University of California, Hastings College of the Law UC Hastings Scholarship Repository

Faculty Scholarship

2000 Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan Setsuo Miyazawa UC Hastings College of the Law, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation Setsuo Miyazawa, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan, 1 Asian-Pac. L & Pol'y J. 1 (2000). Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1219

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan

Setsuo Miyazawa

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

http: //www. hawaii. edu/aplpj

Copyright ©2000 APLPJ Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 1

Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Elite in Japan

Setsuo Miyazawa 1

with 2 Hiroshi Otsuka

A Paper Prepared for the Conference on NEW CHALLENGE FOR THE RULE OF LAW, LAWYERS, INTERNATIONALIZATION, AND 3 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL RULES

Acknowledgment: At Kobe University Faculty of Law, Ken'ichi Yoneda, then a lecturer, Keiichi Ageishi, then a doctoral student, and Masashi Kanno, then a master's student, helped the authors in data collection. In Cambridge, Hans Van Der Sande, a JD student at Harvard Law School, edited most of the text and Table 1, and Roy Freed, Esq., edited the conclusion. For the publication in the Asian- Pacific Law & Policy Journal, James Hitchingham, Editor-in-Chief, and his staff who kindly reformatted and otherwise refined the paper. The authors are most grateful to them.

1. INTRODUCTION A. Legal Education and the Production of the Power Elite before the Second World War B. The Elite in JapanesePolitics C. The Elite in JapaneseBureaucracy D. The Elite in Business E. The Elite in Judiciary F. The Elite in Legal Academia II. CONCLUSIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

C. Wright Mills wrote that the "power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences," that "the drama of the elite is ...centered in the command posts of the major institutional hierarchies," and that "there are now those command

I Professor of Law at Kobe University.

2 Then a doctoral student in Law at Kobe University. Now, a lecturer at Nara Women's University.

3 November 7-9, 1997, University of California at Santa Barbara. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2." 2 posts of modern society which offer us the sociological key to an understanding of the role of the higher circles in America." 4 Since "[w]ithin American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains," 5 the "chief executives ... the political directorate ... [and] the elite of soldier-statesmen ... tend to come together, to form the ' 6 power elite of America." Then, who are the power elite in Japan? A standard answer to this question is that they are top members of the ruling party in the Diet, in the public bureaucracy, and in the business community. 7 Such a view, however, has recently come under increasing criticism. The Liberal Democratic Party continuously controlled the Diet of Japan for forty-eight years between 1955 and 1993, and returned to power in 1996 as the overwhelmingly largest partner of a coalition government. Zoku or its members representing special interests "align with bureaucrats and interest groups, in a kind of Japanese version of the iron triangle," but they "also play an autonomous role vis- i-vis the two other corners of the triangle[.] ' '8 While "[p]reviously, former bureaucrats had played leading roles both in key private-sector organizations and in the ruling party[,] ... [a]fter the 1970s, subtle barriers arose among elite groups that were nearly 9 obliged by experience and responsibility to represent separate spheres of Japanese society." Moreover, not only does the jurisdictional sectionalism of the ministries and agencies of the central government often prevent policy coordination, 10 but also the whole relationship among the three groups is characterized by rivalry as well as cooperation, and the fragmentation of the elite structure has been observed. ' Therefore, it has become increasingly difficult to argue that

4 C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3-5 (1956).

5 Id. at 6.

6 Id. at 9.

7 YOSHIO SUGIMOTO, AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE SOCIETY 193-219 (1997).

8 GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE WAY OF POLITICS, 115 (1988).

9 Gary D. Allinson, Citizenship, Fragmentation,and the Negotiated Polity in POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 29-30 (Gary D. Allinson & Yasunori Sone eds., 1993).

10 See SUGIMOTO, supra note 7, at 195-96; CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS 120-21 (1995).

11 See SUGIMOTO, supra note 7, at 216-18. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 3 top members of the ruling party, the public bureaucracy, and the business community "command."

Nevertheless, no one denies that these top members still hold key positions in their respective sector of the Japanese society, so that nothing important can be decided without their participation, though they do not always get what they want. In this sense, they can still be called the elite of Japan, if not the power elite. This paper analyzes the relationship between legal education and the reproduction of those elite in Japan. In the first section of this paper, we will summarize the historical development of legal education in Japan in the context of conscious modernization of Japan by the government. In each of the following three sections, we will analyze more recent situations regarding politics, bureaucracy, and business, respectively. We will show that the basic characteristics of the relationship between legal education and the reproduction of the elite established in the pre-Second World War era have largely survived in the post-Second World War era. We will, then, examine how teachers of those elite, namely elite law teachers, are reproduced, and how elite members of the judicial system are reproduced. In the conclusion, we will discuss what reforms are required to change problematic aspects of the existing pattern.

A. Legal Education and the Production of the Power Elite before the Second World War The history of legal education and its political context in Japan before the Second World War is summarized in Table 1.12 Legal education was highly fragmented until the Imperial University was established in 1886. Since there was not a sufficiently large pool of people educated in western arts and sciences as required for the rapid modernization of the country, various governmental ministries established schools to educate their own personnel. Students received scholarships and were required to work in their respective ministry for a certain number of years. The Justice Ministry, which not only had prosecutors as its staff, but also had the judiciary under its control, established its own law school in 1871. Then, the Ministry of Education established the

12 See generally IKUO AMANO, KJNDAI NIPPON KOTO KYOIKU KENKYU [A STUDY ON THE HIGHER

EDUCATION OF MODERN JAPAN] (1989); MAKOTOASO, NIPPON NO GAKUREI ERITO [THE EDUCATION-BASED ELITE IN JAPAN] (1991); Takayoshi Yoroi, The Faculty of Law at Imperial Universities and "National-SocialDemand" (in Japanese) 22 HO-SHAKAIGAKU (1970). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 4

University of Tokyo in 1877 and opened its own Faculty of Law, mainly to educate teachers for various national schools. Graduates of this law faculty also became prosecutors and judges. Graduates of the Justice Ministry Law School and University of Tokyo Law Faculty did not need to take a qualifying examination to become attorneys, but that career was less attractive to them. In the meantime, private law schools started to appear in 1880. Their main purpose was to prepare students for qualifying examinations to become attorneys. They also produced members of the movement for increasing freedom and democracy in Japan Yiyu minken undo). Since private law schools, however, had to rely almost solely on tuition fees paid by students, faculty members were paid very little, if anything at all, and these schools had to admit a large number of students beyond their capacity. Not surprisingly, the quality of their legal education was far below the level of the University of Tokyo, which was supported entirely by the government. The gap between University of Tokyo Law Faculty and private law schools also reflected differences in their academic backgrounds. In order to enter Tokyo University, students until the 1910s had to finish four years of compulsory education in normal elementary school, two to four years in higher elementary school, five years in middle school, and three years in high school. It was not uncommon to spend a year or two between middle school and high school preparing for entrance examinations. Therefore, it took ten to fifteen years of compulsory education in order to enter the University of Tokyo. The number of students who could afford to go through this process was extremely small. Private law schools, needing a large number of students, did not even require graduation from middle school. They admitted many students based solely upon examinations. This amorphous situation changed when the government decided to change the University of Tokyo to the Imperial University as the sole institution of training fast-track career bureaucrats, who were called koto bunkan or high civil servants. The University of Tokyo Law Faculty first absorbed the Justice Ministry Law School in 1885 and when the University of Tokyo became the Imperial University in 1886, the Faculty of Law became the College of Law. The Decree on Imperial University (leikoku Daigaku Rei) defined the purpose of the University as the teaching of arts and skills that satisfy needs of the state. One such need was the training of trustworthy students to fill positions in governmental agencies, particularly the Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 5

Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs was an extraordinary ministry since it encompassed an enormous range of policy areas presently covered by several ministries, controlled local governments by sending its officials as governors of prefectures, and, most importantly, included police forces. Another need was to develop legal studies that would serve the interests of the state and shield those students from the influence of liberal legal studies taught at private law schools. Thus, the government established the Rules of Civil Service Examination and Apprenticeship (Bunkan Shiken Shiho oyobi Minarai Kisoku) in 1887, and waived that examination only for graduates of the Colleges of Law and Letters of the Imperial University. The purpose was to recruit a small number of both highly talented and politically acceptable persons, and place them in fast-track careers that were totally separated from middle and low- ranking civil servants. Their highly privileged status was created to maintain their loyalty to the government. In this sense, they clearly fit the definition of the power elite as defined by Mills. They were recruited, nurtured, and assigned responsibilities and powers specifically for the purpose of commanding the country. At the same time, the government gave the power to supervise private law schools to the President of the Imperial University. The government, in return, allowed graduates of the seven recognized private law schools to take the civil service examination if they had completed middle school. The reason for this was the lack of governmental resources to increase legal education under its direct control. Therefore, the government tried to co-opt private law schools as supplementary resources. The quality of legal education at private law schools was definitely improved. Since such schools' students, however, included those who had not finished middle school, the number of students who enjoyed this privilege was limited. Moreover, the political tone of teaching at private law schools also changed since they had to conform to that of the Imperial University. Nevertheless, other private law schools followed their suit in order to obtain the same privilege. Ultimately, however, the government dumped these private law schools by denying this privilege once its immediate needs were met as soon as in 1893. Table 2 indicates occupations of early graduates of the College of Law of the Imperial University. The largest groups are high-ranking administrative officers, followed by judicial officers. Only a small minority became attorneys. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 6

Table 3 indicates a contrasting situation at private law schools. The occupations of a large number of graduates were not known probably because they simply returned to their hometowns and villages. Only a small minority of graduates joined the government as high- ranking bureaucrats, while the largest category is "other" governmental jobs, namely, middle- and low-ranking governmental jobs. Nearly as many graduates also became attorneys. Imperial University graduates who received a bachelor's degree did not need to take the employment examination for judicial positions either. The reason was that not many holders of a bachelor's degree wanted to become a judge or a prosecutor, largely because their institutional reputation was lower than that of high-ranking administrative officers, their power was decidedly smaller than that of administrative officers, and their initial salary was at least 50% lower than that of administrative officers. Therefore, among approximately 1700 judges and prosecutors in 1904, only 21% had a bachelor's degree. A vast majority of judicial officers were graduates of private law schools who had to take the employment examination. The popularity of an attorney as an occupation for university graduates was far lower. For instance, among approximately 2000 attorneys in 1912, only 175 held a bachelor's degree. This domination of graduates of private schools, who had been constantly discriminated against by the government, appears to have contributed, at least partly, to the development of the traditional professional ideology that defines themselves as zaiya houso or lawyers in the opposition to the government, as opposed to judges and prosecutors who had been called zaicho houso or lawyers in the government. When attorneys obtained autonomy from the government during the reform after the Second World War, they enshrined this professional ideology in Article 1 of the Practicing Attorneys Act of 1949 by defining the mission of the attorney as "the protection of fundamental human rights and the realization of social justice,"' 3 which was contrary to the reality that most of them were handling nothing other than ordinary civil cases for paying clients. Ultimately, the privileges given to Imperial University graduates sowed the seed of gakureki shugi (the education-based elitism in Japan). This elitism, however, applied only to bureaucratic careers until the end of the Second World War. In spite of the fact that the content of legal education appeared to be more clearly related to legal professions than to public

13 PRACTICING ATTORNEYS ACT art. 1 (1949). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 7

administration, 14 the professional education of legal professions, particularly attorneys, never became a major consideration of the government. The purpose of legal education at national universities was further removed from the training of legal professions when Kyoto Imperial University was established in 1897, and the College of Law was established there. After Japan had won the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, the government felt the need to train students who would work in expanding the economy and managing the colonies. This purpose was clearly identified by the President of the University when the Kyoto Imperial University was established and it had a lasting influence for more then forty years. Table 5 indicates the different compositions of occupational categories among law graduates of the Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities in 1939. Tokyo produced a far larger number of bureaucrats, judicial officers, and military officers, while only Kyoto produced attorneys and those who worked in foreign countries, mainly Manchuria. In the meantime, colleges of law and letters had been established in the two new Imperial Universities in Tohoku and Kyushu. Also, in 1920, eight of the private schools were formally granted the status of university. 15 Because of its supervisory status, the College of Law of Tokyo Imperial University set a model curriculum of legal education. Table 4 indicates the amazing resilience of the initial model. In spite of its main purpose of training administrators, the curriculum was basically designed to provide doctrinal training in roppou or the six basic codes of Constitutional Law, Civil Law, Commercial Law, Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, and Criminal Procedure. Eighty years later, the same basic structure is maintained. It is interesting to note that the assumption seems to be that those who did well in the curriculum, which apparently better fit legal professions, would also do well as administrators. Table 7 clearly indicates similarities of knowledge expected of administrators and judicial officers. This point will be taken up again later.

