Cold War Counterintelligence
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CHAPTER 1 Cold War Counterintelligence Introduction The distinguished American historian Richard Hofstadter suggested that periodically in American history, during times of great worry, many individuals turn to “conspiracy theories” to explain away their anxieties. The early post–World War II scene was such a period. To some Americans, President Franklin Roosevelt sold out the European nations that fell victim to the Communists. The peace that Americans expected after fighting the Nazi attempt to subvert the European continent was not there. Unable to rationally explain why they failed to achieve any security, the American public believed the answer was the result of widespread treason and subversion within the nation. President Harry Truman was bogged down in Korea but unwilling to commit the resources to win because the United States had to build up NATO to defend Europe. Because of Truman’s actions in promoting loyalty oaths for the US Government, some rightwing Republicans in Congress accused the Democrats of being soft on Communism. If there were indeed traitors in the country, then the Democratic Party was responsible for them because they had controlled the government since 1932. In 1948, Whittaker Chambers, a journalist who admitted he was a Communist Party member and Soviet spy, accused Alger Hiss, a middle-level aide to President Roosevelt, as having provided classified documents to the Soviets. The case might have faded into the dustpan of history except that Hiss lied about knowing Chambers. Caught in that lie he was convicted of perjury. Elizabeth Bentley, another former Soviet spy, also came forward at this time with her story of Soviet intelligence penetration of the government. The next event fueling American anxiety was the Soviet Union’s detonation of the atomic bomb. The US intelligence community had convinced American leaders that the United States was five years ahead of the Soviets in this area yet the country now faced this new menace. The arrests of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Harry Gold, and several other Americans revealed that through them Soviet intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project, as the A-Bomb program was called. A senator from Wisconsin by the name of Joseph McCarthy rode the nation’s apprehension about Communist subversion to political stardom. McCarthy constantly told people he had the names of Communists within the government. Yet, he never released a single name to the press nor did he identify a single 3 Communist in the government. He actually had nothing but was able to convince people that what he said was true. McCarthy was an alarming symbol of just how anxious American society had become. In the end he went down in flames. The identification of the Communist party spy rings caused Soviet intelligence to end this recruitment practice. The intelligence services looked to running “illegals”—a Soviet national documented as a citizen of another country who emigrates to the targeted nation. This practice was revealed when Rudolph Ivanovich Abel was arrested by the FBI in 1957. It was the start of the Cold War. Every presidential administration beginning with Harry Truman had to design its foreign policy around the overwhelming fact that the United States was locked into a deadly competition with the Soviet Union that left very little room to maneuver. To the Counterintelligence Community, this meant its resources and energy had to be focused on that threat. 4 Cold War Counterintelligence Military Security The sudden Korean outbreak found the military The most pressing counterintelligence problem right security (counterintelligence) effort of the Office of the after the opening of the Korean Conflict had to do with Acting Chief of Staff Intelligence Division, Department the establishment of military censorship, especially of the Army (OACofS G-2, D/A), in a noticeably armed forces and public information media censorship. unsatisfactory state. Although the new conditions of This was the case despite the fact that anticipatory Cold War had served to increase all phases of this effort planning both for national and military censorship in to a marked degree, the Army had not only been the event of an emergency had been accomplished prevented by higher authority from carrying out the during the previous Cold War period. Furthermore, on domestic intelligence operations it needed to support 7 February 1950, the Secretary of Defense had formally prior planning for the possible use of federal troops in directed the Secretary of the Army to assume primary local emergencies but had also been denied any direct responsibility for: control over the establishment of policies and procedures aimed at uncovering subversion or sabotage within its Coordinating all aspects of censorship planning, own ranks. Moreover, due mainly to defense economy as it concerns the Department of Defense, with a considerations, the total authorized strength of the two view to developing censorship programs which security branches that formed part of the earlier merged are soundly conceived and integrated with those Security and Training Division had been reduced to 36 of the Federal Agency having primary officers and 41 civilian employees just when the responsibility for censorship. demands of the security clearance program for personnel, requiring access to classified information of Providing consultation and coordination with the Government, had reached a new peak in intensity. the National Security Resources Board through a On 25 June 1950, under the terms of a special regulation working group compromising appropriate dated 14 September 1949, which was still in force, these representation from each military department and branches were being called upon to perform the such representation as the NSRB may desire. following functions: Informing the Secretary of Defense from time Operations Branch—Formulates, promulgates, to time of programs and developments in the field and supervises counterintelligence programs of censorship planning.2 pertaining to the Army; establishes counter- measures against efforts to gain unauthorized One result of this timely directive from the Secretary access to classified information pertaining to plans, of Defense was the prompt creation of a working group operations, and capabilities of the Army; and on censorship planning, which came to be known as initiates, controls, reviews, and recommends final the National Censorship Readiness Measures action on certain types of security investigations Coordination Committee (NCRMCC). Enjoying of military and civilian personnel connected with appropriate National Security Resources Board the Army. (NSRB), Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, Navy, and Air Force representation, the NRCMCC Security of Military Information Branch— started without delay to prepare an emergency plan for Formulates, promulgates, and exercises armed forces participation in the implementation of supervision over measures for censorship and for national censorship if it was ever ordered into effect.3 safeguarding classified military information; and Even though the letter of instructions to the field promulgates and interprets policy on the disclosure regarding that plan could not be actually issued until 29 of classified military information to foreign August 1950,4 it was already in the process of Army– governments and their nationals, the United States Air Force staff coordination at the time of the Korean Government, nongovernmental agencies, and outbreak, so its chief provisions were generally individuals.1 understood and accepted by all concerned. 5 Cold War Counterintelligence This planning effort had been founded on the thesis problem effectively; but, under the existing conditions that national censorship would be immediately imposed such a course of action was plainly out of the question. by the Chief Executive following some kind of The three major press services in the United States, declaration of war. The Korean conflict, however, was though, were persuaded to agree not “to compile or then being officially regarded as a United Nations police publish state or national round-ups of National Guard action led by the United States, which presented an or Reserve units being called to active duty.” entirely new concept in the matter. Besides, neither the Additionally, on 9 August 1950, when the Secretary of Air Force nor the Navy seemed to feel in 1950 there Defense cabled Commander-in-Chief Far East was any compelling need for the establishment of (CINCFE) to express his grave concern over the censorship and the National Censorship Adviser to the recurring breaches of security displayed in dispatches NSB had already expressed an opinion that “in view of emanating from Korea, General MacArthur stated that the diplomatic and political implications, the President he preferred a code of voluntary press control to one would not give his approval to the imposition of national calling for an imposed censorship and also noted as censorship.”5 follows: Nevertheless, the problem of affording a suitable In Tokyo previous directives from Washington military security for troop movements, combat forbade such direct procedure but something of the operations, and the introduction of new weapons into same general effect has been accomplished by the Korean conflict soon became both real and acute. constantly calling attention to correspondents to Since there were at first almost no curbs at all on published dispatches which jeopardized security. The results are progressively