SURVEY OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES

concerning CIVIL DEFENSE

A REPORT OF A NATIONAL STUDY

IN MARCH, 1954

by

Stephen li. Wiiliey Survey Research Center

Institute for Social Research University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan

September, 1954 4th SURVEY OF

PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES concerning CIVIL DEFENSE

A REPORT OF A NATIONAL STUDY

IN MARCH, 1954

by

Stephen B. Withey

Survey Research Center

Institute for Social Research University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan

September, 1954 FOREWORD

This is a report of a national study conducted in March, 1954.

It also includes material from a number of other studies that is helpful in understanding people's present attitudes toward civil defense.

The climate of opinions, expectations and level of infor• mation related to civil defense is presented in this report along with the public's knowledge of certain recent and current de• velopments in the area.

The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan has, since 1946, conducted several studies that cover the re• actions of people to the threat of war. Though the early studies were focused on the prospects for war or peace and the prob• lems of international affairs, the studies since 1950 have been directly focused on the problems of civil defense. These studies, four in number, were sponsored by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. It is the last of these that is given greatest emphasis in this report.

The general findings of this report indicate that, while progress has been achieved in many areas, one cannot say that the whole frontier of preparedness has been pushed forward. There are still areas in which misinformation is prevalent and there are developments in preparedness that are not well known by the public.

But, there is a clearly discernable increase in interest in the topic of civil defense. Interviewers, most of whom had worked on other civil defense studies, reported that respondents were more interested in -the study than previously. Respondents asked more questions and some contacted local authorities, after the interview, for information on civil defense. These things had been exceedingly rare on the first studies for the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

iii The reader of many of the interviews comes away with the impression that the public is not at all disdainful of the topic. People are not necessarily accepting civil defense but they are more adjusted to living in a world with nuclear weap• ons. They are not as fearful as they once were but they still evidence considerable concern. They do not expect war as imminently as they did two or three years ago. Nevertheless, they do report interest in preparedness and defense information. They want help, but there is no lessening in the usual time in• volving commitments and competing interests that restrict vol• untary attempts to get information and severely hamper personal participation in local efforts.

Although knowledge of the existence of nuclear weapons and their effects has grown, the information that is held is not very detailed or sophisticated. People have difficulty saying what they would like to know but they do pay attention to what they feel is significant and authoritative information. About seven in ten know something about the Nevada tests in the sum• mer of 1953. This is seven in ten out of adults in the nation, adults in cities or adults in the rural areas. It held the country's attention.

This report deals with matters of this kind. The public's opinions on the power of modern nuclear weapons is given. People's estimates of how many planes would get through on a bombing attack are reported. The climate of war expectancy is traced for nine years. But most of all, the report outlines the attitudes that are closely and intimately tied up with civil defense itself and the public's information and ideas about local and personal protection.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword iii

Chapter 1 Some Psychological Factors in

Civil Defense 1

2 Strategy of the Surveys on Civil Defense . . 10

3 Background to Civil Defense , 44

4 Current Climate for Civil Defense 54

5 Civil Defense Information 79

6 Community Civil Defense 93

7 In Case of Attack. . . ? 108

8 Particular Groups 135

Appendix Al: Miscellaneous Tables 141

A2: Bibliography and References 169

v Chapter 1

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN CIVIL DEFENSE

The scope of civil defense is staggering. In the basic leg• islation the term means "all those activities and measures de• signed or undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the civil• ian population caused or which would be caused by an attack upon the United States, (2) to deal with the immediate emerg• ency conditions which would be created by any such attack, and (3) to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency res• toration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack."!

It is little wonder that members of Project East River** en• tertained, at first, (a combined project examining the problems of civil defense) an almost universal and typical reaction - a feeling of being overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of a prob• lem so large, so complex, and so seemingly impossible of ade• quate and practical solution. They saw manageability as the crux of the problem. As a result the concept of manageability was basic to the approach of Project East River and was re• flected throughout the structure and content of the report. 2

When the effort is to avoid, minimize, and/or, recover from an attack causing widespread death and material destruc• tion, the initial steps that seem to be required are not psycho• logical. People's attitudes or information do not stop a bomber in flight or turn a bomb into a dud. One rather thinks of the performance of the military in providing an early warning, the efficiency of the military in reducing the intensity of an attack, the reduction of target vulnerability through spacing and con• struction standards, the stockpiling of needed materials for medical treatment, emergency housing, feeding, and so forth. These are matters of legislative, administrative, organizational and logistical preparedness.

^Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Public Law 920 - 81st Congress. 2General Report. Part I of the Report of Project East River, Oct., 1952. Associated Universities Inc., New York, N.Y. 1 Many of these technical matters have psychological aspects. The distinctive feature, however, of the civil defense effort is that, if civil defense is to work, the preparedness must have worked its way down to individuals and groups of individuals. Survival is still to a large extent a matter of individual behav• ior during the period of crisis and danger even when warning, direction and a certain amount of defense and protection are provided. The effective execution of the best plans and the efficient use of the most ample resources can be materially reduced if the populace, at large, does not carry out the most adaptive behavior possible during the time of disaster. Civil defense thus requires a program of information, guidance, edu• cation and training that results in motivation, insight, confi• dence and skill on the part of the public in carrying out its assigned task.

Even taking just this psychological point of view, the scope of civil defense is still staggering. It requires that to a cer• tain extent people must live with uncertainty. It means that they must prepare for a day that may never come. It involves the difficult approach of facing the unwelcome possibility of widespread destruction, with the remedial and protective steps offered seeming, in many minds, to be of questionable efficacy.

The psychological problems that are raised in the current and extended period of preparedness differ sharply from those that arise and will arise in a time of disaster and these in turn are not the same problems that arise during the lengthy period of recovery and reconstruction.

Before a disaster occurs and when its probability is inde• terminate it is extremely difficult to motivate and involve peo• ple in the problems of surviving it. When the possible disaster also has the magnitude of an atomic attack with the probable purpose of "knocking out" a nation, people begin to discount the feasability of any defense or protection other than a mounted, military defense.

When the disaster is imminent, however, these cease to be problems. Involvement is unavoidable and even the slimmest chance of survival is worth trying.

Since the prime focus of civil defense is on what might be called a really major diasater, it might be worth while to

2 consider those psychological experiences that are certain to occur. One of the tasks of preparedness is to take steps, in so far as is possible, to channel crisis behaviors into adaptive and constructive areas.

In any disaster fear is going to be felt. It can occur be• fore, during and after the disaster impact itself. Danger is an exceptionally strong stimulus which inevitably leads to an emo• tionally intense response. If the threat is exceptionally intense as in a "near miss," as many incidents in World War II showed, the response can be uncontrollable. If the danger is real and repeated a person develops an increasing sensitivity to the threatening aspects and anxiety increases. If the danger does not seem real or the threat does not materialize then a person adapts or gets used to the danger and feels considerably less threatened. "Wolf, Wolf" cries of impending danger lead to this sort of adaptation as does the learning of any habitual re• sponse.

Even though the reaction behavior is emotionally laden it can still be adaptive or maladaptive depending on the situation in which it occurs. If the stimulus of danger is too strong, if the escape behavior that is started is blocked, if there is no insight into any means of escape, if there is no guidance or in• formation to direct one towards a means of escape, or if there is insufficient ability to negotiate the avenue of escape, then the behavior is likely to become disorganized and something resembling what is called panic behavior. This can occur in an individual or in a group but since the action of others itself carries information, guidance and suggestion it is especially likely to be contagious in a group of people.

But panic is comparatively rare. It requires very special circumstances for its occurence. The time of threat is the period in which panic would be most likely to develop. Apathy, shock, daze, dejection, anger and stupefaction--these are the more probable reactions when the disaster is sudden and unan• nounced.

Though behavior in time of an emergency is hard for any• one to predict, it is interesting that the majority of the Ameri• can public do not think that they would run or flee if an atomic attack threatened. This choice is strongly influenced by ideas of the available time between warning and attack, but the

3 prevailing expectancy is to go into some handy and available shelter and then wait it out. Ideas about evacuation are, how• ever, getting greater acceptance when one compares current ideas with those reported two years ago.

It is also inevitable that there will be a great amount of uncertainty and doubt. This feeling usually gives rise, espe• cially when accompanied by fear, to a certain amount of anxiety. It is usually impossible to grasp all the significant features of a disaster, let alone the small human details of such a catas• trophe. In many circumstances one cannot even be certain of one's own continued safety. Added to this is the uncertainty about the nature of the danger, what is going to happen and what has happened to one's family, friends, possessions, etc. Hudson^ reports that the individual's inability to arrive at an acceptable and meaningful interpretation of the events is signifi• cantly related to the arousal of anxiety: the more confused his hypothesis, the greater his anxiety (r-.48,N-62).

This climate of uncertainty with an increase in communica• tiveness, is the one in which rumor grows rapidly. Even with• out rumor it leads to a hoard of individual ideas as to what is going on and hundreds of hypotheses about what is going to happen and an equal number of different behaviors—each making individual sense. Marks and Fritz^write that it is not the ir• rationality or maladaptiveness of individual behavior that raises the major control and logistic problems in disasters; rather it is the lack of coordination among the large number of actors who are acting on the basis of relatively private definitions. The restoration of organized, concerted behavior requires the reestablishment of the channels of communication and the sub• stitution of a common or collective definition for the multitude of private definitions.

The data in this report indicate that, currently, for the public, there is considerable uncertainty about weapons effects, especially the phenomenon of radiation. It crops up again and again in respondents' reports of dangers and is mentioned by a large portion of the population. Also, there is considerable

3Hudson, B.B., "Behavior in Response to Perception of Threat," Dis• aster Research Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1954. 4Marks,E.S. & Fritz, C. "NORC Disaster Studies," Disaster Research Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1954.

4 lack of information or insight into what people can or should do after a bombing attack. Uncertainty, doubt and rumor are almost sure to be common at such a time.

Identifications are feelings that we carry with us continu• ously. There are people and things outside of ourselves that are virtually as much a part of us and our lives as our own bodies. A threat to them is a threat to us. If there were a warning of an atomic attack, according to the replies of re• spondents in metropolitan areas, one third of them would im• mediately try to get to their families to insure their safety and to be with them. Excluding children at school, the head of the household would be away from home on a weekday in only about 70 per cent of homes, so that this getting together of families who are in fact separated is really applicable to half of the families that are already not close together.

In times of danger this feeling becomes strong and demand• ing. It leads to behaviors of sacrificial rescue. It results in frantic efforts to get information. It results, too, in poorly directed, if not disorganized, activity till the uncertainty and doubt about safety is removed.

Although one identifies most strongly with certain closely related objects and people, a broader identification can also be found in studies of disasters.5 There is a general breakdown in social barriers. The danger seems to place all people on a common base and previously strong barriers are temporarily disregarded in the common peril. During the period of recon• struction and recovery these barriers are established with ac• companying psychological problems.

In times of crisis one's responsibility and duty are often not clear. It is then that habitual and lifelong roles have their greatest strength. It has been noted in disaster studies that many clergyman, doctors, firemen, etc. are less disorganized, less emotionally upset and so forth, simply because their duty is clear, their role is needed and their behavior is known, practiced and prescribed. Admonitions and temporary training do not operate with the force that these deeper ingrained habits achieve.

5University of Oklahoma Research Institute "A Study of the Effect of Catastrophe on Social Disorganization. RESTRICTED Washington, Opera• tions Research Office (1950) Declassified.

5 Danger is nearly always frustrating, although in mild doses it has an attraction of its own. When accompanied by loss the reactions of aggression and anger are frequent. Studies of dis• asters have found frequent expressions of aggression by people and a feeling that blame should be placed somewhere. The Strategic Bombing Surveys® found that the victims of bombings in Germany and Japan tended to blame their own governments much more than they did the Americans or others who were actually doing the bombing. This is extremely important for the government of a nation that is under attack. There is little evidence that bombing in any way improved morale. The uni• fied effort demanded in time of war did build up morale but di• rect attacks did not seem to contribute to it.

The vicarious experience of danger has its own enticements. There is bound to be a certain amount of curiosity. Sightseers are a necessary accompaniment of a diaster. This is built up by a lack of information about actual events and results and also by the realism that accompanies actual witnessing of a disaster area-with the emotions that follow such realism. For many on the periphery of a disaster, there is genuine concern and anxiety over developments and they move in with the curi• ous to the disaster-struck area.

Though these feelings and emotions cannot be eliminated from a disaster experience, one can take steps in advance of a disaster and during its onset to minimize their disruptive force or to channel them into constructive channels or, if one must, to cope with them by restriction and containment. The point in preparedness is to tackle the correct problems in advance.

This may not be hard in small disasters or in terms of individual preparedness but pre-planning for a whole population involved in atomic attack can be very difficult. Many factors are completely unpredictable in such a major catastrophe. The report of Jams'' indicates that individual reaction to atomic bombing was not very different from individual reactions to any

6USSBS, Morale Division. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japa• nese Morale., Washington, D.C, U.S. Govt. Printing Office (1946). USSBS, Morale Division. The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale, Vol. I, Washington, D.C, U.S. Govt. Printing Office (1947).

^Janis, I. L., Air War and Emotional Stress. Rand Corporation Report R-212, June 1951.

6 other large disaster. But, when one is planning informational efforts, logistical preparedness, services readiness and so forth, the following factors may compound the difficulty of the predictions one must make.

1. Past experience. In a tornado, mining diaster or flood the community often has some experience with similar, previ• ous disasters. For America a bombing attack has no precedent and an attack with atomic weapons has been experienced only by a comparatively few people in Japan. However, one can add that people who went through bombings in the last war had never been through such experiences before.

2. Duration of warning time. Many disasters can be pre• dicted. Flood waters usually provide a substantial interval of time during which protective measures can be taken. An at• tack on the United States, theoretically at least, need not be a complete surprise. However, the time of warning is a matter that is in the hands of the military. What is done with and for the public during the available time is, however, of tre• mendous significance for civil defense,

3. Duration of crisis or danger. Civil defense measures and the reactions of the public will vary with the length of the danger period. A lengthy and continued attack, a period of fire-storms, or lingering after-effects intensify the problem.

4. The location of the attack. The problems that arise wiU vary according to what area is hit. Densely populated, urban areas will have problems that are different from open suburban areas or less populated small towns. Also, the avail• ability of avenues of exit or approach will alter the task of rescue or escape. The data in this survey indicates that resi• dents in metropolitan suburbs are far and away better prepared to handle such a situation than the residents of the nearby metropolitan area. Even their preparedness is probably insuf• ficient however.

5. Size and nature of attack. If the attack involves a multi• ple drop or the use of high-energy weapons such as the hydrogen bomb or the use of auxiliary, unconventional weapons the task becomes more complex.

6. The timing of an attack. The unpredictable element of

7 timing can make a material difference in the type of problem that is raised for civil defense. A nighttime or a daytime at• tack, or one on a weekday as against a weekend day, present problems that are both similar and different. Some material on these differences is presented in this report.

7. The nature of effects. These are of course related to the type of attack and the location and type of target. How• ever, the occurrence of fire, extreme disorganization, break• down of leadership and the multitude of incidents that tangle and snarl the execution of laid plans further complicate the problems that are immediately raised.

The certainty of some incidence of the psychological fac• tors mentioned and the uncertainty of many characteristics of the possible, future disaster make the task of civil defense a difficult one. However, one can focus one's attention on cer• tain psychological factors that have importance no matter what the nature of the disaster. Further it might be said that some attention must be given these factors if civil defense is going to work at all, either now, during the stage of prepared• ness, or in some distant time during the stage of crisis.

No civil defense activity is likely unless there is knowledge that a danger exists. For the present this is as much a mat• ter of warning as in the pre-attack phase when the warning takes on a siren note and becomes a more precise and direc• tive signal of imminent danger. Now, in any case, the sensi• tivity to present danger can be measured.

It is not enough, however, to know that some danger exists. To add uncertainty to threat—uncertainty regarding how and in what vehicle danger is approaching—is to develop an intolerable condition impossible to handle. As far as an atomic attack is concerned, awareness of danger is measured by the degree of specificity in knowledge about atomic weapons' effects. The question to ask is: Is there a clear idea of what the danger would be? And then the question: Is this a realistic expect• ancy?

To leave the situation there would be to create tremendous . anxieties which people would try to suppress or rationalize away. Once having developed or created this sensitivity to threat, it is important that people become convinced that there

8 is some way of escape and also that this way has a fair prob• ability of being traveled to safety. Civil Defense information falls in this area of preparedness.

Such information has intrinsic value of its own but its worth in time of crisis is considerably enhanced to the extent that there is some practiced ability in the use of these protective measures. Scanty practice will not guarantee the occurrence of future behavior under crisis but it will increase the proba• bility of its occurrence.

For many the idea of an atomic attack on the United States has little more reality than the sudden melting of the polar ice caps. For that reason there is little motivation to carry out the preparations and behaviors that may be seen as necessary from a purely rational and intellectual point of view. If the danger were intensified in a convincing manner and the pro• cedures for defense had the merit of apparent effectiveness, then the motivations for activity and involvement would be greater. But, they would be so only if the necessary activity were seen as clearly requiring the individual himself. So much of civil defense is seen as outside of the behaviors of minor individuals and, for some, personal protection seems so very ineffective.

9 Chapter 2

STRATEGY OF THE SURVEYS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Surveys, using the term in a specific, technical sense, are a practical, method for gathering accurate information about the knowledge, feelings, attitudes, expectancies and experiences of the public as a whole. A census is too expensive and slow so one has to devise some easier and cheaper procedure that will give the same sort of information. As developed and improved during the last 15 years, surveys—if the best techniques are used—constitute a good measure of these aspects of people's reaction.

Interview and Questionnaire.

Initially, it is important that the survey should be designed so that it answers the questions that need answering. This may sound obvious, but there are often great difficulties in de• fining exactly the objectives of a projected study. The appetite for information is sometimes so great that it is difficult to narrow the survey goals down to workable proportions. At other times the problems giving rise to the need for a survey are so vague that it is difficult to define the survey task with clarity. Like testimony in court, the evidence from a survey must bear directly on the case; and, to carry the simile fur• ther, the charge must be clear and the witnesses credible.

Whatever the survey goals, they have to be specified so that they can be achieved within the limits of staff, budget and time available. A survey is a complicated, integrated, admin• istrative operation. For instance, about 125 people, not count• ing respondents, were involved in one phase or another of the survey reported here. The entire operation took about eight months. Travel, mounting up into thousands of miles, was required before all the chosen respondents were contacted.

Once the goals for such a task are determined it is im• portant that the right kind of questions be asked to meet the

10 set specifications. This is a matter of skill, competence, and knowledge from long experience in designing questions. It is also a matter of 'best guess' as to what items should be cov• ered. No one knows in advance how rewarding certain areas of questioning will be.--For instance, the problem of arousing people to the needs of civil defense—may be well known and it may be well specified, as "What are the attitudes regarding war expectancy of people who feel a need for civil defense?" Yet answers in this area of questioning may not show any relation at all between feelings of imminent war and enthusiastic support for civil defense, and we are left with the problem still un• answered.

Psychological theory, to a certain extent, suggests the areas that might be most rewarding in such an investigation. An important part in the determination of question content is also played by the needs of operating personnel for information on specific topics which are part of their program.

Even though the areas for study are well chosen and well defined it is of crucial importance to ask these questions in a manner that will lead to responses that in fact express the feelings and attitudes of the people interviewed. This is a matter that calls for technical competence and experience. The wording and sequence of questions are important and the inter• viewing procedure itself has a big influence on the quality of results. Certain principles have been developed that reduce ambiguity and misunderstanding, or the suggesting of answers not the respondent's own. Adherence to these principles in• creases the confidence one can place in the findings.

The interviewing procedures and the questions asked should be such that the respondent feels he can answer frankly and clearly.

Procedures and questions are designed so that the respond• ent has to get the answers out of his or her own head rather than from the ideas of the questioner.

A choice of answers is provided only when one can be sure that the items suggested are not outside the ken of the individ• ual respondent.

Questions and probes such as "How do you mean?" or "Can

11 you tell me more about that?" are worded in such a fashion that the frame of reference of the respondent is fairly clear and interpretive misunderstanding is avoided.

Interviews are recorded as close to verbatim as' possible so that judgments of meaning do not have to be made in a snap fashion and unrelated to answers in other parts of the interview.

These and other principles become the rules for question• naire design and interviewing procedure. Words are tricky things. They can have a variety of meanings. It is important for the analyst not to stake his interpretive judgment on too scanty evidence. For this reason a survey should have fairly lengthy answers to questions on which there might be any am• biguity, to make sure that the question is understood and to be confident that the respondent's meaning is correctly conveyed. A simple check mark or a few words or sometimes even a single question do not provide this freedom in interpretation. These goals are achieved by having questionnaires that are not short, that cover several aspects of the central problem being investigated and that require full answers from the respondents, in which they have to present their own, self-structured feelings and attitudes or reproduce the information that they say they have.

No matter what one's skill and experience it is still danger• ous to use a survey questionnaire without thoroughly testing it out on enough people to insure the workability of the research instrument. A question may seem plain enough to a researcher but for one reason or another it may juBt not work well. It has a word that is not well understood or it uses an idea that is hard to grasp in a hurry or it poses a situation which is foreign to many people and they reject it. The reason a ques• tion doesn't seem to work well may not even be known but a' thorough test of its usability will provide insurance against mis• takes.

Sample

These efforts to get a really true expression of people's attitudes and opinions would be wasted if the sample of respond• ents did not represent the total population that one thought one wasy studying. In this case the population is people 16 years of age and above in the United States, excluding institutionalized

12 persons and those not living in private homes. Our sample was approximately 1600 persons.

Part of the strategy in planning a sample is to devise one that is accurate enough for the purposes to which it is going to be put. If one use is administrative decision the results don't have to be exact but accurate enough to be a firm base for policy. Economy suggests that no more accuracy be paid for than is actually, needed.

Those unfamiliar with sampling procedures frequently re• gard a sample of this size as inadequate. A mathematical proof of adequacy, though available, is too academic and techni• cal to be duplicated here. Instead we outline the procedures involved in the selection of a sample and point up the validity and stability of such samples in empirical findings.

Because one uses samples, results will differ from survey to survey and vary from the census figure. If one asks a sam• ple of, say, one thousand people to give their age, the distri• bution of people in various age groups will not be exactly the same as that obtained in a census. Also, if one does the same thing with another sample of one thousand the results will not be the same as either the previous sample or the census. These differences, due to the fact that one is using a sample and not a census, are termed "sampling error." It is not really error, it is instead the range of possible discrepancy.

One can think of one thousand people, who, if they reported their ages, would not be at all like the distribution for the na• tion. It is not at all hard to contact or locate one thousand people whose ages would not form the same distribution as census results. But, if the procedures, about to be described, are followed, one can state the chances under which the results could be way off. One can also state how far off they could be at various levels of chance.

Thus, although no one can be sure that the results from a survey are absolutely correct, one can say that within these stated limits or tolerances the chances of their being correct are as good as many chances that we stake our lives on. For this reason small differences in results from one survey to an• other cannot be regarded as significant since they may be due to sampling differences.

13 For samples of the size used on this study the sampling errors are as follows:

TABLE 2-1

APPROXIMATE SAMPLING ERRORS (Expressed in percentages)

The chances are 95 in 100 that the "true" value lies within a range equal to the sample per cent plus or minus the number of percentage points shown below.

Sample per cent Sampling error 50 4 20 or 80 3 10 or 90 2.5

The sampling errors for chances of 99 in 100 are approxi• mately twice the sampling errors given in the above table.

These figures refer to statistics of the whole sample. If one looks at a percentage figure of a smaller sub-group of the sample the sampling errors are a little larger depending on the size of the sub-sample. For a sub-sample of about 600, the three sampling error figures in the table would be 5,4 and 3. For one of 300 they would be about 7,5 and 4.

The key item in the procedure is the sampling process. The technique is known as "probability sampling." It is not in common usage among the majority of polling organizations who also tend to use different interviewing and questionnaire pro• cedures than those just described. In this procedure one does not start with a known distribution and then try and locate re• spondents until one has a sample distribution that is the same as the known or census distribution. That process is known as quota sampling; it lacks the possibility of similarly calculating confidence limits, and bias can be introduced on those measures on which one did not control in the initial selection.

In simple, random, probability sampling, begining with the whole population, each individual has an equal chance of being chosen. In principle it is as if all the individuals were lined up in single file, then starting at random one picked every tenth person, or some other interval, until one had gone down

14 the entire line. If the sample thus chosen is large enough, in the hundreds if the whole population is big, then the findings from the sample should be close to what the findings would be from the whole population of individuals, within the stated tol• erance limits. The point is that the s lection process was done by a deliberate random procedure. No bias was intro• duced. The only decision is in the total size of sample.

For the nation as a whole the procedure is more compli- 1 cated but the principle is exactly the same. We can't line everybody up. We can't even do it on paper using a list of people. No such listing existB. But we can put houses on paper. This is the key to the problem. We know where houses are and we know where they are concentrated and where they are not.

The procedure of choosing every tenth person from a. long line of individuals would be equally good if we divided the line up into groups of ten people, chose groups by a similar random process and then ehose individuals at random from the selected groups.

In probability sampling applied to areas like the United States the procedure is to first divide or group the country into lots of small areas among which we choose certain ones at random with a certain probability rate of choice. Within these areas we similarly pick smaller ones. These areas are visited by a field staff of workers who list every household unit in the entire area. This list is the basis for the final selec• tion of households to be chosen and visited by the interviewer. Usually the procedure is carried further and a random selection table is printed on the front of the questionnaire so that the in• terviewer can pick, a respondent at random and not by the chance factor of who is at home or available.

This is a somewhat over-simplified description of a sampl• ing process that is quite tedious and laborious, but the results . are rewarding. No such considerations as "that is a difficult place to get to," "that area of town is dangerous," "that dis• trict is too far," "he is never at home," "this woman is easier to talk to," or, "interviews are hard with people like that" are allowed to influence the choice of respondents.

For budgetary economy the selection is complicated by an

15 effort to cluster the choices so that respondents and interviews are not spread thinly across the whole country. In doing so, the principle of probability selection is not lost. The map s shown indicates the location of sampling points used by the Survey Research Center. Depending on the total size of the sample they may all be used on a single study or only a por• tion of them. The surveys on civil defense have not been large enough to warrant the use of all points on any one survey.

I

Survey Research Center's random pie of the United States.

The stability and reliability ot tms sampling procedure with the differences that occur in various samples are shown in Tables 2-2 and 3. The data are taken from other studies. In Table 2-2 there are four separate samples, each about 300 in• dividuals. The last column is the total sample of about 1,200 persons. In Table 2-3 samples drawn during- four years are compared with census data. The stability of such figures, for samples drawn in the way described, continues to be amazing even though the proofs of such stability exist. What is meant by "sampling error" can be seen by comparing figures across the tables in the horizontal rows of numbers. These small variations are the predictable differences that are given the above term. The samples used in these tables are small. The one used on this study was considerably larger.