14 See infra Table 4.

15 See infra Table 6. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 8

Returning to the 1920s, Table 8 indicates that the largest number of law graduates was already going to private companies. Thus, the main function of legal education was further removed from training of legal professions. Since the law faculties of Imperial Universities also trained future high-ranking bureaucrats, who were considered the most prestigious people, business corporations also gave the highest position to law graduates from Imperial Universities. Table 9 indicates salary differences at a major company among graduates from different types of schools. Even when compared to Imperial University graduates from other fields, law graduates were particularly coveted. Therefore, the status of Imperial University Law Faculties, particularly that of Tokyo Imperial University was firmly established both within the government and within big business. In other words, Tokyo Imperial University Law Faculty became the institution to train the power elite in both the public and private sectors in pre-war Japan. Thus, the main task in the following three sections is to examine to what extent this role of elite reproduction of legal education has been maintained. Since the number of law students, however, radically increased after the Second World War, 16 it has become far less meaningful to talk about all law graduates in Japan. The focus of this paper will still be the University of Tokyo Law Faculty and, to a lesser extent, Kyoto University Law Faculty.

B. The Elite in JapanesePolitics Arguing that "the center of initiative and decision has shifted from the Congress to the executive,' 17 Mills argued that fifty-odd men of the executive branch of the government "are now in charge of the executive decisions made in the name of the United States of America." They include "the President, the Vice President, and the members of the cabinet; the head men of the major departments and bureaus, agencies and commissions, and the members of the Executive Office of the President, including the White House staff." 18 Since top bureaucratic members within the ministries will be discussed separately, what we should discuss as Japanese counterparts here will be the Prime Minister and cabinet members.

16 See infra Table 10.

17 MILLS, supra note 4, at 229, 231.

18 Id. at231. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 9

We, however, must note that there is an increasingly strong argument that the formal powers of the Prime Minister and cabinet members are severely constrained. 19 Under the parliamentary cabinet system, the Prime Minister and the cabinet have power to propose legislative bills. Those legislative bills and policies are formulated by ministries and other agencies, and the cabinet ministers who head them. The Prime Minister, however, has enemies within his own party. Richardson argues that "[u]nder LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] rule, the prime minister was the temporary head of an intraparty, interfactional coalition. ... Factional competition was consequently pervasive ... . Exposure to faction and policy group challenges 20 made him abnormally vulnerable. The result was limited, sometimes weak leadership." Moreover, the Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers have to rely on bureaucrats whom they are supposed to lead. Richardson says that "[b]ecause the cabinet and prime minister have only a limited staff, much of the policy research needed by the central organs of government is performed within the bureaucracy. ... In theory, Japanese cabinet ministers have the authority to decide on internal personnel assignments ... But the matter of control over appointments is hard ' 2 1 to trace." Nevertheless, we may still argue that, at least institutionally, the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers occupy key positions. No important decisions can become final until they decide, approve, or, at least, consent. The way they use that position may be contingent upon various conditions. For instance, Richardson acknowledges that different prime ministers left different marks on the Japanese political landscape depending on their respective priorities and leadership, though none of them was able to realize even half of their priorities. 22 In short, prime ministers and cabinet members may still be called the elite of Japanese politics, though they do not necessarily command. Therefore, we will examine how legal education, particularly that at the University of Tokyo, is related to production of Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers. Table 11 indicates the educational background of all the Prime Ministers since 1946. Of the twenty-one Prime Ministers, fourteen are law graduates. Of the fourteen law graduates, nine

19 See BRADLEY RICHARDSON, JAPANESE DEMOCRACY 97-108 (1997).

20 Id. at 98.

21 Id. at 102.

22 See id. at 106-107. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 10 are graduates of the Tokyo Law Faculty, and only one is from the Kyoto Law Faculty. Four Prime Ministers are graduates of private law faculties, including the present Prime Minister. The dominant position of Tokyo Law Faculty is due to the fact that high-ranking bureaucrats used to be the main and most stable source of new Diet members for the LDP, which controlled the government from 1955 to 1993. Five Tokyo Law Faculty graduates during that period were former high-ranking bureaucrats, and the sole Kyoto Law Faculty graduate was also a former high-ranking bureaucrat. This dominant position of the Tokyo Law Faculty appeared to fade quickly after the LDP's loss in 1993. While two of the four Prime Ministers since 1993 are law graduates, none of them is a Tokyo Law Faculty graduate or a former bureaucrat. In this sense, the recruiting of the political elite in Japan appears to have become more diverse. Turning to lesser members of the political elite, namely cabinet ministers, Table 12 examines changing patterns of their educational background over forty years. In the Kishi cabinet in 1957, fourteen out of the twenty ministers were law graduates, and twelve of them were Tokyo Law Faculty graduates. The Fukuda cabinet in 1976 had nearly the same proportion of law graduates, but the proportion of Tokyo Law Faculty graduate had declined slightly. The Hashimoto cabinet further reduced not only the number of Tokyo Law Faculty graduates, but also of law graduates in general. Only eight out of the twenty-two ministers are law graduates, and there are only four Tokyo Law Faculty graduates. While graduates of Tokyo Law Faculty are still the largest group, their lead is very slim. These trends, of course, do not deny the fact that law graduates, particularly those of Tokyo Law Faculty, have long dominated conservative politics in postwar Japan. For instance, Table 13 shows that in the first half of the postwar period when former bureaucrats were a main source of Diet members, University of Tokyo graduates, particularly those of the Law Faculty, really dominated. Nevertheless, the situation seems to have changed. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Tables 13 and 14 show that proportions of law graduates did not decline much over forty years. What declined drastically is the proportion of Tokyo and Kyoto Law Faculty graduates. In contrast, graduates of law faculties other than Tokyo and Kyoto radically increased. This change may reflect the fact that more people have received legal education in postwar Japan than in prewar Japan as we have seen in Table 10. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 11

This might imply a new, less elitist function of legal education in postwar Japan. We will take up this issue again later. Other interesting findings in Tables 14 and 15 is the small and declining number of attorneys among Diet members. Of course, given the fact that we have only approximately 16,000 attorneys for the 93 million people between twenty-five years of age and seventy-five years of age, 2 3 4.3% of Diet members is an overrepresentation. Nevertheless, their number is too small to be consequential. Moreover, Table 16 indicates that a vast majority of that small number of attorneys belongs to the Communist Party. This reflects the fact that the candidate must have an independent source of income if he is going to run in a district where his chance of winning is slim. Another interesting finding in this table is that Communist Party is nearly as elitist as the LDP in terms of the proportion of the University of Tokyo graduates, though their backgrounds may be markedly different. Many Communist University of Tokyo graduates are attorneys, 24 while those at the LDP are former bureaucrats. To summarize, while the dominant position of University of Tokyo Law Faculty is steadily declining, the dominant position of law graduates has not declined much. This steadily increasing presence of law graduates, however, has had little effect on the number of attorneys. Therefore, it is uncertain that the content of legal education itself has made any significant contribution to prepare them for political careers. It is at least clear that the significance of legal education as a background for Diet members is not a professional one. We will discuss this point later.

C. The Elite in JapaneseBureaucracy Mills wrote that the "United States has never and does not now have a genuine civil service ... effectively above political party pressure,"' 25 and that "[t]here is no civil-service career that is secure enough, there is no administrative corps that is permanent enough, to survive a

23 ASAHi SHINBUN, 1997 JAPAN ALMANAC 48, 228 (1997).

24 See infra Table 11.

25 MILLS, supra note 4, 239. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2." 12 change-over of political administration in the United States." 26 Hence, professional bureaucrats are not at the center of decision-making. Japanese bureaucracy appears to be opposite. Johnson argues that "the postwar bureaucracy ...has had fewer rivals for power [comparable to the military and the monopoly capitalists] than did the prewar bureaucracy," and that "[t]he bureaucracy does not rule in a 2 7 vacuum in Japan, but it does hold an ascendant position and is likely to continue to do so." Moreover, careers of bureaucrats do not stop when they leave the government. Their "[lives] begin[] at fifty" when they retire. They can move to leading business corporations, industrial associations, semi-governmental organizations, or to politics. 29 Therefore, some bureaucrats can reach top positions in at least two sectors, either in bureaucracy and business or in bureaucracy and politics. If so, it is high-ranking bureaucrats who connect the three sectors of the elite in Japan. Such a view of Japanese bureaucracy has also come under increasing criticism recently. ' 30 For instance, Reed argues that "it is autonomy, not power, that the bureaucrats are protecting." Allinson argues that "[a]fter the early 1970s, the majority of Keidanren's [Federation of Economic Organizations] leaders consisted of business managers who had served their entire careers in the private sector," and that "lifelong politicians came to dominate the highest ranks of the party [LDP].",31 Furthermore, "firms hire bureaucrats to increase their influence in the bureaucracy,"' 3 2 rather than the bureaucracy influencing firms. On the other hand, "the two great powers of the bureaucracy are the initiating of legislation and the compilation of the budget." 33 How bureaucrats can use these institutional

26 Id. at 241.

27 JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 126, 140.

28 Id. at 142.

29 See id. at 141-56; SUGIMOTO, supra note 7, at 196-98.

30 STEVEN R. REED, MAKING COMMON SENSE OF JAPAN 120 (1993).

31 Allinson, supra note 9, at 29.

32 Margaret A. McKean, State Strength and the Public Interest in POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 82 (Gary D. Allinson & Yasunori Sone eds., 1993).

33 JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 122. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 13 powers may vary under different circumstances, as in the case of the exercise of power by the Prime Minister or cabinet. Nevertheless, legislation and the budget cannot be introduced into the Diet without their work in most cases, and we may still argue that they still belong to the elite in Japan, if not the power elite like their predecessors in pre-war Japan. It was said in the 1980s that different careers after graduation were ranked by law 34 students at the University of Tokyo as follows: Special 1: Those who pass both the Law Examination and the examination for fast- track career bureaucrats within four years and join the Finance Ministry (including the Bank of Japan), the Ministry of Home Affairs (in charge of local governments), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), or National Police Agency; Special 2: Those who are asked by their professors to remain in the Faculty as

research associates (oshu); Special 3: Those who pass the Law Examination within four years; Special 4: Those who rank within the top 20 on the examination for fast-track bureaucrats; Second rate: Others who somehow manage to join the government; and Bottom: Those who intend to go to the private sector from the beginning.

