THEMATIC ESSAY THE SNTE, ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CALDERÓN CARLOS ORNELAS

Carlos Ornelas is a professor in the department of education and communication at Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Xochimilco campus. Calzada del Hueso 1100, Colonia Villa Quietud, CP 04960. E-MAIL: [email protected]

Abstract: Although the National Union of Workers in Education (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación–SNTE) no longer has the monopoly of representing the teaching profession, and in spite of movements that challenge the leadership of the group’s president, the group continues to be the most powerful union organization in Mexico. Its power extends to other areas of political life, bureaucratic institutions, and to an even greater degree, to the administration of basic education. One might believe that the SNTE and its president, Elba Esther Gordillo, have become more powerful under the protection of President Felipe Calderón, yet they face new challenges. This article analyzes the corporatist practices of the SNTE and the institutional consequences for the Secretariat of Public Education, especially in terms of the behaviors of the bureaucratic cadres. During the analysis, theoretical notions for explaining the case are discussed.

Key words: basic education, power, unionism, educational policy, Mexico.

Reason cannot become transparent to itself as long as men act as members of an organization that lacks reason.1 (Horkheimer, 1976:219)

Introduction Many analysts believed that the wave of neoliberal economic reforms that appeared in Latin America in the 1980s would reduce the power of the unions, whose influence had grown through state expansion, economic protectionism, a rigid labor market, and political protection (Murillo, 2001). However, judging from the political evolution of Mexico during recent years, the National Union of Workers in Education (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación—SNTE) is successfully challenging that expectation. Although changes in union leadership occurred in the late 1980s, not only has the chain of reforms from the term of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari survived, but union members have also enjoyed improved income and benefits, and union leaders have more canonries. While the SNTE no longer has the monopoly of representing the teaching profession, and in spite of movements that challenge the leadership of the group’s president, the group continues to be the most powerful union organization in Mexico. Its power extends to other areas of political life, bureaucratic institutions (like the Institute of Social Security and Services and of Government Workers) (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado—ISSSTE), and to an even greater degree, to the administration of basic education. The source of power for the SNTE or more precisely, for the dominant group that is concentrated in its National Executive Committee (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional—CEN) is illegitimate; although institutionalized, it did not arise from the organization itself but was granted by the regime of the Mexican Revolution. Even though the SNTE was created from borrowed power, it attained—because of Mexican corporatism, which is vertical and authoritarian—a notable degree of autonomy from government. In the 1950s, the SNTE implemented a long-term strategy to colonize the governing structures of basic education (Ornelas, 2006). This mediatized the action of the authorities, distanced teachers from education, and transformed teachers into colonizers who infused their tradition and nature into the bureaucratic functioning of the Secretariat of Public Education (Secretaría de Educación Pública—SEP) and other organizations in the states. In spite of the employment and economic progress made during the administration of President Vicente Fox and the victory in the 2006 elections upon consolidating the registration of the New Alliance Party (Partido Nueva Alianza— Panal), sponsored by the SNTE, the political appetite of the Gordillo camarilla seems to be insatiable. One could believe that today, under the protection of President Felipe Calderón, the SNTE and its president, Elba Esther Gordillo, are in a situation that is close to perfect: their power seems to be unlimited and the agreement they made with President Fox has been extended and broadened in the new administration. Their collusion was made manifest in December of 2006, when President Calderón designated Fernando González Sánchez, Gordillo’s son-in-law, as the undersecretary of basic education, and appointed Luis Enrique Sánchez Gómez, another loyal follower of Gordillo, to the Federal Administration of Educational Services for the Federal District. If the argument is true that an alliance exists between President Calderón and the SNTE, one should ask if this alliance will be sustained during the president’s time in office, and if the government will be able to place limits on the ambitions of the group that controls the SNTE. This association could be ruptured by the old rivalry between modernizing sectors and traditional SEP sectors, the growth of dissident groups within the union, or the modernizing ideas of civil organizations. No coherent, complete theory provides plausible solutions to questions that imply speculation and reasoning more than empirical proof. It is not about being a fortune teller—a heretical profession in academia—but about carrying out an exercise in imagination and political sociology (Mills, 1961). In order to provide a basis for that exercise, an analysis is made of the corporatist practices of the SNTE and the institutional consequences in the SEP, especially the behaviors of the bureaucratic cadres. On the way, theoretical notions to explain the case are presented.

Unique Corporatism and Political Colonialism No general theory of government offers satisfactory solutions to all practical situations subject to analysis. The abstract concept of state refers to a society’s type of political organization, to the institutions within that organization, and to the relations established among individual citizens as well as among the government bodies in that society. Academic essays refer to democratic, authoritarian, benevolent, evaluating, dictatorial, or corporatist states (cf. Carnoy, 1984). The postulate could be developed that no government exists without adjectives. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 incorporated many of the traits of the democratic state (or liberal democratic state, as defined by Bobbio, 1989). It instituted the separation and balance of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial), the election of government officials and legislators through universal, secret voting (the main demand behind the Mexican Revolution), and basic freedoms (of thought, expression, assembly, association, and movement). The Constitution of 1917 also ratified the notion of a secular, lay state. With the constitutional reforms of 1946, specifically the third article, the state specifies that democracy will be understand as “[...] not simply a legal structure and a political regime, but a system founded on constant economic, social and cultural improvement for the people”. But the winning group in the Mexican Revolution upset the democratic political organization embodied in the Constitution and implemented a corporatist regime. Although it has its origins in the Middle Age system of a layered society, corporatism as a method of political organization in government flourished in Fascist Italy, in Nazi Germany, and in Falangist Spain (Incisa, 1981). In the western democracies, after the First World War and the consolidation of the so-called “benefactor state”, group interests, social classes, and regions began to be represented more by their leaders and less by elected officials. National government became the most dynamic agent of development, and within a few decades subordinated sub-national political entities. In Latin America, where democracy had not been consolidated, the model seduced dictators and charismatic leaders. In Mexico, the constitutional arrangements varied little. Corporatism, according to Panitch (1980:162), was not an ideology, but a way of organizing—the technology of power—the relations between employers and workers in advanced capitalism. Critics on the left describe corporatist institutions as promoters of “internal colonialism”, in which the head of state dominates (in the sense of bureaucratic subordination) the other powers and regions.2 From the point of view of social power, corporations (political parties, unions, schools, public institutions) were the principal elements of social cohesion and their representatives had preponderance over territorial authority. The populist regime of the Mexican Revolution fused the supply of certain benefits for organized workers, yet even more for its leaders, in exchange for submitting to the control of the official party machinery (Córdova, 1973). Real populism and corporatism subverted formal democracy. According to Schmitter (1974:93-94), corporatism is the opposite of democratic pluralism. In his words, corporatism is “a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.”3 The national government replaced the parties and obtained hegemonic power in the modulation of the economy as well as in practical policy. As foreseen by Weber (1964:744-745), the control of the state apparatus by a professional bureaucracy became an end in itself, with the resulting reduction of civil society and its institutions. In Weber’s opinion, a bureaucracy is the purest type of legal domination. In his ideal type of legitimate domination, the bureaucratic rationale identifies with the history of the modern state. Officials designated by turns, election, or luck are part of the concept of bureaucracy, provided their competence is based on established norms. In his book, Economy and Society, Weber dedicates one extensive chapter to bureaucratic domination, in which he examines its essence, assumptions, and development, as well as its political action:

