斤Jゴビ〟′～d爪7／／げ／毎ノ卸α〃S仇、ぬ馳りな中 190

Ri＄eandFalloftheJapanSocialistParty ItsStrategiesbeforetheMid－60s and their Problemsホ

．ヾ／／／り〃J／71川／

1・FourStagesoftheJSPTsHistory 2．Conservative Barrier 3．JSPanditsRuralStrategy 4．Failurein Power 5．Loca】Government Alternative 6・LeftwingDominanceandOrganizationalFallacy ConcLusion

TheJapanSocialistParty（JSP）wasfoundedinOctober1945，thereby unifyingvariouspre－WarSOCialistfactions．TheJSPmade aluckystart andformed asocialistrleadingcoalition cabinetin1947．Afterthesevere defeatinthe1949generalelection，SOCialists’forcebegantoriseagaln．In theendofthe1950s，theJSPsecuredaboutonethirdoftheDietseats，167 inthe Lower Houseand78intheUpper House．Giventhatthesocialists hadneverwonmorethan42seatsoftheLowerHousebeforethewar，it WaSaremarkablesuccess．（1）NodoubtthedefeatofJapanintheWarand nationwidepovertyfollowingitgavetheJSPanimpetus．

lshouldliketoexpressmyappreciationtotheFooverInstitution．Stanford，CA， fortheopportunltytOpreSenttheessentialargumentofthisessay．Formanyhelpful comments and criticismslamindebted to the atendants at the c（）nference on the 1955－SytemiIIJapan，he】d at HooverInstitutiollin March，1988，eSpeCially to TetsuyaKataoka，Chairmanoftheconference．Thedraftofthisessaywasp11blished in Tetsuya Kataoka ed，，The1955System：The Origin ofJapan’s Politics（Ann Arbor，Michigan：University of Michigan Press．1989）．In this essay．Irevised the draft verymuch．

J 189 ぶ．γ如扇 But sucha favourablecondition fortheJSP did notlastlong，In the latterhalfofthe1950s．theJapaneseeconomybegantogrowrapidlyand the1960sfoundmoreandmorepeopleenjoyingnewcomsumerlife．The socialstructureofthiscountry also begantOChange．TheJSP seem to have failedin adaptingltSelf to these changes▲In the first half of the 1960s，the party was on a plateau；in thelatter half，it experienced a suddendecline．The year1960，WhenJapanunderwent agreat upheaval causedbythe controversy over the revision of the USTJapan Security Treaty．wasawatershedintheJSP’shistory． The purpose of this chapteris to trace theJSP’s history before the midT1960sandtrytoexplainwhyitfailedingrow】ngintoapartystrong enoughtoousttheLiberalDemocraticParty（LDP）fromthegovernment． IalsotrytofindsomepossiblealternativesopentotheJSPinthosedays． Needless to say，pOliticsis the art of the possibility．Historyis an amalgamation ofirresistible environmentalelements a11d more orlcss positive choices of various actors．Thcn，itis worthwhile toinvestigate SOmCpOSSjbilitiesopentotheJSPsothatwemightmorefullyunderstand Japanese politics． MostpoliticalscientistsstudyingmodernJapanesepoliticshavetended toconcentratetheir attentionontheLDP，neglectingtheJSPandother minorparties．Ofcourse，thisisunderstandablc．ThoughtheJSPhasbeen thelargest ofthe oppositionpartiessince the formation of the LDPin 1955，ithasneverbeenabletobreakthr－Oughthe“barrierofonethirdin theDiet．”IncontrastwiththeJSP’sgloomyplight，theLDPhasalways beeninthepositionofgoverningparty．Undersuchapredominantparty SyStem，（2）itis rather naturalthat many people have given onlylittle Significancetotheroleofanyoppositionparties，atleastinthepolicy makingprocess．（3） Inthesedays，however，thereisanewtrendtoreassesstheinfluence and the significance of the opposition par－ties，eSPeCially theJSP．The article ofKataokainthisvolumeisone ofgoodexamplesofthistrend． HearguesthattheJSPhcIpedthemainstreamoftheLDP，theYoshida faction，tOeffectivelyresist againstthepressurefromtherightwing of theLDPandtheclaimofAmericatorearnl．Ontheotherhand，Mabuchi pointed outJSP’sinfluenceover the distr－ibutive policy sphere，SuCh as

2 動滋β机上柏㍍qト仏ノ‘坤〟〃5〃rわ／如月7巾 188 Welfarepolicy．（4）Dcliberlationproceduresandrathershortsessionofthe Dietalso gives advantage to the opposition parties；they do havemore influencethanexpected fromtheirforcesin the Diet．（5） Anyway，theJSPhasbeenplayinganimportant rolein the postwar Japanese politicalsystem．To discuss various aspects of the socialist POliticsinJapanstillremainssignificant．Inthischapter，Iwillanalyse thecausesoftheJSP’sstagnationfocussingonfivedifferentpoints：（1） theJapanesepoliticalculturesurroundingtheJSP：（2）thedeficit ofthe JSP’s ruralpolicies；（3）the failure of the Katayama Cabinet，the only Cabinetledbysocialists；（4）theshortageoftheJSP’slocalgovernment activities；（5）1eft，Wing dominance and electoralstrategies of theJSP． Beforediscussing thesepoints、1et’shave a bird’s－eyeview oftheJSP’s historyuntilnow．（6）

1．FourStagesoftheJSP’s History In this paper，the elector’algains andlosses of politicalparties are tracedinrespectoftheirshareoftheelectorate，nOttheirpercentageof votes．Usingsuchanilldexhasanumberofmerits．Foronething，WeCan exclude the temporaleffectsofchanglngturnOut SO that thelongterm trendsofthepartiesmaybecomec］earer．Second，uSingtheindexofthe Shareoftheelectoratecanbringcasestolightwhereonepartyseemsto lose electoralsupport evenifit obtains more votes thanin theprevios election，Onthefluctuationoftheturnout．（7）Thenetstrength Dfaparty canbeestimatedin termsofitscapacltytOget VOterSgO tO thepolling Stations and writethe names ofits candidates（inJapan．a11adults are automaticallyenlistedontheelectoraterolls），thoughthedataofopinion po11s，the share of votes and the share of seats are also takeninto consideration． Figurelshowsallthepostware】ectoralresultsoftheLDPalldtheJSP exceptforthatof1946asthe1946electionwasconductedinawayvery differentfromtheothers．OnthebasisofFigurel，theJSP’shistorycan be dividedinto three orfour periods．

3 S．γ加扉

76．1 71．b 71・n 73．5 71．4 74．4 74．2

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tい i～71 ★includingconservativepartiesti】11955andwinnjngconservativeindependents・ ※※includingtherightandtheleftJSPduringits195155divisionandtheshort lived Labourers－Farmars Party． Figurel ShareoftheElectorateatGenerall引ections

a．Periodl：1945－60

Duringthis periodtheJSPsteadilygrewinsizeexceptforthedefeat Of1949．Thisgrowthseemstohavebeenmaintainedtill1960，ifweadd theshareofthevotethenewlyformedDSPgarneredtothatoftheJSP． Thetwopartieshavenotbeenreunifiedasyet，butsomeinfluentialDiet members of both parties now frequently discuss the possibility of a reunlOn． Thisperiod also saw the first and thelast socialistic Cabinet，1ed by PrimeMjnisterTetsuKatayama．Aftertheunexpectedvictoryinthe1947 gelleralelection，theJSPdecided，Or WaSCOmpelled，tO forma Cabinct withtwoconservativeparties．TheJSPalsoparticipatedinthesucceed－ ingAshidagovernrnent．ThoughthetⅥ■osuccesSivecabinetssurvivedfor Only sixteen monthsin total，theJSl）remained as one of the most powerfulparties till1955，because of the conflict among conservative

4 帖l■√り‖ノ′1′ノ′／り′■／んl、ノ√小川、ヾり∴▲晶／ノ叫、 I86 foI－CeS． Ontheotherhand，亡heJSPsufferedfromcentrifugaltrends．First，the extremeleftwingaswellastheextremerightsecededfromthepartyin 1948，thoughmost of the memberslater rejoined theJSP．The main Streamitself was twice split as a result ofideologicaldifferences．Thc firstsplitlastedforonlytwomonths，butthesecondcontinued for four years（1951－55）．Thencamethedefection oftheDSPin1959． ItwasfortunatefortheJSPthattheconservativesbegantoIosevotes afterits1952peak，After that their decline wassolinear and theJSP’s growthso steady that manyJapanese anticipated theJSP wouldbein powersoonerorlater．Thesocialistswerever’yoptlmisticforafewyears． Another feature of this period was that theleftwing of theJSP expandedintermsofthenumberofDietmembersfasterthantheright Wing．In1953theelectedmembersoftheformeroutnumberedthoseofthe latter．Theleftwingbeganto oppresstheright duringthisperiod．The secessionof theDSPcan beexplainedin thiscontext．

b．Period2二1960－67

Inthe1960generalelection，theJSPlost5．2percentofitsshareofthe electorate．This was due to the defection of the DSP．But the party maintainedthesupportof20percentoftheelectorateunti】1967．Thatis， theJSPwasonaratherhighplateau，thoughitsrapidgrowth，aSinthe 1950s，abruptlyended．TheDSP，meanWhile，remainedasaminorparty． Inthissence，theDSP’sseccessiondirectlydamagedtheJSP and made themlose5percentoftheelectorate，Whichamountedtoaround25seats in the Lower House． On the other hand，the LDP waslosing votes as before，despite the unprecedented prosperityJapan enjoyed during the same period．The differencebetween亡heLDP’sshareofthevotesandtheJSP’sdecreased to17．5percentin1967，thesmallestthroughoutthepostwarperiod．Ifwe addtheDSP’ssharetothatoftheJSP，thedifferenceisonly12．1percent， Althoughmostsocialistsandsocialdemocratswere discouragedby the LDP’soverwhelmingmajorityintheDietandbythefactthattheycould SeenOimprovementintheirelectoralresultssince1960，itwasinaway 185 ．ヽ、／言侶■

duringthisperiodthat theywereclosest topower・ ChangesappearedintheJSPinthelastfewyearsofthe1950s，First， controversies over the party’s basic strategy，known as the structual reformdebates，1edtofactionalreshuffles．Thenewright－winggroupled by Saburo Eda，a formerleft－wing activist who advocated the new doctrineofsocialismcalled“structualreformtheory’’，graduallybeganto attractnot afewsympathizers，inspiteoftheunchangedpredominance Oftheleftwing． Second，SeVeraloldinfluentialDiet members and otherincumbents begantoloseinelections，Instead，neWCOmerSWhoweresponsoredbythe tradeunions，eSpeCiallybySohyo，theGeneralCouncilofTradeUnionsof Japan，increasedsteadilyinnumber．Someofthemwereformerleaders Oftradeunions，eSpeCiallyunionsinthepublicsector，Mostofsuchnew DietmembersbelongedtothelefトWingfactionsand，aSareSult，reduced theinfluenceofthenewlyformedright－WlnggrOup．

c．Period3：1967．76

rnthegeneralelectionof1969，theJSPatonetimelostalmostsixper CentOfthe electorate；Since then，the party has not recovered theloss， staying on alowerplane for severalyears．At thistime，the sudden fa11 WaSnOtCauSedbyanydefectionorsplit，aSinthecaseof1960．TheDSP keptitsoriginalelectoralsupport．TheRussianinvasionofCzechoslova， kiain August1968and the Chinese turbulence caused by the“great Culturalrevolution”inthe’60spartia11y affectedtheelection▲Therecan besomeotherreasons．Butthisisnotthetopicofthispaper． On the other hand，the conscrvatives atlast reached thelevelof the lowestsupportinspiteofthesecessionofasmallandshort－1ivedgroup， theNewLiberalClub（NLC，WhichsplitawayfromtheLDPin1976but returnedin1987）．The sum of the LDP’s sharc and that of the NLC fluctuated around34．5percen during this period．The defection ofthe NLC，however，annOyedtheLDPintheDietbecausetheyrefusedtoally withtheLDP．TheLDPfouTlditdifficulttomaintainamaJOrityineither ofthe Houseswithoutanally． Insofar asthelocallevelisconcerned，aninterestingchangecanbe

β βムピ〟習d飽JJげ伽ノ卸α77Sor∫αJ∫5f凡ゆ 184 POinted to．Theleft－wing parties，eSpeCially theJSP and theJapan Communist Party（JCP），SuCCeSSfully attacked conservative powerin manylocalgovernments，includingsuchimportant areas as Tokyo and Osaka．Theso－Called“KakushinJichitai”（progressivelocalgovernments） flourishedhereandthere，SuPPOrtedbyvariousleft－1eaningcoalitions．In mostcases，theJSPwasoneoftherulingpartiesleadingsuchacoalition． The progressivelocalgovernments had a significallt effectin such SPheresassocialwelfareadministrationandimprovementoftheenviron－ ment；theLDPhadtochangesomeofitsnationalpolicies．

d．Period4：1976－ DuringthisperiodtheJSPsufferedfromacreepingdeclineillpartdue to the exacerbation of the conflictswith the extremeleft－wing faction （the Socialist Society）．SaburoEda，theleader ofoneofright－Wingfac－ tions，defectedfrorn thepartyandseveralDiet members followed him． TheyformedtheSocialDemocraticFederation（DSF），butEdadiedsoon afterthedefection．Thepartyexhaustedsomuchenergytoshakeoffthe imageasextremlypro－Marxistpartyandtointegrateitselfthatitwas not able to concentrate upon policy－making or upon pressuring the government．Finally，SuChturmoilandinertialedtheJSPtoafataldefeat illthe1986generalelection：it obtainedonly84seats（one more elected joinedthepartylater）comparedwithl12seatsinthe previouselection． Many opinion po11s，in the meantime，POintcd to a revivalof the COnSerVatives．The LDP started to recover some ofitslost support， especiallyafter198O（seeFigure40nP．33）andsometimessucceededin attaining a comfortable majorityiIlthe Diet，thoughits share of the electoratewas atbest35per cent orso．Theconservativesin totalhad morethan290menlberselectedin1980andiIl1986． Suchtrendsaffectedtheloca11evel．Theconservativesresumedpowel． in manylocalgovernments onceheldbytheprogressives．TheDSPand the Komeito（the CleaIIGovernment f）arty，CGP），both of which were ratherleft－Oriented formerly，made a turn totheright and allied them－ Selves with the LDP．Ilereafter，localgovernments，eSPeCially at the Prefecturallevelandinlargecities，becamemoreandmoretechnocratic；

