The Role of Imported Technology in Soviet Research and Development

FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : THE ROLE OF IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY IN SOVIET R & D : Do Western Equipment, Wester n Supplies or Western Informatio n Make a Differenc e

AUTHOR : Stephen Sternheimer

CONTRACTOR : Harvard Universit y

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Dr . Mark Kuchmen t

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 625- 8

DATE : August 1, 198 6

The work leading to this report was supported by funds provide d by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . NOTE

This is the second of three reports on Soviet research an d development from Council Contract #625-8 with Harvard Universit y for an interview project entitled "Soviet R & D : Information an d Insights from the Third Emigration" . The first was a report unde r the same title by Harley Balzer, dated July 1, 1986 . The thu d report will be "The Role of the Communist Party in Soviet R & D " by Robert F . Miller . Two incidental papers are appended to this report by Stephe n Sternheimer, as of possible interest to specialist . Appendix I is an account, in journalistic style, by Mark Kuchment, of th e career in the USSR and contribution to Soviet microelectronics o f Filipp Staros whom Mr . Kuchment believes to be Alfred Sarant, a n American engineer who left the United States in 1950 . Appendix I I is the transcription of a personal account of experience with Sovie t computers by Dr . Emanuel Bobrov, a Soviet specialist in the theor y of elasticity who immigrated to the United States in 1975 . The tables referred to in the text of this paper appear afte r the Notes and just before the Appendices . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper concludes that imported Western (including Japanese) technology, both "hard" and "soft", plays only a minor role in the effective- ness of Soviet research and development . It reaches that conclusion, and some corresponding policy recommendations for control of technology transfer, o n the basis of a survey of 200 Soviet emigres who worked until about 1980 i n various capacities in different parts of the Soviet R & D establishment . The study does not address the issue of technology transfer geared directl y to civilian or military production, or to overall economic performance . Moreover, a survey study of this kind, involving emigre sources that ca n neither be c-mpletely representative nor competely random, is importan t for the direction of its findings rather than their amplitude . The first five of the following principal findings refer chiefly to th e role of "hard" technology .

1. Foreign technology never has, and still does not play, as important a rol e in Soviet R&D work as does domestic (Soviet and East European) equipmen t and materials .

Insofar as the data revealed no significant generational variations , any conclusions regarding the minor role of imported technology hold for mor e recent decades (1956-1980) as well as for the more distant past (1930s and 1940s) .

Only about one-third of the sample indicated a dependency on Wester n technology in R&D work at the level of 50 percent of all equipment or higher ; most imports came from Western Europe and Japan rather than the United States .

Nor did we find any real indication in the informants ' comments to sugges t that there were multiple cases in which Western technology was " critical . "

2. Only in the following ways does the use of Western technology "make a difference " in Soviet R&D in ways that have statistical validity .

A . R&D institutes receive such technology through their norma l supply channels and not through the military .

It flows through the Academy ' s supply channels (Glavakademsnab) fo r

Academy institutes, through the industrial ministries for the production-branc h research bodies, and through the Ministry of Defense and the other ministrie s for the PO boxes . There is no single, dominant conduit into the Sovie t

R&D institutes for Western technology, least of all one that is character- istically military .

B . Foreign technology associates with high-cost projects , only for military research institutes and for production-branc h research .

It has no bearing on cost for Academy or university affiliates . Thi s

suggests that institutional affiliation, rather than the technology itself ,

probably drives the costs upward .

C. The use of imported technology in Soviet R&D lengthens rathe r than accelerates the amount of time required to complete R& D projects, making any contribution to " storming " doubtful .

Technology imports, however, are associated with projects of shorte r

duration within production-branch and military research insitutes . Thi s

suggests, again, that institutional setting, rather than foreign technology ,

makes the difference .

D. Use of foreign technology is tied to military funding only i n the case of defense research institutes (PO boxes) .

It does not correlate significantly with military funding mor e

generally . This runs counter to the assumption that it is the Soviet militar y

which acts as the chief supplier and main conduit for tech imports for

all R&D .

3 . A number of facets of the Soviet R&D process appear unresponsive t o (independent of) the use of foreign as opposed to homegrown technolog y of the hard variety .

Insofar as these facets represent defining characteristics of R& D

by any yardstick, we conclude that overall, tech transfers do not have a majo r

impact on the R&D process or R&D results in the USSR . Among the dimension s

of Soviet R&D not affected by the national origins of the technology use d

are : the size of research groups, the political generation of research workers ,

the nature of the research (basic, applied), institutional setting, tim e

lapsed for equipment delivery, institutional suppliers, total project cost ,

and the level of design decision-making . iii

4. R&D technology imports from the West have not concentrated in military R& D and show few signs of having made a significant contribution in the aggregat e to this particular branch of R&D work .

This holds true regardless of how " military R&D " is defined in the Soviet con-

text-- " research in a PO-box institute, "" research with a military character, "

" research funded by the military, "" research for which the defense supplies th e

equipment, " " research in which the defense ministry is responsible for desig n

decision making . " The fact that such a five-part definition of " militar y

R&D " could turn up no significant linkages calls into question several assumptions .

Chief among these is the claim that a conscious and effective thrust of th e

USSR's policy of encouraging tech transfer has been to obtain, and concentrate ,

the best of Western scientific know-how and technology on research projects fo r

the Soviet military .

5. The presence or absence of imported technology in the Soviet R&D proces s is a function neither of the level of planning or decision making involved , nor of Party involvement and support .

If anything, the data suggests that when a top Party organ, or high-leve l

government, body takes part in research designs, less rather than more foreig n

technology is utilized .

When the focus shifts to the impact of " sof t " transfers--those involvin g

information but not equipment--on Soviet R&D, the picture changes very little .

Among other things, the data indicates that " hard " tech transfers and " soft "

tech transfers do not substitute for one another in different dimension s of the Soviet R&D process . iv

6. There is no systematic relationship between research projects that emplo y imported equipment, lab apparatus and materials and those that have acces s to soft technology from abroad .

The two are neither complimentary nor exclusive, which means that bot h the intensity and scope of tech transfer is restricted in an aggregate sense .

7. R&D work in a research institute run by the Defense Ministry is th e single best predictor of access to soft tech from the West, along some but not all channels .

The correlation holds both for those for whom such work was a primar y occupation, and for those who worked in PO-box institutes at any time durin g their professional careers . For example, the kind of " success " defined b y possession of a clearance associated strongly with work in such a setting .

The same held true for entre to foreign and Soviet classified materials . However , there was no correlation between military research work and contacts wit h foreigners, or with the tracking of research findings in Western sources .

