUES FMT ! ?7 V25 TYPF OF WORK: 1 9 2 7 -1 9 3 7 8 0 . 0 8 9 . o c . ' 1 I _ ! I 1 1 ! '■! ' .I 1 1- U 1 ? . H'C'L CPMM1 SSA8 13 . C l'!*MA \I1 + ADM 1 \ 1 4 . M.lL+Ar'MI N + PARTY Tcrr_crT^TTr'r'fi'T-+A-rr'm--- 1ft. MIL MANAGEMCNT 1 7 . CPm y.A c,0r- r + c 0mm I SSAR I P . MIL ** C.V 1 St:'? ao • V" V. AA lAU'U* URL A ■! 1 £6 IP . COMMA NTT R AND “ ARTY WORKER 26 . PEASANT hu . p a - iv wumk + c u m m r jr s x r r " ...... 59. OPGAVIZATIOY OP CONT 84 . NOMINAL M ILITA R Y WC° 88. l'7!!tL POLITICAL 00 I ' i . M I ’L ' T” A I 1 \‘L " 82 . MIL 1ECMV0L0GY 5 . MIL + PAPTY WORK. 2? . i\t '\r IDS >'T I CI 80 i 1 . -y ru 1 H GKGAM1ZFK 32 . LA 2 OP liPGANIZFR " "3 wOMr\ OROAMZFR 3-4. PEASANT C G A M I Z E R .* 3 . L \! ■ L-l'. L-1-’1 "Jn'.i uAj | y ...... - S I . iVF.VRr AL PARTY WORK 82 . iL'h OLOGY —P -■■CCP FITE DOCUMENTATION FOR THF 238 VARIABLES 1 N THE F IL F 'CCP 1 RFL VAP I ABLE VAR IA RLE LABEL MISSING ° P T POS NAMF VALUFS FMT 27 V25 CONT 7 4 . OVERSEAS CHINESE 75. Fnr.FIGN CPrpcpAT[ p\t ------=rrti f» • .-if-HjW— i l Hi.i’ij n K-fr*?-*- .i i \ ^ ir r ------7 7 . LAI/ 7P . CP NEPAL POLITICAL 7 ». L E C-1 S LA T 10 \ ------?TT— A01=“r*7-1A-'J 0 -pTiRTY-- MISS PP. IMAP MISS ft). Pir/n MISS «o. MISSING OATA 28 V26 TYPE OF WORK: 1 ° 3 7 - 1 « 4 5 p.p.BO. o oc>. ------j-j— M r - r t ‘Mr-rrr-,-'.7F-R------1? . POL COMMISSAR 12. C O MAMP+AOM IN 1A . M lL+A PM IV+ d ARTY “ ...... IB." ~CT—-'rPS'S'AR +AHMTN ...... — 1 6 . M L MANAGEMENT 17. CCi-'MA M.'F P + CCMM 1 SS AR 1E . MIL AEVISOR 3 6 . ■vL im A i\ L^iCN ORGANIZE 1° . CrMMAVOER A NO PARTY WO° K fr 26 . PR ASANT . 0 • "FAPTY IVO'-'.N + COMM I S ? A S. ' ...... 5 9 . OF GAN IZA f I Cl \ OP CONT PA. NO r. INAL M ILITARY wor P6. NO,! IN AL POLITICAL WO F? . MI L T F A I N I i\ 0 M IL TEC H N O LO G YP 3 . MIL TECHNOLOGYP S5 . m i l + p a r ty WORK ??. NONE lPO’TIFIFD 3 1 . YOUTH T.RT;AN I Z'ER 2 2 . LA I’OF. OR FAN 11 EP. 23 . WOMEN ORGANIZER 3 A . PEASANT EPGANTZFR -• v • T N ’PFKCRP'JNP P'AF ty - ...... 61 . CFNFRAL PARTY WORK 6? . 10 FPL COY-PROP AG ANPA S3. I'M T IP FRt.Nl l-'CIPK ------trr- -1 n - r » E-N-s-Ti— i" i r ’Rr n ------228 CCP FTITF DOCUMF NTAT 1CNI FOR THF ?2« VAR IA F. IFF J fC THF rIL F »CC.P ' RFL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL KIS 5 ING PR T POS WAKE VALUES FMT ; 23 V26 CriWT > SB . I.Y1FLLIGFNCF-SFCUP IT SO . MFC.PT 1 ATL'P i i. • F 6j (; I L *1 FF A 1 1. S c? . NATIONAL PL A VNIMG 64. PC I F “JCF — T FCHWOLOGY 66 . y I '.o'- I TY AFFAIRS “ 1 V, T. 63. I N IJ U S 1R Y 6 9 . ECU JM) FIMAMCF 71. T-OREIC-V TRAPS 1 ? J I f> 1;C A 7 tnN-CUL-IUTF ------7 3 . CCMKO AND fKA.VSPQRT 7 4 . OVERSCAN CHINESE v k crtr'rw'M rrnuctinTinii 66 . -STATTF-'ATJK Pi I S TRATf'R" ' 77 . LAW 7P . GENERAL POLITICAL 7<= . LEO 1S LAT lf’W 0 1. • I*'" ATTD'P5 A ?. T V MISS FA . IMAP M I S S f 0 . Pr- A p MISS ?0 . HISSING FATA 2® V27 TYPE OF WORK: C1C TO!!. E R 1449 PS. fl IJ° . OQ. t t :— -"it c u M '-iAwnr--. 1?. PCL commissar 13 . COMMAVD+ADM IN 14. Ml L + Af-M i N + P ARTY T 5 ~ _ccMTn_r. CCP FILE DOCUMENTAT ION EOS THE- 2?E V A D 1 AP Li'S IN THE FILE 'CCP i RFL VARIABLE v a r ia b l e LABEL MISSING PPT POS NAME VALUES FMT 29 V27 CONT E 3 . MIL TECHNOLOGY P5 . MIL+PAETY WORK . ML" IE 1 < > -1 -1 1 El HI 31 . YOUTH OCCAM 1Z PR 32. LA POP ORGANIZER WC-MfN ORGANIZER ~ *y * PEASaNT I* i-A'J i'ZVK UM-FRGROUND *>A»TY if: GENERAL PARTY WORK *5? . 1D r r:I. C'G V -P P o P A G ANDA L-'ll*-!.' t-PL.\ 1 WORK IN TER NATL LIASON EA . INTc LL1 GEMC F— CF CUR I T !5P . ME GOT I ATOP p .; . Pi i OS /?. . h* 'UC A TI ON—CL'L TCTR F 73. COMMO AND TRANSPORT I t * . LVPP. SFAS CHINESE 79. Ft.iR F I C-N CGOiPF RATI DN 7f> . S1A1F ADM IN IS 1RAT UK 77 . LAW 7« . CENTRAL POLITICAL 79 . LEGISLATION p I • Al. ,-i I is AND PARTY" MISS SB. IMAP MISS P9. DEAD MISS h o . MISSING PAT A 30 V2f? TYPE OF WORK: SFpTEMbEP. 19PA PP . 0 HP. 9 9 . 11 . 1 L LI 'RMAMi t K 1? . P(. L COMMISSAR 13 . Cr-MMA\n + Ar.M 1 \ 14 . M L + ArMIN + PAp TY ------n r r T T T -: r 111S S'A ■ P"+' A' P y-1' rj ■ 230 'CCP FTCF DOCUMENTATION FOR TH* 238 VARIABLES I\' THF FILE ’ CC.P • REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL HI.EE I,VO PRT PDS NAME VALUES FMT 30 V?e CONT 16. !-' I L MANAGEMENT 17. CPVv.A ,\Rr+COV.MI S5 AR ------rn'.— ill! -APVlTr?;------36. WOMAN LABOR ORGANIZE 19. COMMANDER ANO PARTY 29. WORKER ------rFcr~PTfTsinrr------: ■ BP. PARTY WOPV+CCMMIESAR 9 ° . ORGAN IZAT I UN OP. CONT BA. NOMINAL MILITARY WCiR ------ct> .—‘■■t m r : a l 11 n trrrr e r r ~Tr~ °? . M L TRAINING F3 . MIL TECHNOLOGY PR. t.lL + PARTY WORK ------0 1 !.—A-e v e — I D E -y'f'I-E -m A ------31. YOUTH ORGANIZER 22. LABOR ORGANIZER 22. WCMEN ORGANIZER ' -■ -f . P!. A BA I IU" G A N 1 Z E R 39. UVDtFGROUND PARTY ■>1 . GENERAL PARTY WOE K 92 . ID EDL OGY-PRf.'P AG ANPA ------’’TM t'ClNf-T -MJR'!- HCM ------BA. l.NTFKNATL I.IASON SB. INTELLIGENCE-5ECURIT *59. NE GOT I Alt R ------tTP ;- T - OR I " 1~G~N A F F A •I '?.’?------63. NATIONAL PLANNING (A , SC 1c NC5 - T E CHN DL 00 Y 66. MINORITY AFFAIRS ------GT-„—Atr-r vD -ens ^SMTV ------68. INPUSTRY 6 9 . ECO ANO FINANCF 71. FOREIGN TRADP ------7? s-r-r-frrrtcr T-r. i-cTtrar ------7 3 . C0 P.Mf: Af;0 TR ANS PORT 79. OVER S EAS CHIM‘:SF 79. FOREIGN C!OPERATION ------Tfrr-S-rcT-f— ArftfM-Mrl-STRTrrOP— 77. LAvi 7E . GFNEPAL POLITICAL 7 9 . legislation ------M r - —m . M A ~ f f NC" -p'A ;r r »------231 CCP~ F l L F ------ DOCUME NTAT ION FOR THF 2?E VAR I AP LFS IK THE FILF 'CCP I RFL VAR I AP.LF va r ia b le LABEL MIS S I \'G pr>r POS NAMF VALUES FMT 3° v? a CONT MISS p p . IK AP MI Sc Be. OF AD MIS S ’1 ’ i j . F IS is I NG D/i 1 A 31 V29 TY°E OF WORK: PTH CC PP. 0 ... - .PP. g u ; . 11 . MIL COMM ANDFR 1? . I-CL COMMISSAR 13. CPMMAN'D+APM im — — VT I +7.1 I1: -+u AU IV "" ------IB . Cl'iMM.IS.SAR+AfiMlN 16. y I L MAYAGEMF!'’ T 1 7 . COMM A NO" '■ + C U M !•' 1 S * A ° it? . mil iTTOn :-n. wn.v/»fs labor nsoAMizF 1 °. COMMANDER A Ml PARTY ,! 6 . ■FFTiT'A VT------...... ‘ ”■ 50 . PARTY WOKK+COMMISSAR . nPC/.MZATIOK OR CONT m a . CUM I NAL IL IT AMY WOR tn . -\T 7 - n r .7 L' F'L'L' I T IC M T V/O ...... 0 2 . M IL T c\4 I N I DC F ?.. r. t; MIL TECHNOLOGY MlL+PAPTY WO°K i < . ■ \C- Vl K'L 41 i 1- 1 D ■1 . YOUTH ORGANIZER 3? . LABOR fiP/AKIZFP A;> . i.’OM F N d m g a v IZFR : *•/ . P T r S . CT“ C!3 C> A \ I Z'FR "'" IB. I KDE RC-R OUN'f.1 PARTY 61 . C-F NEPAL PARTY WORK ':■?. I n f o l r 3 y - p p p a g a n d a 6 3 . LT V I 1 F f' PRC'IT WOeK 54. 1NTFp;;ATL LlA.SON 55. lKTf. LL IGFNCE — SECL'R I T BP . NEGOTIATOR . F L - I I ; A 1 A r H A I 5 43 . NATIONAL PL ANVI MG 1-4 . SC IF KCF-Tf C'JNnLOCY 66 . *•'1: r< I TY AFFAIRS 6 7 . AG A :.!.1 F U i\S T ! \ V 232 "CCP- n r t r ------ DOCUMENTATION POP. THC 238 VARIABLE'S IN THF FILE 'CCP REL VAR IA RLE VARIABLE LAFiEL KISSING ORT PCS NAME VALUES FMT 31 V?9 c c m 6F. INCUS TRY 69. f cr /.An FINANC7 7 V. Et '“ t- I (/'•! I » ALL 7,7. F OL'CA T1 fN-CUL Tl/RF 73. CtMrU'j A»l> TRANSPORT 7A. UVERECA.S CHIMFSF vs. k ;r t t w c t r,p:F'R 7rrnw 76. STATE ADM 1NIS TRATOR 77. LA Vi 73. f.rvr-P/L POLITICAL ~rT-. CF'CTSrATTC*'! F l. AH MIX’ AVP PARTY KISS 8 3. 1NAP MISS y .° . READ "MTS'S MISSING T .5E T 32 V30 TYP F OF WO° K: PTH CC PF . 39 . VV. 11 . MIL COMKA.XntR 1? . FCL CCMM1SSAR 1 3 . Ct.i’.MANn + AC'M I.Y JTA •TTL + A TJM TCTPT r r 1 5 . C C IS K. 1 £ S A P + A Pi 11NI 16. MIL MANAGEME 'IT 17 . COMMA,\‘Or?: + Cn-J!MISSAR 1 . MIL '"A 'C VrsU P ------3 6 . WCill AN LA3CR 'ORGAN IZF. i p . CT”MA \D ER A,\>n PARTY pa. wc-pkfp TT7T57TCT' 50. PARTY WCEY + COMM 1S S AR 59 . ORGANIZATION OR CUNT HR . NOMINAL ILITARY WOR "t- rr; tv r.i m vat: ■ -p ttl'it t c a t- w i t £•?. MIL TRAINING £3. MIL TECHNOLOGY E-5. ^r-s-p KIL + PARTY"incsnT'FTFn— WCRK 31 YOU IE' ORGAN I ZFR LA',OR OP GAN I Z FR WOUFN ORGANIZER Pb ASAM ' i'R’.-AN 1ZER 233 -CCP -"FTL'F DOCUMENTATION FOR THE 22P VARIARL.L;S IN THE FILE 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL MI SSI MG o p j POS NAME VALUE? FMT ! 32 V30 CONT ! IB. UN OFF GROUND PARTY M . GENERAL party WORK 10 F C L i-'i V -F R l A r fl aLj A b 3 UNITED KK.C'NT WORK 36 . INTERNATL LIASOM f-3 . IMFLLICFNCF-SECUR IT ------«rrrr—•rrrrvr-Ti r r r -;- 6 2 . F:C.'!:. F 1 CM /• FH A I =tS 6 3 . ’ .'AT ] LA'AL PLANNING 66. SC IFMOF-TFCUN'OLOGY '■fT6T— M'l'NOR'l'TY' AFF'A T~5------67 . AC FORESTRY 6P. INDUSTRY (-.9. PCI AND FINANCE ■ ~ 7 T .- FORM CM "TC"AHE'"' ...... 7 2 . EOUC AT I ON-CL! L TURF 7 2 . CDMi-P AND TRANSPORT 7 A . OVERS IAS CHINESE / f>. FC.-tji.^ CL.L -'t: - n i i I'iv 76 . STATE ADMINISTRATOR 77. LAN 78 . GENERAL POLITICAL i'F . L r i: 1 S LA T 1L1M PI . ADMIN AND PARTY MIS? PE . 1NAP MISS ft 9 . DEAD " '" M I S S ------r u . /. 1 S 5 I No DATA 33 V31 TYPE OF WORK: 1 DTEI CC PR . 0 ft°. ...."" 9 0 - 11 . MIL COMMANDER 12. PPL COMMISSAR 13. COMMANO*ADM IV 16. "Ml T*V. 0 “ I N' + PV 7 T Y ...... " 15. CPMU1SSAR +ADM IN 16. MIL MANAGEMENT 17 . CPMANDER+CI':MM I SS AR 1F .' MIL ADVISOR 36. UP MAN LABOR ORGANIZE IE. COMMANDER. AND PARTY 26 . WORKER 234 ""CCP" prce " ■ ' DOC U N C U T A T IO N FOR THF 238 VAR1AF.LFS IN THF FILE 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VARIA3LF. LABEL MISFlNO DiU PC'S NAMF VALUES FMT ! 33 V31 CONT I 50. ) PARTY WOYK+C.rpy isr.47 fo . PEPA\t 17A TIP'--: PR CPVT '"■‘t • TP " I N I C -*T ITTT AR Y “ Ys'lJ-T" 6 6 . NOMINAL POLITICAL WO !•? . M 1 L T L'.'> N IMG — n— — ...... •wc-— 3 • MIL TbCHUGLOGY c •* . --xi n I r.iv.P L + 1* A K T ( V T i.rna W I J W Kv , ~ ?? . -:n \F In*r \ !11 F I ED 31 . YOUTH ORGAN I/.FR ?•?. LA POP OR GAN izfr “ TT~T7r."F",' tt-vc?: - m et^— •?4. f-FASAST ORGAN 12 PR 35. tAWPCRCUNP PARTY 6> . "TP,=~n L COY - P P'PP AT. 'A N 1 i A" 5 3 . r u n r r fromi work 54 . IVTFP.VATL LI A.SUN S3 . rjTFLLIGEVCF-SECUR IT ‘I t : 1.-!! 1 I ATP a ...... " ~ 6? . FOSE ION AFFAIRS 63. S'A T10\AL PLANNING 64. SC IEMCE-TFCHNPLOGY fcf. . M YUR ITY rtr F A I R S 67. AC A '■!P FORESTRY 68 . INDUS TRY 69 . ECU AMI FINANCE — n— TV.irHT-M— — — '■ ...... - ■' 72. F0UCA1 I UN-CULTURE 7?,. COMMC ASP TRANSPORT 74 . PVFR5 FAS C H IN F S F T 5 ’V '""FCRTTOT.T CTOFmTTTTTiM" 76. S T A 1 I: AO.'! IM 1 S TR A TOR 77. LAW 78. G5NRPAL POLITICAL -m reTRnrrrni ------E 1 . ADM 1N AND PARTY MISS HH . IMAP MISS 89. DEAD MISS 9 9 -. M1SS1VC DATA...... " " 34 V32 MEM3ER CPPCC: 1ST SESSION 0 — 1— ' • r u P T r u F DOCUKFNTATION FOR THE 230 VARIABLES IN THF FILE »CCP______' REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL MISSING D5J POS NAME VALUFS FMT 34 V32 CONT • DELEGATE 3 . N A I L COMMITTEE 4 . S rANT. INI", CP;‘M TTTF E ' 5 . SECRETARY GENERAL 6. VICE CHAIRMAN 7 . chairman Miss H . I NA P...... - MISS 9. MISSING DATA 35 V33 MEMBER CPPCC: 2ND SB SSI CM P. 0 ...... 