7 183 、ヾ．／こ／〃．・－ seeminglyapoliticalrulebyexpertsinadrninistrationbecametheorderof theday． Abriefreview oftheJSP’shistoryaswehave made so farbringsto lightsomeinterestingquestions．Forexample，Whataretherealcauscsof theserioussetbackin1969？Whatkindsofeffectdidtheprogressivelocal governmentshaveontheJSP？Whatwerethereasonsfortheriseofthe leftist Socialist Society？As mentioned earlier，however，the following discussion willbelimitedonlytotheperiodsa andb．

2．Conservative Barrier TheJSPfailedtobreakthebarrierofonethirdintheDiet．Incontrast WiththeJSP，the LDPhaseverbeeninpowersinceitsfor’mation．Why hasthcJSPfailedtobec（）meStrtOnger？Whyhavetheconcervativesbeen so successful？ Onthispoint，S．SatoandT．Matsuzakifindthereasontobethehigh1y homogeneouscharacterofJapanesesociety．Accordingtothem，itiseasy fortheJapaneseconservativestointegratethelllSelves，bccausethereare Very few politicalconflicts or politicalcompartmentalizations steming fromreligiousorethniccleavages（theonlyexceptionmightbetheCGP）． Moreover，the corelation between socialstrata or occupationalgroups alldpoliticalsupportisnotclear．Inthisway，thelackofclassandethnic POliticsinJapanexplainstheuninterruptedruleofthe LDP．（8） Itis certain that the ethnic minoritiesinJapan such as Ainu，Uilta， Korean，and Chinese are so smallin number that they can hardly be influentialin politics．Concerning class politics，Class consciousnessis generallyweak．EvenindustrialworkersareapttobemoTeloyaltotheir companythantotheirownclass．（9）Thehornogeneoussocietyhypothesis is rather attractive．It surely giveslight on some aspects ofJapanese politics．But one ofits weak poinsis thatit does not explain how the homogenietyislinked with the conservative dominance．（10）Evenif we assume that thisis self－evident，the hypothesis cannot explain why the LDPcontinuedtolosevotesduringthe195Osandthe1960s． More popular way of explanation is to associate Japanese political culturewith the LDP’selectoralsuccess，In fact，Classes or other social

、ヾ 斤ねど〝邦♂飽／／（〆〃陀ノ郎〟〃S〃ぐね／か′fわゆ t82 CleavagesdoexistinJapan．ButasFlanaganandRicardsonpoinedout， effect of these upon politicalbehaviour，eSPeCially voting one，is often OVerpOWeredbysomeculturalfactors，SuChastendencytorespecthuman relationandsocialnetwork．（11）AndJapanesepoliticalcultureisusua】1y thoughttobefavourabletotheconsevatives．Forexarnple，R．J．Hrebener arguesasfollows：thereasonfortheLDP’srulecanbefoundinpartin Japan’sessentiallyconservativeandpassiveelectorateandinpartinthe ineptitude of the growing number of opposition partics，eSpeCially the JSP．（1Z） Of course，itis dangerous to too exaggerate theimporatnce of the politicalculture．Someof recentstudies on voting behaviour and party SuppOrt reVealthat occupationalinterests，POlicy preference，and other SOCialfactorsareimportanttoformvoters’politicalattitude．（13）Butwe CannOtignorethepoliticalcultureunderlyingthosefactors，eSpeCiallyin dealingwith theJapanese politicsearlyinthe post war period．Indeed， Japanese people are very passivein the sphere of politics，thoughit remainsmootwhethertheyarestrikinglysoincomparisonwithsomeof EuropeannationssuchasItaly．Wheneverresearchersask themifthey arewi11ing to particIPatein politics to realize their owninterests and jdeas，1essthan twenty percent of them answerpositively，Most people prefer to depend（）n their representatives or politicians to realize their OWninterests and policy preferences．（14）The passivity toward political activitiesleadstoacceptanccofpresentauthoritiesorordersandindirect－ 1yhelptheconservatives． Japanese politicalculture helps the conservativesin a more direct fashion．C．Hayashistatistica11yanalysestherelationshipbetweenthink・ ingwayofJapanesein dailylife and theirparty support．He findsthat they tendtosupport theLDPnotnecessari】ybecause ofitspoliciesbut becausetheylikeitsopportunisticstyleofbehaviourandtraditional，nOt fully rational，Way Ofthinking．They areapt tohatethose who strictly Clingtosome principlesorideologleS andwho deny what they vaguely illlaglneaStraditionalthings．Theyalsodislikeincessantcriticismexpres－ Sedbytheprogressiviststothepresentstateofthesocietybecausethey fee＝timpose psychologicalstrains on themselves，（15）Allthatisleft to mentionisthepropencitiesofsomepeopletodefertotheir’Superiorsand

9 18t S7h佑

suspectasunmoralthosewhuchallengethepresentauthorities．（16） Thus，the more a partyinsists on radicalchanges of thesociety and politics，CriticizingmercilesslythegovernmentandotherpowerfulLs，the more people become opposed to the party．Clearly，SuCh psychologlCal tendencydamagesthecommunistsworst．Moreover，gOVernmentSbefore the war successfully inculcated the fear of any thoughts criticising the existingresime，eSpeCiallythecommunism．Thisisoneofreasonswhythe Japan Communist Party（JCP）could not obLain enough votesin the SeVeralgeneralelectionsafterthewar．TheJSP，tOO，nOdoubtsuffered， andissufferingtosomedegree，fromsuchamentaltendency，thoughit hasbeenideologicallymuchmoreflexible than theJCP．Even rational－ minded conservatives often prove to be unpopular．People are apt to prefermodestlyirrationalandpragmaticalconservatives． Suchconservativedispositiondidnotchangeverymuchinspiteofthe occupation reforms and the great metamorphosis of social structure causedbytherapidgrowthofJapaneseeconomy，（17）Needlesstosay，the COnSerVativecu】turehasbeenmoredominantamongruraldwe11erstha【1 urbanonesanditisthemajorobstacletothepenetrationofprogressive Or SOCialist forces．Evenin the generalelection of1947，When theJSP WentSlightlyaheadofanyoftheotherparties，itfai］edtogainanyseats inasmanyas17constituencies，mOStOfwhichwerepredominantlyrural． One constituencyin the Hokuriku district has not allowed any non－ COnSerVativecandidatetowininallofthegeneralelectionsafterthewar． The conservative atmosphere jn ruralareas crystalizesitselfin the form ofjiban．The jiba7？COnSists of severalcounties and a few towns Where politicians can always expeCt StrOng electoralsupport．In their jibans，they keep manylocalleaders and notables under their control． Thoselocalinfluentials，Who are conservative－Oriented，areuSually not affiliatedwithanypoliticalparty．Theirauthorityjsapolitical，butthey CanSuCCeSSfully get many ruralvoters write the names of their conser－ ativebosseswhoarecandidatesontheballotpapers，eVenifthevotersdo nothaveanyideasoftheirpolicies．＝8〉 ItissaidthatthejibanbecanlePOPularinthe1920s．（19）Beforethewar， it waslocalnotables many of whom werelandowners that associated voterswithcomtervativepoliticians．（2O）Theoccupationreforms，SuChas

JO β正（）〟”♂飽／J〆JJiピルα〝5〃ぐね／7s′魚ゆ 180 agrarianreformandpurgesofmanypoliticiansatlocallevelsaswellas atnationallevel，SWepttheinfluenceofoldnotables．Butthetendencyof localpeopletovoteforthecandidatewhoranfromtheirlocalitydidnot Changemuch．（21）Moreover，neWnOtablestookplaceoftheoldoneswho hadbeenousted．They werenewlyelectedlocalassemblymen，members Of newly organizedlocalcommittees，Officials of agricalturalcoopera・ tives，and thelike．After the war，it was those new notables aselected Officeholdersthat actuallyhadauthority overtheordinary people．（Z2） Innational（andprefectural）elections，they gatheredvotes forconser－ VativecandidaLeinruralareas．Facesonthejibanschangedbuttheway ofvote－gatheringremainedthesame．atleastforseveralyearsafterthe War．（23）Forexample，R．E．Ward，Whocarriedoutintensiveresearchina vi11ageintheoutskirtsofOkayamaCityinthe1950s，foundthatthejibans Of the prewarinfluentialpoliticians remained considerablyintact even after the war．（24） Such jiban was personally owned property of each politician，SO tO SPeak，andit was possible for him to giveit to another politician or WOuld－be politician．Therefore，many neW COnSerVative caIldidates suc－ Ceededtothejiba72S Ofthepurgedpoliticiansinthefirstgeneralelection after the war．（25）Even Shigeru Yoshida had to get a bequeathed jiban When he ranin his first generalelection，because he did not have any electiveposts whenhewas appolntedas prlmeministerjust beforethe new constitutionbecame effective．（26） Of course，its electoralimportance did not remain unchanged．New notables could hold their offices asIong as they were elected．Their POSitionswerenotsostableasprewarlandowners，Asdemocraticthink－ ingwayattractedmorerura】people，SOtheability ofthejibantomove VOterS Shrinked．Some of alert politicians began to seek new typeOf VOte－gathering organization，Koenkai，arOund the mid－1950s．（27）The Koenkaiistypically a private organization for a politician to organize VOterSdirectly，thatis，Withneitherpartyinterventionnordependenceon the ability oflocalnotables to gather votes．（28）Today，eVen municipal assemblymenplay onlylimitedroleinelectioneering．t29） But atleastduringtheearly period aftertheWar，thejibanwas the majorobstaclefortheJSP．Itoffsettedthefavourableeffectsontheparty

Jノ 179 5．乃γJf

causedbytheoccupationreforms．Infact．itwasdifficultforsocialiststo findtheirownruralleadersorsubleaders．Wardpointsoutthatonehas tomeetsix requirementsso asto beinfluentialinruralareas：1）to be local，2）to haveleisure Linle，3）to havc enough understanding and knowlegc about agriculturalproblems，4）to bemiddle－aged or elderly men，5）to be of gentle birth，6）not to be affiliated with any political Parties．（30）Some of these conditions are somewhat，if not completely， contradictory to the ethos of socialisnl．As ruralpeople followedtheir leadersnotbecauseofthelatter’spoliticalthoughtbutbecause oftheir SOCialauthority，SOCialistsweTenOtabletoenjoyenoughopportunitiesto gainaccessto ordinaryvi11agers． Wardconcludeshisreportasfollows：

An appreciabledecreaseinconservative strengthin one of Japan’s staunchest conservative areas and the gradualemer－ genceofaleft－WlngOpPOSitionarelong－termandslowrmovlng trends which are subject to future jnterruption，diversion，Or distortionintermsoftheirpoliticalconse（1uenCeS． As a rnatter of fact，COnSidering the enorrnOuS StreSSeS tO which postwarJapanese society has been subjected，the continued strength，reSiliency，and adaptability of the tradi－ tionalsociopoliticalorderandprocessesaremostimpressive． Politically．as otherwise，Niiike［thevi11age researched by him］remainsanessentiauyconservativecommunity．（3り

1nthe1940sandthe195Os，Japanesesocietywaspredominantlyagricul－ turalexceptforinafewmetropolitancities．Evenin1960，44percentof Japaneselivedoutsidecitiesasadministrativelydefined．Moreover．asthe law enactedin1958prompted the merger of municipalities，Japanese Citiescontainedmanyruralareaswithintheirboundaries．Inthosedays， itwascrucialforallpartiestogainthesupportoffarmersandotherrural dwellers． BeingassistedbyJapanesepolitical，OraPOliticalculture，manyCOnSerq vative politicians were able to easily entrench themselves against the SOCialist offensiveand postwardemocratizationintroducedbytheOccu・

J二】 ／〃．、＝ノハノ／1ィ∴∫－′／■仙＿付－〟りヽ1′．イ．J∴・■＼．一／1．－？什 178 PationArmyintheruralareas，Whateverofficialpoliciestheypresented to their electorates．Evenin urban areas，the conservative tradition COntinued tocapturenumerouspeople，includillgSOmeWOuld－besocialist activists．Socialists as wellas conservatives with modernized minds neededenormousenergytosurvivesuch asituation，