16 TABLE 2-2 SAMPLES COMPARED ON OCCUPATION

A B C D Total Professionals and semi-professionals 6% 6% 3% 7% 5% Businessmen, proprietors and managers 11 15 15 14 13 Clerical and sales workers 8 13 11 11 11 Skilled workers 15 13 14 14 15 Semi-skilled workers 13 15 16 14 15 Laborers (unskilled) 6 3 5 4 4 Service workers 7 8 5 5 6 Farmers 16 11 15 14 14 Housewives 3 5 6 3 4 Unemployed persons 3 3 2 2 2 Students 2 * * 2 1 Retired persons 7 4 5 4 5 Mixed and not ascertained 3 4 3 6 5 100% 100% 100% 100% Number of interviews 317 308 299 303 1227 •Less than half of one per cent

TABLE 2-3 AGE DATA FROM SMALL SAMPLE SURVEYS COMPARED WITH CENSUS BUREAU DATA

Age in Survey Survey Survey Survey Bureau of Years I n in IV Census

21-29 22% 24% 22% 22%. 22.8% 30-44 34 33 36 30 33.9 45-59 26 27 25 32 25.6 60 & over 17 15 17 15 17.7 Not available 1 1 0 1

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Number in sample 585 592 570 625

17 Analysis

Lastly it is important that the analysis of results be carried far enough so that relations and insights can be discovered. A report of the numbers of people who feel one way or another is not the only result a survey can offer. Far from it. Once one has assembled the numerous answers in the interview from a national sample of people there are possibilities for analysis that should not be left untouched. What attitudes are associated with certain critical opinions? What influence does area or edu• cation have on important beliefs or points of view? These and many others are the types of questions to which some answer can be obtained by intensive analysis.

Summary

The purpose in the interview and questionnaire is to get the information and opinions of the respondent the way they were before the interview was taken, that is the knowledge and atti• tudes that are his and his alone. After all, one is generalizing the results to those people who were not confronted with the questionnaire and interview procedure.

The purpose in the sampling procedure is to get as repre• sentative a sample of people as is possible for the uses to which the results are going to be put and within the set limits of budget and in so doing to be able to calculate the limits or range of tolerances, in the engineering sense, by which one may be a little off the "true" figure.

The Civil Defense Studies

The Sample

The first study, done in 1950, covered the population in the metropolitan areas of the eleven largest cities in the United States. These were naturally classifiable as prime target areas and ones in which civil defense effort was then focused.

The second study, done in 1951, extended the above sample to include the suburban area surrounding these eleven largest cities. A large share of the burden of civil defense effort would obviously fall on the fringe areas of a metropolitan city.

18 With weapons growing in strength they become part of the main target area.

The third study, done in 1952, extended the sample to the nation as a whole but did not sample the rural areas at the same rate as the urban areas. This was primarily a decision based on budget and available financing.

The fourth study, done in 1954, for the first time in this series took a straight unweighted sample of the national adult population but included persons aged 16 to 20 years old in ad• dition to the adults usually interviewed.

The last survey involved approximately 1600 respondents as did the previous national study. The second study involved about 800 persons and the first one approximately 600 persons.

Content of the Studies

The studies that have been conducted have dealt with- a variety of topics. They were chosen primarily because they were the problems on which people in the Federal Civil De• fense Administration needed answers for their day-to-day op• erations and future programming. Many of these factors, how• ever, were of dual utility, since they could also be used as psychological variables that might provide insights into the reasons back of the feelings, attitudes and behavior of indi• viduals .

There were four basic problems:

1. What is the state of citizen preparedness in terms of his information, knowledge, expectancies and skills?

2. What is the degree of citizen involvement and partici• pation in civil defense?

3. What is the probable behavior in time of crisis that we can currently expect?

4. What factors are influential in arousing various types of answers in the above problem areas?

19 Problems one and two were fairly straightforward and ones to which answers were readily available. These answers were necessary measures of the effectiveness of organized civil de• fense and also guideposts to avenues in which further effort should be concentrated.

Problem three is a hard one. It is undoubtedly the one most important in civil defense planning. Behavior that re• peats itself and occurs somewhere in the population with close study can be predicted to a certain extent—difficulties vary. But predicting behavior that would occur in the United States under conditions that have never occurred in the United States is virtually impossible. Such a goal can only be approximated. Studies of small disasters in this country offer some light on this problem area but the dimensions of a disaster can ma• terially influence the type and extent of behavior that develops.

Nevertheless, people's reactions in a time of stress are going to be influenced by their present knowledge and their cur• rent expectancies. These can be discovered. To pose a con• dition which had no realism at all for the respondent would lead to useless answers. But to investigate the state of knowl• edge regarding advocated policies for disaster situations and people's feelings regarding the adequacy of such steps, is to gain some insight into probable behaviors. The discovery of what people think they would do in a disaster situation serves to specify the starting point for programs which attempt to di• rect people's planning towards other patterns of behavior.

Problem four is the main research question. This one is the challenge for the social scientist and the civil defense pro• fessional. The problem is not yet solved any more than simi• lar problem questions in economic or political behavior have been answered. But several insights have been gained. Fur• ther areas can be explored on subsequent studies. The various factors that have been studied are listed below.

20 Factors Related to Understanding Public Posture on these Basic Problems 1. Background Ideas a. Probability of war b. Expectation of bombing on the U.S. c. Expectation of attack on immediate locale d. Expectation of military protection 2. Types of Danger a. Nature of attack b. Estimates of bomb damage c. Estimates of particular sources of danger weapons effects 3. Degree of Crisis a. Immediate need for civil defense b. Civil defense as a community problem c. Adequacy of local civil defense d. Personal concern and involvement 4. Solution to Threat Organizational a. Attitudes toward civil defense in the past b. Implementing civil defense locally c. Needs and priorities in civil defense d. Local leadership e. Confidence in and knowledge of local CD Individual a. Personal protection b. Expected role in current preparedness c. Expected role in time of crisis d. Available skills 5. Emotional Posture a. Realism and rational consideration b. Escape and avoidance thinking c. Apathy 6. Information & Com• munication a. Sources of information b. Accepted authorities c. Nature of remembered information d. Interest in information e. Areas of ignorance 7. Community participation a. Organizational and group membership in the community b. Active involvement in civil defense 8. Demographic characteristics a. Sex b. Age c. Education d. Income e. Occupation f. Rural-urban differences and similarities g. Religion h. Family size and composition

21 Some Interviews

The combined technological, administrative and organiza• tional aspects of a survey result in a collection of statistics which need close study and interpretation in order to have them make sense. These aspects, however, are swept aside when the interviews are read as conversations. -Figures are imper• sonal and their human meaning has to be provided by imagina• tion. The interviews themselves are human documents with all the detail of daily living crammed into them. Taken alone, they do not represent anything more than the feelings of one individual, who does not speak for the nation or even for a group of individuals—his feelings and thoughts are his own.

It is sometimes helpful when one has to interpret and work with tables to go back now and then to the basic information from which the figures and tables were taken and to realize that they are the feelings, perspectives and opinions of indi• viduals confronted with the racing, tense, and crowded events of our day.

Three interviews are reproduced on the following pages- one with an 18-year-old college boy, one with a farmer's wife, and one with a man in an administrative position in a metro• politan area. The interviews were not chosen for the point of view they express. The respondents hold unique patterns of attitudes and opinions that make none of them typical. The interviews should not be read as if they represented the view• points of teen-agers or women living in rural areas or men in the highly concentrated metropolitan areas. They are only ex• amples of interviews and the sorts of things that are said to interviewers using this type of conversational questionnaire.

* * *

The first interview is with an 18-year-old boy who lives in Chicago. He is a freshman in college, his father a hammer operator in a foundry. There are no children under 16 years of age in the family. The family has one car which the father drives to work every day. The father earns around $6,000 a year.

* * *

22 There is a lot of talk these days about atomic energy, sometimes along with uses in war and sometimes along with uses in peacetime Have you ever heard of atomic energy in connection with anything besides the atomic bomb?

Yes, sure haveI

What kinds of things have you heard about?

Atomic submarine, atomic power plant, atomic batteries, motors for car also atomic cocktail for cancer.

He missed President Eisenhower's speech before the U.N.

How likely do you think it is that we're in for another world war?

Yes I think it is likely—we have to watch our step.

Why?

Russia wants to dominate the whole world.

If a world war does come, do you think it's likely to happen in the next six months, the next year or two, or when?

Ten years.

If war were to break out, do you think people in the United States would be in danger of enemy attack?

Definitely so.

What sort of things do you think would be used against us in an attack?

Hydrogen and A-bombs, sabotage, fire bombs.

Anything else?

No that would be bad enough.

Would you say people here in Chicago, are in danger from any of these things?

Yes.

How about germ warfare that spreads diseases? Do you think that is likely?

No I hardly believe so.

How about gas warfare that spreads poisons. Do you think that is likely?

23 No—It would bring about world annihilation.

What do you think things would be like in the United States a month or so after an atomic attack (if there was one)?

We would have our cities in ruins—we probably would have litter— no public transportation.

Anything else?

Our food supplies would be very low and city dwellers would have to be moved to the country to retrench themselves for future living. It would be horrible.

Do you think there is anything the United States could do to make a war less likely?

Yes—build our military strength until it gave us adequate protection, and most important build a confidence of power among our allies-- Russia won't stop.

Well, suppose that enemy planes tried to make a surprise attack on the U.S. How many of the enemy planes do you think would get through and bomb our cities? Would you think most of them would get through, only a few would get through, or what?

Most or many would get through f~l

About half would get through /~/

Few or not many would get through /Kj

None or one or two, would get through /"/

Don't know /~7

If an atomic bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed? (The kind of A-bomb we have now) 1/4 mile to 1 mile s over 1, to 5 miles n over 5, to 10 miles o over 10 miles a Don't know n Prom what you've heard what causes most of the deaths in an atomic attack? 24 Radiation, falling debria, fire, earth cracks, concussion.

What other dangers would there be do you think?

Ignorance of self preservation is the biggest danger.

Have you heard about an H-bomb (hydrogen bomb)?

Yes.

If an H-bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed?

About 5 to 10 miles.

Do you think that the Russians have an H-bomb that they could use?

No I don't think they have.

Did you hear about or see the televised test explosions of atomic bombs out west in Nevada last summer?

Read about it and saw pictures in paper and TV

What things were most interesting about the test explosions?

Effects on inside of the homes, damage on cars.

Do you feel that you learned anything from it?

Yes.

How do you mean?

You should keep your buildings painted, fire proof roofing, build a bomb shelter.

Can you think of anything you'd like to know from tests like these?

I'd like to find out how to build a bomb shelter-and what paint is best for buildings.

Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do for his own safety and hie family's safety if there were an atom bomb attack?

Somethings I have heard on TV.

What were some of the things you heard that a person ought to do?

Shelter out of cement and brick, a heavy door and two ways out— have first aid, candles, flashlight, food and a gun.

25 Is there anything in particular you have already done for your own (or your family's) safety in case of an atom bomb attack?

Truthfully no.

Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do to take care of himself or his family AFTER an atomic bomb attack?

Wait till you hear the all clear—Don't runl Perhaps wait an hour till radiation dies down.

What do you know about what a person ought to do for his own safety and his family's safety after an atom bomb attack?

Put out fires near you—don't drink until the water is checked.

Where have you heard or read about these things that ought to be done?

TV, Radio, Newspapers.

Anywhere else?

That's all.

Would you say you've heard about these things pretty often, now and again, or what?

Pretty regular—about three or four times a month.

How do you feel about the information you get?

It is useful—they should put more on the programs—but Tve done nothing about it.

Do you know what the warning signal is which tells people that enemy planes are headed for your city (town)?

Yes.

What is it?

Three one-minute wailing noises on a siren.

Do you know the signal that says the danger has passed?

Yes.

What is it?

Three one-minute siren blasts.

26 Can you hear these signals easily from wherever you usually are?

Yes.

If you heard the warning signal, how much time do you think you might have before planes reached here?

I'd estimate about a minute or two and possibly five minutes at most.

If you heard some Sunday that an A-bomb attack had started on the United States, what would you do, stay where you are or go somewhere else?

I would hurry to prepare and do all the things I should have done before. I'd get blankets, water, food and take them down in the basement.

What sort of a place would you go to?

I would atay put down stairs in basement.

If you had heard a warning and wanted to get some more information about what was going on and what to do, where would you try to get it?

I'd go to the local police and check with the CD unit which should be there.

If you tried a radio, where would you tune in?

At the end of the dial—1 think.

Say it was eleven o'clock on a week day morning and you heard an air raid alarm; where would you be most likely?

About eight miles away at school.

Where would your father and mother most likely be?

Mother at home, father at work four miles away.

Now, if you had had an hour's warning of a possible attack what would you do?

I'd gather our needs as I said before.

If at school?

I'd go to basement of Subway Station after I got some food—It's an air raid shelter.

27 What would your family do as far as you can guess?

Father—He'd probably drive home and take ma downstairs in base• ment and then run up to find out if he could help someone else.

Say there was warning of an attack and time for an evacuation, is there any member of your family living here, who could not walk about a mile or so, to be picked up by trucks or busses to be taken further?

No.

What would (all of) you start carrying if you had to go?

Covers, money, jewelry, food, clothes.

How about walking a mile or so if it was night time?

It would be all right.

Do you have any place in mind you'd head for where you (your family) could stay if you were evacuated out of town?

No.

How about if they had a practice evacuation; would you take part in it?

No I don't think so.

Have you heard or read anything recently about what civil defense people are doing or planning to do in your community?

Yes.

What did you hear or read?

They have meetings and every Tuesday a practice air raid.

Anything else that the State or Federal government may be doing?

No.

Have you heard or read anything about asking people to get into civil defense work?

Yes.

Have you had any civil defense job (since World War II)?

No.

28 Is there a civil defense program in your neighborhood as far as you know?

Yes.

Is there anything going on in civil defense where you or any member of your family works?

Not that I know of.

Do you know of anything that the schools are doing in civil defense?

Yes. We discuss the probabilities of the effectiveness of CD and we find that those in CD would be hampered too much by people who have done nothing to help like myself.

If you were asked to sign up to give two or three hours a week for at least six months learning about civil defense, would you do it?

Probably I would now that you mention it but I'm not too sure.

There are lots of reasons why a person might find it difficult to do that, or might not want to, what are the reasons in your case?

Just plain laziness about self protection.

Is there anything else about civil defense or atomic war that you would like to know more about?

No. It would make me feel like a heel because I should be helping and I'm not.

Is there anything else about civil defense that you would like to add?

Yes. Make it mandatary if you want a successful organization or else drop it.

Do you think there is any use in peacetime for civil defense?

No.

In the second interview, the respondent is a housewife. She is married to a farmer who works a farm in Kansas. They earn about $4,500 a year. They own their own home and have a car. She graduated from high school and took one year of business college. There is one child in the family who is four years old. She, herself, is twenty-seven years old.

29 There is a lot of talk these days about atomic energy, sometimes along with uses in war and sometimes along with uses in peacetime Have you ever heard of atomic energy in connection with anything be• sides the atomic bomb?

Yes, I have.

What kinds of things have you heard about?

Medicine, could use it in place of electricity.

Anything else you have heard of?

Nothing else I can think of.

Last December (8th) President Eisenhower made a speech about atomic energy before the United Nations. Did you see it on TV, hear it on the radio, read it in the newspaper, hear about it from somebody, or, did you miss it?

I missed it.

How likely do you think it is that we're in for another world war?

I don't think it's too likely for a long time, yet.

Why?

I think people are worn out from war and I don't think Russia has as much as they say they have.

If a world war does come, do you think it's likely to happen in the next six months, the next year or two, or when?

Five or ten years.

If war were to break out, do you think people in the United States would be in danger of enemy attack?

More than likely. With the new bombs and long range planes.

How do you mean?

I think Russia is building up and could attack.

What sort of things do you think would be used against us in an, attack?

H-bomb if they have them.

30 Anything else?

I think that would probably be enough.

Would you aay people here in , are in danger from any of these things?

I don't believe so I think the larger cities would be more the tar• gets, with all their talk about A-bombs and H-bombs if they don't go ahead and use them I think we will be doing fine.

How about germ warfare that spreads diseases* Do you think that is likely?

I think so. They accuse us of it so they think about it.

How about gas warfare that spreads poisons. Do you think that is likely?

No I don't, not too likely.

What do you think things would be like in the United States a month or so after an atomic attack (if there was one)?

I think people would be pretty well prepared, probably the country would be.

Anything else? '

Pretty much of a shambles. I imagine there would be a lot of injured, sick and homeless people.

Do you think there is anything the United States could do to make a war less likely?

Well I think they are doing about all they can.

Well, suppose that enemy planes tried to make a surprise attack on the U.S. How many of the enemy planes do you think would get through and bomb our cities? Would you think most of them would get through, only a few would get through, or what?

Chose "Few or not many would get through" category.

If an atomic bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed? (The kind of A-bomb we have now).

Chose "over 1, to 5 miles" category.

From what you've heard what causes most of the deaths in an atomic attack?

31 The terrible heat, suffication, falling debris and falling building ai I think hysteria would cause some deathB.

What other dangers would there be do you think?

I don't think of others right, now.

Have you heard about an H-bomb (hydrogen bomb)?

Yes.

If an H-bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed?

Twenty-five to fifty miles.

Do you think that the Russians have an H-bomb that they could use?

Not now I don't, probably working on it.

Did you hear about or see the televised test explosions of atomic bomt out west in Nevada last summer?

Yes.

Did you. hear about it, read about it, or did you see it?

Radio, newspapers.

What things were most interesting about the test explosions?

Well I say the heat that melted everything.

Anything else?

I know it left some houses standing and others it didn't leave standing.

Do you feel that you learned anything from it?

Not as much as I should.

How do you mean?

Well I suppose most people Just don't read about those things lik they should.

Can you think of anything you'd like to know from tests like these?

No nothing I can think of.

32 Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do for hi: own safety and his family's safety if there were an atom bomb attack?

Yes and read of it.

What were some of the things you heard that a person ought to do?

Have correct kind of shelter?

What sort of shelter.

An underground shelter of materials that would protect you from heai and not fall apart.

What else have you heard?

Well you have to be careful of the food you eat.

Is there anything in particular you have already done for your own (or your family's) safety in case of an atom bomb attack?

No.

Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do to take care of himself or his family AFTER an atomic bomb attack?

About the only thing would get to a hospital if there were one standing.

Where have you heard or read about these things that ought to be done?

Newspaper and magazines.

Anywhere else?

No, maybe radio.

Would you say you've heard about these, things pretty often, now and again, or what?

Not so much lately.

How do you feel about the information you get?

Well, if you paid enough attention it would be adequate.

If you heard some Sunday that an A-bomb attack had started on the United States, what would you do, stay where you are or go somewhe else?

We'd probably be safe enough here so I'd stay here.

33 What sort of a place would you go?

I think here in our house unless there were a shelter near and we needed to go.

If you had heard a warning and wanted to get some more information about what was going on and what to do, where would you try to get it?

I don't know.

If you tried a radio, where would you tune in?

To your closest station.

Say there was a bombing attack on Kansas City what do you think you would be expected to do?

I don't think too much would be expected of us unless it were Red Cross work.

Anything else you might be asked to do that you can think of?

Maybe clothes, food, bedding for those who lost theirs.

Have you heard or read anything recently about what civil defense people are doing or planning to do in your community?

No.

Anything else that the State or Federal government may be doing?

No.

Have you heard or read anything about asking people to get into civil defense work?

Yes, I have read it.

Is there a civil defense program in your neighborhood as far as you know?

No.

Is there anything going on in civil defense where you or any member of your family works?

No.

Do you know of anything that the schools are doing in civil defense?

No.

34 If you were asked to sign up to give two or three hours a week for at least six months learning about civil defense, would you do it?

Yes, I think you should.

Is there anything else about civil defense or atomic war that you would like to know more about?

Well, I would like to know all about both or as much as I could know about them.

Is there anything else about civil defense that you would like to add?

No.

Do you think there is any use in peacetime for civil defense?

Yes. If you are to be prepared for everything.that might happen.

This interview took place in Boston. The answers are given by a man, 50 years old, who holds an administrative position that cannot be told without the danger of destroying the guaranteed anonymity of the interview. He has a wife and two children in their early teens. They own two cars. He had seven years of college and as the interview itself describes, he walks to work every day. They own their own home and he earns well above $10,000 a year. * * * There is a lot of talk these days about atomic energy, sometimes along with uses in war and sometimes along with uses in peacetime Have you ever heard of atomic energy in connection with anything be• sides the atomic bomb?

Why, of course.

What kinds of things have you heard about?

Submarines

Anything else?

Reactors, home batteries, medicine, research, isotopes.

Last December (8th) President Eisenhower made a speech about atomic energy before the United Nations. Did you see it on TV, hear it on ?

I saw it on TV.

35 Thinking back to what you heard, (read) what are some of the things said?

He proposed a peaceful pooling of atomic energy.

Anything else?

It would be an international organization including several nations that have atomic energy, pooling their atomic supplies together f< peaceful purposes.

(As you said) The President made a suggestion that the nations pool their atomic materials for peaceful things; how do you feel now aboul that idea?

I think it would be a good idea.

Why?

It's too bad to have all this energy tied up; better to use if for peaceful purposes.

The President also talked about the strength of the atomic bombs the U.S. has now. Do you think of anything he said that made you feel any differently?

No.

How likely do you think it is that we're in for another world war?

Unlikely.

Why?

I think we have achieved an uneasy balance of power which will endure for the next 10 or 20 years.

If a world war does come, do you think it's likely to happen in the n six months, the next year or two, or when?

Ten or twenty years.

If war were to break out, do you think people in the United States wc be in danger of enemy attack?

Oh of course, of course.

What sort of things do you think would be used against us in an atta<

All the conventional munitions.

36 How do you mean that?

Ordinary explosives.

Anything else?

No, they wouldn't dare use anything else!

Would you say people here in are in danger from any of th things ?

Of course.

How about germ warfare that spreads diseases? Do you think that is likely?

I doubt if they'd use it.

How about gas warfare that spreads poisons. Do you think that is likely

I doubt if they'd use that.

Do you think there is anything the United States could do to make a war less likely?

I think so.

What could we do?

Adequate defense.

Can you tell me more about your thinking on that?

Build up our army, navy and civil defense.

Well, suppose that enemy planes tried to make a surprise attack on the U.S. How many of the enemy planes do you think would get through and bomb our cities? Would you think most of them would get through, .only a few would get through, or what?

I don't know.

If an atomic bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed? (The kind of A-bomb we have now)

1/4 mile to 1 mile fj

over 1, to 5 miles f~7

over 5, to 10 miles /X7

37 Over 10 miles /~7 Don't know /~7

From what you've heard what causes most of the deaths in an atomic attack?

Shock, fire and radiation.

What other dangers would there be do you think?

Disruption of services, disease, fire and panic.

Have you heard about an H-bomb (hydrogen bomb)?

Yes.

If an H-bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed?

Thirty miles.

Do you think that the Russians have an H-bomb that they could use?

I think so.

Did you hear about or see the televised test explosions of atomic bombs out west in Nevada last summer?

Yes.

Did you hear about it, read about it or did you see it?

All of them.

What things were most interesting about the test explosions?

It's all interesting, nothing special.

Do you feel that you learned anything from it?

Yes.

How do you mean?

Spectacular, 'awe inspiring.

Can you tell me more about that?

I don't want any part of it.

Can you think of anything you'd like to know from tests like these?

38 A person should be Informed as to what to do, In case of an atomic attack.

Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do for his own safety and his family's safety if there were an atom bomb attack?

Oh, yes.

What were some of the things you heard that a person ought to do?

Supposed to go' to cellar, get next to the walls. Seems to me non• sense; you're not going to have time to dig a hole, or get in a cellar if someone explodes an atomic bomb.

Is there anything in particular you have already done for your own (or your family's) safety in case of an atom bomb attack?

No.

Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do to take care of himself or his family AFTER an atomic bomb attack?

Yes.

What do you know about what a person ought to do for his own safety and his family's safety after an atom bomb attack?

Keep out of radiation by getting below surface of ground like a cellar. Wait for a reasonable length of time before you go out. Have a supply of food and water.

Where have you heard or read about these things that ought to be done?

The radio.

Anywhere else?

Newspapers and meetings.

Would you say you've heard about these things pretty"often, now and again, or what?

Pretty often, they wasted a lot of breath.

How do you feel about the information you get?

It's probably reasonably accurate.

Do you know what the warning signal is which tells people that enemy planes are headed for your city (town)?

Yes. 39 What is it?

Long and two short blasts.

Do you know the signal that says the danger has passed?

Yes.

What is it?

Can't remember.

Can you hear these signals easily from wherever you usually are?

No.

If you heard the warning signal, how much time do you think you might have before planes reached here?

I have no idea, neither does anyone else.

No one knows but what do you think?

I have no idea.

If you heard some Sunday that an A-bomb attack had started on the United States, what would you do, stay where you are or go somewhere else?

I would disbelieve it.

Assume there was an attack.

1 would stay here. I wouldn't think this was judging from my experi• ence in World War 2.

What sort of a place would you go?

I would ignore it and go about my business.

If you had heard a warning and wanted to get some more information about what was going on and what to do, where would you try to get it? •

Telephone and turn on TV and radio.

Where would you tune in?

I don't know, I have it marked down some .place.

Say it was eleven o'clock on a week day morning and you heard an air ra: alarm; where would you be most likely?

At work, three miles away. 40 Where would your wife most likely be?

At home.

Where would your children most likely be?

At school, one four blocks away and the other a private school 100 miles away.

Now, if you had had an hour's warning of a possible attack what would you do?

rd get my daughter, wife and animals and go to my summer place, 60 miles away and pack my family. Then I'd go back to Boston and report to the Naval Reserve where I'm on call.

What would your family do as far as you can guess?

They'd wait for me to pick them up.

How about the boy 100 miles away?

His teachers would tell him what to do.

Say there was warning of an attack and time for an evacuation, is there any member of your family living here, who could not walk about a mile or so, to be picked up by trucks or busses to be taken further?

No.

What would all of you start carrying if you had to go?

I would take food from the deep freeze like frozen beef steak.

How about walking a mile or so if it was night time?

No, why should I mind, I walk three miles to the office every day.

Do you have any place in mind you'd head for where your family could stay if you were evacuated out of town?

A farm 60 miles north.

How about if they had a practice evacuation; would you take part in it?

No, I would certainly not take part in it.

Have you heard or read anything recently about what civil defense people are doing or planning to do in your community?

Yes.

41 What did you hear or read?

They've had a few practice alerts, they led out fire fighting equip• ment. They're acting like a lot of boyscouts giving each other medals.

Anything else that the State of Federal government may be doing?

I have no idea but it's probably futile.

Have you heard or read anything about asking people to get into civil defense work?

Yes.

Have you had any civil defense job (since World War H)?

No, and I'm never going to. I learned how to run around with sand when I was an air-raid warden in World War 2. It was all very silly.

Is there a civil defense program in your neighborhood as far as you know?

I don't know and I want no part of it.

Is there anything going on in civil defense where you or any member of your family works?

No, and so help me there won't be.

Do you know of anything that the schools are doing in civil defense?

Yeah, they teach the little kids to get under their desks which is dopey.

If you were asked to sign up to give two or three hours a week for at lease six months learning about civil defense, would you do it?

No!

There are lots of reasons why a person might find it difficult to do that, or might not want to, what are the reasons In your case?

I've been through it, it's futile; a waste of time, no job for Americans. If they expect me to fight a 10 million ton T.N.T. bomb with a shovel and hatchet and a bucket of sand, they're crazy.