All domination becomes manifest and functions in the form of government. All government regimes need dominion in some form, since they must place imperative powers in someone’s hands. The power to lead may have a modest appearance and the leader may be considered the “servant” of the dominated. This almost always occurs in so-called direct democratic government (Weber, 1964:701).

The Weberian bureaucratic prototype has been widely criticized for its weakness in explaining the decision-making process and failing to capture informal types of power and influence. Baldridge pointed to three weaknesses of this focus. First, the bureaucratic model is centered on the idea of legitimate, formal power but does not explain power based on illegitimate threats and movements of masses that appeal to emotions and feelings; nor does it foresee the power that emanates from union organizations. Second, the Weberian guideline helps to explain formal structures, but contributes little about the dynamic processes of the acting institutions in a political system. Third, the bureaucratic paradigm explains the formal structure at a certain moment, but does not explain changes over time; nor does it study the process of formulating government policies or the intervention of social actors outside government, like power groups and civil organizations (Baldridge, 1978:31). The Mexican regime seems to have studied well the maxim of Benito Mussolini: “The union cannot be an end in itself: it becomes exhausted in political socialism or in the Fascist corporation” (quoted by Incisa, 1981:436). The corporatism impelled by the regime of the Mexican Revolution disarticulated free unionism and workers’ voluntary membership in organizations that would defend their rights, by implementing official unions that workers were required to join, even against their will. During the term of President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), the social sectors had been subordinated to the government and grouped by corporation: workers in Mexico’s Confederation of Workers, peasants in the National Peasant Confederation, a variation of middle segments in the National Confederation of Mass Organizations, merchants in the Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce, industry in the Confederation of Industrial Chambers, bankers in their own association; even the Catholic church had accepted a type of tacit concordat with the regime. All workers were in a union organization, sole and national, with leaders loyal to the serving president. Except for teachers. As stated in numerous studies (Raby, 1974; Medina 1978; Ornelas 2006), the SNTE was organized by the government against the will of most of its 700-plus unions, federations and confederations of teachers who had resisted, with a degree of success, the attempts to unify them in a centralized, unitary organization. The leaders of the then small but combative associations did not want to be enclosed in the state apparatus, in the Party of the Mexican Revolution, later called PRI. The peculiarity of Mexican corporatism was its authoritarian and vertical essence. The unions and other corporations attained a monopoly in representation only when authorized by the public power. Pacts signed to subordinate workers to the party structure and to presidential loyalty were oriented to maintaining social order, state legitimacy, and consensus for the system (Medina, 1978). In return, the government created institutions for the protection of union members. “The right of industrial societies is used increasingly more to strengthen corporatist interests; exactly the same happens with us” (Córdova, 1972:47). The government also granted leaders incentives to guarantee worker subordination. Through the PRI, the sectors had positions: on city councils, in lower and upper legislative houses, and even governorships. The SNTE obtained the monopoly in representing teachers in cooperation with President Ávila Camacho (Mexico’s president, 1944), who ordered the Secretariat of Finance to retain the teachers’ union dues and deliver them to the secretary general of the SNTE. According to Benavides y Velazco (1993:54-61), some of the corporatist attributes that marked the SNTE as a state-linked apparatus were that it was sole, nationalist, authoritarian, and vertical. It was a loyal defender of revolutionary nationalism, the number one advocate of the philosophy of the third article of the Constitution (except in the portion that defines democracy), and the forger of the ideology of Mexican Normalism—attributes that served to form camarillas that appropriated teacher representation. A camarilla is a group of people who associate to protect their illegitimate interests within an institution; the benefits for comrades often clash with institutional purposes.

Policy and Bureaucratic Professionalization The history of the CEN and its evolution has already been told (for example, Benavides y Velasco, 1993; Peláez, 1984). What is barely beginning to be documented is how the SNTE reached high degrees of autonomous power (except for the president) and colonized the SEP and groups charged with managing basic education in Mexico’s states. To correspond to political loyalty, since the 1950s, the government has permitted, and even stimulated:

[...] the colonization of vast territories of the SEP by the union bureaucracy, which permitted functional aggregation of bureaucratic interests [...] In this manner, the material bases of reproduction of the union bureaucracy, its assets of domination and representation, extended their roots within the Secretariat of Public Education; meanwhile, the conduction capacity of the state bureaucracy over the educational system would find fundamental support in the SNTE for leading and operating the educational system (Reséndiz, 1992:5).