3．JSPanditsRuralStrategy Thoughthebarriertoentrywashigh，SOCialistsdidenjoyconsiderable SupPOrtinsomeruralareas，Wheretheydevelopedanappropriatestrat， egy and were more active than conservatives．For example，theJSP obtainedmorethanonethirdofallocatedseatsofseventyplCallyagrlCul－ turalprefecturesin the1947generalelection．Intwo of themtheparty WOn eVen a half of the allocated seats．Why was this possible？It was Simplybecausemost ofthose areaswere wheresocialists hadstruggled Veryhardonbehalfoftenantfarmersforalongtime．Suchafactmight SuggeStSOmethingabouttheJSP’sruralstrategy， First，theJSP’sagriculturalpolicieshavetobeexamined．Whatkindof policiesdiditenvisage？Howdidittrytoorganizefarmersorapproach farmers’organizations？ The agrarian reformis one of the mostimportant politicaleventsin postwarhistory．Itdistributedtothetenantsmorethanfivemillionacres of farmland previously owned by the landlord class and completely OVerthrewtheruleofparasiticlandlords．Needlesstosay，thereformwas OrderedbytheOccupationArmy．thoughsomeJapanesebureaucratsand othershadrealizeditsnessesitybeforetheend ofthewar．（32）Thesocial－ istswhohadbeenstrugglingtoemancipatemiserab】etenantsfromtheir semi－feudalisticpositionweresurprisedatthereform．Theywereindeed Stupefiedbecausetheirgoalwassuddenlyfulfilledbyothers．（33）Butthey should not have been so． Besidestheagrarianreform，Variousbillswereenactedtodemocratize andimprovetheruralsociety．Forexample，theLandImprovement Act WaSenaCtedin1949tohelpcu】tivatorstoexchangetheirpaddyfieldsand toenlargethemforconvenience．EachlocalgovernmentWaSOrderedto establish an elected agriculturalcommittee，One Of newlyintroduced

J．●r 177 、ヾ 71リノ．ご

administrative committees．And moreimportant was the Agricultural CooperativeActpassedin1947，Theseactsenlargedthescopeofgovern－ mentalactivitiesin the agriculturalsphere．This enabled the political partiestodevelopvariouskindsofncwstrategleSiftheywanted：aSSert－ ingtorevisesomeactsorintroducenewones，aSkingthegovernmentto implementadministrativemeasuresforfarmersintermsofagivenact， andsoon．Throughsuchactivities，SOmepartiesgainedthesupportofthe farmers． However，theJSPinthe1940sdidnotmakeanyconcreteproposalsto improvefarmlngeXCeptforsomepublicassertionssuchasnationalizlng fertiliser companies．Evenin1949，theactionprogram of the party still pointedoutthenecessitytoimmediatelyformulateanagriculturalpolicy and principles tolead the farmers movements．（34）But socialists spent enormous energy（in vain）debating the way of the expected socialist revolution．AsregardsagrlCulturalpolicy，theconservativesortheLDP did not have any substantialideas either，but they could rely on the bureaucrats．They alsocould，and did，preSSure bureaucrats concernlng Variousprograms andmeasures． Later，theJSPstartedtoformulatemorelogicalagriculturalpolicies． Their basicidea wasto“modernize”farmingbyjoint management and protectJapaneseagricultureagainsttheinternationalfreetradeinagrar－ ianproducts．Theparty tried toisolate the agriculturesector from the StruCturalchangesintheJapaneseeconomy．Thequestionis，then，howto implementsuchascheme，eVenifitwasfeasibletosomeextent．（35）Butit WaSnOtClear whatthesocialiststhoughtonthispoint，Anyway，SuCh a StreSSOnaCOOperativestyleoffarmingbringsustotheproblemsofthe farmers’organizationsandtheirmovements． Socialists who participatedin the tenant movements before the war formedtheJapanFarmersUnion（JFU）inFebruary，1946．Theystruggled fiercelyfortheaccomplishmentofagrarianreformandtheJFUrapidly grewin size．Butitis naturalthat the union shrank rapidly after the reformwascompleted，becauseitdidnotmademuchefforttopreparcfor the post－reform period．Itmight not be too exagerated to say that the socialists did notthink ofanyhtingother thanclass struggle，Oncethe agraian reform wascompleted，they couldnot persuade farmers ofthe

Jエゴ 人’‘ごトtこ川．／八丁」／・・／－仙ノ√小川・ヾ・′l－J■√ノ心／〃〃パ t76 necessjtyofancwkindofc】assbattle．Sincearound1950，theweightof farmersin socialistsmovementsincessantly decreasedexceptsuch spe－ cial cases as where they were threatend to be deprived of their newly acquiI．ed farmlandsby thegovernment plannlngtO buildbases forthe American army．（36） On the otheI．hand，the agriculturalcooperativesintroducedin1947 0rganizedalmost allthe farmers．Theorlglnalpurposeoftheestablish・ mentwasnottopromotejointfarmingastheJSPhadatfirsthoped，but toimprovethefarmers’economicconditiDnSbysuchmeansasco】1ective PurChaseofequipmentandloansonfavourableconditions．Itwaspurely aneconomicorganizationinprlnCipleandprohibitedtoactpoliLicallyby thelaw．ButitwasverylmpOrtantWhichpoliticalforcetookhegemonic COntrOlin the cooperativein eacharea becauseit was almost the only Organizationwhich attractedallthefarmers．Ifsocialistscouldgainthe leadershipintermsofagricultureandeconomyamongthefarmers，they COuldhavewonthefarmers’truStandsecurcdtheirpoliLicalsupport．But WeCanhardlyfind theagriculturalcooperativesmentionedintheJSP’s majordocuments． Thesecond possibletypc ofruralstrategy wasnot directly aimed at agriculture，Itwastocontainwidelyrangingpoliciesandprograms：from reglOnaldevelopmentpoliciesingeneraltotheimprovement ofspecific ruralroads．Earlyinthepostwarperiod，mOStruralpeoplewerepoorand localinfrastructures miserable．Apart from the macro plan to develop backwardarcas，then，thereremainedmanythingsforpoliticiansto do forthebenefit of theirruralvoterS．Ex－Prime ministeI－KakueiTanaka， forexample，drewahugeamountofpublicworkprojectstohishackward COllSLituencyin Niigata Prefecture and succeededin securing the over－ whelmingsupportofhisvotcrs．Publicworkshavetwomerits：first，they improvctheruI．alinfrastructuredirectly，SeCOnd，theybringpeoplemore employmentopportunities．（37〉 Incontrast to Tanaka，ShoichiMiyake，One Offormerleaders of thc tenantmovementinNiigataPrefectureandlaterthevice－Speakerofthe Lower House，WhohadbeenelectedaDietmemberbackedby theJSP fromthesameconstituencyasTanaka’s，WOuldprovetobeimpotent，Or reluctant，Wheneverhewasaskedbyhisvoterstoinfluencethecentral

J5 175 、ヾ、7こ川▲・■ burcaucracy and have them do something for their vi11ages and towns． The supporters of this famous socialist Diet member became so disap－ pointedthat thesupportfortheJSPitselfbegan todeclinein thisarea． Manp voters who once had supported the JSP switched their votes to Tanaka，thatis，tOtheLDP．Even somesocialist subleadersin thisarea deserted theJSP andparticipatedin the Ta11aka’spoliticalrnachine．（38） Thisepisodeissuggestivein thinking about theJSP’s generalattitude towardslocalproblems． Thisisnottosaythatsocialistpoliticiansshouldactinthesameway as conscrvatives．Rather，they shouldhave been more sensitive to their VOterS’demandsandthroughcopiTlgWiththemworkedoutauniqueand realisticdevelopmentalplanoftheirown．Afterall，theJSPcouldnot．or didnot，makethemost ofthefruits ofthetenant movements，partially becauseitclungblindlytotheideaof“socialistagriculture，”andofclass Struggleandregardeditasdishonesttotrytodeveloplocalcommunities orlocalagricultureinthemidst ofthecapitalisticsociety．〈39） BしItit must be recognizedthat theJSPdidhavesome，ifnotenough， rcsourcesandpossibilities．Theyshouldhavemadepositiveuseofthem， thoughit was stilldifficult for them to do so，in so far as they were alienatedfrompower at thecenter．

4．Fai1urein Power Oneofthebestwaysforapartytogainthetrustofvotersistobein POWer and showits governing ability．For example，the Sucial－ DemocraticPartyinGermany（SPD），Whichwasanoppositionpartyafter thc war，decided to form a“grand coalition”government with the Christian Dcmocratic Union（Cl〕U－CSU）in1966．The successfulexperi－ mentofthecoalitionbroughttheSPDmorevotesinthefo1lowinggeneral election．WhentheSPDparticipatedinthecoalitiongovernment，itsshare oftheeIectoratewas34．1percellt．Itroscto37．Opercentin1969andto 41．7percentin1972． InJapan，theJSP sharedpowerwithtwoconservativepartiesin1947 and TetsuKatayama，theleaderoftheJSP，preSided over theCabinet． After the Katayama government collapsed，theJSP participatedin

J6 仇・ヾ‥川（／／・うノ／／∫1′■／／“ノ小川J・′tJl．骨、イ／1〃汀 174 anothercoalitiongovernment．ButtheJSPmadesuchfatalmistakesin thetwogovernmentsthatitlostconsiderablesupportinthe1949general election・Ifsocialistshad administeredthetwogovernmentsbetter，the earlyperiodoftheJSPwouldprobablyhavehada positiveimpacton theirfuturesupport．WhydidLheyfail？ FirstcomestheinLentionandpolicychangeoftheGeneralHeadquaters Of the Occupation Forces（GHQ）．As the supreme force，GHQ often Wielded absoluteinf）uences onJapanese politics．Without the decisive resolution of GHQ to democratize and demi1italizeJapan，mOSt Ofthe postwarreformscouldnothavebeenrealized．（40）GHQjbrcedJapanto institutionalizecompletepoliticalfreedom，Needlesstosay，alltheleftist forcesinJapanbenefitedagreatdealfromthisdemocratizationpolicyof GHQ． It was moreimportant for theleftists that GHQ expected much of them．Atfirst，itevenpositivelysupportedtheJCPinordertooppressthe ultranationlists．Afterashorthoneymoon，GHQandtheJCPsoonbegan toquarrelwitheachotherandweredivorcedfinally，InplaceoftheJCP， GHQfoundtheJSPlovableandpreferablc，Earlyintheucupationperiod， itthoughtoftheJSPastheliberal，middle－Of－the－rOadforcebetweenthe Communists and thc conservatives and hopedit play aleading rolein democratizingthepartypolitics．（41）GHQIsfavourableappreciationofthe JSPledthepartytopower． ItcannotbeexplainedonlylntermSOftheresultofthe1947general electionwhy theformation of theKatayamacoalitiongovernment was possible．Asmentioned above，the numberofseats theJSP obtainedin that election was far short of the majority，CoaliLion government was inevitablefortheJSP，butthethenlargestconservativeparty，theLiberal PartyledbyShigeruYoshida，refusedto participatein the government ledbythesocialistsattheearlystageofnegotiationamongparties．Ifthe SeCOndlargestconservativeparty，theDemocraticParty，hadrejectedthe requesttojointhecoalition，theKatayamagovernment wouldnot have beenrealized．Indeed，theDemocraticPartysoughtachancetohavetheir OWnprimeminister．ItwasthestatementofGHQtosupportKatayama that finally made the r）emocratic Party decide to accept the socialist Premiershipandjointhecoa】itioncabinet．（42）

J7 t73 、ヽ、．ソ」リ∴・■ Thismeant，however，thattheKatayamagovernmentwastoodepen－ dentontheGHQ，smindtomovebyitself．Withaslightwhithdrawalof theGHQ’ssupportforittheJSPcouldcasilybewrecked・Forexample， theKatayama Government wasdamagedbyGHQ’s pressure to purge Rikizo fIirano，the then Minister of Agriculture and Forestry；he was judgedtohavebeentoosympathetictomilitalismduringthewar・Hirano wasoneofthefoundersoftheJSPandplayed aconspicuousroleinthe electioncampaignin1946．Hispurgein1947wasoneofthemainreasons fortheseccessionofsixteenDietmembersfromtheJSPtoformthenew butshort－1ivedparty，theSocialProgressivistParty．（43） In1948，U．S．occupationpolicychangedabruptlyduetotheesca】ation of the Cold War，American goverllment Shiftedits policy stance from fartherdemocratization ofJapanto economic recovery ofthiscountry． ThisshiftchangedthepowerbalancewithinGHQ，Insteadofprogressive groups represented by the Government Section（GS）of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers（SCAP）which had promoted the democratization ofJapan radica11y，COnSerVative，anti－GSgroupsbegan to gain power．The）T，eSPeCial】y the second GeneralStaff Section（G2）， triedtobrakedemocratizationofJapanandbackeduprightistssuchas Shigeru Yoshidatomake economicrecoverysmooth．After shortresis， tance agalnSt the policy change of his government，MacArthur himself SWitchedhissupportto Yoshida’sLiberalParty．（44） TheshiftiIIU．S．policydcprivedtheJSPofagoodreasontourgethe COnSerVative parties to accept another alliancewith the socialists．1t becamealmostimpossiblefortheJSPtogetinpowerunlessitobtained themajorityintheDietbyitself，atleast duringthe occupation period． TheonlyalternativelefttotheJSPinthosedaysmightbetomaintainthe secondsocialist－COnSerVativecoalitiongovernment，theAshidacabinet，aS longaspossible．ButtheShodenscandalfinallyoustedtheJSPfromthe governmentJune，1948． Behindthiseverlt，tOO，WaSa POWerStrugglewithinGHQ．Thatis，the risi11gG2successfully madeuse ofthescandalinwhichit was saidthe presidentoftheShowaDenkolnc．（Shoden）bribedseveralpoliticiansand bureaucrats，including Premier HitoshiAshida，and exTVice－Premier Suehiro Nishio who wasa rightwingleader oftheJSP．Almostallthe

