Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR IP0174C

We have received an increasing number of requests for information

on the United States civil defense program and on the effects of nuclear

war. This Info Pack contains material on nuclear weapons and on the

anticipated physical, economic, and social consequences of nuclear attacks

on the United States, basic information on the civil defense program, and

material discussing some of the arguments, pro and con, surrounding the

civil defense issue.

Those wishing more specific information on the civil defense program

should write to:

Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Public Affairs 1725 I Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20472

We hope this information is helpful.

Congressional Reference Division

March 12, 1982

This paper outlines the Fiscal Year 1983 civil defense program requested by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for emergency-related programs spanning the full range of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery--in peace or war.

Revital ized Civi 1 Defense Program Fol lowing the Administration's review of civi1 defense programs and pol i - cies, President Reagan, on October 2, 1981, announced his intention to "devote greater resources to improving our civil defenses," as part of his plan "to re- vitalize our strategic forces and maintain America's ability to keep the peace we1 1 into the next century."

The fundamental purposes of the National Civil Defense Program are :

(1) Tn save American li~cin the event of a nuclear attack. It will save 1ives by a lspers I ng people into rural areas where they will be least affected by the blast and thermal effects of the nuclear explosions, leaving radiation as the major hazard for the dispersed population. Our goal is to double the number of Americans that would survive from a major Soviet attack on the United States.

(2) To make nuclear war less likely by improving our ability to de- ter the Soviet Union from an attack on the United States. In conjunction with our strategic forces, Civil Defense can help to persuade the Soviet leadership that the ultimate outcome of an attack by them on the United States would be worse for them than for us. It also reduces the ability of the Soviets to co- erce the United States during a period of international crisis.

(3) To provide an improved capability for States and localities to deal with the day-to-day. emergencies that occur as a result of natural and tech- nological hazards. These "dual -use" benefits of the civil defense program were recognized by the Congress in December 1981 amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act.

FY 1983 Civil Defense Proaram

FEMA's budget for 1983 requests $252,34O,OOO for civil defense activities --about $1.10 per capita. As the first year of a moderate, multiyear program intended to deploy population protection capabilities, the requested FY 1983 budget is a first step toward rebuilding reasonable protection for our people. The program will be deployed in an orderly way--not as a crash effort--and in full partnership with States and localities.

The thrust of the program is to protect the U.S. population by relocatinq (evacuating) people from larger cities and other potential risk areas over- a period of several days during an acute crisis, and providing them with fallout protection and support. Capabi 1i ti es wi11 a1 so be improved to protect people in-place (at or near their homes, schools, or places of work) should time or circumstances preclude crisi s re1ocati on. Studies indicate that a balanced, moderate-cost civil defense program em- phasi zi ng crisis re1ocati on might save--i n a 1arge-scal e attack preceded by strategic warning--up to twice as many Americans as the 40 percent expected to survive under present civil defense. Such a balanced program includes both plans for crisis relocation of people from potential risk areas, and operational systems and capabilities for execution of relocation plans and for protecting the population from fa1 lout.

Based on extensive research and on experience in peacetime evacuations, crisis relocation could be highly effective if two conditions existed: (1) Completion of high qua1 ity olans, together with development of operational systems and capabilities; ana (2) several days of warning time in which to move and protect the bulk of the approximately 145 million people living in our lar- ger cities or near important military instal lations. Surprise attack is considered hi ghly unl ikel y . Most experts be1 ieve that an attack on the U.S. would come only in the context of a lengthy period of in- ternational crisis. Moreover, it is 1ikely that we would have sufficient warn- ing time because the Soviets must protect the bulk of their urban population by evacuati on.

Evacuation experience in both peacetime and World War II is that most people will comply with official instructions, provided that these are under- standable and make sense in terms of improving chances for survival. In fact, in a threatening situation, many people will leave potential danger areas on their own, whether or not they have been advised to do so.

The FY 1983 program will provide a basis for action, in future years, to permit full deployment of required capabil ities. The FY 1983 program will ac- cordingly accelerate activities a1 ready underway (e.g., crisis re1ocation plan- ning, development of State and local Emergency Operating Centers) whi ley at the same time, improving the quality of plans and systems. The program will feature greater participation by State and local governments in managing the implementa- tion and achievement of national goals and objectives. FEMA will also commence new programs in FY 1983 (e.g., survivable, hi gh-perfqrmance warning and communi - cations systems). The FY 1983 program also provides for analyses and pilot ac- ti vities in the area of protection of key industries and related work forces.

FY 1983 Proaram Hi~hliahts

In the area of nuclear civil protection for the people, the FY 1983 re- quest provides for accel erating development of crisi s re1ocati on olans. By end-FY 1983, augmented State planning staffs should have compietea about 56 per-.. cent of the initial CRP's required by local jurisdictions throughout the United States. FEMA a1 so proposes to accelerate the National Shelter Survey, which provides data needed as a basis for crisis relocation planning.

The most important factor in effect: ve crisis re1ocation is publ ic cooper- ation which, in turn, depends upon the publ ic's understanding of official ad- vice and instructions. FEMA therefore intends to work with the States to pro- vide additional crisis relocation maps and instructions. These instructions ire intended to be placed in local telephone directories in areas where crisis re1ocation plans have been completed. By end-FY 1983, such instructions should be publ ished in telephone directories in jurisdictions including about 25 per- cent of the total U.S. risk population. Additional FY 1983 activities will include resumption of selective shelter mark-ing (suspended in 1973), as well as work to provide a basis for future quan- tity procurement of austere shelter supplies and ventilation kits. Shelter signs identify for the citizen those bui 1dings providing protection against nuclear at- tack effects, while shelter stocks permit people to remain in shelters until the decl ine of radiation level s permits emergence from she1 ter.

FEMA's FY 1983 request will improve the coverage of the existing National Warning System, while preparing for deployment of a survivable radio-warning system and of a survivable system for communications between the National , Re- gional , State and State-Area 1eve1 s.

FEMA proposes to accelerate the program started in FY 1981 to provide matching funds for development of State and local Emerqencv O~watingCenters. EOC's are protected sites, with necessary communications, from which key local and State offi ci a1 s direct coordinated operati ons i n peacetime or attack emer- genci es . ,FEMA proposes a1 so_>& accelerate the program to._ecau.ide-fa-l.louL-bnd electroma-qnetic pul~-~~~~protection for b-rocddcast stations, as well as an e~~ea~-pawergenerator. Such protected stations provide a critical compo- nent of readiness, the ability to provide authoritative information and instruc- tions to the public in an emergency. Matching funds will also be provided to enhance existing State and local networks for emergency communications.

The FY 1983 request also provides for support of professional Radiologi- cal Defense Officers at the State-Area level, and extension of the State-level RDO structure being developed in FY 1982. Full-time supervisory RDO's are the keystone in developing radiological defense systems and capabilities. In ad- dition, capabilities will be developed to produce and deploy, in future years, about 7 million sets of instruments required for the shelter and post-shelter * periods.