Undersecretaries, general directors, area directors, as well as directors of federal education (elementary, secondary, and physical education) in the states remained the responsibility of officials who had begun their career as militants in the SNTE, and it is reasonable to assume that they were more loyal to the union than to the government. Some of those offices remained as positions in the teaching profession. Teachers who shared political criteria and worked for the same cause found themselves face to face at the negotiating table, some representing the SEP and others the SNTE. The word, colonization, is useful for illustrating SNTE’s ascent over SEP. Colonizing is the act of intervention in a territory, through conquest or agreement, by the citizens of another country; colonizers settle and impose their “culture” on the colonized people. The concept becomes clear when nation and country are replaced by institution. Colonization assumes a radical change in the colonized institution: political segregation (being or not being a teacher educated in a normal school, for example), mixed races, and acculturation. Those loyal to the SNTE became established— and are moving forward in the process of becoming established—in the middle and low segments of the bureaucracy of the educational sector. It is a conscious and permanent union strategy. Extrapolating the classic text by Martin Carnoy (1972:60-61), the colonizer is powerful upon arrival in the colonial context; the colonizer has the support of a rich union apparatus; the colonized entity has no power; if it tries to fight, it is conquered by other means. The colonized entity (the official bureaucracy) has no freedom of choice. This psychological explanation grants a sense of superiority to the colonizing force, pride, self-esteem and ties of unity that have their basis beyond bureaucratic offices. In contrast, modernizing bureaucrats do not share the colonizers’ “culture” and “history”, nor do they have ties of identity that allow them to form a group spirit. They concentrate on technical areas, planning and evaluation, but in basic education, control is exercised by those who are loyal to the SNTE, the colonizers. For this reason, the bureaucracy of the SEP is also composed of “[...] directors, inspectors and general directors who reached those positions with the support of the union organization [who] put into play values, orientations, preferences and behavior guidelines they acquired in their socialization” (Loyo, 1997:208). Some cadres were professionalized in service, not in the union; some officials combined both functions (Miranda, 1992; Street, 1983). Their control over the apparatus was fundamental, if not for fabricating policies, then for implementing or failing to implement them. Ergo, in the mechanisms of bureaucratic negotiation (groups SEP-SNTE), most members frequently share the same ideology and defend the same interests. Over history, the colonization of the SEP by the SNTE weakened the presence of the official bureaucracy in basic education. The union had an advantage over the high-level bureaucrats of the SEP, generally career politicians not in the educational sector. In contrast, the SNTE cadres did not improvise and were professionalized through a union promotion system—still in use—that is informal but effective. A leader of the SNTE would begin with a minor position in a delegation (school zone), and then become the secretary of that delegation, an officer on the executive committee of the section (a federal or state segment in a federal entity), moving on to a position of higher rank, and then becoming another officer or member of an important commission. These cadres generally began their political careers as student leaders in the normal schools. Through a combination of union merits, charisma, contacts in high places, and political skills, the most ambitious would reach a position as secretary general of the corresponding section. In addition to progress in the internal promotion system, those leaders acquired experience in the political party, and were candidates—at the time when being a candidate for the PRI was a guaranteed win—for the legislature or other popularly elected positions. The most outstanding became officers in the CEN after at least twelve years of previous experience, having acquired knowledge of the mechanisms of power, and skills to argue their cause (Loyo, 1997; Ornelas, 2006). For these cadres, the teachers’ union is a life project, not school or education. The high official bureaucracy, on the other hand, attained positions through political appointment, often without being familiar with the profession or having a long-term commitment, as members of a political team. In that game, many officials conformed to complying and then moved on to another commission. Even when politicians arrived with the assignment of promoting an important project—such as the reform of Luis Echeverría or the administrative reforms during the term of López Portillo, for example—they had to negotiate with experienced cadres knowledgeable about the reality at schools and holders of a consolidated ideology—Mexican Normalism—and clear interests. The defense of those inclinations was key in all negotiations. The bureaucracy of the SNTE had a greater mastery of the technology of power than their counterparts from the SEP or the weak organizations in the states.

Colonization and Contest During President Echeverría’s term, a new modernistic bureaucratic group began to form, foreign to the interests of the SNTE. This group had a long-term view and cadres with a certain technical formation that served to project them into politics. The group grew and was consolidated in the term of President López Portillo and challenged the power of the traditional bureaucracy. The conflicts and reconciliations, discords and agreements between these groups has marked the recent history of educational policy. The institutional instrument used by the modernizing group was the “administrative decentralization” of the SEP, in order to seize portions of control from the bureaucracy linked to the SNTE (Prawda, 1984; Street, 1983). At the beginning of the term of President Miguel de la Madrid, the conflict between the two sides was open; Secretary Jesús Reyes Heroles called for an “educational revolution”, whose main assignment was to decentralize basic education and normal education; the opposition of traditional elements and the SNTE was radical. After Reyes Heroles’ death, the SNTE recovered the colonizing mood and became a net winner (Prawda, 1984). The program of educational modernization during the administration of President Salinas de Gortari and the modernistic team led by Manuel Bartlett withstood the offense of the Revolutionary Vanguard of the Teaching Profession, took advantage of the discontent of broad segments and expelled the “lifelong” leader, Carlos Jonguitud Barrios. The modernization program in the educational sector paved the way for neoliberal ideas of liberalization, macroeconomic adjustment, structural reforms and a strategic approach to the United States. Salinas distanced himself from revolutionary nationalism and eliminated the rhetoric of the Mexican Revolution, while the nation’s borders were opened to trade, the banks restored to the private sector, and reforms made to the untouchable Constitutional articles: 27, 28 and 130. Salinas’ government maneuvered for a replacement of the unaccommodating leader, by a person the president and his political advisors (Manuel Camacho and José Córdoba Montoya) perhaps considered loyal and yielding, Elba Esther Gordillo. This maneuver confirmed ex post that Salinas’ government promoted neoliberal economic reforms, but not the democratization of the state, and even less the democratization of education. As in the oil workers’ union, leaders who had become a deadweight for the project were removed, but the corporatist structures left intact. Salinas himself established the bases for new leaders to survive his term and in the case of Gordillo at least, to deny his sponsorship. Elba Esther Gordillo promoted internal revision in order to legitimate her leadership. She formed her own current (institutional) and negotiated with dissident groups; removed obligatory affiliation to the PRI from the statutes (which did not dismantle corporatism, however); implemented the “National Mobilization for Education”; constituted the SNTE Foundation for Teacher Culture, and invited the participation of politicians, journalists, and prestigious academics like Olac Fuentes, its first president and director (Ornelas, 2006:240-241). But she spearheaded a conflict with the secretary of public education, Manuel Bartlett, because he did not allow her to expand her strategy of colonization. Although other motives may have been present, the president’s firing of Bartlett represented a triumph for the CEN and its secretary general, marking the end of a project of radical decentralization that was considering the dismantling or federalization of the SNTE and the second governmental conquest of the spaces colonized by the union.4 Upon the arrival of Ernesto Zedillo to the top position in the SEP, the trend reversed. With the signing of the Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education, the SNTE wrangled concessions from the government to compensate for its acceptance of the federalization of education. The explicit favors were substantial improvements for teachers (salary increases and incentives through the “Carrera Magisterial” program), offers for updating, and symbolic rewards (the revaluing of the teaching function). One of the implicit concessions was tolerance for the new colonization of the administration of basic education. Within a few months after Bartlett’s resignation, the “historical positions” of the SNTE in the SEP returned to its hands. And more.