Jβ βねg〟〝d爪7／／〆J如ノ卸α〃5〃C由〝扉f七巾 172

SuSpeCtedpoliticianswereofthemiddle－Of－the－rOadcamp supportedby GS，therivalofG2・Evensome ofofficersofGS weresuspected tobe involvedinthccrime・ItwasagoodchanceforG2tobringdownfallto GSanditsassociatedJapanesepoliticians．G2pu11edstringstohaveeven Slightlysuspectedpeoplearrested．Today，ther・earesomewhoassertthe SCandalitself was just a frameup by G2．（45）Indeed，mOSt pOliticians， includingAshida and Nishio，WCre aquittedlater． DuetotheShodenscandal，Lhepartiesformlngthecoalitionlostagreat manyvotesinthefollowingelection．TheJSP，eSpeCially，Sufferedfrom thelossDfitscleanimageowlngtOthearrestofNishio．Thismeant，at thesametime，thatitlostaversatilepoliticianwhowasindispensableto thethenJSP．Mor・eover，theJSPbecameunabletorelyontheauthority of the SCAP． Second，theinstability of the Katayama government was partially CauSed byits prematurity．Less than two years had passed since the formationoftheJSPwhenittookoverpower．ThcJSPneededmoretime tosettleitsorganizationalproblemsandtolearnhowto actintheDiet． Besides，theJSP obtained only17．6percent oftheelectorate，1ess than onethirdofalltheseatsoftheLowerHousein1947，incontrastwith34． 1percentwhichtheSPDgainedin1965．ItwasinevitablethatthcJSP’s initiativein the coalition government was heavily constrained by the OVerWhelmingpower oftheconservatives． WhentheJSPfounditselftheleadingparty astheresult ofthe1947 gcneralelectio11、it was hardlypreparedtoleadacabinet．Thepartydid notevenexpectedsuchanelectoralsuccess，aSmentionedabove．Infact， itreluctantlycameintopowerbecauseit wasundcranillusionthat the party politics requestedtheleading party to form a cabinet under any circumstances．（16）Butitwaspossible，andcertainlybetter，fortheJSPto wait for another chance，because the conservative forces secured the maJOrityinall． ShigeruYoshida，1eader ofthe LiberalParty，also play anirnpOrtant Part，Say，indrivingsocialistsintopower．HeexactlyperCeivedthepoor ability of theJSP to manage a cabinet．1nsisting that the“rule of the COnStitutionalgovernmellt’1demandedtheleadingpartytotakepower，he CunninglyrefusedtoparticipateinacoallitionwiththeJSP．Herefused

ノタ 17l S．T那扇

to make a conservative coallition governmentled by himself，tOO．He anticlpatedtheshortlifeofasocialistgovernmcntanddeliberatelymade itimpossiblefortheJSPtoremainanopposition．Heexpectedsocialists’ blunderstoimpressvoterswiththeirinabilitytogovern．Hehitthemark succcssfully．（47） Third．theJSPlackedadecisiveandtrustworthyleader．PrimeMinis， terKatayaInaWaSknowntobeindecisive．Heneitherrejectedthemove toaskhimtoformacabinetnordidhetakealeadingroleinthecoalition： he took office asprime minister quite reluctantly．When he was faced Withthepressureof theGHQ topurge Hirano，hecould not personally perSuade Hiranotoresignhisministerialpost．Instead，hcconcealedthe realreason to ask HirallO tO reSlgn and complicated the matter．In the end，hewascompe11edtodismissHirano．Sorneright－wingDietmember－ erssympatheticwith Hiranogot angrywith thedismissalanddefected theJSP，An10ngthemwasZenko Suzuki，eX－PrimeministeroftheLDP government．When theleftwing oftheJSP rebelled agaistthe Cabinet over thesupplementarybudget of1948，Katayama did not carry out his policydecisively．Hislackofstrongleadershipacceralatedthecentrifugal trendsintheJSPandencourageattacksfrombothinsideandoutsidethe party，But theJSP did not have any otherleader to take Katayama’s Place，Partly because some of the party’sinfluentialleaders had been purgedbyGHQ． Finally，SOCialistslacked a willingness to maintain the Cabinet．In general，pOliticalparties．onceinpower，wi1lendeavortoholdthegovern－ ment under their controlaslong as possible．But the socialistsin the Katayamagovernmentgaveuppowerquiteeasi】y．Asamatter offact， theHouseofRepresentativesdidneitherpassavoteofnonconfidencenor VOtedownthefullbudget．Thecabinetcouldhavesurvivedalittle】onger， providedthat Katayamahaddecidedto stayinpower，thoughhe＼＼TOuld perhapshaveencounteredthelnOredifficultproblemofrearmamentsoon thereafter． If theKatayamagovernment hadsurvivedlonger，theShodenscandal might not have occurred．In fact，the government had many talented intellectualstocopewiththeproblemsofJapanesesociety．Therefore，if the government had had enough time toimplementits policies and

2〃 尺八ぐ〟〃〟♪b／／′イ／毎ノ／ゆ〟〃5／ノ（－～■〟／ね／撤γ什 170

PrOgramS，thevoterswou】dprobablyhaveevaluatedtheJSP’sabilityto rulemorefavourab］y．Theycould haveimprovedtheeconomy，tOO． The failure of the Katayama government led to a serious socialist defeatinthe1949generalelection．（4別Asaresult，theJSPlostitspostTWar momentum，thoughitregainedmostofitslostvotesinthe1952general election．It also spoiled the politicalcareer of those who were newly electedafterthewar．They weredamagedbeforethey fully established theircredentials：manyOfthemwerenotreelected，Thiswasseriousfor a semi－Cardre party（49）such as theJSP，because the party depended COnSiderablyon thevotescastforeachJSP－backedcandidateforrather PerSOnalreasons．Besides，thefailureofthecoalitiongovernmentswasa prelude to the decline of the right wing，becauseit was the right－Wing leaders that accepted the agreement to a11y the party with the two COnSerVativepartiesinspiteoftheleft－wing’sopposition． TheJSPhad atleast one morechance to share power．TheJSP can COrneinto power ol巾T When the conser’Vatives are dividedinto a few partiesandwhen，atthesametime，nOSlnglepartycanellJOyamaJOrlty intheDiet．ThefirstsuchchancecametotheJSPin1947．Thesecondand probablly thelast chance srniled at theJSPin1953，When the Liberal PartyledbyShigeruYoshidalostitsmajorityintheLowerHousesothat nosinglepartycouldformastablegovernmentwithoutacoalition．The wholeJSPobtained138seats，thoughitwasatthetimedividingintotwo factions． Seei11g the struggle among the conservatives，Minoru Takano，Chief executiveofSoわ′0（GeneralCouncilofJapaneseTradeUnions）andone Oftheleft－Wingleadersinthesocialistmovement，SuggeStedthattheJSP SuppOrtananti－Yoshida protagonist，MamoruShigemitsu，theleader（）f the Progressive Party to make a more acceptable government to the socialists．Itis said thatit was not feasibe to make a socialist－ COnServative coalitionin those days，（50）but stillTakanoIs suggestionis noteworthy．Iftheyhaddaredto promoteShigemitsuasprimeminister， the socialistsmight atleast have succeededinintensifying the conflict amongtheconservativesandhavegottenclosertopower． Why did the JSP not seriouslv consider the possibility of another COalitiongovernment？Theofficialreasonwasthatitwasunacceptab】cto

2j 169 ヽ 7こごJ∴・

blur the distinction beしWeen the progressive side and the conservative one．（51）Butsuchanexplanationisnotpersuasiveenough．Therecouldbe otherreasons．First，theleftwingoftheJSPwasinfluencedbyanarcho・ Syndicalism and was apt to makelittle of governmentalactivities．（52） Indeed，it ot）pOSed the formation of the Katayama government，tOO． Second，manySOCialistsfearedthattheywouldimpairtheir“Shutaisei，” if they participated recklesslyin a coa】ition．The wurd“Shutaisei，” originated from Germanidealism，and as such means somethinglike Self－identification that earnest and genuine socialists were supposed to hold．Third，theirbitterexperienceduringthecoalitiondaysdiscouraged themfrommakinganother attempt Eventually，mOStSOCialistsweretoonaivetopursueanypossibilityto divideandweakentheirenemy．Theconservativesunitedthemselvesinto the LDPin1955and did not allow theJSP to take advantage of the COnflicts among them anylonger

5．LocalGovernment Alternative In most of theindustrialized countries，localgovernmentis another arena where politicalparties vylng for power at the nationallevelcan PrOVeitsabilitytorule．Whenapartyisoutofpoweratthenationallevel， it canimpress the voters with an alternative politicalcourse through Various activitiesinthelocalgovernmentsullderitscontrol． Thepostwarlocalgovernment systeminJapangives parties alot of Chancestotrytheirpolicies，inspiteofthecentralizedinter・gOVernmental relationsandweakfinancialbasisofmostlocalgovernments．IllBritain， forexample，localgovrnmentscandoonlywhatthelawpermitsthemto do underthedoctrineof ult7tlUires．Iftheywanttodosomethingwhich isnotlegallyarticulated，theymustask parliament topasslocalbillin Ordertoauthorizethemtodoit．Besides．that procedureislengthy and expensive．In America，Dilon’s rule functionsin the same way as the doctrineof ult771乙）i77？S．（53）Incontrast．Japaneselocalgovernmentscanin prlnCIPledo anythingthelawdoesnot prohibitthemfromdoing．（54） Thus，Torazo Ninagawa．a famousleftist governor of Kyoto Prefec－ ture，WaSabletoimplementhisoriginalsubsidyprogramforthefarmers

二∵ ガねg〝習〟♪滋／／〆伽ノ如〟習ふフCJα／オ5f吾7ゆ 】68 Whenthecentralgovernmentcut one ofits agriculturalsubsidies．This helpedhimtogainmoresupportforhimself．Heimplementedmanyother POlicies different from the centralgovernment’s onesin such fields as education，Welfareandtheprotectionofsmallenterprises．Hewasorlgi－ nallybackedby theJSPbut theJSP’sineptitude madehim a pro－JCP POliticianlater．（55）Hewasinofficefor28yearscontinuously．TheJCPin Kyoto prefecture succeededinraisingits share of the votes under the umbrellaofasympatheticprefecturalgovernment（seeFigure2）．（55） Another example may be more suggestive．In a smal1vi11agein the l10rthern part ofJapan，there was a talellted politician named Masao Fukazawa．fIewasborninSawauchiVillageinIwatePrefecture，elected to mayorofthevi11agcin1957a11ddiedinofficein1965． Inthe1950s，SawauchiVillage，justasmostofothervillagesinJapan7s backwardareas．wasverypoorandordinarypeOplewereleadingavery precariouslife．Above all，manyinfants and old people werein poor health，Partlybecause mostvi11agers weretoo poor to see a doctor as Oftenasnecessary，andpartlybecausethehealthadministrationdidnot function well．When Fukazawa took office，theinfant mortalityin the Villagewas6．96percent，thatis，70utOflOOnewlybornbabiesdiedbefore

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一－－－－・－・・・→一′ ＿一 一／（i．（） 〔ノ1 t）Lユ⊥ 1i）5ニ‡ h〔 5ホ 〔i－〕 ∋：与 い7 ㈹ 72 7（i 7リ

Figure2 Shareof VotersinGeneralElections 一一“JSPandJCPin Kyoto Prefecture

エフ t67 ．ヽ、／こノ〃ノ■ theirfirstbirthday．Today，theaveragerateinJapanisaboutCI．6percent． Fukazawa endeavored toimprove this state of affairs．Heinstituted freemedicinesystemforinfantsandpeopleolderthan60bysubsidising the nationalhealthinsurance system，though the vi11age’s financial marginwasnarrow．SawauchiVillagewasthefirstlocalgovernmentin Japan whichexempted the weak from medicalexpenses．On the other hand，heimprovedthepublichealthnursesystem，introducedpreventive CareOrganizationsintothelocalcommunities．equllJpedtheonlyhospital managedbythevi11agewithmorefacilities，anddidalotofotherthiIlgS， Following his activities，theinfant mortality dropped remarkably，and WaSfinallyreducedtozeroin1962．However，themunicipalfinancesdid not gointo the red．except for during the earliest pcriod of his administration．（57） Fukazawa’s remarkable achievementsin Sawauchiimpressed many SOCialist politicians，though he himsclf was neither pro－SOCialist nor PrO－COnSerVative．The socialists started to adopt similar policies to CXempttheneedyfrommedicalfeeswhentheycameinto poweraLthe locallevelinthclate’60sandintheearly’70s．This wonthemconsider， ablepopularity．Theleftistsuccessinthefieldofwelfarepolicyforcedthe LDPgovernmentatthenationalleveltorecDIISideritscconomy－Oriented POlicies，Anyway，FukazawapresentedafeasiblealternativetoJapanese politicsin themidst of the age when economic values overwhelmed almosteveryoneelse TheJSPoftensucceededinattainingpower’at theloca11evel．Several Prefectureswere，Orare，gOVernedbyJSP，backedorpro－JSPgovernors， thoughmostDftherndidnotsucceedinstaylnginofficeforalongtime （seeTablel）．Atthemunicipallcvel、manymOreIocalgovernmentswere， Orare，ruledbysocialistsorprorsocialists．Therefore，iftheJSPhadful】y learnedthecasesofNinagawaandofFukazawaandhadmorecreativcly and effectively managedlocalgovernments underits control，it could

Tablel．SocialistOr PrO－SocialistG（）VermOrS year 1947 51 55 59 6二う 67 71 75 79 83 即 number 4 7 7 5 5 4 3 8 3 5 4

二’，／ 〟八＝肋ノ′二ノ．／ト！／／ムlノ小．り∴ヾ．・（L∴イト／／ミ．・り．l・ 166 haveenjoyedmoresupport ofthe voters．ⅠIowever，theJSPwasrather indifferent to】一）Calgovernment activities apart fromgettingin power． Forexample，theJSP’splatformformulatediIl1955madenoreferenceto localgovernmentproblems．（58）ItwaspossiblefortheJSPtoinventunique andpracticablepoliciesforlocalgovernmentsinitsearlystages．Infact， many progressivelocalgovernments succeededin developlng eXCellent Welfareandenvironmentalpolicieslater，thuughmanyofthemcouldnot Stayln pOWerlong enough to entrench themselves agalnSt COnSerVative attacks． WhywastheJSP ratherindifferent tothe possibilityoflocaldemocL racy？Did theleft wing，Which was sympathetic to Marxism，SCOrn decentralization？（59）Suchquestionscouldbe raised，butin fact veryfew Jar）aneSe understood the significance of the chapter concerninglocal autonomywhenthenewconstitutionwasunderdiscussion．Thefailureof theJSPwasthatitdidnotsucceedinmakingpracticaluse ofopportu－ nitiesit wasgiven．In contrast with theJSP，the conservatives success－ fully adapted themselves to the newly decentralizedlocalgovernment systemusingcentralcontroleffectively．They did not welcome the new SyStembutwere quite shrewdin utilizlnglt pragmatically，

