NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD OFFICE NATIONAL DE L’ÉNERGIE
Hearing Order GH-1-2006 Ordonnance d’audience GH-1-2006
EMERA BRUNSWICK PIPELINE COMPANY LTD. (EBPC)
Application to Construct and Operate the Brunswick Pipeline
VOLUME 10
Hearing held at L’audience tenue à
Hilton Saint John Trade and Convention Centre Loyalist Room One Market Square Saint John, New Brunswick
November 16, 2006 le 16 novembre 2006
International Reporting Inc. Ottawa, Ontario (613) 748-6043
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 2006 © Sa Majesté du Chef du Canada 2006 as represented by the National Energy Board représentée par l’Office national de l’énergie
This publication is the recorded verbatim transcript Cette publication est un compte rendu textuel des and, as such, is taped and transcribed in either of the délibérations et, en tant que tel, est enregistrée et official languages, depending on the languages transcrite dans l’une ou l’autre des deux langues spoken by the participant at the public hearing. officielles, compte tenu de la langue utilisée par le participant à l’audience publique.
Printed in Canada Imprimé au Canada
HEARING ORDER/ORDONNANCE D'AUDIENCE GH-1-2006
IN THE MATTER OF Emera Brunswick Pipeline Company Ltd. (EBPC) Application to Construct and Operate the Brunswick Pipeline
HEARING LOCATION/LIEU DE L'AUDIENCE
Hearing held at Saint John (New Brunswick), Thursday, November 16, 2006
Audience tenue à Saint-Jean (Nouveau Brunswick), Jeudi, le 16 novembre 2006
BOARD PANEL/COMITÉ D'AUDIENCE DE L'OFFICE
S. Leggett Chairperson/Présidente
K. Bateman Member/Membre
S. Crowfoot Member/Membre
Transcript Order GH-1-2006
APPEARANCES/COMPARUTIONS
Applicant/Demandeur
Emera Brunswick Pipeline Company Ltd. - Mr. Lawrence E. (Laurie) Smith, Q.C. - Mr. Nick Gretener - Mr. Peter Doig
Intervenors/Intervenants
Companies/Compagnies
Anadarko - (Bear Head LNG Corporation, Anadarko Canada LNG Marketing, Corp. and Anadarko LNG Marketing, LLC) - Mr. Bernard Roth
Enbridge Gas New Brunswick - Mr. David MacDougall - Ms. Christa Baird
Imperial Oil Resources and ExxonMobil Canada Ltd. - Mr. Ron Moore
Irving Oil Limited - Mr. James H. Smellie
Repsol Energy Canada Ltd. - Mr. Peter C.P. Thompson, Q.C. - Ms. Kirsten Crain - Mr. Gerald Nemec
Shell Canada Limited - Mr. Robert Gall
504-474 N.B. Ltd. - Dr. Darrell Gallant
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 APPEARANCES/COMPARUTIONS
Groups/Groupes
Teresa Debly (On behalf of Concerned Citizens, Teresa Debly and the Estate of A.J. Debly) - Ms. Teresa Debly
Friends of Rockwood Park - Saint John Fundy Chapter Conservation Council NB - Mr. David Thompson - Mr. Alan Ruffman - Mr. Eugene Gould
South Central Citizens / House of Tara - Ms. Anne-Marie Mullin
Individuals/Individus
Ms. Teresa M. (Terry) Albright - Mr. Ivan Court
Ms. Carol Armstrong - Ms. Carol Armstrong
Ms. Dawn Baldwin - Ms. Dawn Baldwin
Mr. Bernard Ball - Mr. Bernard Ball
Mr. Philip Blaney - Mr. Philip Blaney
Mr. Michael Burgess - Mr. Michael Burgess
Mr. Ivan Court - Mr. Ivan Court
Mr. Patrick Bruce Court - Mr. Patrick Bruce Court
Mr. Charles L. Debly - Mr. Charles L. Debly
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 APPEARANCES/COMPARUTIONS
Individuals/Individus
Ms. Janet Dingwell - Ms. Janet Dingwell
Ms. Deborah Fuller - Ms. Deborah Fuller
Mr. Glenn Patrick Griffin - Mr. Glenn Patrick Griffin
Mr. Edward Harned - Mr. Edward Harned
Ms. Patricia Higgins - Ms. Patricia Higgins
Ms. Frauke Humphrey - Ms. Frauke Humphrey
Dr. Tom Inkpen - Dr. Tom Inkpen
Mr. James L. Laracey - Mr. James L. Laracey
Ms. Betty Lizotte - Ms. Betty Lizotte
Dr. Robert Moir - Dr. Robert Moir
Ms. Frances Oliver - Ms. Frances Oliver
Ms. Joan Pearce - Ms. Joan Pearce
Ms. Yvonne Perry - Ms. Yvonne Perry
Mr. Jack Quinlan - Mr. Jack Quinlan
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 APPEARANCES/COMPARUTIONS
Individuals/Individus
Ms. Darlene Richard - Ms. Darlene Richard
Ms. Carol Ring - Ms. Carol Ring
Ms. Ernestine Rooney - Ms. Ernestine Rooney
Mr. Horst Sauerteig - Mr. Horst Sauerteig
Ms. Linda Stoddard - Ms. Linda Stoddard
Dr. Leland T. Thomas and Ms. Janice L. Eldridge-Thomas - Dr. Leland T. Thomas - Ms. Janice L. Eldridge-Thomas
Ms. E. Jean Thompson - Ms. E. Jean Thompson
Governments/Gouvernements
Environment Canada - Mr. Jake Harms
NB Department of Environment - Mr. Paul Vanderlaan
NDP, Friends of Saint John Community and Dan Robichaud - Mr. Dan Robichaud
Nova Scotia Department of Energy - Mr. Stephen McGrath
National Energy Board/Office national de l’énergie
- Ms. J. Saunders - Ms. M. Yuzda
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES
Description Paragraph No./No. de paragraphe
Opening remarks by the Chairperson 14300
Preliminary matters brought forward by Mr. L. Smith 14304 Preliminary matters brought forward by Ms. J. Saunders 14309 Preliminary matters brought forward by Mr. A. Ruffman 14311 Preliminary matters brought forward by Emera Brunswick Panel 4 14315
Emera Brunswick Panel 4 - Engineering Design, Safety, Risk Analysis
Mr. Ralph Mayer Dr. Frank Bercha Mr. Andy Drake Dr. John Kiefner Mr. Mike Whalen
- Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard 14340 - Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman 14431 - Examination by Mr. E. Gould 14724
Ruling by the Board 14865
- Examination by Mr. D. Thompson 14893 - Examination by Mr. P. Blaney 14953 - Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan 14988 - Continued examination by Mr. P. Blaney 15090 - Examination by Ms. D. Richard 15104 - Examination by Dr. R. Moir 15283 - Examination by Dr. L. Thomas 15319 - Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig 15359 - Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir 15505 - Examination by Ms. J. Thompson 15653 - Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen 15676 - Examination by Mr. J. Laracey 15769 - Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud 15913 - Examination by Mr. S. McGrath 16156 - Examination by Ms. M. Yuzda 16179
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 LIST OF EXHIBITS/LISTE DES PIÈCES
No. Description Paragraph No./No. de paragraphe
B-63 Response to an undertaking given by Panel 4 to Mr. Ruffman concerning CFER Circle material 14305
B-64 Response to an undertaking given at Volume 5, paragraphs 7330 to 7334, relating to residences contacted on Creighton Avenue. 14886
B-65 Direct evidence of Philip B. Ribbeck and direct evidence of Denis Marcoux. 14889
B-66 Response to an undertaking given by Mr. Blair to Mr. Harms concerning Bicknell’s thrush 15188
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Preliminary matters
--- Upon commencing at 9:02 a.m./L'audience débute à 9h02
14300. THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everyone.
14301. I think the only preliminary ma tter that the Board has is just that in sitting late last night and hearing the sound from next door, we have discovered that there's a Raffi children's concert taking place next door from eleven to noon today.
14302. So what we're proposing is that we will probably break early for lunch because we figure that's a better use of our time than -- I don't think any of us can compete with Raffi. So if that's what happens and the noise becomes an issue, that'll be our plan is to break between eleven and noon.
14303. Are there any other parties who wish to raise preliminary matters? Mr. Smith?
14304. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I had a response to an undertaking. This was an undertaking given by Panel 4 at Volume 9, paragraph 14133 to Mr. Ruffman and it was the CFER Circle material. That's C-F-E-R. If I might have an exhibit number, please?
14305. THE HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. That's Exhibit No. B-63, Pièce numéro B-63
--- EXHIBIT NO./PIÈCE NO. B-63:
Response to an undertaking given by Panel 4 to Mr. Ruffman concerning CFER Circle material
14306. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, beyond that, the Panel, I know, has transcript corrections and further undertaking responses but if there are others with preliminary matters perhaps to let them go first.
14307. THE CHAIRPERSON: Are there any others who wish to raise preliminary matters at this point?
14308. Ms. Saunders?
14309. MS. SAUNDERS: Thank you, Madam Chair. I've been advised that for parties who need additional charts for marking their exhibit numbers we've made some more available at the back on the table, if you need those for -- in preparing for your cross-examination.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Preliminary matters
14310. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Ruffman, do you have a preliminary matter? Of parties, as far as the order. Yeah, please come and let us know? Thank you.
14311. MR. RUFFMAN: Linda Stoddard is -- has to work this morning. She's AWOL at the present time. She has consulted with me and I've consulted with Mr. Smith about whether she could do her few questions and interrupt myself and we agree to that, providing the Panel agrees to that.
14312. THE CHAIRPERSON: That would be fine. We'll proceed on that basis.
14313. Any other preliminary matters?
--- (No response/Pas de réponse)
14314. THE CHAIRPERSON: With that, Mr. Smith, we'll turn it over to your Panel, then for their preliminary matters.
--- RALPH MAYER, Resumed: --- DR. FRANK BERCHA, Resumed: --- ANDREW DRAKE, Resumed: --- DR. JOHN KIEFNER, Resumed: --- MIKE WHALEN, Resumed:
14315. MR. MAYER: Thank you Madam Chair. We just have a few transcript corrections. First turn -- this is referring to Volume 8 of the transcript and turning to paragraph 11820. It's identified there that the speaker was Mr. Whalen but in fact, we believe the speaker was Mr. Smith.
14316. The next one appears at 11835, where it says that Mr. Whalen was speaking but in fact, we believe Mr. Mayer was speaking. The next one is on 11839, where it's indicated Mr. Whalen was speaking but in fact, it was Mr. Mayer that was speaking.
14317. The same correction can be made to 11846. Again it indicates Mr. Whalen but it should be Mr. Mayer. And the last one is on paragraph 12113, where it says Mr. Whalen was speaking. It was actually Mr. Mayer.
14318. Those are all the transcript corrections we have at this time. But I believe our Panel would like to respond to an undertaking taken at the very end of yesterday, Mr. Ruffman's request. Mr. Drake is going to start off our response.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Preliminary matters
14319. MR. DRAKE: In the matter of the normal operating pressure request and I think it really comes down to the comparability of the examples for which we've provided, I think after we took our homework assignment to heart last night and we've deliberated at length -- which is a frightening thought when you get so many engineers late in the day talking about technical issues -- but after significant deliberation, I think that we conclude that it is -- for the purposes of the examples and the purposes of this discussion -- that the relevance of a normal operating pressure for the comparability of these examples is not relevant or even prudent from an engineering standpoint.
14320. That the issue actually revolves around an issue of mass flow rate which is something that is brought to bear in both the Kuprewicz materials that are already on file as well as the Bercha reports that are already on file. And the mass flow rate is a product of the diameter and the pressure which I'll ask Dr. Kiefner to talk to in length in just a moment.
14321. But I think when we go back to it, we really are trying to reaffirm our position that the examples of the existing high pressure natural gas transmission pipelines in high density areas provided in our, I think it's what GH-1-2006 reply evidence, Attachment 2, does represent an accurate comparison of the proposed Brunswick pipeline which was the purpose of those examples and the purpose of all of this effort.
14322. As stated in our Attachment 2, page 1, "Introduction", and I will read that just for the purposes of the synchronization: (As read)
"There's a general public concern regarding the safety of the proposed Brunswick pipeline near high density urban and industrial locations within the City of Saint John, New Brunswick. This document is intended to relieve this concern by providing multiple mapping examples of similar high pressure transmission pipelines operating safely in other urban and industrial locations throughout Canada and Eastern United States.
Specifically the Canadian mapping examples illustrate how similar large diameter high pressure transmission pipelines are commonplace in other large Canadian cities. Further it demonstrates how transmission pipelines co-exist with other critical infrastructure and most importantly how they have operated safely in those -- in close proximity to high density populated and unindustrialized areas.
The following information is offered to demonstrate why these examples are comparable to the proposed Brunswick Pipeline and
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Preliminary matters
why focusing just on normal operating pressure may not be a true measure of comparability.
Table 1 in Exhibit B-40-a reflects the individual specific pipeline maximum operating pressures of the pipeline systems which is consistent with the methods used in Dr. Bercha and his risk analysis for the Brunswick Pipeline, i.e., the analysis based on the proposed Brunswick's 1440 MAOP design pressure.
This is prudent and diligent since it offers the highest pressure at which the pipeline could operate at any given day, at any given time based on loading changes and different draw downs from consumers and correspondingly it represents a more conservative projection of the potential impact zone. A real zone that can be created by that pipeline as authorized under regulation."
14323. With that, I'd like to ask Dr. Kiefner to walk through a little bit about mass flow rate and its relevance there and its -- and how that creates comparability to these examples and why these examples were chosen.
14324. DR. KIEFNER: A mass flow rate which I think everybody agrees is what count as far as the escape of gas in terms of a rupture is proportional to the square of the diameter and the pressure in the pipeline. So that if you compare a 36 inch pipeline operating at 1,000 psi it has exactly the same mass flow rate in the case of a rupture as a 30 inch pipeline operating at 1440.
14325. MR. MAYER: And I wanted to add something that I briefly touched on yesterday. As Mr. Drake has just repeated here these examples, you know, show pipelines in urban and industrial areas and in other communities. It's very evident when you take a look at the maps that that's the case.
14326. That's important because it's very easy then for one to see that these pipelines must have been following a design factor, design requirements that would put them in that range with a .5 or a .56 design factor.
14327. And that's a stress level that's in the pipeline and so that's important because if you consider a pipeline that may be operating at a lesser pressure than the Brunswick Pipeline, say a pipeline instead of 1440 psi is operating at 1000 psi with the same design factor in order to come up with a design the engineers would have either reduced the wall thickness or reduced the grade in that pipe.
14328. So in fact, even though they're at a lesser pressure, they're -- may be more susceptible to puncture as discussed by Dr. Kiefner in earlier testimony as the wall
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Preliminary matters
thickness is really making this urban portion of the Brunswick Pipeline here very resilient to punctures.
14329. MR. DRAKE: I think just as a final point, we took our homework assignment to heart. It would have been easy, actually to just focus on a single plain issue. But I think it does a disservice to the issue. As engineers we are obligated to try to give some diligence to this matter. It is not appropriate or prudent for us to simplify this discussion.