In the area of training, the FY 1983 request provides for restoring capa- bi1 ities to provide simulated-emergency exerciqes for local and State officia1 s. Effective execution of plans to deal with peacetime or attack emergencies re- quires that key officials know what to do in case of emergency, and experience has shown that exercising is the most effective way of providing this knowledge. Other civi 1 defense training activities will1 inclge-i-n-creasing capabi 1iti to provide surviual in-formation to the pub1 ic during _a.garj4-d_Z=ek-e-1.oping-~-cisis, starting training in the area of shelter management, and accelerating training of radio1ogical defense personnel . Finally, the FY 1983 request provides for a real increase in matching-fund support for the State and 1ocal civi 1 preparedness structure. This would permit new jurisdictions to enter the program, and additional personnel to be supported in jurisdictions now participating. This will, in turn, improve capabilities for management of both peacetime and attack emergencies. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE October 1, 1981 In September of 1979 the House If given a chance, civil defense will passed my amendment to the Depart- work. It will save lives both during nu- ment of Defense authorization bill clear war and natural disaster. An en- that embodied the thrust of Presiden- hanced US. civil defense program will tial Decision 41. It set out the goals serve to restore a measure of the stra- and elements that were to be included tegic ba.lance of power with the Soviet Reprinted by the Library of in an enhanced civil defense program, Union which has an active, well Congress, Congressional Research authorized a 5-year program and, most funded. and by all accounts a workable Service, December 1981 importantly, it stated that civil de- civil defense program. Moreover, an . fense would be considered part of the enhanced civil defense promis af- U.S. strategic defense. Unfortunately. fordable, even with today's tight bud- this amendment died tn the confer- gets. There can be no greater priority ence committee that year in 1979. for spending tax dollars than to spend In 1980 we renewed this effort and them on a program that will save the we were successful in a similar amend- lives of US. citizens. The total cost of ment, minus the 5-year authorization. the 7-year D-prime program would be It was adoped by both Houses of Con- a modest 32.3 billion. The 5-year ver- gress. It was signed into law by the sion of the plan, known as the D pro- President. Thus, the House, the gram. would cost around $2 billion. In Senate, and the administr.^tion went either case, it is a small price to pay on record in support of an enhanced for the lives that would be saved. civil defense program. Mr. Speaker, there is support for an This year we fared just as well enhanced civil defense program here during the authorization process. The in Congress and among the population Houze in the Department of Defense as a hole. The number of Members authorization bill approved $174 mil- participating in this special order re- lion for fiscal year 1982, an increase of flects that fact. In addition, on this $41.2 million over the administration's floor on July 17, the chairman of the request. House Appropr~ations Subcommittee on --Independent Agencies, Mr. BOLAND,told me in a colloquy concern- This was an endorsement of the ing the D and D-prime programs, "I House Armed Senlces Committee would be willing to fund a program at judgment that this level of funding is that level over that period if it has the needed to implement the D-prime pro- administration's support. If we are gram, a 7-year funding effort to im- going to put into place a civiJ defense CIVIL DEFENSE: prove population surpival in the event program that is going to protect the The SPEAXER pro tempore. Under of nuclear war, thereby enhancing de- people of the United States, not only a previous order of the House. the gen- terrence and crisis stability. in time of war but also against natural tleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON)is Unfortunately, we have not met disasters, this type of program is nec- recognized for 60 minutes. with equal success in the appropri- essary ." Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker. I have ation process over this same period. We have much to do, h4r. Speaker. often taken the floor of this House to Our attempts to get adequate funding and out time is mgshort. We talk on the subject of civil defense, in for the citll defense prograxn have must begin an enhanced civil defense offering amendments to authorization been frustrated at every turn. In the program soon, and we must deal with and appropriation legislation and at decade prior to the fiscal year 1981 ap the related areas of command, control. other times during general debate propriation, we saw the resources allo- and communications. early warning when the subject of civil defense cate&for civil defense decline steadily. systems, air defense, and ballistic mis- arose. Last year. we did manage a real in- sile defense. The time for study and I have asked for this special order crease of 10 percent over the fiscal reevaluation is over. The time for today because I believe it necessary year 1980 level. Although this fiscal action is now. once again that the Members of this year 1981 fuixiing of $123 million was Mr. MITCXELL of New York Mr. body have the opportunity to express far less than the $167 million needed Speaker, will be gentleman yield? their support for this vital program. to begin D-prime last year, a number Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend, .this program of civiI defense. I want to of us were encouraged. We thought the gentleman from NEW York (Mr. thank my colleagues who are here that at least we had turned the comer MITCHELL). today to join in this effort. and could build on the initiatives per- Mr. MITCHELL of New York. I To begin this discw&on. Mr. Speak- mitted by this increase, move toward thank the gentleman for yielding. er, it would be appropriate to review full implementation of PD-41, and Mr. Speaker. I wish to commend my what has happened to civil defense have a truly nationwide, comprehen- good friend and colleague, the gentle- and the civil defense program in sive civil defense program. man from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON)on recent years. both in terms of legisla- Needless to say, our hopes have not his holding of this special order on tive action here in Congress and been fulfilled by what has happened civil defense. He has been a long and within the various administrations. In so far this year on ciW defense fund- strong supporter of an improved civil September,' 1978, then President ing. The =-independent agencies defense program for our Nation. Carter issued Presidential 'Directive appropriatlon bill for fiscal year 1982 It is my belief one of the most press- PD-41 which directed that the Na- funds civil defense at $128.8 million, ing and unmet needs facing our Nation tion's civil defense promshould en- an amount that is even below the is for an adequate civil defense pro- hance the survivability of the Amerl- $132.8 million requested in the origi- ---one which is responsive to ex- can population and their leadersfrip. nal Carter budget, and endorsed by isting threats and prepares us for thus enhancing deterrence and stabil- the Reagan administration. We have future challenges. ity and reducing the possibility of been told that the new administration To respond to this need. I proposed Soviet coercion during a time of crisis. has endorsed PD-41. but so far this ad- a comprehensive, 7-year civil defense PD41, Presidential Decision 41, also ministration. like its predecessor, has program. Its cost of approximately contemplated a "dual use" civil de- not joined the fight to secure funding $2.6 billion, represents but a fraction fense to help deal with peacetime dis- that !s sufficient to make the lofty of our estimated tot,al, defense expend- asters and emergencies. goals of that document a reality. itm*s for the period covered-the fn- G( October 1, 1981 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --Hot JSE H 6777 crease in fnnding over our present pro- Most experts agree we eRjoy "rough Soviet superiority-they M longer amounts to approximately one- equivalence" with the Soviets in weap claim it does not exist-is to retarget tenth of 1 percent of our Department Onrp. F'mm my perspective it appears our weapons. Retargeting would sup- of Defense annual budget. to get mugher each gear. But if Soviet posedly balance through civil de- The prom I am advancing is one weapons have a far greater destructive fensethe potential saving of Ameri- that will give us. for the first time in effect on us than our weapons on can lives rather than the potential de- tbnuclear era. the protection we them. it is as though they had far struction of Soviet citizens must be assured of as we face our ideo- more weapons. This makes 2 mockery We must begin today to rebalance logical adversaries who lack our corn- of the strategic balance. It does not the strategic equation. How do you mitment for the pursuit of peace, exist. deter an attack unless you can con- Simply put. my goal is to help to bal- Once the balance of tenor is gone vince an enemy that you will win the ance the strategic scales but, if there the Soviets have an awesome edge in war that he is sbrtln(L? I find it doubt- should be a war, to guarantee the sur- any confrontation, whether it be at ful that anyone aware to the strategic viva1 of our Nation. We have no such the bargaining table, an act of adven- imba.Lance belleves we would fire any guarantee today. It is time we did turism in Europe. Africa. the Mideast nucIear weapons if it meant tbde- The 7-year plan would concentrate or in all-out nuclear war. struction of our society. Without a the use of the funds requested for: It hss been said that “eternal vigi- cinl defense system that is precisely Crisis evacuation: research and devel- lanco is the of liberby." Euenh in what It means. opment: emergency operating centers. Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan vy.this $2.6 billion grogram training and education: admanage- have shown tha&to be true, If Rusia requves the authorization of the Fed- ment and coordination. is able to grab up one or two more eral Emergency Management Agenc;' In each one of these crittcal areas countries, we may be forced into war- to increase from $174 minion- our present civil defense program fails with a strong possibility that the in I282 to $487 million in 1988. the test of adequacy. flict could develop into a nuclear con- For the Ffrst time ever the Ecme This promwas not developed by frontation. Why not provide at least Anned Skrvhs Snbcammittee on Mili- me. rather it emerged ov'er an ex- minimal protection for our civilians? tary bstahtioas designated D-prime tended period of time after protrscted Why not teach them to survive? by experts who Why as the desired program for civil de- study d~lldefense have we not done someWling fense in the United States. The $17.1 have earned respect and a rtgtional about civil defense? Chiefly because million authorized for 1982 represents reputation for their wrk in this area far too many Americans are the vlc- the frst yesis cost of this 7-year com- It is a product of serious. well-inten- tims of three mk.conceptions--the first prehensive program. tioned people rho share a cancern being the overkill fallacy, wherein the about our present. have learned from casualties per kiloton in Hiroshima The committee language is an fol- lessons of the past and are determined and Nagasaki are multiplied by the lows: in is arse- The level of funding in the authorization to prepare us to live peaee. It the number of kilotons in the world's (a1 prom D-prhne recommendation of nal. This implies that by some means of appropriations in subsection repre- sents Lbe first year of a comprehensive 7- the civil defense wori;shops which we can collect the entire target popu- year upwed funding program for civil de- were held in Rosslyn. Va. in the tall lations in the same density as existed f- btYWll aS the D-prhne Which of 1977 by the Systems Planning Cor- in HiroshimP aab Nagasskt and keep fsbssedu~the~ofsehf~scom- poratfon for the Defense Clvil Prcpar- them unwamed and vnlnersble. A mesfPe populrrti0~relocsticnr ~ilitp edness Agency. statement of identical validity is that for time of crisis The mmun orkmaki in We are in trouble. ~hesov-fetslrave the world's inventory of snail arms executive branch studies in the dvil defense an excellent civil defense system. We ammunition, or for that matter, kitch- area that provided the basis for Presidentfal do nut. Neither nation had an ade- enknives. can also kill the human pog- directive 41. issued in September 1978. and is consistent with the action of Cmgress In quate program in the midsixties But ulation several times over. enacting title V of the Federal Court De- for more than a decade the Soviets Another widely held misconception fense Act of 1950 in Public Law 96-342 have been spending over $1 btllion a is that much of the world's population year on civil defense. We have aver- would be destroyed by-fallout fmm a The Congress of the United States aged less than $100 million. They have l-sde nudear war. "On the will spend approximately $225 billion a three-track program: Individual prs- Beach" reflects how this tMgfor our offensive capability. Without cemion. communitg shelters, and pog origh&d The Naaional Academy of the $174 million for civil defense we utation evacuation We have only one. Science esthaks that the long-term are doing almost nothing to protect community shelters, and it is in disar- effect of this fallout would only American citiz* ray in spite of the dedicated and amount to a 2-perewt increase in the Does it not make good sense to dogged efforts of rmury professional cancer rate over a Syear period, This spend a little more to provide a plan and amateur civil defense leaders. increase could be countered by not re- that would help prevent wax. but in Why fs this a problem? Because it building many of the cigarette plants the event. of war, would help protect destroys the strategic balance. The that would be destroyed in such a hol- all Americans? best hope far peace, we are told, is the ocaust. I urge my colleagues to join me in maintenance of' the strategic bdance. Pinally. victims of the doomsday sce- helping to implement the D-prime pro- There are varying estimates on the nario feel. mistakenly, that survivors gram. Our totai nation& defense de- effect of an all-out nuclear war. If the af a &ge-aak nuclear war woad mands no less Soviets have time to put their civil de- Wetcs Eve und- for weeks at fense program intc~operatiorb4 or 4 a tirme. Not so, our scientists tell us, U 1746 days prior to the holocaustthe re- An individual can protect himseU from Mr. 0BEBSTA.R. Mr. Speaker, will sults would be far more destructive tc the most dangerous type of radiation the gentleman yield? the United States, Wch does not because it travels like light. in a Mr- SICELTON. I yield. have a P~---ow~100 Won dead- straight Line. A -ef. folded Mr. OBEBSTAR. Mr. Speaker. I than the Soviet Union-5 to 20 milli4n aver six or eight tima can meru m Would like to commend the gentle- We& ShoaM. we adopt the I3-prime effective gas mask to provide pwfer?. frem Missoarl for taking this special Plan of the lnteragencp St- an Civil tfonfmnr the less dangerous type of order on the vital issue of civil de- Defense, developed under the aegis of rsdiation fense. and cangratulate him and the the National Security Council. they es- That is the bad news. The good news gentleman from New Yorh (Mr. timate we can save up to 85 percent of is it is not too late do something about Mmxm~)for the contribution both our population. Should the Soviets it, A relatively inuruensive remedy is of them made as recognized national target populatian. they estfmate up to to dwelop a civil defense system af leafiers la alerting this country to the txxk4hird.s of our population_will be our oam. Some: of our defense leaders need of rebuilding civil defense. and preserved. suggest the way to cornpensae for fighting on the House floor for im- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOIJSE October 1, 1981 proved funding for the civil defense ef- clear war is winnable and that should assumes an awesome exchange of forts. be a sobering thought for all of us. weapons followed by little else than I have supported their efforts in the I am committed, as I believe this just clouds of radiation. past and will continue to support them Congress is, to the restoration of this Before every new conflict, we are in the future. I hope all of our col- Nation's military posture. However, I told that weapons are so awful that leagues will pay close attention to the believe, as does my colleague from the war will last not longer than a few very substantial information that is Missouri, that an intricate element in days or weeks. The invention of the being presented here in the course of our overall strategic strength lies in a machine gun was supposed to make this s~ecialorder. no-nonsense "emergency preparedness World War 1 very short. It did not, as Mr.'S?XELTON. I thank the gentle- program. armies learned to dig in deeply. World man from hlmnesota very much. I would therefore urge both my col- War II was supposed to be very short Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, will the leagues in the House and the adminis- as the invention of the bomber plane gentleman yield7 tration to continue the progress made would make it impossible to fight Mr. SKELTON. I yield to my friend to date in the civil defense of the longer than a few weeks. Now, of from Maryland. United States. course, we talk of the 3-week war or (Mr. DYSON asked and was given Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentle- even in shorter terms because of nu- man from Maryland for his remarks. permission to revise and extend hsre- clear weapons. -rrlrr \ He has been a strong supporter of civil uka1u./ It is a strange thing that we do not Mr. DYSON. Mr. Speaker, I would defense since he has been in Congress. find talk of mutual assured destmc- like to take this opportunity today to I thank him for his contribution &-.aa.. tion emanating from Moscow. What wuay. applaud my distinguished colleague's will we do find is that the defense hierar- efforts on behalf of a strong home de- Mr. McDONALD. Mr. Speaker, chy of Moscow talks of fighting and the gentleman yield? winning a nuclear war. We also find a fense for the United States. Let me Mr. SKJ3LTON. I yield to my col- join him in requesting from the Presi- vast system of civil defense that is league from Georgia. building factories out in the country, dent the continued commitment he (Mr. McDONALD asked and was and his party have made for an effec- has deep shelters in its cities, spends given permission to revise and extend several billions on training civil de- tive civil defense program. his remarks.) It is my concern, however, that per- Mr. McDONALD Mr. Speaker, I fense personnel and plans to evacuate haps during our current budget diffi- as many people as it can. Could it be thank the gentleman from Missouri that the Soviet Government values its culties, the administration, with the for yielding. I would like to applaud consent of the Congress. will make citizens more that we do? The People's his havrncr a mecia1 order to review Republic of China also has a vast shel- !his country's emergency preparedness and extr~melysimportanttopic that, a casualty of the budget ax. unfortunately, our Nation has disre- ter system to protect its people and, For fiscal year 1982, the budget for garded for too long. We can see from obviously, intends to try and survive a the Federal Emergency Management nuclear Strike. And, while neither the the great interest by the news galleries Soviet nor the Communist Chinese Agency is $128.8 million, which trans- over our heads, that is symptomatic of lates into 57 cents per capita that this civil defense systems are perfect, they the problems that we face, that for will be able save a lot of people and Government is spending to protect the whatever reason, the news media of to life and property of the American much of their industrial capacity in this country have been active propo- any nuclear exhange. people from nuclear attack and assist nents by its sense of omission or com- them during times of natural and mission of the MAD policy of mutual As in the case of the infantw in manmade disasters. assured destruction. World War I, we need to dig deeply I realize that this subject is one of Mr. McDONALD. Mr.-Speaker, the into the earth and let that be our little interest to many of my col- subject of civil defense looms larger amour against a nuclear attact, We, leagues and, to some degree, the each day and becomes important with too, need a shelter system, an evacua- American people who view the ques- each passing hour as the United States tion plan, and a system to protect our tion of survivability in a nuclear moves into "the window of vulnerabil- industrial capacity. For a few hundred attack impossible. Yet I believe the ity" to our strategic forces. Our only million dollars, we could start a serious role of a nation's emergency prepared- hope to change the pathetic situation civil defense program, start training ness has a dual function. The question as regards to civil defense in this coun- the necessary personnel and start of survivability is essential but also taking the steps necessary to our Na- a try, is to change the basic public atti- tion's sunival and abandon the MAD viable and comprehensive program of tude that has been built up by our doctrine which can only lead to our civil defense will clearly demonstrate opinion makers that we are in for to our adversaries that the United mutual assured destruction and that Nation's destruction and/or surrender. States will yield no strategic advan- no one will survive, so why even dis- Otherwise, we are doomed to live in tage to the Soviet Union or any other cuss it. This attitude is the grossest the valley of the shadow for the next nation. nonsense of all time. The United 5 years at least, our very existence de- I believe that it is important to again States has to survive and continue if pendent upon the whims fo the Polit- remind the Members of this House civilization, as we know it, is to contin- buro in Moscow. and the American people'that it is not ue. Can we expect the athiest Marxists Mr. Speaker, let me once again com- the United States which has embarked with their 100-percent materialism to mend my colleague from Missouri for on the most ambitious and aggressive preserve civilization if they prevail or this most important special order on civil defense program during peace will they turn the entire Earth planet the subject of civil defense. time, but the Soviet Union, and my into one vast Gulag? I think we all Mr. SKIELTON. I thank my friend question is, why? know the answer to that- and colleague from Georgia forpis Studes conducted by our own ex- The theory of mutual assured de- contribution today. perts show that the Soviets spend 20 struction has done more than cripple Mr. BRINECLCI. Mr. Speaker, will times as much for civil defense as the our civil defense. It has amost crippled the gentleman yield? United States-nearly $2 billion annu- our national yill to survive. It has con: Mr. SF;ELTON. I yield to my-friend aily. Why does a nation which cannot vinced the man in the street that and colleague from Georgia. provide its people with basic consumer there is no use in civil defense as each Mr. BRINECLCI. Mi. Speaker, I goods devote substantial resources to side has enough bombs to kill each thank the gentleman very much. If civil defense? Are they afraid of a U.S. other 10 times over anyway. MAD has the roll is called of civil defense and sneak attack or is it mere paranoia? further, and insidiously in my view, civil defense issues, the name of the I would argue that it is neither, but prevented our Nation from having a gentleman from Missouri would head rather a calculated element of their real strategic goal in my future con- the list in terms of those who have overall strategic philosophy that nu- flict with the Soviet Union in that it made such a fine contribution to the October 1, 1981, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE remedial legislation designed in the in- I think that success is a matter of Mr. SECGLTON. Mr. Chsirman, I terests of the American citizen in time mafafns. I think that that capability thank the gentleman from Georgia of war. Following Mr. S~ELTON'Sname which better Prepares itself just a (Mr. BRINKLEY),and I do appreciate certainly would be the gentleman little bit more in a state of readiness the gentleman's participating in our from New York (Mr. MrrCKELL). Mr. would stand it in good stead in the s~ecialorder this evening. WHITE~JRSTof Virginia, Mr. DICKIN- event of war. -The gentleman from- Georgia has SON of Alabama, and many others of So I do speak for a dual use System. shown extraordinary leadership as us who have felt for a long time that and I would say to the Members of the chairman of the subcommittee in as- civil defense has been neglected. Eouse that our subcommittee has at sisting civil defense, and he has in all Mr. MITC- of New York. Mr. this time grafted in the defense au- meanings of the word been the "father Speaker, will the gentleman yield? thoetion bill language which does of dual usen--dual use of civil defense, Kr. BRINKUZ. Of course. bring natural disaster preparedness up including natural disasters, along with Mr. MITCHELt of New York. I to the same status, as a matter of stat- the protection against nuclear attack. would just like to add that very nearly utory law, as that in the civil defense The gentleman from Georgia should at the top of that list would be the system. We are in conference right certainly be thanked for the hard gentleman from Georgia because of now, but we are trusting that that will work he has done in this area the splendid job he has done not only become a matter of law and that this Mr. gRAMER. Mr. Speaker, will the to develop the civil defense system. will be helpful to our civil defense gentleman yield? but in the leadership he has provided system because of the fact that it Mr. SICELTON. I yield to my friend. as chairman of the subcommittee that serves as a powerful incentive. It would motlvate our local and State the gentleman from Colorado. has jurisdiction over this subject. Mr. gRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. BRINKLEY. I thank my friend people who are .charged with the and fellow pilot from the State of New needs of a natural disaster situation. it the gentleman for yielding. York. would encouarage them to do their Let me first begin by saylng how Where I am coming from is just a job. and then we would have them in much I personally appreciate-and I tad different. The Whiteman Air place in the event the attack disaster am, hopefully. speaking on behalf of Force Base. I believe, you have Instru- would come along. the people of the congressional district ments of war there that would be tar- Finally, Mr. Speaker. I might men- of which I have the privilege to be the geted by the Soviet Union; is that not tion the item which the last speaker Represertative, the Mfth Congression- correct? referred to, and that is the doctrine of al District of Colorado-and how much Mr. SICELTON. That is absolutely mutual assured destruction (MAD). It we appreciate the work of the gentle- correct. We have 150 ICBM misslle has been said that the Soviet Union man from Missouri (Mr. S~ELTON).the sllos that are at or in the Fourth Con- has sufficient firepower to kill every work of the gentleman from New York gresslonal District of Missouri that I human being on Earth and that we in (Mr. MITCRELL),and the work and ef- represent. The gentleman is correct. the United States have sufficient fire- forts of our distinguished subcommit- Mr. BRINIZLFY. If I recall correct- power to kill every human being on tee chairman, the gentleman from ly, in the gentleman's district in the Earth. Why is it, then. that we corn- Georgia (Mr. BBIXKLEY)in bringing to recent paat. -there has been severe Pete more and more in this anns nrce the followu~stage this most critical flooding which we would term as a in which we are engaged? and vital issue. natural disaster. Well. that is not exactly right. Those The MAD doctrinemutual assured Mr. SKELTON. Yes, we had-and of Rresumptions, those beliefs, would pre- desttuction-under which this country course I have told the gentleman of sume that on bombing