If this is true, the legacy of the historical origin of the University of Tokyo Law Faculty is still very strong. An anecdote was reported recently that when University of Tokyo law students ask career plans of classmates, they ask "The Law Exam (Shiho)? National Civil Servant Class One (Koku Ichi)? Then, the private sector (minkan)?' '35 implying the descending order of the respectability of those three careers among themselves. It is particularly interesting to note that they somehow place themselves on the side of the government already and mention business careers as something to which they have to go out of their more proper realm. Another interesting aspect of this anecdote is that the prestige of the legal profession among University of

34 See RYUKICHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] 125 (1985).

35 Contemporary Personalityof Tokyo Law Faculty Students (in Japanese), AERA 14 (June 2 1997). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 14

Tokyo law students appears to have markedly improved from that before the war. We will take up this point later. Tables 17 and 18 indicate how firmly the domination by Tokyo Imperial University law graduates was established before the war. Higher civil service positions existed virtually only for them. Moreover, those Tokyo Imperial University law graduates were particularly well represented in the two key ministries, namely, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The question is how the situation has changed since then. Table 19 shows that as far as bureaucrats in top positions of ministries are concerned, the situation has not changed at all in 50 years after the war. The proportion of law graduates and of Tokyo law graduates has not essentially changed. All the top bureaucrats at the Finance Ministry and the Home Affairs Ministry in 1995 were Tokyo law graduates. The upper half of Table 20 indicates the situation in the mid-i 970s. The proportion of Tokyo graduates was largest among top bureaucrats, followed by middle-management bureaucrats, and was lowest among new recruits. It is safe to assume that an overwhelming majority of them were law graduates. Moreover, even among the new recruits, more than half of them were Tokyo graduates, and their proportions were larger in more powerful and, hence, popular ministries and agencies, such as Finance, Home Affairs, International Trade and Industry, and Police. Kyoto graduates were far distant seconds in all categories. There were none of them among top bureaucrats at the Finance Ministry. In this sense, too, the legacy of the different historical backgrounds of the establishment of Tokyo and other national universities remained very strong. It is often said that once they are hired, members of the same entering class are promoted at the same speed until one of them becomes a Vice-Minister. Then, all other members retire. The data, however, indicate that differences already appear at the middle- management level. Tokyo law graduates are promoted faster than others are. The second table in Table 19 gives us a glimpse of the main reason for this overwhelming domination by Tokyo graduates. Among those who passed the civil service examination for fast- track positions, only 25% were Tokyo graduates. Given that Tokyo is the largest national university and attracts the brightest high school students, this proportion is not too surprising. More surprising is that the proportion of Tokyo graduates doubles among those who were actually hired. Simply passing the civil service examination does not guarantee actual hiring. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 15

Actual hiring is determined by the personnel department of each ministry or agency. Applicants must visit the personnel department of the ministry or agency, which they wish to join. Therefore, the data imply that personnel departments still favor Tokyo graduates when they finally decide hiring. After all, hiring officials themselves are likely to be Tokyo graduates, and applicants from Tokyo can expect a friendly reception, while those from other schools cannot. Those from other schools may even hesitate to visit ministries and agencies where there are no former graduates of their school in the personnel department, and limit their job search to less prestigious ministries and agencies from the beginning. It is likely that such personnel practices favor Tokyo law graduates throughout their careers. In fact, Tokyo graduates can work in an environment, which is almost an alumni organization of the University of Tokyo and can feel more confidence in their future, whereas those from other universities are constantly reminded that they are minorities and do not have the same supporting networks among elite bureaucrats. The data at the bottom of Table 19 show the new recruits of the Finance Ministry who will join the ministry next year. The Ministry proudly announced that the proportion of Tokyo law graduates is smaller than before, that graduates of private universities were hired, and that even two women were included. Nevertheless, Tokyo graduates including those from outside the Law Faculty still account for nearly two thirds of the total number, which is not different from the situation in 1976. It should be clear from these data that the production of bureaucratic elite is still overwhelmingly carried out by the University of Tokyo. Then, how about the domination by law graduates? Table 21 indicates the proportions of the three main fields of specialization among the new recruits in 1981 as measured by types of examinations they took. The largest group was always the one who took the examination for houritsu-shoku or law-related staff. The most extreme example is the Ministry of Home Affairs where fourteen out of the fifteen new recruits were in that category. The group of keizai-shoku or economy-related staff came close at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, but remained a distant second at most other ministries. Oddly enough, the group of gyosei-shoku or administration-related staff is smallest in spite of its apparent expertise in administration. These data imply that they are not exactly hired for their expertise in law, economics, or administration. A good example is the Finance Ministry. Eighteen of its twenty-seven new recruits were hired as law-related staff. This does not mean, however, that they were hired as Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 16 professional lawyers. It is more accurate to say that they were hired as human resources, which are smart and trustworthy enough to receive a series of on-the-job training designed to mold and grow them as generalists who can efficiently handle any assignment. Such on-the-job training at 3 6 the Finance Ministry goes as follows:

First to third years: Recruits spend most of their time in the corridors of the Diet. Their main job is to find what Diet members are going to question so that the Finance Minister and top bureaucrats can prepare answers. Recruits are expected to learn during these first years how to handle information, what politicians do, and how the Diet works. Third to fourth years: These one-time recruits are sent to foreign or domestic universities to learn economic theories and obtain other specialized knowledge. Fifth to sixth years: On returning, they work as chief sub-department heads (kakaricho). Seventh year: The department heads next work as heads of local tax offices while they are still only 28 or 29 years old. They supervise older subordinates and deal with local leaders, who treat them often as the guest of honor. As the heads of local tax offices, they are also expected to learn leadership. Eighth year: They return to the Ministry headquarters as assistant department head (kacho hosa). These now seasoned bureaucrats are expected to show their ability in defending the turf of the Ministry by arguing against bureaucrats of the same rank from other ministries, in drafting bills and designing policies, in negotiating, and in obtaining a broader perspective.

A similar pattern exists in the Ministry of Home Affairs. 37 After the elite bureaucrats have familiarized themselves with the culture in the Ministry, they are sent to prefectural

36 See KITAGAWA & KAINUMA, supra note 34, at 149-15 1.

31 See id. at 150-51. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 17

governments for two to three years. They return to the Ministry headquarters as sub-department heads. In the seventh or eighth year, they are sent to prefectural governments as heads of key departments such as general affairs, tax, and planning for two years. They return to the Ministry headquarters as assistant department heads. Every ministry or agency, including the National Police Agency, where the speed of promotion of elite recruits is faster than other ministries and agencies, has its own pattern of training, rotation, and promotion. Since nearly every promotion is coupled with relocation or a change of departments, what is expected of elite bureaucrats is not specialization or technical expertise. This point can be better understood by examination of the different status of clerical (imukan) and technical staff (gikan). The national civil service examination includes categories designed to recruit specialists, including scientists. Those technical staff members include holders of master's and doctoral degrees or even medical doctors, such as those in the Health Ministry. Technical staff members, however, rarely reach top positions. Table 22 shows an example of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1981. The Vice-Minister and a majority of bureau chiefs were clerical staff. Most of the heads of the most important departments within each bureau were also clerical staff. It is safe to assume that a vast majority of those clerical staff were initially recruited as law-related staff. 38 The struggle between clerical staff and technical staff was exposed in the aftermath of the HIV infection of hemophiliacs in Japan by contaminated blood products. 39 In this scandal involving the Health Ministry, medical profession, and pharmaceutical industry, one Ministry official, one medical doctor, and three past and Present presidents of the largest blood products manufacturer were arrested and indicted for criminal negligence causing death. When the scandal broke, the Health Minister formed a task force to search for documents relating to the case, the existence of which the Ministry officials had denied. The task force, headed by the Vice-Minister, who was a clerical staff member, found crucial documents including those of a former head and a medical doctor of the Department of Biologic and Antibiotics in the Bureau of Pharmacological Affairs. The indicted Ministry official was also a medical doctor. While the

38 See infra Table 20.

39 Koseisho no Hanzai: Yakugai [Crime of the Health Ministry: Injury by Medication], MAINICHI SHINBUNSHA SHAKAIBU YAKUGAI EIZU SHUZAIHAN 57-77, 92-97 (1997) [hereinafter "Koseisho no Hanzai"]. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 18

responsibility of the Bureau certainly requires medical and pharmacological expertise, the Bureau Chief had always been a clerical staff person and the Head of the Planning Department, considered most important among the departments in the Bureau, was also a position reserved for clerical staff. Nevertheless, the former Bureau Chief who was responsible for the final decisions of the Bureau escaped investigation. Therefore, some observe that clerical staff of the Health Ministry seized this scandal as an opportunity to further their already dominant position in the Ministry. 40 In any event, it must be clear now that law graduates are not hired by the bureaucracy as professional lawyers, nor for their legal expertise. Ever since the College of Law of Tokyo Imperial University was designated as the central institution to train future elite bureaucrats, law faculties have always been the most competitive of nearly all universities. Law graduates are hired essentially because they are considered to be smarter than others. In that sense, legal education, particularly that at the University of Tokyo, is playing a decisive role in the reproduction of the elite in Japanese bureaucracy. It does not mean, however, that legal education per se is directly related to the reproduction of elite. Therefore, legal education of elite bureaucrats has not contributed, for instance, to the advancement of the rule of law in Japan. It is widely known that extra-legal measures called administrative guidance (gyosei shido) are the main instruments for the elite to carry out their policies. 41 Of course, an enormous number of statutes are enacted every year, and a vast majority of them concern activities of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the statutes are essentially designed as instruments of the bureaucracy, and rarely provide the public with legal rights to challenge the bureaucracy. In other words, the rule by law, not the rule of law, still prevails in Japan. In any event, as far as the elite in the bureaucracy are concerned, we have found that the situation has not changed between the pre-war and post-war periods. The bureaucratic elite are largely reproduced by legal education at the University of Tokyo. This conclusion is further supported by Tables 23 and 24. Table 23 indicates where law graduates of the University of Tokyo went in 1981. Table 24 shows the same information for 1997 in comparison with Kyoto

40 Eric A. Feldman, Deconstructing the Japanese HIV Scandal, Japan Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 30 (1997).

41 See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 174-176 (1987). For a contrary view that Japanese governmental agencies have been forced to use administrative guidance because they were not given legally enforceable instruments, see also JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER 139-41 (1991). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 19 and Kobe Universities. One can clearly see that excluding the Judicial Research and Training Institute, the largest individual employers of Tokyo law graduates were government ministries and agencies or other organizations closely related to the government, such as the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, the Bank of Japan, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. Though it is indicated that five graduates of Kyoto Law Faculty were hired by the Office of Prime Minister in 1997, the Office is actually divided into several agencies including the National Police Agency, so it is inconsequential. It is surprising that while Kyoto was the second Imperial University, and is definitely the second most competitive national university in Japan, the distance between the two law faculties with regard to the reproduction of elite bureaucrats is staggering. In a ranking of the difficulty of entrance examinations of national and municipal law faculties, which gave a score of seventy-three to the highest-ranked Tokyo Law Faculty and a score of fifty to the lowest-ranked law faculty, Kyoto was ranked second with a score of seventy, Osaka was third with a score of sixty-nine, and Kobe, Tokyo Metropolitan, Nagoya, and Hitotsubashi were jointly ranked fourth with a score of sixty-five, closely followed by Kyushu with a score of sixty-four. 42 The difference between the first and fourth most competitive universities in, say, the United States, may be negligible, but it is not so in Japan. For instance, no national ministry or agency is a major employer of Kobe graduates. Moreover, Table 24 implies that the differences in institutional status among Tokyo, Kyoto, and Kobe Law Faculties have been deliberately maintained by the Ministry Education. Tokyo has the largest number of students and faculty members, Kyoto is allowed to have only two-thirds of what Tokyo has, and Kobe and other national law faculties are allowed to have even less. Since national universities are part of the Education Ministry, any expansion or reform must be authorized by the Ministry. No national university is allowed to out compete Tokyo on any account. As long as the present system of recruiting elite bureaucrats remains, the position of the University of Tokyo Law Faculty will remain unassailable.