Is there anything else about civil defense that you would like to add?

42 No, except that I hope we have nothing like a repetition of the Civil Defense that we had during World War 2.

Do you think there is any use In peacetime for civil defense?

Not in the slightest, any more than there was during the last war. With radar and the Atlantic Ocean, there's no sense in turning off lights and shoveling sand. The only good it will do is to give the people a sense that they are protecting their country.

43 Chapter 3

BACKGROUND TO CIVIL DEFENSE The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in the latter half of 1945, threw a new tool of devastation into the practice of total war. These were the first public appearances of the new, terrible, atomic weapons. The havoc and destruction seemed so complete that concepts of "the front" and the "haz• ards of war" were completely altered even though the bombings of World War n had already changed the meaning of these ideas.

The impact of the atomic bomb on the minds of the Ameri• can people has few parallels in our history. This impact was accentuated by the more or less immediate termination of the war in the Pacific. All but the most inaccessible knew about "the bomb." Even before Bikini ninety-eight per cent of all adults knew something about the new, awe-inspiring weapon.

In present-day America few people venture to depreciate the power of the bomb. While public concepts of the bomb vary from the very simple to the highly sophisticated, they al• most universally emphasize its destructiveness.

The first tests of atomic bombs, which followed in 1946 at Bikini, found the public expecting far more damage than oc• curred. * The most common opinion before Bikini was that "judging from what the bomb did in Japan, it should pulverize all the ships—with not a thing left." All but a small portion of those people who would venture any prediction expected that all or almost all the target ships would be destroyed by the bomb. However, it is notable that more than a third of the people would venture no prediction and that uncertainty was as common among generally well-informed people as among people who appeared to be poorly informed about current world affairs.

^Campbell, A., Eberhart.S., Cautley, P. W., "Public Reaction to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs." S.R.C., Univ. of Mich., April 1947.

44 When the same people were asked, after the test explosions, whether the bomb had done as much damage as they had thought it would: 46 per cent said no and 20 per cent said yes. Seven• teen per cent, though they knew of the bomb, had not heard of the tests. Even among those who said they had not expected very great destruction, a third said the test results were less impressive than they had expected them to be. The most widespread reaction was that Bikini had been an anti-climax. Expectations based on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had not been met. Typical reactions were:

"I expected that the whole world would feel the shock—it would be so great." "I thought it was such a powerful thing it would blow the ships all up to nothing. I thought it would get moBt of them but it didn't." "Well no, I thought if it was so powerful it would destroy any target, regardless of what it was." In our report, following these tests, we concluded the fol• lowing: At the present time the American public do not seem emotionally disturbed about the bomb. They admit its ex• traordinary force but only a fourth say they are worried about it. The majority have found a way to push the bomb into the back of their minds. Many feel that the creative genius of America, in which they have great faith, will per• fect a defense before this country is threatened. Some feel confident that no country would dare provoke a war with us. Others are willing to admit the worst but seek at least supers ficial refuge in a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitable un• folding of the atomic age. Others feel that the responsibil• ity for dealing with the problem rests entirely with the authorities, that it is useless for the ordinary citizen to be concerned. Many people, of course, are simply unable to respond to future eventualities; they live in a world of day- to-day events and the bomb is not yet on the horizon. In one way or another the majority of Americans have assumed a point of view toward the bomb which makes it possible for them to be free of active personal concern. Recognition of the bomb's frightful potentialities remains, however, and a threatening incident involving the bomb would certainly excite great public reaction.

45 The bulk of that statement could be repeated today. Though eight years have passed and the conditions and events of inter• national and national affairs have changed, public reaction has not shifted materially from that statement. It must be recog• nized that, for a sizable proportion of the American public, international affairs have very little reality. The psychologi• cal importance of world events varies enormously within the population. Despite the tremendous network of newspapers, radio, television, magazines and other media, only a minority of the people can be considered actively conversant with con• temporary world problems. A fourth or more of the popula• tion are completely detached from these problems; they know nothing about them. Their world does not include foreign af• fairs until foreign affairs intrudes into their own lives.

This detachment from events beyond the immediate con• cerns of everyday living is not a question of physical isolation from the sources of current information. All but a small fraction of the adult population are reached regularly by either radio or newspapers, in most cases by both. The question is rather one of interest. For the most part, those Americans who are poorly informed on affairs in the world are not moti• vated to learn; they do not avail themselves of information which is immediately at hand frequently right in their own homes.

Even at that time—late in 1946--it is interesting to note the following excerpt from our report:

Of the various foreign countries, Russia is far and away the most prominent in the thinking of the American people. At the present time foreign affairs tend mainly to mean relations with Russia; the activities of the United Na• tions organization are thought of largely in terms of what Russia is doing. Russia is very much on the minds of those people who devote any thought to world affairs. For the most part, American attitudes toward the Soviet Union are generally unfavorable. She is thought of as un• cooperative and domineering. Her intentions are regarded with suspicion. The majority of the American people do not feel that the Russian government can be counted on to be friendly to this country. The number of Americans who take a consistently favorable position toward the Soviet Union is very small indeed. Evidences of insecurity which appear in people's think• ing--in their desire to maintain strong armed forceB and to

46 keep the secret of the bomb, or in their criticism of what they regard as too lenient behavior toward other countries- are often related to misgivings about Russia. And although it cannot properly be said that the American people are in general fearful of the Soviet Union, yet they do not feel they can count on her or predict what she may do. They are irritated with what they regard as Russia's unreasonable obstinacy and wary of her international maneuvers.

Russia, however, did not yet have the bomb and this gave Americans a certain feeling of security. Yet the public was making more conservative estimates of when they might have it than the experts were. Only a very few thought that it would take more than five years for other countries to master the production problems.

Q. "How long do you think it will be before the other countries are able to make the atomic bomb?" August 1946 Some other country may already be able to 24% Pretty soon, before long (no precise time) 13 Under three years 8 Three to five years 4 Over five years 12 "It depends" & "Don't know" 34 Not ascertained 3 Don't know what the Atomic Bomb is 2 100% Nevertheless the same number of people felt that the bomb had made peace easier to keep as felt that it had made keeping the peace harder. There was no majority feeling, even then, that such a weapon would guarantee a peace. There was also some anxiety. Half the American people said that they were not at all worried about the atomic bomb; but, one eighth ac• knowledged clearly that they were decidedly worried about it.

"That thing is just like a bunch of lightning--I'm so wor• ried I don't read about it," one said. Another: "Sure. I'm scared. You know what I think? I think we are living on borrowed time."

However, among those who denied any worry there were few who also denied any danger. Few thought that Russia, when she got the weapon, would hesitate to use it if it were to her advantage to do so. Rather their reasoning indicated an

47 implicit appreciation of the, fact that there was an actual danger. Half the people who said they were not worried indicated a recognition that the bomb was a threat—often a very grave threat. Many in the group said simply that it was a threat before which they were helpless, that they did not worry be• cause worrying would not forestall the danger:

"I'm not worried about it. What's the use of worrying? If I did, there are other weapons which are worse being de• veloped all the time, and I'd no sooner get over worrying about it than a worse one would come along. So what's the use?" "In a personal sense, I'm not worried. Of course I do have the hope that it'll never be used (I'm not worried) because I have the feeling that worried or not it wouldn't make much difference."

Others were too busy or too satisfied with their own af• fairs to worry about the bomb:

"I don't know. I don't think I devote much time to worry• ing about it. The building business is too complicated now for me to worry about the bomb. It's too remote." "No, I don't care any more. I got everything I need. From the morning, when I get up, I pick apples, and I get a dollar a bushel. So why should I worry about that bomb? I don't need to worry. Let it come. I don't think about it."

Consistent with their expectations that other countries would be able to develop the bomb were people's feelings that atomic bombs might actually be used against the United States.

Q. "Do you think there is a real danger that atomic bombs will ever be used against the United States? August 1946 Yes 16% Yes with qualifications 43 Undecided, don't know 11 No, with qualifications 12 No 14 Opinions not ascertained 2 Do not know what atomic bomb is 2 100%

48 But 40 per cent thought we would be able to work out some defense against the bomb. This was largely a confidence in American science and its ability to contrive something but also a feeling that we would stay ahead in the field of armaments and thus offer a defense through strength of retaliation. At this time, however, the expectancy of another war was extremely low—practically non-existent. A question on the topic was not even included in the study. However, as the cold war took form and the temper of international relations changed, the probability of world war began to rise.

Figure 1 indicates the fluctuations in war expectancy that have occured in those years. The peak of war expectancy is associated with acts of aggression which could lead to a larger war. The first rise seems to have reached a peak following the incidents and tensions of the Berlin blockade. Things slackened off as that situation was resolved peacefully. How• ever, the chances of world war rose sharply again with the start of hostilities in Korea but has dropped off steadily ever since. At present the feelings of imminence seem to be about as they were in 1948 but the current trend seems to be toward regarding world war as less and less imminent.

Although at first glance the two questions reported across the top of Figure 1 do not seem to be particularly comparable the data would indicate that they are not as different as they appear. Those answering yes,--we were in for another world war—when asked to date the most probable time in the ques• tion that followed, tended to give answers well under 20 years. Six per cent of this group regarded the most probable time as ten to twenty years away and only one per cent saw war as being over 20 years away. However 12 per cent of this group, though admitting war was likely, did not know any time period at which it might be regarded as most likely.

The events that are inserted across the bottom of the Figure do not, of course, necessarily bear any relevance to the fluctuations of opinion. Other events could have been used to describe the main features of current events. Certainly other events had an influence. In 1949 the main events of the Communist Revolution in China occurred. The heated contro• versy and the headline events on legislative and investigative activity over domestic communism spread out from 1948 on to

49 FIGURE 3-1 FEELINGS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC REGARDING IMMINENCE OF WAR WITH RUSSIA

# Q. In your opinion, is this country going to be able + Q. Speaking of world affairs, how likely do you think to g-t along with Russia, or are we going to have it is that we're in (or another world war? to go to war within the next 10 or 15 years? A Q. If war does come, do you think it'a likely to • If YES: Do you expect war within the next year happen In the next six months, the next year or or two? two, or when?

* Per cent answering YES we axe likely to have to go to war with Russia In 10 or 15 years • Per cent answering YES they expected war within the next year or two + Per cent thinking another world war was likely (no mention of time) A Per cent thinking that war, if it came, would come m two years or less

100%

tn 50% ©

0% 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954

H -C

& V

5 3 8s •Studies in these two years involved only a sample of large metropolitan areas. On all other studies it has been found that residents In these areas regarded world wax as a trifle less probable or Imminent than residents in other areas. The differences have always been very small however. See Tables 4-2, lb 5, the present. Certainly the war in Korea was known by most Americans. It might be worthwhile, at this stage, to present some other events, in terms of their informational impact, as a base for comparison with later civil defense data.

In December 1946^ twenty per cent of the adult American public were unable to give an answer to any one of the follow• ing five questions:

Q. Can you think of any things that the U.S. and Russia are likely to have trouble about in the next few years? What do you have in mind?

Q. How about power and influence in the world--do you think we are likely to have trouble with Russia over that?

Q. Russia and the U.S. have already had some disagree• ments. As you remember it, what are some of the things the two countries have disagreed about?

Q. In what ways are things different in Russia now than before they had communism?

Q. What would you say is the main difference between the government in Russia and our government here?

In April, 1947,3 thirty per cent were unable to give a simple explanation of the purpose of the United Nations. Ac• ceptable ideas were as simple as "preventing war," "keep the peace" or "to help countries get along."

In October 1948, half the population did not know whether the United States was doing anything to try to stop Russia from getting control of other countries. ^ This was at a time when

2Lang, H.R., "Public Attitudes toward Russia and United States- Russian Relations,"S.R.C, Univ. of Mich., April 1947. ^Campbell, A. et al., "Public Attitudes toward American Foreign Policy," S.R.C., Univ. of Mich., May 1947. 4Withey,S.B., "Attitudes Toward United States-Russian Relations," S.R.C., Univ. of Mich., December 1948.

51 the Marshall Plan had been active, also aid to Greece and Turkey and various actions in the United Nations. At the same time, a little more than one in four were unable to re• call any trouble with Russia in Berlin. The land blockade of the Allied sectors had started on April 1 and was not termi• nated until September 30, 1949. In 1949, about two months before this interviewing,^ Presi• dent Truman made a very widely publicized and important an• nouncement to the American people. He stated that there was evidence that an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. The reactions to the question used were categorized as follows:

Q. Did you happen to hear about an atomic explosion in Russia recently?

Respondent stated: Correct content of announcement 26% Comething vague, but generally correct 29 Something vague, but largely erroneous 10 He heard something, can't say what 7 He heard nothing 27 Not ascertained 1 100% However, it is important to realize that although there is a sizeable portion of the public to whom international affairs are an unknown there is also the sizeable majority who do know about some significant events and adapt their attitudes to them. But for those to whom goings-on outside the United States are fairly important there are still a horde of goings-on closer to home that seem more important, more pressing and deserving of much more attention. Also, a man cannot separate himself from his habits, motivations, daily role, expectations and satis• factions or from his friends and associates when he tries to behave sensibly in accordance with what is going on in the world. His job, his family, his club and other things receive their usual attention and lo and behold there is little time left for anything else.

5Fisher, B. & Belknap, G. /'America's Role in World Affairs—Patterns of Citizen Opinion, 1949-50," S.R.C., Univ. of Mich., May 1952.

52 In this report there is no need to describe, objectively, the nature of atomic weapons and their effects or to venture an assessment of the degree of threat or the military postures of the two major powers in the world today. There is enough evidence available that would indicate the need for some sort of civil defense preparedness whether it be for some distant tomorrow or even for a day that may never come. The task of this report is to assess some of the psychological factors that are important in this preparedness as far as the American public is concerned.

53 Chapter 4

CURRENT CLIMATE FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

War Expectancy Early this year, as was shown in the last chapter, the ex• pectancy of all out, imminent, global war was lower than it has been for several years. But a prediction involves two things, one must estimate both the likelihood and the timing. Many people think that war is inevitable but not near, others regard war as unlikely but imminent, if it should occur. This means that war expectancy is a rather complex picture.

Opinions on the likelihood of war have shown a tendency to move toward two extremes. The number of people regarding war as "very likely" has grown during the past two years. The number thinking that war is "very unlikely" has also increased. This change has occurred in the minds of residents of both metropolitan areas and less populated urban or rural regions.

TABLE 4-1 LIKELIHOOD OF ANOTHER WORLD WAR

Q.: How Likely do you think it La that we're In for another world war?

April 1952 March 1964 War certain, very likely 17% ) 23% ) ) m ) 4T% War probable, likely, better 36 ) 24 ) than even chance Pro-con, 50-50 chance, depends 9 9

Unlikely, probably not 21 ) 25 ) ) 22% ) 31% No chance of war, very unlikely 1 ) 6 ) Only wishes or hopes expressed 1 2 Don't know 12 9 Not ascertained 3 2 100% ioo%

54 TABLE 4-2 LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Under 50,000 in• * Metro• Metro Over cluding Rural politan Suburb 50,000 rural only World War . Very likely 20% 24% 23% 24% 26% Likely 20 22 24 25 25 50-50 6 11 7 10 9 Unlikely 28 26 27 23 23 Very Unlikely 10 9 5 5 5 Don't Know 13 2 11 9 9 Not Ascertained 3 6 3 4 3 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% *This classification of urban-rural occurs frequently in the report. The column "Over 50,000" refers to people living in cities or towns, or their immediate environs, that have a population that size, but not as large as metropolitan areas. It is the same classification as that called "Urban" in Table 4-3. The column "Under 50,000" includes the rest. It is the same classification as "Small City, Small Town and Rural" combined. The last column "Rural" foUows the usual definition of villages no larger than two or three thousand plus open country. It is contained ln the column "Under 50,000."

Opinions on the imminence of war, if it should come, show a steady decline in the number thinking that war is very near. The number who think that war is five years or more away has doubled in the last two years. To ascertain the real na• ture of expectancies it is therefore necessary to try and com• bine the two factors of likelihood and timing.

Very few indeed see war as likely or, if their guess on chances is wrong, as even possible within the next year. The tendency is for likelihood and nearness to be associated. Those who think war is likely see it as nearer than do those who re• gard the chances of war as poor. The half of the population who see the chances of war as greater than ever seem to cluster their timing expectations around two to five years. This three or four year period they seem to regard as a fairly well guaranteed period of "peace." One quarter of the population

55 TABLE 4-3 LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BY CITY SIZE IN 1952

Small Small Town #Metro Urban City and Rural National

Very likely 13% 22% 18% 15% 17% Likely 30 30 30 46 36 Maybe, pro-con 10 9 10 8 9 Unlikely 30 20 26 14 21 Very unlikely 3 * 3 * 1 Don't know 10 16 10 12 12 Not ascertained 4 3 3 5 4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%- •Less than one-half of one per cent. #See Footnote Table 4-2.

TABLE 4-4 IMMINENCE OF WAR

Q.: If a world war does come, do you think it's likely to happen in the next six months, the next year or two, or when?

April 1952 March 1954

Less than six months 4% ) 2%) Six months to a year 8 j 4 j One year up to two years 19 ) 16 ) Two years up to five years 22 ^ 21 ^ Five years up to ten years 7 j 12 ) Ten years up to twenty years 4 ) 11% 8 j 23% Twenty years or over # j 3 ) Never, not at all likely 2 4 .Don't know or depends 18 16

Not ascertained 15 14 "100% 100% # This category not used in the 1952 studyjpreceding category should read "10 years or more."

56 TABLE 4-5 IMMINENCE OF WAR BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Total Sub• Over Under* Popu• Rural Metro urban 50,000 50,000 lation alone

Less than six months 1% - 1% 2% 2% 3% Six months to a year 2 2% 6 4 4 5 One yr. up to two yrs. 16 10 15 19 16 19 Two yrs. up to five yrs. 18 26 24 19 21 20 Five yrs. up to ten yrs. 12 11 17 10 12 10 Ten yrs. up to twenty yrs. g 12 10 6 8 6 Twenty yrs. or over 7 3 2 2 3 1 Never, not at all likely 7 2 4 4 4 4 Don't know or depends 17 12 13 18 16 16 Not ascertained 11 22 8 15 14 16 100% 100% 100% 100% T56% T00% #Includes rural - see footnote Table 4-2

TABLE 4-6 RELATION OF LIKELIHOOD AND IMMINENCE OF WAR

War is very Un• Very un• Don't likely Likely 50-50 likely likely know

Under 6 months 4% 1% *% 1% *% 2% 6 mos. - 1 yr. 7 5 3 1 2 5 1-2 yrs. 23 19 16 13 7 7 2 - 5 yrs. 26 27 19 20 4 11 5-10 yrs. 15 14 15 12 9 3 10 - 20 yrs. 5 7 5- 14 16 3 Over 20 yrs. 1 1 1 6 12 1 Never * * * 7 28 1 Don't Know 10 14 23 9 4 55 Not ascertained 9 12 18 17 18 12 150% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

57 see war as likely and also probably occuring within five years or less. One fifth of the population see war as unlikely and if it does occur as more than five years away.

There are, of course, very few cues which the average person can use for a valid estimate of when war will come. Considering the average level of information, people's estimates are probably based on hearsay or hunches. What they see in the behavior of Russia is the major reason offered by those who think that war is likely. Secondly, they mention the occurrence of trouble spots and near-war conditions at various spots in the world. A few are resigned to the inevitability of another world war and disregard any predictions that are made on the basis of events.

Those who do not see war as likely do not seem to be ig• norant of these same events but they do them a slightly differ• ent interpretation. They also know of near-war incidents but seem to regard these as proofs that the nation will go no fur• ther. They emphasize the terrible aspects of global war and the feeling that nobody wants it. They interpret U.S. and Russian behavior as showing their unprepar edit ess for a real clash. Some mention absence of heavy draft calls and reduc• tions in military budgets as indications of a feeling, by U.S. officialdom, that major war is not in the offing.

Attack on the United States

There is very little doubt in the public mind that the U.S. would be attacked in the event of another war. This feeling has grown since 1946 but not in recent years, it is doubtful that it can increase much more, but there has been an increase in the number who feel that their community would be a target. Over half the population, across the U.S. now feel that there is danger for their community if war comes. Whatever danger is seen for the nation as a whole, is also seen as much closer to home than it was previously.

This feeling is to a certain extent due to knowledge of the increased hazards of war with the newly developed atomic weapons but it is also related to a feeling that one's community is important and that it is a meaningful target in time of war. The hazards are well known. The number who know about the H-bomb exceeds 80 per cent of the population.

58 TABLE 4-7 DANGER OF ENEMY ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES

Q.: If war were to break out, do you think people in the United States would be in danger of enemy attack?

April 1952 March 1954 Yes 86% 84% No 8 10 Don't know or depends 5 5 Not ascertained 1 1 100% 100%

TABLE 4-8 DANGER OF ENEMY ATTACK ON RESPONDENT'S OWN COMMUNITY*

Q.: Would you say people here in are in danger?

April 1952 March 1954 Yes 37 50% Yes, qualified (less than big cities) 9 6 Pro-con 1 1 No, qualified (not as much as big cities) 14 8

No 21 15 Don't know 2 2 Not ascertained 2 2 86%* "84%* * This question was asked only of those people who thought that the na• tion as a whole was in danger of enemy attack.' (See Table 8-1 for feelings of rural residents)

About a third of those who had not heard of the H-bomb felt they could not make an estimate on the imminence of war, but, among these others, there is a feeling of greater imminence than among those who know of the Hydrogen bomb. Among those who have heard of the H-bomb there seems to be no difference in the felt nearness of war according to whether people think the Russians have the H-bomb or not. The number thinking the Russians do have it outnumber those who think they do not have it by a ratio of 2 to 1.

59 Defense and Protection

This sense of danger and threat is to a certain extent less• ened by a widespread feeling that if an attack were staged it would suffer extremely heavy losses. The majority of the population feel that casualitiea in such a cross-the-world bombing mission would • be two-thirds or more of the bombers involved. The estimated cost of such a mission has lessened a little in the past two years but the majority still hold the opinion just stated. It is a wide• spread feeling occurring among both metropolitan and rural resi• dents. TABLE 4-9 CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE

Q.: Suppose thai enemy planes tried to make a surprise attack on the U.S. How many of the enemy planes do you think would get through and bomb our cities? Would you think most of them would get through, only a few would get through, or what?

April 1952 March 1954 Most or many or all 13% 12% (2/3 or more) About half (between 1/3 and 2/3) 3 14 Few or not many (1/3 or less) 60 50 None or one or two 5 10 Don't know 14 14 Not ascertained 5 * 130% 100% •Leas than one per cent

TABLE 4-10 CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Metro Over Under Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 Rural

Most 13% 18% 11% 11% U% Half 15 16 14 13 12 Few 40 43 49 55 57 None 15 13 10 B S Don't know 16 10 16 13 12 Not ascertained 1 .# • * 150% 135% Too% 100% 105% * Less than one per cent

60 Those who think that about half or more of the planes making an attack on the United States would get through to their targets tend to be people with higher education and, re• lated to this, people in the. "better" occupations such as pro• fessional and managerial positions, though there is a steady increase in the number holding this opinion as one moves up in the occupational ladder. Those with higher incomes tend to express this opinion a little more than others but differ• ences are small. Those who are over 50 or under 20 tend not to hold this opinion as strongly as people in the other age brackets and men seem to hold this opinion more frequently than women do. Those who do not know or will not guess a radius of almost a 100 per cent mortality in the event of an A-bomb or H-bomb burst, also tend to think that few planes would get through on such a mission, or they refrain from even estimating how many would survive the defenses offered. For those who do make an estimate of the radius of such a maximum mortality area there is very little relationship be• tween the size of that estimate and their guess as to the num• ber of planes that could reach a target in their bombing mis• sion on the United States.

Although not asked in this study, because the previous ap• proach seemed clearer, two questions used in earlier surveys showed the same confidence in the effectiveness of our military defense. In August, 1951, almost 70 per cent of the metro• politan population thought that the military could prevent heavy damage to U.S. cities.

TABLE 4-11 OPINIONS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY DEFENSE IN 1950 AND 1951

Q.: "In case we have another world war, how well do you think the Army, Navy, and Air Forces could do in preventing air attacks on our cities ?"

September 1950 August 1951 Very well 15% 12% All right 41 42 Pro-con . 7 6 Poorly 15 11 Very poorly 3 2

Don't know 14 12 Not ascertained 5 15 100% 100%

61 TABLE 4-12 OPINIONS ON MILITARY PROTECTION IN 1950 AND 1951

Q.: "All in all, would you say the Army, Navy, and Air Forces could give our cities complete protection, protect them from heavy dam• age, or wouldn't be able to prevent heavy damage?

September 1950 August 1951

Complete protection 9% 16% Prevent heavy damage 39 52 Depends 4 1 Not prevent heavy damage 21 20 No protection at all 2 1

Don't know 11 4 Not ascertained 14 6 100% 100%

Weapons

There is no doubt that the predominant expectancy is that an attack on the United States would be an aerial bombardment. Virtually all of those who saw any prospect of an attack saw the attackers as using planes and bombs. A great majority thought that the bombs used on such a mission would be atomic bombs of some type. One out of 10 think that rockets and guided missiles would also be used. Other forms of attack are mentioned by only a few. Only six or seven per cent spontaneously mention possibilities of biological or chemical warfare. When they were directly asked the likelihood of such warfare appearing in an attack on the United States, the num• ber, who thought it likely, jumped to about one-third of the population. Though people know vaguely about the possibilities of such unconventional types of attack, there seems to be a feeling that the probability of their use is low.

62 TABLE 4-13 SPECIFIC TYPES OF ENEMY ATTACK EXPECTED

Q.; What sort of things do you think would be used against us in an attack?

Atomic bombs, H-bombs 62% Bombs (unspecified), planes 19 Rockets, guided missiles 10 Sea attack, submarines, warships 8 Germ warfare 7 Gas warfare 6 Sabotage, subversion, 5th column 5 Land invasion, paratroopers, troops 3 High explosive and/or incendiary bombs 2 Other 3 Don't know or not ascertained 9 No danger of attack 10

* Totals to more than 100% since several people mentioned more than one type.

TABLE 4^14 EXPECTATION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Q.: People who did not mention germ warfare spontaneously were asked the following: "How about germ warfare that spreads diseases? Do you think this is likely?"

Mentioned spontaneously and listed in 7% previous table Yes, germ warfare likely 28 Maybe, possibly, 50-50 chance 9 No 30 Don't know 9 Not ascertained 1 No danger of attack 16 100%

63 TABLE 4-15 EXPECTATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

Q.: People who did not mention gas warfare spontaneously were asked the following: "How about gas warfare that spread poisons? Do you think that is likely?"

Mentioned spontaneously and listed in previous table 6% Yes 27 Maybe, possibly, 50-50 chance 10 No 32 Don't know 8 Not ascertained 1 No danger of attack 16 100%

Weapons Effects

When people were asked the question, "If an atom bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed?" they tended to give answers that exceeded the official estimates given by the Atomic Energy Commission. This has been true for the last four years. With the increase in power of such weapons it may be that public estimate is now closer to the fact than it was when they made it first in 1950. Their estimates of the power of these weap• ons has indicated an opinion that their power was growing but the increase has not been very large. Back in 1950, and even . in the first tests at Bikini, people's expectancies of damage tended to be high.