day all the has operated its strategic umbrella these because of his interest in the people of the world would go into the now for almost two decades is, in my dual use of civil defense--we had a cities to which that firepower is tar- judgment. a dixredited policy. It is killer flood in the western part of my geted. The Soviet Union has different one by which the acronym. MAD, district, the Fourth District of Missou- plans. It has a dispersal system which truly and very characteristically iden- ri, and we have had killer tornados on would take the people away from the tifies the significance of this policy, two occasions in which civil defense Population centers and thus save the because it is a policy that emphasizes played a very important part. lives of millions. That is the goal the disprotection of the American Mr. BRINRLGI. And ttus brings me toward which the gentreman from homeland and the American people. It to the structure of which I speak. New York (Mr. MXTCEELL)has pointed. is a policy that in effect holds Ameri- which is one of dual use which would If we should go to r continental can POpulatiOns ap unwitting pawns in provide a future in-place system of system such as the prime or the a game of strategic balance and coun- civil defense that would be tested and followon, it would serve the American terbalance. It pur~osely puts the exercised by the Vikings. the Ber- people well because we would disperse American population at risk; because serkers--the natural disasters that do the people and we would save millions. it says that to be able to protect your- certainly come along from time to countless millions of lives. self and your citizens is somehow de- time, which would provide us an ade- Finally, in conclusion. I am going to stabilizing or is somehow go- to quate preparedness on which we could explore with our subcommittee the ad- upset potentially the other side. depend should that dire day ever dition of language whichwould permit Thus it has come about that we have come. the President to institute a volunteer no protection against incoming hostile system with reference to State and bombers, we have no protection 0 1750 - ' local governments under the authority aealnst incoming hostile missiles, and So I have been something of a mis- of the Federal civil defense umbrella we have no way today of which I am sionary. I have preached the gospel of which might come into play and trig- aware of protecting the American dual use. not only because of the cer- ger the energies of national groups people in the event that some calami- tainty of natural disasters but because chartered by the Federal Government. tous or purposeful or inadvertent it would give us some self-confidence I am speaking of those charters held event is somehow triggered. in our attack preparedness. by veterans' groups. Gold Star Wives, Since the gentleman has brought I also believe. Mr. Speaker, it would and others who might be an important these matters to our attention during provide an important peacetime divi- backup in any dispersal-system that the course of our subcommittee meet- dend, a cost-effective mechanism that we might have. ings. I have often since reflected and would give us more bang for the buck. Once again, Mr. Speaker, I thank wondered, what would happen if an It would give us two for the price of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. American President faced a crisis of one. If we are getting the utility of SKEZTON)for taking this time to em- this kind. As I understand it. it would civil defense in peacetime, we also phasize the importance of civil defense take about 4 days for the Soviets to have it standing in the wings for a and the fact that it is time that we fully implement the Soviet civil de- time of war. "fish or cut bait." fense policy. What would an American CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE President do at a time when a crisis to the attention of the American lars a year to keep alive chronically ill arose between us and the .Soviet people. people. Here is a society which be- Union, when tensions were running Mr. SKZLTON. I the gentle- lieves in setting up kidney treatment high, if the Soviet Government imple man vem much. I appreciate the gen- centers at a cost of over $1 billion a mented its civil defense policy 1 day at tlemsn from Colorado's continued and year. a time, knowing that if that policy very helpful support in the area of Mr. SICELTON. If I may reclaim my were successfully implemented, the civil defense. The gentleman has been time for a moment, I know the gentle- potential exists, as I understand the so sincere and working hard, and we man would be interested in knowing figures, that if an exchange were then do appreciate the gentleman partici- that in the year 1977 and the year to Lake place between us and the pating today. 1978 .the U.S. Government, through Soviet Union, the United States would Mr. GINGRICB. Mr. Speaker, wLU the .U.S. Atr Force, spent $124 million lose upward to 150 million people from the gentleman yield? to harden 150 ICBM silos in western its population and the Soviets, al- Mr. SEELTON. I yield to my friend Missouri, in my district. the Fourth though they would suffer a tremen- fmm Georgia (Mr. Gmmm). District of Missouri. dous loss, could nevertheless minimize Mr. GINGRICH. I thank my friend During that same year, less than that loss to about 15 million, less than from Missouri for recognizing me. I $100 million was spent to protect the the number that was lost by the Sovl- appreciate the gentleman taking the an people of this Nation from the very ets in World War XI? leadership to speak today on issue same eventualfty that they spent $124 With those kinds of mtios staring an that is only of importance should war million to harden those silos. It is American President in the face and come, but then is of such Fmportance rather ironic. That is exactly what the with a Soviet ultimatum then follow- that it should concern aU of us In gentleman is saying. And I yield to ing, what action would an American peacetime. him again. President take? The question I think every American GINGRICH. Would he capitulate to Soviet de- should ask is what is the cost of insur- Mr. I thank my col- mands, or would he have the capabili- ance and what is it worth to have it. league for enlightening me. I had no It is very clear to anyone who has idea of those numbers and I think the ty of resisting? gentleman is right. We harden mis- Quite frankly, if I were an American looked at any field that the Sovlet siles, but we do not harden human President in that situation I do not Union does believe that nuclear war is beings. We protect control centers but know what I would do, and I hope that an instrument of political pohcy. It ~s no American President is ever put in very clear from anyone who has ever we do not protect people. that situation. studied history that accidents do There is probably no single cause in But until we pay attention to the ca- happen, rmstakes are made, political terms of the amount of attention it pability of reversing the discredited leaders do frankly goof. and the net does not get that deserves more atten- doctrine of MAD and turning to the result-can be a war no one wanted. tion, more investment, more thought. defense of the American homeland If we were to invest in civil defense and more commitment than the cause and the American people, that risk is on the scale that is reasoned, and le- of civil defense. one that we run against a very danger- gitimate and necessary, and nothing I challenge the Reagan administra- ous time fuse and a very dangerous ever happened, we might at most have tion and I believe this Congress will ul- time clock. And our' mbcommfttee wasted some money. Id we fail to timately join in challengipg the chairman has. I think. put it very art- invest in civil defense and something Reagan administration to build a pro- fully in terms of the statement. that happens, we wlll have wasted lives. human, prosurvival, propopulation, the "time is now to fish or cut bait." r would far rather be the man who strategic policy that is the equal to its Many have stated, "Well, the Ameri- faced my grandchfldren and said, yes, weaponry, its hardware, and its strate- can people really don't mre about civil I was too cautious, yes, .I cared too gic offensive policy, because if we look defense. It is not an issue." Well, we much, Yes. I did too much, than be the at the real world it is inconceivable to can tell, I think, from the news atten- man who faces the survivors and tries me, as I am sure it is inconceivable to tion that this matter is getting that it to expb why we did not do the my colleague, that any President is not an Issue. But I would submit things that were necessary. would use any kind of strategy or.&- It is clear that the Defense Depart- plomacy knowing that a Soviet first that it is not , an issue because the MX American people, as we sit here in this ment looks too narrowly at the ques- strike, even if it allowed the to room. honestly believe that they do tion of stratemc weapons and strategic survive, would, in the process, have have a capability of protecting them- defense. We are on the verge of de- killed literally millions of Americans selves, and the gentleman is doing a siglllng an MX mtsdle system which from fallout, not from the blast. not marvelous job of educating them so will guarantee that after an all-out from the immediate effect, but from that they no longer believe that. Soviet first strike. missiles will survive the careless, wanton lack of prepara- but cities will not. Any reasonable ex- tion on the part of our Government 0 1800 amination of the plans for the MX and its leaders. They do have a civil defense pro- mobile basmg system will indicate I simply want to close by saying gram that is capable of defending clearly an assumption that it is mi- again to my colleagues, I know that it American populations, and that is the ble that the Soviet Union might one is a long and lonely vigil. I know the reason that so little excitement seems day, for reasons of policy, explode 100. gentleman and the dean of the Geor- to be generated over the issue. 200, 1,000, 3,000 hydrogen warheads gia delegation have led the fight. I I really truly believe that the gentle on the North American Continent. In want to commend both of you because man from Mtssouri (Mr. -#) that environment, the fallout, the ra- I tb.ink literally there may be in our does us a real service by educating us, diation, the downwind effect on the lifetime no single cause that saves by laying out these cold, bleak, hard Midwest, on Chicago, on Detroit. and more American lives than the cause of facts as to just what great risks there in some drcumstances on Washington. civil defense that the two of you have are if we continue on this policy. would be so phenomenal that the so eloquently espoused. I thank the We can no longer continue to be impact on human befngs would be so gentlemen. solely an offensive country. building incredible that wrstand a chance of Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentle- weapons that are capable of destroy- saving literally millions of human man for his very appropriate com- ing people without.some consideration beings. ments. of protecting ourselves and our people Here is a society which will 8pend The gentleman reminds me that against those same weapons or types over $1 million to keep alive a person during the 1930's. beginntng about of weapons being directed against us. .. who has been in a car wreck and 1934, there was a Member of Parlia- I am privileged to be a part of this whose brain has ceased to function. ment in the United gingdom that special order and again I commend the Here is a society which will spend lit- spoke of a great danger across the gentleman for bringing this vital issue erally hundreds of thousands of dol- English Channel, and that great October 1, 1981 NGRESSIQNAL RECORD - HO danger and the great new fact. of only the mundane, long-haul planning about $2.6 billion over 7 years. or which this Member of. Parliament that all of us pray we will never nee& about $1.67 per person per year. This spoke was the fact that Germany was Congress can be proud that in the system, called a "Crisis Relocation building a tremendous air fleet. Few last few years we have made a start in Pl-" would cost about $1.8 billion paid attention. Few paid attention to plannlng for national emergencies. We more than the current civil defense him until about 1938, and pe6ple did have done our homework and found system, yet save about 90 million more begin to pay attention to Winston that civil defense has more uses than human beings than current capabili- Churchill. They did begin to build we thought. Not orily will an effective ties could. In the words of the FZW.4 Hurricane fighters and Spitfire fight- plan provide stability during time of report: "This works out to $20 per life ers. crisis and enhance our survivability, saved. which many consider an attrac- But what is more important, they but the mere promise of stability and tively low insurance premium." began to make preparation for the use survivability provides a deterrent to The benefits of such a system of the tunnel system, the subway our patential enemies and a powerful extend well beyond those in the event system of London. should the e-ventu: psychological weapon in our arsenal. of nuclear conflict, which we must ality ever come to pass that London A strong civil defense network can make every conceivable effort to were bombed, and thank goodness he be efficiently adapted to natural dis- avoid. First, such a system could actu- was heeded. asters so that we can marshal1 our re- ally deter the occurrence of conflict, He was heeded. and because of that sources to provide a coordinated re- by improving our defense. Second, it literally thousands of British people sponse for floods, hurricanes, torna- could reduce the Soviet's powers of co- are alive today because they had that dos, blizzards, or nuclear and chemical ercion, by reducing a genuine civil de- protection, not just from the intercep accidents. fense gap between the United States tors that were built, but by the use. We need to do more in this area. We and U.S.S.R. Third, in the event of the proper use of those tunnels, and can not afford to postpone our efforts natural disasters, nuclear powerplant the proper use of the subways in to some unspecified future date.. incident, or other peacetime emergen- London. Mr. HUGRES. Mr. Speaker, I Fel- cy, a civil defense evacuation plan Mr. Speaker. a number of our col- come this opportunity, offered by my could prove invaluable. distinguished colleague IKE SKELTON, leagues have spoken today and ex- to discuss the vital subject of our Na- So let us not be shortsighted as we pressed. as I have attempted to, the tion's civil defense. consider means to provide for our Na- sincere desire to have a strong civil de- In the past, when conventional war- tion's defense. Although a good of- fense for our Nation. I represent the fare was the sole source of confronta- fense may be the best defense, a good 4th Congressional District of Missouri. tion between nations, conventional defense should not be forgotten In that district is Whiteman Air Force means for defending a nation's citizen- , We cannot forget the need to allevi- Base, which is the control center of ry were sufficient. We could hide from ate some of the terror of the nuclear 150 ICBM missiles, Minutemen II mis- enemy bombs and bullets using the age. to attempt to prevent the feared siles. These missiles, as we all know, same facilities we would use to hide eventuality, and to save as many are targets of Soviet missiles should from tornaches or natural disasters in American lives as possible should the the unthinkable come to pass. this country. In addition, our natural leaders of the Soviet Vnion or oar own I want the people of western MLssou- geographie~i9alationfrom our enemies leaders ever think the unthinkable, ri to be safe, But there are other provided sufficient disincentive to dis- and plunge us into an irreversably Whiteman Air Force Bases in this courage our enemies from major tragic confrontation; Let us support Nation and ,there are other missile attack with the exception of the civil defense.. fields in this Nation; there are other bombing of Pearl H~rbor. .-Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Speak- strategic airfields and there are other Nuclear weapons and accurate mis- er. I commend the gentleman from strategic submarine bases, some 39 sile guidance Systems have changed Missouri for securing a special order to strategic first-strike areas that we our countries defense needs. Now, we give House Members an additional og think would be targeted first. The can no longer afford to soley concen- portunity to discuss the posture of or people that live in those areas, as well trate on weaponry designed for attack Nation's civil defense. His concern as the people that live in our cities -and or defense from conventional attack. over the possibility that Congress may towns all across our Nation. deserve nor can we assume that our most sig- compromise our civil defense capabili- Protection should the unthinkable nificant enemy, the Sbviet Union, can ty by reducing its budget commitment come to pass. be wholly prevented from penetrating for this program is to be appreciated. Let it not be too late. our defenses in the case of a nuclear Indeed I share fully his commitment Mr. Speaker. I intend to presevere. conflict. SO, at a time when we are to maintaining a level of appropri- Mr. Speaker. I intend that we eventu- spending record amounts on weapons ations adequate to preserving civil de- ally have a strong civil defense pro- systems which we hope will discourage fense as an essentail and integral part gtam that is properly funded and one the Soviet Union from ever bew-g of our overall national defense policy. that we in America can be proud of a conflict, we must also plan for a pos- The civil defense effort should not be and one that will be part in t~thand sibility which we fervently hope will surrendered or reduced. fact of our strategic defense. cever become reality-nuclear attack. In the process of reviewing and es- With the help of the Members of In the event of a full-scale nuclear tablishing defense priorities civil de- this body we will have such a civil de- confrontation between the United fense always seems to be the odd man fense in the days ahead. States and U.S.S.R.. there is onehines- out. Offensive hardware attracts at- I=. F'LIPPO. Mr Speaker I would capable reality-millions of human tention away-from the very real need like to associate myself with the re- beings would die and life as we how it to maintain passive defense programs. marks that have been made by my col- would be inalterably disrupted. But including civil defense. Neither effort leagues about civil defense. The prob- knowing that, we must not forget that should take from the other. They lem with civil defense has been that the tragedy which would befall the must be mutually supportive in their no one ever needs it. no citizen spends United States in such an event could roles 'of deterring soviet aggression much time thinking about it, no pres- be significantly mitigated in the event and the aggressive acts of other poten- sure groups breath down our necks to Of an attack hCSllions of Uves could be tial adversaries. do something until it is too late-until saved at a surprisingly low social cost. The result of this conscious disen- there is a disaster. Only then will our According to data provided by the chantment with passive defense has constituents turn to us and say, with Federal Emergency Management been the erosion of our civil defense justification: "Why didn't you plan for Agency G"EMA), a system of civil de- posture over a period of years to the this?" fense which could save approximately point where it no longer is a credible There is nothing politically expedi- 80 percent of our population from element within our strategic force ent or glamorous about civil defense; death in a nuclear war would cost structure. Civil defense, in my judg- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE October 1, 1981 ment, must once again be considered powered ballistic missfle submarines our ability to implement the US. de- in conjunction with our offensive and more quicgly than the United States. terrence strategy. defensive forces if our national secu- new genemtions of longer range sub- We have to ownup to the fact that rity is to be preserved. To erase it from marine-launched ballistic missiles the worse case scenario might occur. our strategic formula is to threaten (SLBM) thereby expanding the patrol Should it occur in the near future, the the very mission and purpose of our area of the Soviet submarines making Soviet Union has a first strike capabil- strategic nuclear force; namely the de- them and their missiles less accessible ity of inflicting on currently unpro- terrence of nuclear war. to U.S. interception. F'urther, while re- tected Americans something in the We no longer have the luxury of as- taining their existing intercontinental order of 1.60 million fatalities. En- sured force superiority over the Sovi- bomber forces, the Soviets have de- hanced civil defense efforts providing ets. Those days are long behind us and ployed over 100 Bacbfire bombers and for a greater degree of survivability it is questionable today whether or not are adding about 30 each year. This and' continuity of government will a balance of strategic military power- bomber has sufficient range to be used serve to improve our deterrence pos- often referred to as a "rough equiv- as an intercontinental bomber against ture. alence"--exists. At best, we can say the United States. In the interest of world peace, the that, for the present time, the real While the United States can claim Soviets cannot be permitted to believe strength and preparedness of the US. advantage in state-of-the-art tecMol- that their civil defense system will im- strategic Triad remains credible to the ogy, technology not employed or de- prove their ability to wage war and en- Soviet Union. However, the future of ployed does nothing to improve our hance Soviet survival of a nuclear ex- relative United States-Soviet strategic defense posture. change. We need, instead, to impress balance is cloudy. United States devel- These trends, which must be viewed upon the Soviets the ability of the opment and deployment of modem with serious concern, have created United States to recover quickly from strategic weapons just are not keeping what the President often refers to as the effects of a nuclear attack, and in pace with the Soviet Union and our the "window of vulnerability." The a condition permitting a US, retali- defense capability, in the eyes of the very size of that so-called window atory attack of a nature to inflict cata- Soviets. may be waning. makes survivability a top priority con- strophic damage to the Sollet Union. The facts speak for themselves. To cern. It is more than clear that the Currently, our civil defense program understand the extent of our vulner- strategic military balance between the lacks credibility. and I join my col- ability to Soviet nuclear attack re- United States and U.S.S.R. continues league and friend in taking this oppor- quires only a brief review of the rela- to shift toward our potential adversary tunity to express my full endorsement tive United States-U.S.S.R. strategic in a very big way. Zndeed, the imbal- for maintaming a firm budget commit- balance. ances are of sucn magnitude measured The current US. B-52 bomber force quantitatively and qualitatively as to ment for a strong and viable civil de- confront the United States with the fense.. will require modernization beyond the Mr. LQTT. Mr. Speaker, I certainly mounting of cruise missiles. We prospect of facmg such imbalances agree with my colleagues on the floor cannot afford continued reductions in well into the future. This is particular- today who are spealung to the impor- fleet size for the purpose of cannibal- ly true in light of the Soviets willing- civil ization of aircraft to keep remaining nwto continue to invest heavily to tance of defense as an integral B-52's on line. keep the momentum going in their ,part of our Nation's defense posture. Current land-based ICBM forces will favor. We must take caution against any mis- become more vulnerable with time as The realities of the United States- conceptions regarding the viability of Soviet missile accuracy and MIRV ca- Soviet strategic balance render it es- civil defense. pability improve. sential that civil defense be main- Over the last 15 years. the Soviets The submarine-launched ballistic tained as a critical element in our na- have spent almost $2 billion per year missile (SLBM) force represents the tional defense structure. The Soviets to const,ruct a comprehensive civil de- only US. strategic delivery system are approaching a first strike capablll- fense system. This amounts to ap- being modernized. Meanwhile, the ty and the ability of the United States proximately $5 per capita and com- Soviet Union is modernizing a large to survive such a strike becomes of pares to our own expenditure of some portion of its forces, hardening its ever-growing importance as a deter- 49 cents per capita, most of which is facilities and continuing its intensive rent factor. earmarked for administrative expendi- research and development. To note now seriously the Soviets tures. Since 1970, according to information view civil defense, one has only to look Although estimates regarding the provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at their efforts in this regard. To com- capabilities of the U.S.S.R. civil de- the United States has put into produc- plement their offensive capabilities, fense system vary, it is clear that the tion one variant of an existing inter- the Soviet Union maintains a large Soviets are making a conscious effort continental ballistic missile (ICBM), strategic defense force supplemented to protect their population in the one new type of submarine and subma- by what the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer event of nuclear war and have includ- rine-launched ballistic missile system, to as "an extensive civil defense pro- ed all segments of their society in and no new strategic bomber systems. gram," both of which are far superior their defense planning. In the same period, Soviet efforts to to their US. counterparts. The irony of our present situation is improve and enlarge its strategic We must approach the Soviet level that the United States -could develop a forces have brought them from a Posi- of effort for passive defense. including reasonably effective civil defense pro- tion of clear inferiority to one of supe- civil defense, if our strategic nuclear gram given a few well-thought-out riority in many measures of capability. force is to continue to provide a credi- plans and relatively modest expendi- The Soviets have. modernized the ble deterrence to potential Soviet nu- tures of time and money. AU that is ICBM force through new deployment clear aggression. Our "window of vul- lacking is a Federal commitment. modifications to deployed systems nerability" remains too wide open Such a commitment is necessary to which have incorporated greater without such an improved civil defense an effective partnership in civil de- throw weight, more reentry vehicles posture. We must take into account fense between local governments and per misstle, and increased accuracy. the civil defense'commitment of the 'the Pedenl Government to prepare The Joint Chiefs of Staff now report Soviets and strengthen our own civil our communities and the Nation to that the Soviets possess a "clear and defense program accordingly ,with the survive a war. If this; preparation is growing advantage in ability to kill purpose of develo~ingplans to be im- made, these same communities are hard targets." plemented during times of crisis. also prepared to survive the common Too, the Soviets continue to diversi- The magnitude of Soviet civil de- natural occurrences of floods, torna- fy and improve other elements of their fense efforts and capability, when cou- does, and hurricanes. strategic element structure. They con- pled with high accuracy and more reli- In view of current international ten- tinue to build modern, nuclear- able missiles, could adversely affect sions, the civil defense partnership October 1, 1981 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE must be upheld and strengthened. Civil defense must once again become an integral component in our strategic debate.. Civil Defensethe New Debate

