Out of Office the PRI's Restructuring and Perspectives 2006

P O L I T I C S Out of Office The PRI ’s Restructuring And Perspectives 2006

Guadalupe Pacheco Méndez* o o r r u u c c s s o o t t r r a a u u C C / / s s e a l r a o l S F

y l n l a e u N J

PRI President Roberto Madrazo next to legislative caucus head Emilio Chuayffet and State of Mexico Governor Arturo Controversial Teacher’s Union leader Montiel with other PRI leaders. Elba Esther Gordillo.

INTRODUCTION of revolutionary regional forces during the founding leader or the nation’s pre s - THE GRADUAL DISARTICULATION the years of the Revolutionary Natio n - ident. And this was the fundamen tal OF POWER GROUPS : 1988-2000 al Party, or PNR (1929-1938); that of distinctive trait that determined its in - a corporatist front of mass social orga - ternal power relations. The defeat of the Institutional Revo lu - nizations during the years of the Party From 1988 on, external political con - tionary Party ( PRI ) in 2000 closed a his - of the Mexican Revolution, or PRM ditions exerted increasingly strong pre s - toric cycle in Mexico’s political life. (1938-1946) and as the Institutional sures on the PRI internally, particular - Throughout its existence, the “party of Re volutionary Party, or PRI (1946-2000), ly the series of electoral reforms t hat the Revolution” took on several orga - subject, together with its three sectors would culminate in 1996 with the auto - nizational identities: that of a coalition (workers, peasants and community nomy of electoral authorities vis-à-vis mem bers), to the authority of the coun - the executive branch of government, try’s president. The common denomi - stripping the party of its privileges one *Researcher at the Sociology Depart men t of the Autonomous Metropolitan Uni - nator of these stages was its subordi - by one, particularly those originating ver sity, Xochimilco campus. nation to an external authority, whether in the government, which had allowed

7 Voices of Mexico • 69

TABLE 1 PRI LEADERSHIP ELECTION RESULTS BY GOVERNOR ’S AFFILIATION (F EBRUARY 2002)

GOVERNOR ’S MADRAZO PAREDES CANCELLED TOTAL DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE AFFILIATION GORDILLO GUERRERO VOTES VOTES MADRAZO /PARE - MADRAZO / DES (NUMBER PAREDES (%) OF VOTES )

PRI -Madrazo 424,069 80,967 20,518 525,554 343,102 65.3

PRI -Paredes 596,611 949,824 82,746 1,629,181 -353,213 -21.7

Total PRI 1,020,680 1,030,791 103,264 2,154,735 -10,111 -0.5

PAN 384,401 266,766 33,671 684,838 117,635 17.2

PRD 112,982 168,660 12,903 294,545 -55,678 -18.9

Total 497,383 435,426 46,574 979,383 61,957 6.3 PAN and PRD

Overall Total 1,518,063 1,466,217 149,838 3,134,118 51,846 1.7

Source: Table designed by the author with data from the PRI Internet portal, http://www.pri.org.mx/principal/ PRI .htm

it to maintain electoral hegemony. This ed burying the Keynesian model of the during the 1994 campaign and the tug - combined with a change in the internal state, and on the other extreme were of-war that resulted in the designation distribution of “power quotas,” strength - those who waved the neo-liberal ban - of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León to ening the ability of those directly linked ner and agreed with the government replace him also accentuated the in- with the new public sector technocra - technocracy’s restructuring of the eco n - ternal tensions. cy to vie for candidacies for public of - omy and the public sector. Later, new developments sharp - fi ce. That created tensions with the old After the severe 1988 political-elec - ened internal tension and discontent - “nationalist” elites linked to corpora tist toral crisis, new focuses of tension ment. The shock created by Zedillo’s sectoral organizations. In turn, this would emerged in PRI interal life. During the announcement that he would estab - unleash an internal dynamic fraught administration of Carlos Salinas de Gor - lish a “healthy distance” vis-à-vis the with outbreaks of autonomy by party tari (1988-1994), two bids were made PRI , together with the bad electoral militants who no longer wanted to sub - to reform the party from above with Sa - re sults of 1995 and 1997 caused by ordinate themselves to the authority linas attempting to eliminate the PRI ’s dis contentment with the economic cri - of the nation’s president at the same sectoral structure by different means: sis that broke out at the beginning of time that links between those acti vists the fourteenth national assem bly’s “te r - the administration were all factors that and PRI governors were strengthened. ritorialization” (1990) and the imple - sharpened internal tension and dissa t - These power struggles were also men tation of the “Pronasol” prog ram isfaction. This led to the beginning o f crisscrossed by an ideological fight: on in the sixteenth assembly (1993). 1 The a phase of attempted rebellion of cer - one side were those who, under the assassination of PRI presidential can - tain PRI groups against the president, flag of revolutionary nationalism, resist - didate Luis Donaldo Colosio Mu rrieta which translated into the imposition