9." 1 . MD 2. DELEGATE 3 . NAIL CPMMITTEF 4 . ST A ? ’ ITTD G“ 'CC! V M I ' l l F. E " 5 . SECRETARY general 6. VICE CHAIRMAN 7. C.h A I R KAN A' 1 s s !: . 1 \ A V M I S S P. MISSING DATA 36 V24 MEMBER CPPCC: 3RD 5F SSI ON fl . 0 9. 1 . MD 2. PELFOATE 3 . NATL COMMITTFF 4 . .sl Al\L 1M, L l l v ''U I 1 b E C, SECRETARY GENERAL • a T VIC.F CHAIRMAN 7 . CHA ] s. man MISS F . rr-EAP ■ ...... MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 37 V35A MEMBER CPPCC: ATM SESSION f l . n FT 1 . NP 2. DELEGATE ?. \ M L COMMITTER ------apt - s t a t d t n g " c t m m t t t f f B. SECRETARY GFNF.RAL 6 . V1CF CHA I R‘l AN 7. C -ir. IP v-AV 'MTS'S------1" . TN T P ------236 ------C C P" F I LG ...... DOCUMENT ATICM. FOR THF 23 VAP.IABLFS IN THF FILE 'CCP • RFL VARIABLE VAR I A9L E LAREL MISSING PR T POS NAME VALUES FMT ! 37 V35A CONT ! M I S c 9. KISSING DATA i 36 V35 3 ■' F'iF R C Pu C D I . NO 2. MFKBFP j - Vl'_f CHAIRMAN A . CHAIRMAN MISS R . IMAP KISS 9 . f-‘ I F S I \'G CATA 39 V36 MFM°FR ,\'PC : 1ST CONGRESS £ . 0 U • 1 . NO 2 • 0 F L E G A 7 E 3 . STANDING COV’-'ITTEF *♦. SECRETARY GENERAL r> . VI CF CHAIRMAN t-’ . CHAIRMAN ...... MISS r. . I NAP MISS 9 . KISSING DATA ------/rYV------'1 . NO 2. C F LEGATE ? yr-A'X-ti i n 'v - ctt k h t t t f c ‘V. SECRETARY GENERAL S. VICF CHAIRMAN o . CHAIRMAN MTS'S------..... k . TNAP" MISS 9. MISSING DATA 41 V38 MEMRER NPC : 3RD CDNC.PESS fl. 0 ...... — V".— I . NO 2. OF LEGATE 2 . STAND TNG COMMITTEE ------A .—S F t? r 1 'A MY- GTNTR'AT fi. VICE CHAIRMAN 6. CHA11'NAN MISS R. IMAP ■m t s t ------p ;— m l-ygt-^a— rryfa------237 ~ CCP FILE OOCUMFNT AT ION FDR THE 2?.P. VARlABLFS IN THF FILE 'CCP i PEL VARIAFLE VARIABLE LAPEL MISSING 00 J POS NAME VALUES FMT ! 41 V3B C CIV T [ I 42 V39 MFM3ER 7TH CC POLITBURO 3. 0 1 . nc 7. ALTFRNATF 3. FFCULAR ------4 sT/.M 7i\ii, tcnr-trTTFF 3. vice chairman iS. CHA 13 M AM .miss p. i:■ t,p ____ MTS’S"' "’u ; HISSING I;A1A " 43 V40 MEMBER GTH CC POLITBURO P. 0 9. ?. A l T f 0 HATE 2. RFOULAR 4 . STANDING COUMITTFF IT :— r i C F THA'IRMA.V U 1 L" H 1 • .HI I M I S S «. IMAP MISS MISSING DATA 44 V41 MEMBER 9TH CC POLITBUP.O E. 0 9 . 1 . NO £ . 1 tr 4 A 1 f 3. REGULAR 4. STANOIMG COMMITTEE 5 . VICE CHAIRMAN i-> . LHA i kh a i'j MISS A. IMAP MISS 9. MISSING DATA 4? ’ V42 M'EMBER' 10 TH CC D C‘L lTUU vTT r- . i> 9. 1. NO 2. ALTERNATE 3. F=',-.ULAK 4. STAMPING COMMITTSE 5. VICE CHAIRMAN A. CHA IF MAM ------c. 1 h.-r-tj------238 "CCP "FIITF”" DOCUMENTAT ION' FOR THF 2 3 « VAR IABLFS IN THF FILF 'CCP 1 REL VAR1ARLF VARIABLE LABFL MISSING P 5 T PCS NAME VALUFS FMT 1 45 V42 CO NT MISS PAT A i 9 . MISSING V 4 .j M c M is h < 7T H CC S r C ■< t T A P I A 1 P . u 9 . 1 . \ P 2 . Y FS MI S S >> . 1NAP MISS 9 . MISSING OAT A 47 V44 M p p, p PTH f.C SEC? FT AR I AT P . 0 9. 1 . NO ?. YES MISS Q . 1N A P MISS 9 . MISSING I'A 1 A 48 V45 MEMBER PTH CC CONTROL COMMISSION 8. n 9. 1 . :*!. 2 . YFS MISS P . 1N A P M IS S 9 . MISSING PATA 49 V46 MEMBER 4TH CC CONTROL COMM ISSION 8. 0 9. 1 . NO S . YES MISS P. 1NAP • MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 50 V47 MEM 5b- k "TOTH CC CON tkl.L COMMISSION 8. 0 9. 1. NC1 2 . YFS MISS E • i i\ A MISS o . MISSING DATA 51 V4P DIRECTOR CC 1)5 PTS: U! 1556 E. 0 9 . 1 . NO ? . YFS MIS': P. 1NAP —KTtC------■c s n ’c r m — 239 CCP' FI UF...... DOCUMENTAT ION' FDR THF ?3f- VARIABLES IN THF F I L c 'CCP t REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LAFEL MISSING PRT PGS NAME VALUES FMT 51 V48 COM T 52 V49 DIRECTOR CC Dc-PTS: P TH CC 8 . 0 1. no 2. HE PUT Y DIRECTOR ftt«------!TT—3 . t DIRECTORVrp------MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 53 V50 DIRECTOR CC Dr PTS : CTH CC F . 0 V . 1 • Mr' 2.‘ DEPUTY DIRECTOR ? . r I s ECTCIR. y I r <; h . 1 ,v t. P M I S S MISSING DATA 54 V51 DIRECTOR CC DEPTS: 10TH CC 8. 0 9 . 1 . MO 2 . DEPUTY DIRECTOR 3. DIRECTOR MISS " ? . 1 V A V ' MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 55 V52 MEMBER PEOPLF • S SUPREME COURT: 1949-1954 8. 0 9 . 1. KC 2 . MEMBER 3. UFPUTY CHIEF 4• OH IFF MISS P. I \' A P MISS 9. MISSING DATA 56 V53 1 ~ MEMBER- P F ' C r t r ■S SU l>t“t I T " C O U O T : 1 RTM CC o . 9. 1 . NO 2. MEMBER " ' ? n PU1Y -CHIEF 4. CH1FF MISS P. I NAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 240 - ccp F i r r DOCLMENTATION FOR THE 23H VAR 1APLFS IN THE EILF ‘ CCP REL VARIAPLE VARIABLE LABEL MISSING p °T POS N AME VALUE? FMT 57 V54 MEM3ER DrnPLE'S SUPREME COURT: 9TH CC 1 . ,\L 3. PF-PUTY CHIEF A. CHIEF 10/ P -!rrfCO—OTTTT 58 V55 MEMBER PEOELE'f. SUPREME COURT: 10TH CC H . o. “TO------ME M R E R C F PUT Y CHIFF CH IFF " M I T- S -rrrrp- M I ? ? MISS I MG DATA 59 V56 PRE M1ER STATF COUNCIL: 19«A-1954 1. ML ?. . VICE PREMIER 3. PREMIER -KtTT- "TNA P" MI SS 9. MISSING PATA A. VICE SFC.-GENRAL 5 . SFC-GFNRAL 60 V57 PREMIER STATE COUNCIL: FTH CC fi . 9 . 1. NO "VI C F —PRF M I'F rC 3 . PRFM1FR MISS 8 . INAP MIS? P. .MISSING OAT A VICE "■SEC-UENTTTnr 5. SFC-GbNRAL 61 V 58 PP.E VI FP STATE COUNCIL: 9TH CC R. 1 . NO VICE PREMIFF. 3. P F f IT I F R -rrrsT- -vr:— m V P ------ i 241 r C P ~ F I X F POCUMFNTAT ION) FOR TH E ?3P VARIABLES I\' THE FILE 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL MI S SING PR T POS NAME VALUE S FMT 61 V58 CUNT M I S S «•. MISS INS OAT A 9 . VILE SrC-CFNRAL s • C —v. E I L 6 ? V 5 9 PREMIER STATE COUNCIL: 10TH CC R. 0 P. 1 . NO .?. VICE RRFM1ER a. RE EMIFR MISS P. IMAP M 1 6 b V . i' 1 SSI M-. 1 A I A •V. VICE SEC-GE.N.RAL 5 . SF.C-GENP.AL o i V 6 0 O F F IC E L!IR f CTItR STATS LWJMC1L: 19AS—19 r>4~ P . 0 9. 1 . NO ?. Of- PUT Y riJEFCTPR » LI ~ 11, 11 'rt MISS A • IN A P HISS 9. MISSING OAT A t>4 '"V6"l OFFICE'' lilRIX iP T ~ S T A T E CliUTCrC: FTR CC F . t) 9 . 1. NO . ?. pP -P U TY DIRECTOR ' ' "" *■. HIRE L ’lV.IR 11 MISS ■c . I SAP MISS 0 . MISSING OAT A ' 6'5“ ~ V 6 2 " OFF ICt: 1 * 1K L C 11 !t\ b 1 A I b COUNCIL: u IH CL 6. 0 9 . 1 NO ?.l OEPL'TY 0 I p E C T CR a. 1 ■ 1 L 1 L;R MIS S P. I NAP MISS <•'*. MISSING DAT A 66 ve>3 OE t- iL h o i r t c t t f : STATE COON'CiL: lDTH'CC F. 0 9. 1. NO ?. rpPUTY DIRECTOR IIIKH, IVK 242 -■ " C C P - - F i r s ------ DOCUMF.NTAT ION FOR THE ?3P VARIAPLr-S IN THE FILE 'COP i , P'R L VAR1APLF VARIABLE LAEPL MIS S1NG PRT POS NAME VALIJFS FM r 1 66 V63 CO NT I MI S S R. IMAP > M IS S MISSING DAT A 67 V64 MFNBFR STATE COMM 1 SS 1 ON : l'M ,Q -] cic.4 a . 0 P. 1 . Nl.1 2 . .-lONnrf p. 3. VICE CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN MISS P. INAP MISS O.i r S - I Ni, DATA 6B V65 MFM ’■?ER STATE COMMISSION: PTH CC e. 0 p. ?. Mf-ypsp 3. VICE CHAIRMAN -y-f-p-?------A.------Cl'AIRMAN MISS o. MISSING DATA 69 V66 KFMRFR STATS COMMISSION: 9TH CC P . 0 ...... °V I . NO 2. MCM6EP 3 . VICF CHAIRMAN MISS P. INAP MISS P. MISSING DATA •?0 VTT7 ------ME 1*3 E P.' STTrT'S" C r r -' M 1 SSTfTN;" l ' D T H CC------Z~.------0 9. 1 . NO ?( .• .mempfr . i. i i i i 3* V I CL CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN MISS n . INAP MISS n . MISSING DATA 7 1 V 6R MINISTER STATE COUNCIL: 19A6_iQf,t F. 0 1 . NO 243 — "CCP FILE DOCUMENT AT ION FOR THE ? 3 H VARIABLES IN THE FILE 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VARIABLE- LABEL MISSING PRT POS MAM6 VALUES FMT 71 V6S CONT 5. PI RFC TOR 3. MINI STEF MISS 9 I MISS IMG DATA A. AMc'ASSAOFR T2 V7;9 ------M IM 1 S TFR''S TATE C CUNC. I L 'i ~ S'T T T C C ------FT------O' 9. 1 . NO P. VICE M1MSTFP . Mi >■ t-L ILIK 3. MINISTER MISS P. INAP MISS MISSING DATA •» . /.i-iir /• i ; au tK 73 V70 MINISTER STATE COUNCIL: PTH CC 0. 0 9. ------1 _ vr ------?. VICE MINISTER ?. F I RECTOR 3. MINISTER Trrrrs------rrr-rr-rrp------MISS 9 . v 1 s.5, IMG DATA A. AMLAS SADFR ------T9~~ m ------m ri'STFT—srTrrr (XorcTCT'TrvTFr-tc- - K • IT' " 9. 1 . NO 2. VICE MIN ISTER 0 m I ' 1 l\ K 9 1 UK 3. MINISTER MISS F. INAP MISS m is s in g DATA 75 V72 CCP MILITARY COMMISSION: P.TH CC a. 0 9. J. • i'.-u ?. MFMPER 3. TPPUTY CHIEF a . c h ie f TSfS-S------FT-IVAF 244 CCK FILF' ' " DDC!llMFNTAT10M r-QR THE 22P VARIABLES IN THE FILF 'CCP • REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL M 1 s S I vr. ORT POS NAME VALUES FMT 75 V7 2 con r MISS 9. MISSING DATA 76 V7 3 CCP l-i I L I rA R V i.GiT'-l SS Il '.V: "OTH CC I. . 0 9. 1 . MP ?. M r M ft F P 3. I't-MUtY CHIEF 4. CHIEF MISS 0. INAP MISS c. f-‘ 1 S S I \'G HAT A 77 V74 CCP MILITARY COMMISSION: 10TH CC e. 0 p. 1 . NO 3 . MFMr-bK ?. HE PUTY CHIEF CHIEF MISS P. IMAP Ml.16 v. 1-lBXliM.. I-AIA 78 V75 NATIONAL DEFENCF COUNCIL: TC 1=49 8 . 0 p. 1 . ■!!.' ?. mfkbfr 3. DEPUTY CHIEF A . CH 1E r Ait:>> f.. INAP .MISS 9. MISSING DATA 79 V76 NATIONAL OFFENCE COUNCIL: FT« CC 8 . 0 9. 1. NO ?. MFHFEP. 3. 1‘FPUTY CHIEF A. LHlfcr MISS 8. IMAP MISS 9. MISS IMS DATA 8U V 77 NAIHJNAL In PENCE COUNCIL: C IH CC 8 . 0 9. 1 . NO ?. MEMBER i. I u M i v r u n : c 245 ...... CCP FILE ...... DClCUMSNTAT ION FOR THE 23a VARIABLEE IN Tmp FILE 'CCP 1 REL VAPIA8LE VAR IA 5L F LAbfL MISSING PRT POS NAPE VALUES FMT 80 M i l CONT “ • CH IFF WIFE 8 . INAP MI S S ^ • " Ml S 'S 'lT .sr DATA' 81 V78 NAT IONA L DEFENCE COUNCIL: 10TH CC 8 . 0 9 . 1 • DO 2. MEMHER 3 . DEPUTY CHIEF A. cu i r f M IF F ------8 . J - •! h' r MISS 9. KISSING DATA 82 V79 MIN I STEP NATIONAL DEFENCE: 1949-1984 P. 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . DEPUTY CHIEF SUR-DFP CHIEF SUE-DFPT ** • "VI Ctr~"'“ 'I".\,TS (t 3 6 . DI'-FCTUR-SUD DEPT 5 . KIN ISTFP. MISS 8 . INAP MTS S 9v j.-1 ss-l'NO"D'A r A 7 . PUL COMMISSAR 83 V80 MIN I S TE P NATIONAL DEFENCE: 8TH CC 0 ~ ' 9 . 1 . NO 2 . ( f F-U7 Y CHI cF SU8-DCP s • CHIEF S U l— DF.PT A. VI CF' 'f - n \- i STER 6 . 01 RGCTLiR —sub dept 5. MINISTFR MISS 8 . IN A 0 ' MISS — 9 • !■• 1 S S I NG DA- r A 7. PUL COMMISSAR 84 V81 MINISTER NATIONAL DEFENCE: 9TH CC 8 . 0 — «rr~ 1 . NO 2 . f ’-f PUTY CHIEF SUE-DEP 2. c h it f sur-nrPT •A --V 1-Ct—ttltrre trR ------246 - CCP rrcr ■ ™ DOCUMFNTATI DM FDR THF ??f V AR I A c L p S IN THE FILE 'CCP' • RFL VARIABLE VAR IA3LF LAPEL y l ssing P R T POS NAME VALUES FMT 84 V81 CONT 6 . r-1 Er C; TOR-SUB OF DT P . ” 1 r. I S TF R " ■Ri’S'S o • 1 P MI s r. 9 . MISS1.V. DATA 7. POL CT/IMISSAR 85 V82 ■■ rfl'iT'; TfR-"NA'T'ICMA'C TTFFTMCE : TO'TH CC 8 . "0" 9. 1. MO 2 . DEPUTY CH1FF SUB-OEP Ct'ltF EUr,-DF P'T 4 I VI cr MINISTER 6 « OIRFCTOR-SUB DEPT K ^ MIM STEP !*• IS s H ♦ IK A F MISS 9. MI 5 5 IMG DATA 7 • PUL COMMISSAR VP’3” ■■■ ■rtrtrrT /t ?rr—K*;rT I'* A w-IS i) 9. 1. ,\n 2 » DI.Pl'TY CDMMANOFR .• • HE PX'TY C DM ■! 1 S'S* si...... ^ • COMMANDER 5. CDMM ISSA R 6 • POL DEPT HFAD OR COS 87 V84 MIL ITARY Hu: CTH CC 8. 0 o• 1 . NO 2 . ■"DC PUT Y COMM A.VDER" 3. DEPUTY COMMISSAR 4. CDMMANOFR 5. C C'M M I S S A p e. • POL UFPTTTFAO OR CCS 88 VOS MILITARY HC: PTH CC 8 . 