The possibility of a newprogram for strengthening the U.S.civll defense against nuclear attack has been raised in Washington recently. Because the editors of Worldview believe a public debate on the program would be useful, we asked a number of people to respond to one or more of the following questions: 1. Do you understand it to be the policy of the Carter administration to give major priority to civil defense in the over-all defense posture of this country? 2. Would such a direction be a positive or negative factor in term of (a)American security and (b)reducing the chances of nuclear war? Why? 3. What is drfferent now from the debate over civil defense against nuclear attack that took place in the late Fifties and early Sixties? 4. What are the ethical considerations you believe are relevant to the above questions? New Situation, New Response

Paul H. Nitze eorge Kennan, in an interview published deploy ICBMs in dispersed hardened silos and SLBMs by the New York Times Magazine, in hard-to-find submarines at sea. An elaborate civil affirmed Gthe proposition that it is better to be "Red than defense program was given second priority. The first dead." Since the end of World War I1 the United States priority recommendations of the Gaither Committee has been engaged in a successful effort to demonstrate were put into effect. that the choice thus implied is wrong. We have demon- The executive branch concurrently initiated a modest strated, at least to date, that it is not necessary to be civil defense program designed to provide warning, iden- either "Red or dead"; it has been possible both to tify and mark already existing shelter spaces, and remain free and to avoid a nuclear war. The essential partially stock them with supplies. New shelter con- task is to continue so to do. struction was left to individual initiative. By 1962 we In the last half of the 1950's, at the time of Sputnik, had deployed sufficient ICBMs in dispersed and hard- serious doubts arose as to whether a time would shortly ened silos and enough Polaris submarinsbased launch- arise when that issue-"Red or dead"-could become ers to provide assured crisis stability and high-quality serious. It had not been a serious choice during the deterrence. After that time civil defense could be, and period when we had a nuclear monopoly, or even when was viewed as, a low-priority requirement. To many it we had an overwhelming and stable nuclear deterrent. became, unjustifiably, a cause for derision. But with the Soviet development of ICBMs, the techno- Today the situation has changed; the Soviet Union has logical practicality of which was first demonstrated by for a decade or more been devoting far greater effort to Sputnik, it became possible, perhaps probable, that the its strategic offensive capabilities than have we. We cut "better Red than dead" issue would arise in all serious- back our program to a third, if measured in cQnstant ness in a few years. dollars, of what it averaged during the six years from The alternative solution originally given most atten- 1956 to 1962. The Soviet program has expanded to a tion was the initiation of a U.S.civil defense program. point at which it is now estimated to be triple ours. The Gaither Committee, a study group appointed by There is now little doubt that our previous nuclear stra- President Eisenhower, came to the conclusion that such tegic superiority has been eliminated. Many, myself a program could indeed be effective both in enhancing included, believe we are heading into a period of serious deterrence and greatly reducing casualties if deterrence strategic inferiority and instability. Authorities in the were to fail. They also concluded, however, that higher executive branch take a less serious view than I, but they priority should be given to immediate measures to too are concerned. The "better Red than dead" or "bet- improve the survivability of our strategic bomber crews ter dead than Red" dilemma is again a serious concern. so that a significant portion could be continuously on Under these circumstances the question arises wheth- alert, and by assuring that the alert bombers could get er we should again consider a more active civil defense off the ground in the time provided by the warning program. The executive branch is putting priority on system. It was recommended that this be coordinated measures to assure the continuing survivability, endur- with a program to assure that as soon as possible we ance, and capability of our ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. I wish the executive branch were doing even -- - - more in that direction and had acted earlier. In addition THE HONORABLE PAULH. N~TZE,who has held many high be government positions, served until 1974 as the representative the executive branch is reported to considering of the Secretary of Defense to the United States Delegation to doubling, or thereabouts, the current civil defense SALT. He is Director of Policy Studies of the Committee on program of $90 million a year. In other words, they are the Present Danger. considering adding to our civil defense program an