8 Politics

of serious limitations on his discre - tionary ability to designate the next Power struggles were crisscrossed presidential nominee during the sev - by an ideological fight between nationalists and enteenth national assembly held in the neo-liberal technocrats. 1996; these were called President Ze - dillo’s “padlocks”, or limits. As the 2000 presidential elections one— for making major decisions and the eighteenth assembly, the decisive approached, internal clashes between regulating internal conflict. The coun - debates took place in the working group PRI members identified with the party try’s president had always taken care on the by-laws, with a central confron - traditions and the “technocrats”, the of that. This meant that when its can - tation between Madrazo and Labastida open opposition of then-governor of didate lost the election, the organiza - followers over control of the party. In Tabasco Roberto Madrazo Pintado to tion was left without its traditional general, despite the acrimony of the overturning the reforms of the seven - political head. debate, the Madrazo followers man - teenth assembly, and the mushroom - From July 2000 until the election aged to impose their proposals, par - ing of groups inside the PRI with a lo cal of the new national leadership in Feb - ticularly about how the new national power base were all circums tances ruary 2002, the PRI came apart at the leadership was to be elected. that led Zedillo to handle the succes - seams. After the first moments of baf - Regardless of the kind of party the sion in the most favorable way possible flement, without the leadership of the PRI might have evolved into and the for himself. He decided to promote nation’s president, the elites heading degree of internal institutionalization the direct election of the presidential up the party’s different groups began it might achieve, simply having nego - nominee in which he would guarantee to struggle furiously to fill the vacuum tiated basic agreements and made de- all the support of the party apparatus of power. To survive politically, party cisions without internal splits and with - for his candidate, Francisco Labas tida , members faced the task of creating out the intervention of a PRI president , and instituted a system for counting a new method for electing a national has undeniably meant that the party the votes by dist ricts won, making the leader ship and setting up rules for func - went through a major organizational victory of oppo sition members with tioning and decision making outside change. strong regional support difficult. The the framework of the government. central confron tation was between La - In February 2001, the PRI elites and bastida and Madrazo. The primaries their main notables came to several THE FIRST INTERNAL ELECTION were held November 7, 1999, and, as agreements for electing the new na tio n - OF NATIONAL LEADERS : 2002 expected, Labastida won the PRI ’s pre s- al leadership. This meeting, known as idential nomination. the “El Caballito conclave” was the Once the rules of the game were esta b- beginning of an internal truce. These lished, the next step was to put them informal agreements were ratified by into practice. In late 2001, two possi - ELECTORAL DEFEAT the National Political Council. The ble slates emerged from the two party AND THE INTERNAL POWER most important was to hold the eigh - factions to contend for heading up the STRUGGLE : 2000-2002 teenth national assembly in November party: Roberto Madrazo, backed up 2001 to write new by-laws. The cen - by Elba Esther Gordillo, and Beatriz The victory of Vicente Fox Quesada tral question, naturally, would be the Paredes Rangel and her running mate and the National Action Party ( PAN ) is mechanism for electing the new party Javier Guerrero. They would compete a milestone in the country’s political president and the general secretary of for votes in February 2002. Both sides history. For the first time since 1929, the National Executive Committee had gathered groups with different in - a candidate from outside the “Party (CEN ), until then appointed by Mex - terests and varied regional forces. of the Revolution” had won. Until then , ico’s president. At this stage of the The primaries took place February the PRI had not developed any real process, the actions of PRI governors 24, and the results were made public internal structure —not just a formal were crucial. During the sessions of on February 27. The process was not

