P O L I T I C S Out of Office The PRI ’s Restructuring And Perspectives 2006 Guadalupe Pacheco Méndez* o o r r u u c c s s o o t t r r a a u u C C / / s s e a l r a o l S F y l n l a e u N J PRI President Roberto Madrazo next to legislative caucus head Emilio Chuayffet and State of Mexico Governor Arturo Controversial Teacher’s Union leader Montiel with other PRI leaders. Elba Esther Gordillo. INTRODUCTION of revolutionary regional forces during the founding leader or the nation’s pre s - THE GRADUAL DISARTICULATION the years of the Revolutionary Natio n - ident. And this was the fundamen tal OF POWER GROUPS : 1988-2000 al Party, or PNR (1929-1938); that of distinctive trait that determined its in - a corporatist front of mass social orga - ternal power relations. The defeat of the Institutional Revo lu - nizations during the years of the Party From 1988 on, external political con - tionary Party ( PRI ) in 2000 closed a his - of the Mexican Revolution, or PRM ditions exerted increasingly strong pre s - toric cycle in Mexico’s political life. (1938-1946) and as the Institutional sures on the PRI internally, particular - Throughout its existence, the “party of Re volutionary Party, or PRI (1946-2000), ly the series of electoral reforms t hat the Revolution” took on several orga - subject, together with its three sectors would culminate in 1996 with the auto - nizational identities: that of a coalition (workers, peasants and community nomy of electoral authorities vis-à-vis mem bers), to the authority of the coun - the executive branch of government, try’s president. The common denomi - stripping the party of its privileges one *Researcher at the Sociology Depart men t of the Autonomous Metropolitan Uni - nator of these stages was its subordi - by one, particularly those originating ver sity, Xochimilco campus. nation to an external authority, whether in the government, which had allowed 7 Voices of Mexico • 69 TABLE 1 PRI LEADERSHIP ELECTION RESULTS BY GOVERNOR ’S AFFILIATION (F EBRUARY 2002) GOVERNOR ’S MADRAZO PAREDES CANCELLED TOTAL DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE AFFILIATION GORDILLO GUERRERO VOTES VOTES MADRAZO /PARE - MADRAZO / DES (NUMBER PAREDES (%) OF VOTES ) PRI -Madrazo 424,069 80,967 20,518 525,554 343,102 65.3 PRI -Paredes 596,611 949,824 82,746 1,629,181 -353,213 -21.7 Total PRI 1,020,680 1,030,791 103,264 2,154,735 -10,111 -0.5 PAN 384,401 266,766 33,671 684,838 117,635 17.2 PRD 112,982 168,660 12,903 294,545 -55,678 -18.9 Total 497,383 435,426 46,574 979,383 61,957 6.3 PAN and PRD Overall Total 1,518,063 1,466,217 149,838 3,134,118 51,846 1.7 Source: Table designed by the author with data from the PRI Internet portal, http://www.pri.org.mx/principal/ PRI .htm it to maintain electoral hegemony. This ed burying the Keynesian model of the during the 1994 campaign and the tug - combined with a change in the internal state, and on the other extreme were of-war that resulted in the designation distribution of “power quotas,” strength - those who waved the neo-liberal ban - of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León to ening the ability of those directly linked ner and agreed with the government replace him also accentuated the in - with the new public sector technocra - technocracy’s restructuring of the eco n - ternal tensions. cy to vie for candidacies for public of - omy and the public sector. Later, new developments sharp - fi ce. That created tensions with the old After the severe 1988 political-elec - ened internal tension and discontent - “nationalist” elites linked to corpora tist toral crisis, new focuses of tension ment. The shock created by Zedillo’s sectoral organizations. In turn, this would emerged in PRI interal life. During the announcement that he would estab - unleash an internal dynamic fraught administration of Carlos Salinas de Gor - lish a “healthy distance” vis-à-vis the with outbreaks of autonomy by party tari (1988-1994), two bids were made PRI , together with the bad electoral militants who no longer wanted to sub - to reform the party from above with Sa - re sults of 1995 and 1997 caused by ordinate themselves to the authority linas attempting to eliminate the PRI ’s dis contentment with the economic cri - of the nation’s president at the same sectoral structure by different means: sis that broke out at the beginning of time that links between those acti vists the fourteenth national assem bly’s “te r - the administration were all factors that and PRI governors were strengthened. ritorialization” (1990) and the imple - sharpened internal tension and dissa t - These power struggles were also men tation of the “Pronasol” prog ram isfaction. This led to the beginning o f crisscrossed by an ideological fight: on in the sixteenth assembly (1993). 