Table 4-16 indicates the number of people making various estimates of the radii of maximum mortality for an Arbomb that might be used at the time the question was asked. Table 4-20 gives the data for similar estimates of H-bomb damage.

The questions on the Hydrogen Bomb were asked on only the last survey. Although people may not realize the size of a circle, described by the radius measurement they chose, or even have an adequate idea of what a mile is, it is still clear that people expect a rather extensive area of damage involving maximum mortality in either an A-bomb or H-bomb burst.

64 TABLE 4-16 MORTALITY RADIUS OF A-BOMB

Q.: If an atom-bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed?

Sept. 1950 April 1952 March 1954

One-quarter mile to 1 mile 17% 19% 20% Over 1 mile, to 5 miles 29 32 29 Over 5 miles, to 10 miles 23 25 16 Over 10 miles (included in 5-10) 17 Don't know 23 20 18 Not ascertained 8 4 _ Too% 100% 100%

TABLE 4-17 MORTALITY RADIUS OF A-BOMB BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Metro Over Under Rural Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 only

One-quarter mile to 1 mile 16% 23% 24% 18% 19% Over 1 mile, to 5 miles 29 39 28 27 27 Over 5 miles, to 10 miles 16 13 13 18 19 Over 10 miles 20 14 16 18 19 Don't know 19 11 19 18 15 Not ascertained * 1 1 100% 105% 100% 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

One wonders whether the events of last March in the Pa• cific made any difference in public estimates of H-bomb effec• tiveness or damage. The tests did increase the number of people who had heard of the H-bomb. It is also clear that the tests considerably raised the public estimate of H-bomb power.

The survey that was conducted in 1954 straddled the news of these tests. Half of the survey was conducted before

65 March 13th and half between then and March 31. News of the first explosion, involving supposed underestimates of explo• sive strength and the incident of the Japanese fishermen and the tuna catch, broke after the 13th of March. All interviews, therefore, preceded the public showing of the official film on Operation Ivy. Although these two halves of the sample are not exactly comparable, they are close enough to permit com• parisons. Looking at the last choice that was provided in the question "a radius of 20 miles or over" the number regarding this as the measure for maximum mortality jumped from 13 before the Pacific tests to 27 per cent after those tests. This is a big difference and too large to be due to any differences in the time before and afer samples. A check of appendix tables will show that the two halves of the sample were really quite similar.

The estimated power of the Atomic bomb made a similar but less spectacular jump in the over-10-mile group from 15 to 20 per cent. Perhaps a more significant finding is that radiation as a cause of death is an atomic attack moved from a choice made by 32 per cent to one made by 41 per cent fol• lowing the pacific tests. There was also a slightly significant change in the number regarding Civil Defense as useless or something they definitely did not want to think about. This group numbered three per cent before and seven per cent after the explosions of March 1954. General ideas on post-attack conditions showed no difference. The imminence or likelihood of war did not seem to change in any way. The number of planes likely to get through, did not alter, nor did the likelihood of attack on the U.S. if war came.

There is a close relationship between estimates of mortal• ity readius for the A-bomb and those made for the H-bomb. Three-quarters of those picking the minimum radius for the H-bomb also choose the minimum radius for the A-bomb. Nearly half of those who pick 20 miles or over as the H-bomb mortality radius also pick the last—over ten miles radius—in their estimate of A-bomb area.

People's estimates of the nature and severity of a bombing attack using atomic weapons involves more than just an esti• mate of the area or maximum destruction and fatality. Exactly what do people think will be the cause of most deaths in atomic attack? Table 4-24 indicates the number of people regarding various causes as resulting in "most of the deaths."

66 TABLE 4-18 INFORMATION ON H-BOMB

Q.: Have you heard about the hydrogen bomb?

Metro Over Under Rural Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 Nation only Yes 80% 88% 79% 80% 81% 82% No, or don't know 19 11 20 19 18 17 Not ascertained 1 1 1 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

TABLE 4-19 DO RUSSIANS HAVE H-BOMB?

Yes 43% Maybe 5 No 22 Not now; will have soon (within 1 yr.) 1 Don't know 11 Not ascertained 1 Had not heard of H-bomb 17 100%

TABLE 4-20 MORTALITY RADIUS OF H-BOMB

Q.: If an H-bomb hit a large city, how far away from where it fell do you think almost everybody would be killed?

Metro Over Under Rural Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 Nation only One-quarter up to 1 mile 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% One mile up to 5 miles 11 11 11 9 10 8 Five miles up to 10 miles 8 17 10 11 11 11 Ten miles up to 20 miles 16 16 13 14 14 14 Twenty miles or over 25 19 18 18 20 19 Have not heard of H-bomb 19 11 20 19 18 12 Don't know or not ascertained 20 25 26 28 26 35 155% 100% 100% 100% 100% 160%

67 TABLE 4-21 INFORMATION ABOUT THE H-BOMB BEFORE AND AFTER THE PACIFIC TEST NEWS OF MARCH 1954

Before After March 13 March 13 Have heard of H-bomb 80% 82% Have not heard of H-bomb 15 10 Don't know 4 7 Not ascertained 1 1 100% 100%

TABLE 4-22 ESTIMATES OF H-BOMB MAXIMUM MORTALITY RADIUS BEFORE AND AFTER THE PACIFIC TEST NEWS OF MARCH 1954

Before After March 13 March 13 One quarter mile up to 1 mile 2% 1% One up to 5 miles 12 8 Five up to 10 miles 12 9 Ten up to 20 miles 15 13 Twenty miles or over 13 27 Don't know or not ascertained how far 26 24 Has not heard of H-bomb or not ascertained whether has heard of H--Bomb 20 18 100% 100%

TABLE 4-23 ESTIMATES OF MAXIMUM MORTALITY RADIUS OF A-BOMB BEFORE AND AFTER THE PACIFIC TEST NEWS OF MARCH 1954

Before After March 13 March 13 One quarter to 1 mile 22% 17% Over 1, to 5 miles 29 29 Over 5, to 10 miles 17 15 Over 10 miles 15 20 Don't know 17 18 Not ascertained * 1 100% 100%

68 TABLE 4-24

RELATION OF ESTIMATED A-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO ESTIMATED H-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS

H-Bomb Mortality Radius Twenty Don't know Hae not heard 1/4 to One to Five to Ten to miles or of H-bomb or one mile S miles 10 mile a 20 mllea or over not ascertained N.A. A-Bomb Mortality Radlua 1/4 mile to one mile 15% 68% 31% 10% 8% 15% e% Over one mile to S miles 17 25 55 51 18 25 16 Over 5 miles to 10 mllea 4 3 9 24 25 16 13 Over 10 miles 4 2 3 13 41 17 16 Don't know 0 2 2 3 7 26 46 Not ascertained 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 100% ioo? "100% "TOO?, loo% "100% 100%

It is probably a little unfair to say that the public regards radiation as the major hazard. Although only 29 per cent men• tion blast, or concussion as a major cause of death, 26 per cent mention falling buildings or flying objects as a very real danger. It is fair to assume that many people regard this damage as a by-product of the blast or explosion itself. The correct interpretation seems to be that the public regards the causes of death in an atomic attack as rankable in the following order:

1. Blast and its effects.

2. Radiation.

3. Heat and fire.

It should be noted too that approximately one in ten mentions panic as a cause of death 1

The category titled "Gas fumes, smell, chemicals" also includes some people who thought they were talking about radi• ation. A large number of the population have heard about radiation but the idea has acquired a great number of synonyms. When people are talking about the results of an atomic explo• sion they frequently use language such as "that gas that the bomb gives off or "those fumes that come after the bomb." In some cases one can fairly see that they are in fact talking

69 about radiation effects, in other cases it is not quite as ap• parent.

Radiation comes out frequently and is possibly mentioned by more than half the population as a cause of death in an atomic attack.

A further question was asked that was focused on those dangers that might not necessarily be causes of death. The first question had been "From what you heard what causes most of the deaths in atomic attack?" It was followed by an• other: "What other dangers would there be do you think?" In response to this question, fire and burns received major men• tion. One in four realized that fire would be a danger, fol• lowing the dangers accompanying the atomic attack itself. One in ten mentioned the dangers of food and water contamination and a similar per cent mentioned dangers of "hot" areas. Radiation crops up again under various guises as a continuing danger following atomic attack.

TABLE 4-25 CAUSES OF DEATH IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK

Q.: From what you've heard, what causes most of the deaths in atomic attack?

April 1952 March 1954 Radiation, rays 19% 37% Blast, concussion, the explosion 20 29 Falling buildings, debris, flying objects 5 26 Gas fumes, smell, chemicals 15 18

Heat, the flash ) 91 12 Fire ) " 7 Panic 3 9 "The bomb" 1 1 Other 1 11 Don't know 12 13 Not ascertained 3 1 100%* 164% Comments: 72% of those who mentioned one cause mentioned a second cause. 64% of the total population mentioned two causes. * (Double mentions were not coded on the 1952 study, so the two columns should not be compared except in terms of the order of frequencies)

70 TABLE 4-26 OTHER DANGERS FROM AN ATOMIC ATTACK

Q.: What other dangers would there be do you think? {in an atomic attack)

Burns, fires (non-radiation) (or burns unspecified) 24% of the population Other miscellaneous dangers 23 Food and water contamination 11 Hot areas, burns (radiation) 10 Shock 7 Radiation sickness 5 Diseases (not radiation caused) 4 Shortages, food, drugs, medical services, etc. 2 Don't know 20 Not ascertained 21 Comments: 77% of those who mentioned one cause mentioned a second cause. 24% of the total population mentioned two causes.

If one looks at Tables 4-24 and 4-25 and imagines that the list of categories describes the types of danger that are seen by the average member of the public, one can imagine the sur• vivor of an atomic attack, thankful that he is alive at all, but fearful of what might still be in store. If on Table 4-26 one rules out blast, concussion, the explosion, heat, flash, and "the bomb" one is left with dangers that are perhaps still con• tinuing. What are they? The survivor is still conscious of dangers from radiation, from fire, from panic, from food and water and occasionally, from the very ground at which he is looking. The possibilities for rumor and disorganization are very high among a population who see these dangers as exist• ing.

What are seen as the later effects of an atomic attack? Our question did not focus on the details of effects in the area actually hit. We were, instead, interested in a combination of the respondent's estimate of how severe and widespread an atomic attack on the United States would be and also what ef• fects he saw as following whatever attack he imagined. The question we used was "What do you think things would be like in the United States a month or so after an atomic attack (if

71 there was one)?" From one point of view this is not a good question for the simple reason that its answers were vague and emotional. Thirty per cent of respondents gave answers that were entirely emotional, such as, "Oh my God it would be terrible, I can't imagine what it would be like, it would be horrible." Such an answer gives a clear picture of the re• spondent's reaction but a rather vague description of the actual state of affairs.

It may also be that for half the population there is no con• tent or imagery when they think of post-attack conditions. Perhaps the question worked perfectly. Simple probing would suggest that it did. As Ude* suggests: "Everyone is aware that atomic bombs exist and . could be delivered against our cities, but most people fail to realize the consequences of such an event Rational thinking stops at the very point of the atomic or hydrogen explosion After the explosion the uncontrolled thinking sets in; there is chaos, doom for all' humanity, suicide, and immediate defeat or victory."

Forty per cent gave answers which mentioned or listed various types of results expected from an atomic attack. Such verbal descriptions were given about half and half by those who saw the results as comparable to the heavy bombings toward the end of World War H and those who showed the picture in a much darker light involving multiple bomb drops on various cities in the United States and rather dire conditions resulting therefrom. Major emphasis seems to be given to mentions of physical damage, the wreckage of cities, and the loss of physi• cal establishment.

Of about equal importance are health, psychological and economic conditions. Under economic the major emphasis is on losses, scarcities and interruptions in various economic services. Under "health" by far the major emphasis is given to the loss of life and care of the dead. An equal number picture the psychological effects in a demoralized and partly dependent public. A few see advantageous psychological effects in terms of high moral and concerted purpose. Housing prob• lems are not mentioned specifically by very many--only five per cent of the population, but 22 per cent do say that areas

iklfi, Fred C., "The Social Versus the Physical Effects from Nuclear Bombing," Scientific Monthly, Vol. LXXVm, No. 3, March 1954.

72 would be wiped out and that large sections would be in ruin. (Tables on this material are in the Appendix.)

Atomic Tests in Nevada--Summer 1953

One can often get some measure of public opinion and mood from reactions to certain specific events. The attention that is given these events, the degree to which they are re• called and attitudes regarding them are often revealing. The one covered in the survey was the well publicized and even televized atomic explosion in the Nevada desert during the summer of 1953. These latter tests included the automobiles, houses, mannikins, troops, and so forth, which later received considerable- publicity.

The audience for the summer atomic-tests in Nevada was impressively large. About 70 per cent of the nation saw it or heard or read about it. One-third saw some part of the tests on either TV or on newsreels.

Further, nearly half of the population feel that they learned something from these tests. What this something was, however, varies greatly from person to person. Certainly the sheer power of the bombs used was most impressive. The majority of people reacted to only the physical features of the spectacle.

Nevertheless, a sizeable proportion feel that they learned things pertinent to their own chances of survival. At least one- fifth of the nation see better chances of survival as a result of something they learned out of the tests.

One-third still want information but by and large it is either general knowledge which they feel they do not have, technical, authoritative information on time and distance factors or "how to" information.

Overall the public reaction seems to have been one of con• siderable interest and a general, positive evaluation of the worth of such tests. The most impressive feature is the spread of attention across the country. Both men and women, young and middle-aged, metropolitan residents and rural people knew of these tests about equally well.

73 TABLE 4-30 AUDIENCE FOR THE NEVADA TESTS

Q.: Did you hear about or see the televised test explosions of atomic bombs out West in Nevada last summer?

Audience 69% Uncertain 1 Don't remember tests 30 100% (See Table 8-4 for rural population)

TABLE 4-31 MEDIA FOR THE NEVADA TESTS

Q.: Did you hear about it, read about it, or did you see it?

For those re- For the Nation membering the tests Remember seeing it on TV 27% 39% Remember seeing it on newsreels 6 8 Read about it in newspapers or magazines 15 22

Heard about it on the radio 4 5 Heard about it from somebody 3 5 Other ways 14 21 ~69% • ~100%

74 TABLE 4-32 NOTABLE THINGS ABOUT THE TESTS

Q.: What things were most interesting about the test explosions?

Percent of Percent of Percent of Mentions Audience Nation

Power of the bomb, distance or extent of damage, blast and heat effects. 36% 46% 31% Physical features of the explosion—cloud, fireball, visual effects. 22 28 19 Frightening, horrible, terrible. 6 7 5 Limitations of the bomb—damage less than expected. 4 5 4 Survival in terms of protection in or near blast area—dummies safe, etc. 9 11 8 Survival in terms of distance—troops, other personnel safe. 11 14 9 Radiation danger, severe "hot" areas. .8 .7 .5 Radiation not too bad—people moving in soon. .6 .8, 1 Specific mention of "fire." .3 .4 .5 Other 6 8 5 Not Ascertained 4 5 3 T00%~ (I26%7- "(86%7# * Totals to 126 per cent since 21 per cent of the audience mentioned two notable items and 5 per cent mentioned three. # Totals to 86 per cent, although only 69 per cent are included in the column, 31 per cent who did not remember the tests are omitted. Fourteen per cent men• tioned two items and 3 per cent mentioned three items.

75 TABLE 4-33 THE TESTS AS AN EDUCATIONAL' DEVICE

Q.: Do you feel that you learned anything from it? How do you mean?

Felt they learned something 46% Felt they learned nothing 21 Not ascertained 3 Tests missed 30 100%

TABLE 4-34 WHAT WAS LEARNED?

How powerful the bomb is 18% How limited the bomb is in power 2 What the explosion looked like 8 ' How frightening it is 2 Survival possible near blast area shelters, dummies, etc. 4 Survival possible not too far away— troops near 4 Felt they had a better chance of surviving* 9 Felt need for a better defense & CD program* 3 Felt there was no chance except in flight or escape* 1 Miscellaneous 4 Something learned—not ascertained what 2 * These respondents actually stated an application of what they had seen to their own feelings and personal situation.

76 General Attitudes Toward Civil Defense

After reading the whole, hour-long interview that was taken with each respondent, it was possible to get a fairly good esti• mate of a person's general feelings and information in the area of Civil Defense. The distribution of attitudes so obtained is perhaps more indicative of the distribution of reactions to Civil Defense than is the answer to any single question (which, after all, deals with a single aspect of the problem under investiga• tion) .

For one-third of the population Civil Defense does not seem to be known. These people may have heard of the bomb and they have ideas about the imminence of war and they may even have received some information on protection. However, Civil Defense as an organization, as an agency or as an effort seems to be pretty well unknown to them. This is not just a question of ignorance of terminology but a lack of information regarding ongoing Civil Defense activities. One-quarter of the adult population of the nation have information about Civil De• fense and what it is doing, although, in many cases, the level of information is not very high, but they do not feel at all in• volved in the problems and express no concern or interest in Civil Defense.

Sixteen per cent are informed of the activities of Civil De• fense, are also convinced of the value of such effort, and are willing to participate and cooperate. Another 12 per cent are equally convinced of the value of Civil Defense but are quite willing to leave the task to somebody else who feels more in• volved or to other people whom they feel should be more re• sponsible. Three per cent report some knowledge of Civil De• fense and also a feeling of guilt that they are not, themselves, Involved. Four per cent feel that Civil Defense is unnecessary. One per cent feel that it is useless and one per cent spontan• eously express the feeling that the effort is disorganized.

Looking at people who reside in metropolitan areas includ• ing the suburbs, one finds that those who are nearest "downtown" show the greatest incidence of people reporting no information at all of Civil Defense. The number of people reporting Civil De• fense information rises steadily as one moves further and fur• ther away from the downtown area out into the distant suburbs where information is high and civil defense is accepted as a necessity to a greater extent. 77 TABLE 4-35

GENERALIZED ATTITUDE TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE

Metro• Total poli• Sub• Over Under Rural Popu• tan urban 50,000 50,000 only lation CD is necessary, feels a duty 13 27 17 14 14 16 Guilty, should be in CD 2 5 3 4 4 3 Somebody sure should do It 19 22 11 9 7 12 Not opposed to CD, but bland, nondescript and pathetic 25 20 25 24 24 24

CD is disorganized, no plan 1 1 1 1 • 1 CD is unpopular - * * * * - CD is useless, hopeless 2 1 1 1 1 1 CD is unnecessary 5 2 4 3 4 4 Refuses to think about war, too terrible 4 6 2 3 2 3 Civil Defense not known 28 15 35 40 42 34 Other 1 * 1 1 * 1 Not ascertained * - * * 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% loo% * Less than one per cent

The situation is, also, different for various population- concentration areas. One finds that Civil Defense is best known in metropolitan suburban areas and that it becomes an area of greater public ignorance as one moves toward less populated and rural regions. One finds the highest amount of willingness to participate in Civil Defense in the metropolitan suburbs and in this same area of willingness one finds the metropolitan dweller no more eager and willing to work for Civil Defense than rural people.

78 Chapter 5

CIVIL DEFENSE INFORMATION

Outside of the efforts to organize, train, and build up a stockpile of needed reserves, one of the major functions for Civil Defense in the extended period of the present is a matter of information for the public at large. Information regarding the probability of attack does not fall within the responsibility of Civil Defense. However, information on protection and sur• vival measures certainly falls within its area of responsibility.

Two years ago 63 per cent of the American population had some information about what should be done in the way of per• sonal protection in the event of an atomic bomb attack. This per cent, already fairly high, increased to 78 per cent by 1954. Most of this information centered around protection in terms of shelter. Almost all of the behaviors that were reported in• volved going into a basement or cellar or getting under the table, avoiding windows, covering exposed parts of the body, lying-face down, going into a corner, or protecting food and water. Hardly anybody reported receiving information on evacuation. With the type of information described, prominent in the public mind, it is not surprising that virtually nobody reports having taken any concrete steps for his own or his family's safety in case of an atomic bomb attack. Only six per cent report any such behaviors at all and many of them cover steps that would be normal household preparedness for any accident, such as a first aid kit.

Far fewer people report having received any information about what to do after an atomic bomb attack. Two years ago less than one third reported having any information in this area. However, in the last two years this number has in• creased to 40 per cent. Most of the things reported deal with the avoidance of contiminated food and water or how to get rid of contaminated clothing, and with the importance of waiting for instructions in post-attack operations.

79 TABLE 5-1 INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC BOMB ATTACK

Q.: Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do for his own safety and his family's safety if there were an atom bomb attack?

April 1952 March 1954 Had information 63% 78% Had no information 36 20 Don't know or not ascertained 1 2 100% 100%

TABLE 5-2 SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC BOMB ATTACK

Q.: What were some of the things you heard that a person ought to do? (If there were an atom attack?)

April 1952 March 1954 Go into basement, shelter, cellar, trenches, holes 36% 44% Get under table, away from windows, next to walls 23 22 Cover exposed parts of body 21 22 Lie face down' 24 16 Store and cover food and water 7 10 Stay inside, remain in home 7 6 Build shelters, prepare home 3 5 Turn off gas, lights, heat 6 5 Have medical kit, bandages ready 2 3 Get official instructions, listen to radio 3 3 Close windows and doors 4 2 Avoid contaminated food and water 3 2 Have fire fighting kit ready - 1 Flee the city - 1 Don't panic, keep cool 1 1 Others 6 11 No specific information on what to do 31 25 Comments: on 1954 study: 75% mentioning one 55% mentioning two 29% mentioning three

80 TABLE 5-3 SPECIFIC SAFETY MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN IN CASE OF ATTACK

Q.: Is there anything in particular you have already done for your own (or your family's) safety in case of an atom bomb attack?

No, have done nothing 71% Yes, Have done something 6 First aid kit ready 2% Stored food 2 Shelter area fixed 1 Other 3 Have received no protective information 22 Not ascertained 1 100% Comments: 6% mentioning one safety measure 1% mentioning two safety measures

TABLE 5-4 INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC BOMB ATTACK

Q.: Have you heard or read anything about what a person ought to do to take care of himself or his family AFTER an atomic bomb attack? What do you know about what a person ought to do for his own safety and his family's safety after an atom bomb attack?

April 1952 March 1954 Had no information 70% 59% Had information 29 40 Avoid contamination of food and water 12% 14% Wait for instructions, clear signal 10 11 Burn, wash clothing, bathe self 7 6 Help others, first aid, food, shelter, etc. 3 5 Avoid contaminated areas 2, 4 Help others (general) - 1 Yes, but not ascertained what 7 6 Other 10 8 Not ascertained 1 1 100% 100% Comments: 34% mentioning one precaution 15% mentioning two precautions

81 Specific information on protection is generally received most frequently by the professional, managerial and white col• lar occupations. Women are a little more conscious of such safety steps than men, and residents of metropolitan suburbs are definitely more conscious of these needs than people down town or in less urbanized areas. Those with higher incomes tend to report more information in this area, and of those with some college education, all have virtually some information on protection information. Most of those with some high school education also have some information in this area but approxi• mately one-third of those with less education cannot think of any protection information. Very few differences exist by age except in the over 65-year-old group in which information is lower than in the other age levels.

Information on what to do after an attack seems by and large to be held by about the same type of persons. Metro• politan suburban dwellers again come out high as do succes• sively higher education levels and income rates. Women, how• ever, have a little less knowledge in this area but professional people are especially well informed. Only one-third of this occupational group could recall no information about what to do after an attack.

When people were asked whether they received such pro• tection information often, occasionally, or never, the majority report receiving it occasionally. Approximately one quarter of the population say that they hear it often. The number report• ing in the various groupings has not changed during the past two years. In the interview people were pushed a little fur• ther and asked how they felt about the information that they re• ceived. About one-third of the population reported that the In• formation they get is adequate and accurate enough to satisfy them. However, a little less than a quarter feel that the in• formation they have received is inadequate, though they ars satisfied with the accuracy of what they have already received. Virtually nobody reports inaccuracy or error in the type of in• formation they have gained. Only two per cent regard public information as confusing, inconsistent and not to the point.

Those with more information than others tend to regard the information they have obtained as accurate. They also, since they hold more information, report more feelings of both the adequacy and inadequacy of such information. For instance,

82 TABLE 5-5 FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION

Q.: Would you say you've heard about these things pretty often, now and again, or what?

April 1952 March 1954

Often 21% 23%

Occasionally, now and again ) 41 43 Once, or twice ) 4

Never 1 *

Don't know * *

Not ascertained 3 8

Had no safety information 32 24 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 5-6 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED

Q.: How do you feel about the information you get?

Accurate and/or adequate 30% Accurate but inadequate 22 Welcome 5 True but wrong sort of information 1 Confusing, inconsistent 1 Frightening 1 Inaccurate Better than previously Other 4 Don't know 2 Not ascertained 10 Had no information 24 100%

83 since only eight per cent of people with incomes over $7, 500 per year say they receive no information, as compared with 51 per cent of persons with incomes under $2,000, there is a greater percentage who can choose between the adequacy or inadequacy of the information they receive. In spite of this the better informed are more conscious of the inadequacy of their information than are the less informed.

Respondents were asked to mention the type of information regarding Civil Defense or atomic war that they would like to know more about.1 A little over one-third of the population reported no interest in further information. However, a simi• lar third expressed interest in a variety of things most of which indicated the difficulty of even posing a question in the area. Many of them simply said they wanted information. The bulk of the informational needs seem to be centered around protection information. Very few expressed the need for fur• ther information about organized Civil Defense.

Conelrad

A further area of information that was investigated on this survey was the degree of knowledge of the recently instituted Conelrad. Standing for control of electronic radiation, this is a procedure that would eliminate the navigational assistance offered by radio broadcasting stations to aerial attackers and still permit the continuation of radio broadcasting for informa• tional purposes. The procedure calls for nationwide broadcast• ing on two wave lengths only, 640 and 1240 KC. Respondents were asked where they would tune in on their radio if they used it as a source for information in the event of an attack. Only about one in eight have responses which indicated a clear knowledge of Conelrad and some of these were not exactly sure of the location of the stations on the radio dial. About one in 11 said they would merely spin the dial until they found some information. Behavior of this sort would undoubtedly result in their eventually finding one of the Conelrad wave lengths. Sixty-five per cent of the population mentioned other wave lengths or stations which were apparently favorites for them and regarded as good sources for authoritative information. Undoubtedly some of these would be in the neighborhood of the

iSee Withey,S.B., "Preliminary Report of a Survey on Civil Defense," S.R.C., Univ. of Mich., April 1954.

84 Conelrad wave lengths and the absence of radio broadcasting would cause no concern to the hearers. It is doubtful however whether many of the stations specifically mentioned by people across the United States would fall in too close proximity to the two selected wave lengths. The number reporting knowledge of Conelrad is higher for those with more education than aver• age, for those in the "better" occupations (it is lowest of all among farmers), for those in the higher income brackets, and those in the 30 to 50-year-old age brackets. It is highest among those who mention three things to do in the event of an atomic attack. Only three per cent of those who had no

TABLE 5-7 INFORMATION DESIRED ABOUT ATOMIC WAR OR CIVIL DEFENSE

Q.: Is there anything else about civil defense or atomic war that you would like to know more about?