9 Voices of Mexico • 69

without its clashes and frictions between the contenders; as was to be To survive politically, party members expected, both sides used the same created rules for functioning outside the framework mechanisms that the party had tradi - of the government. tionally used to mobilize voters, spark - ing mutual accusations of rounding up voters and other illicit practices. At Paredes supporters. In this way, the new THE TESTS OF 2003 the end of the day, the winning ticket national leadership took office, but it AND ELBA ’S COUP 2 was headed up by Madrazo and Gor- had to negotiate its executive commit - dillo (see table 1). tee with its adversaries. Up to that After the defeat of PRI presidential Despite strong discontentment in point, the PRI ’s road was not an easy can didate Labastida, the party had to the ranks of the defeated side, Beatriz one, and at times it veered dangerous - make its own political decisions for Paredes decided against breaking with ly close to the abyss of organizational the first time. Since then, it has gone the party and accepted defeat but with - break. With things like this, the PRI through difficult situations and seri - out hiding her disagreement. Paredes approached 2003, a year which had se v - ous internal conflicts, the results of said, “I accept the commission’s deci - eral crucial developments in store. which in the medium and long terms sion, but I do not share the way the In short, the internal power vacu - are uncertain. In 2003, several issues election was carried out.” The next day, um caused by the country’s new pres - stand out: the repercussions of “Pe - she resumed her seat in the Chamber ident not being a member of the PRI mexgate”; 3 the debate about the pri - of Deputies and, before 70 deputies and the subsequent faction fight vatization of the electrical industry; who had supported her, expressed the seemed to herald the collapse or frag - the designation of candidates for pub - need to avoid internal clashes among mentation of the party if not its com - lic office, particularly for Congress; legislators and of keeping the PRI cau - plete disappearance from the political the decision about who was going to cus united so as not to lose influence. map. However, contrary to all forecasts , head up the PRI ’s congressional cau - Madrazo supporters took on the its elites managed to come to a basic cus; and the position of the PRI caucus task of building bridges with the Pa - agreement in the November 2001 about the PAN administration’s fiscal redes supporters in negotiating the eighteenth assembly to decide on the proposals. These problems, although composition of the PRI ’s new National party’s new by-laws. The most surpris - they each had their own dynamic, Executive Committee. The new team ing thing was that the PRI did not split ended up by tainting each other. This was made up mainly of Madrazo and during this process. was due to a great extent to the way tha t Elba Esther Gordillo tried to arrange power relations in her favor. For the first months of 2003, the TABLE 2 PRI ’s attention was fixed on the matter NATIONAL VOTE BY PARTIES AND NUMBER of the illegal funneling of state-owned OF DISTRICT WINS (1997-2003) oil giant Pemex funds through the union to Francisco Labastida’s presi - VOTE (%) DISTRICTS WON dential campaign. In March, the Fe d e r - 1997 2000 2003 1997 2000 2003 al Electoral Institute ( IFE ) fined the party about one billion pesos, a heavy PAN 26.6 39.1 31.8 65 141 82 blow to PRI finances, particularly amidst PRI 39.1 37.8 38.0 165 131 163 preparations for the next federal elec - PRD 25.7 19.1 18.2 70 28 55 toral campaign. This soured relations Others 8.6 4.0 11.9 ———between the two sides of the national

Source: http://www.ife.org.mx/ leadership since, at the end of the day, “Pemexgate” was a problem that had