6．LeftWingDominanceandOrganizationalFallacy WhentheJSPwasformed，itwastherightwingthatledthepartyJn the1940srighトwingDiet members outnumberedtheleft－wing andthey formedtheKatayamagovernmentinspiteoftheskepticalattitし1deofthe leftwing．Butthedomina11CeOftherightwingdidnotlastlong．Theleft wing，being aminority at the nationallevel，SOOn began toincreasein force at thelocallevel．Andlocalactivists unsatisfied with right－Wlng leadership strivedtosendleft・wing delegatestoJSP’s nationalconven－ tions．Besides，Sb毎0mi1itants，Who supported theleftwing，joined the JSP one after another．In the meantime，the rightlost suchinfluential leaders as Hirano and Nishioin1948：Hirano was purgedbyGHQ and NishiowasexpelledfromthepalJtyoWingtotheShodenScandal． Theleft－Wingadvanceintensifiedtheconflictwithin theJSP－Theleft SuCCeededindefeatingtherightintheelectionforthesecretarygeneral

．二lノ了 165 S．Tわ■JJ in1950，thougha rightLWingleader was reelected to chairman of the centralexecutive committee（CEC）at the same time．At the seventh COnVentioninJanuary，1951，theleft－wingdelegatesclearlyoutnumbered the right．Finally，theleft also overwhe］med the rightin the House of Representatives．Sincethen，theleftwinghasmoreorlessdominatedthe JSPtillMasatsuguIshibashiwaselectedtoChairmanoftheCECin1983． Whydidtheleft wingcome todominate theJSP so rapidly？Several answerscanbegiven．First，therightwascrippledbythepurgeofsome influentialleaderslikeJotaro Kawakami，1ater Chairman of the CEC， They could not act freely either to increase their own followers or to Organizepeoplesympatheticwithmoderatesocialdemocracylngeneral， Incontrastwiththeright，theleftwinghadonlyonepurgee． Second，the backgroud of the right－wingleaders must be questioned． Mostcanbedividedintothreecategories：1eftistintellectuals，1eadersof theprewarlabourmovement，andleadersoftheprewartenant farmers movemenL（60）Except fortheintellectuals，theytendedtoleadthemove－ mentin a kind of paternalistic style：they often formed a smallinner Circlein which they behaved authoritatively．The relationship between theleadersandtheirfollowersresembledthesocalled“Oyabun－Kobun” （bossThenchman）relationship or patron－Client one．They were alsoin－ ClinedtoregardtheseniorltySyStemaSimportant．Needlesstosay，SuCh an old－fashioned style ofleadership was unacceptable to the younger generation，eSPeCiallyinthepostwarlabourmovement．Thatissaidtobe OneOfthemainreasonswhyleft－mindedactivistssuchasMinoruTakano took controlof Sb／ひ0，the】argest organizationinthelabourmovement． Helookedself－COntrOlledandintellectualenoughtoattractmanyyounger activists．（61） Third，Sb／ひO POSitivelysupported theleftwingafter1952．Sb毎o was establishedin1950and GHQ supportedit at first；it was expected to developinto a moderatelabour movement．Theleadership of Sohyo． however，WaSeaSilytakenoverbytheleft，thefirstleaderofwhichwas Takano．Sbわ′OWaSrathertightlyorganizedandsuccessfullycontroledits members．Compared with 5bjtyo，right－Oriented trade unions，Which SuPpOrted the right wing of theJSP，Were Smaller and moreloosely Organized．

26 〟八＝川－ノーうJ〟一イ血lノ岬‘川メハイ‘／／山Jl呵l・ t64 Fourth，thereactionagainstthedisastrouswarpushedmanyJapanese towardsMarxismorotherformsofradicalsocialism．Againsttheback－ groundofwartimedestruction，theyetunrealised，mOreOrlessutopian， SOCialistworldattractedthem．Itwasarathergeneralphenomenonthat theleft－WingforcesincreasedtheirstrellgthjustaftertheSecondWorld War：inItaly and French，thecommunist partiesadvanced，andevenin England，the Labour Party took over the governmentin spite of the tactfulleadership of Sir Winston Churchillduring the War．InJapan， SOmepeOple，eSpeCiallyintellectuals，WeredeeplyfacinatedwiththeJCP． ButtheJCPalmostdestroyeditselfas aresult ofitsdreamofaviolent revolution．Moreover，PreWargOVernmentSimplantedfeartothecommu－ nisminthemassessosuccessfullythattheJCPwasheavilyhandicapped． InsteadoftheJCP，theleftwingoftheJSP，Whichincludedanindigenous sect ofMarxism（62）called“Ronoha，”attractedthosewhowerenotsatis－ fiedwiththepresentstate ofJapan． Finally，however，theJapanese communists radicalized theJSPin a SenSe．Untilthedefeat ofJapan，COmmunists hadbeen almost the only force thatbravelyresistedmilitalism．Somecommunistsweremurdered by thepolice and some were under detention for more than ten years． Moreover，theyanticipatedthedefeatofJapanwithscientificanalysis．In contrast，SOCialists were helpless．Most of them did not dare to fight against militarydolninance；SOme Of them even supported theinvasive War pOlicies of the government．This difference with the communists engendered a kind ofinferiority complexin theirminds．Thus，‘‘the burdenofhistory”incessantlyweighedontheJSPandradicalizedit．（63） Anyway，theleftwardswingoftheJSPbroughtthe party some diffi－ Cultiesbecauseleft・wingactivistswereapttobetooidealistic．Most of thembelievedinthe“Ronoha”doctrine，Whichwasratheridealistic and a kind of Marxism．They were also affected by anarcho－Syndicalisme． Theybelievedthattheirmostimportantmissionwasnottoimprovethe misce11aneous things of everydaylife，but to fight againstJapanese monopolistic capitalism for allthe working classes．Theyintended to COnVertJapanintoasocialistcountrywithinashortperiodafterwinning amajoritylntheDiet andtogovernthiscountrythroughparliamentary democracy．Nevertheless，theydidnot attachenoughimportancetothe

27 t63 ∫、’／；ィ〃J parliamentary struggle，Their way of thinkingis typically foundin MosaburoSuzuki’sassertion，Suzukiwasoneofthetopleadersoftheleft WingandwasChairmanoftheCECoftheJSPbetween1955L60．Hesaid as follows：

Whenever the possibility of theJSP to participatein a coalition becomes a significant politicalissue，thatis not SimplybecausetheJSPisoneofmajorpartiesintheDiet，but alsobecauseanygovernment，withouttheparticipationofthe JSP，CannOt enjoy enoughsupport among a】1the working people who constitute95per cent of the whole nation：mOSt peoplewillalways find the partyindispensable to a stasble cabinet．The weight of theJSPin any coalition government wi11alwaysbeheavy，Whether thenumber ofthe seatsin the Dietbebigorsma11；inotherwords，theJSPalwayshasakind ofqualitativeslgnificance．（64）

hlhisopinion，itissocialists，prObablyMarxistsocialists，that“really represent allthe working classes．Theleft－1eaning socialists always dreamedofaPrOmisingfuture，aSumlngthatthereweremassiveworking PeOPlewhoklfen［b／SuPPOrtedtheJSPeventhoughnotatthepollstations． Followlng thisview，they were apt to think more of mass movements OutSidetheDietthanofactionsinsidetheDiet，Theyregardedtheelection asonlyoneofthemeanstoachievetherevolution． Suchmass－mOVementLOrientedstrategysometimesgavetheJSPconsid－ erablevetopower．Butatthesametime，itmadethe partylook uncon－ StruCtive．Some peoplebeganto hold a stereotypedimagethat theJSP OppOSedeverything．Moreover，theactivistsandtheDietmembersbelong－ ingtotheleftwingoftenconsidereditacompromisewiththemonopolis－ tic capital to search for and offer feasible or realistic alternatives to governmentalpoliciesthroughactivitiesintheDiet．Theleftwardswing OftheJSPseemstohavesomewhatdeprivedthepartyofitscapacityto COPeWithrealsociety． Nevertheless，itisdangeroustoexaggeratethenegativeeffects．Forit isatleast certainthat manypeoplevotedfortheJSPbecausetheyhad

2ぎ 情・ヾ．－川（ノバ．イ′■り′ 仙ノ小川．ヾ両′イ∴Jl／ハ〃什 】62 ahighopLnionofitsnon－armamentandabsoluteneutra】ismpolicyinthe diplomatic sphere．People were stillobsessed with the nightmarish memories of the war．Andin the1950s，theleft wing of theJSP was almosttheonlyforcethatclearlyrejectedanyformofJapaneserearma－ ment．Intherightwing，thereweresomewhoratherpositivelysupported therearmamentpolicy andtheUS－Japan Security Treaty． Aboveall，itwastheleft wingthat contrjbuted totheJSP’srecovery from the defeatin the1949generalelection（Table2and3）．Theleft－ wing’s rate ofincreasein the number ofseatsin the Lower House was alwayshigherthanthat oftherightduringthe1950s．Inthosedays，the rightwingwascomparativelystronglnthemetropolitanareasbutweak irlruralareas．Buttheleftwingadvancedinbothareas．（65）Thesuccessin ruralareasexplainsits rapidadvance．Andit was，in turn，5bわ′O Which helpedthegrowthoftheleft． TheJSP did not，and does not，haveits own mass organization to developeffectiveelectioncampaignsbyitself，The number oftheJSP’s memberhasbeenunderseventythousand，uSuallyfortyorfiftythousand exceptforashortperiodjustafterthewarwhenjtwasaroundahundred thousand．Besides，there werenoJSP’sbranchesintwo thirdsofallthe municipalitiesin the1950s．（66）It wasimpossible for the party to obtain

TableZ．SocialistM．P．sbelongiIlgtOEach oftheRight and theLeftWings し）f theJSP

1951 1952 1953 1955 1958

Right 29 57 66 67 56薫 Left 16 54 72 89 91 r ・Calculated by Tokyo Shirnbun

Tab7e3．Support andSharc ofElectorate（JSP）duringitsDivision（195l－55）（％） Right wing Left wing Support Share Support Share 1952 11．4 9．7 3．1 7．4

1953 14．8 9．9 8．3 9．6

1955 12．3 10．4 8．8 11．5

2ワ 16l 5．mJ77

morethantenmillionvoteswithsuchweakorganizationalpower．Hence， ithasbeenveryimportantfortheJSPtohaveotheroutsideorganizations togathervotes．ButtheJSPcouldfindalmostnosし1Chorganizationother thanthetradeunions，AndS（）jひOhasbeenthemostimportantamongthe labourforce．Itsupportedespeciallytheleftwingatleastinthe1950s． Snhyoincluded，andincludes，the strong trade unionsinthe public sector，WhichwereglVenthegeneralnameofKanko777．Kankorounions SuChastheraiLwayworkers’unionsandthepostalunionareubiqitousin most parts ofthecoutry．Thisis tosay that theleft winghaspowerful SuppOrting organizationsin ruralareas as wellasin urban areas．The localbranches of the Sohyo consisting mainly of Kankoro workers CamPaignedactivelyfortheJSP，eSpeCiallyfortheleftwingcandidates． Ajournalist reported about union－SuppOrtedcampaigns of theleft wing around1953as follows：

TheLocalcampaignheadquartersoftheJSPareestablished basedon］ocalbranchesofSo）り，0”．．Inmostcases，botharethe Same Organizations．The S（）hyo branches financially back up theleft，wing candidates and mobilize volunteer workers for thecampalgnlng， AtabranchoftheWorkers’UnionoftheNationalRailway， they have alist ofallthemember workers．The name of the WOrkersareclassifiedaccordingtotheiraddresses．Andtheir addresses are．in turn，grOuPed systematical1yinto their con－ Stituencies…．Thatlistiscruciallyusefulinelectioncampalgn activities．（67）

Besides money and campaign organizations，Sohyo provided theJSP， especia11yitsleftwing，withhumanresources：PartymembersandcandiL dates．Forinstance，52．7percent oftheJSPmembers were workersin 1958．（68）Inthesameyear，29percentoftheJSP’smembersoftheLower House were fromtrade unions，though the percentage was only13．5in 1952（excludingprewarleadersofthelabourmovements）．（69）Thenumber Of Diet membersfrom thetrade unionsintheJSPcontinuedtoincrease gradually throughout the1950s and the1960s（see Figure3）．Thus，the

．ヲ〃 尺Jゴビ〟乃〟f竜／／〆〃柁ノ呼〟〃S（）CfβJ由′掩勅 160

2UO卜

1柵

12り

抑〕

4り ＼▼、・／ u＝jonsirlthepI・■Vate SeぐtOI・ ‾‾ －：う ＝ ユニニコニニニニニこ二二こ＝＝こ二工二二 0 1917 49 52 5：i：）「） 5日 6り 6：1 t汀 6ミ） 7∠ 7（i 7t） RJ 8：1 8t；

Sourse：UnpublishedpaperbyYutakaTsujinaka

Fi即re3 Members of the Lower House wjth trade unjon，s Origjnin theJSPand theDSPinall