14330. It is actually our -- incumbent upon us to deal with the complexity of this issue. Simply trying to define a normal operating pressure is not relevant to the actual impact of a pipeline on the surrounding environment.
14331. I think it is prudent upon us to deal with the complexity of that issue which relies -- revolves around it's mass flow rate, the potential mass flow rate of that pipeline given the dynamics under which it can and will operate.
14332. MR. MAYER: Thank you, Madam Chair, that's the end of our undertaking.
14333. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
14334. MR. SMITH: We have one more quick one, Madam Chair.
14335. Mr. Whalen.
14336. MR. WHALEN: Yesterday, a transcript, Volume 9, transcript 13964, I was discussing gas quality parameters, specifically temperature. And I stated that I thought that temperature in the Brunswick line would have a max and a min value subject to check.
14337. I've now checked the firm service agreement which again is part of our evidence. It's Exhibit B-1-8, appendix 8 and we don't need to turn it up. But the temperature currently in the -- in that exhibit has a maximum value but it does not have a minimum value. That's it.
14338. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms. Stoddard, would you like to come forward with your questions for this Panel.
14339. --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS. STODDARD:
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
14340. MS. STODDARD: Good morning. I want to thank the Panel, Friends of Rockwood Park and Mr. Smith for allowing me to get in now so I can get to my job. I appreciate it. Thank you.
14341. I live in East Saint John and my grandchildren attend Silver Falls Day Care. Therefore the refinery corridor is of the utmost concern to me. And all my questions will contain -- will pertain to safety.
14342. I understand there will be four additional personnel to the 20 existing staff when the pipeline is up and running.
14343. Can you tell me what areas of responsibility will this staff undertake?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14344. MR. WHALEN: Those staff will be tasked with all aspects of operating and maintaining the facility in the field.
14345. So, they would be typically technical people, with a background in measurement of gas, corrosion protection systems, the electronic devices that are associated the pipeline, as well as some administration of that -- of those tasks, and supervision.
14346. MS. STODDARD: Thank you.
14347. Would there be any security personnel hired as well?
14348. MR. WHALEN: We don't have people that are tasked exclusively with security.
14349. We do ask our technicians in the field to do regular security patrols, to look for things like unauthorized activity, encroachment, or anything that is something that should be reported to the authorities.
14350. MS. STODDARD: Okay. And where are these monitors or technicians going to be located along the urban portion of the pipeline?
14351. MR. WHALEN: These personnel would work in any given day at various sites along the pipeline.
14352. Typically, they concentrate their maintenance activity on valve sites. But it could be anywhere along the line, for example, they take corrosion readings, that's
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
about every kilometre along the pipeline.
14353. They would reside in the Saint John area. So, in the event of a call out after hours, the response time would be a lot quicker than if they had been residing, for example, in Moncton or Fredericton.
14354. MS. STODDARD: Thank you.
14355. Now, I understand that security concerns re: terrorist attack were explored earlier. However, I do have one question on that matter.
14356. Since the proposed pipeline is an international transmission line, would security fall under the control of the Federal Government?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14357. MR. WHALEN: My experience is that the security oversight of any infrastructure, it really defaults to the policing jurisdiction in which it lies.
14358. So, for example, the pipeline in Saint John, any vandalism or encroachment, any unauthorized activity, trespassing, would be reported to the Saint John police force. Whereas, in the rural areas, we typically deal, of course, with the RCMP.
14359. MS. STODDARD: My main concern was the terrorism aspect, not so much the vandalism. But thank you.
14360. If you could bring up B-1-d, A-1-2130 Conclusion Summary, page 72. Thank you: (As read)
"The preferred route through Rockwood Park presents lower risk to the public than the other two alternative routes."
14361. My question to this is, how does going through Rockwood Park lower the risk to the public in East Saint John?
14362. MR. WHALEN: Well, the risk is a function of exposure to people. And, of course, in Rockwood Park there are no full time residents or other individuals that are there 24 hours a day, in the vicinity of the pipeline.
14363. MS. STODDARD: Yes, I understand that.
14364. But I live in East Saint John. It goes through my community long before it gets to the Park. So, going through the Park is not going to lower my risk in
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
East Saint John.
14365. DR. BERCHA: That -- well, you're absolutely right, it won't affect your risk, but the overall risk -- the overall exposure to the pipeline is reduced by going through Rockwood Park.
14366. MR. MAYER: I might add that, really, what the context here is like comparing the preferred route through Rockwood Park as opposed to the alternates, north and south around Rockwood Park.
14367. I think that's what the context of this is, and that might help you.
14368. MS. STODDARD: Well, I read that into it as myself as well. I was just concerned about my own area, as you can understand.
14369. Now I would like to bring up C-33-5-a. Okay. It's page 12, Risk Analysis Report.
14370. Chief Simonds, in his risk analysis, states: (As read)
"Giving our cities industrial density, simultaneous hazard material incidents could be triggered by a pipeline failure."
14371. And the next one that I would like brought up is B-1-D-A-1-2-130 Consequence Analysis. And this is Fire and Explosion Damage Criteria. And it states: (As read)
"Direct contact with a fire, for example, inside a vapour cloud, will usually result in fatality. A possibility of fatality is 99 percent within 5 seconds."
14372. In your experience, how far can this vapour cloud float?
14373. DR. BERCHA: Well, in our experience, empirical experience, the vapour cloud will tend to rise.
14374. After it -- I think, as was discussed earlier, after it loses its buoyancy, or its inertia and is affected by buoyancy, so it would tend to travel roughly 100 metres, and then begin to rise.
14375. In the modelling, we've made the very conservative assumption that it will not rise, and we've had it go out to roughly 500, 600 metres.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
14376. MS. STODDARD: All right. Okay.
14377. If a leak occurs in the pipeline on the refinery site, is it fair to say you cannot guarantee that a vapour cloud would not be ignited by open flames from refinery stacks?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14378. DR. BERCHA: I was trying to determine from Mr. Mayer how far the stacks are from the pipeline. That's -- in order to answer that question, I need that little piece of information, so just bear with us, please.
14379. MS. STODDARD: Certainly.
14380. MR. MAYER: I think I can answer the question.
14381. We looked at Dr. Bercha's report when we answered an information request that was along similar lines.
14382. And, given the analysis in his report, and given a distance which I don't have available to me right now, but we scaled it off with some mapping, how far these flares are away from the pipeline.
14383. We answered that the flares are too far away from the pipeline in order for that kind of interaction to happen.
14384. MS. STODDARD: Can you tell me which way, generally, this vapour cloud would float? Would it be east, west, south? Would it be towards the water, away from the water?
14385. DR. BERCHA: Well, it will move with the prevailing wind direction. And if it's completely still, it would simply go in the direction that it comes out of the pipeline, which would, in this case, be parallel to the pipeline.
14386. So, it floats with the wind, pretty much.
14387. MS. STODDARD: So, if it floats with the wind, it could, conceivably, float towards the stacks?
14388. The stacks are on the city side of the proposed route.
14389. DR. BERCHA: Well, it certainly could, if the wind direction were in the direction of the stacks, yes, it could float toward them.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
14390. Mr. Mayer indicated that it would not reach them, because they are sufficiently far that the vapour cloud would not -- would have dispersed by the time it gets to them.
14391. MS. STODDARD: Thank you.
14392. If a leak occurs -- oh, I'm sorry. If a leak in the pipeline is undetected at the refinery site, and a fire occurs on the site from another source, which is -- happens frequently, would this not ignite the gas?
14393. DR. BERCHA: No, the leak is such a small on mass flow rate that it would disperse virtually as soon as it hits the atmosphere, to levels which are not flammable.
14394. So, an undetected leak would not ignite.
14395. MS. STODDARD: Can you tell me how long a leak could go before it was detected? Could it leak for a week, a very small amount, and be undetected?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14396. MR. MAYER: I think, just to be helpful in that, like, if it's a very, very small leak, we would call them maybe a pinhole leak. It could sit there leaking for a long period of time, because it wouldn't be noticeable in the pressure drop in a pipeline.
14397. And so, you know, the pressure readings at our valve sites wouldn't trigger anything at our control centre, as was discussed yesterday.
14398. But if -- these small pinhole leaks, in order to find them, our operations personnel do leak surveys where they walk over the line, they use a special instrument called a flame ionization unit. It's a portable flame ionization unit.
14399. And that's a device that could pick up parts per million of gas in the atmosphere.
14400. And when they detect leaks that way, then they can, you know, excavate down to the pipeline, see what's happening, if necessary, and repair.
14401. And Mr. Whalen can explain some of our operating history on the Maritimes & Northeast system in that regard.
14402. MR. WHALEN: As Mr. Mayer pointed out, we do the leakage
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
survey. And, in our experience to date, you know, pinhole leaks have been non-existent because of the material used in the pipeline and the corrosion protection and the in line tool program, of course, which would detect any minor amount of corrosion, which would take a long time, decades, to create a pinhole leak.
14403. However, I think I testified earlier, as well, that we have other means of looking for leaks. We have regular patrols, as well as looking for any loss of vegetation and that type of thing.
14404. MS. STODDARD: Given the ---
14405. MR. DRAKE: If I -- if I could ---
14406. MS. STODDARD: Sorry.
14407. MR. DRAKE: Just as a point here, I think that's very important.
14408. If -- we kind of get drawn into the worst possible thing that can happen.
14409. But I think the issue that actually may be germane is what would cause a leak, and how prevalent that might be.
14410. First of all, it's not -- it's obviously not very prevalent, but what would likely cause a leak would be a pinhole that we referred to. It would be external corrosion.
14411. And with the corrosion growth rates, even under the most hostile environment that we can model under, it would take 15 to 20 years to create that kind of an event.
14412. And we're inspecting the pipe, looking for volumetric corrosion events, for the purpose of preventing them from becoming leaks.
14413. So, again, this layering of protection is really important. It's not that the pipe is going to have -- be prone to leaking. It is not, by any stretch of the imagination. An incredibly rare event. And we line up many, many defences in front of the pipeline, and tools, and protection vehicles, to ensure that it never gets to that place.
14414. So, in this conversation, we end up talking about if every defence failed that we've put in front of the pipe, what would be the worst possible thing that could happen?
14415. I do think it's important to recalibrate, but there's a lot of things
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. L. Stoddard
happening in front of these things, to where the likelihood of that is almost non-existent.
14416. MS. STODDARD: Well, I hope you can understand that, as I mentioned earlier, I have two grandchild ren that go to day care in Silver Falls. I pass the refinery daily. The refinery is full of chemicals and petroleum products.
14417. So, worst case scenario is topmost in my mind, if you can appreciate that fact.
14418. MR. DRAKE: I very much appreciate it. And that's why we marshal so much energy to protect it from happening.
14419. MS. STODDARD: Thank you.
14420. Given the proposed route goes through the Grandview Avenue and the refinery, and remembering that Emera cannot guarantee, nor can anyone guarantee that an accident would not happen, have you had discussions with the School District concerning procedures required to protect children at the Champlain Heights Elementary School, should an incident occur?
14421. MR. WHALEN: Any public institution, such as a hospital, or a school, you know, certainly have evacuation planning in place, and fire drills, and this type of thing. 14422. And really, a pipeline incident would be no different than any other type of incident which would trigger these already established plans.
14423. That being said, the emergency response personnel are going to be working with us to identify areas within the emergency planning zone, and to come up with scenarios or, I should say, measures for access, as well as evacuation.
14424. I testified earlier, as well, that typically, in a lot of cases, evacuation is not required or recommended, that the safest place to be in an incident would be to remain sheltered in your business, or in your home.
14425. MS. STODDARD: Okay. The reason I brought that question up, it was just put in this morning, the principal of Champlain Heights School was interviewed this morning, has grave concerns that no procedures have been discussed with the School, in order to protect the children.
14426. And that is the reason I brought that question up.
14427. And with that, I'll thank you, and go off to work. Thank you.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14428. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms. Stoddard.
14429. MR. SMITH: Thank you.
14430. MS. STODDARD: Thank you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14431. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Ruffman, on behalf of Friends of Rockwood Park? Are you ready to resume your cross-examination of Panel 4?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. RUFFMAN, (cont'd/suite):
14432. MR. RUFFMAN: Good morning, Madam Chair, Panel. We're going to have to get used to turning this on. Thank you, Reg. Good morning.
14433. We have been given, or you have been given, I believe by Mr. Smith, just as we began, a CFER circle that I believe is related to the Saint John pipeline. We have not been given that, and we would ask that a copy be given to us.
14434. We will do -- go on the record that we do not accept that the CFER circles should ever, ever be used to site or to justify the siting of high-pressure, large- diameter transmission pipelines.
14435. And we would note that in the Carlsbad rupture where 12 people died, all 12 people were outside the CFER circle, and that is in the evidence presented by Mr. Kuprewicz on behalf of the Friends of Rockwood Park.
14436. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, two things.
14437. Perhaps the panel could be permitted to respond to Mr. Ruffman in terms of what he just said about the CFER circle.
14438. But beyond that, I'd just like him to know that I left about 60 copies of the document on the back table, which is where we have always been filing the undertakings.
14439. So I apologize if he didn't get one, but it's -- it's back there. And in fact, I'll get up right now and go and get a couple and hand them to him.
14440. MR. RUFFMAN: Thank you. I'm afraid we were sitting in our places when the announcement was made.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14441. THE CHAIRPERSON: Let's just let the panel respond to those comments, please.
14442. MR. DRAKE: I'd like to at least calibrate one point here, and that is we did not offer the CFER circle as a point of -- for siting purposes. We only offered it as a reference point as a standard used in the United States, and it is an ASME standard, a national consensus standard, the product of significant research.
14443. We do not intend to use it for siting. We only brought it up to the purpose to give some reference point as to impact zone analysis with a definitive number for use in this discussion, but not for the purpose of siting.
14444. I do not know the specifics of the Carlsbad example offhand that they're talking about. We certainly don't have all the data around that at our disposal here.
14445. But I can say -- I feel somewhat compelled to somehow defend the CFER circle. As it exists in the national consensus standard, it was the product of significant research that involved the valuation of the burn patterns of many, many -- I think 30 or 36 different failures that occurred. And these are all large diameter, high- pressure gas pipeline scenarios. And that work is recognized around the world as being valid and prudent.
14446. MR. RUFFMAN: Madam Chair, through you to the panel, or to the panel, am I -- are we not correct that the report on the CFER circle in fact lists 12 examples?
14447. MR. DRAKE: I think there are many examples that were considered by Dr. Stevens that are not cited in the report.
14448. MR. RUFFMAN: Am I right that the CFER report refers to 12 examples?
14449. MR. DRAKE: Offhand I don't know ho w many are in the report specifically.
14450. MR. RUFFMAN: We also received this morning a long discourse from three members of the panel, which we took furious notes, but I note that we won't have a written copy of that until later in the day or tomorrow, and we would like to reserve the right to raise any questions that come out of that when we have the opportunity to read that material.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14451. But what we would like to emphasize is the other request we made with respect to the table in the Bercha report, the QAR -- QRA report prepared by Dr. Bercha, namely, Table 4.3, where Dr. Bercha, we think quite rightly, is attempting to use a more scientific approach than the simple circle, and that these three sets or three groups of values -- we think we got a commitment yesterday to plot the thermal isopleths related to these three examples so that we in fact could have not a, quote, typical jet fire thermal isopleths, but rather ones that are specific to what Dr. Bercha believes will happen with respect to the Saint John pipeline.