Vocation of Power Although militants from dissident teachers’ groups and cadres at the vanguard knew of her ambitions, it was not until President Salinas appointed her as secretary general that Elba Esther Gordillo began to show her full vocation of power. She assumed the post with impetus, implemented an unusually high level of activity, negotiated with all groups, aligned most of the vanguard in the “institutional” current, attempted—and achieved to a high degree—to fragment the National Coordination of Workers in Education (CNTE), and built step by step a union project that would surpass labor issues and the colonization of the SEP: a project that would influence education (Gordillo, 1995:118-124). With express government support, even from Bartlett, Gordillo called two special congresses of the SNTE; in the first she was ratified as secretary general and in the second, her mandate was extended two years in addition to the established three.5 During the term of Ernesto Zedillo, Gordillo was no longer the secretary general, but had formed a camarilla that took over most of the decision-making bodies. First without any position, and then as president of the National Political Council, Gordillo did not release the reins of power; the nation’s president and his secretary of public education, Miguel Limón, recognized her leadership and—perhaps reluctantly—accepted her as the union representative, granted her positions in the SEP and allowed the continued colonization of educational organizations in Mexico’s states. During the term of President Vicente Fox, Gordillo’s ambition skyrocketed. President Fox boasted of his friendship with Elba Esther Gordillo in a attempt to symbolize his appreciation of the nation’s teaching profession. Perhaps he believed that by making concessions to Gordillo and recognizing her as a privileged spokesperson, he could push through certain reforms in education. But the opposite occurred. Through the signing of the Social Commitment to the Quality of Education in August of 2002—which would simply commit each actor to fulfill his role—President Fox granted Gordillo more power, presented her as a “palace favorite” according to the Proceso headline, and as his ally for the reforms “the country needs” (Reforma, August 9, 2002). Gordillo’s appetite seemed unlimited: “She is secretary general of the PRI, operator of the nation’s president [Vicente Fox] and a collaborator of his wife, which forces her to give preference to and use her ability to control the teaching profession to the detriment of teachers’ interests” (Granados Chapa, 2003). But she went even farther, and in spite of the opposition of militants and leaders, she attained the parliamentary coordination of the PRI in the Chamber of Deputies. For that reason, according to Delal Baer, an expert on Mexico in the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, Gordillo was almost as powerful as President Vicente Fox. “She is the Jimmy Hoffa of Mexico, but in a dress” (Reforma, July 31, 2003). As the coordinator of her fraction, Elba Esther Gordillo took risks as usual, but failed. First, she supported President Fox’s proposals to collect value-added tax on the sale of food and medicine (an unpopular measure and against the PRI’s platform) and other reforms. Second, she gave orders to legislators with the same arrogance that she used with the members of her group who owed her for their career or at least their post; while outside legislators owed her nothing. She clashed with them and with the president of the PRI, her former ally, Roberto Madrazo. Third, as secretary general of the PRI, she motivated Panal to oppose the PRI and obtain more power. As a result, she was ousted from the parliamentary coordination, resigned from the legislature and took refuge in her bunker: the SNTE. But her leadership was illegitimate and lacking in institutional support, the end of Fox’s term was approaching, and the statutes had to be reformed to legalize her power. In March of 2004, the 5th Special National Congress of the SNTE was held. At the congress, approval was given to statutory reforms that instituted the position of president and executive secretary general. There were no surprises. Elba Esther Gordillo was elected president and Rafael Ochoa Guzmán, secretary, from 2004 to 2008. On July 7, 2007, a call was made for her de facto reelection. According to newspaper accounts, Elba Esther Gordillo incited her followers to lobby with trusted delegates during the 23rd Special National Congress of the SNTE to extend her mandate for an indefinite time period. The Congress of March, 2008, which was to serve to replace the CEN, would not be held. For Gordillo’s adversaries and independent analysts, that maneuver revealed her aspiration to be the “lifelong leader”.6 Elba Esther Gordillo does not need to control teachers en masse since the power she exerts over sectional leaders and the CEN, which reelected her unanimously, is sufficient to make her power felt. If, during the regime of the Mexican Revolution, the president limited the power of the union caciques, during the “government of change”, those ties no longer existed. Gordilla’s canonries grew along with her accumulated power. But her constituents also obtained benefits. Taking into account their base pay and generic benefits (which in the sector’s language are called professional salaries), the accumulated increase from 2000 to 2006 was 38%, moving from 4,562 pesos to 6,331 pesos per month (an elementary school teacher with a group, in his first position, in economic zone II). More teachers joined the Carrera Magisterial program, the number of mortgage loans and other gains rose, and most importantly, the promise was made to rezone the teaching profession to economic zone III, the zone with the highest cost of living (Ornelas, 2007). Elba Esther Gordillo took advantage of the movement of the teachers from section 22 of the SNTE, in Oaxaca (who did not support her movement but demanded rezoning), to convince President Fox that if rezoning were completed for the national teaching profession, the political movement in Oaxaca, which had spread to other social segments, would come to an end or that she would do everything in her power to terminate it. The promise of more than forty billion pesos for this purpose was given by Vicente Fox’s administration, but he left payment pending for the following administration. And the problem in Oaxaca was not solved.7