0 9...... L'i' No I' DEPUTY CDMMANOFR ^ • DEPUTY COMMISSAR 4. CUMYAE DPR 247 ccv~ FILL ...... POCUMFNTATION FOR THE ?3« VAR IA PLES IN TUE FILF 'CC.P i RFL VARIAFLE VAR IA fi L F LABEL M, 1 S S I NG PRT PCS NAME VA LUES FMT E8 VP5 COi'JT 6 . POL DEPT HEAD OR CDS B9~ VE 6 t* IL ITA’“ V H l t 1 * 1 H Cl. 11 o. 1 . NO 2 • DEPUTY COMIAMOER 'j T'F p 'U T ^ c n r ’o l s s a r 4 . COMMANOF I K• • COMF1 S. SAP . Ft;L DEPT HEAD OR COS 9 0 V87 NA FIONA L YC.'UlH OR GANIZATION: 10AO-1P5A P. 0 P. 1 . NO A . iTEM.-iFR VICE CHAIRMAN CHA IF.MAN HISS p 1 NA p MISS V . MlsS 1 N17 "DATA PI V F 8 NATIONAL YOUTH OP. GAN I Z A T I ON: PTH CC 8 . 0 P. 2 . MEMPER ? . VICE CHA IF'MAN A. CHA io NA'J •m t s t ------r . - ~ tft/cp ------MISS P. HISSING t'ATA 92 VHP NATIONAL Yl UTH ORGAN1ZATION: °TH CC.. C(F ^.... 0 1 . NO 2 . MEMBER 2 . VICE CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN MISS P. INAP MISS p . MISSING DATA 9 3 ' VPO NAT IONAL Y C'UTH ' 0 R CTA'R I Z A' TT C N I I'O T H CC P. ~ 0 "" o . 1 . NO 2 . MFMP.&a f a '/ILL LMA ihi'IA.'J 248 CCP- TILE ...... ■ DGCDMFNTATION FOR THF 238 VAR 1A I. L t S IN TH E FILE 'CLP 9 REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LASf L M I S SING PRT POS NAME VALUFS FMT 92 V90 CCINT A. CHAIRMAN HISS 8 . IMAP I S R r>. .MI SSI Mi L'ATh 9A V91 NATIONAL LABOR ORGAN IZATION: 19A9-1954 8 . 0 9. 2. I-IF M P C R 3. VICE CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN T t- 5-5------r ; ....1 v a t ------KISS 9. MISSING DATA 95 V°? NATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: 8TH CC 8. n ...... 9 . 1 . NO 2. MFKBFR 2. Vice CHAIRMAN A « i-H *■> 1 F f1 A .'J MISS t . INAP KISS 9 . MISSING DATA 96 —V93"A rA'T'TL 'IA L '~trP-> fN-F OF. v-AN 1 ZA f 1 0 .'J • ° T K CC A * 0 9 . I . NO- 2 . ME'-iPF.R V I"C1— CHA IP M'AN ' A. CHAIRMAN ' m is s ?. INAP MISS 9. MISSING DATA 97 V938 NATIONAL LABOR. ORGANIZATION: 10TH CC 8. 0 9. 1. MO 2. ME'MfJ'Elr' 3. VICF CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN MISS 8. INAP m t Ss ■'R." Ml S'STwV"OAT’A" ' 9 8 V 9 4 NATIONAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION: 1RA9-195A 8. 0 9. 1. DC 249 ■ CCP p r is DOC UMENT AT I ON FOR THP 238 VARIABLES IN fliE FILE ’ CCP i RPL VAR1AELF VAR I ABLE LAP EL M I S S I NG o ■? t POS NAME VAL'JFS CMT 98 V94 CONT ?. ME ME EE 3. VICF CHAIRMAN ** a 1P r I !■ !•! A < III S S 8 . I V £ F M I S S 9. MISSING DATA "99~ V95 MAT 1 C!N AC P'eA'S A v T" 0 G A M'H AT 11 j\| 1 FTH C'C '' fl . (l 9 . 1 - NO ?. >'.<-■ VRPP ...... i . VI L E CHA I r;vA il A. chairman MISS 8. INAP MISS 9. MISSING DATA 100 V96 NATIONAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION: °TH CC 8. 0 9. 1. NO 2 • h .-t L l K 3. V IC K CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN MISS r . l \ a p MISS ° . i l l SS 1 IsC HA 1 A 101 V97 NATIONAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION: 10TH CC 8. 0 9. ------f—— ------?. iVF.'iPFR 3. VICE CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN •Ml-s-s------f <~.— I TA P------MISS 9. MISSING PATA 10? V98 NATIONAL WOMEN ORGANIZATION: 19A9-19E4 ....-- rj-.8. 0 1. MO 2. MEMBER 3. VICE CHAIRMAN MISS R• INAP MISS 9• MISSING DATA 250 —CCP- F 1 IT: " DOCUMENTAT ION FPR THF 230 VARIABLES IN T 1-1 F FILE •CCP 1 RFL VARIABLE VARIABLE LAC,EL M I S M NO PRT POS NAMF VALOFS FMT 103 V99 NATIONAL wri.vc\> CFG AM IZAT10M: PTH CC P . 0 9. 1. . N O i . ;';i- i-i■-*I: k 3. VICF CHAIRMAN 4 . CHA1 & HAN ... HMIFF j ^ ,. P. INAP "9 V r i s n w d a t a 1 0 4 V100 NATIONAL WOOFN CP.G AN 1 2 A T I O N ! f t h CC B . 0 9 . 2. ME MGER 2 . VICF CHAIRMAN 4. CHAIRMAN______T-rnrs ------p~.—rr/rp------MIS? P. HI 5? INC- DATA 105 V101 NATIONAL '.-/Cf’ FN ORGANIZATION: 10TH CC P . 0 9. 1 . VO 2. MEMBER 3. VICE CHAIRMAN 4 . CHi A 1 '• I-AM MISS P. INAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA J.U6 V 1 2 rll- 1 i i ,.m i-K ir . NDEH IF I. K G I 1 A-u- L9 !•;. 0 9. 1 . NO 2. MEMBER VI Lt: LHAJKMAN 4. CHA IF MAN MISS P. INAP MISS 9. MISSING DATA 107 V103 FOREIGN FRIENDSHIP ORG: ATM CC P . 0 9. 1. NO 2. ^ 2. VICF CHAIRMAN 4. CHA 1'-'MAN MISS F. INAP “MTS-S------CT"“----T. TTTTB'.': I':ITT7 ------251 ■ CCP -FILF — - ..... DOCUMENTAT I ON FOR THE 23R VARIABLES IN THE FILF 'CCP i REL VAR1ABLF VAR IA8LF LABEL MI S'-IMG D\T POS NAME VALUES <=MT 1 0 7 V I 03 CGNT 1 0 8 V104 FOREIGN FRIENDSHIP OPG: °1H CC n . 0 ^ t 1 . NO 2 . MFMEER ?.. VICE CHAIRMAN mi sr. e. inap MISS 9 . MISSING OATA 1-09— V i1*5------fcp-p i'G N -pp. i rrrrrTHl p",ct,.g: " lTrrrr-cx ------f t ------rr p. 1. NO 2. MEMBER ...... -■ ■■ ------■ ...... 3 ;-"Vl CF"-CHAIRMAN ...... 4 . Ch a ISMAN MISS P. INAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 110 V106 NATIONAL SCIENCE ORGAN IZA T 1 ON: 1949-1954 8. 0 9. 1 . NO J • 1- ■ I'.L- >. K 3. VICE CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIRMAN MISS n. I NAP H I* V . I'.liMNb l*A 1 A 111 V I 07 NATIONAL SCIENCE ORGANIZATION: FTH CC P . 0 o . ------1—=—ME=1------2. MEMBER 3 . VICF CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN -Mi-SrS------P . i 'N A p------MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 112 V108 NATIONAL SCIENCE ORGANIZATION: 9TH CC 8 . 0 ..... - " ° V 1 . NO 2 . MEMFFP 3. VICE CHAIRMAN 4. CIEA'I R MA N ' 252 CCP" r I LI" ' ■■ DOCUMENTAT ION FOR THC 2?Ct VARIAELFS IN THE FILE 'CCP l RFL VARIABLE VAR I A EL T LABEL M15 SI NO P R T PCIS NAME VALUES EMT 112 VlOP CONT MISS 0. INAP MISS c . MISSING DATA 113 V109 NATIUNAL SCIENCE ORGANIZATION: 1 0 TH CC H . 0 R. 1 . NO ' ”2. kb MB'F R —...... 2 . VICF CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN MISS P.. INAP 'MTS'S— v » i'. I E 5 I * v » u A T a 1 1 4 V110 NATIONAL CULTURE ORGANIZATION: io^rv_-l g5^ P . 0 9. ------1— ----Iri------HE MB C R ? . VICF CHAIRMAN A. CHAIRMAN •wi-s-s------r~.—n r rr ------MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 115 v i n NATIONAL CULTURE ORGANIZATION: HTH CC P . n 1 . NO 2. MPMBFR 3 . VICE CHAIRMAN . L H A i l- A i'. MISS P. INAP HISS 9. MISSING DATA 116 ■ v r i - ? " " NAT ICNAC CULIUEE ORG A'I I ZA T I ON : >JT H CC P . u 9 . 1 . 1:0 2 . ME ME F R 3 « VICE C H A 1 R El A N A. CHAIRMAN MISS P. INAP MI S S 9 . MISSING OATA 117 V I 1 3 NATIONAL CULTURE ORGANIZATION: 1PTH CC ‘ P • 0 9. 1 . NO 253 rCP-FTCE DOCUMENTAT ION FUR THE 2 3 P VARIABLES IN THF FILE *CCP i RFL VAR I ABLE VARIABLE LABEL HISSING PRT POS NAME VALUES FMT 117 V I 13 CONT 3. VICE CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIRMAN 111 s s '* « 1 A P MISS P. MISSING DATA 118 V 114 REGIONAL PARTY BUREAU SFC: lo 4 r'-lo ? 4 R. 0 «>. 1 . NO ?. DEPUTY SECRETARY 3. SECRETARY MISS m is s in g data 4 . STA MEMBER TT9 \ r r r s ----- RED rn\'A V _PAT7Y"'R^RTA17,''S,EC: “lV'Dl-lB'fTS ------rn--- IT 9. 1 . NO ?. TFPIJTY S. L C" FTAP Y A . Sri".! 1 A-< V “ ‘ MISS 8. INAP MIS S 9. KISSING DATA 4 . STA MEMBER 120 V 116 PROVINC1AL PARTY BUREAU SFC: 1*49-1954 c 0 • o.’ I . NO 2 . [.■ I:RU I Y SL"C;--ETAKV 3 . SFCRETARY ' MISS 8. l.NAR MISS p. KISSING TATA - STA MDMBcP. " “ "" ' ' " 121 V117 PROVINC IAL PARTY BUREAU SEC: 8TH CC 8. 0 o. 1 • fiij 2. DEPUTY SECRETARY 3. SFCRETARY MISR E. INAP i’i I s s '■> . E: I S S I .\V DATA 4 . STA MEM3FR 122 V I 1 8 PROVINCIAL PARTY BUREAU S^C: 10TH CC P. 0 1 . NO 254 DOCUf-'cMTAT IDM FOP. THF 22P VARIABLES I f ’'! THE FILF ’COP • REL VARIABLE VAR IA ALE LAPEL MISSING PRT POS NAME VALUES FMT 122 v i ie CONT 2 . or RUTY SECRETARY -? ^ 5 E C S s TA k Y Mrt'S'S 1 (. « T * R MISS 9. MISSING DATA A . STA ME M3 ER 123 V II 9 SUB-P-ROVI.'rCTAL' 9 a * i y m i h l l U 9. 1. NO 2. DEPUTY SECRETARY .-i • i t t ' C 1 A" T MISS P . I N t P " 1 s s 9 . MISSING DATA 4. STA, M FMh E R 124 V I 20 REGIONAL GGVFP NM EMI: 1949-1934 p. n 9. 1 . NO f • f/ c \ n f,c R T HEAP 0° SG V. V1C.F CHAIRMAN 5. CIA A I R MAN MISS ,J . M1 S S. 4. MISSING DATA 125 VI 21 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT: 1949-AUG 1°56 — _p . . — 6 1 . NO 2. MEMBER 3 . DEPT HEAP O'? SG a . v i c ? ~ crnrrPKfrN— 5. chairman MISS H. INAP MISS 9. MISSING CAT A 126 V12? PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT: PTHCC fi. 0 9. 1 . ND "> . ME M F. E R 3. f.E 'P T HEAD OR SG *+ • VICE CHAIRMAN ■j • CHAIRMAN ------M-TS-S------f r - -t-W r? ------:------255 C C P - r i L F ” ...... DOCUMFNTAT IC’N FOR THF 23S VARIABLES IN THE FILF 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VARIA3LF LAPEL M1S SING PRT POS NAME VALUES FMT 126 V 12? CONT MISS p . MISSING D /'T A m — v m ------pp.tr v f r c t a l p e v r u ; , r i G n a r v c c r . ;-n~ q th '~ ~ c r 1 . NO 2 . M.EMFFR r : Nrr c r _cvt7, i ------A. CHAIRMAN MISS fl. INAP MISS P. MISSING OAT A 128 V 124 PROVINCIAL c E VEIL UT IONA.0. Y COMM: 1 0 T H CC n . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 • rV: I'lbE K 3. VICF CHAIRMAN 9. CHAIRMAN MISS P. IN/.P ill b-i u . IllM.Si l\V 1;A 1 A 129 V I 25 S U d —P RO VI N'C I A.L REVOLUTIONARY COMM: 9TH C 8. 0 T_NO------9. 2. MEMBER 2. VICF CHAIRMAN •A. CHAIRMAN -m -r s ------r . "i 'i a p------MISS S. MISSING DATA 130 V 126 SUB-PROVING IAL REVOLUTIONARY COMM: 10TH 8. 0 ■ 9 . 1. NO 2 . MFMREP 3 . VICE CHAIRMAN ------At— rt3 A' I FMTTN------MISS F. INAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA T31 V T 2 7 ------PrFCrrm/vL "M I L 1 TV.” Y COMMA'NIT: jccn'-rCTTA ------FT ------rr o. 1 . NT' 2. Of PUTY COMMANDER ------?-r-r^t'urv c o m r i - y s r p ------256 " ‘CCP’ FILF...... DOCUMENT AT IPM FOP. TH E 2 2 A VAR IA P LFS IN The FILE 'CCP i REL VARIAM.F VAR1ABLF LAPEL MISSING °RT POS NAME VALUES FMT 131 V I 27 CC1VT *+ • r-OL OFPT HEAD 0° COS S. COMMA POE !■' ^ • C 0 0 M 1 S fa A <• I • C OFf-iA NO F F + C OM‘ i I S c- AS MISS >i. INAP MISS 9 . MISSING PATA 132 V128 REGIONAL MI LI TAR Y COMMAND: i I . NO ------~v t:fp!jtv erwrePER---- 2 . DEPUTY COMMISSAR 9 . POL DEPT HI: AO OR CDS 3. COMMANDER ------rrr-CUrr-TSKir?..------7 . C.O-.HA i\r>L: F +CPMMI SS AR MISS H. I HAP MISS o. y.ISSlN'G PAT A 133 V I 29 REGIONAL M I L17AR Y COMMAND: 9TH CC n. 0 9. 1. . \n 2 ."DEPUTY "CPMMA'Nr;ER ' " " OF P 07 Y COMMISSAR A I POL DEPT HEAD OP COS 5 . COMMANPE■ fa . Ol.'t -i 1 fafa A P 7 . COr-'MAXDE r.+ C O M M I SS AP. . MISS t* . INAP MISS 9. MISSING OATA 134 V130 REGIONAL MI LITARY COMMAND: 10TH CC R. 0 9. 1 . NO . ["FPTTTY C OMM'ATTDER...... з. OFFUTY COMMISSAR и. POL OFPT HEAD OR COS 3. COMMANDER fa. Cl. i'.P. I S '■ A K 7 . C 0 M M A M D E P + C 0 M M I S S A R MISS a. INAP MISS fa. MISSING DATA 257 —CCP- T T t E ------ D OC UMF STATION FOR THF 22p VARIABLES IN THF FILE 'CCP • REL VARIABLE VA3 I ABLE LA ELL Mi S SING Dt>7 POS \'AME VALUES FMT 135 V131 PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND: 1‘'>49-1 *54 P. Cl 9. 