8. Military R&D broadly defined (i .e ., funding, design, possible application s supply sources) does not correlate with soft tech transfers .

With the exception of " military research " narrowly defined (work in a PO-box institute), access to Western information and know-how is not significantly enhanced by military involvement in R&D work along any of the line s mentioned above . And even a " strict construction " of military R&D does no t produce major distinctions between it and civilian R&D on matters such a s contacts with foreigners or tracking Western research results . From thi s perspective, Western attempts to restrict soft tech transfers owing to thei r possible military application could be unrewarding in terms of curtailin g

Soviet military R&D advances . v

9 . The involvement of high-level political bodies in developing researc h plan s doe s not , ips o facto, guarantee increase d acces s t o channel s for information transfer from the West .

Even though involvement in project decision making by the GKNi T

meant increased access to foreigners, and involvement of the defense ministry a

higher probability of clearance, no overall pattern involving all channel s

surfaced for Party and state organs .

10 . A s measured b y assessment s o f results , the significanc e o f the transfer s of Western information-as-technology remains dubious at best .

A. Military research institutions which commanded an advantage vis-a-vi s access to informatio n channel s di d no t ran k especially high in evalu - ations of R&D performance .

Even for those cases in which the informants themselves had worked fo r

such bodies, assessments did not always improve significantly .

B. New branches of science, and new research-and-training institutes , emerged only in cases where informants had a security clearance , access to foreigners , an d worke d in eithe r Academy o r militar y researc h as their major occupation .

Actual use of foreign technology or classified materials had no systemati c

effect . Nor did involvement in research with possible military applications .

11 . Reliance on imported (as opposed to domestic) R&D equipment produces n o significant changes i n basi c attitudes towards Sovie t scienc e an d technolog y on the part of the R&D community . Nor doe s acces s t o classified information , or contacts with foreigners, produce systematic attitudinal shifts .

Thus, even in terms of a possible psychological " benefit " from exposur e

to information from the West, Soviet R&D workers appear immune . This undermine s

the arguments of those who claim that, regardless of the scientific merits- -

or security-related demerits--of tech transfer in R&D, exposure to Western idea s

and Western specialists has a pluralizing effect . vi

12 . When" military " R&D is defined narrowly, it enjoys some, but far fro m numerous, advantages over civilian R&D in terms of access to importe d technology . When it is defined broadly, these disappear altogether . On an individual case basis, this as well as other generalizations mus t necessarily be qualified owing to the nature of the informants used .

As informants were drawn from the lower levels of the R&D hierarchy , especially in military fields, their replies are not necessarily representativ e of the experiences of highly placed researchers or of others who worked on state- of-the art projects over the past decade or so . Whatever military-civilia n distinctions in R&D and foreign tech usage that do exist appear only whe n

"military " R&D is taken to mean "spent the major part of one ' s professiona l

career working in a PO-box institute run by the Ministry of Defense . " I f

" militar y " is defined by broader criteria--such as defense funding sources, possibl e

military applications, the Ministry of Defense as equipment supplier, or th e

Ministry as a major actor in the research design process--the military-civilia n

distinctions evaporate . INTRODUCTIO N

Recently, Western specialists analyzing technology transfers from th e

West to the USSR have focused their attention on what many see as a national - level program by the Soviet leadership to acquire the best the West has t o offer for industrial production, as well as for both military and civilia n

R&D . The scope, consequences, and impact of such a program have become th e center of an important debate within the American academic and intelligenc e communities .

One group argues that the thirst for Western technology, for the Sovie t economy as well as for Soviet R&D, represents merely an extension of an age-ol d

Russian--rather than uniquely Soviet--phenomenon . From this perspective , tech transfer represents a "normal, " long-term strategy for offsetting th e limitations of economic backwardness in a cost-effective manner, without an y particularly sinister (e .g ., military) intent . The object of such transfer s is to stimulate the pace of technological advancement for individual industria l sectors, to increase factor productivity in a lagging economy, and to promot e higher overall economic growth rates .1 The quest for Western technology coul d also serve important internal political purposes . The Kremlin leadership has bee n divided over how to deal with the USSR ' s lagging growth rate, and its technological backwardness, since the mid-1960s . The death of Mr . Brezhnev ma y simply exacerbate the divisions . For those " centralizers " who wish t o avoid that deconcentration of political and economic power which a truly " manageria l " or market-oriented reform would entail, tech transfer appears to promise mor e rapid technological progress, and the diffusion of innovation, without th e political costs that the other kind of reform would require . 2

Others see the high priority accorded tech transfer during the years o f detente under Brezhnev as a direct expression of the militarization of the

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Soviet economy and of the growing appetite of the defense sector . From

this perspective, the goal of tech transfer is not to stimulate economi c

growth, but to acquire, by legal or illegal means, technologies with militar y

applications, be they for research or actual production . The same hold s

true for Soviet interest in " important and openly available scientific an d

technical information " from the West . 3 Proponents of this line of argumen t

point to the fact that Soviet areas of interest include computers, heat-resistan t

materials, semi-conductors, lasers and optics, nuclear physics, and micro-

biology--all of which have direct military applications . They note that a n

aggressive program for the acquisition of Western R&D technology in thes e

areas could save the USSR hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D costs, woul d

reduce the lead times required for obtaining results, and would offse t

deficiencies evident in the USSR ' s own R&D in these areas . 4

It is this second line of argument that provides the conceptual under -

pinning for claims that the United States must aggressively develop ne w

tactics for regulating the flow of R&D technology abroad, whether it occur s

through equipment, components, or simply information necessary for R& D

work . This is needed to avoid giving aid and comfort to a Soviet militar y

effort directed against the senders of technology themselves . Although th e

costs such regulation could entail, both for open scientific inquiry in th e

West and to relations with our allies, might be large, they would be mor e

than offset by the damage effective regulation of " choke point s " could inflic t

on the Soviet R&D effort .

To the extent that this interpretation accurately models the " real "

state of affairs, we would expect to find the following . First, overall ,

imported technology should play a large role, qualitatively and quantitatively, - 3-

in Soviet R&D projects such that it is apparent to Soviet participants themselves .

Second, R&D projects using Western technology in a major fashion should loo k

" different " from those which do not . Third, military R&D (carried out i n

the research institutes attached to the Ministry of Defense), and military - related R&D (e .g ., R&D funded by the military, with possible military applications, designed by military organs, or supplied by military bodies) shoul d be distinguishable from civilian R&D both in terms of degree of relianc e on tech transfers and in terms of other factors . Fourth, the sorts o f differences just described should hold true regardless of whether the " tec h

transfers " we are discussing are of the "hard " (equipment-oriented) variet y or " soft " ones (involving access to information, foreign contacts, securit y clearances, and the like) .