SOURCE : Worldview v.22, ~an/~eb1979. pp. 40-48" Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of copyright claimant. December 1981. IA CIVIL DEFENSE / 41 amount approximating .O1 per cent of our overall of our nuclear deterrent. I am confused by this sugges- defense budget. The purpose of this increased civil tion. Is it based on the hypothesis that it is wrong to take defense spending would be to give the United States in measures designed to avoid the "better Red than dead" the event of a serious crisis the ability to evacuate most dilemma? _Or on the hypot-t is tq~late ta make of our urban population to the countryside. The execu- such measures effective andthat ac must now agree tive branch estimates that there are circumstances, were with Gorge Kennan that it _Iis "bet--to-be-- - Red than deterrence to fail, in which such measures would enable dead,':' A corollary of that hypothesis would appcarto most of our population to survive. The main point, be that accommodation of the new-Soviet impxium is however, is that such a capability could add to deter- the best course available-to us, gveniEsuckcourse~ere_ rence and thus help us continue to avoid the "Red or to lead to the U.S. subjecting itself to the Kremlin's will. dead" dilemma. Perhaps the hypothesis is -tkat&e mwe dreadful we It is suggested that the Carter administration is there- make the consequences of a nuclear wXoourselv~, the by giving major priority to civil defense and that this more certairr we wiHwto wrdha-thepKudent has raises ethical questions. The first part of the suggestion no real alternative in a crisis but to surrender. To do is evident nonsense; how can an item constituting .O1 per otherwise wouid be to3fii1g Gotterdammerung down cent of the defense budget be a major priority? A more %pn ouraha, even tnougli- pertinent question is whether it is enough to be effective. well-designed military and defense -programs,-Guld The second part of the question is, however, relevant. suffer casuatties perhaps a tenth of ours: The second part suggests it is somehow immoral to I await with interest the otheFai.fi-cres in this series. I think about nuclear war and, having thought, to take trust they will contribute to clarifying the hypotheses those considered steps designed to improve the quality upon which the ethical issues should be judged.

To Clarify the Issue

Hans J. Morgenthau

t is impossible to state with assurance what commission. The only change the evacuation of the civil- the policy of the Carter administration is ian population would bring about would be the place of with regardI to civil defense. As in so many other fields demise. The city populations, instead of dying in their of policy, the policy of the Carter administration with respective cities, would be annihilated in their respective regard to civil defense is contradictory in different places of evacuation. Die they must, if not at home, so at respects. Successive statements of the same officials their place of refuge; if not through blast, then through contradict each other. The statements of different offi- fire and fallout. cials contradict each .other. Official statements are This argument supposes that evacuees arrive at their contradicted by the actual policy pursued. The realities destination according to plan. But what if the evacuees of the situation militate against the policy announced. of neighboring cities arrive at the same destination? If, For the purpose of clarifying the issue let us assume for instance, the evacuees of Boston meet those of Hart- that the administration is committed to a greatly ford? Are we not going to be witness to a war of all expanded civil defense effort over several years, mean- against all, everybody trying to get to a place of safety ing primarily the evacuation of the bulk of the civilian before everybody else, and everybody fighting every- population from the cities. Such a policy is, according to body tooth and nail, since allegedly sheer survival is at the New York Times, "farcical" on several grounds. stake? Fi&+wbereh the civif an population to be evacuated However, we are only at the beginning of our trou- to? Let us suppse the goal of the evacuation would be bles. So far we have dealt with what one might call the Upstate New York and Connecticut. Has anybody visu- technical problems of evacuation, which appear'to be alized the problems of logistics such a move would insurmountable. Now let us take a look at the military entail? Since a comprehensive shelter program appears and political context. Sagmilitary doctrine stresses to be excluded, where would these millions of people the importance of surprise in military -I-.----._operations, espe- find shelter and nourishment, even if they were able to c~nui:~dfw~~vacuationwould signal to an enemy overcome the problems of chaotic mass traffic? Even if the likelihood of nuclear war, either perceived as an all these problems were overcome, the enemy need only enemy move or intended by the evacuating government. change slightly the targets of a few of its multimegaton Are the prospktive belligerents likely to wait until the missiles in order to put the evacuated millions out of evacuation is completed- or are they going to start the -- -,-- nuclear war as soon as the evacuation is started? Evacu- HANSJ. MORGENTHAUis Chairman of the Worldview Edito- ation would be tantamount to an Act of War, forcing the rial Board and University Professor. Department of Political hand of one or DiFother, or more likely of both of the Science. at the New School for Social Research. pros-pi?cfiv

Some Moral Reflections James T. Johnson

here can simply be no doubt that protec- impregnable shield between threatener and threatened; T tion of noncombatants is a major priority warding off the attack of an assailant with skillful of the Western tradition on warfare, generally called the parries; fighting back or striking pre-emptively in an "just war" fradition. Its general concerns are two: to attempt to disarm or disable the assailant; threatening to define when the violence of war is allowable (the prob- retaliate violently if the original threat is carried lem of justification) and to set limits to what may be through. If all the above methods would be equally done in even a just war (the problem of limitation). Paul effective in a given situation, then the sequence of this Ramsey, for example, finds both these concerns in the list defines an order of moral priority among these meth- thought of Augustine of Hippo and argues that for him ods: Those presented first are preferable to those and for Christian just war theory generally they should presented later. be regarded as requirements of divine love. A Christian, The old civil defense program, which aimed at build- on this view, has a duty in love to protect innocent ing shelters to protect city populations against nuclear persons being unjustly threatened by violence or sub- blast and fallout, was a form of shield defense, while the jected to it, and he may utilize counterviolence, if neces- new program recently announced by the Carter adminis- sary, to effect such a defense. At the same time, the use tration represents an attempt to defend by putting of such counterviolence is limited by a number of threatened noncombatants out of reach of the violence restraints also derived from love, foremost of which is a of nuclear attack. Similarly, ABMs constitute a defense duty also toward the unjust assailant not to harm him oriented at fighting back with intent to disarm, while any more than necessary to defend his victim. mutual assured destruction (MAD) strategy is a version A similar pattern of reasoning emerges in Jewish of defense by the threat of retaliation. Prima facie, the tradition. Talmudic ethics allows use of violence against Western just war tradition would seem to favor civil one who pursues with the intent of doing harm; yet the defense p;ograms over these last types of defense against counterviolence that is permitted is limited by two countercity nuclear attack, since civil defense aims to constraints: First, one may do no worse to the pursuer maximize the restraints on use of violence in defense. than what he seeks to do, and, second, one may do no But such a prima facie judgment would be, in this case, more than needed to make the pursuer leave off his evil wrong. intention. Secular contributions to Western just war Just war tradition permits violence if it is necessary to tradition have provided analogous ideas: The medieval an effectual defense, and such violence is allowed up to code of chivalry, for example, defined the knight as and including the level of violence employed by the "un- having a duty to protect noncombatants, while the just" or "pursuing" attacker. It is clear that in this concept of limited war originally defined and put into moral tradition one may kill if necessary to prevent an practice by such military theorists as Frederick the innocent person from being killed. The permission to Great sought to ensure absolute protection of noncom- resort to such a response in kind includes permission to batants outside a combat area and relative protection threaten to do so. Thus we are all well off the scent if we inside such an area. The requirements of defending take the concern of just war tradition to defend noncom- noncombatants against the ravages of war is thus at the batants to rule out the threat of retaliation, or if we take very core of Western thought on how war can be a moral it to imply that programs of civil defense, which are enterprise. inherently nonviolent, are ipso facto to be preferred Still, there are numerous ways to defend against over means of defense that threaten violence against the violence: running away or, more generally, putting the attacker. This tradition is concerned with the protection threatened out of reach of the threatener; interposing an of nonc jmbatants, and that requires an effective de- fense. This in turn requires that moral analysis take into JAMES T. JOHNSON, who heads the Department of Religion at account the relative effectiveness of various possible Douglass College, Rutgers University. is author of Ideology. modes of defense as well as their abstract moral prefera- Reason and the Limirotion of War. bility in terms of the level of violence each entails. CIVIL DEFENSE / 43

The only thing that can be said in favor of mutual impligtlons of such a substitution. But as a supplement assured destruction as a defensive strategy is that for to existing strategic defense policy, it presumably aims quite some time now it has worked to help prevent a at maintaining a balance between the superpowers as to nuclear war. But that is a great deal to say for it. And what level of destruction could be sustained by their given the proposed scale of the Carter civil defense societies in the event of a nuclear interchange. Thus it is program, this program will not replace such a strategy of an effort to bolster the stalemate. A full moral analysis retaliation but can only supplement it. Were this new of this new civil defense program therefore would have program the leading edge of an effort to substitute civil to weigh it within this larger context of a continuing defense entirely for MAD, we would have to weigh the reliance on defense by retaliatory threat.