1 . NO < - • 1. I- l 1 T L, I i ‘ I ill!- 1 ?. DEPUTY COMM IS SAP. FPL DrPT HEAD OR. CDS 5. c? A W PR fi . 1 !• 1 A i- 7. COKMAWFR+CGMMISSAR KIS S. e. inap MISS s. MISSING PATA 136 V I32 PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND: 8 TH CC P. 0 9 . 1 . NO . IrFITIY LPH! A '.III- 3. Of: PUTY COMMISSAR A. POL ri PPT HP AD DR COS c'. C'MM.ANr'FR P. 1 1 L G A 7 . CL MM A NOE F. + CCMM I SSAR MIS^ P. INAP MISS V. M I'S ING DATA 137 V133 PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMA S T .: 9 T H CC P.. 0 9 . 1 . NO r • I ♦ * h I 1 ) C I i’ir ! > L ‘ f * \ 3. OS DUTY COMMISSAR A. P U l. P'JPT HEAD DR COS 5. CP PM A WE R f>. P'. ■. .M J i'.>A * 7 . CO MM A W E P +C.OMM 1 SSAR MISS 8. INAP MIS S p . MISSING DATA 138 V I3 A PROVINICAL MILITARY COMMAND: 1 0 TH CC P. 0 9. 1 . NO e . i / K F c r m r o n n a m i 1 1 * 3 . DEPUTY COMMISSAR A. POL DEPT HEAD DR COS 5. COMMANDER 6 " . c o m vi s s y q ------258 " “CCP "FT'LE------~ DOCUMF NT AT I ON FOR THF ??!i VAR I AB LFS JV THE F IL F 'CC.P • REL VAPIADLF VARIABLE LABEL MISSING o p f PCS NAME VALUFS OMT 138 V134 CONT 7 . C 0 M M A NO E R + C OM M I S S A R MISS * INAP MI S R 9 , A! I 5- 5-1 T A T A 139 V I 35 LOCAL YOUTH OR GA ,Y I 2 A T I PA:: i ^ a q - i q 5 a 8 . 0 9 . i . / * SlANPlNG COMMIT IFF —•P• • VICF CHAIPMAN 4 . CMA IP MAM cl I S 5 - • M I S S 4. MISSING DATA 1 AO V I 36 LOCAL YOUTH PR CAM IZATIPN: STH CC P. 0 9 . 1 . NO ? . STANDING COMM. ITTFE 3 . VIC F CHAIPMAN *+ . CH 1 a A A MISS V-n • INAP MISS Q # MISSING DATA 141 V137 LOC AL' YOUTH UKl’A -N 1 £ A 1 1 {.: i-,i S IH L t 8 . U y • 1 . NO «_0 • STANDING COMMITTEE £ • ■ V TTT ““OCA IR MAN 4 . CHA.1 P, M A f\ M IS S 8 . INAP MISS 4 . MISSING DATA 142 V 138 LOCAL YOUTH ORGANIZATION: 10TH CC 8 . 0 1 . NO " 2 ." ST A 1 SG ConH 11 11.1 ? . VICF CHAIRMAN 4. CHA INMAN MISS 8 . INAP M is s '< . N I Si. I NG OA 1 A 143 VI 39 LOCAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: 1 ° 4 9 —1954 8. 0 9. 259 C C P F T C F DOCUMENTATION FOR TH E 238 VARIABLES IN TOE FILE 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VAR I ASLE LA BEL I S S I NG PRT POS MAKE VALUES FMT 143 V139 CONT 2. STANDING COMMITTEE 3 . V1C.F CHAIRMAN 4 * i_t-« IM Aiv MIS S ft. INAP MISS c'. MISSING DATA 144 V140.... LOCAL L'ADCR ORGANIZATION: bIH LI K. 0 9 . 1 . NO 2. STANDING COMMITTEE 3. VICE CO A I k MA’T 4 . C.H AIRMAN MISS 8 . I nap MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 145 V141 LOCAL LA3GF. ORGANIZATION: 9TH CC P • 0 9 . 1 . NO / • i I Ai-.i 1m , g : 1 1 1 s E 3 . VICE CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIRMAN MISS R. INAP MIS S' ” V . i'il SS 1 I'.'b L‘A 1 A 146 VIA? LOCAL LA30R ORGANIZATION: 1GTH CC • P. 0 9 . 1 » I'iL1 2. STANDING COMMITTEE 3 . VICE CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIRMAN M 1 S S b . INAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 147 V143 LOCAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION: 1949-1954 8. 0 9C 1 . NO 2 . STANDING COMM I TTE F 3 . VICF CHAIRMAN '4"; CH A 1 KHAN MISS 8 . INAP M IS S 9 . MISSING DATA 260 — CCP F T t r r DOCUMENT AT ION' FOP. THF 23 E VARIABLES IN' THF F IL E 'CCP ' REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL MISSING PPT POS NAME VALUES FMT 148 V 144 LOCAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION:' « th CC 8 . 0 I . NO " 2 . PT'ATP'It C" 1 c^r-'N 1 TTEF 2 . VICE CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIR MAX' MISS 0 . INAP MISS a \ " MI'SST .NO- DATA 149 V145 LOCAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION: 97H CC P. 0 9 . —i—— ..------2 - STAMP ING COMMITTEE 3 . VICF CHAIRMAN A . C11A I p MAM -r 150 V 146 LUCAL PEASANT ORGANIZATION: 10TH CC e . n v> • 1 . NO 2 . STAMPING COMM IT TE F VI C c CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIRMAN MISS R . INAP MI S S 9 . MISSING DATA — 1‘5"1 “ V I 4 7 1 L OC L ’WfVIEN ORGAN I Z A T IC ' : 1 v — 1 v* b 4 H m 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . STAMPING C0MM1TTFE 3 • 1 VICE C HA1 IF MAN 4 . CH A IPMAN MISS P. INAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA 152 V148 LOCAL WOMEN ORGANIZATION: RTH CC fi. 0 9 . 1 . NO / . i 1 1 1 VI.- CJMK i 1 1 r r "3 'MCE CHAIRMAN 4 I CMA 1R MAN MISS 0 . INAP ------tt-l-s-s— ------wv -ttt-f^-l-NrF-crg-T-a ------261 — "CCP-"FILE - ...... DOCUMFNTATION FOR THF 238 VARIABLES 11; THF F IL E 'CCP • REL VARIABLE VAR1ABLF LABEL MISSING PRT POS NAME VALUES FMT 152 V I 48 CONT 153 V 1 40 LOCAL WCMf N ORGAN I 2 A T 1CA: °TH CC 8 . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . STANDING COMMITTEE 3 . VICE c h a ir m a n i . CHA IRMAN MISS 8 . INAP MISS 9 . M ISSING LATA 154 V 150 LO^AL WOMB K’ tjPuA I / A T IO N : 1 10TT! Cl. 8 . (j 9 . 1 . • jn 2 . STANflNG COMMITTEE — VTC?— trrrnTT.’-'TW A . CHAIRMAN M ISS P . IMAP M IS S 9 . MISSING DATA 155 V I 5] A YEARS IN PR IMA0 Y POS IT IC N : SEPT 1954 8 . 0 9 . 6 . OF AO 7. KSIV1C.N LUST MISS !i. INAP MISS 9. MISSING DATA 156 V I 5 1 E------" YEARS' 1 'P R 17‘TV0 Y P'fi S 1 T 1 CM : f T'H' C C .... • ' • 0 9 . A . DEAD 7. POSITION LOST '■ MISS'""' r . ktap MISS 9 . MISSING TATA 157 V I 5 2 YFARSIN PRIMARY POSITION: 9TH CC 88 . n 9 9 . MISS 8 8 . INAP MISS 9 9 . MISSING DATA a A . DEAD ------T7~i PTTSTTTTA!- CCTSI--- 158 V I 5 3 YEARS IN DRIMAPy POSITICN: 10TH CC 88 . 0 90. ■m-S^------srr:— rrnrp------262 — C'CP'-FTCF DOCUNFNTAT ION PGR TH F 23P VAR I AC L F S IN THF PILE 'CCP _____ • REL VAR 1 A BLF. VARIAOLF LABEL M I 5 S1 MO DPT POS NAME VALUES FMT 158 V 1 63 CONT MIS S 99. MISSING DATA 6 6 . tiFAD 1 / 1 . Al'6 I I ji'N LHh 1 159 V I 5 A ti OF CONCURRENT 90 51T IO N S : PCT05FR 1949 7 . 0 n . 9 6 . OFATM . MISS 7 . POS11 IONS LOST M I S S P. INAP "ori s s- v . *> 1 i. S 1 i , A T A 160 V 15 5 * OF CONCURRENT PO S ITIO N S : SFPT 1954 7 . 0 P . 9 . 6 . OFATH M I S S 7 . POSITIO NS LOST !•* I S S P . INA.R MI r S u . Ml S. SI LATA 16 i V I 56 d OF CONCURRENT PO S ITIO N S : 8TH CC 7 . 0 n . 9 . 6 . OFATH M I S S 7 . PO SITIO NS LOST MISS e . in a p MI S S 1 9 . iMi :■! 1 'j a I a 16? V I 57 U OF CPNCUpPENT P O SITIO N S: 9TH CC 7 . 0 P . 9 . 6 . DEATH MISS 7 . POSITIONS LOST MISS 8 . INAP Si I S S ...... ‘ ” 9 . M j SI-Ng I.1 AT A 162 V I 58 * OF CONCURRENT P O S ITIO N S : 10TH CC 7 . 0 P. 9 . 6 . OFATH MISS 7 . POSITIONS LOST M IS S P. INAP -r-n r s - 9 . T'l >!ST.VTT,1 TZ...... 263 ------CCP-"FTL'E ...... DOCUM.F\TAT ION FOR THE 23 8 VARIABLES IN THE FILE ’CCP 1 PEL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL MISSING 9RT POS NAME VALUES FMT 163 V I 58 CONT 164 V I 59 LOCALE OF Wf.-K: 19 21-1427 « . n ...... " H. 1 . URBAN 2 . RURAL 111 X E 0 ABROAD ...... " MISS 8 . 1NAP M IS S «. MISSING DATA tt5'" '■'VI6 0 ""LOCAL 5 CF V.'f'-'FT.'" l ’«2 7 - 1 v 37 IN S O V IE T 1 " u oo. 21 . FUKIEN 22. K 1 ANOSI 23 . ".I \ — uF| 1- N—KUNG 22 . KWANG SI _ . HS 1 A!' C-O-KUNG I S I A NL-O-I IS I “4. UNO f 7 OR Ci UNO f THFR 56 * SHE NS I 6-2 . 64 . LThr-R FOREIGN COL'NTR 57. NOE I u Cu INA 5 8 . CENTRAL CHINA " M 1"JTS------r • • I \ A l' • MISS 49 . M ISSING EATA 166 V161 LOCALE OF WORK: l‘>3 7 -1 9 4 5 MH.. 0 9H . 11 . y e n an 12 . s h e n - k a n - n in g 13. f.H IN -SU l ------r t r 1 rrl------15. CHIN-CHI-YU 16. O 1 fv —lLJ—YU 17. CM iM—CH1 —LU—YU -i-r-r-Tfrfl-TTn^G------l r-. M'/F'.lti OH If.A 2 1 . NORTH ANHWEI 2 2 . NORTH KlANf.SU 1 ; -C l-^rl^ -AL i-. 1 AN6SU- 264 ■ C C P ~ F IL T - DOClJMEiVTAT 10M FOR THE 23.° VAR 1 ARLES IM THE FILE 1 C C d < REL VAR I A RLE VARIABLE LAShL HISSING PRT POS NAME VALUES MT 166 V161 CON I . so u th ANHWF1 SOUTH KIANGSU ------T-rrr—frf—i T-^ I ■' H3 1L---- V j J - l.it f l ...... I ...... 27 . EAST CHF'MANG ?P . hijtJ F I-H U N A ’I-ANHWE I 2 « . CENTRAL CHINA ~r. KtTTTrmc------f 4 . liMVFPGRtiUNO 3 ? . vF'iin+i'iinin HAINAN ...... p k y " as- r r /:r " ...... M I S S EH. I NAP MIS S c' 167 Vlo2 '■ 1 LOCAL" ■’OF” wrrp'sc:""OC T0 s'FR"' 1 <5 49 HH . fl o o . 10. SINK1ANG 1 1 . KANSU ------— N-t~rrr^-|-s------1?. SHENSI ]a . TSINGMAI 1?.. I '-J M F r! MONGOLIA Tf— -PET-riTC------17. SHANSI IE. TIFMTSIN 1*= . HUP F I s.TT-FUKTTN------7.2 . K I AMGS I ? ? . ANHWF1 2 4 . CHEKIANG 4l *5 • K I hN ■ SU ?6 • s h a n g h a i 2 7 . s h a n t u n g 31 . KWANGTU - • KW /tivGS 1 ^ 3 • HUNAN 3 A • HOPE I 3 S. HC NAN H I . HE 1 L Uf.’GK 1 A.'ll, A? . K I K L I N At 3 . LI AON INC- SI . TIF.PT ~ 2. . S L F C H W A N 265 • CCP' FI LF "" " DOCUMENTAT 1ON <=rtR THF 23P VARIABLES IN TIM: 1-ILF 'CCP i REL VARIABLE VARIABLE LABEL m i s c \ \ r - PRT POS NAME VALUFS FMT 167 V162 con r 6 3 . YlIM AN ?. A. k HI-1 CHOW > ■ :■ . !'•. Ih : i- 06 . POSITIONS LOST 7 7 . CFNTRAL-PFK 1 -J G 6 ? . US S 3 0 -f . OTHER FL.-.F 1 ON” COO NT R ' I.: ? . OF A Til MISS PR. IMAP MISS m . MISSING PAT A 168 V163 LOCALE OF WORK: SFPTFMSER 1SS4 PP. 0 n o . 1C. SINK I ANG ...... T1II. . K).-VCM...... — ■ ...... —’ ■ 1 7 . NINGHSIA 1 3 . S-H F N 5 I 1 4 . 7 S IN 017. I Tr;— i v m t f : — t t g c t t x 1A . PS •< i ftii.; 1 7 . SHANSI 16. T1p\T SIN - - ...... “ ■ ' — ...... - 1 9 . - "Hr:'D F"i — " ...... 21 . FUKIEN 2 2. E I A NO. SI K I' . ANHWF I ■' . l.t- i-i^ 1 A Jo ? s . K I ANGSU 26 . SHANCHAI 27. SHAM UNO i l . ".WANG 10 32 . K VIA NO SI 3? . HUMAN 36 . HU PE 1 ? * * I F • A M I'i 41 . HE 1LIJNGK 1AMG 42 . KIR L 1 N 4 3 . L I AON1 IMG 6 1 . TIB E T ' "" S2 . SZECHWAN i: ~ - ~. • YU 6 AM e6 . KWE1CI0W 266 c c p f t c e ------ DOCUMF ‘■.'TAT I ON FOP Tlii; ?3 n VARIABLES I \ THE F IL E 'COP i PEL V AP1 A 2 LF v a r ia b l e l a b f l M ] S 5-1 NG p P,T POS NANF VALUES FMT 168 V I 63 CON T 6 6 . Pr S' IT 10W. S LOST 7 7 . CP NT” AL-PFK ING •ft?;- bfrre------. 07 Hi':P. FPl: E I CN COUMTR r-6. [.fain NISS if - . Ik / P -m-s-s------r-rsrrNtr-P7rT7r 169 V 169 LOCALE OF WORK,: ETH CC fifi. 0 9 9 . ------rrr r -rnrKTA'rG- 11 . KA .\su l ? . \INGHSIA l? .. SHFNSl 3 <*. T S i ’NCTA 1 i F . INNER MONGOLIA 16. PF KI NO 17. SHAD'S I Ift . t i rs i a: 19. K 'P F I 21 . FUK TEN 2 ? . KIAYGSl 2 3 . / * :Hvvp I 2 9 . UIFKIANG 2 5. KIANCSU 2 6 . SHANCHAI t ? » S Ha - i 1 UN1., 3 1 . KWANG7U 3? . KWANsSI £ £ 0 HI'NAN ?9 . HU p b 1 3 5 . HO N'AM 91 . HE 1LUNGKIANG 92 . K I f\ 1.1 N ^ . L 1 AC.’,': INI. c l . 7 I r b 7 52 . SZECHWAN 53 . yijna N 69 . K '* •- I C HO W fci . KOREA 6 6 . PCS 1 71CVS LOST 7 7 . Cr-NTRAL-REK. ING 267 CCP- FILE OOCUMENTATIOM FOR THF 53 P, VARIABLES IN TOE FILE 'CLP i PEL . VAPI A ELF VAR 1 AQLE LAbFL MIS SI MG PR T POS NAME VALUES FMT 169 V I 6^ COM T 6 A . OTHER FOE F I CM COUMTP. F'5 . OFATH M I 5 S . MISS S‘< . MISSING OATA 170 V165 l o c a l e OF WORK: ■ 9TH CC PP. 0 uu . 