The True New Alliance If, during the times of the PRI, corporatism was explained by the subordination of workers’ organizations to the power of the president, during the transition to a new regime based primarily on democracy, it was not easy to explain the power and persistence of corporatist organizations. Perhaps Vicente Fox did not have a political vocation or was unable to build a technology of power to deal with the union; such matters may not have been of interest for him. Or perhaps he allowed himself to be seduced by the dynamics and loquacity of Professor Gordillo. The fact is that he ceded in exchange for nothing more than a few laudatory phrases from Elba Esther Gordillo about him and his wife (a factor of real power); but Gordillo’s protégés hurled sharp criticism at his secretary of public education and undermined his programs.8 President Felipe Calderón is a professional politician. He has the political vocation in his genes, imposes discipline on his cabinet, has a mastery of the technology of power, works with other social actors to reach his goals, and always follows the dominant line, except with the SNTE; and it is not easy to find a rational explanation. It seems obvious that during the 2006 presidential elections, an alliance began to form between the presidential candidate from the National Action Party (PAN) and Gordillo. There are many proofs that she manipulated those sure to vote for Panal, her clients and relatives to back their party in the congressional races, but to vote for the PAN in the presidential race. The winner’s margin of almost one and one-half million votes is a piece of information that Gordillo has known how to exploit. The price she charges is excessive and the government pays the price. But she wants more.9 In political negotiations, as in commercial transactions, there is give and take; nothing is free. In exchange for those votes, President Calderón conceded to Gordillo the inclusion of her loyal followers in key posts of basic education. It was the continuity of colonization, not the first, which was a recognition of the strength of the SNTE and not simply the payment of a debt. One tends to forget, however, that the PAN is a doctrinaire party (it can be said that President Calderón was raised on that doctrine), that has a history and a program that renounced the ideology of the Mexican Revolution and its regime. Of course the alliance implied that Panal legislators and other legislators loyal to Gordillo in the PRI and PAN would support the reforms of the ISSSTE law, in exchange for Gordillo’s continued governance in that institution through one of her protégés, as in the previous presidential administration.10 In spite of the gains, Gordillo wants more power and canonries. She obtains salary increases and benefits for her union members, proposes plans, requests stipends, and utters threats. The nation’s president remains silent and the cautious responses from the secretary of public education, Josefina Vázquez Mota, seem to embolden the SNTE leaders and they challenge her at every instant. It appears that the norms are subordinate to the rules of the political game, in which the government representatives offer timid answers. At the beginning of the new presidential term, the balance of power was leaning toward the union. On May 14, 2007, the SEP granted teachers a direct wage increase of 4.8% plus benefits to reach a total increase of 7.0%; 15% advance payment was made to Compactable Provisional Compensation, also known as rezoning, to keep President Fox’s earlier promise, and the alliance was ratified by President Calderón. On July 8, 2007, the SEP announced an addition to the pact of May in the amount of 500 million pesos. Greater resonance in the media was obtained by Professor Gordillo’s intent to create an educational program in competition with the government. To disguise her purposes, the SNTE organized the 4th National Congress of Education and the 2nd National Encounter of Parents and Teachers, from which an “educational” project emerged along with the demand for the president to incorporate it into the sectorial program of education. With the somewhat pompous title, Un nuevo modelo educativo para el México del siglo XXI (A New Educational Model for Mexico in the 21st Century) and the slogan of “Educating is the Way”, the SNTE reiterated old proposals with updated rhetoric (SNTE, 2007). In ten reflections linked to an equal number of challenges, the text suggests that the base of the new model would be a national educational project in which the teachers’ union governs education, at least basic education. The SNTE book contains a devastating diagnosis of the educational system: everything is wrong, it is centralist and out of sync; in addition, it is of low quality and lacks equity. The union organization, however, is free from guilt. Infractions are blamed on the bureaucracy and on past errors. It is ironic that in its proposals, the SNTE criticizes the assessments made by the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education and uses those assessments as a basis for strengthening its distressed vision. The SNTE book is important, because of what it expresses as well as because of what it induces people to think.11 The SNTE asked President Calderón—and Gordillo was emphatic on this point—to decree the creation of a national commission of coordination and agreement for permanent educational improvement. This commission, with fiscal resources, would be in charge of designing the transformation from a system of school years (graded through courses, attendance, and examinations) to another system of skill levels. In addition, it would define the new values, contents, and profile of the new educational model, linked to a national project for a new regime. The SNTE takes the liberty to dictate to the commission’s members the values, attitudes, capacities, and skills that should be defined (SNTE, 2007:48 and 49). The institutional actors on the commission would be the SEP, the SNTE, the National Governors’ Convention, the National Association of Universities and Institutions of Higher Education and the National Parents’ Federation. The commission would be able to invite other social organizations to participate in the big task. To complete the assignment, the SNTE suggested the creation of a technical secretariat, a linking coordinator, and ten sub-commissions, one for each identified challenge. A bureaucratic structure was created to have the new educational model ready in twelve months. The president did not respond to the request to create the commission, but he praised Gordillo and teachers. Elba Esther Gordillo declared that those were the union’s proposals for constructing the National Educational Program for 2007-2012, and she stated: “Now the ball is in the court of the Secretariat of Public Education. And here is proof that the National Union of Workers in Education is no obstacle” (Excélsior, June 23, 2007). But carefully read, the document is proposing the creation of a parallel program with a longer term—a government policy—because, as it claims, governments are ephemeral [...] yet the SNTE remains. For that reason, it is not unusual that the secretary of public education, Josefina Vázquez Mota, has reserved her opinions. During the regime of the Mexican Revolution, documents of this type almost always included one or various quotes from the government of the time; sometimes, they mentioned a well-known philosopher or educator as a source of inspiration. At the beginning of each chapter of the SNTE document, an allegation by Elba Esther Gordillo is used as a quote, and on page 11, eight more are reproduced. For the SNTE, educating is the way [...] of Mrs. Gordillo.12 Not content with the May negotiation and the 500-million-peso prize, Elba Esther Gordillo asked the SEP to channel to the SNTE, in cash, 10% of the scholarships for secondary school, higher technological educational, normal educational, physical and art education, which is where it has members. It can be assumed that the purpose of this request is to strengthen the presence of the camarilla by distributing those resources among clients. According to common knowledge, the SEP did not answer in public, but the Chamber of Deputies applied the brake: the norm indicates that only the SEP can administer these resources (Reforma, July 15, 2007). The greatest assault on power—and the most obvious indicator of the SEP’s ambitions for itself or one of its supporters—is the public disqualification aimed at Secretary Vázquez Mota. In an interview on July 23, 2007 (Riva Palacio, 2007), Elba Esther Gordillo remarked that the secretary “[...] does not know anything about the topic. When someone is unfamiliar with the topic, there are certain difficulties in understanding what is being discussed [...] If we make the Secretariat of Public Education merely a political or partisan position, we are going to do a lot of damage to education”. And after the censure comes the demand (almost a requirement): “I would have loved a plural government [...] because it is the need the country is requiring [...] The country needs reconciliation. We are in a concealed dispute [...]”. It is natural to deduce that if the president gives the SEP to Panal, the plurality that Gordillo wants will be seen. No one in the government responded to such degradation. Gordillo boasts that she always negotiates with the president. In addition, she keeps the key positions in basic education within the SEP, putting Secretary Vázquez Mota in a situation of institutional weakness and reducing her capacity of action and management; in a word, like the ham in the sandwich. Then comes the subtle but clear threat: “[we teachers] are not going to have movements that destabilize the nation.” María Victoria Murillo offers a plausible explanation for the reason governments from the opposition parties do not dare—at least over the short term—to modify pacts and limit the action of corporatist leaders: It can be more risky to seek the replacement of powerful union leaders; the incentives for placing limits on them or promoting competition among unions (a wink to the CNTE, for example) do not compensate for the losses that a weak government can experience (Murillo, 2001:27-30). In the case of Mexico, the argument can be made that weakness corresponds not only to PAN governments: it is the lassitude of the democratic regime, the lack of consolidation of democracy beyond elections. Unions (and other corporations) oppose legal reforms that imply internal democracy, the rendering of accounts, and workers’ freedom to join or not join the union. The power of Elba Esther Gordillo is immense, and infuses terror in her adversaries. There are governors who drink from her hand, congressmen who owe her their position and career, senators at her feet, officials and academics at her service. There are analysts and politicians who do not deny their admiration for her; power seduces, as Foucault sentenced. Elba Esther Gordillo flaunts her alliance with the nation’s president and he keeps his ideas to himself; his unresponsiveness serves to prevent damage to the pact and the possible loss of votes for the reforms he promotes in Congress. There are three injured parties with the de facto reelection of Elba Esther Gordillo and the concessions that the government of President Felipe Calderón grants the union. First, the reform that the president announced; there will be no profound changes in national education other than perhaps cosmetic changes. The Educational Model for the 21st Century will be only a negotiating instrument of the SNTE, with the risk of the government’s accepting the official Mexican standard of educational quality and the “second floor” of the teaching profession. Second, the secretary of public education, Josefina Vázquez Mota, who will remain a captive of the organizations the SNTE colonized in the SEP and in the states’ secretariats of education. Third, the members of the union. Although Gordillo has obtained excellent working conditions, benefits, and improved income for teachers, she has also extended her bureaucratic domination with the support of the group’s members; good teachers have been relegated. It would seem that a perverse, fatal relation has become entrenched in the governance of national education, which is in an iron cage, as Max Weber would say, and which no existing power can liberate. A sound conjecture, although not entirely correct: Professor Gordillo has been contested, although weakly, and her power is far from omnipotent.