Total Sub• Over Under Popu• Metro urban 50,000 50,000 lation Civil Defense—How respondent can help 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% Civil Defense—How to protect oneself 9 10 7 11 10 Civil Defense--What CD does 3 4 5 4 4 Atomic War--How can it be prevented _ 1 _ * * Atomic War—Information on weapons or weapons effects 2 2 4 5 4 General information (lists many specifics) 27 38 37 34 34 Our preparedness, state of defenses 1 1 1 1 What to do if exposed but survived 1 3 2 1 1 Other 4 1 3 2 3 Not ascertained 2 2 2 4 3 No 50 36 38 36 39 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Leas than one per cent

85 TABLE 5-8 USE OF RADIO AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION IN TIME OF ATTACK

Q.: If you heard a warning and wanted to get some more information about what was going on and what to do, where would you try to get it?

Nation Rural only Tune in radio 35% 34% Other sources 48 42 Don't know 13 17 Not ascertained 4 7 100% 100%

TABLE 5-9 KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD

Q.: (If Radio mentioned): Where would you tune in? (If Radio not mentioned): If you tried a radio, where would you tune in?

Nation Rural only Shows knowledge of Conelrad 12% 7% Would juat spin the dial 9 8 Tuning probably incorrect (local station mentioned, which in a few cases might be correct) 65 72 Don't know 10 8 Not ascertained 4 5 100% 100% information on protection showed or reported knowledge of Conelrad. It would seem that the . concrete nature of Conelrad is an actual step in Civil Defense preparedness of the nation as a whole and would add considerable conviction to people's beliefs regarding the need for Civil Defense.

The increase in knowledge of Conelrad would also probably lead to greater dependence on radio as a means of information

86 in the event of an attack. When people were asked where they would try to get information in such a situation only about one- third of the population reported they would tune in a radio. Forty per cent said they would use the telephone usually to call a public agency such as the police. It is very likely that an increase of knowledge of Conelrad would lead to a change of the number picking the telephone for news regarding an event of possibly national proportions. (ThiB matter is further dis• cussed in Chapter 7.)

TABLE 5-10 KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNALS Q.: Do you know what the warning signal is which teUs people that enemy planes are headed for your city (town)? What is it? Do you know the signal that says the danger has passed? What is it?

Over Under Metro Suburbs 50,000 50,000 Nation Correct on both signals 16% 16% 14% 3% 9% Correct on warning only 18 13 7 2 -7 Correct on all-clear only 5 4 8 1 4 Don't know or wrong on both 61 64 56 18 39 No air raid signals in area _ 3 17 76 41 106% 166% 166% 100% 166% As a comparison, a question asked in April, 1952 asked for knowledge of Just the "warning signal." It was not checked against local availability of signals or against the local report of what the signal was, both of which were done for the table above. From Study in April, 1952 Correct knowledge of warning signal 10% Know there is some sort of signal 33 Don't know 55 Not ascertained 2 166%

87 Again the characteristics of people who know about Conel• rad are similar to the charactistics of the informed in other areas. Again the "better" occupations, those with more edu• cation, and those with higher income indicate more knowledge. There is virtually no difference between men and women and only the extreme in the age range, at the older end, seem to have less information of Conelrad.

Those with knowledge of Conelrad also showed, by their responses, that they were better informed in other areas--in knowledge of what to do after warning of an attack or what to do after an attack. They also received civil defense informa• tion more often than those whose predicted behavior in trying to get radio information during the time of warning or attack showed that they had not included the knowledge of Conelrad into their plans and behaviors.

Warning Signals

Another area of information that was covered in the survey dealt with information and knowledge of warning signals. Ac• cording to the results of the survey 59 per cent of the popula• tion fall into a community area in which there are at present air raid signals or warnings. Information or knowledge about these signals is fairly wide-spread but when respondents were asked to report the nature of the signal, and to differentiate the warning from the all clear, considerable confusion and mis• information was evident. Taking metropolitan areas alone, which are now all equipped with warning devices only 16 per cent were able to correctly report both signals. An additional 23 per cent were right on one signal or another. About the same proportions hold for the metropolitan suburbs. Knowledge of these signals, however, has increased during the last two years, both in terms of information regarding the existence of a signal and correct knowledge of the nature of the signals themselves. But the increase has not been very large.

It would seem that correct knowledge of the warning signals is not better known than correct knowledge of Conelrad. How• ever, over 60 per cent of those who were right on both signals were incorrect on Conelrad; and 15 per cent of those who had no air raid signals in their area would still fare all right with Conelrad. Those who are right on one signal or another, or

88 TABLE 5-11 RELATIONSHIP OF KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD TO KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL Correct on Correct on Correct on Don't know No air raid both warning all-clear - or wrong signals ln signals only only on both area Shows knowledge of Conelrad 23% 13% 25% 13% 8% Would just spin the dial 12 8 10 10 7 Tuning probably incorrect 55 67 49 60 73 Don't know S 11 12 14 7 Not ascertained 5 1 4 3 5 100% 100% 155% 100% 155%

TABLE 5-12 RELATIONSHIP OF FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION TO KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL Correct on Correct on Correct on Don't know No air raid both warning all-clear - or wrong signals in signals only only on both area

, Often 34% 34* 37% 22% W% Occasionally 53 51 49 42 36 Once or twice 1 3 0 5 4 * Never 0 0 0 0 * Don't know 0 0 0 * * • Not ascertained s 7 10 9 7 Had no safety Information 7 5 4 32 34 100% 100% 100% 100% 155%

TABLE 5-13 RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL TO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK Correct on Correct on Correct on Don't know No air raid both warning all-clear - Or wrong signals In signals only only on both area Had no Informa• tion 7% 3% 2% 10% 29% Remember nothing specific 1 2 0 3 4 Mentioned one pro tectlve measure 9 e 8 16 22 Mentioned two 20 32 27 26 24 Mentioned three 54 54 63 36 21 100% 100% T55% 100% 100%

89 both, seem to get civil defense information with about equal frequency. Knowledge of the all clear was also related to having information about what to do after an atomic attack.

TABLE 5-14 RELATIONSHIP OF INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK TO KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL Correct on Correct on Correct on Don't know No air raid both warning all-clear - or wrong signals ln signals only only on both area

Had no informa• tion 32% 42% 2T% 60% 70% Had heard or read something, but remembered noth• ing specific 5 5 6 6 7 Mentioned one pre• caution 32 28 36 18 12 Mentioned two pre• cautions 31 25 27 15 9 Not ascertained 0 0 4 1 2 100% Too% 100% I6o% 100%

Media The most notable change over the past two years has been in the number reporting that they got their Civil Defense in• formation via television. One-third of the metropolitan sub• urban dwellers so report. In 1950, three per cent of metro• politan residents reported television, in 1951, eight per cent, in 1952, 15 per cent and in 1954 about 30 per cent. This is a substan• tial and significant growth. After an increase from '50 to '52^ radio, as a media, dropped off fairly heavily between ' 52 and ' 54. In metropolitan areas television is the major medium. Elsewhere, newspapers continue to be the major source of information and news. Who has been reached? The important question in the area of civil defense information is what information has been communicated and who received it.

2See Belknap, George, "Civil Defense in the United States, 1952." S:R.C, Univ. of Mich., Oct. 1952, Table 29, p. 30.

90 TABLE 5-15 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION

Q.: Where have you heard or read about these things that ought to be done? (In case of an atomic attack)

April 1952 March 1 Newspapers 37% 32% Television 11 19 Radio 26 17 Magazines 19 15 Pamphlets, booklets 14 11 Personal contacts 7 5 Exhibits, formal talks, posters, CD cards 7 5 Movies 3 3 Other 12 4 * * * Totals more than 100 per cent since many persons mentioned two media.

TABLE 5-16 SAFETY INFORMATION MEDIA BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Over Under Metro Suburbs 50,000 50,000 Newspapers 27% 42% 37% 29% TV 27 32 22 13 Radio 16 15 15 19 Magazines 11 11 11 18 Pamphlets 11 26 14 5 Personal contacts 7 4 4 5 Exhibits 5 8 3 5 Movies 5 1 3 3 Other 7 4 4 3 Don't know - 2 1 2 Not ascertained 12 6 7 8 No information 19 8 24 29 Comments: % with one mention 69 84 68 61 % with two mentions 47 59 45 39

Protection information is still the area which is most fre• quently reported. Although some people talk about evacuation it is virtually never reported as an area of official policy or recommended behavior. However, protection information that 91 is held is broadly held. It is rare that information of this type gets much above the eighty per cent level.

Some people do not read. Others are too poor to have much contact with the mass media. A few are too busy to have such contact. Some have problems with the English language. A certain number are not very bright and have trouble assimilating any information. A very few are scared and would rather not pay any attention to such matters. Some are isolated and a few feel so safe that it is a waste of time to read such material. There will always be people of these types and communicating to them is exceedingly difficult.

Post-attack information is not as broadly held as pre- attack information. Conelrad is not well known. Air raid warning signals are known but warning and all clear are not clearly discriminated.

People in the metropolitan suburbs continue to be the best informed and the ones who are reached most frequently. As one leaves the large city areas ignorance does increase rapid• ly but the quality of the information does decrease. Neverthe• less, even in small towns and rural areas only about one in three are without any information on what to do at the time of an atomic attack. A significant finding is that people in metro• politan downtown areas—as residents—in what might be regarded as the bull's eye, are not as well informed as people further out in the metropolitan complex.

These various areas of information discussed in this chap• ter seem to be related to each other. There is no single area of information that appears to be held to the exclusion of other areas. People who are well informed about the effects of atomic weapons also tend to be more informed about means of protection, about types of warning and other steps that have been taken in an organized fashion. Those who are in the pro• fessional, managerial or skilled professions, those with higher income, those with better education, and those in the middle age group tend to have more information in these areas than other people do. These people also, of course, tend to have a larger degree of contact with the mass media, with other people, and with various sources of information.

92 Chapter 6

COMMUNITY CIVIL DEFENSE Recent or current knowledge of community civil defense activity has increased somewhat in the last two years. How• ever, there is little knowledge of state or federal Civil De• fense activity reported. Knowledge of the need for volunteers has increased tremendously--from 25 per cent to 44 per cent. Two-thirds of metropolitan-suburban dwellers know of the need. TABLE 6-1 KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT LOCAL CD ACTIVITY

Q.: Have you heard or read anything recently about what civil defense people are doing or planning to do in your community? What did you hear or read? April March 'Rural 1952 1954 1954 Had information 19% 24% 18% Training people, first aid, auxiliary police and firemen 6 6* Getting organized, appropriating money 4 4 Building shelters 2 1 Getting information out to people 2 2 Recruiting people 2 3 Air raid drills, exercises 2 2 Have heard or read something, don't know what 3 2 Other activities 3 7 Have not heard or read anything recently about civil defense in local community 81 76 81

N A whether heard anything 1 100% 100% 100% * 5% of the population mentioned two activities of local CD. 2% of the rural population mentioned two activities of local CD.

93 A smaller number know of civil defense in their neighbor• hood than had recently heard of civil defense in their larger community. The highest knowledge of neighborhood civil de• fense (28 per cent) exist in metropolitan suburbs. Agewise such information is most frequently held by the 40 to 50- year age group. Those under 20 and over 65 have the least infor• mation about Civil Defense in their immediate locale. When it comes to information on community civil defense, however, the teen-agers are as well informed as the rest. Only the older people remained less informed of Civil Defense in their com• munity .

Knowledge of Civil Defense in schools has changed but slightly in two years. It stands at about one in four. One half of those in metropolitan suburbs, however, know of such school activity. More than one in three of all teen-agers in our sample (16-19 years old) know of Civil Defense in schools. This is teen-agers above 16 years old across the nation. Adults in their thirties or forties are similarly acquainted with civil defense in schools. This is the age level at which one would expect people to have children in school. Older people and the adults in their twenties less frequently report such information.

Knowledge of civil defense at work has not changed at all during the last two years. This information is most widely known in the greater metropolitan areas.

When one takes a moderate size sample of this kind, across the face of the nation, the number of Civil Defense workers who fall in the sample is very small. For this reason they cannot be analyzed as a group by themselves.

The turnover in these groups is, however, apparent from the fact that we obtained 24 people currently in Civil Defense and 16 who had been in Civil Defense but were not at the time of interview. Over half of the 24 had had their training over a year ago. It is unfair to evaluate training effectiveness from so small a group. Only a study of Civil Defense work• ers could do justice to this area of interest.

94 TABLE 6-2 ADDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE OF STATE OR FEDERAL CD ACTIVITY

Q.: Anything else that the state or federal government may be doing? National Rural Had no information 82% 87% Had Information 16 10 Appropriating money 1% Getting information out to people 2 1 General planning 2 1 Nothing, just talk 7 5 Other 4 3 Not ascertained 2 3 100% 100%

, TABLE 6-3 KNOWLEDGE OF NEED FOR CD WORKERS A.: Have you heard or read anything about asking people to get Into civil defense work?

Metro Over Under Nation Nation Metro Sub. 50,000 50,000 1954 1952 Yes 55% 63% 49% 33% 44% 25% No 43 35 50 66 55 74 Don't know 1 2 1 1 1 1 Not ascertained 1 * * 100% 100% 100% T6o% Too% Too% Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-4 KNOWLEDGE OF NEED FOR CD WORKERS IN 1952 Small Small Town Metro Urban City and Rural National Yes 45% ' 34% 18% 15% 25% No, don't know 54 66 80 84 74 Not ascertained 1 _ 2 1 1 100% T6o% 100% 100% 100%

95 TABLE 6-5 KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN NEIGHBORHOOD Q.: Is there a. civil defense program ln your neighborhood ae far as you know? Yes 17% of population No or don't know 82 Not now but there used to be * Not ascertained 1 Ioo% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-6 KNOWLEDGE OR NEIGHBORHOOD CD BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Metro Over Under Metro Sub. 50,000 50,000 Rural Yes 22% 28% 16% 14% 11% No or don't know 76 69 84 85 86 Not now but there used to be: 1 * - * * Not ascertained * 2 * * 1 100% 100% 100% Too% 100% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-7 KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT LOCAL CD ACTIVITY BY AGE 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 St over Had information 25% 21% 28% 27% 20% 13% Had no information 75 79 71 72 80 86 Not ascertained 0 * 1 1 0 1 Too% Ioo% 100% 100% 100% 100%

TABLE: 6-8 KNOWLEDGE OF CD IN NEIGHBORHOOD BY AGE 16-IB 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 ft over Yes 13% 16% 19% 33% 17% 11% NO ' or Don't know 86 84 80 77 82 87 Not now but there used to be 0 0 # 0 0 0 Not ascertained 1 0 1 * 1 1 100% 100% 100% I5o% 100% 105% * LesB than one per cent

96 TABLE 8-9 KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN SCHOOLS

Q.: Do you know of anything that the schools are doing in civil defense? April IS52 March 1954 Yes 29% 26% No, don't know 70 73 Not now but there was or used to be - 1 Not ascertained 1 * 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-9 KNOWLEDGE OF CD IN SCHOOLS BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Sub- Over Under Metro urban 50,000 50,000 Rural Yes 39% 48% 33% 13% 8% No, don't know 60 49 66 86 90 Not now but there was or used to be 2 * a 1 Not ascertained * * * * 1 100% 100% T6o% T6o% 100% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-10 KNOWLEDGE OF CD IN SCHOOLS BY AGE 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 & over

Yes 38% 28% 33% 36% 18% 11% No - don't know 61 72 66 82 82 88 Not now but there was or used to be 0 * 1 1 * 0 Not ascertained 1 0 * 1 * 1 100% 100% ~T00% 100% 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

97 TABLE 6-11 KNOWLEDGE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AT WORK Q.: Is there anything going on in civil defense where you or any member of your family works? April March 1952 1954 Yes 12% 12% No or don't know ol any 86 74 Not now but there was or used to be - * Not ascertained 2 1 Inap. —no one in family works, worker works at home # 13 100% 100% * Less than one per cent * Included in "No or don't know of any."

TABLE 6-12 KNOWLEDGE OF CD AT WORK BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Sub- Over Under Metro urban 50,000 50,000 Yea 20% 27% 12% 6% No 71 64 79 75 Not now but there was or uBed to be * _ _ _ Not ascertained * * * 2 No one in family works, or worker works at home 8 8 9 17 100% 100% 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-13 CIVIL DEFENSE WORK Q.; Have you had any civil defense job (since World War H}? Are you now in civil defense?

Now in civil defense *2% of population Have had civil defense job since World War H 1 No civil defense job now or since World War U 93 Not ascertained and don't know 4 100% *The figure In 1952 was also 2 per cent

98 Willingnesa to Volunteer Willingness to volunteer for civil defense, as measured in only one area of willingness, increased substantially. It is interesting that willingness is especially high among the 16-to- 19-year-olds. Eighty per cent of them indicated such willing• ness. It is true that people of this age are eager to assume an adult role and to do significant things and, also, they are at an age when activity and joining are popular. Also one must keep in mind that they have made fewer committments to other interests and responsibilities.

The question that we used probably reflects a feeling of the worth of civl defense but it does not come to grips with the real problem of actually committing time. It is interest• ing that whatever the reasons are for saying "yes, I would sign up for 2 or 3 hours a week," the number of people say• ing so increases as one gets into less populated areas and further away from what might be regarded as realistic, target areas. Considering the fact that the question includes " to learn about Civil Defense," it may reflect interest in infor• mation rather than interest in work.

Although "family responsibilities" is a frequently given reason for the lack of ability to join civil defense, and al• though such a reason is frequently justifiable, family size is not in itself a deterrent to willingness. The highest incidence of willingness occurs in the largest families. The lowest fre• quency of willingness occurs among people who are alone or at least not with a family unit. Most of these are older people with problems of health. However, family responsibilities are most frequently mentioned by those with very .young children (under six, which is pre-school) and by adults in the 20-year- old age range who would be most likely to have children of this age.

The problem of what determines williness to join civil defense is a difficult one to answer adequately. It is not a new problem since similar problems of recruitment exist in the armed forces, among those interested in getting donations of blood for national uses and among those trying to sell bonds or get people to join, subscribe or help on one or another of the hundred and one worthy projects or organizations that are "working on" the American public.

99 TABLE 6-14 WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN~CTVTL DEFENSE Q.: If you were asked to sign up to give 2 or 3 hours a week for at least six months learning about civil defense, would you do it?

April 1952 March 1954 Yes 39% 55% Yes, qualified 21 13 Pro-con 1 1 No, qualified 9 2 No 27 25 Depends 1 1 Don't know 1 2 Not ascertained 1 * i56%~ 100%" * Lees than one per cent

TABLE 6-15 WILLINGNESS IN CD BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES Sub• Over Under Metro urban 50,000 50,000 Rural Yes 37% 48% 61% 60% 62% Yes, qualified 9 15 10 15 14 Pro-con 1 2 2 1 * No, qualified 3 3 2 2 1 No 44 31 23 18 19 Depends 1 1 * 1 1 Don't know 3 * 2 2 2 Not ascertained 1 * * * 100% T66% 100% 166% 166% Less than one per cent

The studies of bond-buying during World War II, by mem• bers of the Survey Research Center, found that personal con• tact was a real incentive to bond purchases and that when it was used, bond purchases rose substantially and rewardingly.

A study of blood donors, by the author of this report, showed that as far as incentives were concerned two factors

100 TABLE 6-16 REASONS FOR NOT PARTICIPATING TN CIVIL DEFENSE

Q.: There are lots of reasons why a person might find it difficult to do that, or might not want to (participate in civil defense). What are the reasons in your case?

Family responsibilities, housework, small children 8% Occupation responsibilities, long or irregular hours 9 Health, physical handicaps 7 Not enough time, too busy 5 No emergency yet, see no need for CD 3 Age (not poor health) 7 Language problem * Others not interested, people think it's silly * Other 6 Don't know Not ascertained 4 Already in CD, willing to participate or don't know 57 # * Over 100% since some people gave more than one reason were at work--the needs of people who had to have the blood, especially GIs, and the challenge of a quota to be met. Forty per cent of the donors reported that solicitation was needed to back up the appeal and 45 per cent of these donors were per• sonally asked. However, among all the blood donors sampled, only one third went alone; the rest went with a group from work or a club and admitted the influence of social pressure in such a situation.

But signing a bond application or going to the local blood center are short-term spot activities. Volunteering for Civil Defense demands much more. Many people, of course, are involved in Civil Defense by definition of their jobs. Such people as policemen, firemen and utilities personnel are "on

101 TABLE 6-17 REASONS FOR NOT PARTICIPATING IN CIVIL DEFENSE Q.: There are lots of reasons why a person might find It difficult to do that, or might not want to (participate in civil defense). What are the reasons ln your case?"

Sub- Over Under Metro urban 50,000 SO, 000 Rural Family responsibilities, housework small children 11% 15% 7% 5% 4% Occupation responsibilities, long or Irregular hours 16 10 11 6 5 Health, physical handicaps 10 13 5 6 6 Not enough time, too busy 8 7 6 3 3 No emergency yet, Bee no need for CD 4 3 3 2 2 Age (not poor health) 9 . 7 5 8 8 Language problem 1 • * * Others not interested, people think it's silly 1 _ * _ _ Other 7 7 3 7 7 Don't know - - - - - Not ascertained 2 4 4 6 6 Already in CD, willing to par• ticipate, or don't know 40 49 63 62 64 Less than one per cent the job" in Civil Defense as much as at any other time. It is the involvement of others that is the problem here.

A study, specifically on civil defense recruitment, that was done in Britain in September 1950 offers some light. Caution should be used, of course, in trying to interpret a study done in one country directly into the operations of another country. Cultural and national differences are often strong and influential.

This study by the Social Survey* compared new recruits to civil defense with those showing decreasing likelihood of joining,

iFothergill, J. E. and Lamberth,D.L., "Recruitment to the Civil Defence Services" by the Social Survey, Central Office of Informa• tion, N.S. 149, September 1950. 102 TABLE 8-18 WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN CD BY AGE 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 & over

Yea 80% 59% 82% 59% 49% 30% Yes - qualified 3 16 14 13 12 11 Pro-con 0 3 1 1 1 0 No - qualified 1 2 2 2 3 2 No 14 18 19 22 30 52 Depends 0 * 1 * 1 2 Don't know 1 2 1 2 3 1 Not ascertained 1 * * 1 1 2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-19 RELATION OF FAMILY SIZE TO WILLINGESS TO SERVE IN CD

One Two Three Four Five Six Seven

Yes 35% 51% 57% 63% 57% 61% 59% Yes - qualified 13 13 \* 12 16 14 3 Pro-con 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 No - qualified 2 3 1 2 3 3 0 No 43 27 25 17 23 17 24 Depends 2 2 1 1 0 3 0 Don't know 3 3 1 2 0 0 11 Not ascertained 1 * 1 1 1 1 0 T6o% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% * Less than one per cent

J03 TABLE 6-20 RELATION OF FAMILY SIZE TO REASONS FOR NOT SERVING IN CD

One Two Three Four Five Six Seven

Family responsibilities 2% 3% 10% 9% 14% 16% 19% Occupation responsibilities 10 10 11 9 9 4 3 Health 19 11 6 2 3 3 3 Not enough time 5 4 5 5 7 7 5 No need for CD 2 4 1 3 4 3 0 Age (not for health) 22 10 6 1 3 1 3 Language problem 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 People think it's silly 1 0 * 1 0 0 0 Other 10 .8 5 5 5 4 0 Don't know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Not ascertained 4 5 4 6 4 4 0 Already in CD, willing to par• ticipate, or don't know 38 55 60 65 58 61 70 Less than one per cent

TABLE 6-21 REASONS FOR NOT PARTICIPATING IN CD BY AGE 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 & over

Family responsibilities 3% 13% 9% 6% 3% 2% Occupation responsibilities 4 10 8 10 12 1 Health physical handicaps 1 1 2 3 11 18 Not enough time 6 3 3 6 3 * No need for CD 0 2 2 2 3 2 Age (not poor health) 1 0 0 * 5 37 Language problem 0 0 * 0 • 1 People think it's silly 0 * * * 0 0 Other 1 4 7 6 6 3 Don't know 0 0 0 0 0 0 Not ascertained 1 6 5 5 4 3 Already in CD, willing to par• ticipate or don't know 83 61 64 62 52 33 100% T6o% 100% 100% TOT 106% * Less than one per cent

104 from some likelihood to none. The authors— Fothergill and Lamberth— found under motives for joining:

"The idea of protecting one's own family was chosen as most important and that of doing one's duty as the second most important. There was a tendency for people to attribute to themselves the better motives, such as joining to gain knowledge, and to say that- other people join to use up their spare time. Thus, there is some indication that people will tend to leave others to join, considering that the others have more time to spare."

Under the main motives against joining, the authors say:

"Having no spare time was selected as the most im• portant handicap. Having no interest and having had enough in the last war were also given as important reasons for not joining. "Having no spare time was said to be due to family ties or being too busy generally. Although three quarters of the sample had not decided against joining, they thought looking after their families or attending to other matters was more important than joining civil defense. This is an indication of the importance of lack of spare time. Family ties are considered to be a greater deterrent in wartime but most of those who said they were too busy to join now, said they would be able to join in wartime."

But under the topic of the main influences on joining, they say:

"The main difference between those with some likeli• hood of joining and the New Recruit's Sample seemed to be in their opinions about the seriousness of the situation. Those likely to join did not seem to consider the situation serious enough to warrant their joining yet "Those more likely to join .... seemed less afraid of war. More of them thought there was some protection against the atom bomb and fewer thought the atom bomb was all-devastating. A quarter of the New Recruits con• sidered the atom bomb to be no worse than any other weapon "Those who held positions of responsibility, who were members of voluntary organizations and who had served their country in the past seemed more likely to join

105 "More of those who were inclined to join said their spouses were favorable but once a person had joined there seemed little chance that the husband or wife would also join."

Finally, on the topic of characteristics of those with some likelihood of joining, they state:

"Age, marital status and whether or not a person had children appeared to have little effect on a person's likeli• hood of joining. "In order to get equal numbers of recruits from each group, it is estimated that a recruitment campaign would have to reach: four times as many women as men; twice as many in the lower income groups as in the upper; twice as many of lower education as of upper; twice as many non-members of clubs as members of clubs or vol• untary organizations. Indoor workers were found to be more likely to join than outdoor workers who, in turn, were more likely to join than those not gainfully employed."

The bulk of their findings are borne out and applicable to the data presented in this report where similar matters were covered. The British study had the advantage of the inclusion of a sample of new civil defense recruits. In the S.R.C. survey done in 1952, however, we carried out a rather exten• sive analysis of the determinants of participation in civil de- fense^2'-*

In this analysis, by Scott, we tried to find out what would help us predict degrees of willingness to participate in civil defense. These were: consideration of signing up, agreement to sign up for two or three hours a week and "active" willing• ness to take a job.

The factors that we related to this index were: Concern over war dangers involving likelihood and imminence of war and probability of an attack on the U.S.; Threat to Community involving local danger, extent of military protection and

2Scott, W. A., "Citizen Participation in Civil Defense," S.R.C, Univ. of Mich., September 1952. '3Scott; W. A., "Attitudes Toward Participation in Civil Defense," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Fall 1953.