42 ASAHi SHINBUNSHA, DAIGAKU RANKING '96 [UNIVERSITY RANKING '96] 226 (1996). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 20

D. The Elite in Business The most conspicuous players of the pre-war Japanese business were zaibatsu, namely, conglomerates controlled by family-owned holding companies. 43 The post-war economic reform dissolved them, and individual capitalists lost importance as the elite in Japanese business. Institutional shareholding replaced shareholding by families. Gerlach calls the social organization of Japanese business in the post-war period "alliance capitalism." 44 While 95% of stocks in the United States is controlled by market investors, including both individuals and institutions, 70-75% of stocks in Japan is controlled by stable investors, namely, affiliated companies. 45 Affiliated companies mutually hold stocks of each other. The proportion of stocks owned by top-ten reciprocal shareholders is nearly 20% among the top sixty companies in Japan, compared to less than 1% in U.S. companies in general.46 In this alliance economy, the most powerful business elite are the top executives who determine institutional investment in affiliated companies, and form and maintain alliances, though most of them are not major share-holders individually. 47 Therefore, the elite may be considered the Japanese counterparts of what Mills 48 called the chief executives. We collected information on the presidents of the largest corporations in 1975 and 1995. The purpose was to examine what schools dominate top positions of top companies, and whether any changes have happened recently. Table 25 presents such information for 1975 and 1995. The top companies in 1975 were those having capital of more than 30 billion yen, while those in 1995 had where ones having capital of 100 billion yen or more. It is clear that Tokyo law graduates were the largest group in both years if presidents were counted for each single faculty. Kyoto law graduates were a far distant second. If you combine Tokyo law graduates with other Tokyo graduates, they control half of the largest companies in Japan. While going to private

43 See generally Edward J. Lincoln, The Showa Economic Experience, in SHOWA: THE JAPAN OF HIROHITO (Carol Gluck & Stephen R. Graubard eds., 1992).

44 See generally MICHAEL L. GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM (1992).

45 See id. at 55.

46 See id. at 77-78.

47 See id. at 78-79.

48 See MILLS, supra note 4, at 118-46. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 21 companies has been the least popular career choice for Tokyo law graduates from the very beginning of the founding of Tokyo Law Faculty, they have still ended up controlling one-fifth of the largest companies in Japan. Of course, the proportion of Tokyo law graduates at top positions in corporations is far smaller than that in the government bureaucracy. In that sense, like politicians, practice in corporations may be more democratic. Nevertheless, it is at least clear that Tokyo Law Faculty has not relinquished its leading position in the business world, too. We must note here that some of those Tokyo graduates may have not started their corporate careers immediately after graduation. Some of them may have joined the government bureaucracy, and have moved to companies as "descending from heaven" (amakudari).49 It is argued that the proportion of amakudari business leaders has decreased since the 1970s, and a 50 majority of more recent business leaders have spent their entire careers in the private sectors. Nevertheless, as most vividly revealed in the scandal of HIV infection of hemophiliacs by the three past and present presidents of Green Cross, the main manufacturer of blood products in Japan, including a former bureau head of the Health Ministry, 51 amakudari does exist, particularly in the more heavily regulated industries. Those amakudari bureaucrats function as personal glue tying the elite in public and private sectors. Business leaders can also form ties with leading conservative politicians. For instance, each time the Prime Minister changes, several groups of business leaders are formed around the new Prime Minister. They meet regularly, exchange views, and discuss policy issues. Table 26 shows the membership of one of such groups formed around Zenko Suzuki who was Prime Minister between 1980 and 1982. Not a former bureaucrat, not a Tokyo graduate, and not even a university graduate, he was not considered a particularly powerful Prime Minister. Nevertheless, this group included top leaders of all four business organizations in Japan, namely, the Japan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Nippon Shoko Kaigisho), the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations (ippon Keieisha Dantai Rengokai), the Federation of Economic

Organizations (eizai Dantai Rengokai), and the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai).

49 See JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 141-56.

50 See ALLINSON, supra note 9, at 28-29.

51 See Koseisho no Hanzai, supra note 39, at 83-91. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 22

Again, one third of the members of these business organizations were Tokyo law graduates and two-thirds were Tokyo University graduates. We should note that the proportion of Tokyo graduates is larger in this circle, which is closer to the power center in Japan, than among presidents of the largest corporations in general. We want to repeat that those Tokyo law graduates were not hired by business corporations for their legal expertise. They were hired as the smartest young people who were to be thoroughly inculcated by the corporate culture. There is no evidence that their presence in the leadership of Japanese business has promoted a corporate culture, which respects law.

E. The Elite in Judiciary Possibly because he wrote before the advent of the liberal activist Warren Court, Mills did not pay any attention to the judiciary in his analysis of the American power elite. We may also ignore the Japanese judiciary in our discussion of the elite in Japan. The Japanese judiciary is hardly activist in the sense that it actively examines the legality and constitutionality of actions 52 of the other two branches of the government. Nevertheless, such a passive judiciary has played a significant role in proclaiming the legality and constitutionality of various arrangements produced by the elite in the legislative and executive branches of the government and business. In other words, the judiciary role as a rear guard for the conservative status quo is not insignificant, and it deserves our attention in that sense. The institutional status of the Japanese judiciary was markedly improved during the post- war reform. The judiciary was separated from the Justice Ministry and was given the power of judicial review. Judges became the best paid government employees. 53 These changes may have caused some changes in the educational background of top members of the judiciary. Table 27 examines such changes. The top judges in 1954 had graduated from universities before the Second World War. Tokyo law graduates formed the overwhelmingly largest group. The top

52 See generally Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influences, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (Percy R. Luney & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). For a view that the Japanese judiciary has been activist in its own sense, see Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and JudicialActivism in Japan, 25 L. IN JAPAN (1995); Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms of Japanese Labor Law, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996).

53 YASUO WATANABE ET AL., TEXTBOOK GENDAI SHIHO [TEXTBOOK CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL SYSTEM] 95 (1997). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 23 judges in 1995 were likely to have graduated around 1960. Tokyo law graduates still controlled half of them, but Tokyo law's proportion was much smaller than that in 1954. The most striking change is the rise of Kyoto law graduates from 6.5% in 1954 to 35.6% in 1995. The Chief Justice between 1985 and 1990 was a Kyoto law graduate, and the present Chief Justice, who has just been appointed in October of this year, is also a Kyoto law graduate. In the same month, another Kyoto law graduate has also been appointed as a Supreme Court Justice, and still another Kyoto law graduate has been appointed the Chief Judge of a high court. It appears that under the continuing domination of the administrative bureaucracy by Tokyo law graduates, Kyoto law graduates have made inroads into the judiciary as if to compensate for their inferior status in the more powerful branches of the government. If this is true, probably the key person who opened many top positions in the judiciary to Kyoto law graduates may be Koichi Yaguchi, a Kyoto law graduate who successively served as the head of the personnel bureau (1970-76), Vice Secretary General (1976-77), Secretary General of the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court (1980-82), Supreme Court Justice (1984-85), and ultimately, Chief Justice (1985- 90). 54 Since elite judges who repeatedly serve in the General Secretariat virtually appoint and promote each other, 55 Yaguchi's long reign may have assisted in the promotion of many Kyoto law graduates in the judiciary. The surge of Kyoto law graduates may, however, simply reflect relative proportions of Tokyo and Kyoto graduates among those who passed the law examinations around 1960. Table 28 provides data pertinent to such a possibility. In 1961, the ratio of Kyoto graduates to Tokyo graduates was only three to four, nearly identical to the ratio among top judges in 1995. Another interesting finding is that graduates from other law faculties virtually disappeared from top positions. Since the "All Others" category means Supreme Court Justices who were appointed from outside law-related occupations, the subject here is the "Other/Law" category. We should note that Chuo law graduates constituted one-third of those who passed of the law examination in 1961. The virtual extinction of schools other than Tokyo and Kyoto from top positions may have resulted from either the selective hiring process or the selective promotion process, or from

54 Nippon Minsu Houritsu Kyokai Shiho Seido Iinkai, ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [DIRECTORY OF CAREERS OF ALL JUDGES] 16-17 (1990).

55 See Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 267-68 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 24 both. In any event, the reproduction of elite judges has become the oligarchy of Tokyo and Kyoto Law Faculties, in contrast to the monopoly of top positions in the administrative bureaucracy by Tokyo Law Faculty. However, given the most recent results of the law examination in which Tokyo law graduates constituted one quarter of those who passed, 56 and were more than double the number of Kyoto law graduates, it might be possible that Tokyo will regain an overwhelmingly dominant status thirty years from now. Incidentally, approximately 25,000 people took the law examination in 1996. The pass rate was approximately 3%. The enormous popularity of the law examination totally contradicts the accepted wisdom of Japanese legal culture. The popularity of the examination reflects the difficulty in becoming an independent person in Japan where employers are likely to demand total devotion to the interest of the organization. 57 One of the best ways to escape from such organizations is to become an attorney.

F. The Elite in Legal Academia Tokyo law graduates form an overwhelming majority of elite bureaucrats. Their share is smaller among elite politicians, elite business people, and elite judges, but they still form the largest group of all. Then, what is the educational background of those who taught Tokyo law graduates? Table 29 provides the pertinent statistics. Tokyo Law Faculty professors were exclusively Tokyo law graduates until the 1970s. The Tokyo Law Faculty started to hire graduates of other schools in 1985. But, the proportion of those non-Tokyo graduates still remains minuscule, at around only 5%. The recruitment and promotion of faculty members at Tokyo Law Faculty was analyzed by Feldman. 58 University legal education in Japan is at the undergraduate level. 59 A vast majority of junior faculty members were initially recruited as joshu (research associates) immediately after finishing their undergraduate legal education. They were promoted to jokyoju (associate professor) at either Tokyo or other universities after three years. Those who entered the graduate program working toward masters and doctoral degrees

56 See infra Table 27.

57 See HALEY, supra note 41, at 111-14.

58 See Feldman, supra note 40.

59 See Yasuhei Taniguchi, Legal Education in Japan, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 298-302 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 25

were considered second rate. Therefore, a vast majority of Tokyo Law Faculty professors do not have any advanced degree. Nevertheless, they examine graduate students and grant graduate degrees. The first graduate student who was hired as an associate professor directly from the graduate program was Kahei Rokumoto. It happened in 1970, and was considered a 0 revolution. 6 The similarity of this joshu system and the fast-track career system in the bureaucracy is striking. In fact, the joshu system has been justified by the need to compete against the bureaucracy and retain bright young students in academia. The situation at Kyoto Law Faculty is not much different. Kyoto's inbreeding rate has always been slightly lower than that of Tokyo. Nevertheless, graduates of non-Kyoto universities form only about 10% of Kyoto's faculty. Moreover, Kyoto also uses the joshu system. The similarity between Tokyo and Kyoto in this respect is also striking. Tokyo and, to a lesser extent, Kyoto also control sizable proportions of faculty members at other major national law faculties. Tokyo occupies more than 40% of all faculty positions, while Kyoto occupies nearly 20%. Their shares have slightly declined in the last twenty years. Nevertheless, they jointly control 63% of faculty positions in major national law faculties. The rest (37%) is divided among the seven other national law faculties and other schools. The share of Tokyo and Kyoto graduates is far smaller at major private law faculties. The reason is obvious. Major private law faculties also tend to inbreed. It is particularly true at the two most prestigious private law faculties, namely, Waseda and Keio. The proportion of their graduates in the elite in Japan, however, is still negligible as we have seen above. In that sense, these private law faculties can not be considered to be major players in the reproduction of the elite in Japan.

II. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions emerge from the analysis above: 1. The educational institution, which is most strongly related to the reproduction of the elite in Japanese society, is still the University of Tokyo. The University of Tokyo is particularly overwhelming in the reproduction of the bureaucratic elite;

60 See YOTARO KONAKA, TODAI HOGAKUBU [TOKYO UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW] 9 (1978). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 26

2. Within the University of Tokyo, the Faculty of Law occupies an overwhelmingly dominant status; 3. It does not appear, however, that graduates of Tokyo and other law faculties are recruited by government ministries and agencies exactly for their expertise in law. They are more likely to be recruited as raw materials to be molded to their own images; 4. The domination by the University of Tokyo and its Law Faculty is strongest among the highest level of the elite in Japan; 5. The mobility of the bureaucratic elite to the political elite or to the business elite has been declining, but is still recognizable. Hence, the old-boy networks of the University of Tokyo and of former bureaucrats are still important parts of ties connecting the elite in bureaucracy, politics, and business; and 6. The elite law professors teaching in the Tokyo Law Faculty have themselves been recruited in a manner similar to the recruitment of their students as elite bureaucrats. They are recruited directly from the undergraduate program with a guaranteed position in legal academia.

We may draw at least two implications from these conclusions. One is directly related to the function of university legal education in Japan, and the other is related to a much broader question of the stratification of Japanese society. Let us first discuss the former. If our conclusion is correct that students of those elite law professors are not exactly recruited for their legal expertise by the government and the business, an interesting question arises with regard to the relevance of content of legal education provided by those elite law professors. It is as if students are ready to forget whatever they learned in the university immediately after joining the government and the business, and to start to eagerly inculcate themselves in the specific cultures of their respective employer. It is, of course, arguable that university legal education more closely contributes a theoretical understanding of law to those who eventually pass the national law examination to become attorneys, judges, and prosecutors. Even that contribution, however, is debatable. Masao Sorimachi, President of LEC, Inc., the largest cram school chain for students preparing for the national law examination, the national civil service examination, and various Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2:2 7

other qualifying examinations, boasts that "Even Tokyo law students do not go to the university these days. Why? That is because study at our school precedes study at the university." 61 He goes on to say that "Students from faculties other than law pass the examination rather faster than law students, because the former do not have preconceptions," and that "Many students pass in their junior year recently ... [because] they start studying [at my school] when they are still in ' 62 high school. He is, of course, exaggerating. Nevertheless, his exaggeration is only slight. One of us recently met a group of such students who passed the law examination in their junior year. They were smart and confident, but could not tell which professors they liked most, and did not even know where the law library was in their university. They had spent their time totally in their cram schools. Sorimachi's chain is not the only one. Several national chains are competing. In this situation, the name of the law faculty from which the student graduated does not mean much. The name of his university should be considered mainly as a proof of the fact that he was smart enough to pass the entrance examination to the faculty. For him, the real legal education is provided by his cram schools. The legal education at cram schools is followed by training at the Judicial Research and Training Institute ("Institute"). Those who passed the law examination spend two years there as Judicial Trainees with salaries paid by the government. The Institute is managed by the Supreme Court, and education there is dominated by career judges who were carefully selected by the General Secretariat to teach mainstream doctrines and forms of practice. Since judges, who are called assistant judges in their first ten years, as well as prosecutors are directly recruited from the Institute, judge-instructors in the Institute also serve as recruiters for the judiciary. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the curriculum of university, legal education is overwhelmingly geared toward the national law examination, its relevance in reality is highly doubtful. Moreover, professional training in the skill of lawyering is only provided in the Judicial Research and Training Institute. It is done in the sixteen months in the middle of the two year

61 HIDEAKI KUBORI, HOKA SHAKAI E NIHON GA KAWARU [JAPAN IS BECOMING A LEGALIZED SOCIETY] 257 (1997). 62 Id. at 260. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 28 training at the Institute. Trainees spend their time at a local court, a local prosecutor's office, and a local bar association. The university legal education offers nothing in areas such as professional responsibility, professional ethics, lawyering, legal research and reasoning, and clinical legal education. Of course, unless most students are likely to become professional lawyers, offering such courses would not make sense, and students would not take them seriously even if offered. In that sense, the present situation may be rational. Nevertheless, it also means that there is no place in Japan, which constantly examines issues, theories, and skills concerning lawyering itself. So, university legal education is both redundant and lacking when it trains legal professionals as well as bureaucrats. Furthermore, since theoretical legal education is provided at the undergraduate level to those who have not studied any other subjects at the university level, it is virtually impossible to have a wide variety of people in the legal profession who have academic backgrounds outside law. In the increasingly more internationally connected legal market where increasingly more sophisticated and innovative legal services are required, the Japanese legal profession and their clients will suffer seriously. What should be the future of legal education in Japan? Take a look at Table 10. Japan now has more than 80,000 law students in each entering class, if those in composite faculties are included. One logical possibility may be to professionalize their undergraduate education like the undergraduate legal education in European countries. Since that possibility, however, requires that a majority of those 80,000 plus students pass the law examination, it is totally unfeasible. Another possibility may be to expand it as liberal arts education. Since political science is always part of law faculty curriculum, this route of reform is more feasible. What is needed is to remove highly technical courses of doctrinal analysis, and replace them with less technical courses which simply outline major characteristics of the legal system and various fields of law and examine their social, political, and economic implications. The aim would be to educate students as wiser citizens and wiser consumers of legal services. Compared to the American liberal arts education which teaches virtually nothing about law, such a law-related liberal arts curriculum has merit. Moreover, since the government bureaucracy and the business are not Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 29 recruiting law graduates as legal professionals, such a change will not cause a serious problem for them. If we can change the undergraduate legal education into more clearly liberal arts education, the legal education aimed at educating students for law-related occupations should be provided at a graduate level. Technical, doctrinal courses should be elevated from the present undergraduate level to this level, and they should be combined with courses on lawyering, professional ethics, clinical education, etc. Internship and other field training should also be incorporated into university legal education. Table 30 indicates that Japan has a large number of law-related occupations other than judges, prosecutors, and practicing attorneys. Since judicial scriveners, administrative scriveners, parent agents, and tax agents all include retired government employees who have never taken qualifying examinations, we believe that they should better be conceived as extensions of government agencies who supplement manpower and reduce the workload of government agencies. If they abolished such automatic admission of retired government employees, the boundary between them and attorneys may be blurred or lowered like the reform which has been going on in the United Kingdom, and the university legal education at the graduate level can become the basis for those legal professionals, too. Nevertheless, the number of such graduate programs will have to be far smaller than that of undergraduate law faculties, which exist now. Otherwise, the situation will continue that only a small proportion of students can have a realistic expectation to become legal professionals, so that taking legal education at the graduate level will lose meaning for a majority of students. Are there any institutions presently which might become bases of such graduate-level, professional-oriented legal education? Yes, there are. Several leading law faculties recently established graduate programs geared toward experienced practitioners and government employees which grant master's degrees in one or two years. Since these graduate programs have no clear purposes, they are presently nothing more than a mixture of various courses of continuing education. 63 Providing professional training in universities at the graduate level will give a clearer function to these programs. The present law examination for those who finished at least two years of university education consists of three

63 See Taniguchi, supra note 59, at 306-307. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 30 parts: multiple choice, essay, and oral. Therefore, the multiple-choice portion, for instance, should be waived for graduates of these programs. Naturally, universities, which are allowed to have such graduate programs, will obtain a tremendous advantage over other schools. Hence, most schools are likely to oppose establishing of such graduate programs if those programs will be allowed to only a limited number of universities. Therefore, an alternative strategy may be to establish such practice-oriented graduate legal studies programs totally anew. For instance, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations may start a Japanese version of the accreditation done by the American Bar Association, and encourage newer universities to establish programs designed to fit its conditions. If we can have such programs, they will have another merit of destroying the present hierarchy among the existing law faculties. Even when universities wanted to collaborate with the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, however, there is another source of resistance. That is the Supreme Court. It might want to maintain its control over professional training. For instance, when it was recently decided to increase the number of people who may pass the law examination from 750 to 1000 from the next year, the Supreme Court proposed to reduce the duration of traineeship from two years to one. Then, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations tried to seize this opportunity and proposed that it would provide training for the lost period by itself. Both the Supreme Court and the Justice Ministry rejected the bar's proposal. Nevertheless, if the duration of professional education at the Judicial Research and Training Institute is further reduced as the number to pass the law examination is further increased, a real opportunity for the Bar's taking over professional training would appear. In any event, the legal profession is the only well-established profession in Japan, which has failed to use universities for professional training of future members. Medical doctors, dentists, and veterinarians all use universities. There is no reason for the legal profession not to join them. Then, the Judicial Research and Training Institute will survive merely as a place for on-the-job training of judges, and the basic professional training of the legal professions will be set free from the central control, and become more flexible and diversified. Let us now turn to the second implication of our conclusions, namely the stratification of Japanese society. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 31

Entrants to the University of Tokyo are now dominated by graduates of private or national high schools which combine the curriculum for three-year junior high school and that for three-year high school in a unified curriculum, so that students are able to finish their high school curriculum in their fifth year, and to devote their sixth year entirely for entrance examinations to universities. In 1989, for instance, among the top twenty high schools of the 64 entrants of the University of Tokyo, only two were regular three-year public high schools. Fifteen were private six-year high schools, and three were six-year national high schools. Therefore, it is those students whose parents are wealthy enough to send them to such schools who can most aspire to get into the University of Tokyo. The proportion of six-year high schools has been constantly increasing. It is well known that the average socio-economic status of parents of students at the University of Tokyo is higher than that of parents of other university students. 65 Moreover, even among those parents, the socio-economic status of parents of students who came from six-year high schools is higher than that of parents of other students. Therefore, if the present elite- reproduction system continues, students from higher socio-economic statuses will increase further, and it becomes at least arguable that the policies and behaviors they carry out as government bureaucrats, politicians, and corporate executives may simply reflect the ideology and interests of their own socio-economic statuses. Furthermore, since entrance examinations to those six-year high schools take place at the end of elementary school, the competition to get into the University of Tokyo will take place when children are still in their elementary schools. Therefore, in a survey of students in the University of Tokyo in 1988, 78% of those who came from six-year high schools had gone to some cram schools during their elementary-school years, 66 while only 48% of the entire student body had gone to cram schools when they were in elementary schools. These data imply that a higher socio-economic status provides students with a higher possibility of joining the elite in Japan. If such a cycle continues, the existing social stratification will not only be reproduced, but also be strengthened.

64 See AMANO, supra note 12, at 19-20.

65 See id.

66 See id. at 20. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2: 32

Then, the question is whether we should introduce some form of reverse affirmative action, which prohibits government agencies to hire more than specified number of graduates from one school or prohibits universities to admit more than a certain number of students from a single high school. Such proposals have been regularly made and rejected. Moreover, given the relatively smaller income inequalities in Japan than in other developed countries, and the general lack of sensitivity to class structure or stratification, the public may not care much about the reproduction of the elite within the elite themselves. Furthermore, so long as the decision-making process in the government is transparent and the government and business are held accountable for their behavior, the self-reproduction of the elite by the elite probably will not cause serious problems to the public. Therefore, the more meaningful reform from the perspective of the public is probably to increase transparency and accountability of government agencies. Though it has various limitations which require improvement, the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1993 was a positive step toward that direction, and the expected enactment of the Freedom of Information Act would be another step forward. Reformers of Japanese society must continue their fight to strengthen the rule of law. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

TABLE 1

History of Legal Education and Legal Profession in Japan until the Postwar Reform

1868 * Meiji Restoration. 0 Kaisei School was established.