10 Politics

ity in the Chamber of Deputies that it had lost three years before (see table 2). The polemical Elba Esther Gordillo After the elections, Gordillo man - used the National Educational Workers Union to support aged to impose herself as head of the gubernatorial candidates opposing the PRI . PRI caucus. As was to be expected, ten sion in the Chamber of Deputies been created by Labastida’s campaign For example, one of the many con - increased because Gordillo continued committee, though the whole party was flicts brought about by the new gener - to occupy her post as general secre - made to pay the cost. al secretary of the CEN , Gor dillo, came tary of the party, openly contravening The debate about privatization of about when she was nominated as a party by-laws. By October, a group of the electrical industry began to have deputy by proportional representation 70 deputies —a number which later repercussions among the PRI currents without promising to resign from her grew even more— called for deposing even before the 2003 mid-term elec - post in the party structure as stipulated Gordillo and electing a new head of tions, but was momentarily taken out in article 166 of the by-laws recently the caucus because of her frank col - of the limelight because of the prox - approved in the eighteenth assembly. laborationism with the PAN adminis - imity of the elections and the change- Not only that, but from the beginning tration and her arrogance and temerity over that meant in the Chamber of De p- of the year, she announced that she in occupying positions of power inside uties. Even so, it was clear that inside would head up the PRI caucus in the the party. This time the former gover - the PRI the discussion about how to newly elected Chamber of Deputies. nor of the State of Mexico, Emilio combine the strategy vis-à-vis the ne w In the elections for federal depu - Chuay fett Chemor, came into the li me - PAN administration overlap ped with ties elected by district majority, the light as the new man of the hour. The the redefinition of the state’s new ins ti - PRI ran as a coalition with the Green clash between the two sides in the PRI tutional profile and that, what was worse , Party of Mexico in 97 districts, and congressional caucus then spread to there was no internal agree ment about made quite a good showing, coming PRI governors. this matter. out with a plurality of 38 percent of The conflict deepened even more Although there was no longer a th e vote, and winning outright 163 dis - in October for two reasons. One was member of the PRI occupying the pre s - tricts. This gave the PRI back its plural - when Gordillo named only her own idency to approve (or “put a check mark next to the name of”) the selec tion of candidates for senator and fe deral TABLE 3 deputies for the July 2003 elections, LOCKED AND DISPUTED DISTRICTS CLASSIFIED BY WINNING PARTY (1997, 2000 AND 2003) in March, the new PRI leader ship man - aged to negotiate its lists of candi dates, TYPE OF DISTRICT NUMBER % suffering serious internal fric tions like in any other party, but without organi - Locked districts PAN 40 13.3 zational break-ups. 1997-2003 PRI 99 33.0 Once again, the PRI governors were PRD 18 6.0 a powerful factor in the negotiation of Subtotal 157 52.3 the candidacies, but not the only fac - tor: the leaders of the large corpora - Disputed PAN - PRI 81 27.0 tist organi zations had held onto their 1997-2003 PAN - PRD 45 15.0 share of power, among them, Elba PRI - PRD 17 5.7 Esther Gordillo, the de facto leader of the National Edu ca tional Workers Subtotal 143 47.7 SNTE Union ( ), the coun try’s largest Source: Calculations by the author using IFE data from http://www.ife.org.mx/ union.