14452. And I would like to clarify that those are in fact -- are an undertaking, or what the Board will make sure that they do arrive in time for our consideration with this panel.
14453. MR. SMITH: Well, Madam Chair, I think that My Friend has now changed his position. When he talked about having the isopleths, he had indicated yesterday, I believe, that he would like them for final argument, and that was a -- in fact we were struggling to know whether we'd be able to have them available prior to the point at which the record closed here.
14454. He's now saying that he would like them -- that -- those exhibits in order to pursue them with the panel. And for sure, that can't happen. We would not be able to produce that material in time for him to continue cross-examining. By my reckoning, again that this panel would be finished today.
14455. So -- and if Mr. Ruffman is asking that the panel stick around in order to speak to the isopleths, then I think that's a very different complexion on, you know, the burden and the probative value of what's being requested.
14456. MR. RUFFMAN: I actually had the impression from Dr. Bercha that this was just a matter of hitting a couple of buttons and out came the diagrams. And I must say, I half expected them to be here this morning.
14457. If we're being told that they cannot be here to be available for this panel, I certainly want the commitment that they'll be available to the National Energy Board to be able to consider with respect to the actual effects or at least the best possible estimated effects of the thermal radiation that may occur.
14458. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I would, through you, caution Mr. Ruffman about his characterization of the evidence.
14459. Mr. -- or sorry, Dr. Bercha was very careful to say that providing this pictorial or illustration of the isopleths is not a simple exercise and that it would take some time to do it. And he was very clear about that yesterday, which is why we had the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
discussion about when the evidence might be available. So I would suggest that Mr. Ruffman stick a little closer to the facts on the record.
14460. Now, if he's satisfied that that would be provided prior to the end -- or the close of the record in the proceeding, fair enough. We're still doing our best to see if that can be accomplished. For sure, it can't be done before tomorrow. And I would not want to request these gentlemen to stick around for a week waiting for that piece of evidence to be produced.
14461. MR. RUFFMAN: I think Mr. Smith may have mis-spoke himself. What we both heard over here, that for sure this can be done before tomorrow. And I think you are not committing to that. Am I right, Mr. Smith?
14462. MR. SMITH: And if I misspoke, I apologize. Thank you.
14463. MR. RUFFMAN: We may have misheard Dr. Bercha, but we are quite comfortable if the materials are -- or these plots are to be available before the end of the hearing. And we'll concede that they may not be able to be available for tomorrow.
14464. MR. SMITH: Now, Madam Chair, there's a further point procedurally.
14465. Mr. Ruffman said that the undertaking response which the panel provided was something that he wanted to come back and cross-examine on tomorrow. And again, the panel may well be off the stand. In fact, we're hoping it will be.
14466. And with great respect to Mr. Ruffman, he's entitled to follow up, he's entitled to ask them to repeat an aspect of the undertaking response, but the natures of undertakings are that if he'd asked the question himself, got the answer right away, he would be expected to pursue it, you know, straight away.
14467. He doesn't get to come back another day to pursue it further. And the undertaking was provided, so he should be expected to pursue it now.
14468. The undertaking was targeted at indicating why the actual operating pressures of the pipelines that Mr. Ruffman identified yesterday were not really a determinative aspect of the safety or comparability. He's certainly at liberty to pursue that right now.
14469. Again, I would not want the record to suggest that we agreed with waiting for another day.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14470. THE CHAIRPERSON: With respect to reserving the right to question the panel at a later date, the Board accepts Mr. Smith's viewpoints that it is your time now, Mr. Ruffman, to complete your questioning of this panel, and that there won't be a right extended to you beyond this period of time.
14471. The record is pretty clear with respect to Dr. Bercha's undertaking, and what we understand from the discourse, the conversation that's taken place this morning, that you are accepting the undertaking that these materials will be provided before the close of the evidentiary record?
--- (No response/Pas de réponse)
14472. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Ruffman.
14473. MR. RUFFMAN: So we will come back then to Table 1 of the reply evidence of Emera, dated October 20th, 2006. And we're dealing with Table 1, which is -- Table 1 of Attachment 2.
14474. And I'm working from my notes of what was spoken this morning by three members of the panel. And if I understand correctly what they said is that we were told that it would not be prudent in their view for them to supply the operating pressures for these various pipelines that are given in Table 1.
14475. So our question for the panel then is, regarding Table 1, Attachment 2, could we please request that you supply the mass release curves, the typical mass release curves for each of these pipelines using the prudent -- as you would say, prudent MOP, or MAOP, as described in the table for each of the examples.
14476. MR. DRAKE: Can we ask a point of clarification?
14477. You say "mass flow curves." I think we would calculate mass flow rate, which is a number, not a curve.
14478. MR. MAYER: That would be the initial mass flow rate rather than a whole series of mass flows over time.
14479. MR. RUFFMAN: As long as it's for a rupture, I think that would be adequate so as to allow the Board to be able to compare these pipelines to what we do know about the Saint John pipeline.
14480. DR. KIEFNER: Well, given that there's a fairly limited amount of time and I want to make this as simple as possible, what I can give you is the calculation
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
that is the -- calculated -- which you can do yourself easily, but it would be the calculation of the diameter squared times pressure, a relative number for all these pipelines.
14481. I'm taking the maximum operating pressure in pounds per square inch, multiplying that times the diameter in inches squared, and the number is a large number so I'm dividing the product by one million, so these numbers come down to a relative size that you can sort of get your hands around.
14482. Now, the Emera Brunswick number, which is the baseline I would assume you want to compare to, is 1.3. If you look at -- starting down the list where we did have pressures, which would be the first page of the table, diameters, the first two under "West Coast Energy" would have relative numbers of .84 and 1.2.
14483. And those numbers carry down for about three pipelines, or two or three pipelines, and I won't quote every one right now but I'll skip around here to give you some ideas. There are -- if you look at, say, a lower pressure pipeline like Union Gas Trafalgar on -- the first one on the next page, for 26- and 34-inch pipelines the relative numbers are .6 and 1.03.
14484. The extreme case in the table, in fact the largest mass flow rate, is associated with the pipeline opposite the bold number "5," It's the Cochrane, Alberta, TransCanada PipeLines’ 36-inch pipeline that operates at 1260 psi, and the relative number for that is 1.63, which is about 25 percent higher than the Emera Brunswick pipeline.
14485. So, those are just sort of a cross-section. I haven't completed all of them.
14486. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I think Dr. Kiefner has tried to give you a range of those values. Now, the request on the table is do you -- would it be helpful to the Board in its understanding of these issues to have the values calculated for each one of those situations on the table.
14487. If it is something of value to you, then we are prepared to do it. If it's not necessary in light of the ranges that have been identified and the manner in which they can be calculated, then we would appreciate being spared the burden of doing it, but we are prepared to do it.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14488. MR. RUFFMAN: In terms of the material given, we will note that Table 1 is their table and we think that they should be able to -- and we've seen it seems
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
fairly easy for them to do -- produce the peak value, as we were given for a few examples, for all the examples in the table. We think it would be prudent of the Board to see those in their entirety.
14489. The second thing that we were, in fact, requesting of the panel was a typical mass release curve for the larger diameter -- for -- we're requesting it for all of them but we would be satisfied for typical mass release curves for the larger pipelines.
14490. The point being that this is a somewhat different pipeline in Saint John, because it has an internal coating which assists the transfer of the gas, reduces friction, and in that sense we have been told that the mass release curve for the Saint John pipeline is somewhat different than the regular pipeline.
14491. So, I think it's important that we know whether any of these other pipelines that they are asking you to accept as being typical and commonplace in communities are, in fact, in the same range as what we're dealing with in Saint John.
14492. THE CHAIRPERSON: Let's deal with one thing at a time.
14493. With respect to having these additional numbers calculated, the formula is on the record and the Board can calculate these numbers, should it decide it's relevant, itself. So, we don't need to see those numbers. Thank you.
14494. With respect to the mass release curves, Mr. Smith, do you have any comments to make?
14495. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, there's yet a further new feature to Mr. Ruffman's question, and that is the internal coating, and I don't believe the panel has had that question put to them.
14496. But what I would do is ask the panel to explain whether they can, or, you know, in what time frame, provide the mass release curves that were requested and perhaps to also comment on the relevance of the internal coating.
14497. MR. DRAKE: For the purpose of comparability, which is what this seems to be coming down to, many of the examples that are defined on here I am personally aware of have internal coated, and they were provided -- and many of them have exactly the same mass flow rate as the New Brunswick pipe.
14498. The 36-inch, 1000-pound pipelines on the Texas Eastern system are internally painted, not coated, and they have exactly the same mass flow rate, operating in very similar environments as this pipeline is proposed.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14499. The examples that are in Massachusetts on the 30-inch, 1440-pound pipeline also are internally painted and have the exact mass flow rate as this proposed pipeline.
14500. MR. MAYER: And I might add that nearly all large diameter pipelines built in Canada since the mid-80s have been internally painted or coated. It's a standard method now.
14501. MR. SMITH: The panel, however, has not indicated how readily they could provide the mass flow -- mass release flow curve which is still a pending request, and I wonder if they could address whether that's practical or useful given the amount of work it would take and how it would benefit the Board.
14502. DR. BERCHA: If I may answer that, Madam Chair.
14503. I can't really estimate that, because in order to calculate the flow -- mass flow curve as we did for the Brunswick Pipeline, we need information not only on the MOP and the diameter which we already have, but also on the valve spacing and closing times, and I cannot -- that information is not under my control.
14504. So, I'm unable to say when we would be able to come up with these. Once we have that information, I would like one or two days to do the calculation, but getting that information may not be so easy.
14505. MR. SMITH: And I wonder if the answer is the same for the other witnesses who had assembled some of these other situations.
14506. I think Dr. Bercha did some of them in the comparable pipeline discussion and then there were others who were responsible for other ones.
14507. I'm just assuming it's the same situation. It may be evident that type of a mass flow curve cannot be prepared without additional information which may or may not be under their control.
14508. And then beyond that how long would it take to do it, because I sense it isn't something that could be done before the close of the record.
14509. MR. DRAKE: As a point of reference anyway, and some illustration of diligence, the purpose in defining max flow rate is to define maximum impact.
14510. The curve is used to define the decay rate which defines really the time, but it does not determine in any -- the time does not determine a bigger burn rate, it determines the time at which the fire -- how long it will take the fire to get smaller.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14511. And so the purpose of defining a maximum is to find the biggest impact that the pipe can have. So, there is some relevance to the fact that max was chosen. The use of curves is not going to change the impact zone significantly. It changes the time for the fire to reduce.
14512. I'd defer that to Dr. Kiefner and Dr. Bercha if they want to add on to that, but I'd just offer that as a point of reference.
14513. MR. MAYER: As to the question of the other maps and other pipeline systems in the attachment, those that are under the jurisdiction of DEGT we can find the information for Dr. Bercha to produce that, but it still is going to take us some days to gather that information from the various areas across our company and ensure that it's correct information before we could give that to Dr. Bercha to do his calculations.
14514. So, in that respect it would take us some time even for the DEGT pipeline systems in order to come up with that information.
14515. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, in light of the amount of time and effort that this would take and in light of the explanation, respectfully I would oppose the requested undertaking for the mass flow curves.
14516. I do so for an additional reason as well, and that is a number of the pipelines that have been identified in the room here and in the reply evidence are within the jurisdiction of the National Energy Board.
14517. The National Energy Board has detailed records of the pipelines under its jurisdiction and the valve configurations and so forth. These are things the National Energy Board deals with constantly and has done so for decades.
14518. With respect, I am not sure how much the additional work that's being requested is going to benefit the National Energy Board's understanding of these issues, so I would leave you with those submissions.
14519. MR. RUFFMAN: The only addition we'd made is that we have -- we are attempting, obviously, to ensure that the Board realizes the importance of these mass release curves or the blowdown curves in terms of the Saint John pipe and that we do have confidence in the National Energy Board to be able to make these calculations if they decide to look at them for the -- each of these examples here.
14520. But it was, we remind you, the exhibit of the proponent and that to be able to use this exhibit in a meaningful way -- all we've got at this point is the maximum allowable operating pressures or some variation.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14521. So, we are attempting to ensure that you have the information in front of you that you will need.
14522. MR. SMITH: You have diameters as well, Madam Chair. I think Mr. Ruffman misspoke. The evidence includes the diameters as well, and the calculations can be done on the basis of the evidence provided.
14523. THE CHAIRPERSON: The Board will consider this request and will provide a ruling at a further date.
14524. In the meanwhile, Mr. Ruffman, would you please proceed with your cross-examination.
14525. MR. RUFFMAN: How does the operating pressure and size of a high pressure gas transmission lateral presently extending into downtown Saint John cited on page 6 of Dr. Bercha's commentary compare to the operating pressure and pipeline diameter of the proposed pipeline across the City?
14526. MR. MAYER: The Saint John Lateral operated by our own -- by Maritimes Northeast Pipelines that runs within the urban portion of Saint John is a 16 inch diameter pipeline with a maximum operating pressure of five hundred pounds per square inch. And the Brunswick Pipeline is a 30 inch diameter pipeline with a maximum operating pressure of one thousand four hundred and forty pounds per square inch.
14527. But there are other comparisons and you were asking for comparisons. The other comparisons would be how it's routed in an urban environment, near neighbourhoods, near places of business. It is designed with, I believe, a .56 design factor. So its operating stress is even a little bit higher. This -- I'm referring now to the Saint John Lateral.
14528. The operating stress is a little higher for the Saint John Lateral than it is for the Brunswick Pipeline. It was designed to similar codes. There -- I think it's the previous version of the CSA Code but in all essence it's modern -- a modern code.
14529. And it's -- the proposed Brunswick Pipeline will be operated in the same manner as the Saint John Lateral in terms of the integrity management plans, you know, emergency planning zones and all those things that Mr. Whalen was explaining the last few days of testimony. So it's very comparable in that regard.
14530. MR. RUFFMAN: Okay, could you please explain how an emergency response plan will be effective in saving lives placed at risk during the early high heat flux phases of a pipeline rupture with early ignition?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14531. MR. MAYER: Please can you define early stages? Can you give us a timeframe for when you said early stages? Is that in the first twenty minutes, hour, etc.?
14532. MR. RUFFMAN: I think we would refer to the first five minutes after a rupture.
14533. MR. WHALEN: What I was discussing yesterday was an acknowledgement that an emergency response plan has no direct relationship with the failure mechanism of a pipeline or you know, it certainly has limited effect on the impact of an incident within the first few minutes.
14534. The benefit of an emergency response plan is to deal with the consequence and part of that is education. An ongoing education program for first responders, an ongoing education program for those within an emergency planning zone. An accurate database of people within those zones. Working with first responders on evacuation if necessary and prudent as well as road blocks.
14535. So how can an emergency response plan reduce the impact? It's really dealing with the consequence and has limited impact on the first five minutes.