1871 * The Justice Ministry established its Law School. The purpose was to train personnel for the Ministry, and French law was taught. Their own schools trained their own staff. Students were provided with scholarships and were required to work in their respective ministries for a certain period of years.

1872 9 Representation by attorneys in civil litigation was permitted, and the term daigennin was introduced as the title for attorney, which meant a person to speak on behalf of another. Under the Tokugawa judicial system before the Meiji Restoration, no representation was allowed. No qualifications for daigennin, however, were established.

1873 9 Formal regulations were established for representation by daigennin. Documents had to be prepared by another person, daishonin (a person to write on behalf of another), who was the predecessor of the present judicial scrivener (shiho shoshi).

1875 * A special category of bengokan (defense officials) was created for state-appointed criminal defenders.

1876 * Aqualifying examination for attorneys (daigennin) was introduced.

1877 * The University of Tokyo was established. It included the Faculties of Law, Letters, Science, and Medicine. The Law Faculty taught Anglo-American law. * A special category of "attorney to the Ministry of Justice" was created to represent both private parties and the government.

1879 9 Graduates of the University of Tokyo Law Faculty obtained the privilege to practice as attorney (daigennin) without taking a qualifying examination. * Tokyo University gave the first bachelor's degrees to its graduates.

1880 * Senshu School (Anglo-American law; now Senshu University), Tokyo Law School (French law; now Hosei University), and Meiji Law School (French law; now Meiji University) were established. * The Tokyo University Law Faculty had 48 students. * Control of the examination for attorneys by the Ministry of Justice was strengthened. Bar associations were established in jurisdictions of district courts. * The Criminal Code was promulgated and the right to counsel was incorporated. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

1882 9 The Tokyo University Law Faculty permitted students to write their graduation thesis in the Japanese or Chinese language, instead of English. * Tokyo Professional School (Anglo-American law; now Waseda University) was established.

1883 * The Tokyo University abolished teaching in English, started to teach in Japanese, and decided to adopt the German academic system.

1885 * The Tokyo University Law Faculty absorbed the Department of Politics of the Faculty of Letters and the Justice Ministry Law School, and became the Faculty of Law and Politics. * The English Law School (Anglo-American law; now Chuo University) was established.

1886 9 The Decree on Imperial University was issued. * The Tokyo University became the Imperial University with Colleges of Law, Letters, Science, Medicine, and Engineering. * Private law schools were placed under the supervision of the President of the Imperial University. * Kansai Law School (now Kansai University) was established.

1887 * The Rules of Civil Service Examination and Apprenticeship were promulgated. Graduates of Imperial University College of Law were exempted from the examination.

1888 9 In return for strengthening control over the seven specially recognized private law schools, the Education Ministry extended the privileges enjoyed by graduates of the Imperial University College of Law to those graduates who had finished middle school before entering law school. Since private law schools, however, also admitted those who had not graduated from middle schools, the number of students who enjoyed that privilege was limited.

1889 9 The Meiji Constitution was promulgated.

1890 9 The Imperial University College of Law decided to make Japanese law the central purpose of education and made foreign law a supplementary subject. * Keio University and Nippon Law School (now Nippon University) were established. * The examination for recruiting judges and prosecutors was separated from that for recruiting high-ranking administrative officials.

1891 9 The Rules for Examination to Recruit Judges and Prosecutors were set. Graduates of recognized private law schools were allowed to take the examination. * There were 1,521 judges, 481 prosecutors, and 1,345 attorneys.

1893 * The Decree on Recruiting Civil Servants was issued. Graduates of the Imperial Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

University College of Law were required to take only the second part of the two-part examination for high-ranking civil servants, while graduates of private universities were required to start from the first part. As a result, in 1896, for instance, while 42 out of 66 applicants from the Imperial University College of Law passed the examination, only 8 out of 144 applicants from private law schools passed. Furthermore, while graduates of national or municipal middle schools were exempt from the examination for middle- and low-ranking civil servants, graduates of private law schools did not even get that privilege. The Attorneys Law was enacted. The new term bengoshi was introduced for attorneys. A committee for annual qualifying examination was formed with judges, prosecutors, and officials of the Justice Ministry, excluding attorneys. Holders of a doctorate in law, graduates of the Imperial University College of Law, and its predecessors could be admitted without examination.

1894-959 Sino-Japanese War.

1895 9 The Faculties of Law, Medicine, and Engineering were established in the Third High School in Kyoto.

1897 9 Kyoto Imperial University was established. It included a College of Science and Engineering. The Faculties of Law and Medicine of the Third High School became the Colleges of Law and Medicine of Kyoto Imperial University in 1899, and the Faculty of Letters in 1906.

1900 * There were 1,244 judges, 473 prosecutors, and 1,590 attorneys.

1907 * Tohoku Imperial University was established, and the Sapporo Agricultural School, which was originally established in 1872 by the Hokkaido Development Agency and was the second school in Japan to grant bachelor's degrees, became its College of Agriculture.

1910 9 Annexation of Korea. * There were 1,125 judges, 390 prosecutors, and 2,008 attorneys.

1914-18 The First World War.

1918 9 The Decree on University was issued. The establishment of private universities and single-faculty colleges was allowed. * The College of Agriculture of Tohoku Imperial University became Hokkaido Imperial University.

1919 9 The Decree on Imperial University was amended. Colleges became faculties.

1920 * The establishment of several private universities was authorized, including Keio, Waseda, Meiji, Hosei, Chuo, Nippon, and Doshisha. While they had already called themselves universities before that time, they had not legally been treated as Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

universities by the government. * Tokyo University of Commerce (now Hitotsubashi University) was established. This school was first established as the School of Commercial Law in 1875 and it later became Tokyo High School of Commerce in 1887. * There were 1,134 judges, 570 prosecutors, and 3,082 attorneys.

1922 9 The Faculty of Law and Letters was established in Tohoku Imperial University.

1924 * The Faculty of Law and Letters was established in Kyushu Imperial University. * Seoul Imperial University was established.

1925 9 The Security Maintenance Law was enacted.

1926 * Students were prohibited from studying social sciences.

1927 * Financial panic was caused by an austere fiscal policy.

1928 9 The Special High Police (Tokubetu Koto Keisatsu) was established to investigate political crimes. * Taipei Imperial University and Osaka University of Commerce (now Osaka City University) were established.

1929 9 The Great Depression started.

1930 * There were 1,249 judges, 657 prosecutors, and 6,599 attorneys.

1931 * The Manchuria Incident occurred. * Osaka Imperial University was established.

1933 * Professor Yukitoki Takigawa of Kyoto Imperial University Law Faculty was purged from the faculty. * A new Attorneys Law was enacted. The attorney's role was extended to services outside the court. Women were admitted. Apprenticeship similar to that for judges and prosecutors was introduced. The prohibition of unauthorized practice, however, was not introduced because attorneys opposed giving more power to the Justice Minister.

1935 * Professor Tatsukichi Minobe of Tokyo Imperial University Law Faculty was purged from the faculty.

1937 * The Federation of Economic Organizations (KeieishaDantai Rengokai or Keidanren) was established.

1939 * The Law for Total National Mobilization was promulgated. * Nagoya Imperial University was established. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2

1940 9 There were 1,541 judges, 734 prosecutors, and 5,498 attorneys.

1941-459 Pacific War.

1949 The present Attorneys Law was enacted as a member bill in the Diet. A national organization of attorneys, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA), was established. The JFBA and local bar associations obtained independence from the Justice Ministry in admission of members, rule-making, and disciplinary actions. The qualifying examinations and apprenticeship systems for judges and prosecutors and for attorneys were combined. The Justice Ministry took over responsibility for the annual law examination (shiho shiken), and the Supreme Court took over responsibility for the newly-created Judicial Research and Training Institute 1hiho Kenshujo) where passers of the law examination spend two years as trainees with salaries paid by the government. After finishing those two years, assistant judges are recruited by the Supreme Court, prosecutors are recruited by the Justice Ministry, and the rest of the graduates become attorneys.

1950 * There were 1,533 judges (and 728 summary court judges), 930 prosecutors (and 743 assistant prosecutors), and 5,863 attorneys.

1985 9 There were 2,001 judges (and 739 summary court judges), 1,173 prosecutors (and 919 assistant prosecutors), and 13,159 private attorneys.

Sources: HOU-SHAKAIGAKU 191-93 (Nippon Houshakaigakkai ed., 1970); IKUO AMANO, KINDAI NIPPON KOTO KYOIKU KENKYU [A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF MODERN JAPAN] (1989); IKUO AMANO, GAKUREKI NO SHAKAISHI [SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE EDUCATION-BASED ELITISM] (1992); Richard W. Rabinowitz, The Historical Development of the Japanese Bar, 70 HARV. L.R. 61 (1956); JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, 103 (1991). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

TABLE 2

Occupations of All Graduates of the Tokyo Imperial University College of Law in 1886-97

Administrative Officers 375 Judicial Officers 300 Private Business 187 Graduate Schools 153 Attorneys 114 School Teachers 55 Study Abroad 18 Members of Diet 9 Military 3 Other 37 Unknown 118 Total 1369

Source: MAKOTO Aso, NIPPON NO GAKUREI ERITO [THE EDUCATION-BASED ELITE IN JAPAN] 85 (1991). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

TABLE 3

Occupations of All Graduates of Major Private Law Schools Surveyed in 1897

Chuo Waseda Meiji Private Companies 96 68 55 Governmental High-Ranking Officials 45 19 Judicial Officials 134 126 Other 252 95

Educational

Self-Employed Attorneys 24 190 Other 1 3

Other 30 26

Unknown 1326 317 1068 Total 2039 570 1585

Source: IKUO AMANO, GAKuREKI NO SHAKAISHI [SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE EDUCATION-BASED ELITISM] (1992). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2 TABLE 4

Subjects Taught in 1893 and 1974-75

Department of Law Faculty of Law Imperial University University of Tokyo September 1893 1974-75

Subject No. of Examinations Subject

Constitutional Law Constitutional Law I, II Comparative Constitutional Law

Civil Law Civil Code I, II, III, IV

Commercial Law Commercial Code I, II, III

Civil Procedure Civil Procedure I, II, III Judicial Administration

Criminal Law Criminal Law I, II

Criminal Procedure Criminal Procedure Criminology Legal Medicine

Public International Law International Law I, II International Organizations

Private International Law Private International Law

Administrative Law Administrative Law I, II, III Labor Law Intangible Property Rights Tax Law Industrial Law

Roman Law Roman Law

Legal History History of Legal Science Occidental Legal History Japanese Legal History Oriental Legal History

Jurisprudence J Philosophy of Law Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ1 2

Sociology of Law Anglo-American Law I, II French Law I, II German Law I, II Soviet Law Chinese Law Theory of Comparative Law

Foreign Languages 3 English, German, and French

(Political Process-not offered in 1893) European Political History Political Science Japanese Political & Diplomatic History International Politics American Political & Diplomatic History Public Administration Comparative Government History of Political Theory History of Japanese Political Theory History of International Politics Asian Political & Diplomatic History Marxist Principles of Economics Modern Economic Theory Public Finance Economic Policy Social Policy Accounting

Sources: Takayoshi Yoroi The Faculty of Law at Imperial Universities and "National-Social Demand," 22 HOU-SHAKAIGAKU 157 (1970) (in Japanese); Haruo Abe, Education of the Legal Profession in Japan, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 579-81 (1976). Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2

TABLE 5

Law Graduates of Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities in 1939

Tokyo Kyoto Administrative Officers 151 12 Judicial Officers 24 5 Attorneys 0 11 Graduate Students 0 0 Educational 4 1 Bank or Company 360 394 Foreign Government or Company 0 17 Military 93 11 Other (including Unknown) 11 59 Total 642 512

Source: Takayoshi Yoroi, The Faculty of Law at Imperial Universities and "National-Social Demand," 22 HOU-SHAKAIGAKU 147 (1970). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 6

Universities in 1920

National University Year Became Imperial University or College

Tokyo Imperial University 1886 With Law Kyoto Imperial University 1897 With Law Tohoku Imperial University 1907 With Law and Letters Kyushu Imperial University 1910 With Law and Letters Hokkaido Imperial University 1918 Without Law Tokyo College of Commerce 1920 Without Law

Municipal College Year Became College Osaka Prefectural Medical College 1919 Aichi Prefectural Medical College 1920

Private University* Year Called "University" Keio Gijuku University 1890 With Law Waseda University 1902 With Law Meiji University 1903 With Law Hosei University 1903 With Law and Letters Chuo University 1903 With Law Nippon University 1903 With Law Kokugakuin University 1906 With Law Doshisha University 1912 With Law

* Note: Private universities were formally recognized as universities in 1920.