Reasons in Opposition John C. Bennett efore our government embarks on the form of civil d&mcasik+q&rati~n to evacuate cities B proposed forms of civil defense I hope would do to our own people. .&ain, this would necessi- that the following reasons for not doing so will be taken tate taking such authoritarian m&~s7C+aTE€iis11so very seriously. unaccustomed to them as to make a great impression on Preparations for the evacuation of cities in a sociaas the American people, leading them to become accus- free u ours would iavslvve such drastic actions that they tomed to nuclear war as more than urnate gos_sibility. would be more of a signal than,we would intend of our Official explanations, which in such matters always readiness for nuclear war. Combined with any build-up seem too optimistic, might create the sense that nuclear q~i~n_u_c~~~~-suggesttda fint-strike war could be survived, not only by a large majority of capability t_o the other side, they x~u1-prevoc- our people, but also by our free institutions and other awtsappears to us,-,- to ----whon?_ihe~ - would seem aspects of our life that we believe most worth defending. innocent aniK88ensive. TPhls reminds me of the account Such an outcome is highly doubtful. The secondary by Thucjldides 0r'tKe"great pains the Athenians took to effects of nuclear explosions would be played down, and conceal from the Spartans the fact that they were the more remote genetic effects on futufe generations rebuilding their walls after the Persian wars. What could would not be considered. It might be better to die be more innocent and defensive than a wall! instantly in Manhattan than slowly in New Jersey. We Greater account must be taken of the fears of the cannot trust the Pentagon's weighing of the intangible Sov~etUnion. In the long run they may fear China more effects of nuclear war. than the US. We are their powerful adversary, who for deca Jes expressed, more unofficially than officially, hostility to the Soviet Union. How much of a residue there is in the USSR of a dogmatic belief in the inevita- .. better to die instantly in Manhattan than bility of war between the two systems, I do not know. A slowly in New Jersey. " tuo-front war is in their minds, and they even speak of China as an eastern member of NATO. They know that the countries of Eastern Europe that are supped to be in their samp are not reliable allies. They even fear the Also, mmqahmbyAuqmp1~~insuch preparations U.S may come to have a powerful presence in Iran. might w_eg_ncrn_crease our own fear of the Russians and our There is in the background something the Russians IOS'TiIify toward them. We have long had a tendency to remember and exaggerate and we have forgotten: the 6e iibTeG~~~-~~IGnatbnof anticommunism and American military presence in Siberia in 1917-20. It is _-anti-Szmi-~&@~Abut --- in recent years we have in large also not forgotten that the U.S. is the only nation ever to measure moved away from it. Eartheamerican people use atomic bombs, that most of the victims were civil- once more to be c~ntrolkd> this obsession would ians, and that the US. since World War I1 has dropped d- QUL&~ and imtie$-acthe other more bombs on other nations than have the rest of the --side. I fear thatprepatinns f8~evacuatbnof citie4wt nations combined. We do not see ourselves in this light me-- thorough -*.. enpugh to-be wtwould -the at all. Indeed, what others see is quite out of line with end of detenre and of any~ise-&~he~,ms our own present intentions as a nation. But fears and raCe;TlilTw~liT~~~eeeVenif wt: l-d~hat Russia's provocations depend on what others see. more authoritarian government had &ke~to The second reason for not going ahead--- is what such a JOHN C. BENNETT.a member of the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley, is former President of Union Theological recognize the grounds I have mentioned for Russian Seminary in New York. fears and its history of invasion by others. can possibly hope to protect its civilian population to the The Misguided Concept extent that nuclear confrontation could be thought safe. Nuclear war would be the greatest possible mistake for both sides. It would bem&y irresponsible----- to---- lead the Ameri-- Thomas J. Downey can people to believe that safety from a nuclear attack cou?irTe -fOund~tTiiTu@-eVaCui3~I~onveYseTy; 'we nyone who believes that the Soviet Union, must not give the Soviet Union the impressionthat we A beGse of .its civil defense program, is believe they have an advantage or a ckancs: of sIl;nriyal better able to survive a nuclear war than the United because of their evacuation program. They do not; and, States is totally misguided. And anyone willing to-a~cept furthermore,. anv. use -ac uation such a foolish argume-ntis3hi ta three basicfacts. would_becnsls destabilizing. accelerating todam- First, the inassive urban evacuation program would -7--fllct. In the event of a crisis situation-say, Soviet inter- have Hmiit$leff~tjveness in rduGng the disastrous effefs of a nuclear attack on the general papulation, even supposing that sucb a scheme could be effectively

---- gic ylanners are conte-mplating a first-strike scenario againsf the United States (as many American ha-wks state in their arguments for an American civil defense evih5uation scheme), they would be unahle to employ

-Ctaeir_urban evacuation plan, because to do so would obvjausly destroy the element of surprise needed for any first.- strike to succeed. What would Soviet urban evacuation on a massive scale-if it could actually be accomplished with Russia's very limited transportation system-actually accom- plish? Millions of city dwellers fleeingto the country- side would prgscnt trmendaus logistical problems even under the best of conditions, and the Russian climate Civil Wense the Last Time Around Basement Concrete-Block Fallout Shelter (Otfrce of Civil and and terrain are iiot n~tedfor mildness and hosp@ality. Defense Mobilization diagram). A pair of slippers lia in readiness for An American nuclear counterstrike would be designed the shelter's one (!?) inhabitant. to destroy the Russian industrial base for waging war and the entire economic structure of the enemy for ference with the supply of oil to the West from the recovery. It is presently_estimated that two-thirds of the Persian Gulf-theUnltedn- Soviet industrial basedd-be-destroyed within hours. dantly clear to the_Ssviet_s_that an implementation of Wia ashatkrd- g\o.crni~ base, a crippled transporta- their urban evacuation program would be seen as a tion system, and the '!means of production" in ashes, prelude to a strike against us and that our nuciear focces Soviet evacuees would be left with only stockpiled food, would be put on alert accordingly- If the US. had-an medicine, and heating oil. There would be no hope of evag-qJi~sckane and putit intosffea the Russians replenishing these essedak. Furth~rmore, fight- to would-xd.oub gaon alest, and the -movement toward rural arsjs-n-oLefens_eag_ainseriftingclouds of nucle- nuclear confrontation would be similarly uelerated. ar raition; and radiation, not blast effect, is the prima- Not on& iuhiL_d.d.ms evacuation ineffectke- in ry cause of death in the civilian poplation, whether protecting the general. population and usxss in plan- u~ir~or rural. Also, if? coun@ntrike occurred before nmg a surpris~firststake,$ could actually incregse the evacuation were complete, the civilian evacuees would be much more vulnerable on the road than they- would have been at home. It should be remembered too that food-producing areas are also imprtant strategic tar- gets, and this further limits the imagined safety of flight to the countryside. Though nuclear-targeting doctrine in the Seventies wed by planning to maintain calm and does not have the aim of slaughtering the civilian popu- American cities in a crisis, whether lation, a very high proportion of the population in any of war or natural disaster. In the event country receiving a nuclear attack would be killed, in the attack and from its aftereffects, whether they fled the urban areas or not. Neither Russia nor the United States

THOMASJ. DOWNEY(D-New York) se~uon thc Committtc on Armed Services of the House of Representativu. CML DEFENSE /. 45

leader of the U.S. or the USSR would choose nuclear The Illusion of Protection war moconceivable national interest on emer side Udiustifv the believed to be nuclear war wdeclsion to pre-ep- Richard J. Barnet ble futujatmeem lausible. The drill for death thilti.&rns so pathological+- when one on a small scale, as he policy of the Carter administration is to at Jonestown, brings us closer to war because it condi- increase substantially civil defense expen- tions us to accept the inevitability of war. The most ditures. InT terms of money it is not a "majority priori- ty," since the administration plans to lock us into overall military expenditures on the order of $1.8 trillion in 1977 dollars by 1988. The justification for the increased civil defense expenditure is that it is a "modest" increase in response to demands for a much bigger program and a helping brainwash a_generasbaaiatcz.aax&q+U counter to the Soviet program. There is a strong pork -:-We% iio'B?"e&tive to~q&ghuuahide. barrel element in the program too. Just as civil defense f -rememkr a fi-pul"d%cabout Nazi Germany was the justification for building the nation's highway called Education for Death. It was one of the most system, it is now being quietly presented to local offi- telling critiques of the moral bankruptcy of a regime cials as a way to get some money into local communities that preached the inevitability of war and drilled the in a time of austerity. It is also a way to buy off opposi- whole society into accepting that belief. Anything that tion to a SALT treaty, or so it is thought. legitimizes nuclear war by perpetuating the illusion that All such justifications for the program are utterly it is simply an extension of old-fashioned war and not an irresponsible. To spend billions on civil defense when historic watershed betrays an arrogant disregard for the crucial programs essential to the strength of the nation future of the planet. We are only beginning to under- are being slashed is pathological. Appeasing critics of s~~tt~~Jogica1effects-of fi~u~_t&m the SALT treaty by throwing them a "harmless" bone is are cuch more serCous th~iprgisusl&~euse self-defeating, for the program lends credibility to their the life-suj@mt- syi&&s7-r,sei& -etc=are view of reality, not that of the treaty advocates, and cre- inivexve no idea of the real extent or dura- ates a climate in which it is easier to defeat the treaty. tTon of the & y irragatingvaqti?%iof €he - The idea that we should "match" the Soviets, or even, phmsei-aiX- haun.imd.~to within very broad limits, be influenced by what they do future enqahs. All we can be reasonably sure of is in civil defense, is puerile. If they were developing a tp- at the effects will be worse than we plan for. To foster program that suggested an ability or an intent to elimi- the belief that nuclear war is "manageable" or "winna- nate virtually all civilian casualties, that would be cause ble" or justified for any political purpose is a way of for concern. It would suggest an effort to create what we avoiding the real ethical issue-that this generation is not used to call a "credible first-strike posture." But that is the owner of the earth, only a steward or a trustee. To not the case. The Soviet program becomes threatening assert the right to destroy it is the ultimate blasphemy. only if we assume that the leaders are prepared to sacri- fice a substantial portion of their population, or more. For-the&- program, as the CZA .Bas ts-qerted,_ca.qn,ot prc?_.e_c=-M- 10. a audy of the Natio_nalS3tyritx Ch.un&Jhe Sovjettwm- Some Possible Problems fer moie than a hunrred-million =stig.in_a-nr?gclx war. meS~iets spena moneymany ways the U.S. would be foolish to imitate. Civil &3e=ee~s a%ims;-- A civil defense program is a waste of money not only David T. Johnson because it cannot protect the society from the effects of a nuclear war,it is harmful because it -ion hile the Carter administration is clearly that Americaps can be "pr-." Jt causes the paying more attention to civil defense government to make outrageous&m~su~hb as lht:-on_e and will Wundoubtedly request more funding for crisis- t~_a_t_tT.~K~,~~.ksa~~4y4ye.vacuatingrelocation planning, this does not yet constitute giving the cities (anyone who has ever tried to leave a ciiy in a normal holiday weekerf&;-ttn-af6fieeanucTearalert,ebbws how -~y_thg-s).It rein tam of suclrai~;o-l Many of the questions related to the desirability or dynamic pushing us toward the ultimate catastrophcJf undesirability of more stress on civil defense are essen- nu? nu? tially unanswerable. We simply cannot know with assur- start ~t believe that it cannot be avoided. Only an insane ance how it will affect U.S. security or the chances of