10 . E1NKIANG 11 . KANSU ------1,? . MI MOMS I A 1 4 . t s i n g h a i l 1?. INNER. MONGOLIA 1 6 . PR KING TT . SHAN5' I------JO.18. lip TIENTSIN p p i FUK1PN j ^ . 1*. 1 l* isL 6 r C m ANHWEI t- ** • CM EK. I A MG 2 5 . KIANG5U ...... 2 6 . SL1A i-S.. hA I 27 . SHANTUNG i 1 . KWANGTU 32 . KWANGS I * * MU “i A v 3 A . HUPF 1 35 . HONAN A 1 . J-£._ HE1LUNGK IAMG *■ I P L I .« A3 . LI AC\ IMG 51 . 1 I3ET 5? . S3 ECHWAN „ J s YU HAN ^ A ♦ KWFI CHOW *3 . KG P.EA • POSITIONS LOST f ^ . CE NTR'A'L'—PEK'TN'G'...... 6 2 . USSR 64 . LTI-'FP FOREIGN COUNTR F5 . b“ ATH ------Li. . <> . ------„ . —t -h-a e------268 — C C P ~ F T C F DOCUMFNTAT ION FOR THE 2 3.11 WARIAPLFS 1 .V TUP F IL E 'CC.P______• RFL VAR IA OLE VARIABLE LAF-EL i c s i \n RRT POS NAME VALUES F M T 170 V 165 CCMT MISS . HISS IMG DATA 171' V166 LiJLALb LH wI'Kn ! 1UIH LL r E . V ° 9 . 10 . S IN K 1ANG 1 I . KA MSU 1 2 .' N J MbH S IA 1 3 . SHE MS I 1 4 . 1 S 1 M.-WA I 15 . 1 \'NFR MONGOLIA 16 . RE k iNb 17 . SHAMS I 18 . TIENTSIN 1 4 . HOPE I 2 i . FUK'IEIT"...... ' ' 2? . KI A MG S I ?3 . AN OWE I ?A. CHEKIANG 25 . R 1A\G SU 26 . SHA.VGHA I ?1 . SHANTUNG 31 . kWANGTU - l' 0 K W A:\6S 1 — / . • WON A A: ?.a . HUPF I 'A C HOMAN ...... A] . H‘- 1 LUVfe* I A.Mb f'C • K IR L IN A3 . LIAONING 61 . 1 1 F t T -• t. 0 Si! I- L hi WAN * 3 . YU NAN !r A- • KwFI CLOW 6? . KOREA tw> « 1-i.S 11 It.-il l.i;S T 77. CHNTRAL-PFKING 62 . USSR 64 . 01 HER FOREIGN COUNTR 66 . nc_ATlT MISS 8 6 . 1NAP MISS 4 4 . MISSING DATA 269 ...... TCP FI L'E...... POCUMFNT AT I DM FOR THf ? ? F VAR IAPLFS IM THF <=ILF T C P i P.EL VARIABLE VARIA8L E LABEL i s s ) :: i; PP T POS NAME VA LUES FMT 172 V 167 CHANGE IN LFVFL OF WORK: OCT IQ A fl-l 05 U fi . 0 9. 1 . NO CHANCE 3 . CP NT?. A I. TO LOCAL LOCAL TO LOCAL 7 . CFATH - r - r r r s ------P T ^crrn -rrrj—corrr MISS A . MISSING c a t a 173 V I 68 CHANGE IN LEVEL OF WORK.: OCT lo«54-P.TH CC 8 . 0 9 . 1 . NO CHANGE ? . LOCAL TO CENTRAL 3 . CFNTR.AL TO LOCAL A , Lf CAL i 0 ClXAL 7 . DEATH N I S S 8 . POSITION LOST MISS P . MISSING FATA 174 V169 CHANGE IN LEVEL OF HORN: 8TM CC-AORIL 59 8 . 0 9 . 1 . A'C' CUANGE 7 . CF M ° AL TO LOCAL A . LOCAL TC LOCAL 7 . DEATH — m+s-s A”. • pL-sm r N-isrrrr MISS o . MISS INC DATA 175 V I 70 CHAMGr- IM LEVEL OF WORK: AP9 59-JA N 6 5 P . 0 9'. 1 . NO CHANGE 2 . LOCAL TO CENTRAL • > • CENTRAL TC LOCAL *-r • LOCAL 10 LOCAL 7 . LFATH MISS 8 . POSI 7 ION LOST MI S S 9 . MISSING DATA 176 V171 IMPORTANT EVENT: 1 c;ll REVOLUTION P. 0 9 . 1 . MO 270 x c r "PILE DOCUMF NT A TION FOR TUF 22 p v a r ia b l e s in t h e f i l e 'c r o 1 RFL VARIABLE VAR IA8LF LAPEL MISSING PRT POS NAME VALl'PR p mt 176 V 1 71 CO NT M 1S S P . IMAP 1 s s c . MISSING r-A.T A 177 V 172 IMPORTANT EVENT: MAV ATI! MOVEMENT P . 0 R. 1 . NO ? • YES MISS 8 . I HA.p M IS 5 MISSING OATA " 1 7 8 ' V 173 IH r'UK TA.'TT EVL,NI: r-HASANI MbVH-iLNI INs.l >•'. d p . 1 . NO 2 . YES MISS . 1 A P MISS P. MISSING DATA 179 V I 74 IMPORTANT FVFNT: KAY ROTH 1MCIDFNT p . 0 v . 1 . NC 2 . Yc S MISS P . I:\AP MI S S v . MI SS1HG" D A 1 A 180 V17S IMPORTANT EVENT: NORTHERN EXPEDITION P. 0 p . 1 • Nit.* 2 . YES MISS 8 . I NAP MISS V . MISSING PAT A. 181 V176 IMPORTANT EVENT: NANCKANG UPRISING P. 0 p . 1 . NO ? . Y'-S MISS H. 1NAP MISS V. MISSING DATA -----18?" ■ V l 7 7 IM PuRTAN T EVENT: AUTUMN H AS Vc'ST" UPR'I S I MG'" 8 . ti 9 . 1 . NO 2 . YFS - MTS'S------■■ e ENTP------271 CCP^FTLF DOC U!•IF NT AT I ON FOR THF 23 8 VARIABLES I iV THE M L F 'COP i REL VAR 1 A ?. LE VAR 1 ABLE LABEL MIS SING P RT POS VI A. ME VALUES FMT 182 V 177 chmt M I S 9 9 . MISSING DATA ltii V 178 ■TMPTTRTATnr "EVENT! L'HING" KANGSHAN H . 0 0 . 1 . NO ?. YES ■"MIST...... ■ " f . TVAH MI S S 9 . MISSING DATA 184 VI 7 ° IMP OR TANT EVENT: CANTO: UPRISING P. 0 u 1 . NO 2 . vi-S MISS P . IMAP ■ "MI y s ' . 9 . m i s s i n g L a i A 185 V18G IMPORTANT EVENT: P IN'G-CH 1ANG UPRISING e . 0 p . 2 . YES MISS 8 . I.NAP NI S 5 9. MISSING DA T A 186 V101 IMPORTANT EVENT: FU-TIFN INCIDENT 8 . 0 1 . NO . YES MI S S F . I NAP N IS S 9 . MISSING DATA ~187' " V I 82 IM°DR TANT EVENT: UI Ei E R AriMEU UPRISINGS 8 . 0 9 . 1. NO ?. YES ■mts-s------f\ i \ a f ------MISS 9 . ill SSI MG DAT/* 18P V183 IMPORTANT EVENT: OTHFP S'lUDENT-WORKER OR o 0 L'. 1 . NO ? . YES MISS 8 . INAP "MISS' " " "9 . MIS S I Ng DAT a " 272 — ccp— t i x f DOCUMENTAT ION FOP THE 22S VAP. JAPLFS 1 N THE F1LF 'CCP ' REL VAR I'AELF VAR'. IASLE LA EE L MISSING PRT POS NAME VALUES FMT iae V 1 S 3 CONT ] P9 V ISA IMP OR TA M EVFMT: LONG MARCH n . o 9 • 1 . NO n YE S HIS c A I IMAP MISS 9 . NI S S I M'o ! 'A 1 A 190 V185 IMPORTANT FVEN T: KOREAN WAP. fi. 0 O. 1 . tvL 2 . YES MIS' 8 . I NAP MISS « . MISSING DATA 191 V 186 ARECST RELATED TO PARTY A C T IV IT Y P . 0 9 . 1 . NO ? • > 1: S "" - MISS P . IN A P MISS 9 . MISSING DATA I ' i d Vi M 1 L 1 1 SK V 1'itliJLi P . u 0. 1 . NONE ?. >‘?.MF[>AL 2 + 2 ME I,.;- L A. e 1*?.?. MEDAL A. UNSPCC1FIcD MISS P . I NAP M1 S'S V . HIS SI MG DATA 1°3 VIPS MILITARY RANK a. o 9 . 1 • NGNF n i. • SOP-GENE PAL 3 • 1 STAR 4. 2 STAR S T A r\ 4 STAR 7 MARSHAL MI S S P. 1NAP -Ki-S-S -MT-SS?T-Nr ;- M A~Tti------273 CCP-TTCP- DOCUMENTATION F 0°. THE 233 VARIABLES IN THF FILE *CCP 1 PEL VARIABLE VARIABLE LAE PL N I S S I • ■■!G rj RT POS NAME VALUES FMT : 193 VIES COM : 1 °4 V1H9 FOREIGN TRAVEL AFTER OCTOBER 19 44 P . 0 p. 1 . DONE 2. 1-3 TRIPS 3. 4-fc (RIPS A . /+ TRIPS ...... " ' H IS S H . ] N A P MIS S 9 . NilSS ING DATA ---T-Ott— — vrrrn------•[.* TV IT A TV— A1 p-^ITI r T T I1 :"r;-- 1 g-.-7-Tr. a-r — — — --- rr — oo. 11. CMDR-2ND FA l?. c o m s s f - p n p fa T37 FTT Fr=T \ rn FA------1 4. tvON KIL-2ND FA 21 . C"P9 —ATM FA C - • -rr-T^XTr-"FA"...... 24 . DUN i-lL —4TH FA 71 . CMDR-OTHER 7 2 . CliMSSP—OTHER >' . • pi • i’w—pTHFR 7 4 . 00'; MIL-OTHER 41 . CMPP-1S1 FA 4? . C.OFSSK-IST FA f. OTH-lSf hA ...... 4 4 . MIA1 M I l - I S T FA 0 6 . NONE 7 7 . C f i\TR AL HO " MISS F f > U'.AP MISS 9°. MISSING DATA 1 9 6 V191 MIL ITARY AFFILIATION: 1 « 3 7 -1 9 4 5 PP. n - -trrcr. 11. CMDR-120TH DIV 1?. CPXSSP-l 2PTH DIV 13. F-OT H—12(< T>s DIV Ttt-r-rcr ^\~vir=T:2trrH-rrrv ?1. Cyr R-12°TK DIV 22. CfSfs.-1?0TH. DIV ??. r cth - i ?« th d i v -l 'i . ■ ruN ■ IL -iym rrrnr 274 CCP~"FILE ...... "" DOCUWFNTATION FOR THE 235 VAR 1 A3 LFS 1M THF F IL F 'CCP 1 REL VARlAFLE VAR IA A L E L AFFL M I? SI NO D O J POS MAKE VALUES F M T 196 V191 COMT 2 1 . CMPR-MEW 4TH ARMY .- • in » Cr,MScp_,>-cW ATM ARMY . J • r. CTR-'IFW 4 1 1* AkhY I** • \('M MIL-KfW 41 h AP.HY 41 . |-^;|P_1 i s iiJ pi \/ 4 2 . CfKSSR-llSTM DIV M.r>. 1 l-.PTFT- 1 1 5 l H D IV 4 4 . MON’ X 1L-115TH O IV 71 . CKPR-OTHER 7 2 . C F:,v. ,c 5 F-D THC R t jj . :-LTF’-r,'lHr.-K 7 4 . ;,0Y r-'IL-CTHFR 44 . \n l e 7 7 . CPKTPAL HO HISS t'i . 1 :\ A1- MI S R 94 . MISSING DATA 147 Vto? Mil. f TAR V AF F 1L I A T 1 PM : 1 °4 S —1949 . 0 4 4 . 11 . CYD5-1ST FA 12. CC'MSSR-1 ST FA 1? . LPTH-IST FA 14 . T'TC’i n L - i S I FA 21 . Cf.DF.-SMP FA 2? . CCT.SSR-PMD FA 2 1 . hr:lH-2HD FA 2‘* . 21 . CKOR—3RD FA - 1- . C L V .S S R -? 0 FA 23 . 5r' TH-2RP FA - z. 41. CKPR-4TH FA 4?. COM?SR-41H FA 4?. K1H-4TH FA "ztztt ''i.'v KIL-<»TM FA 51 . CKPP.-5TH FA 5?. CPKSSR-5TH FA 3 4 . m t l - f i h fa 64 . MUVE 7 7 . CENTRAL HO M I S S F 2 . IMAP ------MTT ------■ ■ iji;- 275 CCP FILF DOCU PFMTATION FOR THE 235 VARIABLES IN IMF FILF 'CCP i RFL VARIAFLF VARIABLE LABEL MIF SING DRT POS N AM F V A L’J F S FMT 197 V 192 CON 7 : io n V193 TYPE OF WORK: APRIL 1959 n p . 0 -... r q' : ~ 9 9 . 1 1 . MIL CGMMANOFR ] ? . PUL COMM I S5 AR - I ’?.."'CliKMA’NI.l + ADM IN' 1A. MI L +AON I v + PARTY 1 5 . COMM I SSAr.+ AtiM IN . 1 6 . MIL MANAGEMENT IT. Ci!.1, fj- \jF. +C UMi-i I SS Ak in. m il A!>VI FOR 3 6 . WOMAN LABOR ORGANIZE 1 9 . COMMA\Pr R AND PARTY t • Wi.P rvE 5 2 ^ • PEA 5 / NT 50 . PARTY WORK+COMM1RFAR 5 9 . f l-C.A . IZ A riO M OP COOT FA, . A l_ !t IL I T A 5. t /. ‘j R PA . WCPINAL POLITICAL WO e ? . I'.IL 7 PAINING r 3 . MIL lECPNOLOGY ■M 5 • I L + P ARTV WIJkK ■ 1 "" ■ 1 2? . MONF ID E N T IF IE D 3 1 . YL'UTH ORGAN IZFR -•?— LA FOR ORGANIZE0 r ' • rtl.'M L (jF.V A.\ 11. i-.R :w • PEASANT C'F’.G AN IZ FR 3 5. UNDF P GR Dl'ND PARTY 5 1 . GENERAL PAR'lY WORK -* ' • 1LJ f L C.oY - P ? GP A\L! A 5.7 . ON 17 f-iI FRUN T WORK 5 4 . INTFKNATL LIASON . .* • INTFLLIGF.NCF-SCCURIT i- f • WE GO I 1A 1 OR ------5 2 . FORE. 1 CM AFFAIRS 5 3 . NATIONAL PLANNING 64 . SC I F.NCE— rC-CMN'PLOGY G'> • ■M-i-NTtRI TY~AF'FATR S ' — ... ~ 6 7 . AC. AN T FORESTRY 68 . INCUS TRY 69 . ECO AND FINANCE . . VHi.,vM\7flil>iH — A ll. 1! l.H_ ! 1 — c _ I ______bbu iw d s a m v A -j WVIv SO d i y ■ dlOi 311 d JHJL Nil i l l d VI a V A 322 d H i liO d n o IiviNdwnooa 31 T H H IT 9LZ 277 — c c p Fitr DOCUMENTAT IP*! F OP THE 23 « VAy 1 AIM. F. S IN THE F IL E 'CCP • REL VARIABLE VARIA3LF LAEEL KISSING PRT POS NAME VALUFS FKT 190 V19A CONT 5 3 . UN 1 TED FRONT WORK t>A. IMTP-JNATL LIASC'N ------— r-'lTEX'L ICTFTTT-S'cCURTT 5E . SC GO I [ATC? 62. FOREIGN AFFAIRS A3. N/TIPRAL PLANNING ------f Z T T C T P ; CP—"'I EC'WR'QTTTG'Y 66. NINOSITV AFFAIRS 6 7 . / G A NO FOt-FSTRY ______6P . INCUS TRY ______n1J • ru e A !\P F 11\ A\Cfc 7 1 . FIT FI ON I RAUF 7 ? . 1:0!JCA T 1 0 V-C UL TU R E 73. Ct MO AND TRANSPORT ------r-rrTl'rPTFATTT’Frni'r ST 73. PORMGN COOPERATION 7 6 . STATF ADMINISTRATOR 77 . LAv: IF. G- '.Eh AL P O LITIC A L 79. LEGISLATION H i . AC MIN ANO PARTY M IS S CL. 1 ‘ A P !■' IS S Fu . iTALi MIS S p p . M ISSING DATA 200 V195 MEM tips PEOPLE'S SUPREME COURT: APRIL 1°? F. 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . MFMEE-R 2 . DEPUTY CHIEF ...... A". CLIFF HISS P . I ’.AP MISS o . MISSING DATA 201 '■'VT95" h f M 31 R PhlTLE r S TP'PREMt CllL'KT'! "JA'T T95'> P. 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . MEMBER ■. I F PUTY""CTnTF "" A . CHIEF MISS P . I NAP MISS p. MISSING DATA 278 -- CCP-“FITE ------ PCCl'MFNTAT IOM FOR THE 728 VAR1AFLFS IN THE F IL F 'C.CP i PEL VAR IAELF VAR IASLF L A P C- L MISSING PPT POS VAME VALUES FMT 20? V197 PRAM IRR STATF COUNCIL: APRIL 1959 P.. 0 9 . 1 . NO ^ . V 1 C F F is f i'. I F n. 3 . PPFMIEP MISS P . 1V A P MI S S 9. MISS]NO CAT A A . V I C F S !-1 , — C F N k a l 5 . SFC-GEVP.AL 203 V] 98 PREMIE* STATE COUNCIL: JAV 1965 8 . 0 u 1 . NC 2 . VI CF PR T- t'i 1 E 9 2 . PR EM I CP. trt-s-':------trr—l-KfP------MISS c. Missive. DATA A . V 1 CF 5 F C -G F >!R A L S . SFC-C-F\'S Al. 204 V199 DIRECTOR STATF CnUFCl'.: APRIL 1959 F . 0 9 . 1 . .VO 2 . OF'PU T V ‘ D'TREC T OR ...... 3 . P IRFC TOR " I s s P . I MAP MIS 9 9. MISSING DATA 205 V200 . DIRECTOR STATE COUNCIL: JAN 196 5 e . 0 9 . 1 . VO OF PUTY''171 Rr C TriR ~ 2 . 01 RFC TOR MISS 8 . IN A P MIS S 9. MISSING DATA 206 V201 MFM6FR SC COMM I SSI ON: APRIL 1959 8 • 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . VFMTFF. 