14536. MR. RUFFMAN: We know where the block valves are to be but could we just check if each of these black -- block valves are the locations of the pressure indicators or are there any other pressure indicators alo ng the pipeline segment in the urban zone?
14537. MR. MAYER: Yes, the pressure transducers, the instruments that will record the pressures will be located at each of the valve sites both upstream and downstream of the main block valve. But there are no plans in this application to put other pressure transducers at other locations other than these valve sites that you've put in the record.
14538. MR. RUFFMAN: So just so I understand it, on both sides of that large block valve, you're measuring the pressure on either side?
14539. MR. MAYER: That's right. Yesterday I cited a piece of evidence that where we have a typical valve site schematic and you can see risers coming off of the main pipeline on both sides of the main valve.
14540. On top of those risers that's where our blow off valves are so if the operations group decides to blow down a section of line they could close the main valve. They could open up the blow off and vent the gas.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14541. Well, on those risers that's where we have points where we take the pressure readings so that we know the valve -- or the pressure in the pipeline on both sides of that valve, should that valve close for example, then you know exactly what you have.
14542. MR. RUFFMAN: And as I understand the block valves from your good description yesterday, they are -- they can be activated from Texas. Were there any considerations given to incorporating automatic closure valves, ACV's that will automatically close when there's a certain rate of pressure change without needing a signal coming from Houston?
14543. MR. DRAKE: Yes, they were considered. We have had experience with automatic control valves on our systems. They have -- we have personally experienced significant reliability problems with them in both false closure and inappropriate response, i.e., we get pressure drop and they don't pick it up. Or they pick up a pressure drop that didn't occur which means they closed off somebody for gas service.
14544. But we've also seen them not respond. And we felt like the remote control valves were much more positive and much more controlled to make sure that we marshalled the energy appropriately for the situation.
14545. MR. WHALEN: And just to be clear with the valves as proposed, the valve closure decision tree which will be in our emergency response plan will reflect the fact that we do not require field verification for the gas control centre to initiate closure.
14546. MR. DRAKE: I think it's also -- and I find it maybe perhaps my job to some degree to provide perspective. We did explicitly decide to deploy remote control valves for the express purpose of expediting closure and minimizing time.
14547. And I think that when you look at all these examples and all these things around us, in the mass flow curve discussion those valves will provide a decay curve almost as fast as can be realized because they get to the actual issue of closing off the gas supply as quickly as possible in a controlled and reliable and consistent manner.
14548. MR. RUFFMAN: Dr. Bercha, may we come back just to the use -- your use of the term "flash fire". And would you please explain how one gets a flash fire from a pipeline rupture?
14549. DR. BERCHA: Well, Mr. Ruffman, I believe we've already done that. Do you wish me to repeat this once again, Madam Chair?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14550. MR. RUFFMAN: I only ask the question to ensure that he does -- he intends to use the term "flash fire". He has used it previously and I'm just -- want to make sure he's still comfortable with using that term.
14551. DR. BERCHA: Okay, the flash fire is a delayed ignition of a vapour cloud where ignition occurs at an ignition point which is not necessarily at the location of the jet or of the release point. And the ignition travels out of the ignited gas flame front. Travels out from the ignition point in various directions, not necessarily in all directions homogenously.
14552. MR. RUFFMAN: And just the last question on that matter, Dr. Bercha, are you aware of the huge turbulence that occurs in such a vapour cloud?
14553. DR. BERCHA: Well, I am. That's why I pointed out that the flame, both rate of travel and geometry is inhomogeneous due to the relatively chaotic conditions of the vapour cloud concentration.
14554. MR. RUFFMAN: Referring to attachment 10 of the reply evidence of October 20th, 2006.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14555. MR. RUFFMAN: Excuse me, we're in the wrong document. We're in the evidence provided to Friends of Rockwood by Richard Kuprewicz. His report is dated the 16th of September, 2006. And on page 13 we have a commentary that explains the difference between the speed of sound in air and the speed of sound in gas.
14556. And I'd like to ask the Panel, probably Dr. Bercha what the difference is between the speed of sound in air and the speed of sound in gas which occurs at the rupture bore choke at the time of the rupture.
14557. DR. BERCHA: As I recall, speed of sound, under standard conditions, the speed of sound in air is about 1087 feet per second. In the methane it's about 1500 feet per second if I'm not mistaken. Of course at the rupture we have significant cooling so both of those values would be significantly lower.
14558. I believe the reduction is about .5 feet per second per degree -- oh, sorry .5 metres per second per degree Celsius, below standard conditions so they'd be substantially lower.
14559. MR. RUFFMAN: In the comments to the Kuprewicz report, the Proponent has made a comment on page 2 of the reply evidence. I think it is that the age of the pipe in the Carlsbad rupture played some role in the failure.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14560. MR. SMITH: Do you have a reference? Excuse me, we're just looking that up. Can you give us a reference and help us?
14561. MR. RUFFMAN: So it's attachment 10 of the reply evidence, page 2. So it's the second last paragraph on page 2.
14562. So if you look at the second -- the first and second line it's referring to the corrosion management at the El Paso line was an aging system.
14563. Perhaps we could ask Dr. Bercha that wrote that to explain how the age of the steel played a role in this accident?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14564. DR. BERCHA: Well, it's not the age, in itself, but it was the fact that microbial corrosion had advanced significantly at the rupture point, as a result of, basically, the lack of inspection procedures that had been noted in the Transportation Safety Board report that I cited in the quotation above that last paragraph.
14565. So, it was the fact that water, and the associated microbial -- microbially induced corrosion, MIC, had been allowed to advance over a lengthy period of time, to the point where a rupture occurred.
14566. MR. RUFFMAN: Thank you.
14567. Yesterday, in testimony to another questioner, Dr. Bercha indicated that he has only done a risk assessment along the preferred route through Rockwood Park.
14568. And could I just confirm that is what you said yesterday?
14569. DR. BERCHA: That is correct, sir.
14570. MR. RUFFMAN: Could the Panel please explain how the National Energy Board is able to select one of the other variants, either to the north, where there are several, three, I believe, or the variant to the south, if they have no risk analysis for the variants?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14571. MR. MAYER: I think the rationale for route selection was thoroughly explored by Panel 1. And their testimony explained how they brought risk
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
assessment in -- into the route selection process.
14572. I don't think this Panel can add any more to that.
14573. MR. RUFFMAN: I do not -- am I correct that your evidence does not have the risk assessment along the variants to the north and the south, per Dr. Bercha's report?
14574. MR. MAYER: Again, that is correct.
14575. MR. RUFFMAN: Would it not be helpful to the National Energy Board to have Dr. Bercha's risk assessment along the variants, if they are at all inclined to consider selecting other than the preferred route?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14576. MR. MAYER: I think in the same manner that Panel 1 explained the status of the environmental field studies, we -- I think if Panel 1 was sitting here, that I have -- subject to check with my colleagues, they'd give you the same answer, if they haven't already, on the issue of risk assessment.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14577. MR. RUFFMAN: We have a request in, and we will be receiving -- the proper term is the thermal isopleths, for the Saint John pipeline.
14578. One of the diagrams that is not provided in the Bercha report, as well, are an overlay of these thermal isopleths, or the thermal impact zone on the Saint John pipeline.
14579. Am I correct that Dr. Bercha's report has not provided a diagram for the urban section of the pipeline, showing an overlay of the impact zones -- thermal impact zones on the pipeline?
14580. MR. MAYER: Can we be clear? You said Saint John pipeline. Are you referring to the Emera Brunswick pipeline, or the ---
14581. MR. RUFFMAN: No, no.
14582. MR. MAYER: --- Saint John lateral?
14583. MR. RUFFMAN: I apologize. I'm referring to the proposed new pipeline of Brunswick.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14584. DR. BERCHA: Well, sir, I think, as I stated before, I'll -- and to repeat myself, the thermal flux isopleths are -- without an exposure time, without a dosage period, are meaningless.
14585. So, I've not done that, and I don't think that would provide any additional information.
14586. What we have done, implicitly, is shown the risk transects which, of course, can be directly translated into risk isopleths, and that is the integrated result of the risk assessment, and that is what is meaningful in this study, not the thermal fluxes.
14587. So, I would not recommend overlaying thermal fluxes, without a dosage. It becomes immensely complicated to try to show the time variation of these thermal fluxes over the route.
14588. So, I think we should concentrate on interpreting the risk transects and their significance, as opposed to looking at thermal transects or isopleths.
14589. MR. RUFFMAN: I appreciate Dr. Bercha's comments.
14590. I would refer him to the October 20th reply evidence of Emera with respect to this pipeline.
14591. And it is on attachment 10, page 4, under 3.4 Section 4, Conclusions. We have it up now.
14592. And let me read the sentence, which I think is quite important: (As read)
"However, the important application of the juxtaposition of structural and demographic features with impact zones to define the emergency planning zone and the ERP is being undertaken jointly, but stakeholders, including the Saint John's Fire Department, the first responders..."
14593. I think it should -- that, "but" probably should be, "by", but I stand to be corrected: (As read)
"The stakeholders, including the Saint John Fire Department first responders and the pipeline proponents."
14594. So, I am referring to that.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14595. If it's not to be an overlay of the thermal isopleths, what is it that is being jointly prepared by the stakeholders, the first responders, and the pipeline proponents?
14596. DR. BERCHA: Well, that's, essentially, the emergency planning zone, which I believe Mr. Whalen has spoken to, and that is really the significant areas, the possible impact zone, which I believe has yet to be determined. And, of course, the risk assessment, and some of our consequence analysis, will be an input to that.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14597. MR. RUFFMAN: This document which is being jointly prepared, do we have any time estimate of when that is to be available?
14598. MR. WHALEN: Yes. I testified yesterday that we would be completing that document in 2008, after an extensive consultation effort, and that it would be filed for approval in advance of any leave to open, if we got that far.
14599. MR. RUFFMAN: And could we ask, when this is being prepared, how you can prepare such a document with -- as -- and define the ERP, without overlaying the thermal isopleths, and subjecting them to some sort of exposure time, to understand what the width of that emergency planning zone should be?
14600. DR. BERCHA: Well, there are a number of different ways to approach the definition of the emergency planning zone, and certainly the one which falls logically from the risk assessment, is the risk isopleths.
14601. And one of the thresholds we've looked at is the one in 10 million risk isopleth, which occurs at roughly 3 to 400 metres from the pipeline, as one possible way to delineate the emergency planning zone.
14602. It is rather difficult to try to emulate all the thermal dosage isopleths, as I've indicated earlier, but that could be done. It might lead to some confusion.
14603. If we were to use the thermal dosage isopleths, I think, as I indicated yesterday, we would like to refine our consequence analysis to provide a more realistic set of thermal dosage levels, which we have not done. As I indicated, because of the risks that came out of the dosage levels, the very conservative ones that we use were very low.
14604. So, if we were to use our consequence modelling, I think we would have to refine it, in order to put in a realistic input to the emergency response plan, and
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
the EPZ delineation.
14605. So, at this point, if we were to delineate an EPZ, as Mr. Whalen and I have discussed, and a number of the other members of the Panel, we would go with a risk threshold, and probably 1 in 10 million would be a significant threshold to utilize.
14606. And as I indicated, that occurs roughly 3 to 400 metres from the pipeline.
14607. MR. RUFFMAN: Are you telling us, Dr. Bercha, that your report, as submitted in your evidence, does not use a realistic set of data?
14608. DR. BERCHA: I have already told you, sir, that there -- a number of conservative assumptions have been made, including the exposure times, including the modelling of the worse case consequence -- consequences.
14609. So, I would not say that it -- that it's incorrect, but as I have stated already to this Board, it is conservative, and I would prefer to use a more refined approach, if we were going to apply it directly to the emergency planning, other than the risk -- the integrated risk, which I think is, indeed, representative of the types of risk levels that we could encounter.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14610. MR. RUFFMAN: Could I ask, Dr. Bercha, whether you're still comfortable with the figures that you have produced in Table 4.3, and which I believe are the figures that we are -- you are proposing to use in producing the contoured isopleth diagrams that have been undertaken?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14611. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Ruffman, I would just caution you about the tone that you're using in posing your questions.
14612. Thank you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14613. DR. BERCHA: Sir, was that a question? Could you repeat that?
14614. MR. RUFFMAN: Watching my tone, sir. I -- could I please ask whether the figures which you have produced in Table 4.3, related to segments 1, 2 and 3, and it's the block of figures, I believe, which are cornered by 560 down to 572, and to the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
right of 702, and up to 689? There are nine figures.
14615. And I believe these are the figures which will be incorporated in your contoured isopleth diagrams, such as the typical curve shown two pages earlier.
14616. Are these still figures that you are comfortable with, or do these have to be refined?
14617. DR. BERCHA: Well, I wasn't planning to refine them, sir, at this point.
14618. You asked me simply to reproduce those in graphical form, and we were planning to do that.
14619. The only thing that you may find that we may have to add to make them a little more realistic is to show a cross-section, because there will be a significant plume rise, so that the distances at the ground level would be somewhat different.
14620. So I'll have to work on that a bit. That's why it'll take a little more than just slapping the plan contours on a piece of paper. We'll have to produce some cross- sections so you get a true appreciation of the ground level distances, which will be somewhat different from those that appear in the table.
14621. MR. RUFFMAN: You resisted my suggestion that a plot of these could be laid over the pipeline because of the concern about how you would then show the time of exposure to a particular radiation and that it could get quite confusing.
14622. Am I correct that you could choose a particular time of exposure and then contour -- and am I correct that the contours that would show for a particular isopleth in the curve would run essentially parallel on either side of the pipeline?
14623. What I'm trying to ask is is it not possible to give a visual illustration on the map of the preferred route, or for a matter of fact, the alternatives north and south in the park, to give a visual representation of the zone on either side at the time of a rupture that could be lethal.
14624. For example, your two colours in your isopleth map sho w essentially lethal zones. When those are laid along the pipeline, they should give a good illustration of a zone where you don't want to be at the time of a rupture.
14625. And I'm reaching for some sort of an illustration to show that along the pipeline so that persons who are attempting to judge whether or not this pipeline is acceptable and in the public interest in terms of those people who live close to it.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14626. MR. MAYER: The short answer to your question, Mr. Ruffman, is no, it's not possible to lay those diagrams out on the pipeline, because at this stage in our process or the project, we have a preferred corridor.
14627. We do not know yet -- or we have not fully determined where the pipeline is going to be within that corridor, and you could see from the application that the corridor is fairly wide in a number of locations, and you know, through consultation with the stakeholders like land owners, utility owners, etc., we'll be finalizing that detailed route, presenting that to the Board at a later date. So we cannot produce the diagrams that you have been asking for.
14628. MR. RUFFMAN: Because you have not chosen the exact location in the corridor.
14629. MR. MAYER: Yes, that is correct.
14630. MR. RUFFMAN: Would it not be possible to show such a diagram for those parts of the corridor which presently are only, I believe, 30 metres in width, and choose the midpoint?