Presumably, if tech transfer matters for Soviet R&D, we would expec t to find consistent patterns across institutions, in terms of the types o f advantages evident and the sort of technology involved, sufficient to make a case for a " Grand Strategy . " In addition, the presence or absence of importe d technology should make a difference in terms of assessments of R&D output s by the participants themselves . Those areas which employ more importe d technology, and have greater military relevance, would presumably repor t better results on the average .

Responses to a questionnaire administered to 202 Soviet emigres who formerly worked in various capacities in different parts of the Soviet R& D establishment were analyzed to determine which of the two models we hav e described best captures the reality of the situation . The conclusions drawn from the survey data, the commentary, and in-depth interviews are, by definition , statements of " general rules, " As such, they do not and cannot take int o account important exceptions or" special cases . " Unfortunately, the kinds of

data involved in such cases are necessarily classified and cannot be discusse d

from the same perspectives as we use for the open-source materials . However ,

for creating a conceptual basis for a general tech transfer policy by th e

United States government, it is the general rules and general tendencies o n

the Soviet side that should receive the most attention . These also appear t o

have been the most neglected to date, owing to the fact that cases of purloine d

technology are simply more interesting . Of course, as the concluding sectio n

emphasizes, policy based on a general assessment does not eliminate th e

need for careful consideration of individual cases as well . 5

I . The Role of " Hard " Technology in Soviet R&D : Equipment, Supplie s and Materials from Western Nation s

The first and most important finding should be stated unambiguously :

in terms of " har d " tech transfers involving laboratory apparatuses, measurin g

devices, and other materials used in R&D work in the USSR, acquisitions fro m * Western countries make a relatively small contribution . Fully 65 .5 percen t

of our sample reported that at least half of the lab equipment and materials ** they employed were of " domestic " (meaning Soviet and/or East European) origin .

By contrast, only a third of the sample reported that they relied heavily o n

technology imported from the West, meaning of combined U .S ., West European ,

or Japanese origin . Fully half of the informants indicated that 60 percent o r

more of their equipment and materials were made in the USSR . Half also claime d

* Transfers of " soft " technology in the form of information are mor e difficult to quantify . These are treated separately in a subsequent section . ** " Domestic " technology here designates all cases in which the reporte d instance of equipment from East Europe and/or the USSR was half or more o f the total . In cases where such equipment was less than 50 percent, the case s were designated as "dominated " by " imported " technology . In the questionnaire , respondents were asked to designate independently the proportion of the equip - ment coming from West Europe/Japan or the United States . However, while the numbe r for the U .S . sources was large, with few missing cases, the large number o f missing cases for West Europe/Japan made " non-Soviet/non-East European " a bette r measure . Fully four-fifths of our sample did in fact report no equipment at al l from the United States, leaving only 20% who used " some . " None used a majorit y of US-manufactured equipment . - 5 -

that some share of their equipment came from other Communist bloc nations .

Lest we assume that there might be substantial leakage of Western equipmen t through East Europe, it is also worth noting that only about one in te n informants replied that East European imports accounted for more than 33 percen t of the equipment and lab apparatus they needed .

When considered in terms of country of origin . Wester n sources do not appear terribly significant to the Soviet R&D effort . Mor e than four-fifths of our sample reported using no equipment at all from th e

United States ; less than 5 percent of the sample reported that even as much a s one-tenth of their equipment had a " Made in the USA " label affixed . Likewise ,

" hard " technology from Western Europe and Japan combined was not terribl y important ; it accounted for 20 percent or more of all equipment and technolog y used in R&D work in only one-third of all cases . Nevertheless, by comparison to that from the United States, it did figure more prominently, suggestin g that any controls would invariably gore oxen other than our own more severely . 6

Comments by the informants revealed that the " imported " technolog y they had in mind was, in fact, quite diverse . Some proportion of it stil l represented chiefly " Lend-Lease leftovers, " as one individual dubbed them .

Alongside aging American, British, Dutch or German equipment of World War I I vintage one might also find up-to-date Western electronic instruments .

One individual felt that his Soviet lab was better equipped with Wester n equipment than the one in which he subsequently worked in Israel ; anothe r estimated that his Soviet research facility was on a par with Brookhaven i n the United States . Frequently Western and Soviet bloc equipment is use d

together, as in the case of computer hardware of Soviet manufacture whio h employs compatible software from IBM or Siemens . In still other cases, -6-

" Soviet " equipment may consist of copies of Western technology (e .g ., th e

IBM 360 computer), with East European sources providing complimentary (soft - ware) components .

Additional commentary attached to the survey suggested that for thos e cases where the quantitative importance of Western technology was unimportant , it was not offset by the "critica l " (qualitative) importance of the individua l pieces of technology involved . Unfortunately, the nature of the answers give n to the query as to which sorts of equipment sources might be " critical " to a particular piece of R&D work did not permit quantification, and this remain s an area where additional research would be useful . Overall, however, we foun d little to demonstrate that there actually exist " choke points " in Sovie t

R&D work at which Western technology imports could be successfully manipulated , in a differentiated fashion, so as to provide leverage for political con - cessions .

What are the defining charaoteristics of those R&D groups in the USS R that do employ imported R&D technology to an important degree? The possibl e differentiating features we investigated included : the military versu s civilian nature of the research ; the size of the R&D unit ; the institutional affiliation or setting of the R&D effort (i .e ., USSR Academy of Sciences , universities, industrial ministries with their production-branch institutes , and the Ministry of Defense with its "PO boxes " ) . We also examined the sourc e of R&D funding, the source of materials and supplies, the locus of plannin g or design decision making for the R&D process, military versus non-militar y applications of the research, and its basic or applied nature .

The first and most important question, from the standpoint of th e overall foreign policy significance of tech transfers in the R&D area, is

how research groups using imported technology in the USSR distribute amon g

the broad divisions " military R&D " and " civilian R&D . " Conventional wisdo m

would probably have it that R&D equipment and apparatuses imported from th e

West find their greatest application in R&D directly targeted to militar y

purposes, as defined and executed by the " P0-box " institutes of the USS R * Ministry of Defense . However, we found neither a statistically significan t ** ** * tie nor even a consistent pattern between those who reported " havin g

ever worked in a PO-box institute of the Ministry of Defense " and extensive *** * use of imported technology (i .e ., over 50 percent of all technology employed) .

When technology source was cross-tabulated with a second indicator fo r

" military-related R& D " (affirmative answers to the question, " did your research

have a military character? " ), neither a significant linkage nor a patterne d **** * response emerged .

