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RUSSIAN FIXED INCOME MONTHLY № 03, 2005 Published March 4Th, 2005

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RUSSIAN FIXED INCOME MONTHLY № 03, 2005 Published March 4Th, 2005 www.cbonds.info RUSSIAN FIXED INCOME MONTHLY № 03, 2005 published March 4th, 2005 Cbonds News Agency, Russia, St. Petersburg Prepared by Igor Sazonov E-mail: [email protected] Russia’s fixed income monthly №03, 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS Monthly Tables ...................................................................................................................................................3 Top News..............................................................................................................................................................12 Early Debt Repayment: Save Money Keeping An Eye On Rating Upgrade’s Costs ....................................12 External Debt Market ....................................................................................................................................14 Initial placements ........................................................................................................................................................14 Sberbank Followed VTB and Issued Subordinated Debt ..............................................................................14 Issue upsizes................................................................................................................................................................18 Market performance ....................................................................................................................................................18 Issues to come .............................................................................................................................................................20 Gazprom: 3 Issues For The Next 10 Months...............................................................................................................20 Domestic Debt Market..................................................................................................................................23 New Changes to Federal Law on Security Market Approved by Duma........................................................23 CBR To Lower Reserve Requirements For Non-Residents’.........................................................................23 GKO-OFZ market .......................................................................................................................................................23 Municipal bond market ...............................................................................................................................................24 Corporate bond market................................................................................................................................................25 Issues to come ....................................................................................................................................................27 GKO-OFZ ...................................................................................................................................................................27 Municipal ....................................................................................................................................................................27 Moscow City Plans To Borrow RUR8.5 bln in March and RUR35.3 bln in 2005; 15-year Issue Is On Agenda ........................................................................................................................................................................27 Corporates ...................................................................................................................................................................28 Ratings....................................................................................................................................................................31 Essential ratings actions on Russia’s issuers: Feb 2005 ................................................................................31 Municipals...................................................................................................................................................................33 Corporates ...................................................................................................................................................................35 2 prepared by Igor Sazonov [email protected] Russia’s fixed income monthly №03, 2005 Monthly Tables Table #1 Russia's eurobond market sectors volumes (at par, USD* mln) 28.02.2005 31.01.2005 31.12.2004 Total volume of Russian eurobonds outstanding 70504 69208 67716 Sovereign eurobonds 43270 43257 43295 Corporate eurobonds 26210 24942 23366 