14631. MR. MAYER: I would suggest then why not the quarter point or the three-quarter point? If you're trying to, as you explained, have diagrams that show the people of Saint John something, and we've produced diagrams that are fairly arbitrary, we're not really putting good information out there and will lead to a lot of confusion.
14632. MR. RUFFMAN: I only would make one further comment, and I leave it up to the Board to consider whether it has to be worried about this, but I will -- in -- may I point out then or ask whether the figures that we have up on the board right now from Table 4.3, which range from 702 metres to as low as 411 -- 448 metres, could not be shown visually on a diagram, especially where you have the corridor -- preferred corridor down to 100 feet, to give an idea.
14633. And there's two or three places that I think this might be very pertinent to a board's consideration. Specifically that zone between the tanks and Champlain Heights, where whether you put the pipeline on one side or the other, it won't make much difference, or the Saint John Regional Hospital area, Millidgeville Crossing, and Milford.
14634. MR. MAYER: I first want to correct something you said, that the corridor was 100 feet in width. It's actually -- at the minimal distance, its width in the city, it's 100 metres in width, not 100 feet.
14635. We're not pushing back on producing any such diagrams. We have all
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
the tools. As soon as we determine where the detailed route will lie, you know, we can produce such diagrams and we can communicate those diagrams out.
14636. As Mr. Whalen explained, part of our emergency response planning is to communicate with the people nearby the pipeline so they'd know exactly what situation they're in.
14637. It does make a difference right now, though, if we produce diagrams showing people what would happen if the pipeline was on one side of this wide corridor or the other, because it may -- you know, it moves that line of influence from maybe one side of the street to the other.
14638. And you know, we don't want to confuse people -- tell people at one point, at this early stage in the project, that they're in a zone or out of a zone, and then flip flop on that later on. It's very important from an emergency planning perspective to get accurate information out there, detailed information out there, and not be very fuzzy about it and confusing about it.
14639. So it's something that's coming later, and we have no problem in doing that. It's just -- I'm just saying it's difficult to do it right now.
14640. DR. BERCHA: I think as I mentioned as well, if we are going to do that, I would like to refine the consequence analysis so that we also have a sense of the vertical movement of the thermal isopleths and a straight juxtaposition of the horizontal distances there, without any time or even with some estimated time, which again would be, at this point, somewhat arbitrary. It simply could cause some misunderstanding and confusion.
14641. So I would prefer to enter that into the emergency response planning process, as we had planned to do in the next -- during its evolution. It's a process thing. We have already initiated dialogue with the Saint John Fire Department, and I think we will continue that. I'd rather not produce some preliminary results such as this, which might be rather misleading at this point.
14642. MR. DRAKE: Can we pause just for a second? Give me just a second.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14643. MR. DRAKE: I think it's important here to make sure that we know what we have available to ourselves. I think the information that Dr. Bercha has been asked to provide under undertaking, which we have agreed to provide -- and I think that will be provided next week at some point -- detailed isopleths and the thermal curtains
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
and -- those are tools that can be used to do exactly as you're asking.
14644. Again, another tool that was offered yesterday -- which is a very cursory tool, but it is a tool -- is the CFER circle. These things used can define right now to anybody in this room to look at a proposed route and overlay it and determine a potential impact.
14645. I think what we're talking about here -- and we kind of get lost in some of the jargon perhaps -- we're talking about a very detailed analysis. And to do a very detailed analysis and a very specific and explicit consequence analysis, we need to know precisely where we're going to be.
14646. But that does not mean that a cursory study cannot be done with the tools that are readily available right now. That there is not a -- we're not pending something to get a pretty -- you know, 90 percentile feel for how big the footprint is and who's in it and who's out, what it kind of looks like.
14647. That's the point of, I think, the undertaking that we offer on Dr. Bercha's work. And it was -- it was the point of a very perhaps simple, or very readily available tool of the CFER circle that people can use to try to calibrate and gauge the impact immediately. It's not totally definitive and it's not as precise as we'd like to be, but to do that, we need to know precisely where we're going to be.
14648. So we're trying to provide vehicles that people can use right now, but we want to qualify that they're not the absolute, the definitive, the nth degree. We can do the nth degree, and that is -- and that -- but that just takes time.
14649. It also takes precision and knowledge, but we don't want to keep people out of the loop, so to speak, while we wait for this precision to occur. We are offering vehicles that can do that immediately.
14650. MR. RUFFMAN: We do understand that this is not an exact science, but we're not at all sure that the CFER circles, which are perhaps in more common use in the United States, are -- in any way should be used for siting decisions.
14651. And we do have in front of us a process which has been begun by Dr. Bercha, which is attempting to use a fairly scientific approach to it. And what we understand from Dr. Bercha, that he's not comfortable with trying to overlay these isopleths, but we do understand that we'll have at least the three diagrams for the three segments of the Saint John pipeline. And while one might wonder which comes first, the chicken or the egg, it does seem to be ---
14652. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Ruffman, do you have a question for the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
panel?
14653. MR. RUFFMAN: We will simple accept the diagrams that Mr. Bercha is going to produce, and we will not be interested in seeing the CFER circle material.
14654. I can go to my last question in this matter and refer us to the transcript of yesterday at line 13580, where Mr. Drake is speaking to Patricia Higgins. We have it up now.
14655. Mr. Drake was referring to Patricia Higgins, who was concerned about a pipeline threading its way through a congested area with houses and other such centres. You said that -- at the end of that -- and I don't want to take it out of context, but you noted: (As read)
"I don't know how many examples we want to go through, but I think a point of precedence is it's not unusual that siting a pipe through an environment that is congested is certainly..."
14656. And then you tailed off and you said: (As read)
"It is not our choice. We would much rather be out in the rural environments. Unfortunately that is inevitable at some point."
14657. And what -- I'd like to ask the question then if the person on the machine could put up the map that we usually have just prior to this item. This one will do. It was actually the first one, the one that we have up all the time.
14658. But would you not feel more -- to use your words, would you not rather be out in the rural environments? Would you not rather be out in a pipeline that simple goes straight across the harbour and does not cause you the problems of threading your pipeline through an urban environment that is congested?
14659. MR. DRAKE: I know that the routing folks have talked at length about this, and I don't wish to burn up our time on the routing issues, but I think there is a -- and I think it's been covered at great length, the practicability of doing so. It is -- it became an issue of practicability, and so the marine route was determined to be not practical.
14660. And I think that is the answer, you know. I think we did look there. That was the obvious, logical place to want to be. But when you do the studies and you do the engineering, it is determined from an engineering analysis with people who specialize in that that it's not practicable, and that was the context of my discussion.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14661. We would much rather be in rural environments to the degree it is practicable to be there.
14662. MR. RUFFMAN: Thank you. We won't be talking about rupture anymore in here.
14663. We do have a couple of questions on the seismic hazard and seismic safety, which I believe is this panel's responsibility as well. Am I correct?
14664. THE CHAIRPERSON: In case people are wondering, because we're going to take an early lunch, I'm thinking we'll just push through and we'll adjourn when the noise starts -- not the noise, the children's music.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
14665. MR. RUFFMAN: I will only be referring to the seismic activity section of the section -- the final report, Volume 1, B-1-f, Section 6.22, "Seismic Activity," and at the back of the section we may make reference to the bibliography which is at the back.
14666. And I don't know to which panel member I should be addressing these questions. It may be Dr. Bercha again. I don't know.
14667. DR. BERCHA: I believe it should be Mr. Mayer and Mr. -- sorry.
14668. MR. RUFFMAN: If you'll recall, there was also some exchanges of IRs in this but I think probably what we can do is work with the main text starting on page 461.
14669. THE CHAIRPERSON: But let's be cognizant of not duplicating the material that's been addressed subsequently in the IRs.
14670. MR. RUFFMAN: We won't.
14671. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
14672. MR. RUFFMAN: In the brief section it refers to the old geological fault lines. (As read)
"All of the faults are dormant with no recent historical seismic activity associated with them."
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14673. Could I please ask what the panel's definition of "recent historical seismic activity" refers to in terms of time?
14674. MR. MAYER: I'm afraid I'd have to ask the author of the environmental assessment. That was not coined by me. I'm sorry. I shouldn't have used the word "coined" but that passage wasn't written by me.
14675. MR. SMITH: The -- just so there's no misunderstanding here, the identification of the environmental baseline set of facts was Panel 1 and the people from Jacques Whitford. The engineering design response to seismic is Panel 4.
14676. So, how is the pipeline affected by certain events, that's fair ball for this panel, you know, what's its survivability, that type of thing, what do you do to mitigate seismic, that again is this panel.
14677. But if you're going to get into a lot of detail about, you know, the history of seismic events, that is the Panel 1 which has passed.
14678. Hopefully Mr. Ruffman can go directly to his questions about, you know, how does the pipeline deal with seismic in terms of design and operation, because I think that is the germane thing here. I hope that helps.
14679. MR. RUFFMAN: Mr. Mayer, you may remember that NRCAN corrected the estimated magnitude of the 1904 event up to 5.7.
14680. Could I ask why there was no change made as a result of that in the -- and I think the term is the "design-based earthquake" that could result in the damage to the pipeline.
14681. MR. MAYER: I think you're mixing two issues here.
14682. One was a stated magnitude of a historic earthquake, and NRCAN in one of their submissions corrected that record. That had nothing to do with the design- based earthquake.
14683. We consider a design-based earthquake, something that we need to employ special measures to design against, as one that would produce ground effects that would impact on our pipeline.
14684. I'm trying to find the exhibit number, but it was an answer to NEB's third round of information requests where we explained ourselves very clearly on ---
14685. MR. SMITH: That would be B-44.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14686. MR. MAYER: Thank you. In B-44 --
14687. MR. RUFFMAN: Probably page 17 of 40, perhaps in that area.
14688. MR. MAYER: Page 17 of 40. Thank you very much. I don't have the PDF page.
14689. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe it's on the screen.
14690. MR. MAYER: And the top of that -- at the top of that page, that was a response to a request by NRCAN to define the design-based earthquake, and what we explained is that there are guidelines for designing pipelines giving consideration for seismic design, and it relies on credible seismic hazards, and these hazards include surface faulting, liquefaction, liquefaction-induced lateral spread movement, landslides, and near surface settlement.
14691. Seismic wave propagation, or what people commonly mean when they say -- use the word "earthquake", does not have a serious effect on a buried, welded steel pipeline.
14692. MR. RUFFMAN: Am I correct that your real concern would be if there was actual movement on a lateral fault which transected the pipeline?
14693. MR. MAYER: Yes, that is correct, or say a landslide associated with ground shaking or surface settlement associated with ground shaking, like serious surface movements are a concern to the design engineers.
14694. MR. RUFFMAN: And am I correct also rupture from the normal fault of the bedrock which propagated up to the surface would also be of concern?
14695. MR. MAYER: That's right. If there was active faults, like a chance for the ground to move through faults, then that would be a concern for design engineers as well.
14696. And we do know of one situation in Alaska where they actually knew they were crossing an active fault and designed in accordance with that.
14697. In fact, that pipeline was brought above-ground at that location and set on rollers, if you have it, for a good stretch of the pipeline length -- I forget exactly but maybe a mile or so -- right where it was crossing this fault.
14698. And that fault actually did have -- did move one day. They estimated
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
how much that fault should move so -- when they did their design, and it did move and the pipeline remained intact because it was basically lying on top of the surface much like a garden hose lying on the ground, and when the ground moved it had no effect on the pipeline.
14699. MR. RUFFMAN: On the same page, down towards the bottom, Emera says -- or Brunswick says that: (As read)
"This is because credible hazards noted in response to Recommendation 7 do not appear to exist in the vicinity of the Brunswick Pipeline or shall be addressed during the detailed routing process."
14700. And this -- I think in a number of cases you refer to faults as dormant.
14701. Are you comfortable with the statement or your conclusion that the Oak Bay fault is a dormant fault and does not have any possibility of breaking the ground surface during the life of your pipeline?
14702. MR. MAYER: I'm comfortable with the information that was put forward when they prepared the environmental assessment and identified the fault as dormant.
14703. MR. RUFFMAN: The information put forward depended entirely, I think, upon reports by Dr. K.B.S. Burke of the University of New Brunswick.
14704. You cite -- may I ask why you did not cite his three peer-reviewed reports that appear in Earthquake Notes in terms of his assessment of earthquake -- historic seismicity and hence would affect your possible choice of design earthquake.
14705. MR. MAYER: Excuse me. I'm not too sure what reference you made there to notes. Can you explain -- bring that up on the record for me, or the screen.
14706. MR. RUFFMAN: I am referring to open public literature, peer- reviewed papers written by Dr. Burke and -- Dr. Gabriel Leblanc and Dr. Burke in Earthquake Notes from 1985 to 2004.
14707. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I'm not sure there's -- is Mr. Ruffman referring to something on the record here?
14708. MR. RUFFMAN: I am referring to something that's on the public record in published literature.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. A. Ruffman
14709. MR. SMITH: But not on the record here.
14710. It's just that we didn't have any notice to deal with this in information requests or evidence, much less putting it to Panel 1.
14711. If my friend could relate this to engineering design and a particular issue with how the Brunswick Pipeline is designed in the urban area or the rural area, that would be fine, but I'm not sure how much further we want to go bringing into the record new material like that.
14712. MR. RUFFMAN: It's not new material, it's been published as far back as '85 and 2004, and my only point is that in choosing the design earthquake I would like to hope that they've dealt with all the material, and I am asking why these three reports that are in the published literature were not used.
14713. If we cannot refer to them in this hearing, then we leave it to the Board to perhaps go look them up.
14714. MR. SMITH: And, Madam Chair, if the panel has a response on their design in light of seismic, perhaps that would be helpful or fair to them.
14715. MR. MAYER: Yes, I'd like to respond to that, Madam Chair.
14716. Another area I turned -- other than their environmental assessment which evaluated seismic activity in the area of the proposed pipeline, I turned to a response to an information request that was related to the Maritimes and Northeast mainline. It was in proceeding GH-6-96.
14717. And I looked to that to see what was said at that time about seismic design for pipelines in the Maritime, and I noted for the 30-inch Maritimes and Northeast mainline that was eventually built in 1999 the designers, based on a review of seismic activity in the Maritimes, decided that no special design considerations or studies would be warranted or -- and they never implemented them for the pipeline based on those, you know, reviews of the seismic activities.
14718. They pointed out that the same design standards proposed to be used for their Maritimes and Northeast pipeline were the same that were used elsewhere in Canada, namely Eastern Canada, where the potential for seismic activity was the same or greater.
14719. So, that gave me, as the manager of the engineering design for this pipeline, another bit of information in which I relied on when I responded to the NRCAN
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
information request. I hope that's helpful.
14720. MR. RUFFMAN: I think I'll leave it there, Madam Chair. I would only caution us that science and information does move forward even in a six- or seven- year period. I believe
14721. I believe Mr. Gould ---
14722. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. -- we're interested in your questions. Thank you.
14723. MR. RUFFMAN: I believe Mr. Gould has a couple of more general questions for Friends of Rockwood, just to simply finish this up.