3 . VICF CHAIRMAN 4 . CHAIRMAN MISS fi . IV A P ------w i- ■CCP TICE DOCUKFMTAT ION FIT? THP 238 VA'J IA E L F S 1 N TH£ F IL E 'CCP i REL VAR 1AHLF VAR I A3LF LA35L MI SSI MG PR T POS MAKE VALUES FMT ! 206 V 2 01 CONT ! 207 V202 MEU5F R SC COMMISSION: JAM 1«*65 P. 0 ') . 1 . NO ? . ME M P F R 3. VICE CHAIRMAN 9 . "CHT'I'F.MA'N " ” MISS R . IMAP MISS 9 . MISSING DATA . .p..,., 2 OS ■~’V2'03" ----- MIN I S Tr -■ "S T /TP" Ll.'U I L : A | L j s H . 9 • 1 . NO 2 . VICE MINISTER ‘.i. 0 I-ECTOR 3 . MINISTER MISS n . IMAP MI S S 9 • MISSING DATA A . A r. A S S A t..; E r 209 V 204 MINISTER STATE COUNCIL: JAN 196 5 8 . 0 9 . ?. VICF MINISTER 5 . C) i " E C TGH 3. MINISTER •MT S 'S------rr;— r r A T ------MISS 9. MISSING DATA A. A Mr. ASS AD PR — 2TCT- V2TT5------rTA'TTnFTnr DEFENCE'COUNCIL:1' APR I t T9 5 9 ...... — 8 . " rr— 9 . 1 . NO 2 . KFMbFR ...... 3 . DEPUTY CHIEF A . CHIEF M1SS fi. IMAP MISS 9. MISSING DATA 211 V206 NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL: JAN 1965 8 . 0 9 . 1 . MU ------? — M r rr r R 280 CCP f i t e DOCUMENTAT 1PM FOR THE ? 33 VARIAhLFS IN THE FILF 'CCP • PEL VAR 1A ELF VAR I AnL r- LAP EL f< I s S I NO DPT POS NAME VALUES FMT 211 V 206 CONT 3 . DEPUTY CHIEF 4 . c h ie f f- I S S 1 :■! A p MISS H ' MISSING DATA 2.12 V2C.7 MINISTER NATIONAL Of:FfcNCF : APRIL 19 59 8 . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . DEPUTY C H IE F SU3-DEP •5 CHIEF SUr'-nr-PT ^ • '' V11.1 M1 I s- 1 I N A. 01 EFCTOR-5U4 Op PT 5. MINISTER MIS S o # INAP “"MIS S ...... u . <" 1 S S I I A 1 A 7 . POL COMMISSAR 213 V208 MIN I ? TE R NAT I ORAL OF FENCE S JAN 1965 H . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . riPpUTY C HI c F SU3-0EP 3 . CHIEF SUE.-0FOT 4 . VI CP M IN I SI PR"' 6 . OlRFCTnR-SUS OF PT 5 . M IN I S TE R MISS « . INAP MI s S 9 . i-,l SSIGu U p-I A 7 . POL COMMISSAR 21 4 V?C>9 MILITARY H'J : APRIL I ° 5 9 P. 0 9 . 1 . NO ?. DEPUTY COMMANDER 3 . OFPUTY COMMISSAR 11 4 . COMMA Np p p " '■ CO’-ml SSAR 6 . POL DEPT HEAD OR COS "2T5“"■ v ^ l C ' " MIL I T APT'“IRUT JA'N- 1 V6 3 8 . 0 9 . 1 . NO 2 . E P PUT Y CCMMANDFR 3 . Hi >-U 1 Y COM'-' I s Sah 281 ■ CCP FILE " ' DOCUMFNTATION FOR THE 23 P VARIARI FS IM THE F IL F »CCP 1 RFL VAP 1 A.FLE VAR 1 A *J L F L A IF L MIS SI MG PP.T POS NAME VALUES FMT 215 V210 CPNT A . COMMA NDF P. 5 . COMf.' I SSA R n • PCL PERT "H"AO"OR " CCS1" 216 V211 REG IONIA L MILITARY COMMA NO: APRIL 1959 0 . 0 9 . 1 . 2 . re p o t y co m m a n d er DEPUTY COMMISSAR A I PCL DFn T HEAD OR COS COMMA". I" h ~i 6 . COMM I S c A R 7 . CD.MMANDFP + COMMI SSAR M I S S P . IN A ° — y l S'R...... ' c' 1. T-FI'S'S-L NG' 'TEAT A 217 V21? REGIOMA L M ILITA R Y COMMAND: JAN 1965 8 . 0 9 . 1 • ? . or- PUTY C. OMR AND e r OFPUTY COMMISSAR A I PCL 0 FR T HEAD OR COS 6 . COMMA NOL R ' - - ■ 6 . COMM I 5 S A R 7 . COM M a NOER + COM MISSAR PISS P . 1M A P 1 r* 1 S"S • I 5 S 1 IM’ Oh T A 218 V213 •PROVINCIAL MILITARY COMMAND: APRIL 1959 P. . 0 9 . 1 • 2 . DEPUTY CCMNANDE.P o-• • DEPUTY COMMISSAR A. POL DEPT HEAD OR COS 5 . CO- L .A Nii E \ 6 . COMM!SS A P 7 . C D y M A M D E p + C 0 M M I S S A R MISS. 8 . I NAP MISS F • m te s icr, rrrA ■■ — - 219 V21^ PROVINCIAL MILITAPY com m and: JAN 1 °6 5 P. 0 9 . 282 CCP FTL’F" ■ DOCUMENTATION FOR THE ? 3 P VAR I ARLES IN THE P ILE 'CCP I REL VARIABLE v a r ia b l e l a b e l MIS SI MG PP.T POS NAME VALUES PMT 219 V214 CDNT ? . EEPUTY COMMANDER 3 . L-t-PUTY COMMISSAR ------rr-— L-r-i-- rre-o-T— irrr-r—i— m — rrrc ------5 . CPMMA.NDgR 6 . CP KM1 Sr A'\ 7 . c c v-M A .VPto+COMKISSAP tn-S-S------H-. 1‘; At------MISS 9. KISSING OAT A 2 2 0 V215 YFARS IN PRIMARY POSITION: a p ^ IL 19 59 PE. 0 9v . MISS E.?. INAP MISS 99. KISSING C'ATA 6 6 . DEAD " ...... " i‘7 • "PfrS'l T l l;\ LOST 221 V216 YEARS IN PRIMARY PUSIT10M: JAN 1965 PR. 0 9 9 . i • c . li.fch MISS c,9 • MISSING OAT A 66 • DEAU 7 7 . POSITION LOST 222 V217 H OF CONCURRENT PO SITIO N S: APRIL l ° 5 ° 7 . 0 R. 9 . r> • i ’t /' I f MISS 7 . POS11 IONS LOST MISS P . IMAP MISS 9 . MISSING PATA 2 2 3 V21M H OF CONCURRENT PO SITIO NS: JAN 1965 7. 0 R. 9. a . I.'t; t' 1 f MISS 7. POSITIONS LOST MISS fi. I NAP MISS P . MISSING EATA 2 24 V219 LOCALE OF WORK: APRIL 1959 CP. 0 9 9 . 10. SINK I ANG 283 C C P - FTUFT DOCUMENTAT ION FCP. THE 23ft VAR I AC RFL VAR I ABLE VAR iAPLE L A E> r- l MISSING np.T POS NAME VA LI IF S FMT ! 2 2 4 V219 CONT 12. ► MIMGMS1A 1 ?•. SHF\S 1 J . ( 5 1 r.LL A J i s . INNER. MONGOLIA 16 . PFK INC 17. SHAMS I lM . 1 1 rr M l b 1 >1 19. HO ° F I 21 . FUKIEN 22 . K. I A MGS 1 t. :> • A\HWl: 1 2 4 . CHEKIAMG 25. KIAMGSU 26. SHANG»AI /. SHAMUNG 31 . KWANGTU 32 . KwAMGSI 5 3 . HUMAN .r h . HlJL'i 1 HONAf, HE 1 LUNGKIANG . K I R L I M ■...... I 'T'A I I vn— ...... “■ 5 1 . TIRET 52 . SZ PCMwA!>! 53 . V 'JX A '>! -rr.-.— >arr 1 cr aw------6 3 * K f j P & A e t, pps i Tin\is l o s t ...... A'2 . USSR- ...... 6 4 . OTHER FOREIGN COUMTR F5. DEATH MISS S r. INAP ------M IS S' 1 99 • (-11 S S I ,\;b HA I a 225 V220 LOCALE OF WORK: JAN 196 5 RR . 0 9 ° . 1U • SI ■'IS. 1 AinG 1 1 . KANSU 12. NINCHSIA 13 . SHENSI ------k———TnTmcirnti ------284 • CCP- 'FTLF ...... PQCUMFMTAT ION FOR THE 738 VARIABLES IN THF F IL E 'CC^ i RFL VA&1A F L F VARIAE L F. L A r F L M I S S I N G PRT POS M AMP VALUFS FMT ! 225 ''2 2 0 CONT | 15. 1NNPP MONGOLIA 16. PEKING ] 7 • SHANSI IE . T 1 ENTS IN 1 0 . l :OPF I 21 . r-UK I EM 2 2 . K 1 A NO 51 2 3 . AW-OiE 1 2 4 . CHEKIANG 2 5 . KIANG5U <. 6 • s h a i j > 11 a i 7 7 . SHANTUNG 31 . *WANGTU 3? . KWAMGS1 — _ » hun av. 3*V • Hl.'PF 1 '7 u; HONAN 4) I h;: 1 LUNGK IANC- E 1 ' L I . 43 . LI AONING 51 . TIBET 6? . SZECHWAN YU SAN 54 I KWi 1C HOW ft 3 • K r y F A 66 . POSITIONS LOST 7 i . CT'MP AL^'PLKTNG" 1 ' " '" 62 . USSR 64 . UIHCP FOREIGN co u n tr FK. DEATH " Mi'S'S' 38 . MISS 0 0 . 1 SS 1 NG DATA 226 V221 CHANGF IN LFVFL OF WORK: JAN 6 5 -9 T H CC 8 . 0 -----o.' 1 . NO CHANGE 2 . LOCAL TO CENTRAL ~ • CENTRAL TO LOCAL *+ • LOCAL 10 LOCAL 7 . DEATH MISS 8 . P U S IT IU N l o s t MIS S 0 . MISSING DATA \ 285 ... C X F . DQCUMFNTA T I C!N FUR THF 23 A VAR I AfcLIS IM THF F IL F ’ CCP t REL VAPIABLF VARIABLE LABEL MISSING P p T POS NAME VALUES FMT ; 227 V222 CHANGE IN LEVEL OF WORK: 9JH C G -IO TH CC P. . 0 I 9 . > 1. Ad CHANGE 3 . CENTRAL T(j LOCAL A. LOL A L TO LOCAL 7 . OF ATM o r r s ^ ------fn-?r o rrrto rr n si ------MISS 9. Missive OAT A 22R V22? M F M 3 F 7 CC? SECRETARIAT: APRIL 1959 5 . 0 9 . 1. f.’C 2. YF S M I S c (■ . IVA P I-' I S £ 9 . M ISSIVG LA I A 229 V229 MFMBER CCP StC R Fi ARIAT: JAN 1965 P. 0 9 . 1 • 2 . YES MISS P . IV A P MIS S 9 . MISSING PAT A 2 30 V225 MFM3ER CC? OFPTR: APRIL 19?9 F . 0 9 . T . \'(J £ « CH-PUTY L IR 1: CTOR...... ?• ♦ r IF. EC TUP MISS p IMAP MISS MISSING PATA 231 V22A MEMBER CCP Df-PTS: JAK 196 5 P. 0 9 . 1 . VO ? * ■ fP T lT l ~T~ O' I MFC r CF, • » LISTCTOR MISS p . 1NAP MISS 9 . MISSING LATA 232 V227 MEMBER STHCC P C LIT .5U R L’ APR 1 1959 e. 0 9 . 1 . NO 286 —CCP"FTCF DDC UMS NT ATION FOR THE 2 33 VAR IAS LFS IN THF F IL F 'CCP 1 PEL VARIAEUP VARIABLE LAfiFL MISSING PRT POS NAME VALUES FiYT : 232 V227 CONT ! > ? . REGULAR A. ST AM' 1 VC COMMITTEE • Vll.f tHA 1v « a N A. CHA IF MAM m i s s e . I \7 P M I S S c . Ml SSI NO, DATA 233 V226 MFM3E.R PTMCC PfiL ITPURO JAM 1«65 3 . 0 1 . NO i. . i'i. i rr-hp i r- 3. REGULAR A. SI/NOING COMMITTEE 6 . VICE CM/. IP.MAV______------rr-crr,n7<-FOTi---- MISS P . I.NAP MISS o . MISSING DATA 23A" ~T7 i P7~ ■ Kt'TI u n 'A l P a !•: IV hlJK: A j SEC JAM lw&!> H . it 9 . 1 . NO ? . DEPUTY SECRETARY j. SFLFFlARY MI S S P. INAP M IS S P. MISSING DATA A . ETA MEMBER 235 V?30 PRCIVINCI AL PARTY SEC: APRIL. l ° 5 9 8 . 0 P. 1. NO 2 . I'^FF 17TY" ’ SGC R T T A R Y 3. SECkiTAPY MISS A. INAP MIS S 9 . MISSING DATA A' > i 1 A MhViotk 236 V231 PROVING IA 1. PARTY SEC:JAN 1965 0 . 0 I . Mi 2. DEPUTY SECRETARY 3 . S IC s ETAPY ' MIS S « . IMAP Mi 1 S S i -ISII a'G I.A 1 A 287 ------CCP- F i r F - PPCUMFNTATirW FOR THF ??f V/.R IAGL^S I ;.j TOP F IL P 'CCP i REL VAP. IAPLF VAR I A7LT LAPf.L v 1S SI MG p R T POS N A ME VALUES EMT 236 V231 CONT 4 . STA MEM Si g R 237 V232 P kO V I PC 1 a l C.OV I : a I- :-; 1 L Ivy V k . () p . 1 . MO 2 . M c M F: f: R 1,c PT HE Al1 OP. SG A . V IC E CHAIRMAN 5 . CHAIRMAN MISS p . m a p "M 1ST. v • !■ ■ 1 R S I NO 0 A T A 238 V233 PROVIMCI A L C-OVT: JA\' l c>65 8 . 0 P. J. . Kl! 2. MrrlRE15 ? . l.FPT P'EAfj OR SG a , V IC F C M IP. MAN _ • <.r i l i MISS F. 1\AP MI S S M M S S ING DATA ■288 Appendix C Scheme for Constructing CCP Positional Scores The purpose of constructing positional scores for the CCP elite is to make full use of positional variables which are categorical. Prom the viewpoint of location, there are four levels, namely, national, regional, provincial, and sub-provincial. Prom a functional point of view, there are six types of positions, namely, political represen tative bodies, Party, administration, military, "non-governmental" associations, and scientific, cultural, and educational associations (though not all types of positions are available at all levels). While the score assigned to each position may be regarded as arbitrary, the principle that guides the construction of scores is to render functional types of positions at the same level into comparable scale and to give differentials to the same position at different levels. I. National Level (l) Political Representative Bodies Organization Position Score People’s Political Consulative Council (1949-1954) Relegate 6 Member of National Committee 7 Member of Standing Committee 8 Secretary-General 10 Vice Chairman 12 Chairman 13 National People’s Congress Delegate 8 Member of Standing Committee 9 Secretary-General 11 Vice Chairman 13 Chairman 14 289 (2) Party Organization______Position Score Politburo Alternate Member 11 Pull Member 13 Member of Standing Committee 15 Vice Chairman 17 Chairman 19 Secretariat Member 10 Control Commission Member 8 Department Deputy Director 8 Director 10 Administration Organization Position Scort Central People's Government Council (1949~1954) Member 10 Vice Chairman 12 Chairman 14 Government Administrative Council/State Council (SC) Deputy Secretary-General 11 Secretary General 13 Vice Premier 15 Premier 17 SC Directorates Deputy Director 13 Director 15 SC Commissions Member 9 Vice Chairman 12 Chairman 14 SC Ministries Director 9 Ambassador (Foreign Ministry) 11 Vice Minister 12 Minister 14 290 Organization______Position______Score People’s Supreme Court Member 10 DeputyChief 13 Chief 15 (4) Military Organization______Position______Score CCP Military Commission Member 11 Vice Chairman 13 