A more detailed examination of imported equipment sources, by countr y

of origin (i .e ., East Europe, West Europe/Japan, United States), and possibl e

ties to work in a PO-box institute, also yielded no significant findings . I n

short, to paraphrase G . K . Chesterton ' s detective, Father Brown, " what matter s

is the fact that the dog didn ' t bark . " The only exception to this generalizatio n

appears in the case of R&D workers who reported using "some U .S . equipment "

(defined quite broadly as " between 1 and 99 percent) and who also worked i n

military research institutes at some point . (See Table 1 .) But the vas t

majority of R&D personnel reported " no us e " of any equipment of U .S . manufacture ,

70 percent for those who worked in PO boxes and 89 percent for those who did not .

* " P0-boxes " are so named because their designation is limited t o an identifying mailbox number . ** Throughout this section, " statistically significant " refers to a chi-squar e correlation that is meaningful at the .05 level . *** " Consistent patterns " refer to statistically meaningful changes on a continuum, as expressed either by a Kendall ' s tau or gamma measure of association . **** 2 x = .67, df = 1, not significant at .41 level, Kendall ' s tau = .07 . *** x 2 = .02, df = 1, not significant at .9 level, Kendall's tau = .02 . - 8 -

Hence, the military targeting of equipment imported from the U .S ., even a t very low levels, appears quite marginal in importance .

No significant relationship between the size of R&D groups, an d reliance on imported technology, emerged from the study . This ran counte r to our assumption that since " large " R&D groups would presumably be rate d more important, they would therefore enjoy greater access to imported technology . We also hypothesized that : (1) imported equipment, being more costl y in terms of scarce hard currency reserves, would find greater application i n applied rather than basic research, owing to greater opportunities for short - term amortization of outlays ; and (2) among three different generations o f

R&D workers (differentiated according to whether they were educated durin g the Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev eras), those more recently traine d would enjoy greater access to imported technology as a reflection of the genera l reliance on technology imports in the economy in the 1960s and 1970s . Neithe r of the two posited relationships, however, proved to be statistically significant .

For generational affiliation and the use of foreign technology, however , a pattern did surface . (See Table 2 .) The suggestive break occurs between thos e who belong to the Brezhnev era in terms of their training, and those wh o received their education at an earlier date . Such findings parallel wha t we already know about the role of tech transfer in the Soviet economy in general, and it confirms our impression that a national policy to encourag e technology imports did affect the R&D community to some extent after the mid -

1960s . 7 In absolute terms, however, the reliance on imported technology b y any generation of R&D workers remains quite small .

Examination of the institutional affiliations of R&D workers and thei r experience with imported technology also turned up unexpected results . Other

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chapters in this study dealing with educational patterns and Party contro l

uncovered clear distinctions based on the institutional setting of the career s

of Soviet R&D workers . In terms of the extent of reliance on Western a s

opposed to Soviet technology, however, no statistically significant difference s

in technology usage by institutional affiliation surfaced . The extent o f

divergence between research institutes tied to the Academy, the universities ,

the industrial ministries, and the military could have occurred mostly b y

chance .

There was, however, a statistically significant pattern in the response s

arranged along a continuum . This, however, ran counter to our " conventiona l

wisdom " hypothesis that the extent of usage of transferred technology i n

Soviet R&D would decrease along a continuum ranging from PO-box institute s

(the most), to university-affiliated ones (the least) . Instead, the result s

indicate that Academy and university institutes cluster at the " hi " en d

of the continuum (41 percent and 39 percent, respectively), with ministry -

affiliated institutes in the middle (36 percent reported using " significant "

amounts of Western technology), and defense-related ones at the " lo " en d

(15 percent with significant usage) . (See Table 3 .) However, we would not e

again that for each of the institutional settings considered separatel y

(as for all of them lumped together), the role played by domestic technolog y

was always dominant, in a range of 59 percent to well over 80 percent .

Such findings, as applied to the institutes of the defense ministr y

compared to the others, merely reinforces our earlier point ; the linkag e

between the military side of the Soviet R&D effort, and imported technology- -

at least in theaggregate--appears more tenuous than is usually assumed .

The ongoing debate in the United States regarding the militar y

significanoe of tech transfers to the USSR, and their effect on the balance -10-

of military power, suggested to us that it would be enlightening to loo k

more deeply at other possible military dimensions of the Soviet R&D effort .

We have already seen that no statistically meaningful relationship surface d

between the use of Western technology and : (1) having ever worked in a militar y

research institute ; (2) having ever been engaged in research of a militar y nature ; (3) having worked in one of the Ministry of Defens e ' s PO-box institute s

for most of one ' s professional career (as opposed to working in an institut e with another sort of affiliation) . The next step, logically, was to facto r

out the effects of " funding by the Ministry of Defense " as another kind o f measure of military relevance .

Here, too, no linkage between funding source and the extent of relianc e on Western technology surfaced, even when we controlled for the possible effect s of institutional affiliation . (See Table 4 .) For each sort of institute- - except, of course, those directly controlled by the Ministry of Defense itself--non-military funding predominated regardless of the country of origi n of lab equipment and supplies . Among the purely civilian-type research bodies , the incidence of military funding was highest for Academy institutes : 19 percen t when domestic technology was employed, 22 percent if Western equipment wa s utilized . In the case of PO-box institutes, it is significant that whe n

Western technology was involved, the incidence of direct Ministry of Defens e funding was twice as frequent than if only domestic equipment was involved .

In brief, the data suggests a certain amount of " fuzzin g " of th e boundary between civilian and military research when Western technolog y is employed . But it is not enough to create a well-defined, institutionalize d relationship such that funding affects technology decisions or vice-versa .

Regardless of the source of funding, equipment of Soviet manufacture rated - 1 1 -

" hi " (i .e ., one-fifth or more of all technology employed on the average )

in roughly 7Q percent of all cases . Conversely, equipment from West Europe/Japa n

rated " lo " (less than one-fifth of all technology used on the average) in a majority of instances . Reliance on American technology/equipment fo r

Soviet R&D figured even less prominently . For 85 percent of all cases involvin g military funding, and for 97 percent with civilian funding, it represente d

less than one-fifth of the total store of apparatus, processes, and materials .