SOTCa11ed“Sohyo－JSP Block”appeared． Itmustbenotedthattheleft－Wingadvanceinruralareasdidnotmean itsideologlCalpermeation．Asmentionedinsectionl，COnSiderablepartof Japaneseruralpeopleweretooconservativetoacceptsocialistideology easily．But，atthesametime，theydidnot necessarilycommitted them・ Selvesstronglywiththeconservativepartiesorspecificpolicies．Roughly speaking，SOmeOfthemvotedforconservativecandidatesonly because theywereaskedtodosobysomeoneelse，Oftenlocalnotableswhowere COnSerVativeinapoliticalsensealmostwithoutexception，Theyrespect－ ed human networks which werein many cases under theinfluence of notables．Then．whensocialistsmadeuseofsuchnetworksinelectioneer－ ing，it waspossible for themtoobtainanumberofvotesin ruralareas． AndmanySoわJObranchesinruralareasdidapproachedvillagersthrough suchnetworksaskinshipandalumnigroups，eVenthoughnotsosuccess－ fullyasconservatives．（70）Withoutlocallabourunionsitwouldhavebeen difficultformanysocialistcandidatestobeelectedinmostruralconstitur enCleS． Such over－dependence of theJSP on 5bhyo has beenincessantly Criticisedbyvariouspeople．MasumiandScalapinooncesaidthatSo7v）O dominatedboththelabourmovementsandtheJSP．（71）ButSohyodidnot necessarily“dominate”theJSP．TheDietmembersfromvariousunions

∴■／ 159 ．S．T血石

belongingto Soわ，O haveneverbeenintegratedinto asinglegroup，Ora slnglefaction．Eachofthemwas，andis，tOOdcpendentonhisownunion which hadits owninterests：thcy were representatives of their mother unioIIS first of all．Henceitwassaid that theDietmembersfrom Sohyo didnothaveconsistentoppinionsinpolicyproblems，ClinglngtOinterests of their mother organizations．（72）Moreover，there have been few top leadersoftheJSPfromSbhyo sofar，nOChairmanoftheCECandonly three secretary generals．MasatsuguIshibashi，Chairman of the CEC during1983－86，tObesure，isfromthepostwarlabourmovement．Buthe is not a typicalSbjりrO－brandedDiet member．He was only30yeas old when he was elected Diet member for the first timein1953． Anothercriticsays：thedependencconSohyoisoneofmajorobstacles fortheJSPtoobtainmc）reelectoralsupport．Butitisinfacttheorgan－ izationalpower of Sbjzyo that has propped up theJSP．InJapan，the Organization，Orthesocialnetwork，Oftenplaysacrucialroleinelections． The LDP，Which washeavily dependent on the traditionalsocialnet－ WOrksandcommunityorganizationsinruralareas，losttheshareofthe electoratelinearlyin the course of the higheconomic growthperiodin Whichtheruralpopulationdecreasedsteadily．Thegapbetweenthehigh SuppOrt for the Ll）P at opinion pollsand the LDP’s comparativelylow Shareoftheelectorateintheredayscan，atleastpartly，beexplainedby this socialnetwork hypothesis．Since themid－1g70s，the LDP has found new supportfrs in urban areas but has not been necessarily able to mobilizemostofthemtothepollingstations，prObablybecausetherehas beennlanySuppOrterSinurbanareaswho areoutofthesocia】networks which are under conservativecontrol．（73） Onthecontrary，beforetheendofthehigheconomicgrowthperiodin 1973，the LDP enjoyed more supportin the generalelections thanin OplnlOnPO11s，eXCePt forafewcases，Partlybecauseitwasabletomake use of traditionalsocialnetworkslike community organizations and Variouskindsofinterestsgroups（seeFigure4）．Thatis，SOmepeOplewho answered they did not support any parties voted for the LDP in the elections．AsfortheJSP，thegapbetweenthetwoindiceshasbeenquite narrowwith the only exception of1947（see Figure5），This probably meansthattheJSPhasnotbeenabletomobilizealmostanynetworksor

、■J二」 山亙〟勅ノん／／t亘仙∴／′函ナノ∫りt、山仏／ハノ／・小・ 158

） ） 一－－ Share（jf Voters － Suppor forl．DPin Oppiniun Polls 60し Source：．7iiitsushinsha，Sengollihon no seito to 53．0 naikaku（Jijitsushi．1Sha，1981）．Yomiuri 5。し Shinbun（Date of1983and1986only）．

。。L 41こ！＿＿ノ 、 軋′′ 、 34．5 35．3 ′ 1⊥ （） 、レ一読石＼、） 0 ハU ■U 3．4．4 34．4 34 3 卜r卜J卜 2 1 34・0 33．5 ＼ ノ8． つ」 （N肌’54） ＼ こ二言うー話．（、3r7 26．1

0 」 一⊥－し【⊥－一⊥⊥－L－－⊥」 」 ⊥一」⊥→」－一 47 49 52 53 55 58 60 63 67 69 72 76 79 80 83 86 X Eachopimdonpo11waIleXerCizedwithinaroundamonthbeforeor aftere］ection dayexcepttwocases． Figure4 SupportandShareoftheElectorateinGenera］ELec＿ tions（LDP，nOtincludingNLC）

50

＋ Share of Voters 40 －－－Support forJSP in Opinion P（IlIs♯ 29．1 Source：The Same asin Fig．2． ニjO ＼ 2f；．∩

＼

ZO

〔N（）V ’54） ヱ（）13．ニー14▲1 13．412．3

l〔）

r） 47 」9 52 53 55 58 60 63 67 6リ 72 7（ミ 79 80 83 86 ApI・・・Jan▲ し）cし Apr・Feb・Ma｝・N軋 No、・・・－an・”ぐぐ・】）e亡・Uec▲（＝）ct・Je▼ Deぐ・Jy， X Eachopimdonp（州wanexercizedwithinaroundamonthbeforeor afterelection da〉▼eXCePttWOCaSeS．

Figure5 SupportandShareoftheElectorateinGeneralElecr tions（JSPonly）

Organizationsexceptforthe Sbhγ0”andothersma】1tradeunions． Thequestionis，then，nOttheJSP’sdependenceonSohyobutitslackof Othersupportingorganizations，thoughsuchoverdependencemighthave

エフ t57 ∫．7kれ■

1ed to conservatization of the attitude DfJSP’s Diet members because sollle Ofthem havebeen recruited according to theseniority system of SL）hyu．＜74）Theleft wlng With strong supportive organizations obtained rnoresupportinthegeneralelectionsthanintheoplnionpolls；inthecase oftherightwingwhichhadonlyweak，ifany，SuPPOrtlngOrganizations， the relatiorlbetween the twoindices was the reverse（see Table3）． TheJSP should have tried to find otlt，Or Create，Various types of supportingorganizations．Thefarmers’organizationshavealreadybeen mentioned above．Among other possible alternatives were consumers COOperatives，enVironmentalmovement groups，Smallentrepreneurs orgaIlizations，andsoforth．TheJSPshouldhavebecome，Say，aPluralis－ ticlabourparty二akindofcadrepartysupportedbyvariousorganizations． Bydoingso，mOreOVer，itcouldhaveabsorbedawidevarieyofopinions andlearned muchmoreofthecomplicatedaspectsoftherealworld：its puliciescouldhavcbccnnlOreSOphisticated． The socialist politicians should have developed their own“Koenkai” Organizations，tOO，Of course，they did have ones．But many of their Or’ganizationsweresmal】andtheirmember’swereoftenthesameasthose （」floca15bhyounions．Notenoughsocialistsmanagedtopenetratedeeply intolocalcommunities or other socialnetworks．In contrast with the SOCialists，COnSrVatives has been strenuously trying to enlarge their Koenkai．Indeed，KoenkaiisthekeyorganizationinLDPDietmembers electioneeringwhercoldlocalcommunitiesornotablesalreadylosttheir holdoverlocalpeople． However，theJSP has endeavoured to become a mass party to be independentevenofSohyoinvain．SocialistsoftenconsideredtheLabour I〕artyin Britain as a typicalandidealmass r）arty．The founders of the JSP respectedit as their example to follow，On this point，Japanese POliticalscientistsshouldalsoshareresponsibilty．Theyofteninculcated the myth of the上うritish Labour Partyin the minds of the peop】e：they OfteninsistedthattheLabourPatywasthemostdevelopedmasspartyin the democratic world．Even a famous Mar’xist politicalscientistlike FukujiTaguchioncecr・iticized theJSPin coTnParisonwith the Labour I）arty．（75） InJapan，WherepeOPle are passive，aS Hrebenar pointed out，and

．’J・／ 仙■ヾ．・止佑ノ／∴／／り／■砿ノ小川、ヾ．・．、1J／吊／1ノ小 I56 reluctanttojoinanypoliticalparty，itisverydifficulttoformatypical massparty．Eventhe LDP，WhichhasgovernedJapan for morethan30 years，hasnotsucceededincreatingitsowneffectivemasspartyorgani－ Zation・ButtheLDPhasbeenshrewderioughtorelyonvarioussupporting Organizations． Of course，the organizationalpower or the ability to utilize social networksdoesnotexplaincompletely thedifferencein strengthamong theparties：thecapacitytoformu】ateeffectivepolicies，theabilitytorun attractivecandidates，andfinancialpower，amOngOthers，arealsoimpor－ tant．Butitisratherdifficult for any party to maintain a considerable amountofvoteswithoutbasicsupportingorganizations．Inasense．itwas lack ofwiderange ofsupportingorganizationsthat crippledtheJSP．It isnowonderthatveryfewordinarypeopledaredto］Ointheparty，Seeing that even a large majority of the workers who devoted themselves to electioncampaignsfortheJSPdidnotvolunteertoobtainmembershipin the party． At the1963generalelection，26incumbent Diet members oftheJSP， including abouttenleading figures，lost theirseats．Most ofthemrelied mainlyupontheirpersonalpopularityandsucceededinholdingtheirseats foralongtime：theyhadbeenlessdependentonthelabororganizations． Intheirplace，manyCandidatessupportedby Sbhyo werenewlyelected． Fortunately，the totalloss for theJSP wasonly one seat，OWing to the SuCCeSSOfthosenewcomers，inspiteofthedefeatoftheinfluentials．Such aphenomenonhadalreadybeenobservedattheendofthe1950s．（76）The plateauonwhich theJSP stayed during the1960s reflected the equilib－ riumbetweentheexitofsomeDietmembersrelylngmainlyontheirown fameandtheadvance of thenewcomersrelyingmainly on So匂′0． Thismeantadeclineofthepoliticiansbelongingtotheoldrightwing， becausemanyofthemmaintainedtheirseatsrelyingmainlyoTltheirown PerSOna】popularity．TtwastherightwingthathinderedtheJSP’sadvance inthosedays．Theywerenotdiligentenoughtofindoutandorganizenew SuppOrterSOfthencwage．Instead，Whattheydidwasjusttosticktotheir smallKocnkai．（77） The decline of the old right deprived theJSP ofits urban character because the right wing was comparatively popularin the metropolitan

35 t55 5．T卯扉

areas．In1955，theJSP’sshareoftheelectorateinthemeLropolitanareas was28percentandthatinnon－metrOpOlitanareaswas21percent．The formerwas20percentin1963andlOperCentin1969．Thelatterwas19 percentand16percent，reSpeCtively．（78）InsteadoftheJSP（andtheLDP）， theCGPandtheJCPgatheredstrengthinsomeofthemetropolitanareas in the1960s．The CGP was backed by a strong religious organization mainlyin the metropolitan areas．TheJCP succeededin organizing Variouskindsofpeoplesuchaswomen，yOungpeOple，Smallentrepreneurs andmerchants，besidesitsownsmall－SCaledbutmi11itantmassorganiza－ tion． SeeFigure6to8．EachofthemshowsthechangeofLheJSP’ssharcof boththeelectorateandtheabsolutenumberofvotesthcpartywonatthe generalelectionsinthreedifferentarcas，thatis，intwotypicalrnetropoli－ tan areas（the one comprises Tokyo and Kanagawa Prefectureand the OtherconsistsofKyoto，OsakaandHyogoPrefecture）andinonetypical

（thuusandノ 2．】23．720

Figure6 VotesfortheJSPanditsShareoftheElectoratein TokyoandKanagawaPrefectures （ingeneralelections）

36 人’／．ヾ．L．川－／トノ／／．・／仙．・ノ‘J♪－川∫し・，イ．ィ／∴ヾ／／1〃／．＼・ 154 ruralarea（the Shikoku djstrict）． Thosefiguressuggestthatthoughinthemetropolitanareasthevoters increasedrapidlyduringthe1960s，theJSPwasunabletocatchupwith thisgrowth．Thepartyatbestmaintainedthesupportonlyofthosewhom ithadsecuredbytheendofthe1950s．InMetropolitanTokyo，itlusしSOme Of the non－Organized voters who used to vote forit supporting the non－armament pOlicy，Or being attractedbythe persona7ities oftheoJd typeCandidates．Anyway，the gap between the number of the whole registered voters and theJSP’s party votewidened，namely，theJSP’s Shareoftheelectoratedroppedsharply．Onthecontrary，thepartyforthe mostpartkeptboththevotersthemselvesandtheshareoftheelectorate it had obtainedin the1950sin ruralareas where population did not increase so much．The decline of theJSPis mainly reducible toits COmParativesetbackinthemetropolitanareas．

（thousand）

1949 52 53 56 58 60 63 67 69 72 76 79 80

Figure7 VotesfortheJSPanditsShare of the Electoratein Osaka，Kyoto andHyogoprefectures （ingeneralelections）

．？7 153 5．7五郎／

（【hou5and）

49 52 53 56 58 60 63 67 69 72 76 79 と；0 Figure8 VotesfortheJSPanditsShareoftheElectoratejn the ShikokuDistrict （ingeneralelections）