106 number of planes that would get through and maximum mortal• ity radius for an A-bomb burst; Information about the civil de• fense program involving various questions on organized civil defense activity and lastly, Evaluation of the need for strengthen- ing civil defense involving several statements on the worth of civil defense in general and the local set up in particular.

Each one of the above factors was significantly related to the index of participation but the multivariate analysis is more revealing. In general, as concern increases, a positive evalu• ation increases also, regardless of the level of information. Similarly, positive evaluation increases with information, re• gardless of the level of concern. The tables of the data be• come quite involved for presentation or discussion but one can say the following things:

Regardless of the level of concern or information, low evaluation of the civil defense program has an adverse effect on consideration of volunteering and participation.

Information about civil defense has a consistent effect on consideration of volunteering, regardless of concern or evaluation level, so that the better informed a person is the more likely he is to have positive feelings toward participation.

A moderate concern over war dangers is better than none at all, for purposes of getting people to think about volunteering, but beyond this moderate level further con• cern has no effect.

The first step in moving from a low to a moderate evalu• ation of the need for strengthening civil defense exerts a dominant influence, among the three areas measured, on making people ready to volunteer.

Scott concluded that for practical civil defense action in• formation that heightens concern over the imminence and threat of war should be accompanied by information concerning people that current civil defense preparation could minimize the threat; and when people are told about the accomplishments of civil defense they must also be made to realize that these are not enough—the program as it stands is not adequate for the emer• gency.

107 Chapter 7

IN CASE OF ATTACK. . . ? Nobody knows what the American public will do under atomic attack. Even an individual cannot be sure that he will behave in the way he plans. But, regardless of terror, the pressure and suggestion of other people's behavior, and the chance matter of your situation at the time of an attack, your attitudes, expectancies and information regarding such an at• tack can be extremely important in determining what you do. Certainly if you plan to flee you are more likely to do so than the person whose present intention is to go down to his cellar.

Virtually no one, in the sample talked about prescribed or advocated policies. They were asked what they would do. They were not asked to defend whatever their choice was or to state where they got their ideas from. The way the questions were worded only voluntary behavior was requested. There was no suggestion in the questions that any particular pattern of behavior was officially prescribed or planned.

The contents of this chapter fall into three areas. First there are purely factual items reported that are relevant to disaster planning. Such items are the ability of people to walk a mile or so and the number of families who will have mem• bers at work or at school.

Secondly there are items dealing with information which are factually true for the present but which are susceptible to change as information level rises. Items in this area deal with knowledge of radio as a medium for information and in• formation of other civil defense measures for their protection.

Lastly there are speculative items where people were asked to estimate what they thought they would do. These are subject to education and change under instruction and are also, of course, subject to change under the pressures of circum• stance. 108 Questions, in the area of conjectured behavior in the event of an attack on the United States, were structured in the fol• lowing fashion. First of all we posed the situation of an A- bomb attack occurring somewhere on the United States on a Sunday. A day, presumably, when most of the family would be together so that the complexity of family separation was initially avoided. This was followed by a question asked only on interviews with people living in metropolitan areas. This question posed the situation: Say it was eleven o'clock on a week-day morning and you had.an hour's warning of a possible attack. This was followed by a third question, asked of the same respondents, which assumed a more structured condition in which a shuttle system of evacuation using trucks or buses was available a mile or so from the respondents place of residence. The question assumed that the trucks or buses would simply take the evacuees farther out of town. A fourth question asked residents of non-metropolitan areas—urban, small town and rural, what they thought their role was or should be in the event of an atomic attack on a nearby, highly urbanized area. These and a few minor questions make up the material on conjectured behavior of the public under attack conditions.

Before presenting the data on responses to these questions, one should realize that people probably react to these questions on the basis of four things. These are:

1. The information that they hold as individuals about weapons, protective measures and so forth.

2. The information they have about their own family situa• tion—the location of their home, the availability of local shelter, the mobility of the family, the ease of access to safety, etc.

3. The information they have about others' opinions, feel• ings and behaviors.

4. The educational reactions that go with such situations.

The first is a somewhat stable area of information. The second can change with the situation—people move, they get sick, they buy and get rid of their cars, and other events occur that alter the situation of the family unit. The third is, at

109 present, an area oi considerable ignorance. What is known, by the average person, is either largely a projection of official policy or advocated behavior which a person can assume is be• ing followed by others or it is based on individual conversations on the matter which are apparently quite rare. The fourth area is effective in molding reactions to the extent that the verbal image that is created by the question is vivid or real as an emotional stimulus.

In the event of attack the same four areas serve as the bases of reaction but their relative weight changes. Individual information cannot be altered too readily but imagination, under the stimulus of emotion, and rumor can create a situation of greater threat. The family situation is dependent on conditions at the time of attack. The third is especially strong at such a time since the behavior of others is very obvious. People run down the street or drive away. There is a tremendous amount of noise and activity that, by itself, can result in considerable tension and act with strong suggestive force. Imitation is very likely to develop. Lastly, there is no doubt that the situation at such a time arouses strong and violet emotions. A Sunday Attack Somewhere in the United States The great majority of people say that they would under such conditions stay in their own houses or go to some nearby shelter.

TABLE 7-1 CONJECTURED BEHAVIOR IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON THE U.S.

Q.: If you heard some Sunday that an A-bomb attack had started on the U.S., what would you do? Stay where you are or go some• where else? If needed: WeU, what do you think you might do? - or - What would you do if there were no orders ?

Leave town 8% of the population Remain In town 88 Don't know 3 Not ascertained 1 (5. 5% would try to leave town by car) 100%

110

t TABLE 7-2 CONJECTURED BEHAVIOR IN THE METROPOLITAN CITIES & ELSEWHERE CONTRASTED

Metro 50,000 Under Rural Behavior Metro Suburb or over 50,000 only Leave town 11% 10% 10% 6% 5% Remain in town 86 88 86 89 90 Don't know 2 1 3 3 3 Not ascertained 1 * 1 2 2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% *Less than one per cent

TABLE 7-3

CONJECTURED BEHAVIOR IN THE METROPOLITAN CITIES & ELSEWHERE CONTRASTED

Metro 50,000 Under Behavior Metro Suburb or over 50,000

Leave town 2% 1% 2% 3% Remain 13 12 20 43 Don't know - - 1 2 Not ascertained - - - 1 15% 23% 49% = 100%

The proportion who would evacuate is eight per cent. This means that about 12 to 13 million persons would be moving out of town. The proportion is slightly higher (11 per cent) in the metropolitan cities. It is about equal in the metropolitan sub• urbs and towns having a population larger than 50,000. Some people still plan evacuation even though they live in rural counties, not having a single town as large as 50,000, but the proportion is small. However, the number who suggest evacu• ation has increased. In metropolitan areas the number has risen, in two years, from two to 11 per cent.

In evaluating these responses one must look at a complex• ity of factors. For one thing, this response is probably in• fluenced by the fact that people in general do not expect much 111 TABLE 7-4 RESULTS FROM A QUESTION USED LN APRIL 1952

Q.: What do you think you'd do if you got the signal that there was going to be an enemy attack? National Behavior Metro (except open country) Specific protective behaviors 74% 62% Get to home or family 9 11 Flee, get out of town 2 4 Don't know 6 15 Not ascertained 9 8 100% 100%

TABLE 7-5 MEANING OF THE AIR RAID SIGNAL

Q.: If you heard the warning signal, how much time do you think you might have before planes reached here?

Over Under For Expected Time Metro Suburbs 50,000 50,000 !Natio n

Less than 10 minutes 31% 44% 24% 7% 20% Ten up to 20 minutes 14 19 12 4 9 Twenty minutes up to one-half hour 7 3 4 1 3 One-half hour up to 1 hour 10 6 9 1 5 One hour up to 2 hours 7 5 4 1 3 Two hours or over 1 2 3 1 2 Don't know 25 15 22 8 14 Not ascertained 5 3 6 2 3 Does not know ) 3 16 75 41 warning signal ) 100% 100% loo% 100% 100%

112 TABLE 7-6 CHOICE OF EVACUATION BY PERSONS MAKING SOME CHOICE, ACCORDING TO EXPECTED TIME OF WARNING

Among those expecting Percent a period of: of each group

Less than 10 minutes 7% chose evacuation 10 to 20 minutes 8% chose evacuation 20 to 30 minutes 11% chose evacuation 1/2 to 1 hour 12% chose evacuation 1 to 2 hours 16% chose evacuation 2 hours or over 18% chose evacuation

of a warning time. Evacuation takes some time and makes the assumption that there is a time of safety during which one can travel. Some people may evacuate without stopping to calcu• late such a consideration. But it is highly probable that such a factor would have some influence. It does (See Table 7-6). When people were asked how much time they thought they would have from an initial warning until actual attack the most fre• quent figure given was under 10 minutes. Half the population gave an estimate of less than 15 minutes and half above this figure. A few people expect rather long warning periods, thus bringing the average for the population up to a warning to at• tack figure of 25 minutes. Almost half of suburban-metropolitan dwellers expect only 10 minutes. As was mentioned earlier (chapter 5) one-third of the popu• lation, according to their own report, would use a radio at such a time as a source or means of further information. A larger group, however, say that they would use the telephone. Only about one-eighth mentioned Conelrad dial locations on the radio even when any statement like "the ends of the dial" was ac• ceptable. In many cases those who said they would tune in to a local station would probably eventually find a correct dial lo• cation, though it is equally possible that they might suspect that the power had gone off or that their radio was not work• ing if they could not find programs in the dial location they first tried. If one includes dial spinners who would probably find one or another Conelrad location eventually, one-third of

113 TABLE 7-7 SOURCE OF INFORMATION

Q.: If you heard a warning and wanted to get some more

information about what wa8f.going on and what to do, where would you try to get it?

Tune in radio 35% of the population Use the telephone 40 Call public agency 38% newspaper or radio 2 friends or relatives 1 Ask someone 4 Other 4 Don't know 13 Not ascertained 4 100% radio users at such a time would tune in correctly, (See Ap• pendix Tables.)

Attention should also be given to the high number who say they would use the phone. Regardless of telephone company practices in time of disaster a load of 40 per cent of the popu• lation using the phone would result in line load limit. People just couldn't get through and the consequences of such failure could be disruptive to the individual.

An important question is; Can we differentiate the people who say they would stay from those who say they would evacu• ate? It would seem that any answers to this question, for the nation as a whole, would be more or less meaningless. The pressure of feeling favoring evacuation is greater in the urban areas and the significance of, say, having children in the fam• ily, would be lost if metropolitan respondents were combined with those in rural areas. For this reason we will attempt to answer this question for people living in metropolitan areas in• cluding the suburbs but will make only a cursory analysis for the population as a whole.

Simply having or not having a car does not seem to affect one's choice of attack-reaction very much. But there is a re• lationship if, instead of looking at the availability of transporta-

114 tion one looks at its habitual use. Simply taking those who state some definite behavior, we find that, among those who do not travel to work at all, four per cent say they would leave town. Among those who walk to work eight per cent would evacuate. Eleven per cent of those who drive their own car to work make the choice of flight and 12 per cent of those who use some other transportation to get to work do likewise. A habitual pattern of behavior is likely to have some influence in such a choice. Five per cent say they would evacuate in their own car and one per cent say they would accompany someone else in their car.

Those with college educations are according to their own report more likely to evacuate than not, but hedge their pre• dictions with a certain amount of uncertainty regarding things which they would apparently take into account into such a de• cision. By and large education seems to make very little dif• ference in predicting such reactions. As far as occupation is concerned there seem to be two groups. Professional people and members of the protective services frequently indicate they would have no choice; they would have to stay, their job re• quires it. Protective service employees are least likely of all occupational groups (only three per cent) to choose flight. Next come farmers; only four per cent would leave. Professional persons are next in the lowness of their number (five per cent) choosing evacuation. Then the fraction jumps. Ten per cent of craftsmen and skilled workers choose flight; 13 per" cent of laborers or white collar workers do so too and also 15 per cent of managers and proprietors.

Looking at the data for the country as a whole—the number of children, their age, the age of the adults (except in the above 65 group), whether they owned or rented, whether the respond• ent was a man or a woman, head of a family unit or not, be• lieved in extensive damage from the A-bomb or the H-bomb or lesser damage—none of these things were found related to choice of evacuation versus non-evacuation. Income did have some relation. Those with high incomes are more likely to flee than any other income group. Sixteen per cent of the over $10,000 a year group indicated such a choice. The middle in• come group (four to five thousand) and the lowest (under two thousand) have the lowest rate (six per cent of those choosing evacuation.

115 Metropolitan Area Residents Only Analyzing the data for just metropolitan area residents one has a similar situation for all respondents, which would not be the case if people in small towns and rural regions were also included. Also it may well be that the reactions of these per• sons are more significant for Civil Defense planning than are the projected behaviors of the whole nation.

Education and income are not predictors of the choice people would make, nor is knowledge of Conelrad.

One needs to ask oneself what, from a psychological point of view, would be the factors that might influence such a choice. Three general areas seem to suggest themselves.

First is the question of effective mobility of the person or family. This is a complex factor if looked at from a psycho• logical point of view. Poor health or old age can reduce one's mobility. The availability of transportation and its habitual use, as has been showing influence such opinions. The age or num• ber of one's children might be interpreted as reducing one's mobility.

We have no measure of health but the over-65-year-old re• spondents tend not to choose evacuation to a greater extent than other age groups. Habitual use of a car or other means of transportation tend to increase the probability of a person pick• ing evacuation. Among those who have children only one in 11 chooses evacuation (of those who made any clear choice at all). Similarly, among those who do not have children living with them, one in eight chooses evacuation. The age of children has a little influence; one of 14 among those with children under six choose evacuation but the number of children seem to have no influence on the choice. It would seem that if mobility is to be a clear indicator it must operate in other areas than those measured although there is some evidence for its influence in the data above. Mobility at a time of disaster is apparently not clearly related to the measures used. Perhaps people dur• ing such a period of threat and disorganization see mobility as extremely difficult whatever their usual mobility may be.

Another psychological factor that may influence choice on such a matter is what might be called "belongingness" and

116 situational responsibility. This is a complex idea and one that can be explained best by showing the type of relationships that are grouped under it. None of the relationships in this area is large.

The nearer you are to your place of work the less likely you are to choose flight. Among those who choose to remain in town the ratio of owners to renters is almost two to one. Among those who choose evacuation the ratio is seven to five. Home owners are thus less likely, apparently, to choose evacu• ation. (This may be a matter of the location of home owners in the metropolitan area.)

Studies of disasters have frequently reported that people with life-habits of responsibility, such as ministers or doctors, who also see a clear role for themselves in such a time of crisis, tend to fulfill such responsibilities and report heavy psychological pressures to do so. There are apparently strong forces to "keep them on the job." In our study, people who fall into the protective services or the professions (a category that includes doctors, nurses as well as numerous other less relevant professional persons) are low in the number choosing evacuation. (Fractions or percentages get unreliable for this narrow a breakdown of data) The other occupational groupings are considerably higher in the number indicating a flight reac• tion.

A final psychological factor that deserves attention is the meaningful one of the degree of threat. One might say that with modern weapons everyone in a metropolitan area should see himself in danger. We would like to suggest that it varies.

It appears that people near downtown in a metropolitan area feel a greater threat and need to get out of town than do people nearer the edge of the city. In other words people fur• ther away from, downtown would feel less threat.

However, for this factor to be related to evacuation choice it is necessary to include another factor to explain people's behavior. This is the feasibility of getting out of town. This decision probably has some relation to the availability and ha• bitual usage of transportation already referred to. In this framework we are thinking more of the time available and the distance that has to be traveled. From this point of view it

117 makes sense to assume a relationship since these factors are closely tied in with the attack situation and the situation of the respondent.

If threat strength and feasibility of flight interact then one should find the following schematic relationship holding when they are related to distance of the respondent from downtown.

Degree of: Threat Feasibility of flight

Downtown Near Far Distance from downtown

If one lives downtown or near downtown one should feel such a high degree of threat that the feasibility of really get• ting out of town makes little difference. Among such people there should be a high rate of persons choosing flight. Re• spondents who are near downtown should feel less threat but the feasibility of effective flight to safety should not have in• creased to a sufficient extent to make them choose flight to as great an extent as the people downtown. People who are quite far from downtown should feel even less threat but the feasibility of effective flight has risen to the point where it is pretty sure to "pay off." Among these respondents the choice of evacuation should be high. Finally, for respondents who are virtually out of town, although the feasibility of flight is high it is unnecessary, since the threat is now too low to be motivat• ing.

This pattern of choice is found among the respondents in the metropolitan areas of the United States. The highest inci• dence of people choosing flight is found among residents of downtown areas. An incidence, almost as high, is found among residents in metropolitan areas who are 10 to 15 miles away from downtown. People who live three to five miles from downtown choose flight no more frequently than do people who live 15 to 20 miles from downtown. In our sample, nobody

118 who lived more than 20 miles from the center of town chose flight.

-EN

10% Per cent choosing evacuation

0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 * # Distance from the center of town (in miles)

•Average estimate of the distance of maximum mortality with an A-bomb #Average estimate of the distance of maximum mortality with an H-bomb A : 18% of those living under two miles from downtown B : 11% two to three C : 8% three to five D : 9% five to ten E : 15% ten to fifteen F : 8% fifteen to twenty

This single figure does not conclusively prove the hypo• thetical explanation we have offered but its worth is further supported if the feasibility of flight in terms of available time also is related to evacuation choice. In other words both a- short distance to travel to safety or a fair amount of time in which to make one's escape would make the prospects for evac• uation more rewarding. Table 7-8 shows that this relationship exists. The greater the expected time between warning and attack the greater the chance of choosing flight as a behavior.

TABLE 7-8 CHOICE OF EVACUATION BY METROPOLITAN PERSONS MAKING SOME CHOICE ACCORDING TO EXPECTED TIME OF WARNING

Among, those expecting Percent a period of: of each group

Less than 10 minutes 7% chose evacuation 10 to 20 minutes 8% chose evacuation 20 minutes to an hour 10% chose evacuation One hour or more 27% chose evacuation

119 A Weekday Attack On Your Metropolitan Area

We tried to pose our question with the complexity that would probably exist in a real-life situation. It was asked only on interviews that were taken in metropolitan areas.

Q.: Say it was eleven o'clock on a week day morning and you heard an air raid alarm; where would you be most likely?

Where would your (wife) (husband) most likely be?

Where would your children most likely be?

Now, if you had had an hour's warning of a possible attack what would you do?

What would (your husband) (your 'family) do as far as you can guess?

Only 21 per cent of heads of households would be at home. Fifty per cent would be at work and over three miles away from home. The rest would be away from home at various unique places or ones of unknown distance. Examples of the first are students and examples of the second are truck or taxi drivers who cannot predict their locations.

Fifty four per cent of wives say they would be at home and 13 per cent say they would expect to be away from home, at work, at a distance greater than three miles. The other one third would be within a mile or two of their homes doing vari• ous things, some at work, some not.

In those families that have children about a third of them would be at home and about one fifth would be at a distance greater than three miles, most of them at school. The rest would be away from home but within a distance of one or two miles.

About one-third of the population say that they would go to some shelter. Another one third say that they, would try to get the family together as a first step. For one case in five of the population this involved traveling home.

Including the behaviors of the familis after they had "got together," the number seeking shelter then rises to about half of the population.

120 TABLE 7-9

BEHAVIOR UNDER HOUR'S WARNING CONDITION

Q.: Now, if you had had an hour's warning of a possible attack, what would you do?

Flee, get out of town 9%

Get family together 18

Get to family, get home 19

Go to job, stay on job 3

Shelter 52

Miscellaneous details 35

Don't know 1

Not ascertained 2

(42 per cent mentioned more than one activity)

TABLE 7-10

INITIAL ACTION

Flee, get out of town 5%

Get family together 16 ) ) 34% Get to family, get home 18 )

Go to job, stay on job 3

Shelter 37

Miscellaneous 18 Get instructions, turn on radio 4 Store & cover .food & water 3 Turn off gas, heat, lights 1 Close windows, doors 1 Home medical kit ready 1 Other 8

Don't know 1

Not ascertained 2 Too%

121 TABLE 7-11

EXPECTED BEHAVIOR FOR OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS

Q.: What would your family do as far as you can guess?

Get out of town 2%

Get family together 3

Get to family, get home 18

Stay at work 5

Stay at school 4

Shelter 33

Miscellaneous 9

Don't know 2

Not ascertained 5

NO/family 19 100%

Five per cent mention flight as their first response. They would try to get out of town without doing anything else. In• cluding those who would first try to collect the other family members, the number indicating evacuation behaviors goes up to nine per cent. This figure is about the same as the na• tional figure choosing evacuation on the previous Sunday Morn• ing question but lower than the number choosing evacuation,for a response to the earlier question, in metropolitan areas and lower than the number choosing evacuation who themselves ex• pected an hour's warning. The only feasible explanation seems to be that some people see the time taken to get the family to• gether as not leaving any more time for flight.

Very few--only two per cent--expect other members of their family to get out of town as an initial behavior. About one-third expect other family members to get to some shelter. About one in five expect the other family members to come home. About one in ten expect others in the family to stay where they are, either at work or school, without mentioning any other behavior.

These results indicate that, by present report, about 40

122 per cent of the population in metropolitan areas would be mov• ing around between time of warning and time of attack, exclud• ing those who might be moving to available shelter outside their own homes.

Walking a Mile or So It would seem obvious that any advocated evacuation policy sould include some specifications or recommended means for getting out of town. One possibility was investigated in the survey. The question did not ask how people like the idea proposed, nor whether they would use such a procedure if it was available. It simply checked on some basic information that would influence the effectiveness of such a procedure if it was inaugurated.

The question was: Say there was warning of an attack and time for an evacuation; is there any member of your family living here who could not walk about a mile or so, to be picked up by trucks or busses to be taken further?

TABLE 7-12

MOBILITY FOR CONTACTING A SHUTTLE EVACUATION SYSTEM

Q.: Say there was warning of an attack and time for an evacuation; is there any member of your family living here who could not walk about a mile or so, to be picked up by trucks or busses to be taken further?

All here could walk 83% of the metro (babies included) population

All could not walk 16 Small children 4% Old people 3 Invalids 3 Currently sick 3 Other & Not ascer• tained why 3

Not ascertained on ability to walk 1

123 The results indicate that about 16 per cent of households have someone for whom this would be very difficult if not impossible. A reading of the responses would seem to indi• cate that the question was answered in the frame of reference intended. Families who have young babies did not tend to in• clude them as individuals that could not walk. Assumedly they could be easily carried. The category of young children re• fers generally to youngsters above the baby age level, but under six years of age, and includes such considerations as: "I could carry them a little way, taking first one then the other, but a mile is a long way. I'm not too strong." None of those who said they could not walk a mile or so chose evacuation as a likely behavior on the other questions.

TABLE 7-13

IF NIGHT TIME. . . ?

Q.: How about walking a mile or so if it was night time?

Makes no difference 77%

Less convenient, but possible 2

Much more difficult *

Could not go at night 2

Not ascertained and don't know 3

Could not walk in daytime 16 100% •Less than one per cent

It is interesting that this type of mobility is related to oc• cupation, income and education. It is impossible that the bet• ter educated or those with higher incomes demand more of their children, have fewer children and fewer invalids and so forth. It is well known that the incidence of sickness is much higher in the very low income groups of the population. What• ever the explanation, it is probable that the three measures are related with a common factor running through them all.

124 TABLE 7-14

MOBILITY FOR CONTACTING A SHUTTLE EVACUATION SYSTEM BY OCCUPATION

Profes• Mana• Crafts• sional gerial Clerical men Laborers

All here could walk 94% 93% 83% 86% 78%

All could not walk 6 2 17 13 20 Includes small children, old, and sick people, and invalids

Not ascertained on ability to walk 0 5 0 1 2 Tool. 100% 100% 100% 100%

TABLE 7-15

MOBILITY FOR CONTACTING A SHUTTLE EVACUATION SYSTEM BY INCOME

Under $2,000- $4,000- $7,500 $2,000 3,999 7,499 or over

All here could walk 58% 72% 90% -88%

All could not walk 42 25 9 11 Includes small children, old & sick people '

Not ascertained on ability to walk 0 3 1 1 100% 100% 100% 100%

TABLE 7-16

MOBILITY FOR CONTACTING A SHUTTLE EVACUATION SYSTEM BY EDUCATION

Past Grade School High School High School

All here could walk 76% 82% 92%

All could not walk 22 17 7 Includes small children, old Si sick people

Not ascertained on ability to walk 2 1 1 100% 100% 100%

125 It is of passing interest to have some idea of what people would think of taking with them if they had to leave their homes on foot and carry whatever they chose. Eighty seven per cent of those who would go would try to take something. Table 7-17 shows that the frequency of choices runs in the order: clothing, most frequently mentioned, then food, money and valuables and finally blankets. Other items are mentioned by only a few. These seem to be realistic things to think of at a time such as that involved.

TABLE 7-17 WHAT WOULD THEY CARRY

Q.: (Asked of those who could all walk) What would (all of) you Start carrying If you had to go?

Clothing 41% >

Food 32 )

Money, Valuables 24 ! 72% of the !. metro popu- Blanket* 10 . 1 at ion Water 5 )

Anything and Other 4 )

Not ascertained 2 ) Don't know 3 Nothing 8 All couldn't walk 16 Not ascertained on ability to walk 1

Where Would You Go? Evacuation, by whatever means, poses the problem of desti• nation. For some the period of evacuation might or could be quite short—little beyond the period of attack. For others whose homes were ruined, damaged or gone the period of evac• uation would be long. There would be tremendous tasks of re• covery and reconstruction to be done in the attacked city and demands for labor and emergency work would be high. Tem• porary housing, doubling up in available quarters and existence in partially, ruined buildings would all be common. These con• siderations are not clear in the minds of most and the ques• tions that we asked in this area should only be interpreted in the light of a destination for the first evacuation. 126 The data in Table 7-18 show that half the metropolitan population have no place in mind that would serve as quarters for them. Many of these if hard put to it, would probably lo• cate themselves somewhere, but it remains a question to be answered in practice. About a third of the population have some destination in mind where they could stay for various lengths of time. A few of these, however, are destinations that are very far away—over 100 miles--and transportation at such a time might prevent travel for such distance.

TABLE 7-18

A PLACE TO STAY

Q.: Do you have any place in mind you'd head for where you (your family) could stay if you were evacuated out of town?

No place in mind 50% of metro population

Have a place in mind 31 Relatives—over 15 miles 10% Relatives--under 15 miles 2 Friends--over 15 miles 4 Friends—under 15 miles * Cottage, etc.--over 15 miles 3 Cottage,etc.—under 15milesi * Some place—Not ascertained what or where 10

Could not evacuate (walk to bus) 16

Not ascertained 3

•Less than one per cent

Information on the type of people who would be without a destination during an evacuation might also be valuable. Those who are under 30 and over 50 years old tend to mention rela• tives while those between 30 and 50 mention friends or other available housing to a greater extent. The stage of one's life- cycle apparently limits one's choice in this matter.

About three quarters of those who are within five miles of downtown cannot think of any place to go. The size of this group drops off as one gets further away from the center of town. Also, those with large families have difficulty thinking of any place—three quarters cannot do so. Those with young

127

i children tend to think of relatives, more than do any other group.