Source: Tatsuo Maeda, Japanese Capitalism and Universities and Law Faculties (in Japanese), 22 HOU-SHAKAIGAKU 114-17 (1970). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 7

Required Subjects of High-Ranking Civil Servant Examination in 1929

Administrative Officers Constitutional Law Administrative Law Civil Law Economics

Diplomats Constitutional Law International Public Law Economics Foreign Language

Judicial Officers Constitutional Law Civil Law Commercial Law Criminal Law Civil Procedure or Criminal Procedure

Source: MAKOTO ASO, NIPPON NO GAKUREI ERITO [THE EDUCATION-BASED ELITE IN JAPAN] 224- 25 (1991). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 8

Graduates of Law Faculties in 1925

Facul, Governmental Educational Business Total Law 186 3 557 790 Law and Letters 54 236 379

Source: Tatsuo Maeda, Japanese Capitalism and Universities and Law Faculties (in Japanese), 22 HOU-SHAKAIGAKU 135 (1970).

TABLE 9

Monthly Salaries at Mitsui Mining Company in the 1920s

School Technical Staff Clerical and Managerial Staff Imperial University 70 yen 75 yen (including Tokyo College of Commerce) Waseda 65 yen 65 yen Keio 65 yen Other Private University 60 yen 60 yen Kobe High School of Commerce 60 yen (now Kobe University) Engineering High School 55 yen Other High School of Commerce 55 yen Vocational School 55 yen

Source: Tatsuo Maeda, Japanese Capitalism and Universities and Law Faculties (in Japanese), 22 Hou- SHAKAIGAKU 118 (1970). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 10

Number of Law Faculties and Law Students in 1972 and 1992

Authorized No. of Students in the Enterin2 Class

Separate Law Faculty No. of Law Institutions Day Program Night Pro2ram

National 15 (9)* 4,206 (2,090) 225 (60) Municipal 3 (2) 550 (250) 153 (90) Private 69 (41) 32,710 (12,990) 3,730 (3,050)

Law in Composite Faculty

National 7 (11) 1,175 (1,100) 70 (110) Municipal 3 (2) 510 (520) 60 (320) Private 97 (65) 39,051 (16,960) 4,240 (3,630)

*Note: Numbers in parentheses arefor 1972.

Source: Yasuhei Taniguchi, Legal Education in Japan, in TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 312 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 11 Postwar Prime Ministers Since 1946

Inauguration Name Party University/Facul 5/46 Shigeru Yoshida Liberal Tokyo/Law 5/47 Tetsu Katayama Socialist Tokyo/Law 3/48 Hitoshi Katayama Democratic Tokyo/Law 10/48 Shigeru Yoshida Liberal Tokyo/Law 2/49 Shigeru Yoshida Liberal Tokyo/Law 10/52 Shigeru Yoshida Liberal Tokyo/Law 5/53 Shigeru Yoshida Liberal Tokyo/Law 12/54 Ichiro Hatoyama Democratic Tokyo/Law 3/55 Ichiro Hatoyama Democratic Tokyo/Law 11/55 Ichiro Hatoyama Liberal Dem. (LDP) Tokyo/Law 12/56 Tanzan Ishibashi LDP Waseda/Letters 2/57 Nobusuke Kishi LDP Tokyo/Law 6/58 Nobusuke Kishi LDP Tokyo/Law 7/60 Hayato Ikeda LDP Kyoto/Law ?/61 Hayato Ikeda LDP Kyoto/Law 12/63 Hayato Ikeda LDP Kyoto/Law 11/64 Eisaku Sato LDP Tokyo/Law 2/67 Eisaku Sato LDP Tokyo/Law 1/70 Eisaku Sato LDP Tokyo/Law 7/72 Kakuei Tanaka LDP 12/72 Kakuei Tanaka LDP 12/74 Takeo Miki LDP Meiji/Law 12/76 Takeo Fukuda LDP Tokyo/Law 12/78 Masayoshi Ohira LDP Tokyo Univ. of Commerce (now Hitotsubashi) 11/79 Masayoshi Ohira LDP Tokyo Univ. of Commerce 7/80 Zenko Suzuki LDP 11/82 Yasuhiro Nakasone LDP Tokyo/Law 12/83 Yasuhiro Nakasone LDP Tokyo/Law 7/86 Yasuhiro Nakasone LDP Tokyo/Law 11/87 Noboru Takeshita LDP Waseda/Commerce 6/89 Sosuke Uno LDP Kobe University of Commerce (now Kobe) 8/89 Toshiki Kaifu LDP Waseda/Law 2/90 Toshiki Kaifu LDP Waseda/Law 11/91 Kiichi Miyazawa LDP Tokyo/Law 8/93 Morihiro Hosokawa Nippon New Party Sophia/Law 4/94 Tsutomu Hata Renewal Party Seijo/Economics Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2

7/94 Tomiichi Murayama Socialist Meiji/Political Economics 1/96 Ryutaro Hashimoto LDP Keio/Law 11/96 Ryutaro Hashimoto LDP Keio/Law 7/98 Keizo Obuchi LDP Waseda/Letters*

* Note: Information on Keizo Obuchi provided by Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal gatheredfrom ; (visited Feb. 12, 2000). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 12 Cabinet Ministers of Selected Years

University/Faculty Number (Note)

1st Cabinet under Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (as of 7/57)

Tokyo/Law 12 (including Prime Minister) National/Other 2 (no Tokyo; I Kyoto) Private/Law 2 (no Waseda; no Keio) Waseda/Other 3 No University 1

Total

Note: The cabinet was formed in 2/57, and was reshuffled in 7/57.

Cabinet under Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (as of 11/76) Tokyo/Law 9 (including Prime Minister) Kyoto/Law I National/Other 3 (no Tokyo; 1 Kyoto) Private/Law 3 (no Waseda; no Keio) Private/Other 4 (no Waseda; no Keio) No University 2

Total 22

Note: The cabinet was formed in 12/76, and was reshuffled in 11/77.

Source for the two cabinets above: SHINPAN NIPPON GAKOSHI JITEN [DICTIONARY OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY: NEW EDITION] (1992).

2nd Cabinet under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (9/97)* Tokyo/Law 4 Kyoto/Law I National/Other" 4 (1 Tokyo; I Kyoto) Waseda/Law I Keio/Law 1 (Prime Minister) Other Private/Law I Private/Other 9 (1 Waseda; 3 Keio) No University I

Total Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2

* Note. The cabinet was formed in 11/96, and was reshuffled in 9/97.

Source: SANKEI SHIMUN, Sept. 12, 1997. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 13

Former Career Bureaucrats Among Cabinet Ministers 1946-78

Universiy/Faculty House of Representatives House of Councilors Total Tokyo/Law 58 34 92 Tokyo/Other 12 15 Kyoto 6 8 Other National & Municipal 4 Private 3 Other 3

Total

Source: RYUKICHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] (1985). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 14

Members of the House of Representatives in the Diet in Selected Years

University/Faculty Number (%)

2/55 Total 467 Tokyo/Law 98 (21.0%) Tokyo/Other 16 (3.4%) Kyoto/Law 19 (4.1%) Other/Law 70 (15.0%)

Attorneys among them 63 (13.5%)

10/96 Election Total 500 Tokyo/Law 68 (13.6%) Tokyo/Other 16 (3.4%) Kyoto/Law 9 (1.8%) Other/Law 107 (21.4%)

Attorneys among them 23 (4.6%)

Sources: various newspapers reporting election results. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 15

Members of the House of Councilors in the Diet in Selected Years

University/Faculty Number (%) (Note)

4/53 and 7/56 Elections Combined* Total 255 Tokyo/Law 60 (23.5%) Tokyo/Other 25 (9.8%) Kyoto/Law 1 (0.4%) Other/Law 15 (5.9%)

Attorneys among them 12 (4.7%)

7/92 and 7/95 Elections Combined* Total 253 Tokyo/Law 26 (10.3%) Tokyo/Other 18 (7.1%) Kyoto/Law 5 (2.0%) Other/Law 44 (17.4%)

Attorneys among them 11 (4.3%) (including one barrister)

* Note: Half of the seats are elected every three years.

Sources: various newspapers reporting election results. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 16

Backgrounds of Members of the House of Representatives in the Diet (by percentage)

Party: Liberal Japan Japan Democratic Socialist Communist (Year of Founding) (1955) (1955) (1946)

All Members Until 1982 N=732 N=362 N=90 University Graduates 74% 44% 54% U. of Tokyo Graduates 29% 10% 20% Local Politicians 26% 26% 14% High-Ranking Bureaucrats 21% 2% 0% Business Executives 15% 3% 1% Politician's Staff 11% 1% 0% Attorneys 4% 3% 21% Party Functionaries 1% 14% 34% Union Officials 0% 37% 10%

Elected in 1983 N=258 N=I 11 N=26 University Graduates 83% 44% 69% U. of Tokyo Graduates 29% 4% 31% Local Politicians 26% 33% 23% High-Ranking Bureaucrats 20% 0% 0% Business Executives 16% 1% 0% Politician's Staff 19% 2% 0% Attorneys 3% 3% 31% Party Functionaries 1% 7% 23% Union Officials 0% 44% 7%

Source: Daniel I. Okimoto, Ex-Bureaucrats in the Liberal-Democratic Party, in INSIDE THE JAPANESE SYSTEM 189 (Daniel I. Okimoto & Thomas R. Rohlen eds., 1988). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 17

Schools with the Top Numbers of Students Passing Higher Civil Servants Examination for Administrators: 1894 to 1947

Tokyo Imperial University 5,969 Among them, Law 5,653 Economics 299 Kyoto Imperial University 795 Chuo University (private) 444 Nippon University (private) 306 Tokyo University of Commerce 211 (national; now Ilitotsubashi) Tohoku Imperial University 188 Waseda University (private) 182 Postal Officer Training School 173 Meiji University (private) 144 Kyushu Imperial University 137

Source: RYUKIcHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] 101 (1985).

TABLE 18

High-Ranking Bureaucrats from 1932-1947*

Ministry of Finance Total Tokyo 347 297 (85.6%)

Ministry of Home Affairs Total Tokyo 189 143 (75.7%)

* Note: Those at the rank of bureau chief (kyokucho) or higher are counted.

Source: RYUKICHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] 101 (1985). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 19

High-Ranking Bureaucrats in Postwar Period*

University/Faculty Number (%) (Note)

1954 Tokyo/Law (71.6%) (7 out of 8 at Finance) Tokyo/Other (11.4%) Kyoto/Law (2.3%) Other/Law (3.4%) Other/Other (11.4%) Total

Source: KOKUSEI SORAN 1954 (1954 NATIONAL DIRECTORY) (1954).