{Here, although the distinction according to funding source was statistioall y

significant, the actual size of the spread was quite small and the prevalenc e * of " lo " usage almost total . )

Up to this point, the inquiry into the contribution of Wester n technology to Soviet scientific progress has focused chiefly on military/non- military distinctions in setting priorities . Logically, however, polic y priorities for such transfer would also vary in terms of the kinds of specialt y areas involved, and in the extent to which high-level political involvemen t lends a given project an aura of national importance . In particular, researc h in certain specialty areas in which the Soviets have lagged badly (experimenta l physics, organic chemistry, and biology, to name a few) presumably would experience a greater need for Western technology--and hence more imports--tha n those areas where the USSR has remained abreast of world-level development s

(e .g ., mathematics, power engineering, materials research) . 8

However, the survey results indicated that there are neither statisticall y significant differences, nor a consistent pattern, such that certain specialtie s employ Western technology more heavily . (See Table 5 .) In only one field ,

*x' = 3 .91, df = 1, significant at .05 level . - 1 2 -

physics, did foreign technology fulfill important functions in research .

And even when tests were run to determine if certain subspecialties (suc h

as " computer usag e " or " electronios researc h " ) cutting across several researc h

areas might lean more heavily than others on Western equipment, the result s

produced no significant findings .

Another way of establishing which research areas Moscow assign s

priority is to look at differences in the reported involvement of the Part y

in R&D design decision-making . Presumably, for high-priority subjects , decisions about R&D design and the basic directions for each project wil l reflect the demands of top political bodies . Priority would also mean greate r access to the fruits of Western technology for successful execution . The natur e of imported technology as a " scarce good " in the Soviet context means that ther e is intense competition to obtain it, which must be mediated by the top . T o this must be added the fact that importing technology for R&D work require s either the expenditure of scarce foreign exchange resources to obtain i t legally, or else systematic espionage directed by the KGB to get it by othe r means . Both avenues would dictate decision-making in the project design at a high level, involving either the main Party organs or else leading governmen t bodies (the Council of Ministers, Gosplan, or the State Committee on Scienc e and Technology, GKNiT) .

The initial cut on this issue produced several interesting findings .

First, informant reports of " hi " involvement by either top-level governmen t or Party organs did not associate with instances in which foreign, as opposed t o

Soviet domestic, technology prevailed . For example, " hi " levels of involvemen t of bodies such as the GKNiT, the Politburo, the Science Department of th e

Central Committee, or even the Ministry of Defense yielded " predominantly " foreign

- 1 3-

technology in a minority of incidences (range of 26-33%) . (See Table 5A fo r

more detail .) Conversely, " lo " levels of involvement by each institutio n

appears to increase the number of instances in which foreign technolog y

figures importantly, in a range of 27-47% . For two institutions, the GKNi T

and the KGB, such differences are statistically significant . This implie s

that far from fostering greater usage of Western tech in R&D work--as woul d

be the case if there were a " Grand Strategy " involved--involvement by the powers-

that-be in Moscow more likely than not is geared to braking the process and t o

increasing self-reliance . Whether this is due to autarkic instincts in th e

area of R&D work, or to a simple desire to husband scarce foreign exchange, w e

cannot say from the data at hand .

To test our conclusions, we also introduced a broader definition o f

political control and priority-setting on the part of the Party . A study o f

the relationship between those instances in which informants reported a " hi "

number of " instances in which the Party provided general guidelines for R& D

development, " and reported levels of usage of Western technology, reveale d

that as Party involvement increased, tech imports declined . Here, too, th e

guidelines the Party apparently puts forth appear to favor greater reliance o n

technology of the homegrown sort in Soviet R&D work . (See Table 6 .) Likewise ,

when informants were asked to rank the Part y ' s role in the development of specifi c

branches of R&D work, for those branches where the Party was assigned a n

inactive role (about 15 peroent of all reported cases), foreign technolog y * figured prominently in at least one-third of the cases .

All the data the survey produced on the role of " hard " tec h

transfers in R&D work points to a single conclusion : there is no evidenc e

* x - = 11 .8, df = 4, significant at the .02 level . to point to a master plan to overtake the West in the R&D sector simply b y virtue of increased usage of technology legally or illegally obtained . 9 Thi s

is not to assert, however, that such a strategy does not figure in individua l

cases, in particular subspecialties, at one or another limited point in time .

Nor does it deny that for industrial production purposes, tech transfer s

may, indeed,10 play a major role when it comes to innovation and it s diffusion,

The data simply testifies to the fact that scientific R&D work, on the average ,

is not part of the same process . Generally, there is no significant relationshi p

between technology source and various features of the R&D process . Where some

statistically significant relationship or pattern does exist, it appears tha t

domestic technology, rather than the imported kind, is favored, or tha t

non-military R&D has more access to imports .

II . The Role of "Soft " Technology from the West : Access, Information, Contact s

The nature of contemporary technology is such that in today ' s world i t

consists as frequently of " soft " goods--access to information, reports o f

experiments, plans and blueprints, knowledge of a particular process o r

technique--as it does of hardware . The acknowledged importance of software fo r

computer applications serves as a concrete example of what is, in fact, a much

more widespread phenomenon . The state-of-the-art in any given field of scientifi c

endeavor may just as easily be described by a report of new experimental result s

in a journal, or by a discussion of unpublished research with foreign colleagues ,

as by a new piece of laboratory apparatus or imported measuring instruments .

Therefore, no disoussion of foreign technology in Soviet R&D work is complet e

without some attempt to systematically gauge such transactions .

To measure " soft tec h " transfers, the project employed several yardsticks .

The first of the " yardsticks " is defined by " possession of a securit y

clearance . " This ensures access to Western information, even from open source s

which, when they cross the Soviet border, are immediately stamped " classified "

(e .g ., Aviation and Space Technology Weekly) . " Clearance " also means acces s

to research doouments stolen from American firms or laboratories (in at leas t

one instance) . In some cases, however, clearances do not involve tech transfers .

They may also be required, for example, to attend special seminars, or t o

work in a border area, or to visit: military test sites . Hence the yardstic k

remains a suggestive, but hardly precise, indicator of actual transfer s

occurring . Over half of our informants--54 percent--had suoh a security clearance .

-16-

" Access to foreign classified materials " (13 .8 percent of the sample )

and " access to Soviet classified materials " (33 .1 percent of the sample )

represent a second and more refined variant of the same measure . From a

third perspective, " contact with foreigners in the USSR " (15 .1 percent of th e

cases) and " contacts while abroa d " (17 .2 percent) provide another gauge of th e

sort of face-to-face exchanges that might act as conduits for "soft tec h " fro m * the West . To make these measures more precise, and to account for possibl e

overlaps, we created two more composite yardsticks, " access to any classifie d

materials " (32 .5 percent) and " access to foreigners anywhere " (48 .2 percent) .