Municipal eurobonds 1024 1009 1055 EURO/USD cross exchange rate 0.7556 0.7673 0.7339 * other than USD denominated eurobonds are recalculated to USD Table #2 Monthly eurobond placements, upsizes and redemptions Eurobond placements Eurobond redemptions Amount at par Coupon, % Amount at par Issuer (mln) Issuer (mln) Rosbank (upsize) USD 75 9.750% ММК (EUR)* USD 132.35 Sberbank (init. placement&upsize) USD 1 000 6.230% Vimpelcom USD 300 8.000% MBRD USD 150 8.625% Total* USD 1 525 Total* USD 132 * in USD equivalent Table #3 JP Morgan EMBI+ spreads Jan 31st, Dec 29th, Change 2004 2004 (bps) EMBI+ 343 366 -23.00 EMBI+ Russia 179 205 -26.00 EMBI+ Ukraine 164 192 -28.00 EMBI+ Argentina 4980 5129 -149.00 EMBI+ Brazil 393 418 -25.00 EMBI+ Bulgaria 62 73 -11.00 EMBI+ Colombia 344 365 -21.00 EMBI+ Egypt 59 98 -39.00 EMBI+ Mexico 153 162 -9.00 EMBI+ Morocco 167 179 -12.00 EMBI+ Nigeria 639 728 -89.00 EMBI+ Panama 273 307 -34.00 EMBI+ Peru 211 239 -28.00 EMBI+ Philippines 399 435 -36.00 EMBI+ Poland 42 48 -6.00 EMBI+ Turkey 237 281 -44.00 EMBI+ Venezuela 437 461 -24.00 EMBI+ South Africa 80 94 -14.00 EMBI+ Latin America 419 439 -20.00 EMBI+ Ecuador 632 644 -12.00 3 prepared by Igor Sazonov [email protected] Russia’s fixed income monthly №03, 2005 Table #4 Expected eurobond issues Expected placement/ № Issuer Currency Expected amount Lead(s) roadshow date 2 OMZ (CLN) 1H 2005 USD 100 mln 3 Rusal 1H 2005 USD 200-300 mln programme worth USD400 mln 2005 USD UBS, Merrill Lynch 4 Alfa Bank (EMTN) (USD340 mln already been placed) ABN Amro,Deutsche 2005 USD 150 mln 5 Bank of Moscow Bank,Depfa Bank USD1.9 bln (programme worth USD, USD5 bln, 2 tr worth EURO1 bln 2005 Deutsche Bank, UBS EURO and USD1.2 bln already been 6 Gazprom (ETMN) placed) 7 Gazprombank 2005 8 Evrazholding 2005 USD 9 Lukoil 2005 USD 500 mln 10 MDM Bank 2005 USD 200-300 mln 11 Rosbank 2005 USD 150 mln 12 Perekrestok 2005 USD 13 Sovcomflot 2006-2006 USD 300 mln 14 Razgulyaj-Ukrros 2005-2006 USD 150-200 mln Mar-Apr 15 City of Moscow 2006 EURO 410 mln 16 Transcreditbank early 2006 USD 100 mln 4 prepared by Igor Sazonov [email protected] Russia’s fixed income monthly №03, 2005 Table #5 Russian eurobonds quotes Issuer Maturity date Price Yield, Yield, Change end Jan end Dec Aries, 14 25.10.2014 123.87 6.22% 6.30% -0.07% ALROSA, 08 06.05.2008 105.12 6.21% 6.81% -0.60% ALROSA, 14 17.11.2014 106.12 7.90% 8.30% -0.40% Alfa-Bank, 05 19.11.2005 104.00 4.56% 5.52% -0.96% AFK Sistema, 08 14.04.2008 108.38 7.11% 7.21% -0.10% AFK Sistema, 11 28.01.2011 104.50 6.18% 6.82% -0.64% Zenit Bank, 06 12.06.2006 101.48 8.15% 8.25% -0.10% Bank of Moscow, 09 28.09.2009 104.25 6.83% 7.02% -0.19% Petrocommerce Bank, 07 09.02.2007 103.50 5.54% 8.04% -2.50% Russian Standard bank, 07 LPN 02.04.2007 101.50 6.93% 7.57% -0.64% WBD, 08 21.05.2008 101.50 7.87% 8.14% -0.27% VTB, 08 11.12.2008 104.70 5.40% 5.35% 0.05% VTB, 11 12.10.2011 107.00 6.12% 5.91% 0.21% VTB, 15 04.02.2015 99.63 6.34% Vimpelcom, 05 26.04.2005 100.87 3.80% 2.96% 0.84% Vimpelcom, 09 16.06.2009 108.88 7.45% 8.12% -0.67% Vimpelcom, 10 11.02.2010 101.25 7.60% Vimpelcom, 11 22.10.2011 101.88 7.97% 8.39% -0.42% Gazprom, 07 25.04.2007 108.50 4.77% 4.81% -0.04% Gazprom, 09 29.10.2009 118.37 5.88% 5.80% 0.08% Gazprom, 10E 27.09.2010 113.00 5.05% 4.96% 0.09% Gazprom, 13 01.03.2013 119.20 6.48% 6.51% -0.03% Gazprom, 20 01.02.2020 106.10 5.98% 6.01% -0.03% Gazprom, 34 28.04.2034 117.50 6.07% 7.18% -1.11% Gazprombank, 05 04.10.2005 104.00 1.95% 2.56% -0.61% Gazprombank, 08 30.10.2008 105.00 5.56% 5.76% -0.20% Evrazholding, 06 25.09.2006 103.20 6.41% 4.11% 2.30% Evrazholding, 09 03.08.2009 110.75 7.87% 8.66% -0.79% Nikoil, 06 06.07.2006 101.00 7.46% 7.71% Nikoil, LPN 19.03.2007 102.16 7.61% 7.95% -0.34% MDM Bank, 05 16.12.2005 103.88 5.28% 6.32% -1.04% MDM Bank, 06 (LPN) 23.09.2006 103.63 6.74% 7.61% -0.87% Megafon 02.12.2009 101.25 7.58% 0.0802 -0.44% MinFin, 05 14.05.2008 93.44 5.10% 5.18% -0.08% MinFin, 06 14.05.2006 98.50 4.24% 4.39% -0.15% MinFin, 07 14.05.2011 85.87 5.77% 5.80% -0.03% MinFin, 08 14.11.2007 95.90 4.87% 4.87% 0.00% ММК, 08 21.10.2008 103.00 6.89% 7.42% -0.53% City of Moscow, 06 28.04.2006 108.50 2.97% 2.99% -0.02% City of Moscow, 11 12.10.2011 109.30 4.71% 4.81% -0.10% Mobile Telesystems, 08 30.01.2008 108.13 6.53% 6.67% -0.14% Mobile Telesystems, 10 14.10.2010 105.25 7.14% 7.43% -0.29% Mobile Telesystems, 12 28.01.2012 102.13 7.55% 7.81% Nizhnii Novgorod Region, 07 03.04.2005 99.99 29.03% NOMOS, 07 13.02.2007 102.42 7.59% 8.03% -0.44% NorNickel, 09 30.09.2009 99.00 7.29% 7.68% -0.39% Rosneft, 06 20.11.2006 112.81 4.79% 4.77% 0.02% Russia, 05 24.07.2005 102.00 3.45% 3.01% 0.44% Russia, 05DEM 31.03.2005 100.55 1.28% 2.50% -1.22% Russia, 07 26.06.2007 111.94 4.43% 4.49% -0.06% Russia, 10 31.03.2010 110.00 4.63% 4.70% -0.07% Russia, 18 24.07.2018 144.38 6.08% 6.28% -0.20% Russia, 28 24.06.2028 170.50 6.68% 6.83% -0.15% Russia, 30 31.03.2030
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