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. GOULD:
14724. MR. GOULD: Madam Chair, Members of the Board, gentlemen.
14725. Mr. Ruffman is wrong. I have quite a few questions.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
14726. MR. GOULD: I apologize, but I thought I made that clear to him yesterday. I'll try not to be too long.
14727. THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, then, let's get started, sir.
14728. MR. GOULD: Okay.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14729. THE CHAIRPERSON: I would just caution you, though, as you're getting started, that, you know, if there -- if you're asking questions on material that has already been testified on, I will stop you at that point, because there's no need to duplicate the record.
14730. Thank you.
14731. MR. GOULD: I -- Madam Chair, I was going to say that I wasn't present here the first hour yesterday morning, and possibly there are some questions that I will duplicate.
14732. If I ask something that has already been asked, just let me know.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14733. I'd like to refer you to the Saint John Fire Department's Risk Analysis, B-40-a, attachment 8, page 1.
14734. I think by now, with all the discussions regarding the pipeline, energy, risks and so on -- and I'll direct this question to Mr. Mayer -- would you agree that Saint John is a -- is already an energy hub?
14735. THE CHAIRPERSON: Could you explain the relevance of that question with respect to this Panel's technical expertise on engineering design and safety?
14736. MR. GOULD: Well, I think that what I'm eventually going to lead up to is the idea of the Fire Chief's report, in that if Saint John is, indeed, an energy hub, then it seems to me that over the past few years, the Fire Chief should already had -- have had a -- an adequate plan in place to deal with pipeline emergencies.
14737. We know, for example, that there are natural gas pipelines that are installed around our city. And I'm wondering why -- and this is really a -- the question, I guess. I'm wondering why Emera Brunswick would have to consult with the Fire Chief and, indeed, change the Fire Chief's report, given the fact that we've been an energy hub for quite some time.
14738. Could you answer me that, please?
14739. MR. MAYER: I suppose we can clear up some of the misunderstanding.
14740. We did not -- for one thing, energy hub, perhaps. I've heard testimony that's where the City, comma, Council, wants to go, the Premier.
14741. I might point out it's not a pipeline hub. There's very few pipelines in the city. We do have an operating -- or Maritimes Northeast, sorry, have an operating pipeline in the city right now.
14742. And I also want to clear up that we did not change the Saint John Fire Department report. We responded to concerns and recommendations that were in that report.
14743. When the report was presented to us, it was full of -- not full of, but it had a number of recommendations within the report. And we met with the Saint John Fire Department and others, such as the water, Saint John Energy, etc., and discussed these recommendations.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14744. And based on that, the Fire Chief took it upon himself -- or the Fire Department took it upon themselves, to table a second report. But we did not edit or change in any way the Fire Department's report.
14745. MR. GOULD: I think that one of the main reasons that I brought this up is that I think the public -- excuse me. The public in Saint John is a little confused about the idea of a report being put forth by the Saint John Fire Department, and a week or two later, it being recalled.
14746. Can I ask you, Mr. Mayer, what were some of the specifics that you found faulty in the report? If, indeed, you found any fault?
14747. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Gould, there's a fairly good written trail of evidence with respect to the responses back and forth in the written process leading up to this oral hearing.
14748. I don't think we want to go back and cover that ground.
14749. So, if there are any specific questions of clarification of the evidence that's already on the record, those would be the questions to ask this Panel.
14750. MR. GOULD: Okay, I'll direct you to B-40-a, attachment 8, No. 2, page 1.
14751. And Madam Chair, if I'm sticking to the same point, maybe you can let me know?
14752. So, attachment 8 says that the -- the general discussion of the Saint John Fire Department's risk analysis, paragraph 1 states: (As read)
"Because the document was prepared without adequate participation of pipeline and risk analysis experts, it contains numerous faulty statements and conclusions."
14753. Considering this statement, is it true that Emera Brunswick was concerned with the Fire Chief's ability to handle a 30 inch natural gas emergency?
14754. MR. MAYER: Oh, not at all, sir.
14755. This attachment 8 document is really, in essence, a very technical review of the engineering materials that went into the Fire Chief's report.
14756. And this was -- this document here was prepared to walk the Fire
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
Department through those things.
14757. Now, we don't doubt the Fire Department's ability to respond to an incident on the existing 16 inch transmission line that runs through the city right now.
14758. And we know that through cooperative efforts on our part, you know, should the Board give us leave to build this Emera Brunswick pipeline, we are very confident by that point that the Fire Department would be fully versed and adequately prepared, in order to deal with anything on the Emera Brunswick pipeline.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14759. MR. GOULD: Can you tell me what would be the difference or differences between a 30 inch natural gas pipeline and a 4 inch natural gas pipeline that are in place around our city, with regards to risk?
14760. MR. MAYER: Well, let me start off, and I'm sure other members of our Panel ---
14761. MR. GOULD: Sure.
14762. MR. MAYER: --- will follow me, but just to explain the 4 inch gas pipeline that are running around your city, I believe, as you put it, are part of a distribution system run by Enbridge Gas New Brunswick.
14763. Now, that distribution system is made up of a series of pipes that range in size and range of material. Some of those pipes are plastic, and some of those pipes are steel.
14764. And in the engineering code, they all follow a different set of code -- design requirements than we follow for transmission pipeline design. So, there is quite a variation there.
14765. And how they operate, and their purpose for operation, is totally different than a transmission pipeline, as well. These distribution pipelines that you speak of, you know, are really there to serve the businesses and the homes. They have pipes running right up to the outside of buildings, where they attach onto metres.
14766. And so, you know, when we talked about the proximity issues, you know, around those transmission pipelines, well, in the case of distributions systems, their proximity is touching the walls of these buildings, and their trenches are coming right up to these places, and they're crossing a lot more infrastructure.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14767. They're going without wide easements that preclude people from getting in and doing digging without notification, etc.
14768. You know, it's -- so, there's quite a difference in the distribution system and the transmission system.
14769. So, I can leave you with that high level explanation on that, and if you wanted to delve deeper into it, we can discuss it further.
14770. MR. GOULD: I just wanted to make one comment about that.
14771. But a 30 inch natural gas pipeline has more volume, doesn't it, of gas?
14772. MR. MAYER: Yes, it does, compared to a 4 inch pipeline, yes.
14773. MR. GOULD: So, in the case of an emergency, in the case of a rupture, a 30 inch natural gas pipeline would be more destructive, wouldn't it?
14774. DR. BERCHA: Let me just address the second part of your question, which is about the risk.
14775. MR. GOULD: Yeah.
14776. DR. BERCHA: And as I've said a number of times, but it's an important concept, risk is a compound measure of -- on the one hand, the probability of occurrence of an event, and on the other hand, the severity of the consequences.
14777. Now, I haven't carried out a risk assessment of the distribution lines here, but we can certainly comment qualitatively the probability of a failure of these lines is quite high, as this has happened a number of times already in the city.
14778. However, the consequences are not huge. They're not large. They are certainly adverse.
14779. Whereas for the proposed transmission line, the probability of failure is infinitesimally small. And this is something that hasn't really been dealt with, because it's shall we say on the favourable side of the equation.
14780. It's been attested to by Mr. Drake and by myself that we have many layers of protection to avoid any sort of a failure of the transmission line.
14781. And, as has certainly been amply brought out by Mr. Ruffman, beside you and others, the consequences in the instance of a failure of the transmission line are
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
significantly larger, yeah, for sure. That has been amply discussed.
14782. But the resultant risk, nevertheless, is extremely low. And I would say that probably, without doing the calculations, I know the risks of the transmission line, but I would think that the risks associated with this distribution lines over a smaller zone of impact are probably greater than those associated with this massive, thick walled, highly state of art, well operated, highly inspected transmission line.
14783. So, that's sort of on the risk side. Probably the risks are smaller, associated with a transmission line.
14784. MR. GOULD: Thank you.
14785. If I could refer you to B-40-a, Emera Brunswick Pipeline attachment 8, page 5? These are recommendations. 3-13, XIII, I guess, paragraph 2.
14786. And it reads: (As read)
"A true explosion requires a critical mass of flammable gas, a hard ignition and containment."
14787. I guess the question is for you, Dr. Bercha. What is a hard ignition? Can you tell me?
14788. DR. BERCHA: Well, a detonation of TNT or another chemical such as that would be a hard ignition source.
14789. MR. GOULD: Okay.
14790. DR. BERCHA: In the jargon of, you know, of our pyro -- pyrology.
14791. MR. GOULD: Thank you.
14792. No. 2, paragraph 2, also states: (As read)
"Such a set of conditions is not expected to occur in 98 percent of the cases, given occurrence of a rupture."
14793. In 2 percent of the cases, an explosion can occur. Is that correct, Dr. Bercha?
14794. DR. BERCHA: Well, at that time, sir, and the Board, we had not actually explicitly inspected the entire route. And following an inspection of the route,
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
which took place subsequent to this statement, we actually couldn't find any conditions where you had sufficient containment that we would expect a detonation.
14795. There were a couple that we had suspected, and upon further inspection, we found that the spacing, according to standards, was -- or the lack of containment, i.e., the spacing, was sufficient that there would not be conditions conducive to an explosion.
14796. So at this point, we're not aware of any location where a detonation could take place in the instance of a rupture or other release of methane from this pipeline.
14797. MR. GOULD: Okay. Thank you.
14798. I'm on the same attachment, Attachment 8, page 6. The last paragraph of Attachment 8, page 6, concludes by stating: (As read)
"Incidents capable of significantly harming Saint John public and property should not be expected to occur from the Brunswick Pipeline, but an emergency response plan should be developed and implemented in the remote likelihood that such incidents occur."
14799. My first question is would you agree that the word "should" in the first half of the statement would indicate or suggest that the risk or possibility of a pipeline fire or explosion is ever present?
14800. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe we have been down this ground before in the evidence, but if the panel has anything further to add to what's already on the record, please proceed.
14801. MR. MAYER: Yeah. I believe we've already covered that, Madam Chair.
14802. MR. GOULD: Well let me ask you this then. The second part of the statement says that: (As read)
"An emergency response plan should be developed and implemented in the remote likelihood that such incidents occur."
14803. I'm not going to ask you about if an emergency response plan has been already -- we've been through that before. But I'm going to ask you this. If an emergency plan -- an emergency response plan was not implemented, what could be the implications there?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14804. DR. BERCHA: Well I think it would show a lack of due diligence. To be honest, I'm not sure what the physical implications would be. Probably -- to be honest, they would be nothing probably, because we don't expect that in the life cycle of this pipeline, there will ever be a situation where the emergency response plan has to be put into action, so -- but I think with due diligence, it should be addressed.
14805. MR. GOULD: Maybe I'm beating a dead horse, but why wouldn't the -- why wouldn't the word read "would" instead of "should" -- "would be implemented" instead of "should be implemented"? Because I've heard here this morning that if this project is given the go-ahead, that an emergency response plan will be implemented. So why wouldn't it read "would" instead of "should"?
14806. DR. BERCHA: Well, sir, I guess we're wordsmithing a bit, but it was my recommendation that Emera Brunswick develop an emergency response plan, and therefore I have used the word, "they should develop an emergency response plan." That's on the assumption, of course, that the pipeline is approved and goes into operation eventually.
14807. MR. GOULD: So I guess you're giving the Board every assurance that an emergency response plan will be implemented if this pipeline is given the go- ahead to proceed?
14808. DR. BERCHA: I'm sure it will, but I'll let Mr. ---
14809. MR. WHALEN: Absolutely. And I've already testified to the fact that it would be developed. And in fact, that's a regulatory requirement.
14810. MR. GOULD: Okay. Fine. Thank you very much.
14811. I'd like to refer you to B-1-d, the appendices, the Quantitative Risk Assessment, Proposed Brunswick Pipeline. And this is the conclusion, Summary of Risk Analysis Results, E-2, page vii, bullet 1.
14812. Now, you might have been over this again -- or before, rather, and if you have, just say the word, and I'll discontinue the question. (As read)
"The individual risk levels to members of the public were within acceptable limits and in the insignificant risk regions."
14813. The first question. Can you explain to me -- I think, Dr. Bercha -- what do you mean "within acceptable limits"?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14814. DR. BERCHA: Well, I think we have gone over this, but it's up to the Board whether they would -- Madam Chair would like me to repeat the explanation.
14815. THE CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps for Mr. Gould's sake, you could provide a very brief summary of what you've already put on the record.
14816. DR. BERCHA: Briefly then, acceptable risk levels are levels that have generally been accepted by various regulators nationally and internationally. And in the case of third party facilities and risk to -- essentially involuntary risk to the members of the public, generally a risk of casualty -- an annual probability of casualty to persons that are actually exposed, which is at a level of one in one million per year or less is considered insignificant, and that's really the level to which I refer.
14817. On the other end, in the second point, we've indicated a level that's intolerable, and that would be a level generally agreed to be one in 10,000 per year of a specific individual casualty. That -- anything at or above that would be considered intolerable. Between the one in a million and one in 10,000 is what is kind of called the grey region, and that is certainly a region of debate.
14818. However, all the risks we've quantified here fall below that one in a million level, so our -- you know, in most jurisdictions, they would be considered insignificant.
14819. MR. GOULD: Thanks, Dr. Bercha.
14820. MR. DRAKE: If I -- if I can just add just for a second.
14821. MR. GOULD: Sure.
14822. MR. DRAKE: Maybe different words help. I think that we're -- we get into some jargon here about risks and consequences and probabilities and all these things, but what is acceptable is a very germane question. And it is not that the consequence is acceptable. The consequences are very high.
14823. It's that the risk is acceptable because significant effort has been marshalled to mitigate the likelihood that something would happen. And that's the measure of diligence. It's the aggregate. It's not that someone is saying the consequence is okay.
14824. As a matter of fact, they're saying quite the opposite. The consequence is not okay. So we must ramp up our efforts to drop the risks very, very, very low. And that's what the aggregate acceptance is; it is have you done enough to drive the risk down, not the consequence.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14825. MR. GOULD: Thank you.
14826. I have three or four other questions. I'll try to keep them short. I should tell you too that I have no reference to make other than the information that we got here yesterday and today concerning risk and pipeline diameters and wall thickness and so on. And if the panel would accommodate me, I'd appreciate it.
14827. Question 1. Would you consider safety to be the central issue to this -- this whole pipeline project?
14828. MR. DRAKE: I think -- having been in many of these, I think that it is quite a germane issue of whether or not -- and I think that's reflected in these drawings. And that's why they're here actually, is to show that this is not the first such discussion on this nature, that many -- many communities have wrestled with this issue, and I think it does revolve very heavily around safety and has an appropriate level of effort been marshalled to manage the risks and deal with, head on, the consequence.
14829. MR. GOULD: Okay. Thank you.
14830. Can you explain to me -- question 2. Can you explain to me why a pipeline of smaller diameter wasn't chosen for this project?
14831. MR. MAYER: The answer to that is fairly complex and was dealt with by the Panel 1, which also dealt with system planning. I'd have to go back to testimony on that in order to ---
14832. MR. GOULD: Oh, that's -- that's fine. That's fine. Thank you.
14833. MR. DRAKE: I think to give it at least a brief answer -- and I know it is complex -- it's a market throughput issue -- it simply can't move the volume of gas coming off of this size of LNG tank. It's just a matter of volume to move from point "A" to point "B".