Education and income seem to make little difference in whether people can think of any place to go or not. Similarly occupation seems to be unrelated and the categories of owning versus renting their living establishment shows no differences.

A Practice Evacuation

The idea of evacuation does not itself meet with strong resistance if it is posed in terms of a trial or practice. Yet there is a significant amount of opposition. Sixteen per cent of households would still have someone who could not manage if it involved walking and 13 per cent give a blunt refusal to such a proposal. Altogether 29 per cent are unsure, hesitant or simply opposed. Fifty three per cent say they would take part without any reservations.

The type of reservations that are offered show the nature of the objections. Outside of those objections that deal with inability, difficulties in cooperating with such a plan, or "too much bother," the major reservation raised is of the type:

TABLE 7-19

PRACTICE EVACUATION

Q.: How about if they had a practice evacuation; would you take part in it?

Would take part without hesitation 53% of metro population

Would take part with hesitation 9

Would take part with reluctance 1

Would not take part 13

Depends and don't know 6

Not ascertained 2

Could not walk 16 100%

t

128 "Would it be well organized?" or "Yes, I would if it seemed that it would work. If it looked like things would get all snarled up--to hell with it."

Role of Non-Metropolitan Residents

If people in the United States heard, some Sunday, that an attack had started somewhere in the U.S. even some rural people and residents of small towns would evacuate according to their own report. (See Table 7-2) However, the most likely occurrence for non-urban people would probably be an attack on some not-too-distant urban concentration.

With this point of view we asked the following question on the March survey:

Q.: Say there was a bombing attack on (nearest feasible urban target). What do you think you would be expected to do?

This deals with what one is expected .to do or, perhaps, should do. It does not necessarily indicate what one thinks one would do.

To get some uniformity within areas the "urban target" was specified for interviewers in each area. The following choices were made: Atlanta, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, De• troit, Galveston or Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Louisville, Minneapolis, New London, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Diego, Seattle, and Washington.

This choice of cities gave us a variety of distances from the point of interview to the supposedly attacked area, a factor that we thought might be of analytic value. These distances were: Under 50 miles 6 counties 50 to 99 miles 5 counties 100 to 149 miles 5 counties 150 to 249 miles 5 counties 250 miles or over 6 counties

129 TABLE 7-20

EXPECTED ROLE FOR NON-METROPOLITAN PERSONS

Q.: Say there was a bombing attack on (nearest feasible urban tar• get). What do you think you would be expected to do?

Counties with Counties with- Rural a town over out a town only 50,000 over 50,000

Expect to do something 68% 67% 69%

General help # 34 34 33 Care of evacuees, housing 14 21 25 Contribute service** 17 12 13 food 8 12 14 clothing 4 8 8

blood 2 3 3 money 2 3 3 equipment * * 1 Rescue work 4 4 4

Nothing, can't think of anything, unclear 32 33 31 100% Ioo% 100% Several people mentioned more than one thing to the above question: #This category includes "help with whatever I could do" and some specific suggestions such as "care for sick" by non-medical persons. ##This category includes technical professional service and job skills, not just "helping out." *Less than one per cent.

These distances can be regarded as the approximate aerial distance to the nearest urban area of any size since the near• est city of sufficient size was chosen in all cases. Sixty nine per cent of those within a 50 mile radius of such an urban area felt that there was local danger in the event of an attack on the U.S. For distances beyond that the sense of local danger didn't seem to change substantially, be• ing 44 per cent for the 50 to 99 mile range, then 49 per cent for the 100 to 149 mile range, then dropping to per cents in the high 30's for the last two categories of distance. This would tend to indicate that either a high proportion of people expect local bombing, which seems unlikely, or the question

130 raises in the respondents' minds ideas of other sorts of dan• gers that would carry over a distance. Another explanation of the continued high proportion who sense danger for their locale is the possibility that other realistic targets exist nearer, to the point at which interviews were taken, than the suggested large-city. The results from the question indicate that one third of non-metropolitan residents cannot think of anything that they would be expected to do in such a situation. Among the rest the major item mentioned was "general help and assistance" which indicates their feelings of willingness and responsibility but also shows a lack in their minds of any clear role for themselves.

TABLE 7-21 EXPECTED ROLE FOR NON-METROPOLITAN PERSONS BY INCOME

Under $2,000 $2,000-3,999 $4,000-7,499 $7,500 or over

Expect to do something 54% 66% 75% 64% General help 31% 32% 47% 34% Care of evacuees 15 18 22 22 Contribute Service 10 14 16 14 Food 8 12 14 7 Clothing 4 8 7 6 Blood 1 2 4 4 Money 2 4 2 2 Rescue work 4 4 4 2 Nothing, can't think of anything, or unclear 46 34 25 36 100% 100% 100% 100%

Farmers and laborers are least likely to think up anything they are expected to do, even though the extremely rural peo• ple do not differ from residents of more urban areas in the pro• portion who see a role for themselves. People with some col• lege education see a role for themselves half again as frequently as do persons with only some grade school background. Age seems to show no distinct variation except that people 65 and

131 TABLE 7-23 EXPECTED ROLE FOR NON-METROPOLITAN PERSONS BY AGE

16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-54 65 and over

Expect to do some• thing 89% 74% 73% 71% 59% 50% General help 31% 41% 40% 37% 34% 28% Care of evacuees 15 19 21 22 14 18 Contribute service 18 18 15 15 11 8 Food 15 13 14 12 S 6 Clothing 13 B 8 6 e 3 Blood 2 6 5 i l 0 Money 2 I 1 5 3 3 Rescue work 3 4 5 4 3 1 Nothing, can't think ot anything, or unclear 31 28 27 29 41 50 155% Tool, Ioo% ioo%" Tool Too% over see a lesser role for themselves. Income tends to be equally unimportant with only the lowest income group (under $2,000) being clearly less conscious of a task to be done.

These factors seem to influence people's feelings regarding a role for themselves much more than simple distance from a metropolitan or highly urbanized area. Distance does seem to impose some differences, however, on the type of role that is felt. Table 7-25 indicates that people within a radius of 50 miles of such a target area tend to see a role for themselves less frequently than do people farther away. But people nearer more frequently see a role of general help and assistance. Care of evacuees is seen as a role by all and especially so by people in the more distant areas. Contributions of food and clothing is also seen as something that the more distant people would be expected to make.

132 TABLE 7-23

EXPECTED ROLE FOR NON-METROPOLITAN PERSONS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Grade School High School Past High School

Expect to do something 54% 72% 79%

General help 34% 37% 41%

Care of evacuees 13 22 24

Contribute service 9 15 22

Food 7 13 14

Clothing 3 9 6

Blood 1 4 5

Money 3 2 3

Rescue work 3 4 7

Nothing, can't think of anything, or unclear 44 28 21 ~T00% 100% 100%

TABLE 7-24 EXPECTED ROLE FOR NON-METROPOLITAN PERSONS BY OCCUPATION

Professional Managerial Clerical Craftsmen Laborers Farmers

Expect to do florae- thing 82% 79% 89% 80% 40% General help' 37% 42% 40% 45% 31% 29 Care ot evacuees 19 25 27 13 17 19 Contribute service" 30 11 13 12 15 13 Food 14 12 19 10 8 11 Clothing fi 8 10 7 4 5 Blood e 4 4 2 2 2 Money 4 4 1 2 2 2 Rescue Work 4 5 e 2 7 3 Nothing, can't think o( anything, or unclear 18% 21% 20% 31% 40% 54% 1051 Tool Tool Tool Tool Tool 29% of the non-metropolitan people mentioned more than one thing that they might be expected to do. #Thls category includes "help with whatever I could do" and some specific suggestions such as "care for sick" by non-medical persons. •This category Includes technical professional service and job skill6, not Just "helping out."

133 TABLE 7-25

Distance from Urban "Target" area {in miles) Role Under 50 50 - 149 150-249 250 or o\

Expect to do something 60% 70% 68% 74%

General help (41%)* (35%) (31%) (33%)

Care of evacuees (13) (17) (18) (20)

Service (12) (13) (14) (17)

Food (3) (14) (16) (12)

Clothing (3) (8) (7) (10)

Other (1) (7) (5) (11) Nothing in mind 40 30 32 26 100% "100% 100% 100%

*The figures in parenthesis refer to the percentages of people questioning things in this category. They add to more than the figure above the column since a few people mentioned more than one type of aid.

134 Chapter 8

PARTICULAR GROUPS

This chapter summarizes some of the highlights of find• ings regarding the opinions, attitudes and information held by metropolitan versus rural residents and by the teen-agers, aged 16 to 19, who were included in the study. Most of the data on these groups have been presented elsewhere in other chapters.

Teen-agers

Since the sampling process used on these studies starts with a sample of homes one can only claim that the resulting sample covers those people who live in homes, apartments or other dwellings that are not institutions. For adults this rules out only .those people in the military establishment and in hos• pitals, hotels, and other types of institutions actually housing people.

For the 16-19 age group, however, there is a fairly high percentage who are off in college. Many of these do not live at home and thus are not represented in our sample since col• lege dormitories fall into the category excluded from our "home" sample. However, those who did fall in our sample do serve as a representative sample of persons in this age range who do live at home—either with others or in a home of their own.

The most outstanding characteristic of this age group is that they are overwhelmingly willing to give up two or three hours a week to learn something about civil defense. This may be an over-zealous enthusiasm towards participating in some• thing important that, in fact, might not result in participation if the opportunity was given. Nevertheless 80 per cent of this group did say that they were willing. The chief reason given, by them, for not participating was the lack of time.

135 They knew about local community civil defense as well as those in the other age groups but they were less well informed about civil defense in their own neighborhood. They were well informed, however, on civil defense activity in the schools.

On the topic of the frequency of information on civil de• fense they reported that they got such information frequently. The medium by which they seemed to receive this knowledge was outstandingly "movies." Though they reported TV and radio fairly often they mentioned movies twice as frequently as any other age group. They were low on information on what to do in the event of an atomic attack, but were higher, near to the other age brackets, on what to do after such a disaster. They were also the ones who least often reported intended use of the telephone as a source for information in a pre-attack situation. Their knowledge of Conelrad was comparable to that reported by adults.

Confidence in the adequacy of military protection was equal to that expressed by their seniors but their impressions of H- bomb mortality radius tended to be greater than that reported by older persons in the sample.

In general it would seem that as a group their prepared• ness is not much different from the other members of the pop• ulation but they are more interested in civil defense informa• tion than other age groups and they are contacted through spe• cial media to a greater extent than can be said for their elders as a total group. It is very likely that the determinants of their information, attitudes and general preparedness are the same as those that are found for adults but, with the group of persons in this age group being less than one hundred, it was impossible to carry out sub-analysis on the influence of educa• tional level, income of family, etc. within the teen-age group alone.

Metropolitan Residents

The people who are best informed about civil defense, and whose preparedness may be said to be the highest in the coun• try, are the residents of metropolitan suburbs. The reasons for this are not just their distance from metropolitan downtown,

136 of course, but rather the factors that are associated with the type of people who live in such suburbs. In addition, suburbs are smaller and more homogeneous social units and local ac• tivity tends to be better known than in the large metropolitan complex.

Civil defense in its organizational aspects within the com• munity or in the immediate neighborhood of the respondent is best known in the metropolitan suburb. The residents of these areas also report with high frequency knowledge of civil de• fense in schools, the need for volunteers and campaigns of re• cruitment. In evaluating their own willingness, (to learn more about civil defense) though they are not high in willingness com• pared with less densely populated areas, they frequently say that they should participate from a sense of duty. This, they feel, is something that they ought to do. As an obstacle to such participation they most frequently mention conflicts with family requirements.

The opportunities to receive information are high in these areas. Residents report a greater degree of contact with the mass media than that reported in other areas. Also, their information regarding weapons effects seems to be closer to the official estimates than that reported in other areas. To a greater extent they tend to believe that most planes on a bomb• ing mission against the U.S. would get through to their target. However, like residents in metropolitan cities, they see war as less imminent than do people in other cities and towns.

Residents of metropolitan cities see war as less imminent and less likely than do people in other areas though the dif• ferences are not large. (Such differences have been found, however, on all studies during the last few years.) They also tend to regard the H-bomb as effective over a larger radius than do their suburban neighbors or people in cities and towns. The most outstanding characteristic of this group is their lack of interest in civil defense information and their lack of wil• lingness to participate in learning more about it. The reason that seems to be most distinctive for this group is the conflict with occupational and job demands for their time.

Rural Residents

Rural people in open country and towns of just three or four thousand report the highest war expectancy both in 137 likelihood and imminence. They also often report a feeling that only a few planes would get through or an ignorance of how many planes would complete their mission.

About a third of residents in these rural areas feel that their areas are in danger of some sort if an attack on the U.S. were to occur. Half of them report the danger of radiation as a cause of death in an atomic attack though this question did not refer to danger in their area if the attack were at some distant location.

Among this group civil defense is least known and protec• tion information is lowest. There are, of course, scarcely any such areas that have air raid signals, but Conelrad is not at all unknown. Residents in these areas feel little sense of duty towards civil defense and little responsibility in preparedness. They do, however, express a high degree of willingness to help if disaster does occur. They also have the lowest amount of contact with the mass media—TV is not infrequent, 16 per cent seeing the Nevada test by this medium—but they don't seem to feel left out of informational distribution as a consequence. They seem to be satisfied with the level and frequency of the information that they do get. Their attention to the Nevada . test was as high as for the country as a whole.

138 TABLE 8-1

RURAL ESTIMATES OF DANGER OF ENEMY ATTACK ON RESPONDENT'S OWN COMMUNITY*

Q.: Would you say people here in are in danger?

Yes 29%

Yes, qualified (less than big cities) 9

Pro-con 1

No, qualified (not as much as big cities) 14

No 30

Don't know 2

Not ascertained 1 "8B%* 'This question was asked only of those people who thought that the nation as a whole was in danger of enemy attack.

TABLE 8-2

RURAL ESTIMATES OF CAUSES OF DEATH IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK

Radiation, rays 32%

Blast, concussion, the explosion 27

Falling buildings, debris, flying objects 23

Gas fumes, smell, chemicals 21

Heat, the flash ) 12 Fire ) 5

Panic 11

"The bomb" 1

Other 13

Don't know 15

Not ascertained 1 161% 61% of the rural population mentioned two causes of death.

139 TABLE 8-3

RURAL ESTIMATES OF OTHER DANGERS FROM AN ATOMIC ATTACK

Burns, fires (non-radiation) (or burns unspecified) 21%

Other miscellaneous dangers 21

Food and water contamination 7

Hot areas, burns (radiation) 9

Shock 7

Radiation sickness 4

Diseases (not radiation caused) 2

Shortages, food, drugs, medical services, etc. 2

Don't know 22

Not ascertained 22 117%

17% of the rural population mentioned two dangers

TABLE 8-4

RURAL AUDIENCE FOR THE NEVADA TESTS

Rural Nation Population

Audience 69% 69%

Uncertain 1 *

Don't remember tests -30 31 1015% 100%

140 APPENDIX APPENDIX TABLES TO CHAPTER 4

TABLE 4-A1

RELATIONSHIP OF IMMINENCE OF WAR TO WHETHER RUSSIANS HAVE H-BOMB

Yes, Russians Don't have H-bomb Maybe No know

Less than 6 months 2% 0% 1% *% 6 months to a year 5 5 3 2

1 year up to 2 years 16 10 16 15

2 years up to 5 years 24 18 20 16

5 years up to 10 years 13 10 16 10

10 years up to 20 years 9 6 11 6

20 years or over 3 3 4 4

Never, not at all likely 3 5 6 4

Don't know or depends 12 20 9 26

Not ascertained 13 23 14 17 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (684) (187) (348) (183) (Only those who had heard of the H-bomb were asked whether they thought the Russians had it.)

TABLE 4-A2

RELATIONSHIP OF IMMINENCE OF "WAR TO KNOWLEDGE OF H-BOMB

Yes, have heard No, or don't know about H-bomb

Less than 6 months 1% 3% 6 months to a year 4 5

One year up to two years 16 19

2 years up to five years 23 16

5 years up to ten years 14 4

10 years up to 20 years 8 4

20 or over 3 1

Never, not at all likely 4 5

Don't know or depends 13 31

Not ascertained 14 12 100% 100% (1302) (294)

143 TABLE 4-A3

RELATION OF LIKELIHOOD OF WAR TO LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK ON RESPONDENT'S OWN COMMUNITY

Yes No Yes Qualified Pro-con Qualified No

War Certain 24% 28% 22% 30% 21%

War Probable 25 32 17 21 25

Pro-con 11 7 22 8 6

Unlikely 24 17 13 26 30

No chance of war 5 5 0 7 6

Only wishes or hopes expressed 2 5 0 2 2

Don't know 7 1 26 4 9

Not ascertained 2 5 0 2 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

TABLE 4-A4

RELATION OF LIKELIHOOD OF WAR TO TYPE OF ATTACK EXPECTED

Atomic Bernl. - ftocW.- IMn1! Know Mo du|ir Bomb* - liiaiptc Iliad) Guktta St* G«rm CM Hl(h • or not of H-tocnbi plant* MlUll** •Uiek wvrfitrf •Offera BUBTaralan law Ion OUwr uetrltitMd nutt

WIT ccrUlii "% IH lot, Ul n% 111 m 11* in 1« m m Wu prctabla 11 14 11 » i) 14 14 • 1 •i 10 IB IT Pro-eon s 11 11 « H 1 1 IT it 11 4

Unlllwly » 11 It II u 18 1< 14 10 11 14 14

No ehuc* of w»r i 4 4 T t 1 10 0 1 1 e 11

OB1)T wUh» or hop» vrpriuod i 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1

Don't know a 11 1 • • « i 5 0 B 17 Id

Hal a.acirUui«i i 1 1 1 a 1 i 1 i « 1 1

100% ion 100* 100% ion 100* •on ion •on ion 100% H; 11009) [KM) (IM) I1W) (1IT) (10) (41) (•4) (140) (IH)

144 TABLE 4-A5 RELATION OF LIKELIHOOD OF WAR TO EXPECTATION OF GAS WARFARE

Not No Mentioned Don't ascer• danger spontan• Yea Maybe No know tained of attack eously

War certain, very likely 31% 25% 23% 23% 18% 33% 21% War probable 24 29 23 23 23 20 15 Pro-con, 50-50 chance B 8 13 10 9 7 6 Unlikely, probably not 26 21 25 26 21 13 27 No chance of war 3 5 4 -7 4 7 10 Only wishes or hopes expressed 1 2 2 2 3 7 3 Don't know 6 8 9 5 19 13 17 Not ascertained 1 2 1 2 3 0 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (96) (437) (162) (519) (129) (15) (253)

TABLE 4-A6 RELATION OF LIKELIHOOD OF WAR TO EXPECTATION OF GERM WARFARE

Mentioned No spontan- Don't danger eously Yee - Maybe No know of attack

War certain 25% 27% .18% 23% 20% 21% War probable 23 28 27 23 27 15 Pro-con 11 7 14 10 6 6 Unlikely 33 22 IB 29 22 27 No chance of war 6 5 5 7 3 10 Only wishes or hopes expressed 0 2 3 2 4 3 Don't know 2 0 12 4 17 17 Not ascertained 0 2 3 2 1 1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (117) (452) (W7) ("5) (H7) (253)

145 TABLE 4-A7 ESTIMATED H-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS BY AGE

16-19 20-29 30-39 40-46 50-84 85 Si over

One quarter up to 1 mile 1% 2% •ft 3% 1% 1% One up to 5 mllea 4 12 12 9 9 9 Five up to ten miles 10 15 10 11 11 8 Ten up to twenty miles 20 14 n 16 13 10 Twenty miles or over 23 17 24 19 19 13 Don't know or not ascertained how far 18 26 23 25 23 33 Has not heard of H-Bomb 24 14 14 17 24 26 100% 100% 105% T06% 100% 100% N: (71) (262) (381) (301) (317) (202)

TABLE 4-A8 RELATION OF ESTIMATED A-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE

Most (2/3 About half Few None or Don't or more) (1/3 to 2/3) (1/3 or less) one or two know

1/4 Mile to one mile 27% 30% 20% 16% 6% Over one mile to 5 miles 30 33 32 24 17 Over 5 miles to 10 miles 17 17 18 16 9 Over 10 miles 19 16 18 25 9 Don't know 6 4 12 18 59 Not ascertained 1 0 • 1 0 100% "100% 100% 100% 165% N: (194) (225) (797) (168) (224)

TABLE 4-A9 CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE BY AGE

16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65 St over

Moat (2/3 or more) 10% 14% 15% 14% 9% 7% About half (1/3 to 2/3) 14 14 16 14 15 10 Few (1/3 or less) 57 55 46 48 46 49 None or one or two 11 11 11 11 e 12 Don't know 8 6 12 13 20 22 Not ascertained 0 0 a • 1 * 166% 166% T56% 155% 166% 100% N: (71) (262) (381) (301) (317) (202)

146 TABLE 4-A10 CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE BY EDUCATION

Past High Grade School High School School

Most (2/3 or more) 8% 11% 24% About half (1/3 to 2/3) 11 14 19 Few or not many (1/3 or less) 50 53 41 Non or one or two 11 11 6 Don't know 20 11 9 Not ascertained • * 1 100% 100% 100% N: (558) (772) (272)

TABLE 4-All CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE BY INCOME

Under $2,000- $4,000- $7,500 $2, 000 3,999 7,499 and over

Most (2/3 or more) 8% 11% 13% 19% About hall (1/3 to 2/3) 10 14 16 16 Few or not many (1/3 or less) 45 51 51 45 None or one or two 10 10 12 6 Don't know 26 14 8 13 Not ascertained 1 * 1 "100% 100% 100% 100% N: (260) (527) (622) (165)

TABLE 4-A12 CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE BY OCCUPATION

Profes• Mana- Crafts - sional gerlal Clerical men Laborers Farmers

Most (2/3 or more) 22% 18% 13% 11% 10% 9% About half (1/3 or 2/3) 18 13 21 12 13 14 Few (1/3 or less) 42 46 47 54 44 49 None or one or two 7 9 10 13 14 B Don't know 11 13 9 10 IB 20 Not ascertained 0 1 0 • 0 * 155% T55% 155% 100% T5o% T50% N: (125) (149) (192) (478) (176) (185)

147 TABLE 4-A13 CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE BY SEX

Male Female

Most (2/3 or more) 17% BX About half (1/3 to 2/3) 18 12 Few or not many (1/3 or less) 48 52 None or one or two 10 11 Don't know 10 17 Not ascertained 1 • 1615% 166% N: (735) (875)

- TABLE 4-A 14 RELATION OF ESTIMATED A-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE

1/4 to Over one Over 5 to Over Don't one mile to 5 miles 10 miles 10 miles know

Moat (2/3 or more) 17% 13% 13% 13% 4% About half (1/3 to 2/3) 21 18 IS 13 3 Few (1/3 or less) 49 54 55 52 35 None 9 9 10 15 11 Don't know 4 8 7 7 47 Not ascertained • • • • 0 100% T66% 100% 100% 166% N: (318) («5) (258) (282) (282)

TABLE 4-A 15 RELATION OF ESTIMATED H-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO CONFIDENCE IN MILITARY DEFENSE

1/4 to One to Five to Ten to Twenty one mile 5 miles 10 miles 20 miles or over

Most (2/3 or more) 13% 21% 15% 17% 12% About half (1/3 to 2/3) 22 19 18 16 17 Few (1/3 or less) 44 48 57 55 47 None 17 8 7 8 14 Don't know 4 4 2 • 4 10 Not ascertained 0 0 1 0 0 100% 166% T66% 166% 100% N: (23) (161) (176) (231) (306)

148 TABLE 4-A 16 RELATIONSHIP OF ESTIMATED A-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO EXPECTED CAUSES OF DEATH IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK 1/4 mile Over one Over five Over Don't to mile to miles to 10 mllea know one mile five miles 10 miles

Radiation, rays 52% 41% 37% 33% 19% Blast, concussion 37 32 28 28 15 Falling buildings 29 30 26 27 15 Gas fumes 13 20 19 23 15 Heat, the flash fire 14 19 7 10 6 Panic 11 11 10 9 6 "The bomb" 1 6 1 * 4 Othw 11 11 13 9 11 Don't know 4 8 11 11 37 Not ascertained 1 1 1 1 2

N: (318) (465) (258) (282) (282)

TABLE 4-A17 RELATIONSHIP OF ESTIMATED A-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO "OTHER DANGERS" EXPECTED IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK 1/4 mile Over one Over five to mile to miles to Over Don't one mile five miles 10 miles 10 miles know Burns, Fires (non-radiation) 31% 26% 27% 26% 11% Other misc. dangers 33 24 22 25 11 Food and water contamination 17 15 9 9 3 Hot areas, Burns (radiation) 13 16 11 8 4 Shock 9 9 6 8 3 Radiation sickness 8 6 7 2 3 Diseases (not radiation caused) 5 5 6 4 2 Shortages, food, drugs, etc. 3 3 1 2 2 Don't know 8 12 19 20 49 Not ascertained 9 15 18 16 20

N: (307) (453) (250) (274) (272)

149 TABLE 4-A IB SPECIFIC RESULTS OF AN ATOMIC ATTACK

Social Conditions Population shifts, care of evacuees Housing problems Other

Political Conditions

Military effects—mobilization, draft Other

Economic Conditions Production interrupted Production dispersed, reassigned Transportation not working or severely cut Utilities, gas, electricity, telephone, sewers not working Scarcity of food Scarcity of Jobs, money Other

Health Conditions Loss of life, disposal of bodies 1' Care of injured ' Disease--radiation danger Disease—other or not ascertained whether radiation Contaminated food and water Loss or shortage of medical facilities, personnel Other

Psychological Effects Public demoralized, panic 11 Public uncertain ! We would be fighting mad We would be united--high morale ! Other . !

Depends On size of attack Other

Miscellaneous Areas inaccessible—radiation damages, etc. Ground unuBuable for crop growing, etc. Buildings gone, rulnB, areas wiped out 22 Other 2 Don't know 10 Not ascertained 20

150 TABLE 4 -A 19 DEGREE OF DISORGANIZATION EXPECTED FROM AN ATOMIC ATTACK ON THE U.S.

Q,; what do you think things would be like in the United States a month or BO after an atomic attack (if there was one)?