RICHARDJ. BARNETis a Senior Fellow of the Institute for DAVIDT. JOHNSONis Director of Research at the Center for Policy Studies. Washington. D.C. Defense Information, Washington, D.C. 48 1 WORLDVIEW I JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1979

nuclear war. P&hkpamka&e made on both sides, An expansion of U.S. civil defense justified primarily on but it is mostly speculation. Nobody who feels strongly the basis of "international perceptions" (perceptions oixewagoi the other is likely to have his views changed. that Secretary Brown appears to find in error) seems The debate will be predictably inconclusive. somewhat dubious. It may encourage equally question- What masquerades as rational decisionmaking on able decisionmaking on other defense issues. most issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is really Camel's narc- Mare civil defense preparations may be a strikingly subjective process in which no one should the camel's nose under the tent. Once the American have much confidence. Decisions are reached, such as people are convinced of the efficacy of some "limitedfi , - the decision to expand civil defense preparations, on the civil defense measures, they will be appealed to en the *- ' basis of a hodgepodge of relevant and irrelevant consid- same grounds for additional means of protection. erations. Different people and groups will oppose or Expansion-of US. air defense capability and stepped-up support the decision for their own reasons. Shifting tides ABM research and potential deployment of new ABM of prejudice and habit will play a determining part. systems are likely follow-ons. If a little protection is It is certain the debate over civil defense in 1979 will good, why not more? be primarily presented as an issue of whether the U.S. Fear of nuclear war. Another apparently unavoid- should be strong vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. More intel- able-if unintended-consequence of the new stress on lectual types will be appealed to on the basis of the civil defense will be that it will serve as a signal of the presumed moderate, prudent, humanitarian character of g~er-j%%ii6iTTtYoffnucTearwar. It is more likely that f~ the Carter civil defense insurance policy. In the existing this ipcreas-d_ fear willkmahilized in thedirection of climate there will be less than adequate attention paid to military build-up and "tough" foreign policy actions some possible problems arising out of the new civil than in the direction of reducing nuclear arsenals. defense thrust. The heart of the danger in the civil defense issue The Soviet threat. Regardless of whatever plausible- today was reflected in the words of Clyde Mitchell, sounding arguments are made for the Carter civil director of Oklahoma City's civil defense program: "We defense program, an unavoidable consequence of selling don't want to lay down and die in Oklahoma City. Folks the program to the American people and the Congress around here say, yes, eventually we are going to come to will be an increase in their fear and suspicion of the a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. It's sort of Soviet Union. Of course this is the whole point of the inevitable." exercise for some people. Others, perhaps even Presi- dent Carter and Defense Secretary Harold Brown, may be less pleased with this side effect. It may complicate, rather than help, the SALT ratification process. U.S. military weakness. Both President Carter and The Background Music Secretary Brown have on numerous occasions down- played the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense activities in shielding the Soviet Union from the effects of an American nuclear strike. They have expressed firm Paul Ramsey confidence in the American deterrent irrespective of Soviet civil defense. However, the effort to promote the he trial balloons recently sent up about new U.S. civil defense program will undoubtedly stimu- T protecting our population in the event of late widespread concern in the U.S. about the possible nuclear war focus on the staged evacuation of cities- potency of Soviet civil defense. It will inspire unneces- not, as in the early Sixties, on bomb shelters. The aim sary anxieties about U.S. nuclear strength. today is more on countering nuclear threats, less on Perceptio~.In~r~~$gly, American militarx_&!ro- protecting people or defending the nation. A capability : -rams are being argued fp_t0~~~~6~n~~f what other to maneuver people (like troops) is ~~~~&e-tfje countries might think of the U.S., their "perceptions" of presiden~~~~~t~~fofofiej@_n~@t_o~a;~blackmail. U.S. power or weakness. Officials seem-willing to advo- This is what is called crisis management, and it has a cate programs that are needed just to improve "percep- "logic" of its own. For example, the US, would have to tmns," even if their strictly military justification is!ess be-able to move people out of cities, or protect them than compelling. The Carter administration's-civil ae- thesin vastly greater numkrs than- Russia needs to do fense program has just this character. In April, 1978, simply lo make fhings even. We. have far more of our the New York Times quoted from a secret' ten-pge poptxatioeinh-mare and far rnose-populotlsmetropol- --memorandum from Secretary Brown to tharesident: itan areas than has Russia* The president,jf_ he is__sensi- Xs you know, the Soviets have shown great interest and ble, is more Wrely^ts*eld tcL P~JNS-movm u~derwver Iconsiderable activity in this field. While I do not believe o~-~~Qyats than is Russia. He must blink kt. , ,' that the effort significantly enhances the prospects for Sovi- Under such conditions, who now has the more ~rdible deters&.? i et society as a whole following any full-scale nuclear i ' 1 exchange, it has obviously hat. an effect on international 1 The main question to be raised about civil defense in a j perceptions, particularly in contrast to our small and static j nuclear age never was whether this is feasible or not. 1 civil defense program. For that reason alone I believe at 1 Icas_tm~~souldhave otf, PAULRAMSEY is Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Chris- -Tmphasis added]. tian Ethics at Princeton University. CIVIL DEFENSE I 47

(The plans-long in existence-for the staged evacua- and even against vats of Pentagon poison. Thus the tion of Oklahoma City are reported to be practical [New neutron bomb was opposed, even though it is a more York Times, December 1, 19781. Oklahoma City is a discriminate weapon. It kills people was the vocal good-size Russian city!) Listen to the background music reason. The real reason was: We ought to do nothing to in some of these responses in Worldview and the forth- weaken or alter our single-minded intention to destroy caming national debate over this proposal (if there is entire populations on the condition that we are one). It will be evident that the morality and feasibility- attacked-to prevent that attack, of course! of massive deterrence is the issue. Yesterday, today, and Looking back, I should have introduced this further forever in a nuclear age this will be the issue, not one micro-point. I should have made the case for a just revo- component part of such a strategy. Those who accept the lution against the Deterrent State that meam to make desirability or the irreformability of mutual assured no defense of its people. In a thrice the theory of justifi- destruction (the MAD policy) will argue that civil able revolution can be directed against a government defense is infeasible. The background music, however, is such as ours that means to maneuver its citizens (wheth- that such defense Is undesirable because MAD is the er to protect them or not) as if we all are soldiers, and only sound or moral strategic policy. By this we get that also treats the entire citizenry of an adversary as if peace, with-it will also be supposed-fewer bucks and they were combatants, pawns in the power struggle no bangs. between nations. I myself doubt there will again be serious discussion of the morality or immorality of the Deterrent Siate such as there was in the early Sixties. For what can be better khan peace, even if the means are immorally "How explain [the churches '] acceptance of aimed at civilian hostages? Peace with butter-and a the systematic political intention of the U.S. national health plan. to do evil that good may come?" In the early Sixties I was one of two theologians who dared address the matter of "shelter morality." L.C. McHugh and I* probed mainly the micro-problem of what one should do in the event of a breakdown of all government and human beings were returned to a '%ate I should have argued that every head of household, or of nature" or, at least, to that stage of society in which local councilman, is in principle already a chief magis- the paterfamilias or limited local chieftains served also trate who may be called upon to overthrow the magis- as the highest known political authorities, before the trates in power who have abandoned the intention to emergence of the differentiation of "government" in wage only just war. That, in short, MAD has placed us larger societies. To such a primitive political situation, I before such deterrence fails in a situation like the one argued, we would be returned by nuclear destruction of when deterrence fails. I should have argued with John modern organized states; and that then the remaining Calvin that "if there be, in the present day, any magis- "magistrates" should do what they must to save life trates appointed for the protection of the people and the when all lives cannot be saved-protecting by whatever moderation of the power of kings . . . I am so far from means the capacity of a bomb shelter to save life, prohibiting them in the discharge of their duty, to perhaps against desperate human beings banging at the oppose the violence and cruelty of kings, that I affirm door, whom to admit would mean all would be lost. The that if they connive in their oppression of their people, Princeton faculty planned, in those days, to designate such forebearance involves the most nefarious perfidy, the underground levels of Firestone Library as a place of because they fraudulently betray the [lives and] liberty refuge for ourselves and the students, for whom we had of the people, of which they know that they have been first responsibility, then as a community shelter to the appointed protectors by the ordinance of God." Such extent the facilities allowed. This was proper planning, connivance now takes the stark form of taking hostages but only if the larger context was proper. and giving the people of one's own nation over to be Father McHugh may have been told to write no more; hostages to deter a nuclear enemy. Any "forebearance" and it would have saved personal energy if I also had to raise democratic opposition to massive deterrence or, been so told-since few then or now in the church or in that failing. to bring about radical reform in military American political society seem able to be convinced policy, to raise a revolution against such government, is that the chief thing wrong with fallout shelters or city indeed a nefarious perfidy. evacuations is not their infeasibility but, rather, their The greatest betrayal, however, has been that of the participation in the gross immorality of our MAD deter- churches. How explain our acceptance of the systematic rence policy. The articulate elites in our nation and in political intention of the U.S. to do evil that good may the churches seem to believe that they can accept the come? Especially, how can this be excused on the part of Deterrent State while still braying against civil defense spokesmen of churches whose stance is cooperation with politid institutions when just and necessary; disagree- *LC. McHugh, w.."Ethics at the Shelter Doorway," Ameri- mast, opposition, and efforts to reform when they are ca (September 30, 1961); Paul Ramsey, "Shelter Morality," not? HOWexcuse the exertions of political participatory Presbyterian Life (November 15, 1961); with correspondence. religious influence that seizes so many occasions to January 1, 1962. Father McHugh concentrated more exclu- fasten the hold of an unaltered MAD policy upon us. sively on the micro-problem than I-if anyone wants to know. instead of undertaking the difficult intellectual and / WORLDVIEW I JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1979 practical task of finding and supporting those military that those already addicted to such expectations have policies and weapons decisions that can transform this since continued to befuddle U.S. foreign policy by the system?* same hopes. This leads such people to place greater and A nonpacifist Christian should experience an endur- greater reliance on "minimum" deterrence, meantime ing moral sorrow over the exclusive attention of the blinding themselves to sound discussion of any such church to other concerns in recent years, and over it$ policy by rhetorical persuasions that we already had too misattention to this one. Even Christians who stand much. within the tradition of involvement in the constraining So I seriously suggest that any sensible person-for realities of politics know, or should know, that the state his own serenity, if for no other reason, whether can become a beast or a drunken "harlot sitting on the possessed of the apostle John's ultimate faith or not- seven hills." refuse to discuss or get agitated about any single item or This is a moment of mortal peril for our nation, all the all the separate items together that are on our present more because it is unrecognized. By mortal peril 1 do not military agenda unless he or she has some expectation of so much mean survival as our place in the future mohl opening again the discussion of the basic immorality and and political history of mankind. Symbolically, but only the final irrationality of the present shape of mutual symbolically, the critical moment was Martin Luther deterrence. This would be a sound political resolution King, Jr.'s, Riverside Church address linking the plight whether the specific issue is bomb shelters or staged city of the poor and the blacks to the Vietnam war (April 4, evacuation or the neutron bomb or the Trident subma- 1967). Then liberals supposed there would be a "peace rine or SALT 11, or whether we already have overkilled dividend" resulting from extrication from that war. and can safely cut the defense budget, or our commit- King only tapped beliefs already deeply imbedded in the ment to NATO to increase the budget by 3 per cent, mentality of the articulate liberal blite, especially in the beyond inflation, or whether we can abandon altogether churches. our contimtt&ged missiles and depend on the other There was no such "peace dividend" in sight of any two parts of the tkipod (submarine and air-based city- realistic analysis at that time. It is not surprising, then, destroying missiles), or should learn to move the --- - Minuteman missiles around or instead increase their *It is rather late, if not too late, to cite in support of options to throw-weight or multiple accuracy. our confirmed MAD policy the following experts who are no These are only some of the options in contention. way contaminated by theological politid reasoning: Arthur Discussion of them is "sound and fury signifying noth- Lee Burns ( Adelphi Paper, No. 69, "Ethics and Deterrence: ing," unless and until we relate them each and every one A Nuclear Balance Without Hostage Cities?" [London: Insti- tute for Strategic Studies, July, 19701); Donald G. Brennan of to the radical transformation of mutual massive nuclear the Hudson Institute, who first coined the MAD acronym deterrence. As long as any of thw options is only a (New York Times, Op. Ed. page [May 24 and 25, 19711); and subordi?ate aspect of MAD, it too is equally M-A-D, Bruce M. Rwtt ("Short of Nuclear Madness," Worldview however feasible or infeasible when considered alone. If [April. 19721). In this and other articles Russett advocated a a sound discussion of military strategy could be countercombatant deterrent. The Russians are adequately launched, it would not have as a basic premise "more deterred by a credible threat that the U.S. can and will wipe bang for the buck." But neither can the premise be-to out their army on the Chinese border; there is no nted to aim which the religious are inclined-the notions that we at their civilian population. For the record I may add that in can have enough immorally intended but planned-not- earlier writings on the morality of warfare and of deterrence to-be-used bangs with fewer bucks, or that what was my expression "counterforce" took its meaning from its opp site, "counterpeople." I never meant to say the U.S. should once called "minimum deterrence" is a good idea develop the overwhelming power to destroy Russia's missile because it promises that we can turn our attention to the forces with impunity. Russett's expression "countercombat- priority of domestic claims on the Federal budget, or ad'exactly expresses my meaning-including their military that distributing more butter could possibly justify the forces, of coursc. peacekeeping means our nati~nnow relies on. V7thlet Congress f COXMITTEE PEINT { No. 2