Challenges Posed to Corporatist Power It would be strange if a person who has accumulated immense power through illegitimate means, although within established institutions, did not have enemies or at least adversaries. Power struggles always occur. Elba Esther Gordillo has three groups opposite her that dispute portions of her power: two from an older vintage and one that is in the process of consolidation. The first group is the modernistic bureaucracy of the SEP, to which the secretary of public education and the upper bureaucracy belong. This group learned to interact with the traditional bureaucracy linked to the SNTE. Never before had it suffered from the affronts of recent times, not even in the years of Jonguitud versus Secretary Reyes Heroles. Although the group of modernizers has abandoned the direct control of basic education, it has reduced the presence of the traditional bureaucracy in technical areas, planning, and higher education; in addition, it has the advantage in promoting innovations and attractive programs, such as the safe school program. Secretary Vázquez Mota has also formed ties with legislators, state governments, and civil organizations; she gives the impression that she does not contest the disqualifications of the SNTE and its president, out of discipline and loyalty to President Calderón, but she has not remained idle (Ornelas, 2007). Old rivals from dissidence in the teaching profession, grouped in the CNTE, Bases Magisteriales and other organizations, have been joined by their former allies and today’s new adversaries. This is the second collective, although lacking in organic links, that is challenging the president of the SNTE. Although Gordillo has learned to live with—and even withstand insults from—radical groups that accuse her of corruption, of failing to represent union members, and even murder, ever since her de facto reelection, numerous Elbistas have been struggling against their former boss.13 Outstanding is the group led by Noé Rivera, the promoter of the Citizens Association of the Teaching Profession, the queen mother of the Panal. Rivera has denounced the poor handling of SNTE resources. He formed the State Union of Workers in Education in Baja California, with dissidents from sections 2 and 37. The old PRI is also collecting fines for disloyalty; starting in 2003 and continuing on with increased strength in 2004, when the rupture between Madrazo (as president of the National Executive Committee of the PRI) and Elba Esther Gordillo (as secretary general) was notorious, the government of Tabasco opened a new front for the SNTE: the creation of the Independent Union of Workers in Education in Tabasco (Ornelas, at press). The third group that is opposed to the SNTE’s power expects to consolidate over the short term; it aspires to represent social power and is struggling to influence national education. Although various civil organizations attained marginal spaces in the press and media several years ago in an attempt to mediate between the SEP and the SNTE, their intervention was inconsequent and their were not taken into account. Yet the insistence of the representatives of civil society is beginning to bear fruit, along with their emphasis on evaluation, on the rendering of accounts and on carrying out the educational programs that require the society’s participation. While they cannot be accused of being subordinates of Secretary Vázquez Mota, sixty-two nongovernmental organizations marched in step with her (she may consider them allies in resisting attacks from the SNTE) to form the Citizens Alliance for Education. They presented themselves in fine form on July 31, 2007, with a timely analysis of the SNTE document, A New Educational Model for Mexico in the 21st Century, indicating its failures and exclusive nature. Alberto Athié stated that the “second floor” in the teaching profession as proposed by the union would cost the country approximately 140 billion pesos, with no consequences in the quality of education (Reforma, August 1, 2007). An accurate calculation that gives the public a hint of what the SNTE expects in exchange for the promises of support for President Calderón. It is impossible to predict the existence of organic confluence among these three segments, but they are confronting the power of Professor Elba Esther and her camarilla; they have more space in the press, their denouncements are finding increasingly more of a echo, and they may begin to chip away at the influence of the SNTE. But nothing will happen if the nation’s president, at the apex of power, remains in agreement with the union leader.