1995 Tokyo/Law (69.4%) (9 out of 9 at Finance; 5 out of 5 at Home Affairs) Tokyo/Other (10.2%) Kyoto/Law (5.5%) Other/Law (5.5%) Other/Other (9.3%) Total

Source: KOKUSEI SORAN 1995 (1995 NATIONAL DIRECTORY) (1995).

* Note: Those at the rank of bureau chief (kyokucho) or higher in Ministries (sho or fu) are counted. Those in Agencies (cho) are not countedfor the sake of simplicity. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 20

National Civil Service Examination, Recruitment by Ministries, and Universities of High- Ranking Bureaucrats*

1976 New Recruits and Graduates of the University of Tokyo

Total Toko KYoto 573 265 (46.2%) n/a Finance 32 20 (62.5%) n/a Home Affairs 12 12 (100%) n/a MITI 37 29 (78.3%) n/a National Police 24 16 (66.7%) n/a

1976 Universities of Graduates at the Rank of Section Chief (kacho) or Higher of Major Ministries

Total Toko KYoto 1,600 1,001 (62.6%) 137 (8.6%) Finance 105 93 (88.6) 6 (5.7%) Home Affairs 41 31 (75.6%) 5 (12.2%) MITI 113 93 (82.3%) 7 (6.2%) National Police 49 22 (44.9%) 2 (4.1%)

1976 Tokyo and Kyoto Graduates at the Rank of Bureau Chief qyokucho) or Higher of Major Ministries Total Toko KYoto 155 126 (81.3%) 16 (10.3%) Finance 11 (100%) n/a Home Affairs 4 (80%) n/a MITI 8 (80%) 2 (20.0%) National Police 7 (87.5%) n/a

Source for the three tables above: YOTARO KONAKA, TODAI HOGAKUBU [TOKYO UNIVERSITY LAW FACULTY] 112-114 (1978)

1994 Passed the Examination (8/94) Recruited bv Ministries (as of 10/94) f f f Total 1,725 287 Tokyo 436 (25.3%) 149 (51.9%) Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

Source: ASAHI SHIMBUN, Aug. 10, 1994 (evening) and Oct. 5, 1994 (morning).

1996 Recruits of the Ministry of Finance Tokyo/Law 6 (including 1 woman) Tokyo/Other 5 Kyoto 2 Keio 2 (including I woman) Hitotsubashi I Waseda 1 Total 17

Source: ASAHI SHIMBUN, Oct. 3, 1997 (international satellite ed.).

* Note: Only fast-track career bureaucratsare counted. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 21

Fields of Civil Service Examination of Recruits* of Major Ministries in 1981

minisr Administration Law Economics Finance 1 18 8 Education 2 11 1 Health 3 8 Agriculture 12 4 MITI 15 13 Transportation 14 3 Post 7 4 Labor Construction Home Affairs National Police Agency

* Note: Only clerical staff (jimukan) among fast-track career bureaucrats are counted. Technical staff (gikan) are not counted.

Source: RYUKICHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] 147 (1985).

TABLE 22

Domination of Clerical Staff: Ministry of Agriculture in 1981*

Clerical Technical Vice Minister I 0 Bureau Chief 7 2 Senior Department Chief and Similar Position 20 9 Department Chief and Similar Position 31 67 Managerial Position of Local Office 24 38

* Note: Only fast-track career bureaucratsare counted.

Source: RYuxIcHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] 160 Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

(1985).

TABLE 23

Graduates of the University of Tokyo Law Faculty in 1981

Total 595

National Government 122 Ministry of Finance 15 National Police Agency 14 Ministry of Home Affairs 13 MITI 12 Ministry of Transportation 10 Ministry of Construction 10 Public Corporations and Local Governments 47

Judicial Research and Training Institute 32

Research Associate of the U. of Tokyo Law Faculty 8

Banks and Brokerage Firms 156 Insurance Companies 20 Steel and Nonferrous Metals 19 Trading Companies 31 Shipbuilding and Machinery 18 Electric and Electronic Appliances 24

Reentering the U. of Tokyo Law Faculty 14 Graduate School of Law of the U. of Tokyo 6

Source: RYuKIcH KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITo [THE ELITE OF JAPAN] 126 (1985). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 24

Largest Employers of Graduates of the Law Faculties of the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, and Kobe University in 1997

Tokyo 48 Professors, 23 Associate Professors, 5 Lecturers

Number of Graduates ca. 700 Judicial Research and Training Institute 56 Nippon Telephone and Telegraph 18 Ministry of International Trade and Industry 13 Ministry of Finance 12 Ministry of Home Affairs 12 National Police Agency 11 Bank of Japan 10 Ministry of Transportation 10 Industrial Bank of Japan 9 Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance 9

Kyoto 36 Professors, 14 Associate Professors, 1 Lecturer

Number of Graduates ca. 400 Judicial Research and Training Institute no data Sumitomo Bank 11 Kansai Electric 8 Nippon Life Insurance 8 Mitsubishi Bank 6 Sanwa Bank 6 Prime Minister's Office 5 Kyoto City 5 Daiichi Kangyo Bank 5 Industrial Bank of Japan 5 Sumitomo Trading 5

Kobe 31 Professors, 15 Associate Professors, I Lecturer

Number of Graduates ca. 220 Judicial Research and Training Institute no data Nippon Life Insurance 6 Kobe City 6 Nippon Telephone and Telegraph 4 Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2

Sekisui Chemical 3 Daiei 3

Source: ASAHI SHIMBUNSHA, DAIGAKU RANKING '97 [UNIVERSITY RANKING '97] (1997). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 25

Presidents of Largest Companies

University/Faculty Number (%)

1975: Capital 30 Billion Yen or More Tokyo/Law 16 (22.9%) Tokyo/Other 21 (30.0%) Kyoto/Law 2 (2.9%) Waseda/Law 1 (1.4%) Other/Law 2 (2.9%) Other/Other 28 (40.0%)

Total 70

Source: DAIYAMONDO KAISHA SHOKUINROKU 1976 [1976 DIRECTORY OF COMPANY ExECuniVES] (1975).

1995: Capital 100 Billion Yen or More Tokyo/Law 18 (22.2%) Tokyo/Other 22 (27.2%) Kyoto/Law 5 (6.2%) Other National/Law 5 (6.2%) Waseda/Law 1 (1.2%) Keio/Law 2 (2.5%) Other/Law 1 (1.2%) Other/Other 27 (33.3%)

Total 81

Source: DAIYAMONDO KAISHA SHOKUINROKU 1996 [1996 DIRECTORY OF COMPANY ExECUTIVES] (1995). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 26

Members of a Business-Leader Group for Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki in 1981

Tokyo/Law 10 (including Presidents of the Japan Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations)

Tokyo/Other 11 (including President of the Federation of Economic Organizations and Representative Secretary of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives)

Kyoto/Other 7 Other National/Law 1 Other National/Other 7 Private/Law 1 Private/Other 0 No University 2 Total

Source: RYUKICHI KITAGAWA & JUN KAINUMA, NIPPON NO ERITO [THE ELIE OF JAPAN] 141 (1985). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 27

High-Ranking Judges*

University/Faculty Number (%) (Note)

1954 Tokyo/Law 23 (74.2%) (including Chief Justice) Kyoto/Law 2 (6.5%) Other/Law 5 (16.1%) All Others 1 (3.2%)

Total

Source: KOKUSEI SORAN 1954 [1954 NATIONAL DIRECTORY] (1954).

1995 Tokyo/Law 16 (51.6%) (including Chief Justice) Kyoto/Law 11 (35.6%) Other/Law 1 (3.2%) All Others 3 (9.7%) Total

Source: KOKUSEI SORAN 1995 [1995 NATIONAL DIRECTORY] (1995).

* Note: Supreme court justices, judges at the rank of bureau chief (kyokucho) or higher in the Supreme Court General Secretariat, chief judges of the high courts, and chief judges of the Tokyo and Osaka district courts are counted. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 28

Top Universities in the National Law Examinations in Selected Years

1961 Chuo (private) 106 Tokyo (national) 41 Kyoto (national) 32 Waseda (private) 19 Meiji (private) 18 Kyushu (national) 17 Tohoku (national) 12 Nippon (private) 11 All other universities 77

Total 333

1975 Tokyo (national) 108 Chuo (private) 77 Waseda (private) 52 Kyoto (national) 42 Meiji (private) 19 Osaka (national) 16 Hitotsubashi (national) 16 Tohoku (national) 13 Keio (private) 13 Kyushu (national) 11 Osaka City (municipal) 11 Nagoya (national) 10 Kansai (private) 10 All Other Universities 74

Total 472

Source for two years above: Haruo Abe, Education of the Legal Profession in Japan, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYsTEM 572, 578 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).

1996* Tokyo (national) 191 Waseda (private) 115 Kyoto (national) 90 Keio (private) 74 Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

Chuo (private) 52 Hlitotsubashi (national) 35 Osaka (national) 23 Sophia (private) 19 Meiji (private) 17 Kyushu (national) 17 Nagoya (national) 15 Kansai (private) 10 All Other Universities 110

Total 768

* Note: The data for this year indicate those who passed the essay examination. A final oral examination was to be administeredafter it, but only afew usually fail at that stage.

Source: HOUGAKU SEMINA, No. 504, 119 (1996). Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 29

Last Schools of Law Professors in Selected Years

Faculty No. of Faculty Percent from Tokyo Percent from Kyoto Members Graduates Graduates 1966 Nine National* 236 48.3% 25.4% Tokyo 46 100.0% Kyoto 43 4.7% 93.0% Six Private** 212 6.6% 10.2%

1976 Nine National 262 50.0% 22.5% Tokyo 54 100.0% Kyoto 37 100.0% Six Private 290 10.0% 7.6%

1986 Nine National 337 45.4% 22.3% Tokyo 56 94.6% Kyoto 41 2.4% 97.6% Six Private 288 9.0% 8.0%

1996 Nine National 360 43.6% 19.4% Tokyo 71 94.4% 1.4% Kyoto 47 6.4% 89.4% Six Private 305 11.1% 7.2%

* The "nine national" law faculties are those at the seven former imperial universities (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kyushu) and Hitotsubashi and Kobe Universities.

** The "six private law" law faculties are those at Waseda, Keio, Chuo, Sophia, Doshisha, and Ritsumeikan Universities.

Sources are: ZENKOKU DAIGAKU SHOKUINROKU 1966 [1966 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY MEMBERS] (Kojunsha Henshubu ed., 1966); ZENKOKU DAIGAKU SHOKUINROKU 1976 [ 1976 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY MEMBERS] (Kojunsha Henshubu ed., 1976); ZENKOKU DAIGAKU SHOKUINROKU 1986 [1986 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY MEMBERS] (Kojunsha Henshubu ed., 1986); ZENKOKU DAIGAKU SHOKUINROKU 1996 [1996 Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal I APLPJ 2

NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF UNIVERSITY FACULTY MEMBERS] (Kojunsha Henshubu ed., 1996). Full- time faculty members at the rank of lecturer or higher are counted. Faculty members in subjects other than law, politics, and international relations are excluded. The school listed as the last school of each faculty member is counted. Asian-PacificLaw & Policy Journal 1 APLPJ 2

TABLE 30

Persons Doing Legal Work in Japan in 1982

Judges 2,700 Prosecutors 1,173 Practicing Attorneys 12,233 Company Employees Doing Legal Work 1,320 Judicial Scriveners 14,572 Administrative Scriveners 30,121 Patent Agents 2,600 Tax Agents 40,86

Total 105,579

Population Per Person Doing Legal Work Japan (1981) 1,119 France (1965) 4,026 West Germany (1971) 1,561 United Kingdom (1971) 1,023 United States (1978) 505

Source: Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United States, in COMPARATIVE LAW 290 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).