Of particular interest is Title V - Improved

THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFESSE ACT Civil Defense Program effective September 8, 1980 OF 1950 as P. L. 96-342. As Amended Through February 1, 1981

PREPARED FOR THE U6E OF THE COMMITTEE ON AHJLEI) SERT'ICES

OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEXTATRES

TITLE V-IMPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAhl

SENSE OF CONGRESS FEBRUART 1981 SEC.501. [50 U.S.C. App. 2301) (a) It is the sense of Congress thnt- (1) a civil defense progrtlni roviding for the relocation of the population of risk arens, inc7 uding the larger United States cit~es,during a period of strategic warning resulting from nn Printed for the use of the Committee on internntiond crisis mny be effective in protecting the popult~tion; Armed Servims of the House of Representatives (2) the present civil defense progrnm should be im roved; and - (3) an improved civil defense proprnrn cnn be deveyoped which U 8 OOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE could enhnnce the civil defense ctiptlbility of the United States. 269a10 WASHINGTON .I881 (b) It is further the sense of Congress that an improved civil defense program should be implemented which- (1) enhances the survivability of the Americm people md its leadership in the event of nucletlr war and thereby im roves the busis for eventual recovery and reduces the Nation's vuf ner~~bility to a major attnck; (2) enhances deterrence, contributes to perceptions of the United States-Soviet strtltegic balt~ncetlntl crisis st~~bility,~nd reduces the ossibility thtit the Unitetl Stt~tesmight be susceptible to coercion E y nn enemy in times of increased tension;

2' The Atonlir Ener Y Act of I'M6 was conlpleCcly revised hy the Act of August 30, I!+%. and was rrdrsig- Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional nated as the Atomic 8ne y Act of 1W. That Act is classified principally to chapter W (section 2011 ct snq.) Research Service, December 1981. of title 42. United States ?ode.' (3) does not suggest my change in the United States policy of (15) Civil defense-related resenrch rind development. relying on strategic nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in (16) The development of other rtppropriete systems tint1 capn- mnintt~iningdeterrence; bilities to incretise the lifesriving potential of the civil defense (4) inclutles plnnning for the relocr~tionof certain segments of progrrm. the po~)ultttion(luring times of international crisis; antl ADBIINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS (5) is atlaptnble to help deal with nr~turaldisasters and other peacetime emergencies. SEC. 503. [50 U.S.C. App. 23031 The powers contr~inetlin titles I1 nnd IV of this Act shnll be used in developing mcl implementing the ELEhlENTS OF AN IMPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM program required by section 502. SEC.502. [50 U.S.C. App. 23021 (a) In order to carry out the sense of Congress expressed in section 501, the President shnll, to the extent practicable, develop and implement tin improved civil defense program which includes- (1) r p-opmm structure for the resources to be used for uttack- reltlted civi defense; (2) a pro rrtm structure for the resources to be used for disaster- related civif defense; and (3) criteria nnd procedures under which those resources for attack-related civil defense nnd those planned for {Iannedisaster- related civil defense can be used interchangeably. (b) In developing t~ program structure for attack-related civil defense pursuant to subsection (ti), the President shall give considera- tion to including in such program structure the following elements: 5-' (1) Nuclear civil protect~onplanning for more rapid popula- r tion relocation during times of international crisis. (2) Nuclear civil protection planning for improved inplace population protection during times of international crisis in the event circumstances preclude population relocation. (3) A survey of the shelters ~nherentin existin6 facilities. (4) Planning for the development during times of crisis of adtlitional shelter. (5) Development of c~yabilitiesfor shelter management. (6) Marking and stocking of shelters. (7) Development and procurement of ventilation kits for shelters. (8) The development of emergency evacuation plans for areas in which nuclear powerplnnt,~are located. (9) The improvement of civil defense wtirning systems. (10) The improvement of systems and cripabilities for direction find control of emergency opmtions by civil governments at a11 levels, including further development of a network of emergency operating centers. (11) The improvement of radiological defense ~apabilities. (12) The improvement of emergency public lnformt~tionand trnining progrtuns rind cnpabilities. (I:<) The tlevelopment of plms for postattack economic recov- ery t~ndt,he c(eve1opment of plans for postt1i:aster econornk recovery to the extent tht~tpl~mning for posttlistwter econonllc recovery planning does not detrixt from plr~mingfor post,attjack ecor.omic recovery. (14) The improvement of antl training in self-help nuclear ww survival skills. C c -I Congressional Research Service a The Library of Congress

CIVIL DEFENSE BUDGET

In response to requests for information on the fiscal year 1982 and 1983 budget outlook for civil defense, we have gathered the following information. The FY 1982 appropriation figures for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , which has the responsibility for civil defense activities, are from the Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-101), as verified by FEMA. The figures for the FY 1983 budget request were provided by FEMA. The budget information is provided in three major categories.

CIVIL DEFENSE PORTION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY BUDGET

in thousands of dollars unadjusted for inflation FY82 (actual) FY83 (request) I. State and Local Assistance

A. State and Local Assistance

3. Radiological Assistance

C. Nuclear Attack--Civil Preparedness

D. Emergency Operating Centers

E. Communications and Warning

11. Emergency planning and Assistance

A. Research

B. Training and Education

C. Telecommunications and Warning

1. Telecomaunications and Warning

2. Communications and Warning

111. Salary and Expenses

Total

Source : FEMA Budget Office , February 10, 1982

Congressional Reference Division deadly radioactive particles carried by the winds. The new approach is predicated on New Civil-Defense Aim: the conviction of civil-defense planners that the US. would get several days' notice of an impending Soviet nuclear Empty Major Cities attack during a period of gro\+.ingten- sion, as occurred in the Cuban missile Will Reagan's plan to evacuate era1 chaos would result if officials tried crisis of 1962. Aside from being tipped target areas improve chances to empty America's largest cities. Still off by an exchange of demands and other opponents contended that mon- threats, officials count on the detection for peace--or risk nuclear ey could be better spent in other ways by intelligence sources of other signs of war? Views are split over a big to increase the nation's defenses. danger such as movement of ships and switch in U.S. strategy. The new civil-defense scheme differs troops and a higher alert status for Rus- significantly from those put forward in sian nuclear forces. Amid rising controversy over Presi- the 1950s and 1960s, largely because of Ruled out: Surprise. Administration dent Reagan's nuclear-arms policy, a the enormous rise in the number of experts consider a bolt-from-the-blue White House plan for a vast new civil- nuclear weapons now aimed at the US. surprise attack very unlikely, because defense program has ignited a political Once it was assumed that an atomic this would bar evacuation of Soviet cit- firestorm. attack would destroy some cities but ies and leave the Russian population The plan spelled out in late March leave many others intact. Kow the as- defenseless against a return blow from calls, in case of a nuclear showdown sumption is that 400 targets-all the the United States. "Even if we ha\,e as with the Soviet Union, for evacuating to U.S. cities of more than 50,000 popula- little as 3 hours' warning, our progrbm the countryside the 145 million Arneri- tion, the bomber and nuclear-subma- will save lives," says Giuffrida of FEMA. cans living in 400 high-risk areas in big rine bases, the missile silos and other "If we have a week's warning, our pro- cities and near vital military bases. military and industrial sites-might be gram will be of significant benefit." Key to the proposal is the assump- hit almost simultaneously. In contrast to earlier civil-defense tion that risk of a nuclear war would be The number of Americans living or programs that called for widespread CI- obvious days before it actually began- working in those high-risk areas totals vilian preparation in the form of fallout not a surprise attack of the sort that 145 million, and for them there would shelters and stocking of emergency formed the basis of the last civil-de- be no place to hide. supplies, the new plan requires \.irtual- fense program, which called for send- The new plan is to move them out ly no involvement by most Americans ing people to nearby shelters. into the countryside to host areas until a nuclear war appears imminent. Experts predict that an all-out nucle- where they would be relatively safe If that happens, this is how the plan is ar attack today probably would kill from blast, heat and the initial burst of supposed to unfold: some 139 million of the nation's popu- nuclear radiation. They would require rn Each target city would have its lation of 231 million. Proponents claim protection-perhaps for weeks-from own-~evaciation~Ian. with a corm of the new ~lanwould cut the death ,u,..,,,,, ,,,,,; ,,,,, civildefense workers tramed to toll to abbut 46 million. direct the exodus Evacuation "Our goal is to double the num- maps, along with instructions on ber of Americans that would sur- where to go and what to do. \rould vive from a major Soviet attack on be printed in telephone books the U.S.," said Louis 0. Giuffrida, rn When people from the clties director of the Federal Emergen- reached the countrys~de,man\ cy Management Agency. would be put to work Some would Strategic aim. The plan also has operate kitchens for mass feedmg a strategic purpose: To prevent a Others would be handed shovels situation from developing during and told to stack dirt around shel- an eyeball-to-eyeball confronta- ters for protection agamst radia- tion in which the Soviets could fildn fr6m nuclear fallout empty their cities but the U.S. XEGCTiii&%

Civil Defense Agency: 'Trying to Do Something!-.

~ c~ldrs~taf~a a -- tht *: "Cdor rb.t you ned ln .helms.?

todsidbeit No mars.

CrtdainNttb.ttbcpro(gunL,~ rama rroemfRcfams Idd '22-op malor dam Li nuclear attack loomed. But Mr.

~~.bout-~~Intarrain tte agQcy and tbs a-Pw47 m.tmversp. He smiled. For an .gaocy tht ru backmtsr, ae'N matiMslotof~lewrYaervolg

Reprinted by the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, with permission of copyright claimant, August 1982. THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1982

Reagan Nme Gas Request Deleted in Military Bill1

gads request foe $54 million to begin werthe 1982 spending figure. making d binary nerve gas munitions. The United States suspended pmdw Ibc committee met for more than tion of lethal gases in the early 1970%. two weeks in dosed seaaim to reconcile Biimunitions contain two mtoxic slightly differing versions of legislation chemicals that mix and become nerve that would set spanding targets for pru- gas while the gas shell is in flight. The auiag def- weapam and equip Senatevotedtoapprwe the President's ment, for research and development $54 millim request to begin nerve gaa and tor operating and maintaining the pmductim, but the House pwed an cumed services. Todav it anreed to au- mendmat striltinn the bfnarv maDW

ary, Tbe MministrPhon's, request for W3.4 bill1011reprssented ari increase in mIlitaIyspendiasofalma6t33percent - *----

statement today that the conferees had minMtation request to begin produo mated cost of the helicapter M "defed without prejudice the request tion of nine MX intercontinental ballis- aroused criticism earlnt this year. for funds for production of bichem- tic missiles, with bdhgof 51.14 billian qA vote to cancel immediately idmmi~ because of U* stiarp L. LWlir~lyarla~~plrpor. Y . ductm of the *-LO tigtms bomc divisions on this issue which exist in tbe However, Sehator Tower said the corn- which the Air Force had inmuled to Congress.'* mttee had voted to provide $889 mlllioo pbase out in the 1984 budget year. This mtmnt, one Congressional staff to procure just five MX missiles. qA vote, reported earlier, to beglo member said, that "Congress is not giv- procurement of 50 Loddseed C5 air ing the White House money for the gas W*tlcn*1.ntaMXMaUc6 planes, as well as three mrbutismakingmval~judsment 'bmmmittee~wlldto~~reightaircrattthatwereaddedasa Pnd is leaving open the powbility of a that a $7l5 million autborizatim for m sort of "consolation price" for mem- new propam next year." search oa how and where to base the bua of Congreplr who bad fought for a MX missiles and t158 million for ma- pmposal to sub6titute 74Ts lor tbe CS'u terials for MX basing not be spent until Senator Tower pr+ixd tbq work d President Reagan has submitted a writ- the committee. tenplaa on how to base the missilea. But Senator Gary LIarl, Danoart d Other significant actions gy the aa- Cotorado, said the cmfercdlca zep~fl temaecommittee included; was "largely a charade" in which a ma- ----+ ~AdecisiontospendS25mlllimto forltyofmnfe1#5hadban"ta,qpr proam the Amy's attack hell- to yield whenever its bill dllfsrsd from coptsr. Sharp inatpsar In the atl- thawishustottbp~t.goa*~ _, -

Reproduced by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress with Permission of Copyright Claimant