Recovering the Power of the State Gerardo Estrada asked the presidential candidates a provocative question: if they would be willing to confront the SNTE to drive a “true reform of education” (Reyes Heroles y Bohórquez, 2006: 49). Felipe Calderón demonstrated familiarity with the terrain he would be covering if he won the presidency; he was not guilty of ingenuity, although he evaded the matter of confronting the union. He answered:

Everyone is aware of the political force possessed by this group and their capacity to drive improvements or resist changes that can affect their interests. It is necessary to respect their rights, but without impairing the education we Mexicans deserve [...] My proposal is to build a grand national agreement with all actors who intervene in the educational process, understood as teachers from different educational levels, directors, parents, local authorities, unions, and organizations from civil society [...] Education is a concern of everyone and not only of the government and the teachers’ union (Reyes Heroles y Bohórquez, 2006:49).

Felipe Calderón prepared for the conquest of power and gave signs of being in control and wanting to extend that control; the fight that he is leading against organized crime is sufficient proof of his aspiration for legitimacy through government effectiveness. For this reason, it is strange that he is not attempting to broaden his power to the terrain controlled by corporatist groups. Javier Lozano, the secretary of labor and social welfare, spoke with an attitude ranging between fatalistic and resigned, about the privileges of corporatist unions:

I see great pressure all of a sudden for us to limit the unions and their leaders. We cannot. Constitutionally speaking, union autonomy indicates that they are free to define to define their statutes, all internal documents, to name their leaders, and to reelect them as many times as they want, by means of the mechanism or method they desire (Excélsior, August 3, 2007).

Law at the service of corporatism, as Córdova (1972) explained. But it seems that the government, which is able to do many things without breaking the law, is not bold with regard to unions, and even less bold with regard to unions of government employees. For example, the government retains union dues from wages, allows leaders to double, triple, or even more positions, tolerates the manipulation of general working conditions, does not impose sanctions on demonstrated administrative failures, and does not prevent teachers from transferring or selling their positions at retirement. Laws do not regulate this matter. No one requires the government to violate the Constitution. Quite the opposite: President Calderón is being asked to maintain an explicit pact with the SNTE and its president, instead of surveying the possibility of changing the correlation of forces in favor of government power. That agreement deflates any discourse aimed at modernizing and elevating the quality of education; as Calderón the candidate expressed, it is “impairing the education we Mexicans deserve”. With such allies, continued failure is most certain. The price is paid by all of Mexico. It is not simply a governmental issue. It is understood that a government without a stable majority in the legislature will forge bipartisan alliances to reach legislative agreements, will make concessions, and will even pay political debts. However, taking all factors into consideration, in its association with the SNTE, the government is actually strengthening a power within the power of the state. With such a policy it encourages corporatism, punishes democracy, and condemns workers to remain tied to organizations that lost their legitimacy long ago. Much worse, to the same degree that the SNTE is benefited, education is damaged, to the detriment of the government and cabinet. President Calderón faces a dilemma. He either fulfills his campaign pledge and becomes open to society, or he continues following a policy of pacts that can turn into complicity. As expressed by Machiavelli, power and fortune are elusive: “[...] because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation” (Maquiavelo, 2002:87-88). President Calderón is sitting at a table that has been set. The leader of the SNTE has drawn to maximum tightness relations with the SEP (and hence with the government), and is facing new opposition within the union organization; plus certain civil groups are also wanting to participate. President Calderón has the vocation of power, which has been superseded by the ambition of a camarilla and its leader. The question is if he will exercise that vocation, will put limits on corporatism, and will break the alliance that chains him to the past.

Acknowledgements To Ana Rosario Loera for her comments and suggestions, especially for requiring clarity of expression. To Aurora Loyo for inviting me to participate in this issue and for her criticism of the first draft, and to two anonymous reviewers whose criticism forced me to improve the argument.