Some reflection suggested that the "

access-to-foreign-technology-of-the-soft variety" could also be measured using other questions as well . Thus ,

we also examined responses to the queries, " do you follow developments in your

field through foreign literature?" and " how important do you feel such tracking i s

to your research? " to create yet a fourth yardstick . Over half (55 .1 percent )

felt tracking was " very important . " The significance of such tracking of literatur e

in a specialty as a form of transfer becomes readily apparent when we note th e

lower instance of positive responses to a similar query regarding tracking i n

the Soviet literature (50 .5 percent of the cases) . Interestingly enough ,

all informants assigned conferences and informal contacts a less important status .

As measured by the first yardstick (the " possession of clearance " indi-

cator), soft-tech transfers associated only marginally (52 .6 percent) with th e

use of " hard tech " imports . The results, however, were not statisticall y

significant, suggesting the absence of a firm linkage . This, too, undermines an y

assumption of a Grand Strategy to " swallow " as much Western technology a s 1 1 possible, even in military-related research that involves clearance .

* We should remember, however, that of those who had traveled abroa d with delegations, only 3 percent had been to the West . For the remaining 1 4 percent, " abroad " meant trips to Eastern Europe, the PRC, or the the Thir d World . - 1 7 -

Acoess-through-clearance does not differ significantly in terms of whethe r the R&D work involved is basic or applied . Nor is it affected by the specialtie s of particular researchers, nor by the institutional affiliations of particula r organizations . Predictably, however, access-through-clearance did associat e positively with having worked at any time in an institute performing primaril y * military research .

Several caveats apply to any interpretation of the signifioance o f clearances (as a form of tech transfer) for assisting Soviet military R&D .

First, while the vast majority of those with military research experienc e

(83 percent) did possess a clearance, so did roughly 50 percent of those wh o reported having never worked for any military research body . Second, althoug h clearance correlated positively and significantly with work in a PO-box researc h institute, it did not associate strongly with work simply on projects havin g * * possible military uses .

Further examination of the data indicated that access-via-clearance s distributes more or less evenly across fields of specialization . Although those working in electronics (65 percent), metallurgy (67 percent) and physic s

(75 percent) were slightly more likely than others to have clearances, th e differences lacked statistical significance . Computer users and non-user s were also indistinguishable along this dimension, as were engineers and non - engineers . Compared to all other specialties combined, " electronics " wor k * * * associated weakly with possession of a clearance .

*x' = 7 .35, df = 1, significant at the .007 leve l **x 2 = 2 .72, df = 1, significant at the 0 .1 level, Kendall ' s tau = .1 4 *** 2 x = 2 .53, df = 1, significant at the .11 level - 1 8-

" Clearances " do not exhaust the range of conduits which might increas e

soft-tech transfers . Other possible channels include " access to foreign secre t material " and " direct contact with foreign researchers . " These are analyze d below .

" Access to foreign classified material " does not correlate eithe r

positively or negatively with use of foreign hardware in labs . Likewise, ther e

is no relationship between the source of the actual technology employed, and " fre-

quency of contact with foreigners . " This last observation runs contrary t o what we assumed, namely that extensive use of non-Soviet equipment woul d

stimulate increased contracts with foreign specialists . The potential impac t of Western technology on Soviet R&D is invariably reduced .

Roughly one in every seven Soviet researchers in our sample did repor t some access to foreign classified materials . One of every two had som e contact with foreign colleagues . We wanted to know how such forms of acces s

to information-cum-technology were distributed across various kinds of researc h settings, research specialties, political generations, and so forth . In th e case of classified materials from abroad, we found increases in acces s

(in a linear fashion) as one moved from university institutes (3 .8 percen t with access), to production-branch institutes (10 .6 percent with access), t o defense research institutes (50 percent with access) . (See Table 7 . )

Such access, however, is not distinguished with respect to researc h

specialty, computer use, work in electronics, or work in basic as oppose d

to applied R&D . Nor does it vary across political generation, regardless o f whether the broad (Stalin/post-Stalin) or more differentiated (Stalin /

Brezhnev/Khrushchev) definition is employed . The latter is particularl y * striking, since access to Soviet data has changed over time .

* , x- = 6 .51, df = 2, significant at the .04 level

- 1 9-

Predictably, access to foreign classified materials correlates strongl y

with military as opposed to civilian R&D . But for those so employed ,

the proportion with such clearance (48 percent), and those without it (5 2

percent), are roughly even . (See Table 8 .) For those in civilian R&D ,

however, there exists a huge gap between the few enjoying access (9 percent) ,

and the many without it .

" Contacts with foreigners " represent yet another potential conduit .

Surprisingly, institutional variations in such access did not surface . Whe n

military and civilian R&D employment were differentiated, a pattern did emerg e

whereby those employed in civilian organization were more likely to have ha d

contact with foreigners in the USSR (53 percent) than those linked to militar y * research installations (38 percent) . The pattern reversed with respect t o

contacts with foreigners abroad . Here those with military R&D experience wer e

twice as likely to have made such contacts (30 percent) than were those wit h ** no military R&D experience (13 percent) . The last point appears less anomalou s

when we recall that "contacts abroad " usually meant meetings in bloc nation s

or the PRC . The image of Soviet military researchers as isolated from face-to-fac e

dealings with Westerners thus still holds .

There exists one more potential conduit for soft-tech transfers :

" keeping up with the foreign literature in one ' s field . " This can arguably

be included as a " normal " part of the researoh dynamic in any good scientifi c

community . In the Soviet context, however, it might also reflect a heightene d

awareness of and concern with new developments in the West, to be exploite d

in the USSR .

* g amma = .3 1 ** x ` = 2 .26, dt = 1, weakly significant at .13 level, gamma = .42

- 2 0 -

Here, too, no statistically significant correlations or pattern s

surfaced . Soviet informants who labeled " attention to foreign sources ver y

importan t " were just as likely to use domestic as imported hardware in thei r

research . Those without clearances were just as attentive as those havin g

them . The proportion which avidly followed foreign R&D advances was abou t

equally divided between those who had and those who lacked access to foreig n

or Soviet classified materials . Informants drawn from different specialty field s

displayed no significant differences in the role they assigned Western R& D

developments .

The only statistically meaningful association which emerged was on e

between those who had direct personal contact with foreigners and kep t

abreast of foreign R&D developments abroad (90 percent), versus these withou t * such contacts who still followed the literature (73 percent) . Similarly, engineer s

were less attentive (49 percent) to Western R&D developments than were thos e ** (63 percent) in non-engineering professions or fields . In brief, systemati o

scanning of Western publications by Soviet R&D workers seems to defin e

a " normal " level of scientific curiosity . It does not appear to be par t

an orchestrated tech transfer strategy on the part of the authorities .