1. Only emotional reactions but interpreted as not worse ( 12% of the pop-

than a WWII type raid 3a» ( ulation 2. Specific problems mentioned and seen as jiot worse ( 20 than a WWII type raid 3. Only emotional reactions but interpreted as indicating ( 18% multiple targets and/or damage ln excess of WWII ( type raids 38% (• 4. Specific problems mentioned and seen as worse than ( 20 WWII type raids ( 5. Miscellaneous responses unclasslftable 10 6. Virtually no damage 3 Don't know 13 Not ascertained 4 100%

Metro Over Under Metro sub. 50,000, 50/000 Category 1 above 0% 12% 12% 13% 2 • 29 21 23 16 3 14 21 18 18 4 20 21 17 21 5 10 15 12 7 6 3 3 5 3 Don't know 12 4 9 17 Not ascertained 3 3 4 5 100% 100% 100% "100%

TABLE 4-A20 SPECIFIC RESULTS EXPECTED FROM AN ATOMIC ATTACK

General physical damage 25% Health conditions 24 Psychological conditions 23 Economic conditions 21 Social conditions fl Political conditions 3 Depends (on size or closeness of attack, etc.) 3 No specific problems mentioned 21 Don't know what it would be like 10

*One specific result mentioned 68% Two specific results mentioned 40%

151 TABLE 4-A21 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO HALVES OF STUDY DIVIDED INTO INTERVIEWED BEFORE OR AFTER MARCH 14

Belore After Whole Sex of Respondent a March 13 March 13 Sample

Male 48% 44% 46% Female 54 56 54 T6o% 100% 100% Age Under 30 20% 21% 21% Thirty to 30 22 25 24 Forty to 49 16 22 19 Fifty and over 34 30 32 Not ascertained a 2 4 100% 100% T03%

Education Some grade school 18% 18% 18% Complete grade school 16 12 15 Some High School 22 21 21 High School diploma 27 30 28 Some college 17 17 17 None 2 100% 100% To5% Income Under $2000 19% 13% 18% $2,000 - $2,999 15 14 15 $3,000 - $3,999 19 17 18 $4,000 - $4,909 17 10 18 $5,000 - $7,490 18 25 22 $7,500 and over 10 10 10 Don't know 1 Not ascertained 1 2 1 100% 100% 165%

Area Metro 14% 16% 15% Suburbs 13 13 13 Over 50,000 23 23 23 Under 50,000 50 48 49 100% T0U% T0T5%

Occupation Professional 7% B% 8% Managers, officials, and proprietors 9 10 9 Clerical and sales 11 14 12 Craftsmen, foremen, operators 28 33 30 Laborers 12 10 U Farmers 13 8 11 Other 17 12 14 Not ascertained 3 5 4 166% 156% 166%

152 APPENDIX TABLES TO CHAPTER 5

TABLE 5-A1 RELATION OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK TO URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Over Under Metro Suburbs 50,000 50,000 Mentioned three safety measures 38% 50% 36% 27% Mentioned two safety measures 30 32 23 24 Mentioned one safety measure 13 9 15 19 Remembered nothing specific 2 1 3 3 No safety information 15 7 22 24 Don't know or not ascertained 2 1 1 • 3 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (245) (212) (371) (783)

TABLE 5-A2 RELATION OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK TO EDUCATION

Grade High Past School School High School Mentioned three safety measures 20% 24% 52% Mentioned two safety measures 21 . 42 28 Mentioned one safety measure 18 16 14 Remembered nothing specific 4 2 1 No safety Information 35 15 4 Don't know or not ascertained 4 1 1 100% 100% 100% N: (558) (772) (272)

TABLE 5-A3 RELATION OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK TO INCOME

Under $2,000- $4,000 - $7,500 $2,000 3,999 7,499 It over Mentioned three safety measures 13% 26% 45% 45% Mentioned two safey measures IB 27 2B 31 Mentioned one safety measure 18 17 13 16 Remembered nothing specific 1 4 2 2 No safety information 46 23 11 5 Don't know or not ascertained 4 3 1 1 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (260) (527) (622) (165)

153 TABLE 5-A4 SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK BY SEX

Men Women Mentioned three safety measures 33% 34% Mentioned two safety measures 13 25 Mentioned one safety measure 29 16 Remembered nothing specific 2 3 No safety information 21 20 Don't know or not ascertained 2 2 165% 100% N: (735) (875)

TABLE 5-A 5 RELATION OF SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK TO OCCUPATION

Foremen, Profes• Mana• Crafts• sional gerial Clerical men Laborers Farmers

Mentioned three-safety measures 51% 42% 48% 36% 22% 18% Mentioned two safety measures 30 32 24 29 23 17 Mentioned one safety measure 11 15 18 15 14 22 Remembered nothing specific 1 1 3 3 1 4 No safety Information 6 B B 16 3B 36 Don't know or not ascertained 1 2 2 1 2 3 100% 155% 155% 100% 100% 155% N: (125) (149) (193) (478) (176) (165)

TABLE 5-A6 SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO iDO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK BY AGE 65 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 and over Had no Information 29% 18% 19% 15% 20% 30% Remember nothing specific 0 3 2 3 2 3 Mentioned one protective measure 11 18 14 19 16 21 Mentioned two 25 25 26 30 26 23 Mentioned three 35 38 39 33 33 23 100% 155% 100% 100% 100% 105% N: (71) (262) (381) (301) (317) (202)

154 TABLE 5-A7. INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES

Metro Over Under Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 Had no Information 54% 40% 60% 83% Had heard or read something,but remember nothing specific 3 8 6 8 Mentioned one precaution 21 28 19 15 Mentioned two precuatlons 22 23 14 12 Not ascertained a 1 1 2 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (245) (212) (371) (733)

TABLE 5-A8 INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK BY EDUCATION Grade High Fast School School High School Had no Information 75% 55% 39% Has heard or read something, but remembered nothing specific 5 6 9 Mentioned one precaution 12 21 23 Mentioned two precautions 6 17 27 Not ascertained 2 1 2 "100% 100% 100% ,N: (558) (772) (272)

TABLE 5-A9 DEFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK BY INCOME

Under $2,000- $4,000- $7,500 $2,000 3,969 7,499 and over Had no Information 79% 66% 49% 43% Has heard or read something, but remembered nothing specific 3 6 8 5 Mentioned one precaution 10 17 21 25 Mentioned two precautions 8 10 21 25 Not ascertained 2 1 • 2 100% 100% 100% 155% N: (280) (527) (622) (165)

155 TABLE 5-A10 INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK BY SEX

Men Women Had no Information 58% 82% Had heard something, but remember nothing specific 6 5 Mentioned on precaution 10 19 Mentioned two precautions 18 13 Not ascertained 1 1 100% 133% N: (735) (875)

TABLE 5-A11 INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK BY OCCUPATION

Profes• Mana• Crafts• sional gerial Clerical men Laborers Farmers

Had no information 36% 50% 51% 56% 77% 72% Had heard or read something, but remembered nothing specific 10 6 8 7 2 9 Mentioned one precaution 28 27 20 17 13 11 Mentioned two precautions 23 17 20 10 6 8 Not ascertained 3 0 1 1 2 2 100% 100% 100% 100% "ioo% 100% N: (125) (M8) . (193) (478) (176) (185)

TABLE 5-A12 INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATOMIC ATTACK BY AGE 65 16-10 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-84 and over Had no information 58% 56% 52% 56% 61% 71% Had heard something, but remembered nothing specific 4 9 5 6 7 8 Mentioned one precaution 21 21 20 19 IB 14 Mentioned two precautions 16 14 22 18 14 7 Not ascertained 1 • 1 1 2 2 100% Too% 100% 100% 100% Too% N: (71) (262) (381) (301) (317) (202)

156 TABLE 5-A 13

FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES Metro Over Under Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 Often 26% 29% 26% 21% Occasionally 38 53 40 41 Once or twice 4 1 4 4 Never 0 0 • • Don't know 0 * 0 * Not ascertained 12 9 6 7 Had no safety Information 20 8 24 27 100% 100% 100% T6o% N: (245) (212) (371) (733)

TABLE 5-A14 FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION BY EDUCATION

Grade High Past School School High School Often 14% 28% 33% Occasionally 31 46 4B Once or twice 4 4 3 Never • 0 * Don't know 1 • 0 Not ascertained 9 7 10 Had no safety Information 41 17 6 ToS% 100% 100% N: (558) (772) (272)

TABLE 5-A15 FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION BY INCOME

Under $2,000- $4,000- $7, 500 92,000 3,999 7,496 and over Often 11% 21% 30% 29% Occasionally 27 37 45 53 Once or twice 3 5 4 1 Never 0 * * 0 Don't know • 1 0 0 Not ascertained 7 8 7 10 Had no safety information 51 28 14 7 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (260) (527) (822) (185)

157 TABLE 5-A16 FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION BY OCCUPATION Profes• Mana• Crafts• sional gerial Clerical men Laborers Farmers Often 30% 28% 27% 28% 12% 14% Occasionally 51 40 49 41 34 27 Once or twice 0 4 6 3 6 3 Never 0 0 0 • 0 1 Don't know 0 0 0 0 1 1 Not ascertained 10 8 6 0 4 11 Had no safety information o 11 12 19 43 43 100% T9o% 100% 100% 100% 105% N: (125) (149) (IM) (478) (178) (185)

TABLE 5-A17 FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION BY AGE 65 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-40 50-84 and over Often 35% 25% 27% 22% 22% 17% Occasionally 21 42 43 46 41 38 Once or twice 7 5 3 2 5 I Never 0 0 0 • * 0 Don't know 0 0 0 1 1 0 Not ascertained 6 6 6 11 9 38 Had no safety Information 31 22 21 18 22 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (71) (282) (381) (301) (317) (202)

TABLE 5-A18 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY INCOME Under $2,000- $4,000- $7, 500 $2,000 3,999 7, 499 and over Accurate and/or adequate 15% 27% 38% 35% Accurate but Inadequate 10 19 26 32 Welcome 5 6 4 5 True but wrong sort of information 1 1 1 1 Confusing, Inconsistent 1 * 1 2 Frightening 2 1 1 2 Inaccurate • < 1 0 Better than previously 0 * * 0 Other 2 4 5 2 Don't know 4 2 1 2 Not ascertained 0 11 6 11 Had no information 51 26 14 8

N: (260) (527) (622) (165)

158 TABLE 5-A 19 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY EDUCATION Grade High Past School School High School Accurate and/or adequate 22% 34% 34% Accurate but Inadequate 12 25 26 Welcome 4 5 6 True but wrong aort of Information 1 1 2 Confusing, inconsistent 1 1 3 Frightening 1 1 2 Inaccurate 1 • 1 Better than previously 0 * 0 Other 3 4 7 Don't know 3 2 1 Not ascertained 11 9 9 Had no Information 41 n 7 100% 100% T05% N: (556) (772) (272)

TABLE 5-A20 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES Metro Over Under Metro sub. 50,000 50,000 Accurate and/or adequate 35% 41% 32% 27% Accurate but Inadequate 17 23 26 20 Welcome 6 6 4 4 True, but wrong sort of Information 1 0 1 1 Confusing, Inconsistent 1 3 1 1 Frightening 1 2 1 1 Inaccurate * • 0 1 Better than previously * * 0 • 0 Other 4 5 4 4 Don't know 2 2 1 3 Not ascertained 12 10 7 10 Had no information 20 8 23 28 100% 100% . Too% 100%

N (245) (212) (371) (733) • Less than one per cent '

TABLE 5-AJ1 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY SEX

Men Women Accurate and/or adequate 30% 31% Accurate but Inadequate 22 20 Welcome 5 5 True, but wrong sort of information 1 1 Confusing, inconsistent 1 1 Frightening 1 1 Inaccurate 1 * Better than previously * 0 Other 3 5 Don't know 2 2 Not ascertained 10 9 Had no Information 24 25 100% 100% N: (735) (875)

159 TABLE 5-A3 2 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY HOME OWNERSHIP

Own Rent Other Accurate and/or adequate 31% 30% 18% Accurate but inadequate 23 19 17 Welcome 4 6 8 True, but wrong sort of Information 1 1 0 Confusing, Inconsistent 1 1 0 Frightening 1 1 0 Inaccurate 1 2 Better than previously * 0• 0 Other 4 5 0 Don't know 2 2 3 Not ascertained 10 9 11 Had no information 22 26 41 166% 100% 100% N: (933) (602) (85)

TABLE 5-A23 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY OCCUPATION Profes• Mana• CraftB- sional gerial Clerical men Laborers Farmers Accurate ami/ or adequate 32% 36% 41% 32% 24% 19% Accurate but inadequate 28 26 25 24 14 14 Welcome 4 5 4 6 4 3 True, but wrong sort of information 1 2 0 1 1* 1 Confusing, inconsistent 3 0 1 1 1 1 Frightening 2 1 1 * 0 1 Inaccurate 2 1 1 1 0 Better than previously 0 0 0 • 0 0 Other 8 5 4 3 5 3 Don't know 0 2 3 1 3 3 Not ascertained 9 11 8 12 5 11' Had no information 11 11 12 19 42 44 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Too% N: (125) (149) (193) (478) (176) (185)

TABLE 5-A24 ATTITUDE TOWARD INFORMATION RECEIVED BY AGE 65 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-84 and over Accurate and/or adequate 28% 35% 30% 32% 31% 24% Accurate but Inadequate 25 22 29 23 16 12 Welcome 7 5 4 4 5 4 True, but wrong sort of In• formation 0 1 1 0 2 1 Confusing, Inconsistent 0 1 * 2 1 1 Frightening 1 1 1 2 1 2 Inaccurate 0 0 1 • * 1 Better than previously 0 0 0 0 • • Other 1 3 5 4 5 3 Don't know 1 3 1 1 5 3 Not ascertained 6 6 1 13 12 9 Had no Information 31 22 21 19 22 40 T6o% 100% io5% 100% ioo%- 100% N: (71) (262) (361) (301) (317) (202)

160 TABLE 5-A25 KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD BY OCCUPATION

P rotes- Mana- Crafts• sional gerial Clerical men Laborers Farmers Shows knowledge of Conelrad 18% 16% 12% 15% 10% 5% Would just spin the dial 9 9 13 9 9 8 Tuning probably Incorrect (local station mentioned which ln a few cases might be correct) 81 67 64 65 58 75 Don't know 12 7 9 8 18 6 Not ascertained 0 1 2 3 5 8 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 155% N: (125) (149) (193) (478) (176) (185)

TABLE 5-A26 KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD BY EDUCATION Grade High Past School School High School Shows knowledge of Conelrad 7% 14% 19% Would just spin the dial 8 10 9 Tuning probably incorrect (local station mentioned which ln a few cases might be correct) 68 65 65 Don't know 13 8 6 Not ascertained 6 3 1 100% 100% 100% N: (558) (772) (272)

TABLE 5-A27 KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD BY INCOME Under $2,000- $4,000- $7, 500 $2,000 3,996 7,499 or over Shows knowledge of Conelrad 4% 8% 18% 18% Would just spin dial 7 9 9 9 Tuning probably Incorrect 68 68 83 62 Don't know 14 10 8 10 Not ascertained 7 5 2 1 100% 100% 100"% 165% N: (260) (547) (822) (165)

TABLE 5-A28 KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD BY SEX

Men Women Shows knowledge of conelrad 13% 11% Would Just spin the dial 10 8 Tuning probably incorrect 87 65 Don't know 7 12 Not ascertained 3 4 . Too% 165% N: ("5) (875)

161 TABLE 5-A29 KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD BY AGE • 65 16-10 30-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 and over Shows knowledge of conelrad 11% 14% 18% 18% 0% 5% Would lust spin the dial 10 11 9 11 8 8 Tuning probably incorrect 71 83 84 82 69 68 Don't know 8 10 8 7 9 15 Not ascertained 0 2 3 4 5 6 155% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (71) (262) (381) (301) (317) (202)

TABLE 5-A30 RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD TO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO IN AN ATOMIC ATTACK Shows knowl• Would Just Tuning edge of spin the probably Don't conelrad dial incorrect know Had no information 5% 28% 20% 31% Had heard or read something, but remembered nothing specific 1 2 3 3 Mentioned one protective measure 13- 14 19 14 Mentioned two 28 30 25 28 Mentioned three 53 35 33 24 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (203) (145) (1040) (158)

TABLE 5-A31 RELATIONSHIP OF INFORMATION ON WHAT TO DO AFTER ATTACK TO KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD Shows knowl• Would just Tuning edge of spin the probably Don't conelrad dial Incorrect know Had no information 37% 64% 60% 66% Had heard or read something, but remembered nothing specific 7 2 6 8 Mentioned one precaution 28 17 18 18 Mentioned two precautions 26 17 14 8 Not ascertained 2 0 2 0 100% 100% T55% 100% N: (203) (145) (1040) (156)

TABLE 5-A32 RELATIONSHIP OF FREQUENCY OF INFORMATION TO KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD Shows knowl• Would juBt Tuning edge of spin the probably Don't conelrad dial incorrect know Often 36% 23% 23% 17% Occasionally-- now and again 45 40 41 35 Once or twice 3 3 4 6 Never 0 G • 0 Don't know 1 0 • 0 Not ascertained B 7 8 4 Had no safety information 7 27 24 38 100% 155% 100% 100% N; (203) (145) (1040) (156)

162 TABLE 5-A33 KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL BY AGE 65 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 16-19 and over Correct on both signals 6% 5% 13% 14% 8% 7% Correct on warning only 6 8 7 10 7 5 Correct on all-clear only 0 4 3 5 3 2 Don't know or wrong on bath 43 47 41 40 41 29 No air raid signals in area 46 36 36 31 41 57 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (71) (282) (381) (301) (317) (202)

TABLE 5-A34 RELATION OF ESTIMATED A -BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD

Shows knowl•• Would just Tuning edge of spin the probably Don't conelrad dial incorrect know

1/4 mile to one mile 27% 16% 20% 13% Over one mile to 5 miles 34 32 30 20 Over 5 miles to 10 miles 12 21 n 14 Over 10 miles 18 18 17 17 Don't know 9 12 16 35 Not ascertained » 1 * 1 "100% 100% 100% 100% N: (199) (145) (1049) (157)

TABLE 5-A35 RELATION OF ESTIMATED A-BOMB MORTALITY RADIUS TO KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL

Correct on Correct on Correct on Don't know both warning all-clear - or wrong Signals only only on both

One-quarter to one mile 24% 27% 33% 19% Over one mile to 5 miles 35 33 29 28 Over 5 miles to 10 miles 18 13 13 14 Over 10 miles 16 15 12 18 Don't know 7 12 13 21 Not ascertained 0 D 0 • 100% 100% 100% 100% N: (188) (118) (52) (633)

163 TABLE 5-A38 RELATIONSHIP OF INFORMATION MEDIA USED TO KNOWLEDGE OF WARNING SIGNAL

Correct on Correct on Correct on Don't know No air raid both warning all-clear - or wrong signals signals only only on both ln area

Newspapers 42% 44% 42% 32% 27% TV 33 33 40 21 10 R»dio 24 21 17 12 20 Magazinea 12 8 8 12 20 Pamphlets IB 20 19 13 6 Personal contacts 7 7 8 8 3 Exhibits 7 6 13 6 3 Movies 3 5 2 3 4 Other 6 3 6 4 3 Don't know 1 2 0 1 2 Not ascertained 7 8 6 9 9 No information 1 4 2 21 35

N: (148) (118) (52) (680) (633)

TABLE 5-A37 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION BY OCCUPATION

Professional Managers Clerical Laborers Farm oper• technical & officials and Craftsmen, and ators and kindred and pro• sales foremen, service farm workers prietors workers operators workers laborers

Newspapers 40% 40% 37% 37% 30% 18% TV 18 27 23 27 15 5 Radio 21 16 17 15 14 18 Magazines IB 17 21 13 11 14 Pamphlets 23 13 17 12 7 4 personal contacts 7 7 B 5 2 4 Exhibits 9 4 6 5 5 0 Mo viet 3 6 5 3 2 3 Other 8 4 3 5 2 1 Don't know 1 1 2 • • 1 3 Not ascertained 7 9 8 9 6 16 No Information 9 10 11 19 43 42

N: (125) (149) (193) (478) (176) (185)

TABLE 5-A36 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION BY SEX

Men Women Newspaper •35% 30% Television IB 20 Radio 17 17 Magazines 14 15 Pamphlets 9 12 Personal contacts 4 8 Exhibits 8 5 Movies 3 3 Other 4 3

N: (735) (875)

164 TABLE 5-A39 RELATIONSffiP OF INFORMATION MEDIA USED TO KNOWLEDGE OF CONELRAD Shows knowl• Would just Tuning edge of spin the probably Don't conelrad dial incorrect know

Newspapers 41% 32% 33% 22% TV 28 26 17 20 Radio 24 11 17 14 Magazines 17 17 15 10 Pamphlets 20 7 10 11 Personal contacts 4 7 5 6 Exhibits S 6 5 4 Movies 4 2 4 1 Other 8 1 3 2 Don't know 2 0 2 1 Not ascertained 7 10 9 6 No information 7 26 24 36

N: (199) (145) (1048) (157)

TABLE 5-A40 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION BY EDUCATION

Grade High Past School School High School Newspapers 22% 37% 40% Television 14 24 20 Radio 17 16 20 Magazines 6 IB 24 Pamphlets,' booklets 6 13 21 Personal contacts 6 5 4 Exhibits, formal talks, rosters 3 5 9 Movies 1 5 5 Other 3 4 5 Don't know 12 1 1 Not ascertained 10 8 9 No information 36 17 6

(558) (772) (272)

165 TABLE 5-A41 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION BY HOME OWNERSHIP

Own Rent Other Newspapers 34% 30% 23% Television 19 20 12 Radio IB 16 14 Magazines 16 13 8 Pamphlets 12 11 6 Personal contacts 5 6 2 Exhibits 6 3 2 Movies 3 3 6 Other 3 4 2 Don't know 2 1 2 Not ascertained 8 8 15 No information 21 26 39

N: (933) (602) (65)

TABLE 5-A42 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION BY INCOME

Under S52,000 - $4,000- $7,500 $2,000 3,999 7,499 or over

Newspapers 21% 26% 40% 41% Television 4 IS 28 23 Radio 20 17 16 19 Magazines 7 12 18 21 Pamphlets 2 9 16 15 Personal contacts S 4 5 7 Exhibits 2 4 6 7 Movies 1 3 4 5 Other 2 5 3 5 Don't know 2 2 * 2 Not ascertained 6 10 8 11 No information 51 27 13 7

N: (280) (527) (622) (165)

TABLE 5-A43 INFORMATION MEDIA FOR SAFETY INFORMATION BY AGE 65 16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-84 and over Newspapers 28% 27% 35% 36% 32% 31% Television 23 26 20 18 18 7 Radio 11 14 15 15 21 20 Magazines 13 19 18 15 12 7 Pamphlets 8 IS 14 16 7 6 Personal contacts 1 5 5 6 5 6 Exhibits 4 5 6 6 S 2 Movies 17 7 2 3 1 • Other B 5 4 . 3 4 1 Don't know 0 * 1 3 2 1 Not ascertained 8 6 9 " 9 11 7 No information 28 22 30 18 22 37

' N: (71) (262) (381) (301) (317) (202)

166 APPENDIX TABLES TO CHAPTER 7

TABLE 7-A1 SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY OCCUPATION

Professional Managerial Clerical Craftsmen Laborers Farmers

Tune In radio 50% 32% 40% 35% 24% 30% Use the telephone 37 47 41 42 4B 32 Call public agency 36% 45% 37% 40% 45% 28% Newspaper or radio 1 1 4 1 1 3 Friends or relatives 0 1 1 1 3 1 Ask someone 1 3 2 4 7 5 Other 4 2 4 5 3 2 Don't know a 11 10 10 16 32 Not ascertained 2 G 3 4 2 9 Tool Too% 100% 100% 155% 100% N: (135) (149) (193) (47B) (178) (IBS)

TABLE 7-A2 SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY HOME OWNERSHIP

Own Rent Other Tune ln radio 35% 38% 16% Us* the telephone 43 37 48 Call public agency 40% 35% 40% Newspaper or radio 2 1 3 Friends or relatives 1 1 3 Ask aomeone 3 4 9 Other 4 4 2 Don't know 11 15 33 Not ascertained 4 4 5 100% 100% 100% N: (933) (WI) (8B)

TABLE 7-A3 SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY INCOME

Under $2,000 $2,000-3,990 $4,000-7,499$7, 500 or over

Tune in radio 20% 29% 43% 38% Use the telephone 28 43 43 44 Call public agency 24% 41% 41% 40% Newspaper or radio 2 1 1 3 Friends or relatives 2 1 1 1 Ask someone 10 4 1 2 Other 5 3 3 5 Don't know 25 17 7 5 Not ascertained 3 4 3 5 T55% 100% 100% 100% N: (260) (537) (622) (185)

167 TABLE 7 -A4

SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY EDUCATION

Grade School High School PastHLghSchool

Tune In radio 23% 39% 47% Use telephone 35 44 40 Call public agency 32% 41% 40 Newspaper or radio 2 2 * Friends or relatives 1 1 • Ask someone B 2 1 Other 5 3 5 Don't know 24 8 5 Not ascertained 6 _4 2 1S6% 100% 100% N: (558) (773) (272)

TABLE 7-A5

SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY SEX

Men Womtn Tune ln radio 36% 35% Use telephone 42 38 Call public agency 40% 38% Newspaper or radio 3 1 Friend* or relative! • 1 A«k someone 4 • 4 Other 3 4 Don't know 11 15 Not ascertained 4 4 T0Q% 100% N: (735) (875)

TABLE 7-A6

SOURCE OF INFORMATION BY AGE

16-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 95 and over

Tune ln radio 40% 38% 41% 34% 32% 23% Use the telephone 31 43 41 47 39 as Call public agency 38% 42% 3B% 43% 36% 34% Newspaper or radio 3 * I 3 2 z Friends or rsi at Ives 0 0 3 1 1 3 Ask someone 0 3 2 3 4 9 Other 1 3 5 3 5 3 Don't know 34 13 8 9 14 24 Not ascertained 4 3 3 5 6 2 Tool 100% 100% 100% 158% T55% N: (71) (383) (381) (301) (317) (302)

168 BIBLIOGRAPHY of Survey Research Center Studies Referred to in the Text

Studies on International Affairs Campbell, A.A., Eberhart, & Cautley, P. Woodward "Public Re• action to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs" Survey Re• search Center, Univ. of Michigan, Publ. by Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N. Y., April, 1947 (Study conducted in June and August, 1946) Lang, H. R. "Public Attitudes Toward Russia and United States- Russian Relations" Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michi• gan, Ann Arbor, April 1947 (Study conducted in December 1946) Campbell, A. et al "Public Attitudes Toward American Foreign Policy" Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, May, 1947 (Study conducted in April, 1947) Withey, S.B. "Attitudes Toward United States-Russian Relations,'* Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Dec. 1948 (Study conducted in Oct. 1948) Fisher, B.R. & Belknap, G. "America's Role in World Affairs - Patterns of Citizen Opinion, 1949-50" Survey Research Cen• ter, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, May, 1952 (Study con• ducted in Nov. 1949 and April, 1950)

Studies on Civil Defense Belknap, G. "Public Thinking About Atomic Warfare and Civil Defense, " Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Jan• uary, 1951 (Survey conducted in eleven major cities in Sep• tember-October, 1950) Belknap, G. "The Public and Civil Defense," Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, March, 1952, (Survey in eleven major cities in August, 1951)

169 Belknap, G. "Civil Defense in the United States - 1952," Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Oct. 1952. (Survey conducted in April, 1952) Scott, W.A. "Citizen Participation in Civil Defense," Survey Re• search Center, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Sept. 1952. (Metropolitan portion of survey conducted in April, 1952) Scott, W.A. "Attitudes Toward Participation in Civil Defense," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XVLT, No. 3, Fall 1953 (Sum• mary of Report above) Withey, S.B. "Preliminary Report of a Survey on Civil Defense" Survey Research Center, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April, 1954 (Survey conducted in Feb.-March, 1954)

170