Conclusion

Duringthe195Osandthe1960s，Japanunderwentasortofupheaval．A rather agriculturalsociety was transformed almost overnightinto a post－industrialsociety．Anumberofpeoplewhousedtoliveinruralareas rushedintothemetropolitanareas．Japanbecameoneofthemosturban－ izedcountriesintheworld．AndthegrossnatiollalpI・Oduct（net）in1975 WaS5L4times aslarge as thatin1955．Following this drastic changein Japanesesociety，theJapanesepoliticalmapchanged，tOO．Thetwomajor Parties，the LDP and theJSP，mOre Orless declined and other small Partiesadvanced．Nevertheless，theLDPremainedinpowerthroughthis Period，partly because of theineptitude of the opposition parties，in particular，thatoftheJSP，andpartlybecausetheruralandconscrvative areaswereoverTrePreSentedintheDietowlngtOtheunfaira1locationof theseatsamongdifferent constituencies． Would theJSP havehadabrighter futureifithadbeenmoremature during the first ha】f ofitslife？The answer could be positive，though

3β 斤ねeα〃d旅JJげ′如舟〟れ50ぐね／如f匂γ抄 152

CulturalelementswereconsiderablydifficultfortheJSPtoovercome． Japanesepoliticalculturewastooconservative．Anykindofsocialism， evenliberalism，WereapttOCulturallycontradictorywithJapanesetradi－ tionalwaysofthinking．Thefollowingepisodeissuggestive．Ayoungglrl WaSappOintedasassistantsecretaryofatradeunioninTokyometropoli． tanareain1953．Whenshcinformedherfatherofherassumption，hebeat her severelysaying thatit wasa disgrace to thefami1y to have such a daughterasher．ⅠIeregardeditasasintoopposeanykindofauthority． Infact，thepolicetriedtogatherinformationaboutherinherneighbour－ hoodlater，eVenthoughherunionwasnotledbycommunistswhowere OppreSSedbythegovernmentinthosedays．（79） Politicalcultureis，however，nOtalwaysunchangeableanditwastrue withJapanatthattime；nOtallthepeoplewerecapturedbytheoldway Of thinking．TheJSP surely had varioLISpOSSibilities，if not enough，tO Obtainmoresupportfromthevoters．Buttheypaidlittleattentiontothe OutSide，andwasted much energyinsterileintra－party COntrOVerSies． Theleftward turn of theJSP no doubt narrowedits acceptability amongthepeople．Italsodamageditsreliabilitybecauseitoftenbrought thepartyunrealisticattitudes．Ifithadbeenmoresensitivetothevarious aspectsoftheworld，itcouldhaveattractedmorevoters．Butitwou】dbe wrong to overestimatetheimpact oftheleftward swing upon theJSP． The past achievements of the DSP，Which wasestablished by the right Wing wholeft theJSPin1959，Shows clearly thatitis difficult for socialists or social democratic parties to obtain much support only by Shiftingtheirstance towardsthe right．The DSP has everbeen a5per CentpartySinceitsbirth．（80） One ofthemajorfallacies oftheJSP wasanorganizationalone．The JSPdidnotfullyunderstandthepoliticalsignificanceofoutsideorganiza－ tions．Itclungtothelargestlabourorganization，So妙0，andatthesame time tried or pretended to try to freeitself from this dependency．1t dreamed ofthe“ideal”masspartyinJapan and neglected other organ－ izationalpossibilities．But depending deliberately on and representlng Variousorganizationsisfruitfulto apoliticalpartynot onlyintermsof electioneeringbutalsointermsofpolicydevelopment． TheJSPshouldalsohavebeenmoreinterestedin power onthelocal

．フ9 15l 5．7七〃オ 1evelon wellas on the nationa11evel．It should have tried to form a coalitionwithotherparties，Whenevertherewasachance・Thegoverning ability of a partyis oneofthe mostimportant considerations forthe electoratetochooseamongtheparties．IftheJSPhadbeenmoreambi， tious，itmight have been more successful．TheJSP should have en－ deavouredtodevelopthecraftinessofthefox，eVenifitfounditalmost impossibletobecomeanagrressivelion．

NOTES

（1）370ut Of42seats were won by the Shakai－TaishuLTo（the Socialists People’sParty）．TherestwereufsocialisticindependentsL （2）GiovanniSartori，Fbrties and Fhrb15ystem（Cambridge：Canlbridge University Press，1976），Ch．6． （3）Eg．MichioMuramatsu，Ge71dd［nthon nokaTZ7）＞L）Sei（TheBureaucracyin ModernJapan）（Tokyo：Toyo KeizaiShinpo－Sha，1981），P．31． （4）Masaru Mabuchi，1Saihaibun nu seijikatei（Poljcy－Making Process of Redistribution），’inMasatakaKosakaed”KoudosangyukukkanLlriekis katpitn seisaku（PressurePoliticsand Policy Outputsin HighlyIndustrial－ izedJapan）（Kyoto：Department of Law，Kyoto University．a Report SPOnSOredbytheToyota Foundation，1981），PP、84L152． （5）TomoakiIwai／”Seiji・tekisin仇▼a”no kensho（Re－eXamination of a StereotypcdViewonJapanesePolitics）：inMinoruNakanoed．，Niholl－gafa seisaku ketteino helO，0（Transformation ofJapanese－StylePolicy・Making Process）（Tokyo：Toyo KeizaiShinpo・Sha，1986），pP．21－27． （6）ConcerningthehistoryoftheJSPbeforethemid・60s，thefollowinggives us detailedinforrnations．AllarlB．Cole．Georgc O．Totten．and CecilH． Uyehara，S〃Ck（／isIs n7rtic∫′nノ′ゆ〝n（New Haven，Conn．：Yale Unjversity f）ress，1966）， （7）Masumilshikawa，5bugT）Seljiku＝0－Si（Structure and rIistory of the Politicsin PostwarJapan）（Tokyo：Nihon Hyoronsha，1978），PP．38－41． （8）SeizaburoSatoarldTetsuhisaMatsuzaki，Jlminto seiken（Lr）PRegimre） （Tokyo：Chuo Koronsha，1986）．pp．13－14． （9）The weaknessofclassconsciousnessamongJapanese hasbeenpointed outbyvarioussocialseientists．Eg．KikuoNakamuraed．，GendaiT7ihon seヴibu7Zka（PoliticalCu】turein ModernJapan）（Kyoto：Mineruba Shobo． 1975），PP．24－31；Sabur’O yiiSuda．Genddi7Zij7ullnn katb，？L tShiki（C】ass

4〃 βねピα捏d良ノ／げ′／zgノα♪α乃5〃（・ね払汀f独唱 J50

Idenitificationin Contempor．aryJapan）（Tokyo：Yuhikaku，1978）ch．7； Ken－ichiTominaga，’Nihon no shakaikaiso to sono yukue（Japanese SocialStrataandtheirPossibleChangeinthefuture），lintheSocialPolicy Bureau of the Economic Planning Agency ed．，21－S（｝ikiTlu k（）httlnin Seikats2L－ZOu（WhatwilJbeJapaneseDailyLivesinthe21stcentury？）（Tokyo ：The PrintingBureauoftheMinistryofFinance，1979），PP．129－13l． （10）Contrary to mostJapanoLogists，Richardson and Flanagan argueJapan has deeper cu）turaland value cleaYageS than Germany．As they assume Culturaldifferencesarrerninorinwesterncounriesi】1CludingGermany，the Cu】turalcleavageisdeepestinJapanamongdevelopedcountries．Bradley M．Richadson and Scott C．Flanagan．月減■ttcsin ノαt）〟n．（Boston and Toronto：Little，BrownandCornpany，1g84），PP，79．117， （11）ScottC．FlanaganandBrad】eyM．Richardson，Jqt）aneSeEle（io7tl［Behaz）－ iw（London：Sage PublicatioIl，1977），Ch．7， （12）RonaldJ．Hrebnar，777ejqf・（LneSe n2r＆阜ystem（Boulder，Co］orad：West ViewPress，1986），p．28． （13）SeeIchiro Miyake，Se；［o sヴiナ10bu†lSeki（Analysis of Voters’Attitudes towardthe PoliticalI）arties）（Tokyo：Sobunsha，1985）；Takash＝noguchi， ’Senkyo to kokyo seisaku（Election and Public Policy），’in Leuhlthan （Tokyo：Bokutaku・Sha，1987），VOJ．1．pp．92－112． （14）TheNHKInstituteforOpinionPollsed．，Gcnda［n；holl－jtllPl（）ishik［ （Menta】Characteristics of ContemporaryJapanese）（Tokyo：TheJapan BroadcastPressAssociation，1979），pp．174・18O． （15）Chikio Hayashi，Niho7l－jin no st）iiikLinkaku（How does theJapanese WaysofThinkingin their Daily Lives Affect upon their PoliticalJudg－ ments？）（Tokyo：IdemitsuShoten．1982），Chs，5，6：S，C．FlanaganandB，M． Richardson，Op．Cit．，Ch．4． （16）Japanese peoplehave often regardedit asa sin to challengeordersof government（Okami）．lnsteadoftryingtoousthar．mfulruler．s，they．orat least some ofthem，havebeen apt simply to wait for comming of other good ones．See KeiichiMatsushita，Si血一Seわi－kml（On the Politicsin the New Age）（Tokyo：AsahiShinbunsha，1977），pp．60L63． （17）BradleyM．RichardsonandScott C．F］anagan．op．cit．．chs，4－7． ㈹）Jera】d L．Cur．tis，ElecfioタICbmt）aininJaPan（New York：Columbia University Press．1971），Ch．2． （19）Shin－ichiKiしaoka∴Jiyuminshu－tO（LDP），’inJiroKamishirnaed＿Genda［ Tlihon n（）Seijiko20（PoliticalStrutuTe Of ContemporaryJapan）（Kyoto： Horitsu Bunkasha，1985），Pp．50・51． （20）Strictly speaking，influence oflandloads over villagers was shrinking

♂ノ t49 ∫T加扇

durIng the Taisho era（19111925）．But this did not mpan they became completelypowerlessbeforethewar．SeeJunnosukeMasumi，Niho72Sei10 Sh［－rOn（liistory ofthePoliticalPartiesinJapan（Tokyo：University of Tokyo Press、1979），VOl．5，Pp．344－345． （21）On the stronglocalism among theJapanese voters，See Bradley M． Richardson，771e P〃liLiL■〟lCulture d j〔ゆan（Berkley，Los Angeles，and L（）ndon：University ofCalifornia Press，1974），pp．56－59． （ZZ）KeiichiMatsushita，Genda［nih（）JlnO SeUt－Eekikose［（PoliticalStructure OfContemporaryJapan）（Tokyo：UnfversityofTokyoPress．1962），Ch．6． See also TakeshiIshjda，’Sengo minshu kaikaku to kokumin no hannou （PostLWarDemocratizationand People’sResponsetoit），’inNaohiroAsao et，aし，eds．，Nihon rekishiりapanese Histor）r）（Tokyo：IwanamiShoten． 1977），VOl．22，p．148． （23）Shin－ichiKitaoka，OP．Cit．，pp．50・51． （24）Richard K．Beardsley，JohnW．Hall，andRobertE．Ward， （Chicago：The University ofChicago Press，1959）．pp．435－436． 〔25）Masunlilshjkawa．op．cit．，P．6．See also MasamichiLnoki，坤（）d（つn yoshidasIzde77／（BiographyofShigeruYoshida）（Tokyo：YomiuriShinbun・ Sha，1981）．vul∴う，Pp．282－2日4， （26）ShigeruYoshidawasthelastprimeministerwhowasappointedwithout Seatin the Diet under theimperialconstitution，The new constitutjon promulgatedin r）ecember，1946．permited on）yl）iet members to preside over cabinets． （Z7＝unnosuke Masumi，Gendal’nthon nL）SeU［falbet（RegimcofContempo－ raryJapan）（Tokyo：IwanamiShoten．1966），P．224． （28）On the early days of the Koenkaidevelopment，See NathanielThayer， 仇）W fju）Conscrl、atiL7eS RuleJ7f）an（Princeton．N．］，：Princeton University Press，1969），Ch．4． （29）Thefo1lowingmaybesuggestive．SatomiTani，’Shi－Cho－SOngikaigiinno taikokkaigiin kankei（Relationship between MunicipalCouncillors and Dietmen），’771e Ok（tyama dakaku hwakkaizasshi（TheJournalof the Assuciation ofLaw atOkayama University），VOL36，nO．3＆4（underthe SameCOVer，1987）． （30）R．K．Beardsley etal．，Op，Cit，，pP，405－407． （31〕1bid．，pP．441，445． （32）On the pre－history of the agrarian reform，See KeikiOwada，fIishi； Nihun yLO nLフCh［kaikaku（Hidden FactsinJapannese Agrarian Reform） （Tk〉，O：NihonKejzaiShinbun－Sha，1981），Ch，1， 臼3）Infact，thesociaJists，andcommunists，reSumedthefarmers’movemenLs