Notes 1 “La razón no puede considerarse transparente mientras el hombre actúe como parte de un organismo que no tiene razón” (Horkheimer, 1976:219). 2 I understand technology of power to mean that the daily governance of institutions rests on sets of decisions sustained by norms, routines, tacit or explicit rules, actors’ responsibilities, and symbols that leaders construct or that arise from projects of change (statement by author based on March and Olsen, 1996). 3 Translation into Spanish by author. 4 In a book now being published, I document that conflict and the details of the project (Ornelas, at press). 5 These were resolutions of the First Special National Congress of the SNTE, held in Tepic, Nayarit, in January of 1990, and the Second Special National Congress, held in Mexico City in February of 1992. 6 The information about those two occurrences was taken from daily newspapers, in particular Excélsior and Reforma. 7 The conflict in Oaxaca in 2006, went beyond the demands of the teaching profession. The annual May strike triggered a movement of major importance, beyond the analysis of this text. The demand for the resignation of Governor Ulises Ruiz supplanted economic demands (Vicente, 2006). 8 The historical record includes hundreds of declarations by Rafael Ochoa Guzmán and company against the National Institute for the Evaluation of Education (until they molded it to their taste), Encyclomedia, the National Reading Program, and the Integral Reform of Secondary Education. 9 As I was making adjustments to this essay per the reviewers’ recommendations, a book was published that documents these points extensively and offers many sources of information (Cf. Raphael, 2007). 10 In addition, the president granted her the directorship of the National Lottery and the executive secretary position of the National System of Public Safety. 11 I cannot describe this point in depth here, but in another essay I shall make a detailed analysis of certain points, such as the concept of quality proposed and the construction of a Mexican norm, or the financing policy. 12 Mentioning this matter is not peccata minuta. The center of the matter is a teachers’ union, supposedly the union with the highest level of schooling in Mexico, and not the movement of the 400 pueblos, of poor, illiterate peasants. Yet the text is plagued with misspellings, strengthening the SNTE argument that the educational system has been exhausted. 13 The information about this group comes from the press and from informal conversations with colleagues from various states and teachers. References Baldridge, Victor et al (1978). Policy Making and Effective Leadership, San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass. Benavides, María Eulalia y Guillermo Velazco (coords.) (1993). Sindicato magisterial en México, México: Instituto de Proposiciones Estratégicas. Bobbio, Norberto (1989). Liberalismo y democracia, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Carnoy, Martin (1972). Education as Cultural Imperialism, New York: David McKay. Carnoy, Martin (1984). The State and Political Power, Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press. Córdova, Arnaldo (1972). La formación del poder político en México, México: Era. Córdova, Arnaldo (1973). La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana, México: Era. Gordillo, Elba Esther (1995). La construcción de un proyecto sindical: Mi testimonio, México: Taurus. Granados Chapa, Miguel Ángel (2003). “Plaza pública”, Reforma (México), 22 de mayo. Horkheimer, Max (1976). “Traditional and critical theory”, in P. Connerton (ed.), Critical Theory, Harmondsworth: Pinguin Books. Incisa, Ludovico (1981). “Corporativismo”, en Norberto Bobbio y Nicola Metteucci (dirs.), Diccionario de política, México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Loyo Brambila, Aurora (1997). “Sindicalismo y educación en México: Las voces de los líderes”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología (México: IIS-UNAM), año LIX, núm. 3, pp. 207-235. Maquiavelo, Nicolás (2002). El príncipe, México: Gernika. March, James y Johan P. Olsen (1996). El redescubrimiento de las instituciones: La base organizativa de la política, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Medina, Luis (1978), Del cardenismo al avilacamachismo, México: El Colegio de México. Mills, C. Wright (1961). La imaginación sociológica, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Miranda López, Francisco (1992). “Descentralización educativa y modernización del Estado”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología (México: IIS-UNAM), año LIV, núm. 2 abril-junio, pp. 3-18. Murillo, María Victoria (2001). Labor unions, partisan coalitions, and market reforms in Latin America, Nueva York: Cambridge University Press. Ornelas, Carlos (2006). “El dominio del SNTE”, en Silvia Cherem, Examen final, tomo II, México: CREFAL-El Equilibrista, pp. 227-246. Ornelas, Carlos (2007). “La contienda por la educación”, Educación 2001 (México), núm. 144, mayo, pp. 7-12. Ornelas, Carlos (en prensa). La crítica al nuevo federalismo educativo, México: Siglo XXI Editores. Panitch, Leo (1980). “Recent theorizations of corporatism: Reflections on a growth industry”, British Journal of Sociology (London), June. Peláez, Gerardo (1984). Historia del Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, México: Ediciones de Cultura Popular. Poder Ejecutivo Federal (1944).Diario Oficial de la federación (México), 15 de marzo. Prawda, Juan (1984). Teoría y praxis de la planeación educativa en México, México: Grijalbo. Raby, David L. (1974). Educación y revolución social en México, México: Sep-Setentas. Raphel, Ricardo (2007). Los socios de Elba Esther, México: Planeta. Reséndiz García, Ramón (1992). “Reforma educativa y conflicto interburocrático en México: 1978-1988”, Revista Mexicana de Sociología (México), año LIV, núm. 2, abril-junio. Reyes-Heroles, Federico y Eduardo Bohórquez, coordinadores (2006). En blanco sobre negro: Los candidatos se comprometen por escrito, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Riva Palacio, Raymundo (2007). “Descalifica Elba Esther a titular de la SEP”, El Universal (México), 23 de julio. Schmitter, Phillip C. (1974). “Still the century of corporatism”, Review of Politics (United States), vol. 36, number 1. Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (2007). Un nuevo modelo educativo para el México del siglo XXI, México: SNTE. Street, Susan (1983). “Burocracia y educación: hacia un análisis político de la desconcentración administrativa de la Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)”, Estudios Sociológicos (México), vol.1, núm. 2, mayo-agosto. Vicente Cortés, Joel (2006). Educación, sindicalismo y gobernabilidad en Oaxaca. México: SNTE. Weber, Max (1964). Economía y sociedad, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Article Received: August 30, 2007 Ruling: December 13, 2007 Second Version: January 7, 2008 Accepted: January 8, 2008