Chairman 15 National Defense Council Member 9 Vice Chairman 11 Chairman 13 Ministry of Defense Director, Sub-Department 7 Deputy Chief, Sub-Department/ Deputy General Chief of Staff 9 Chief, Sub-Department/ General Chief of Staff 11 Vice Minister 13 Political Commissar 14 Minister 15 Military Headquarters Head, Political Department/ Chief of Staff 8 Deputy Commander 9 Deputy Commissar 10 Commander 12 Commissar 13 (5) Scientific, Cultural, Educational, and Academic Associations Organization______Position______Score (various) Member 11 Vice Chairman 13 Chairman 15 291 (6) "Non-Governmental"Associations Organization Position Score Youth, Labor, Feasant, Women's, Trade, & Friendship Member 8 Vice Chairman 11 Chairman 13 II. Regional Level (1) Party Organization______Position______Score Regional Party Bureaus (1949-1961 & 1961-1965) Member 9 Deputy Secretary 11 Secretary 13 (2) Administration Organization______Position______Score Regional Governments (1949-1954) Member 7 Department Head/ Secretary-General 9 Vice Chairman 11 Chairman 13 (3) Military Organization______Position______Score Military Regions Head, Political Department/ Chief of Staff 8 Deputy Commander 9 Deputy Commissar 10 Commander 11 Commissar 12 Commander & Commissar 13 292 III. Provincial level (l) Party Organization ______Position Score Party Committees Member 6 Deputy Secretary e Secretary 1 0 Administration Organization Position Score Provincial Governments (1949-1966) Member 4 Department Head/ Secretary-General 6 Vice Chairman 8 Chairman IQ Revolutionary Committees Member 6 Vice Chairman 8 Chairman 10 Military Organization Position Score Provincial Military Commands Head, Political Department/ Chief of Staff 5 Deputy Commander 6 Deputy Commissar 7 Commander 8 Commissar 9 Commander & Commissar 10 "Non-Governmental" Associations Organization Position Score Youth, Labor, Feasant, & Women's Member 4 Organization Position Score Youth, Labor, Peasant, & Vice Chairman 6 Women's Chairman 8 Sub-Provincial Level (1) Party Organization Position Score Party Committees Member 3 I Deputy Secretary 4 Secretary 5 (2) Administration Organization Position Score Revolutionary Committees Member 3 Vice Chairman 5 Chairman 7 Appendix D Results of Discriminant Analyses Performed on Membership in the Central Committees of the CCP in Connection with Political Promotion Appendix D Summary Table D.l Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 7th Central Committee N A N T SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS* CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE 1 V26 12.26000 1 0.78956 0.001 12.25992 12.25992 0.0 0 0 2 V161 6.60051 2 0.68857 0 .000 20.80542 8.54550 0.003 3 TOTCEC 8.35980 3 0.57863 0.0 0 0 33.49811 12.69269 0.0 0 0 4 MANONE 3.60494 4 0.53387 0 .0 0 0 40.16255 6.66444 0.010 5 KA120TH 2.95980 5 0.49873 0 .0 0 0 46.23450 6.07195 0.014 6 MACTRL 6.15272 6 0.43365 0.0 0 0 60.07579 13.84129 0 .0 0 0 7 V12 2.31073 7 0.40997 0 .0 0 0 66.20361 6.12782 0.013 8 TOTEVET 1.15199 8 0.39820 0 .0 0 0 69.51761 3.31400 0.069 9 V13 6.87282 9 0.33721 0 .0 0 0 90.41452 20.89691 0.0 0 0 10 V15 6.60453 10 0.28614 0 .0 0 0 114.76462 24.35010 0 .000 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 1 GROUP 2 V13 12.61400 14.04819 V15 -32.47864 -37.75679 V12 5.71322 3.40849 TOTEVET 7.94628 8.46986 TOTCEC -1.14627 -1.89484 V26 6.53181 7.29522 V161 -9.02844 -10.36043 MA120TH -16.15254 -24.90057 MACTRL -19.28239 -25.93745 MANONE 6.40081 -0.61401 CONSTANT -155.22815 -182.20886 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RE1AT1VE CANONICAL s FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 295 1 2.49489 100.00 0.845 : 0 0.2861 51.303 10 0.000 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON I DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix D Summary Table D.l Continued STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS rUMC 1 ...... V13 0 .47A 26 V15 -0.32278 V 12 - 0 . 1 7 2 7 2 TOTEVET 0.12366 " TOT etc - C . 23 662 V26 0 .0 8 7 2 6 VI 61 -0.09262 MA120TH -0.2.6270 MACTRL - 0 . 7 7 8 9 3 MANONE - 0 . 5 2 2 0 2 ONSTANDARDIZEO DISCR 1M INAt'i T FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 V13 0 .2 1 2 89 V15 - 0 . 7 8 3 4 9 V12 - 0 . 3 - 2 1 2 TOTEVFT 0 .0 7 7 7 2 TOTCEC ...... - 0 . 1 1 1 1 2 V26 0 .1 1 3 3 2 V161 - 0 . 1 9 7 7 2 MA120TH -1 .20 8 56 MAC IFL —0.9 8 7 HP MANONE - 1 .0 4 1 2 8 CONSTANT —4 .0 3 4 6 3 CENTROIDS OF GROUPS IN REDUCED SPACE FUNC 1 GROUP 1 — G. 7 40 68 296 GROUP 2 0 .6 8 1 4 3 Appendix D Summary Table D.2 Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 8th Central Committee I S C R I MI N A N T SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS' CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE I CUMPOS54 53.93082 I 0.64735 0.0 0 0 53.93069 53.93069 0.0 0 0 2 V164 7.23672 2 0.60284 0.0 0 0 65.22380 11.29311 0.001 3 TOTCEC 35.94008 3 0.43986 0.0 0 0 126.07135 60.84755 0.0 0 0 4 FA1 9.58056 4 0.39995 0 .0 0 0 148.53275 22.46140 0 .0 0 0 5 V12 1.31544 5 0.39448 0 .0 0 0 151.96025 3.42751 0.064 6 V14 3.19975 6 0.38150 0 .0 0 0 160.50275 8.54250 0.003 7 V13 2.89191 7 0.36999 0 .0 0 0 168.56427 8.06152 0.005 8 V10 1.45741 8 0.36422 0.0 0 0 172.80330 4.23903 0.040 9 V15 3.09857 9 0.35223 0.0 0 0 182.05817 9.25487 0.002 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 1 GROUP 2 V10 3.88659 3.42285 V12 5.55573 5.32014 V13 3.81748 4.05945 V14 0.32935 0.19811 V15 6.43902 4.90959 TOTCEC 2.27494 1.30584 FA1 -6.25858 -2.93572 V164 -0.63005 -1.81682 CUMPOS54 0.22880 0.15494 CONSTANT -79.90269 -72.33200 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL :! FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 297 1 1.83896 100.00 0.805 :: 0 0.3522 98.605 9 0.000 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON 1 DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix D Summary Table D.2 Continued STANDARDIZED DIS CR l.M INANT FUNCTION CCFFFJC1FNTS FUNC 1 - 0 . 1 1 5 0 5 - 0 . 0 1 6 7 ? 0 . 1 07?1 _=ji..ii°je_ VI 5 —0.1 0 7 83 TOTCEC —0 .3 09 29 FA 1 0 .1 5 9 2 9 _V 16 4 ______.-0,068 7.1 ______CUMP0S54 - - 0 . 3 0 2 ?0 UNSTANOARDIZFP D IS C R IM INANT FUNCTION OPFFFTO IF V T 9 FUNC 1 JV10______= 0 .0 6 0 3 7 ______VI2 -0.03473 V13 0.03567 V14 -0.01935 _V2 5 ______-P . ? ? r-47 ______TO rC'FC -O'. 14287 FA1 0.4P986 V 16 4 —0. 1 7 a °5 _CUKPQS54______= 0 . 0 1 0 8 9 ______CONSTANT 1 .0 0 0 5 9 CFNTROros o f c r p u p <; nv RFnurpn c p aof F UN C 1 GROUP 1 - 0 ,6.7099 ______298 GROUP 2 0 .4 3 9 9 9 Appendix D Summary Table D.3 Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 9th Central Committee I S C R I MI N A N T ANAL SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS' CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE 1 CUMP0S65 189.69415 1 0.43827 0 .0 0 0 189.69429 189.69429 0.0 0 0 2 V152 7.10804 2 0.41805 0 .000 206.02303 16.32874 0.0 0 0 3 RC11AGE69 2.43178 3 0.41120 0 .000 211.91940 5.89638 0.015 4 V157 2.49533 4 0.40425 0 .000 218.11295 6.19354 0.013 5 V165 4.25635 5 0.39264 0.0 0 0 228.93379 10.82085 0.001 6 TOTCEC 24.00314 6 0.33621 0.0 0 0 292.20361 63.26982 0 .0 0 0 7 TOTEVET 6.43062 7 0.32164 0 .0 0 0 312.13940 19.93579 0 .0 0 0 8 FA1 1.36112 8 0.31857 0 .0 0 0 316.58032 4.44092 0.035 9 V14 8.24614 9 0.30084 0 .0 0 0 343.93896 27.35864 0.0 0 0 10 V15 9.16407 10 0.28224 0 .0 0 0 376.37134 32.43237 0.0 0 0 11 V13 1.47603 11 0.27925 0 .0 0 0 381.97168 5.60034 0.018 12 V10 1.44969 12 0.27633 0 .0 0 0 387.57886 5.60718 0.018 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 1 GROUP 2 V13 1.54868 1.66394 V14 -0.00100 0.22445 V10 3.99709 4.32186 V15 16.28966 20.23782 TOTEVET 3.62361 2.49281 FAX 2.15534 4.43756 TOTCEC 0.69247 -0.35967 CUMPOS65 0.04923 0.01388 V165 5.89407 4.58150 V157 3.96565 2.42927 V152 0.22247 0.12113 RCHACE69 -0.10449 -0.07378 CONSTANT -53.02371 -53.29433 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL J FUNCTIONS WILKS'S CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 299 1 2.61S82 100.00 0.851 : 0 0.2763 182.633 12 0.0 REMAING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON I DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix D Summary Table D.3 Continued " STANDARDIZED DISC k i M i .n AN i f-U.NC I ION COEFFICIENTS" FUNC 1 vis 0 .0 6 8 9 7 VIA 0 .0 6 7 4 9 V10 0 .0 5 3 3 6 VI 5 0 .1 0 1 4 6 1 til trVfc 1 - 0 ,<>6655 ” FA1 0 .0 2 324 TOTCEC - 0 . 0 8 6 2 7 CUMP0S65 - 0 .1 5 1 2 1 VlfeS -0.03B58 ” " ' ...... V 1 57 - 0 . 0 6 7 6 0 VI 5 2 - 0 . 0 4 6 7 8 RCHAC-E60 0 .0 2 3 1 1 UNSTANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUN C I------ VI? 0 .0 0 5 9 7 V I 4 0 .0 1 1 6 7 "VI0 0 .0 1 6 6 2 V I 5 0 .2 0 4 4 5 TCTEVET —0.0 5 8 56 FA1 0 .3 1 8 1 8 TOTCtL -0.05446 ...... " CUMP0S65 - 0 . 0 0 1 8 3 V 16 5 - 0 . 067Q 7 VI 57 - 0 . 0 7 9 5 6 "VI5? —0. 0 0 5 26 " ...... " RCHAGF69 0.001 59 CONSTANT —0 .20475 CFNTRCIDS OF GROUPS IN REDUCED SPACE 300 FUNC 1 GROUP 1 - 0 . 5 5 7 5 2 GROUP 2 Oil 7606 Appendix D Summary Table D.4 Differentiating the New Elite from the Old Elite in the 10th Central Committee ...... D I S C R I MINANT ANALYSI s...... SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS* CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO’S V CHANGE I V153 19.51207 1 0.88421 0.000 19.51195 19.51195 0.000 2 V158 12.46706 2 0.81551 0.000 33.70660 14.19466 0.000 3 V3I 2.84290 3 0.80004 0.000 37.23999 3.53339 0.060 4 CUMP0S69 1.15631 4 0.79375 0.000 38.71492 1.47493 0.225 5 FA4 5.93013 5 0.76257 0.000 46.39206 7.67714 0.006 6 Vll 4.67079 6 0.73861 0.000 52.73010 6.33804 0.012 7 FA3 2.46348 7 0.72610 0.000 56.20499 3.47488 0.062 8 V10 3.20392 8 0.71008 0.000 60.83492 4.62993 0.031 9 V13 3.85700 9 0.69117 0.000 66.57300 5.73808 0.017 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTIONCOEFFICIENTS GROUP 1 GROUP 2 V13 1.03272 1.09438 V10 2.64402 2.94436 Vll 5.60616 4.33132 FA3 6.69607 8.14083 FA4 4.61518 2.99892 V31 6.35672 7.12704 V158 2.43001 1.40639 V153 0.48142 0.41135 CUMPOS69 0.04032 0.03744 CONSTANT -35.74614 -36.74857 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL : FUNCTIONS WILKS * CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 1 0.44680 100.00 0.556 : 0 0.6912 53.372 9 0.000 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON I DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix D Summary Table D.4 Continued STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 - V13 0.11535 V10 0.09313 VII -0.08713 FA3 0.06702 FA4 -0.06880 V31 0.05347 V158 -0.13948 V153 -0.06665 CUMPOS69 -0.03508 UNSTANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 V13 0.00902 V10 0.04393 Vll -0.18649 FA3 0.21135 FA4 -0.23643 V31 0.11268 V158 -0.14974 V153 -0.01025 CUMPOS69 -0.00042 CONSTANT -0.07215 CENTROIDS OF GROUPS IN REDUCED SPACE 302 FUNC 1 GROUP 1 -0.08853 GROUP 2 0.23753 Appendix E Results of Discriminant Analyses Performed on Membership in the Central Committees of the CCP in Connection with Political Purge and Political Survival Appendix E Summary Table E.l Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors in the 8th Central Committee ...... - D I S C R I MI N A N T ANALYS IS...... SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS* CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RA0*S V RAO’S V CHANGE I V194 7.80142 1 0.91215 0.007 7.80142 7.80142 0.005 2 V220 4.26595 2 0.86597 0.004 12.53677 4.73534 0.030 3 CUMP0S65 2.23378 3 0.84216 0.004 15.18151 2.64474 0.104 A TOTCEC 16.52809 4 0.69491 0.000 35.56204 20.38054 0.000 5 FA I 7.55858 5 0.63279 0.000 47.00415 11.44211 0.001 6 FA7 2.53599 6 0.61236 0.000 51.27533 4.27118 0.039 7 TOTEVET 1.63344 7 0.59930 0.000 54.15604 2.88071 0.090 8 FA4 1.99319 8 0.58358 0.000 57.79651 3.64047 0.056 9 FAS 1.25737 9 0.57370 0.000 60.18710 2.39059 0.122 10 V15 1.60798 10 0.56117 0.000 63.34007 3.15297 0.076 II VIO 2.73111 11 0.54038 0.000 68.89235 5.55228 0.018 12 V5 3.16283 12 0.51702 0.000 69.74280 0.85045 0.356 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 0 GROUP 1 VIO 12.73784 12.37140 V15 83.47075 81.97023 V5 56.85394 56.90526 TOTEVET 69.26552 69.78819 TOTCEC 74.42444 74.97203 FA1 -29.64404 -32.53227 FA4 -14.54776 -16.20984 FA5 134.37964 133.05254 FA7 72.50650 73.08139 CUMPOS65 -0.74123 -0.74108 V194 14.85340 18.90669 V220 42.01881 42.27914 CONSTANT -25822.5195 -25868.6758 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL S FUNCTIONS WILKS * CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION :r DERIVED LAMBDA 1 0.86153 100.00 0.680 : 0 0.5372 46.605 12 0.000 304 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON 1 DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix E Summary Table E.l Continued STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 VIO 0 .0 6 7 8 7 V I 5 0 .0 7 6 5 4 V5 -0.03177 j TOTFVFT - 0 .OF 1 TOTCEC - 0 . 1 2 3 4 6 FA1 O .C « 7 1 5 FA4 0.07Q O 3 FA5 0 _04£6" FA7 - 0 . 0 2 7 1 7 CUMP0S65 - 0 . 0 0 0 9 9 VI 94 -0.16867 V 2 2 0 ______- 0 . 0 1 2 85. UNSTANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION CDFFFICIFNTS FUNC 1 VIO 0 .0 3 9 3 4 VI 5 0 .1 6 0 9 1 V5 - 0 . 0 0 5 7 6 TOTEVFT -0 .0*669 TOTCEC —0.0 5920 . FA1 0 .7 1 C 5 7 FA4 C .17P 7? FA5 0 .1 4 2 0 ? FA7 - 0 . 0 6 2 1 ? . CUMP0S65. - 0 .0 0 0 0 1 V I 94 -C .6 8 5 6 ° V220 - 0 . 0 2 8 1 6 CONSTANT 5 .1 7 0 7 6 CFNTROIDS OF GROUPS IN RFOUCFD SPACF FUNC 1 305 GROUP 0 0 . 1 5 6 2 4 GROUP-______1____ — 0.21429- Appendix E Summary Table E.2 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 8th Central Committee CRIMINANT ANAL SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS' CHANGE IN- SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE 1 V220 4.15799 1 0.87460 ' 0.048 4.15773 4.15773 0.041 2 V194 2.89656 2 0.79261 0.038 7.58784 3.43011 0.064 3 V2I8 1.43602 3 0.75258 0.049 9.53374 1.94590 0.163 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 0 GROUP 1 V194 0.20984 2.10400 V218 3.14760 2.56004 V220 11.87705 15.58894 CONSTANT -9.86633 -11.70552 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL : FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 1 0.32876 100.00 0.497 : 0 0.7526 7.817 3 0.050 REMAINING COMMUPTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON I DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS CENTROIDS OF GROUPS IN REDUCED SPACE FUNC 1 V194 0.48126 V218 •0.36427 GROUP 0 -0.58899 V220 0.62996 GROUP I 0.32395 UNSTANDARDIZEDDISCRIMINANT COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 V194 1.28720 306 V218 -0.39929 V220 2.52255 CONSTANT -1.38243 Appendix E Summary Table E.3 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the New Elite in the 8th Central Committee ------DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS’ CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE 1 V194 6.34354 I 0.88741 0.014 6.34354 6.34354 0.012 2 RACHGE65 1.46433 2 0.86166 0.025 8.02734 1.68360 0.194 3 CUMPOS65 1.75787 3 0.83122 0.029 10.15192 2.12458 0.145 4 FA7 5.91488 4 0.73831 0.006 17.72189 7.56998 0.006 5 TOTEVET 5.75897 5 0.65616 0.002 26.20024 8.47835 0.004 6 Vll 2.20525 6 0.62551 0.001 29.93445 3.73421 0.053 7 FA2 1.86780 7 0.60003 0.002 33.32761 3.39316 0.065 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 0 GROUP 1 Vll 2.62677 1.31336 TOTEVET 1.22014 2.15019 FA2 1.55363 3.11716 FA7 3.21934 6.77764 RCHAGE65 -0.04124 0.06079 CUMPOS65 0.05029 0.02204 V194 2.58573 6.02620 CONSTANT -5.42389 -8.02439 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL : FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 1 0.66656 100.00 0.632 : 0 0.6000 23.750 7 0.001 307 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON X DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix E Summary Table E.3 Continued SI ANPARbl iED DiS (LK1MI WAR I PUN Cl 11)15 CUUF'PILI blil S r UNC 1 Vll -I-/ ^!-4 TOTEVET 0 .13B6 9 FA2 0.073 AC FA7 0 .167*9 RCh a ut-6 2 0 * £. P 11 L CUMPOS6 5 -G.2 1 7 1 E VI94 0 .1AR9 1 UNSTANURPIZED p 1SCK.I MI 1 ANT FUNCTION COF.FFICIEMTS F UJC 1 Vll -0 .1620 3 TOTEVET 0.11474 FA2 C- . 142 8 9 Fa ( RCHAGE6 5 0 .012 i 9 CUKPOSAE- -0 .CCJh F Vl^A i- . h 24 4 a CENTROIPS OF GROUPS IN REDUCE0 SPACE FUNC 1 GROUP 0 -0 .11112 ! GROUP J 0.274 10 308 Appendix E Summary Table E.4 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors in the 9th Central Committee ...... DISCRIMINANTANALYSIS------SUMMARYTABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS' CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE 1 V30 14.80966 1 0.90303 0.000 14.80948 14.80948 0.000 2 WCHACE69 9.93455 2 0.84202 0.000 25.69044 11.08096 0.001 3 V165 3.16645 3 0.82287 0.000 29.70604 3.81560 0.051 4 CUMPOS69 4.34172 4 0.79723 0.000 35,09935 5.39331 0.020 5 RCHAGE69 4.71485 5 0.77013 0.000 41.18929 6.08994 0.014 6 V22I 1.73311 6 0.76022 0.000 43.52437 2.33508 0.126 7 FA4 2.39332 7 0.74668 0.000 46.81551 3.29114 0.070 8 FA3 1.16566 8 0.74010 0.000 48.46010 1.64459 0.200 9 VIO 2.55656 9 0.72582 0.000 52.12694 3.66684 0.056 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 0 GROUP 1 VIO 1.16469 1.40853 FA3 -0.91250 0.06686 FA4 0.74666 -0.23297 CUMPOS69 -0.02132 -0.01245 V30 1.70225 0.66804 V165 0.91631 -0.95478 WCHAGE69 3.83612 -1.64982 RCHAGE69 0.15519 0.10737 V221 -0.25301 -1.55342 CONSTANT -4.83238 -3.60435 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL ; FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION :r DERIVED LAMBDA 1 0.37773 100.00 0.524 : 0 0.7258 42.779 9 0.000 309 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON 1 DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix E Summary Table E.4 Continued STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 ViO 0 .C446G FA? C .0 2 5 4 2 F A4 - 0 .0 3 4 7 9 CUKP0S6O O .0 7 6 6 6 V30 - 0 . 0 4 7 3 5 V165 . -0 .08500 KC.HA GE6 ° -C .C ° 4 4 G RCHAGrftQ -O .06Q61 V221 - 0 . 0 4 3 8 8 UNSTAr.DAROIl ED D TSCRI M TKANT FUNCTION COFFFTO TFNTS FUNC 1 ViO 0 . 0 3 - 6 7 FA? 0 . C504-9 FA4 -0.090?] CUKP0S69 n . 0 0 0 P. 7 V30 —0 . O o 6 *- 6. V i 65 —0 .17 2 F P WCHAGE69 -G .5 0 6 8 8 RCHAGF.69 - 0 . 0 0 4 4 ? CONSTANT 0 .0 5 7 8 8 CFNTROIPS OF GROUPS IN RFPUC.FD SPAfF F UNC 1 __ GROUP O - 0 . 1 5 5 3 7 310 GROUP 1 0 . 0 4 4 1 9 Appendix E Summary Table E.5 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the Old Elite in the 9th Central Committee DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS1 CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA SIG. RAO'S V RAO'S V CHANGE 1 V22I 12.65623 1 0.70330 0.002 12.65624 12.65624 0.000 2 V152 11.20468 2 0.50729 0.000 29.13721 16.48097 0.000 3 RCHAGE69 3.62128 3 0.44920 0.000 36.78554 7.64833 0,006 4 WCHAGE69 1.32065 4 0.42825 0.000 40.05219 3.26665 0.071 5 FA4 4.02090 5 0.37089 0.000 50.88567 10.83348 0.001 CLASSIFICATION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 0 GROUP 1 FA4 4.82383 0.06647 V152 0.30295 0.13414 KCHAGE69 9.47190 1.86880 RCHAGES9 0.18023 0.10540 V221 14.43783 4.26590 CONSTANT -12.37110 -2.30759 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL :r FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 1 1.69619 100.00 0.793 : 0 0.3709 27.276 5 0.000 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON I DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix E Summary Table E.5 Continued STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS FUNC 1 FAA 0 .3 2 3 3 A V I 52 G . AAR DA. WCHAGF69 0 . 2 9 7 63 “ RChA GE69 C .2A 6FF V221 0 . 6 ? °7 2 • • * ...... UWi 1 ANL* AfNUl L L-II lU SLK JM IN AN I hUNCUUN CUfc l-P IC IE N 1S FUNC 1 FAA 0 • ;* /6 3 I- V I 52 0 .0 3 1 1C KCHAGE69 1 .Aonf-. l RCHAGE6 9 0 .O 1 3 T 9 V221 J • !-■ / A i 1.1 CONSTANT -1 .2531 A CENTROIDS' OF" GRlJUHS IN REDUCED SHACfc F UNO 1 GRIiuh I) 1 .5 6 2 5 5 GROUP 1 - 0 . 3 6 0 5 9 Appendix E Summary E.6 Differentiating the Purged from the Survivors of the New Elite in the 9th Central Committee ...... DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS------ SUMMARY TABLE STEP VARIABLE F TO ENTER NUMBER WILKS’ CHANGE IN SIG. OF NUMBER ENTERED REMOVED OR REMOVE INCLUDED LAMBDA S1G. RAO’S V RAO’S V CHANGE 1 V30 12.63869 1 0.89347 0.001 12.63862 12.63862 0.000 2 WCHAGE69 6.70672 2 0.83983 0.000 20.21642 7.57780 0.006 3 V165 4.52395 3 0.80482 0.000 25.70665 5.49023 0.019 4 V152 6.66185 4 0.75593 0.000 34.22481 8.51816 0.004 5 FA6 4.35220 5 0.72499 0.000 40.20795 5.98314 0.014 6 FAS 1.12503 6 0.71700 0.000 41.83669 1.62874 0.202 CLASSIFICATIONFUNCTION COEFFICIENTS GROUP 0 GROUP 1 FA5 1.89450 0.79555 FA6 3.46424 -2.84536 V30 3.31809 0.86468 V165 2.45281 0.54288 V152 -0.03904 0.16310 WCHAGE69 4.26678 0.67954 CONSTANT -2.12665 -0.62315 DISCRIMINANT EIGENVALUE RELATIVE CANONICAL : FUNCTIONS WILKS' CHI-SQUARE DF SIGNIFICANCE FUNCTION PERCENTAGE CORRELATION : DERIVED LAMBDA 1 0.39469 100.00 0.532 : 0 0.7170 34.265 6 0.000 REMAINING COMPUTATIONS WILL BE BASED ON I DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION (S) Appendix E Summary Table E.6 Continued STANDAR'PTZ'EO" 'DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS'- " FUNC 1 FA5 11 .!• FA6 0.14463 V30 0.2903 5> V165 0.2C474 VI b l -u I; J WCHA CE64 0.16219 ~UN'STANrrA"ROTTEDnr> T SC RTMI Mi&'NI FUN CTT ON- CC'TFF ICIENTS------FUNC 1 C .,'61 !'• FA6 1.503 0° V30 0 . 5 P 4 4 6 V16 5 0.45499 Vi b tL -O . ( i4P 1 5 WCHAGE69 C .P34 5fc c o n s t a n t -c .21PPP CFNTROIDS OF GROUPS IN RFPUCED SPACF FUNC 1 GROUP 0 0 .30Pf>6 GROUP 1 -0.12P0P 314