14834. MR. GOULD: I'm glad you -- I'm glad you mentioned that because that's -- that's the subject of my last question.
14835. I understand that this particular pipeline has an interior coating that acts as an agent to reduce friction and to speed up the flow of gas. And I guess that's true, it's it, Andy? If I -- I guess I can call you Andy, since we've met.
14836. MR. DRAKE: Yes, sir, you can. Yes, it does have an internal coat of paint put on the inside to help efficiency of flow.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14837. MR. GOULD: Okay. Then is it also true that the greater the diameter of pipe, the greater the volume and the faster the flow of gas, all of which will result in greater volume of gas being received at the receiver end. Is that true?
14838. MR. MAYER: Well, only in relation to a similar size pipeline without that coating. Basically all of the large diameter pipelines built in Canada these days have that internal painted coating on the inside in order to enhance their flow.
14839. So when the designers are looking at various sizes of pipe, etc., they're all taking that into consideration because it's in all of their options when they're looking at which size of pipe to select in order to move the volume to market.
14840. MR. DRAKE: If I can, from just a different perspective, and maybe to slice at it a bit different, we've talked a lot about mass flow rates in very probably obtuse-sounding engineering jargon. The ability to move a volume of gas is a result of many different factors.
14841. The primary factor that we see is diameter. Obviously it's given great weight. In mass flow, it's squared. So it has a big effect on how much you can move is how big is the tube.
14842. The second driver would be the issue of pressure. And very tertiary issues would be things like paint coatings, things like that. That just helps reduce the drag so we don't have to put so much horsepower on one end to push it through the pipe. It doesn't help that much, but it does help us save fuel, so to speak.
14843. So kind of stacking them, diameter would be first, pressure second. Some of these others would be, quite frankly, tertiary; I mean, a very, very small effect.
14844. MR. GOULD: So if I can just ask one final question. So you have a 30-inch natural gas pipeline transporting gas through a pipe that is coated on the inside to increase the flow of gas. So the faster that gas travels, the sooner the gas gets to its destination. Is that true?
14845. MR. WHALEN: What we've typically found in the operation of these types of pipelines is that the diameter would increase the volume of the gas, or the quantity of the gas, i.e., the capacity of the transmission system. But the systems are designed for a certain acceptable pressure drop from point "A" to point "B".
14846. Sometimes they require compression along the way, sometimes they don't. But the velocity or the speed of the gas is relatively constant or the same in all of these systems. It's roughly five miles an hour is what we find typically.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. E. Gould
14847. For example, the transmission system from the south shore of Nova Scotia to the border with Maine, the Maritimes Canada system, we found that the speed or the velocity of the gas in that system is typically around five miles an hour, or you know, seven to eight kilometres an hour. And typically that's what we find in transmission systems.
14848. So, the diameter, as Mr. Drake pointed out, is really related to how much volume or capacity of gas can get through the system.
14849. But in terms of the speed or the velocity they're relatively constant in all of these systems, and this internal coating is really just a coat of paint and it adds a small amount of efficiency, i.e. the friction factor on the wall, the pipe is reduced by a small amount. But it really doesn't increase that five mile an hour speed or velocity of the gas stream.
14850. I hope that helps.
14851. MR. GOULD: Yes, it does. Thank you.
14852. If I could just make one final point, and I don't think I'm being out of order here. I think with all the talk of safety, with all the talk of fear, for example, that has been expressed in one way or another, especially in the last two or three days in these proceedings, I think the point has to be made that even many cities across the hemisphere of high pressure gas pipelines going through their cities, that's not reason enough to say that Saint John should be subjected to this 30 inch natural gas pipeline.
14853. Thank you very much.
14854. THE CHAIRPERSON: You'll have your chance to make whatever points you want in argument, sir.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14855. MR. THOMPSON: Exhibit B-4 ---
14856. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair -- and I'm sorry to interrupt Mr. Thompson -- at some point would it be possible to have a break.
14857. And it has nothing to do with the mass flow rate yet.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Ruling by the Board The Chairperson
14858. THE CHAIRPERSON: I've been, sort of, conducting a little experiment as to how long I could keep this going.
14859. Yes, let's take a break. I don't know if the concert is underway. If it is, it doesn't seem to be causing us any problems.
14860. I wonder if -- it's 11:30. Why don't we break for an hour and come back at 12:30 and we will have accomplished two jobs at the same time.
14861. So, we'll come back at 12:30 then.
14862. MR. SMITH: I have one filing that I'd like to just put on the record quickly before we break. A response to undertaking ---
14863. THE CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps we could do it at 12:30 when we come back.
14864. MR. SMITH: That's fine. Thank you.
--- Upon recessing at 11:30 a.m./L'audience est suspendue à 11h30 --- Upon resuming at 12:30 p.m./L'audience est reprise à 12h30
14865. THE CHAIRPERSON: The Board has a couple of rulings from things that we've been asked to rule on previously that I would like to put on the record at this point.
14866. Yesterday, Mr. Sauerteig asked the Board to consider and allow him to continue cross-examining Emera's Panel No. 1 about his counter-proposal to the marine route that Emera examined in the course of making its decision to apply for the preferred route in its application.
14867. The grounds Mr. Sauerteig relies on to bring this motion are that this marine crossing was an important part of his written intervention and that he has not been afforded sufficient opportunity to test the evidence adduced by Emera regarding the marine route alternatives.
14868. Mr. Sauerteig also argued that no objections to this line of investigating Emera's application to the National Energy Board were raised before November 13, 2006.
14869. Mr. Sauerteig further argued that according to Item 1.8.6 of Emera's application to the NEB, this marine crossing was considered but rejected for reasons
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Ruling by the Board The Chairperson
which Mr. Sauerteig intended to show in the course of his cross-examination were either wrong or overstated.
14870. Mr. Sauerteig states that this makes this aspect of Emera's application to the NEB suspect and that he was, until his questioning was halted, in the process of disproving most, if not all, of Emera's reasons listed in his application for rejecting this marine crossing.
14871. As the Board has set out in previous applications for review during this hearing, Rule No. 44 of the NEB Rules of Practice and Procedure, requires that an application for review of a Board decision identifies sufficient grounds to raise doubt as to the correctness of that decision or order, including an error of law or jurisdiction, changed circumstances or new facts which have arisen, or facts that were not placed in evidence in the original decision, and were then not discoverable by due diligence.
14872. The Board has not persuaded that grounds have been identified to raise doubt as to the correctness of the Board's request to have Mr. Sauerteig move on to another line of questioning.
14873. As a result, Mr. Sauerteig's application for review is denied.
14874. While the Board could end the matter here and -- will take this opportunity to explain that it is incumbent upon a project proponent to demonstrate under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act that the proponent has considered alternative means of carrying out its proposed project that are technically and economically feasible.
14875. The Board has throughout these proceedings permitted cross- examination within the scope set out under CEA. In this instance, Emera has filed evidence that it has considered the marine route as an alternative means to the preferred corridor for which it now applies.
14876. It is the appropriateness of the preferred corridor that Emera asks the Board to adjudicate, not the alternative means such as the marine route.
14877. In deciding whether to grant or deny Emera's application, the Board must be satisfied with Emera's evaluation of alternative means, as set out in the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. Should the Board be satisfied with Emera's evaluation of alternative means under that act, the Board is then only able to judge the appropriateness of the preferred corridor, as applied for by Emera.
14878. The Board points out that in the argument phase of this hearing, parties are free to argue about the adequacy of the alternative means Emera has considered under
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Ruling by the Board The Chairperson
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, including the technical and economic feasibility of those alternative means, and that parties can also argue the adequacy of the preferred route and the general land requirements as set out in the list of issues.
14879. With respect to Mr. Ruffman's request that Panel 4 produce mass flow rate release curves, the Board notes that prior to this oral hearing there has been an extensive written interrogatory process, and that would have been the time to raise requests of this type.
14880. The Board is not persuaded that the requested information would be of sufficient probative value to outweigh the burden of producing this material.
14881. Therefore, the Board does not see a need for Panel 4 to produce this material.
14882. Are there any other preliminary matters that people want to raise before we continue with cross-examination of Panel 4?
14883. Mr. Smith?
14884. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I have two filings if I might. The first is a response to undertaking. It is an undertaking given at Volume 5, paragraphs 7330 to 7334, and this related to the residences contacted on Creighton Avenue.
14885. If we may have an exhibit number, please.
14886. THE HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. That's B-64.
--- EXHIBIT NO./PIÈCE NO. B-64:
Response to an undertaking given at Volume 5, paragraphs 7330 to 7334, relating to residences contacted on Creighton Avenue.
14887. MR. SMITH: And the next document is the direct evidence of Philip B. Ribbeck and the direct evidence of Denis Marcoux.
14888. If we might have an exhibit number, please.
14889. THE HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. That's B-65.
--- EXHIBIT NO./PIÈCE NO. B-65:
Direct evidence of Philip B. Ribbeck and direct evidence of Denis Marcoux
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Ruling by the Board The Chairperson
14890. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, they are simply the curriculum vitae -- it's not new substantive material -- it's the CVs of both witnesses who will appear on Panel 5.
14891. Thank you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14892. THE CHAIRPERSON: Do Friends of Rockwood Park have any additional cross-examination for Panel No. 4?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. THOMPSON:
14893. MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Madam Chair, but very short.
14894. If we could go to Exhibit B-40-a, Emera Brunswick Reply Evidence? If we could go to page 4 of the Reply to an Independent Analysis of the proposed pipeline routes in Saint John, New Brunswick by Richard B. Kuprewicz, and it's Reply Evidence, Attachment 10.
14895. If we could go to page 4 of that. Okay. Starting -- reading -- if you could just put that up a little bit on the -- there, now we got it. Going to line 5 -- near the end of line 5, reading: (As read)
"To define the Emergency Planning Zone and the ERP is being undertaken jointly..."
14896. And it says, "but" but I think that that should be by. Could we ---
"...by stakeholders including the Saint John Fire Department, the first responders and the pipeline proponents."
14897. Who is included in the stakeholders here and will the stakeholders include representatives from local community groups in the areas where the pipeline is going to pass through?
14898. MR. WHALEN: Typically, when we put together a field emergency response plan, which of course is only one component of our overall emergency response program, the plan itself is really a tactical plan to respond to a consequence.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Thompson
14899. So, it contains roles and responsibilities of various first responders, emergency measures organizations and ourselves, of course, as a pipeline operator.
14900. So, in the past we've included in this field, the emergency response plan, obviously first responders, emergency measures organizations, you know, fire police ambulance. We haven't in the past included community groups, but we would be open to that suggestion.
14901. I think that other components of our response program which is an over-arching program may be more appropriate for community input, such as programs -- such as continuing education for those within emergency planning zones for example. That education program is part of the response program, not the field plan; I just want to make that distinction.
14902. But, we’re open to that suggestion and if we see that there’s merit or that there’s a desire then we would include community groups, as well as the agencies that I’ve described.
14903. MR. THOMPSON: So we can include that if community groups in a certain area -- I’m thinking about areas such as Milford or perhaps in the Milledgeville area or Champlain Heights area -- if the people in the neighbourhoods there wanted to become involved in defining the emergency planning zone you would be open to people in the community, community groups being involved in that?
14904. MR. WHALEN: No. What I said was that I would be open to having those groups involved in the formulation of the field emergency response plan. The definition of the EPZ itself is typically a technical study. As Dr. Bercha pointed out, there’s various criteria that that could be based on
14905. MR. THOMPSON: I’m not asking about that. What I’m asking about is to defining the emergency plan zone. That is the zone that would be -- geographic zone that would be covered by the emergency plan. Would you involve community groups, would you be open to that?
14906. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Thompson, I believe that question has been answered. I don’t know if the witness wants to provide any further clarification.
14907. MR. WHALEN: Well, again, the formulation of the actual numerical values behind a planning zone are typically done by a technical consultant. So I wouldn’t agree that community members would have input into the definition or the math behind the zone. However, we’d be open to explaining the zone and what it means and how it was defined, certainly.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Thompson
14908. MR. THOMPSON: Further, regarding this emergency planning zone, when it’s defined who would approve the definition of the zone?
14909. MR. WHALEN: Well, in my experience our regulator would have oversight and input and approval around whether or not the emergency planning zone is appropriate and whether it was based on something that was sound.
14910. MR. THOMPSON: Do you mean the National Energy Board?
14911. MR. WHALEN: Yes.
14912. MR. THOMPSON: Would there be any others who would be – any other groups whose approval would be required in the definition of the emergency planning zone?
14913. MR. WHALEN: None that I’m personally aware of, no.
14914. MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.
14915. If we go to B-44-c, and I see an AOW6E5. Well, that’s exactly what I’m looking for is this map.
14916. Could you enlarge the map a little bit in the left-hand corner, in that area?
14917. Near the bottom of the screen we see a red line and we also see a white line. Could you confirm if that white line, immediately adjacent, I guess we sort of see it as two lines here from where I’m sitting. Could we confirm if that is the Milford Overpass? Lou Murphy Overpass.
14918. MR. MAYER: There are a few white lines on there, perhaps you can use a pointer to refer which one you’re speaking to.
14919. MR. THOMPSON: I’m referring to this area. Is that the Lou Murphy Overpass?
14920. MR. MAYER: Yes. That area near the bottom left-hand side of the map; now it’s moving up a bit, that’s delineated in a little box, that is the overpass that you’re speaking of.
14921. MR. THOMPSON: Okay. The red line, correct me if I’m wrong, is my understanding of an alternate emergency road that’s been made available or is
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Thompson
proposed to be make available over a property, I guess, may be owned by J.D. Irving and others?
14922. MR. MAYER: Yes, it appears in a covering letter that went along with this map; that it is owned by J.D. Irving Limited.
14923. MR. THOMPSON: I was wondering if you -- I find it very confusing and I was wondering if you could explain how this road would serve in an emergency where it basically goes the very same place -- it crosses the very same place as the overpass. I mean how could it function ---
14924. THE CHAIRPERSON: Let’s let them address your question, sir.
14925. MR. McGRATH: Certainly. In this area we have a fairly wide preferred corridor and we’ve still yet to locate where the pipeline would eventually be built. That would be part of our detailed routing process and there is width of that corridor available to us to put the pipeline in a place other than right under the Lou Murphy Overpass.
14926. So it could be somewhere up the road, closer into Milford. It doesn’t have to be right there at the overpass. And I personally met with a number of people from Milford. We walked out to the location -- of one location where we thought was a candidate for a crossing, like we haven’t done engineering work or had detailed discussions with the city yet about where to cross their road but I pointed out a likely candidate. And it wasn’t right underneath the overpass; it was closer into Milford, underneath the embankment leading up to the overpass.
14927. MR. THOMPSON: If the actual route in the corridor was going to be moved to the north, up in this direction somewhere and I don’t know how wide the corridor is. Is my pointer in about the area of how wide the corridor would be or could you just indicate when I point there, about where the corridor would be the northern end of it?