■プ2 仙■、l・（イ畑／J・1招一t／仙ノ小川バ冊■－J／吊Jl叫l、 148

SOOn afterthe reform．But they did sosimply makinguse oftheabsolute authorityofGHQtofightresistinglandloads，nOtmanagingbythemsIves todevelop fresh newagriculturalpo】icies adjustingtothe newsituations afterthereform．ThecaseofOkayamaprefecturewellshowstheirneglect－ ingpolicyproblems．AkiMizuno，Okttvama－kensjulkaiundo－Shi（Hjstoryof the SocialMovementsin Okayama Prefecture）（Tokyo：Educationa】 Centerfor Laborors，1979），VOl．1，PP＿249－265． 削）Theonly way toimprovefarmers’1ivingconditionswithoutdeveloping any practicalagricultura】policies was to have the government subsidi7e them．The most simple form ofsubsidy the sociaLists though［Of was of coursetokeepricepricesunderthecontrolofthegovernmentandraisethe produccrs’pricessubstantiallyneglectingproductioncost，Toavoidneither budgetdeficitnorriseoftheconsumers’prices，theyinsistedonthecutback of war expenditures．りHeighproducers’priccs，””】ow consumers prices，’ and”norearmament”werethetypicaltrident slogan of theJSPin those days，Forexample，SeeTheDivisionofFarmersundertheOrgani2ational Committee of theJSI）and the Policy Research Committee of theJSP． Nwokikitatsakuzenkoku nosonkatsudo－kakaなino50ukatsu（Summaryof the National Conference Held by Rural Socialist Activists to Meet the Agricaltura）Crisis）（mimeo，1958），pp，8・9． （35）SeeAllan B，Coleetal．，OP．Cit．，PP．401・407formoredetailedanalysisof theJSP’sagriculturalpolicy． （36）Thefo1lowingmaybeagoodexample．AkiMizunowrote16volumesof thesocialistsmovementshistoryinOkayamaprefecture．Bu［hecou】dnot makeanymentionaboutfarmersmovementafter1947，Therehasbeenno American basesin this area and farmers movement almost disappeared Shortlyafter theagriculturalrefom．AkiMizuno，OP，Cit．，VOIs．13L16． C17）Becauseofthesereasons，OVVllerSOf】ocalconstructioncompaniesbecame moreandmoreinfluentialineJectioneeringactivities．SeeGeraldL．Curtis ＆MasumiIshikawa，Doken knkka n抄on（Japan：A Constructors’SLate） （TokyoこKobun－Sha，1983）ch．1． ㈹ See MichitoshiTakabatake．Chiho no oukoklL（LocalPolitica】Powers） （Tokyo：UshioShuppn・Sha，1986），P．35． 伽）r）recisely speaking．left wing socialists once made a rather practical programfor agriculturaldevelopmentasapart oftheirgeneraleconomic P】an under theinitiative of Hiroo Wada，Who started ou［as a talented bureaucrat and was appointed as the minister of the Department of AgricultureandForestryin1946byShigeruYoshida，theconservativethen prlmeminister．This contained such a policy as building multi・r）urr）OSe

イ．▲ブ 147 5．T加扇

damstoirrigatefieZdsat亡hesametimeproviderura7areasaswellascities Withelectricpower．lowrinterestfarmarsloansystemrunbythestate，and SOforth．ThePolicy ResearrhCommitteeoftheJSP，MSA nirhosensife： Heiup・a keizai5－kanen keikaku（A Challange to the MutualSecurity Act： 5－yearSPlanforPeacerulEconomy），intheEditingBoardtoPublishBooks forthe40thAnniversaryoftheJSP，ShiTyO n如01L Shakat［o yonju・nen－Sht （Documents：The40years of theJSP）（Tokyo：Japan Sociatist Party， 1985），PP．252r270，Butthisprograrnwasnotconsjderedseriouslybysocial－ iststhemselves．SeeKeisukeOtake．Maborosino hana（VisionaryFlower） （Tokyo：RakuyuShobo，19Rl），VOl．2，P，47， （40）On the early occupation policies of GHQ，See the following．Takemae Eiji，1Early Postwar Refornlist Party，in Robert E．Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu eds．，Demo（・ndl－2ing j＠an（Honolulu：University of Hawai Press，1987），Pp．350－351． （41）SeeHirohikoTakahasi，’RealizationandCo）1apseoftheCabinetLedby Socialist Prime Minister，’in Nihon rekishi，Op．Cit．，VOl，22（Tokyo： 1wanamiShoten，1977），PP．269－270． （42）Ibid．，Pp．270－271． 師）See ShigetaroIizuka，Toshihiko Uji，and Kiyomasa Habara，Keffo yonjz（－nen；nih（7n Shakalfo（Four・ty Years History of theJSP）（Tokyo： GyoseiMondaiKenkyしぃSho．19日5），PP．96－97． （44）On thechange oftheoccupationalpolicy，See RyujiSasaki．’Reisen no gekika tosenryo seisakunotenkan（Esca】ation oftheColdWarand the ChangeoverintheOccLupation Policy），’inNih（）n rekishi，OP．Cit．． （45）EditorialDivision of Shincho－Sha，Makkasa no yL如L）n（Japan Ruled by MacAr亡her）（Tokyo：Shinchosha，197O）．pp．32l324，338．ShigetaroIi2・Llka et al．，Op．Cit．，p．109．Jun－nOSukeMasumi，Sengo seLii（PostwarPoliticsin Japan）（TokyoニUniversityofTokyo Press，1983），VOl．1，pp．255－258． （46）WhenM．Takahashi，ProfessoratKyushuUniversity，advisedhimnotto getinpower，Katayamareplied，”Iagreewithyouinprinciple，Masao．f3ut wehavenoehoiceaslongasJSPistheleadingparty．”MasaoTakahashi， Shakai10nO hinlitsIL（Secretsofthe］SP）（Tokyo：Chobun－Sha，1981），p．34． （47）Yushjda aJso successfully narrowed scope for the Katayma cabEnet to develop socialistic policies．TakeshiKinoshita，Ka［qvama naikaku・ShiLTT）アl （History of the Katayama Administration）（Kyoto：IIoritsu Bunkasha， 1982）pp．88－97．Of course，hisdecisionnot to participatein thecoalIition governmentcannotbeexplainedexclusivelylntermSOfhisskiIlfuItactics， Theotherreasonwasthatheseriouslytookideo70gicaldifferancebetween theJSP and hisparty．MasarnichiInoki，OP．Cit．，VOJ．3，PP．300－3Ol．

り 動滋α机上糀／Jqr班ピノ坤α〃5〃（・わ放〟fb竹 146

㈹ The fact that many notable socialists failedin the election made the defeatal】themoredisastroustotheJSP．Amongthemwereformerprime minister Tetsu Katayama andformervicePrimeministerSuehiro Nishio． 14 0ut Of 26CentralExecutive Comittee members were defeated．The EditorialDivision of the Monthly Review of theJSP．Nthon shakL7ito sanb・u－nen（30YearsIIistoryofLheJSP）（Tokyo：TheJSPf）ress，1976），P． 1（）5． （49）Maurice Duverger．LesIbrtis Fb［ifiques．thelOth ed．（Paris：Librairie ArmalldC（〕1in．1975），pP，118－129． （50）SeeEijiTorninomori．、Sb捏gO hoshufo－Shi（HistoryofthePostwarConser－ Vative Partiesl（Tokyo：Nihon Hyoronsha，1977），p．53． C・1）TheDivisionoftheMonthlyReviewoftheJSP，Op．Cit．，Pp．200－202． （52）Gerald L．Curtis、ノ‘ゆanese Wノわ・〆FbliliL■s（NY：Columbia University Press，1988），pP．131－133． （53）In1868，JohnF．Dilon，judgeofthesupremecourt ofIowa，ruledon the matterufmunicipaljurisdiction，HedecidedthatLocalgovernmntshadno inherentrightandthescopeoftheirjurisdictionwascompletelysubjectto Willofthestate．Hisjudgementcametobeacceptedbya11otherstatesof America． 伽 On theJapaneselocalgovernment syste711，See Kurt Steiner，L（）Ca［ Gノ〃ernme〃li7ヱノ（4）an（Stanford，CA：Stanford University Pr・eSS，1965）； NaohisaNagata，1TheDevelopmentoりapaneseLocalGovernmentandits Cur’rentIssues，’inEropa LocalGovemmentCenter，Compa7t7tiueStu4）・071 〟柁ん）〔・〟J撤帥c A〟椚わヱね′柑′われ∫〃A∫わ邦α刀d fもc吏斤亡・Co〟れ′rオg5（Tokyo二 Eropa LocalGovenment Center，1984）、Pp．114－130． （55）SeeEIJisS．Krauss，’OppositioninPower：inKurtSteiner，EllisS．Krauss． andScottC．Flanaganeds．．PoliticalCbPoslttunundLocalEblittcs t71jaPa （Princeton，NJ：Princeton UniversityPress，1980）． （56）Ninagawa waselected to govenor of Kyoto prefecturein1950forthe firsttimeaIldstayedinofficeti】11978．1ntheearlyperiodofhisreign，he wasnotcloselyassociatedwith theJCP＿lndeed，theJCPevcn nominated jts own candidate to opposeto Ninagawain the1958gubernatoriaIelec・ tion．Generallyspeaking．however，therelationship between thembecame moreandmor’eintimatewiththepassageoftime．InLhe1970s，manypeOPJe regarded Ninagawa asacommunistgovernor．lncontrast totheJCP，the JSPinKyotobecameannoyedwiththeintra－partyCOnflictoveritsattitude toward thc governor and atlast spliteditselfin the1974gubernatorial election． （57）Takeo Kikuchi，Jibun－ia（・hl’deseilne［wo mam（）tia mur〟（SnlallMunicト

45 145 S．7有7J～■

palitywhichsaveditspopLllation’slives）（Tokyo：IwanamiShoten．1968）． （58）SeeTheEditingBoardtoPublishBooksforthe40thAnniversaryofthe JSP，Op，Cit．，PP．306－314． （59）SomeleftwingsocialjstsopposedthemselvestoJSI）’sinvoIvementwith localself－gOVernment aCtivities、They esl）OuSed so・Called democratic cen－ tra】izationasthebestwaytoorganizesocialiststates．Theythought］ocal autonomy as contradictory toit．（from myinterview to the secretary generaJoftheJSP’sOkayama prefecturebranch） （60）Ishikawa，Op．Cit．，P，27． （61）YuzoTamし1ra，Scngoshak〟ito nc）ni77aitetachf（ActivistsandLeaderswho COtltributedto theJSP）（Tokyo：Nihon Hyoronsha，1984），P，27O． 博2）A birdls－eyeviewofthe Rono－ha history fsgiveninthefo］1wingbook． Gerald L．Curtis．J7f・aneSe H旬・〆Jblitics，Op，Ciし，pP．133・138． （63）Gerald L Curtisand MasumiIshikawa．op．cit．，P，131． （64）Mosaburo Suzuki，’Shakaitono ayumu－bekimiti（What should theJSP do？）：Shakaishinbun（TheJSPTimes）（Mar，10，194卵． （65）JunrichiKyogoku，’SellgOSOSenkyo niokerutohyo kodo（Votingbehav・ iorinthepostwar generalelections），’partl，Shis（）．nO．435（Sept．．1960）． （66）Takeo Hisayoshi，’Kakushin seito no soshiki－ryOku（Organizational PoweroftheProgressive Parties），’Shis〃．No．420（June，1959）p．83． （67）See Ken－ichj Hirose，Sahu Shukailo no jlttai（RealPhases of the Left Fact；on oftheJSP）（Tokyo：Sekka－Sha，1955），Pp．99・100， （68）Hisayoshi，OP．Cit．，P．90， （69）Ishikawa，Op．Cit．，P．27．FukujiTaguchi，N妙on no kukushi71Sei7γOku （Progressive ForcesinJapan）（Tokyo：Tobundo，1961），P．13． （70）Hirose，Op．Cit．，P．101． （71）Robert A．Scalapino andJunLnOSuke Masurnj，jb71ies and Fbliticsin ConlemPo771りメ神勅（BerkeleyandI＿OSAngeles，CA：UniversityofCalifor・ nia Press，1962），p．97． （72）Yoshihir（）Yanada，55－nen kliseif（）ylih（）n Shakuito（1955－Systemandthe JSP）（TokyoニHobunLSha，1956，rePrinted by Ariesu Shoboin Tokyoin 1981），P．125． （73）【tisoftensaid Koenkkajisa rnassorganizationcreatedbyeachpoliti－ cian．Yes．Butpoliticians，eSPeCiallyconservativeones，tendtousevarious kind of socialnetworks such as cornmunity organizations and alumni associationstoformtheirownKoenkais．Itisdifficultforthemtocapture， even to know thenanle Of，a PerSOn Whois outside any socialnetworks available for them．See Shin－ichiKitaoka，OP．Cit．，pp．53－55．Left politiT Cians’Koenkaisare apt to be madewhithinlabour unioTIS．

46 〟／、＝肌ノ晶〃イ／ノ．・lノ坤′JJ∴ヽ、川て′／／ノー＼／ハノ小 144

（74）Putnampointsou【tha【seniorityrulemakesapoliticalsystemstableand givesitexperiencedleadersbutdeprivesitof an adaptabilitiy，Robert DL Putnum，771e Cnn4）a772filJeShL4y q［n71iti（、alElites（EnglewoodCliffs．NJ： Pren［ice－Hall，1976），P．53． （75）FukujiTaguchi，’Nihonshakaito－rOn（OntheJSP）：Chuo ko7’On，No．843 （Sept．，1957），p．128． （76）Ibid．一p，126． （77）Itwassaid thatKoenkaiwhichsuppor［edJSPDietmemberscomprised about ten thousandpeopleonaverrage．AllanB．ColeetalリOP，Cit．，p．246． 銅）1shikawa．op．cit．，p．118． （79）Based onmyinterviewwithher． ㈹InJapan，defencepolicyhasbeen one ofthe most hotly dispu［edissues between the conservatives alld the progressivists．The DSP at first proposed the abolition ofthe US・Japan Securityin the far feature．Butit became more and morein favor of the treaty and finally supprtedit positively．Forexample，theDSP’spJankin1978clearJydeclaredtheparty StOOdagainsttheabolitionofthetreaty．YamatoIshigami．MillShafo（The DSP）（Tokyo：Kyりiku－Sha，1978）．pp．18－19．TatsuoNakanoandShigetaro Iizuka，Shakaifo．Minshato（TheJSP and the DSP）（Tokyo：Sekka・Sha， 1968），pp．223－229．Asseeninthiscase，theI）S上）hasbeenshiftingitspolicy StanCemOre and more towardsthe rightistcamp，

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