FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : THE ROLE OF IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY IN SOVIET R & D : Do Western Equipment, Wester n Supplies or Western Informatio n Make a Differenc e AUTHOR : Stephen Sternheimer CONTRACTOR : Harvard Universit y PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Dr . Mark Kuchmen t COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 625- 8 DATE : August 1, 198 6 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provide d by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . NOTE This is the second of three reports on Soviet research an d development from Council Contract #625-8 with Harvard Universit y for an interview project entitled "Soviet R & D : Information an d Insights from the Third Emigration" . The first was a report unde r the same title by Harley Balzer, dated July 1, 1986 . The thu d report will be "The Role of the Communist Party in Soviet R & D " by Robert F . Miller . Two incidental papers are appended to this report by Stephe n Sternheimer, as of possible interest to specialist . Appendix I is an account, in journalistic style, by Mark Kuchment, of th e career in the USSR and contribution to Soviet microelectronics o f Filipp Staros whom Mr . Kuchment believes to be Alfred Sarant, a n American engineer who left the United States in 1950 . Appendix I I is the transcription of a personal account of experience with Sovie t computers by Dr . Emanuel Bobrov, a Soviet specialist in the theor y of elasticity who immigrated to the United States in 1975 . The tables referred to in the text of this paper appear afte r the Notes and just before the Appendices . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper concludes that imported Western (including Japanese) tech- nology, both "hard" and "soft", plays only a minor role in the effective- ness of Soviet research and development . It reaches that conclusion, and some corresponding policy recommendations for control of technology transfer, o n the basis of a survey of 200 Soviet emigres who worked until about 1980 i n various capacities in different parts of the Soviet R & D establishment . The study does not address the issue of technology transfer geared directl y to civilian or military production, or to overall economic performance . Moreover, a survey study of this kind, involving emigre sources that ca n neither be c-mpletely representative nor competely random, is importan t for the direction of its findings rather than their amplitude . The first five of the following principal findings refer chiefly to th e role of "hard" technology . 1. Foreign technology never has, and still does not play, as important a rol e in Soviet R&D work as does domestic (Soviet and East European) equipmen t and materials . Insofar as the data revealed no significant generational variations , any conclusions regarding the minor role of imported technology hold for mor e recent decades (1956-1980) as well as for the more distant past (1930s and 1940s) . Only about one-third of the sample indicated a dependency on Wester n technology in R&D work at the level of 50 percent of all equipment or higher ; most imports came from Western Europe and Japan rather than the United States . Nor did we find any real indication in the informants ' comments to sugges t that there were multiple cases in which Western technology was " critical . " 2. Only in the following ways does the use of Western technology "make a difference " in Soviet R&D in ways that have statistical validity . A . R&D institutes receive such technology through their norma l supply channels and not through the military . It flows through the Academy ' s supply channels (Glavakademsnab) fo r Academy institutes, through the industrial ministries for the production-branc h research bodies, and through the Ministry of Defense and the other ministrie s for the PO boxes . There is no single, dominant conduit into the Sovie t R&D institutes for Western technology, least of all one that is character- istically military . 11 B . Foreign technology associates with high-cost projects , only for military research institutes and for production-branc h research . It has no bearing on cost for Academy or university affiliates . Thi s suggests that institutional affiliation, rather than the technology itself , probably drives the costs upward . C. The use of imported technology in Soviet R&D lengthens rathe r than accelerates the amount of time required to complete R& D projects, making any contribution to " storming " doubtful . Technology imports, however, are associated with projects of shorte r duration within production-branch and military research insitutes . Thi s suggests, again, that institutional setting, rather than foreign technology , makes the difference . D. Use of foreign technology is tied to military funding only i n the case of defense research institutes (PO boxes) . It does not correlate significantly with military funding mor e generally . This runs counter to the assumption that it is the Soviet militar y which acts as the chief supplier and main conduit for tech imports for all R&D . 3 . A number of facets of the Soviet R&D process appear unresponsive t o (independent of) the use of foreign as opposed to homegrown technolog y of the hard variety . Insofar as these facets represent defining characteristics of R& D by any yardstick, we conclude that overall, tech transfers do not have a majo r impact on the R&D process or R&D results in the USSR . Among the dimension s of Soviet R&D not affected by the national origins of the technology use d are : the size of research groups, the political generation of research workers , the nature of the research (basic, applied), institutional setting, tim e lapsed for equipment delivery, institutional suppliers, total project cost , and the level of design decision-making . iii 4. R&D technology imports from the West have not concentrated in military R& D and show few signs of having made a significant contribution in the aggregat e to this particular branch of R&D work . This holds true regardless of how " military R&D " is defined in the Soviet con- text-- " research in a PO-box institute, "" research with a military character, " " research funded by the military, "" research for which the defense supplies th e equipment, " " research in which the defense ministry is responsible for desig n decision making . " The fact that such a five-part definition of " militar y R&D " could turn up no significant linkages calls into question several assumptions . Chief among these is the claim that a conscious and effective thrust of th e USSR's policy of encouraging tech transfer has been to obtain, and concentrate , the best of Western scientific know-how and technology on research projects fo r the Soviet military . 5. The presence or absence of imported technology in the Soviet R&D proces s is a function neither of the level of planning or decision making involved , nor of Party involvement and support . If anything, the data suggests that when a top Party organ, or high-leve l government, body takes part in research designs, less rather than more foreig n technology is utilized . When the focus shifts to the impact of " sof t " transfers--those involvin g information but not equipment--on Soviet R&D, the picture changes very little . Among other things, the data indicates that " hard " tech transfers and " soft " tech transfers do not substitute for one another in different dimension s of the Soviet R&D process . iv 6. There is no systematic relationship between research projects that emplo y imported equipment, lab apparatus and materials and those that have acces s to soft technology from abroad . The two are neither complimentary nor exclusive, which means that bot h the intensity and scope of tech transfer is restricted in an aggregate sense . 7. R&D work in a research institute run by the Defense Ministry is th e single best predictor of access to soft tech from the West, along some but not all channels . The correlation holds both for those for whom such work was a primar y occupation, and for those who worked in PO-box institutes at any time durin g their professional careers . For example, the kind of " success " defined b y possession of a clearance associated strongly with work in such a setting . The same held true for entre to foreign and Soviet classified materials . However , there was no correlation between military research work and contacts wit h foreigners, or with the tracking of research findings in Western sources . 8. Military R&D broadly defined (i .e ., funding, design, possible application s supply sources) does not correlate with soft tech transfers . With the exception of " military research " narrowly defined (work in a PO-box institute), access to Western information and know-how is not sig- nificantly enhanced by military involvement in R&D work along any of the line s mentioned above . And even a " strict construction " of military R&D does no t produce major distinctions between it and civilian R&D on matters such a s contacts with foreigners or tracking Western research results . From thi s perspective, Western attempts to restrict soft tech transfers owing to thei r possible military application could be unrewarding in terms of curtailin g Soviet military R&D advances . v 9 . The involvement of high-level political bodies in developing researc h plan s doe s not , ips o facto, guarantee increase d acces s t o channel s for information transfer from the West . Even though involvement in project decision making by the GKNi T meant increased access to foreigners, and involvement of the defense ministry a higher probability of clearance, no overall pattern involving all channel s surfaced for Party and state organs .