1 The a phase of attempted rebellion of cer - one side were those who, under the assassination of PRI presidential can - tain PRI groups against the president, flag of revolutionary nationalism, resist - didate Luis Donaldo Colosio Mu rrieta which translated into the imposition 8 Politics of serious limitations on his discre - tionary ability to designate the next Power struggles were crisscrossed presidential nominee during the sev - by an ideological fight between nationalists and enteenth national assembly held in the neo-liberal technocrats. 1996; these were called President Ze - dillo’s “padlocks”, or limits. As the 2000 presidential elections one— for making major decisions and the eighteenth assembly, the decisive approached, internal clashes between regulating internal conflict. The coun - debates took place in the working group PRI members identified with the party try’s president had always taken care on the by-laws, with a central confron - traditions and the “technocrats”, the of that. This meant that when its can - tation between Madrazo and Labastida open opposition of then-governor of didate lost the election, the organiza - followers over control of the party. In Tabasco Roberto Madrazo Pintado to tion was left without its traditional general, despite the acrimony of the overturning the reforms of the seven - political head. debate, the Madrazo followers man - teenth assembly, and the mushroom - From July 2000 until the election aged to impose their proposals, par - ing of groups inside the PRI with a lo cal of the new national leadership in Fe b - ticularly about how the new national power base were all circums tances ruary 2002, the PRI came apart at the leadership was to be elected. that led Zedillo to handle the succes - seams. After the first moments of baf - Regardless of the kind of party the sion in the most favorable way possible flement, without the leadership of the PRI might have evolved into and the for himself. He decided to promote nation’s president, the elites heading degree of internal institutionalization the direct election of the presidential up the party’s different groups began it might achieve, simply having nego - nominee in which he would guarantee to struggle furiously to fill the vacuum tiated basic agreements and made de - all the support of the party apparatus of power. To survive politically, party cisions without internal splits and with - for his candidate, Francisco Labas tida , members faced the task of creating out the intervention of a PRI president , and instituted a system for counting a new method for electing a national has undeniably meant that the party the votes by dist ricts won, making the leader ship and setting up rules for func - went through a major organizational victory of oppo sition members with tioning and decision making outside change. strong regional support difficult. The the framework of the government. central confron tation was between La - In February 2001, the PRI elites and bastida and Madrazo. The primaries their main notables came to several THE FIRST INTERNAL ELECTION were held November 7, 1999, and, as agreements for electing the new na tio n - OF NATIONAL LEADERS : 2002 expected, Labastida won the PRI ’s pre s - al leadership. This meeting, known as idential nomination. the “El Caballito conclave” was the Once the rules of the game were esta b- beginning of an internal truce. These lished, the next step was to put them informal agreements were ratified by into practice. In late 2001, two possi - ELECTORAL DEFEAT the National Political Council. The ble slates emerged from the two party AND THE INTERNAL POWER most important was to hold the eigh - factions to contend for heading up the STRUGGLE : 2000-2002 teenth national assembly in November party: Roberto Madrazo, backed up 2001 to write new by-laws. The cen - by Elba Esther Gordillo, and Beatriz The victory of Vicente Fox Quesada tral question, naturally, would be the Paredes Rangel and her running mate and the National Action Party ( PAN ) is mechanism for electing the new party Javier Guerrero. They would compete a milestone in the country’s political president and the general secretary of for votes in February 2002. Both sides history. For the first time since 1929, the National Executive Committee had gathered groups with different in - a candidate from outside the “Party (CEN ), until then appointed by Mex - terests and varied regional forces. of the Revolution” had won. Until then , ico’s president. At this stage of the The primaries took place February the PRI had not developed any real process, the actions of PRI governors 24, and the results were made public internal structure —not just a formal were crucial.