Data pertaining to attentiveness to Western literature did not suppor t

the notion that those involved with " research of a military character " woul d

be more attentive to Western R&D achievements than others . In fact, th e

pattern suggests that the opposite sort of pairing was likely to hold ;

levels of attentiveness were higher among those not engaged in projects havin g

any military relevance (88 percent) than among those doing military-relate d

*x ' = 8 .51, df = 3, significant at the .04 level, Kendal l ' s tau = 16 , significant at the .01 leve l ** x2 3 .50, df = 1, significant at .06 level

- 2 1 -

* research (79 percent) . " Attentiveness to Western R&D developments " did no t

associate with institutional R&D setting, however . Nor did it correlat e

significantly with work in a PO-box institute .

To confirm the mounting impression that Soviet science policy lack s

any general strategy for absorbing Western technology-as-information, w e

looked in the last instance for possible linkages between the level of desig n

decision making and all " access " variables . Presumably the higher up, or mor e

powerful, those involved in project design, the greater the frequency o f

clearances, the opportunity for foreign contacts, and the like .

In the case of projects developed by the GKNiT, the only significan t * * impact on information access occurred in " contacts with foreigners . " B y

contrast, a prominent role in project design for the presidium of the Academ y

of Sciences, the Science Department of the CC, the Secretariat of the CC ,

the Politburo, or Gosplan made no significant difference in information acces s

along the lines already mentioned .

When the defense ministry enters the picture, the frequency of clearano e

and access to classified material rises significantly . Thus some militar y ** * cast to Soviet R&D does make a difference in the process . What is missin g

from the picture, however, is any sort of persistent pattern (or systemati c

milking of opportunities) to absorb Western technology for any and al l

R&D projects of sufficient national importance to have the central politica l

institutions involved in design decision making .

III . Measuring the Impact of Tech Transfers in Soviet R& D

Up to this point, the analysis has focused exclusively on " inpu t " questions .

Such an approach, however, remains a partial picture ; it tells us little abou t

* Kendall's tau = -0 .19, significant at the .006 leve l ** x 2 = 10 .1, df = 4, significant at the .04 leve l *** x 2 = 9 .18, df = 4, significant at the .06 level . However, defense ministry involvement did not affect contacts with foreigners, although we expected that the y would fall sharply . - 2 2 -

the actual contribution modes of tech transfer provide in shaping--or failin g

toshape--the results Soviet R&D yields . This section thus concentrates o n

selected "output " dimensions of the picture .

The best available output indicator for purposes of cross-tabulatio n

comes from evaluations of the level of R&D performance by informants themselves .

We are interested in the presence or absence of a correlation between pe r

formance assessment and differentiated access to foreign technology .

The linkage between technology as " input, " and the quality of researc h performance as " output, " in Soviet R&D appears highly tenuous at best .

In no event did Academy research institutes, which were highly regarded b

R&D personnel, rely largely on Western technologioal inputs or serve a s settings for classified research, or function as places in which one ha d extensive contacts with one ' s colleagues from abroad . The PO-box institutes , which did occupy a favored position when it came to such matters, were no t held in particularly high esteem by Soviet R&D workers .

The evidence for such a conclusion emerged from the assessments o f

R&D output, by institutional type, from our emigre informants . When aske d to evaluate the quality of the work of each of the four types, on a scale fro m

" excellent " to " poor, " their replies showed that Academy institutes heade d the list with an 87 percent response in the " good-excellen t " range, followed b y production-branch institutes (69 percent), military institutes (68 percent ) and university institutes (61 percent) . (See Table 9 .) It is striking tha t research by the military, which most Western sources place head and shoulder s above all other Soviet varieties, was not regarded highly by the Soviet informants themselves . Likewise, when asked where they might have preferre d to work, it was Academy institutes (48 percent of all affirmative responses) , not military ones, that led the list . - 2 3-

To what extent is such a distribution of responses " objective " --an d

to what extent is it simply a matter of " defending one ' s own? " First, the ran k

of the frequencies of positive evaluations--Academy, production-branch, militar y

and university institutes--does not correspond to the proportions of th e

distribution of informants by institutional affiliation (production-branch ,

Academy, university and military) . (See Table 10 .)

In order to draw out possible instances of self-serving responses , we next looked for possible correlations between the institutional affiliatio n

of respondents and positive assessments of the R&D work of that institution ' s

affiliates . No strong statistical associations surfaced between informant s

from PO-boxes or from the Academy and evaluations of the R&D output of in-

stitutions of these types . It colored evaluations of the work of the ministries ' * institutes rather weakly ; only in the case of university personnel and thei r assessments of university-based researoh was there any clear evidence of self - interest in the results obtained by the survey . (See Table 11 .) Thus ,

the rank ordering of assessments seems minimally biased .

Commentary on the reasons for the rankings were less enlightenin g as to the preeminence accorded the Academy than they were to the lower ranking s given the others . Universities were praised for the level of their theoretica l work and criticized for their failings in the area of applied research . " Lack of equipment " and "poor instrumentation " --teohnology--were cited as leadin g causes . Comments in answer to the question " where would you have preferre d to work and why " did shed some light on the failings of two other institutiona l types, the military and production-branch institutes . The latter were criticize d for placing " too much stress on practical applications, " for providing " littl e freedom in choice of topic " or " opportunities for creativity . " The defens e

Significant at the .10 level . -24-

research institutes were criticized for their " excessive secrecy , " for th e

" strict discipline, " and for the " lack of freedom in choice of topio " -- although " high salaries (10-15 percent above the norm) " and " better organizatio n and equipment " were praised .

From the standpoint of the major concern of this section of the report- -

the significance of technology imports for Soviet R&D--what stands out is tha t

technology per se was not the only, nor even a main, criterion by whic h

Soviet R&D workers evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of R&D in a particula r branch . Similarly, they did not award especially high marks to the researc h environment or to the research results from the institutes of the Ministr y of Defense . This cannot, however, should not be construed as implying tha t

individual defense-research units, even commanding certain advantages (se e

Section I), are necessarily poor performers . Characteristics of groups o f phenomena cannot be equated with those of individual cases or actors withou t committing what social researchers have long warned against as " the pervasiv e and dangerous eoological fallacy . "12 All the same, it remains true that while th e

PO-box institutes are well endowed in terms of the economists ' traditiona l

" factor inputs , " the payoff from the collective grouping may be more disappointin g than is commonly realized .