11 Voices of Mexico • 69

Leaving behind the anachronistic

The PRI has known how to deal di vision between those who disci plined with the new political-electoral challenges, but its themselves to the nation’s president, internal equilibrium is still fragile. when the PRI still managed to impose its candidate, and those who rebelled against the government technocracy followers to head up the key Chamber During 2004, Gordillo has contin - that used the party as a mere instrument , of Deputies committees allotted to the ued to be the source of polemics sinc e and going beyond the conflicts arising PRI , shunting aside deputies trusted she created a new leadership post inside out of the simple struggle for power, by party president Roberto Madrazo. the SNTE , which she then proceeded we can also recognize a political-ideo - The other was when she pressured to to occupy. Later, during the local elec - logical axis that runs through the PRI force the whole PRI caucus to vote in tions in Aguascalientes and Oaxaca with different intermediate shades of favor of the Fox administration’s fiscal and probably also in Veracruz, she used grey. It goes from those who, under the proposal to put a VAT tax on medicine the union to support gubernatorial can - banner of the old revolutionary nation - and food, an issue discussed in Octo - didates oppos ing the PRI , which led alism, defend the need to continue to ber and November 2003. These were to calls for her expulsion from the par - reserve for the state Keynesian eco nom - the straws that broke the camel’s back . ty (although this proposal was never ic and social functions, all the way to Until that time, Madrazo had been implemented). those who favor a neo-liberal restruc - ambivalent about the general secre - turing of the state and the economy. tary’s maneuvers during the conflict. This makes it difficult to predict But, since Gordillo had already made PERSPECTIVES FOR 2006 the result of the PRI candidate selec - too many assaults on his supporters tion process for 2006, particularly the and pressure had begun to mount, Ma - Thus, 2003 brought the PRI the most presidential nomination. This will be drazo had to concede and begin the important political choices it has had the PRI ’s real trial by fire: nominating process of removing her as head of to face as an organization indepen - a presidential candidate without split - the caucus. dent of the government and led by an ting the party and carrying out a coor - On December 2, awash in a sea of internally limited, but elected national dinated electoral campaign. The pre - intense pressure, the extraordinary se s - leadership. The party has been trans - cedent set by Gordillo, who frankly and sion of the PRI Standing Political Com - forming itself up to a certain point into openly violated the by-laws and esta b - mission 4 and the National Po litical a different political organization from lished external alliances without the Council met to make a call to relieve what it was before 2000, but it has stil l party’s approval, and the lack of a po - Gordillo of her post. This was despite not shed many of the old hallmarks of litical response by the national lead - the fact that only hours before, the party identity that its long organiza - ership may be an incentive for every - Gordillo bloc had pressured and even tional past left indelibly engraved on one to ignore the by-laws when the tim e threatened deputies aligned in favor its internal habits. comes to choose a presidential candi - of the switch, and that the Gordillo Although until now the PRI has bee n date and launch themselves into a de puties’ absented themselves in an able to deal more or less positive ly with battle without quarter that could seri - attempt to make a quorum impossible. the challenges of the new po litical-e lec - ously fracture the party. Of course, it is The next day, the PRI caucus met and toral situation and has ma naged to avoid also very possible that political prag - elected Chuayfett as the new coordi - the internal power struggles causing matism, something the PRI elites excel nator by 118 votes. Once she was de - splits, it is undeni able that its internal at, may also lead them to keep the feated, her support among the gover - equilibrium is still fragile and precarious. party together for all of 2006. nors also waned, since they opted to And not only that: many of its actors The external challenges arising from respect the deputies’ decision. That ope rate motivated only by vested inte r - the election results are still to be met, closed, for the time being at least, the ests, which makes for a panorama of whether they win or lose the presi - chapter of Elba’s coup. 5 rather unstable internal alliances. dency, whether they win a majority in

12 Politics

the Chamber of Deputies and the Se n- be played out to a great extent. From 2 ”Elba’s coup”, or the elbazo , refers to PRI Ge n- eral Secretary and Federal Deputy Elba Esthe r ate or not. In both cases, there will be that point of view, the PRI ’s hand is not Gordillo’s actions: together with a group of pressures inside the party. From the bad, but everything will depend on its followers, she decided to support the Fox admi n - istration’s fiscal proposals without reaching an point of view of the elections them - knowing how to play its cards. And for internal agreement with the PRI ’s main po lit - selves, the PRI has two things in its that it has to maintain organizatio n al ical players. favor : having maintained a constant 38 unity, something which is more un - 3 or 39 percent of the vote in the last certain. The term “Pemexgate” refers to the scandal about Mexico’s state-owned oil giant funnel - three federal elections (1997, 2000 ing funds to the PRI presidential campaign and 2003) and having won one-third through the union. [Editor’s Note.] of all the seats in elections of federal NOTES 4 This structure, made up of National Political deputies by district (see table 3). Ac - 1 Council members, was created by the eigh - tually, a great deal seems to depend on The author refers here, first, to the attempt to teenth national assembly, and is an interme - transform the party from a corporatist organi - diate body between the NCP and the PRI ’s how the non- PRI vote is distributed zation based on sectors into one in which the national president. between the PAN and the Party of the leaderships were picked on a territorial basis. The implementation of the Pronasol program Democratic Revolution ( PRD ) in a se - refers to the attempt to subordinate the party 5 In PRI insider language, the term “ albazo ” is ries of strategic districts. In any case, to the interests of and support for the Na tio n - used to mean that a political group attempts al Solidarity Program (Pronasol), the admin - to surprise another group with an unexpected most probably, their efforts will cen ter is tration’s social relief program that covered maneuver ahead of scheduled formal events. on taking the districts where the PAN all aspects (education, health care, housing, The term “elbazo”, loosely translated as “Elba’s food) and was used in a corporatist way to coup”, is derived from Gordillo’s first name, has a chance of winning, where the strengthen the government party among the Elba, and refers to her maneuvers during fall result of the federal elections will also country’s poorest population. [Editor’s Note.] of 2003.