Another possible " outpu t " measure appeared in answers to the question :

" did you witness the emergence of new branches of science and technology? "

The nature of R&D work makes evidence of innovation a mark of success ;

indeed, innovation and discovery form a critical ingredient of what Kuhn an d others have labeled " the scientific paradigm ." 13 At the same time , we know from a variety of sources that it is precisely in the realm of innovatio n

that the Soviet system appears so deficient . 14 Therefore, such a question

- 2 5 -

provides a measure of the " norma l " quality of Soviet R&D, rather than a

gauge of its " exceptional " character .

Replies to the query regarding innovation were marginally positiv e

(55 percent) . The sort most frequently cited occurred in the field o f

electronics, including computer technology, micro-circuitry, transistors ,

semiconductors, and microscopy . For those working in production-oriente d

institutes, the development and introduction of ASU (automated control systems )

in Soviet industry and industrial research was listed as a major step forward . 1 5

All the same, as with the previous performance measure, it is ultimatel y

the absence of major input-output linkages that is the most striking .

Direct access to foreign technology apparently made no difference for innovations ; * nor did possession of a clearance . It appears that technology transfer s

of the " hard " variety do not yield significant R&D gains in the Soviet setting .

Recognition of scientific and technological breakthroughs by our informant s

was " indifferent " to measures of work in basic as opposed to applied research ,

or to experience in an institute doing military research . Nor was ther e

any correlation between the project ' s " minimal " measure of military research- -

" research having a military character " --and a positive assessment of new scienc e

and technology developments . The same held true when we used the othe r

measures of "military research, " such as " military sources of financing " or * "the defense ministry as a major supplier of equipment . "

.2 = .38, df = 1, not significant at the .54 leve l* * ** An additional caveat is in order . Our informants at best were onl y occupants of middle-level positions in the military R&D establishment, as i n most of the other research hierarchies . It is quite possible that they were no t exposed to, or were kept deliberately ignorant of, new breakthroughs in certai n areas . Soviet sensitivity to possible leakage of sensitive military informatio n on the part of suspect minorities is too well-known to require much discussion . The results therefore cannot suggest that a Soviet capacity for R&D innovation, eve n in the military, is totally lacking . - 2 6-

Only in the case of " access to foreigners " and " access to foreign

classified materials " did even a weak hook-up between the amounts of Wester n

technology employed and performance evaluations surface . Those wit h

foreign contacts responded in a highly positive fashion (72 percent) to th e

performance evaluation question, while those without such contacts were almos t

equally as negative (62 percent) . (See Table 12 .) Individuals with acces s

to classified materials were more likely to report new S&T developments i n * Soviet science (82 percent) than were those without such knowledge (42 percent) .

The performance assessments of Soviet R&D produoed by the surve y

lend credence to the following " rules of thumb " which can be used to summariz e

the " input-output linkage " in the realm of R&D work . First, neither access to , nor isolation from, Western equipment, materials, and information exercis e any systematic influence over the course of Soviet R&D . Neither " hard " tec h nor " soft " tech, it seems, improves the quality of the final product . Second , institutional variations among R&D settings in terms of outputs are important , with the least evidence of innovation coming from R&D tied most closely t o production . Such a failing by now is commonplace to students of the Sovie t scene . Third, the connection between innovative capacity and a military focu s for R&D work is tenuous at best . Military funding, military supply networks , and possible military applications of research had no effect . The performanc e of the PO-boxes themselves rated rather low .

it is useful as well to trace possible effects of exposure to Wester n achievements on informants ' evaluations of Soviet scientific progress . Th e main issue here is how--or whether--the presence of imported technology affect s levels of satisfaction with Soviet achievements . Evidence of a " ripple effect "

x 2 = 5 .9, df = 1, significant at .02 level -2 7 -

in perceptions, such that exposure yields rising expectations, or, alternately, a n

increasingly critical stance, represents another possible, policy-relevan t

outcome .

The pattern of responses indicated that greater use of importe d

technology did not increase the importance informants assigned technologica l

progress versus that in basic science . A majority of the sample, 66 .5 percent ,

felt that technology and basic science ranked equal in importance ; exposur e

to imported technology did not yield much of a variation from this average .

Use of Western technology also made little difference in replies to th e

assessment questions : " since Soviet technological products are less complex ,

are they more reliable than those of the United States? " Over 80 percen t of our respondents disagreed with such a claim, and the use of Western technolog y made no statistically significant differences in evaluations . We also foun d

that there was no relationship between the dominance of Western or Soviet technolog y

in projects and the average amount of time required for R&D innovations fro m

individual projects to pass into serial production or widespread use (diffusion) .

The slight advantage foreign technology usage appeared to confer on close r examination turned out to be not statistically meaningful .

IV . Conclusions and Policy Implication s

Approximately a dozen salient points emerge from the mass of statistica l data and the multiple perspectives on the tech transfer issue which the stud y

has explored . Taken together, they provide not only new insights into th e

Soviet R&D process itself but also alternative perspectives for the formulatio n of policy options for the United States government . Before presenting thes e

points, we would remind our readers once again that in a study of this kind, -28-

involving emigre sources that can neither be completely representative no r completely random, it is the direction of the findings, rather than their actua l magnitude, that is most interesting and useful . The first five conclusions refe r chiefly to the role of "hard " tech transfers .

1. Foreign technology never has, and still does not play, as important a rol e in Soviet R&D work as does domestic (Soviet and East European) equipmen t and materials .

insofar as the data revealed no significant generational variations , any conclusions regarding the minor role of imported technology hold for mor e recent decades (1956-1980) as well as for the more distant past (1930s and 1940s) .

Nor did we find any real indication in the informants ' comments to sugges t that there were multiple cases in which Western technology was " critical . "

2. Onlyinthe following ways does the use of Western technology " makea difference " in Soviet R&D in ways that have statistical validity .

A . R&D institutes receive such technology through their norma l supply channels and not through the military .

It flows through the Academy's supply channels (Glavakademsnab) fo r

R&D institutes for Western technology, least of all one that is character- istically military .

- 2 9-

B . Foreign technology associates with high-cost projects , only for military research institutes and for production-branch research .

It has no bearing on cost for Academy or university affiliates . Thi s

suggests that institutional affiliation, rather than the technology itself ,

probably drives the costs upward .

C. The use of imported technology in Soviet R&D lengthens rathe r than accelerates the amount of time required to complete R& D projects, making any contribution to " storming " doubtful .

Technology imports, however, are associated with projects of shorte r

duration within production-branch and military research insitutes . Thi s

suggests, again, that institutional setting, rather than foreign technology ,

makes the difference .

D. Use of foreign technology is tied to military funding only i n the case of defense research institutes (PO boxes) .

It does not correlate significantly with military funding mor e

generally . This runs counter to the assumption that it is the Soviet militar y

which acts as the chief supplier and main conduit for tech imports fo r