14928. MR. McGRATH: Perhaps if you shut your pointer off, I’ll put my pointer on.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
14929. MR. THOMPSON: Thank you.
14930. MR. McGRATH: There are better mapping on file to delineate the corridor through this area but just to stay on this map, we don’t want to be flipping back and forth.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Thompson
14931. The pipeline corridor, in general, runs on this diagram or this map, from the top to the bottom, in this general direction here. There’s a church located right here and the corridor itself is coming along beside that church, crossing over and then we get into the NB Southern rail yards, down here off of what we can see on the screen.
14932. This red line that’s delineated on this map is a private road owned by J.D. Irving which they use to access their facilities on this side of the Lou Murphy Overpass. And this side, the right-hand and left-hand sides of the Lou Murphy Overpass, so they have a rail line. They own a rail line system through here and recently they’ve constructed a haul road to avoid them having to go around on city streets in order to get from one facility to the other.
14933. Now, when the Milford community spoke to us about their concerns of something happening here where we’d potentially be crossing the Greenhead Road, they were looking for some help as far as how do they get in and out if the road is somehow shut down? Which is a problem they face right now if there was a tanker overturned or something like this; road traffic accident or something like this, anywhere along this single access into Milford.
14934. We took it upon ourselves to contact J.D. Irving and asked them to see what they can do in order to respond to this concern. And what we have here is the cover letter which is also in Exhibit B-44-b and the attached map that we have up here on the screen.
14935. And as I discussed a few days ago, what we’re trying to do is get the first responders together with the land owner, in this case, J.D. Irving, to see what they can do about facilitating access for first responders to this area, not only for our pipeline, you know, I think they need to deal with other incidents as well. J.D. Irving’s cover letter responds specifically to our pipeline.
14936. But you’ll see at the bottom of the letter, talking about discussions with first responders in this regard. So we hopefully have facilitated something that can go forward to alleviate a concern and, you know, we’ll keep on working with our first responders and working with the community and see how far we can take it.
14937. MR. THOMPSON: Have you talked to the community, at a community meeting since this road was developed on the map?
14938. MR. MAYER: I believe we took this back to that Milford community. I’d have to check with my staff. There was a representative group from Milford and our commitment was to secure this access and then, you know, put this information to them. Obviously it’s here on the public record and many of them are
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Thompson
present in the room but I’d have to double-check if it actually was transmitted to the representative from that group.
14939. MR. THOMPSON: Well, the information that came to you, did you feel that the community was comfortable with this after -- as you say -- there was some dialogue with the people in Milford?
14940. MR. MAYER: No, my understanding is that there’s still not that level of comfort over this solution. Maybe some of it is further explanation. I think there’s still some people that feel that the eventual pipeline would be built right underneath the overpass, right underneath where this red line is here and that’s why they’re confused about how this access is supposed to help them because they’re imagining a scenario where something happens right there, underneath the overpass, right on our pipeline that really takes out the overpass, the alternate road, and our pipeline all in the same instance.
14941. And so part of our job is that we would, you know, need to communicate to them, well that’s not necessarily the case; we still have to locate the crossing but we have other places to locate the crossing so that that would not be a scenario.
14942. MR. THOMPSON: In respect to the road and the Lou Murphy Overpass, how close are they together, the roadway and the overpass?
14943. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Thompson, could you explain the relevance of your line of questioning to this Board -- this Panel that’s dealing with the engineering design? This is sounding awfully like routing which we’ve covered extensively, previously in the record.
14944. MR. THOMPSON: The purpose of the questioning is to determine if it would be effective in the case of an accident happening.
14945. THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Well perhaps the Panel could respond to that concern. Thank you.
14946. MR. MAYER: I believe your question was how close is the J.D. Irving private road to the Lou Murphy overpass? And the answer is; it’s whatever the vertical distance is from the road to the overpass itself because the road passes underneath the overpass. They intersect, if you will.
14947. Right -- now, I’ll point it out on the diagram for you. Right at that location there, the road goes under the overpass. The road is built beside rail lines and
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. P. Blaney
that was initially what the ove rpass was designed to do, was to span those rail lines. So all they’ve done is taken the area adjacent to the rail lines and built a roadway there.
14948. MR. THOMPSON: Where they are located so close together, could you envision some kind of an accident or emergency situation that could put them both out of commission for people to pass on, where they’re located so close together?
14949. MR. MAYER: Well, now sir, you’re asking me questions about the effects of the roadway, the private roadway and the Lou Murphy overpass. I can answer questions regarding our pipeline, our proposed pipeline project, but I think that what you’ve just asked me is outside of the realm -- you know, or what I’m here for today.
14950. MR. THOMPSON: That’s all the questions I have. Thank you.
14951. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
14952. I understand that we have a switch in the order. Mr. Blaney, you’ve got some questions that you’d like to bring forward to this Panel, at this time?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. BLANEY:
14953. MR. BLANEY: Hello. Thank you.
14954. The Panel and I’d like to ask, as I did with the first Panel. I assume that your evidence has been conducted in a scientific manner and all your results have been peer reviewed by an outside independent source?
14955. MR. MAYER: We’ll go down our Panel here from end-to-end about their scientific work. In answer to your two questions; were they done in a scientific manner and were they peer reviewed ---
14956. MR. BLANEY: --- by an outside independent source.
14957. MR. MAYER: I’ll ask Dr. Kiefner to respond first.
14958. DR. KIEFNER: I have produced four -- three exhibits, Attachments 4, 5 and 6; one dealing with puncture resistance of the pipe. It was performed by a member of our firm and personally checked by me.
14959. The methods we use are available in the public domain and actually have been developed by CFER and verified by a European group, pertaining to the puncture resistance in the pipe. That was Attachment 4.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. P. Blaney
14960. Attachment 5 deals with the issue of pressure cycle induced fatigue. We -- again I had a person on my staff perform the calculations. I reviewed how they were done and approved of the method.
14961. The methods are taken from standard textbooks on assessment of fatigue, crack growth. And we use -- we back that up with research that has been done in the United States and Canada, on pressure cycle induced fatigue. And of course, if you needed more detail, I could always provide references.
14962. MR. BLANEY: All right. If the Panel could assure me on -- everything was done and independently peer reviewed, I’d accept that. I don’t need -- I’m just wondering if it’s independently peer reviewed. That’s my main concern.
14963. DR. KIEFNER: Well, not in a sense that I passed these on to yet another organization. What I’m maintaining here is that we use standard methods that are accepted. We are not developing anything new here.
14964. These are standard techniques that our competitors use, as well. So in my view, when these kinds of methods are used and checked by an engineering consultant, that is maybe not equivalent to peer review, but it certainly is standard procedure.
14965. MR. BLANEY: On reply evidence; Attachment 7, October 20th, page 3, I think. Do I just go on?
14966. You have:
“Third party damage can occur because of events such as heavy equipment crossing the pipe or excavation near the pipe and will be accordingly aggressively managed in order to prevent any occurrence. Prevention measures will include pipeline patrol, crossing administration, public awareness…”
14967. Was there any discussion of terrorism at all, or sabotage?
14968. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Blaney, there has been extensive discussion on that, on the record yesterday. I don’t know if you were able to attend or not?
14969. MR. BLANEY: I did not hear that; no.
14970. THE CHAIRPERSON: You weren’t here?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. P. Blaney
14971. Perhaps the Panel could give a very brief overview for Mr. Blaney’s benefit, so that he can have the benefit of a high level of wisdom from you.
14972. MR. WHALEN: Certainly. What I described yesterday is that we will have a pipeline security management plan and it will have various components within the plan to address potential terrorist activity.
14973. As one example, we will have threat advisory levels and associated actions related to security depending on the threat advisory levels. As well, we’ll classify the facilities and depending on the classification, we’ll have security measures in place at each of the facilities, depending on the classification.
14974. I also mentioned that the Board has issued guidance -- that being the National Energy Board -- that the Onshore Pipeline Regulations are to be amended in the near future to require a formal pipeline security management plan. And we’ll ensure that our plan will be amended if necessary, to meet those guidelines.
14975. MR. BLANEY: Okay. So as far as terrorism right now, do you find there’s a high or low or nothing really to worry about right now?
14976. MR. DRAKE: I think, again, there’s been considerable discussion about the likelihood of the terrorism threat. I think in reports from many, including Mr. Kuprewicz, I think that the threat of terrorism or the risk of terrorism is very, very low.
14977. These pipes are not classic candidates for that threat in that many of our third party damage measures would work against -- to mitigate the likelihood of terrorism, as well. And I think we’ve talked about that at fair length.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14978. MR. BLANEY: Right here? Reply evidence, Attachment 11, October 20th, 2006, page 3, 3.4, risk assessment: (As read)
“Mr. Wreathall also suggests that the QRA is incomplete because it does not deal with sabotage explicitly. Accordingly, the QRA should not be deemed incomplete as we have shown consideration has been given to shut and failure, the reduction in historical data has been substantiated and there is allowance for other causes such as sabotage.”
14979. So I would like to know is the QRA incomplete for this reason?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
14980. MR. MAYER: Yes. Our evidence is that the QRA is complete.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14981. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Blaney, I’m going to suggest that potentially you and Mr. Ruffman could coordinate and get yourselves organized to ask these questions.
14982. We’ll continue on through a couple of other parties and then come back to you, because we are trying to be fairly expeditious about the way we’re proceeding here.
14983. MR. BLANEY: I don’t really have a lot of questions and I also have to get back to work, so ---
14984. THE CHAIRPERSON: If you could try to just phrase the question, that’s what the Panel wants -- is here to listen to.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
14985. MR. RUFFMAN: I think your suggestion actually might be worthwhile. We’ll just retire for a moment and let one other speaker come and then we’ll finish Mr. Blaney’s questions.
14986. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Ruffman.
14987. Mr. Quinlan?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. QUINLAN:
14988. MR. QUINLAN: Madam Chair, Board members, and Panel. My name is Jack Quinlan. My highlight is on safety.
14989. My first question; how will Emera Brunswick staff address all concerns or complaints to the satisfaction of residents of east Saint John, especially the most vulnerable of our population, the sick, the elderly, who may not have means or mobility to leave a dangerous area?
14990. MR. DRAKE: That’s a good question. I think that we have gone to great lengths to try to communicate with the public and the public’s representatives on this issue. I think it’s an iterative process.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
14991. Certainly these proceedings are a key part of that. But, prior to these proceedings, we engaged the Fire Chief, who seemed to be taking quite a proactive position on this, and seemed to become the focal point for the community on these discussions vis-à-vis his report. And we engaged him in a discussion at great length about his report.
14992. And I think it became an interactive, kind of education process, that provided both of us, through the communication, a better understanding of the concerns of the Fire Chief, and retrospectively, I think also -- or reciprocatively, a better understanding of the Chief of some of the issues that we were affording to -- affording the pipeline to mitigate the risks associated with operating in this environment.
14993. And I think -- through that discussion, I think we've both reached a better understanding of our position. And I think we've seen the Chief, actually -- not to speak on his behalf, but I think that is part of what motivated him to revise his position on this.
14994. And I think that communication is very, very important. And I think that that's an ongoing process. It's an -- process.
14995. It's a-- the fact that there aren't a large number of big diameter gas transmission pipelines in this environment certainly would be, I think, indicative of where the community is, with regard to dealing with them, and that there may be a lot of questions about, "What are these things" and, "How do they work" and, "How does that go?" And I think that that conversation is an ongoing conversation.
14996. Through these proceedings, we make ourselves available to answer those questions. And we want to be a constructive part of this community, if provided the opportunity to place this pipe here, on an ongoing basis.
14997. We're not going to hide and run away, not avail ourselves to ask questions and make the local residents, the community, comfortable with what is being done on this pipeline.
14998. I think through these proceedings, we've tried to be very transparent as to what we're doing.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
14999. MR. DRAKE: What are the practices that we're deploying?
15000. And I think, to this point so far, we have tried to illustrate that not only are we following the national standards that are specifically designed to deal with being
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
in this kind of environment, we're actually exceeding them, to try to provide even greater lengths and greater measures to further provide confidence to the community, that those risks have been marshalled as well as they can possibly be marshalled.
15001. And with that, I can turn it over to some of the others on the Panel, because I think this is quite a good question.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15002. MR. WHALEN: Well, I guess to add to Mr. Drake, certainly my staff is going to be charged with operating and maintaining the pipeline, if it's approved and constructed, obviously.
15003. And on an ongoing basis, we have extensive public awareness programs, landowner communication programs, continuing education and training for first responders, as well as those that may reside within an emergency planning zone.
15004. And that's not just, you know, in the first year. As I testified yesterday, that's for the life of the facility.
15005. MR. QUINLAN: Thank you very much for your answers.
15006. Another one. Will the Emera staff be addressing safety concerns in person? Will staff live -- live on the pipeline route? Anywhere along the corridor?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15007. MR. WHALEN: I can't really speculate at this point where the additional staff will choose to buy a home.
15008. We haven't recruited those additional folks yet, but they will be living within the general Saint John area.
15009. MR. QUINLAN: Okay. Thank you.
15010. How many City workers have been trained, or will be trained, to repair water and sewer pipes around a 30 inch natural gas pipeline?
15011. MR. WHALEN: What we plan to do is, certainly, through our public awareness program, one of the target audiences would be municipalities.
15012. And what we've done in the past, and we'd continue to do at this facility, is to ensure that the workers who operate and maintain the infrastructure that
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
may be near or in close proximity to the pipeline, have an appreciation of how close they can dig to a pipeline; the fact that they need to have a locate; the fact that we need to be there to provide third party oversight, to provide extra assurance. You know, have a good understanding of the separation distances that are required, and that type of thing.
15013. So, there's going to be nothing unique in terms of how you repair what they take care of. There's no change there.
15014. It's an enhanced understanding of the additional safety precautions that need to be taking place, in the event that there was a repair required that was in proximity to this pipeline.
15015. MR. QUINLAN: Thank you very much.
15016. This one might -- sorry.
15017. My next question, it might have been touched on, but I'll ask it anyway, and if it has to be overruled or whatever, I'll accept.
15018. Who will pay for their train -- City workers' training, in future, for the rest of the pipeline's life?
15019. MR. WHALEN: What I touched on yesterday, and I think earlier today, was the fact that the proponent is responsible, and will pay for ongoing training related to emergency response, related to our pipeline.
15020. And that could be training for the police department, the fire department, first responders, mock emergencies, that type of thing.
15021. And as I outlined, there's really no specific training required, that I can see, for City workers, outside of first responders.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15022. MR. QUINLAN: Are City workers versed on NEB safety regulations?
15023. MR. WHALEN: Yes. Again, our staff act as agents for the NEB in administering Section 112, which are the -- basically the crossing regulations.
15024. And those regulations are very specific in terms of what you can and can't do on or near an operating pipeline.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
15025. So -- and then in addition to that, we have specific procedures behind or based on these regulations that talk about separation distances, how close you can excavate to the pipeline with mechanical equipment, by hand, that type of thing.
15026. So, again, our ongoing education would be with supervision staff, with the City, who would pass that message along to the workers, and/or our own staff would be out with the workers, providing third party oversight, and reinforcing that message and those regulations.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15027. MR. QUINLAN: Who is in charge of communications between City and the pipeline company?
15028. MR. WHALEN: Could I ask you related to what?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15029. MR. QUINLAN: I guess there's a couple of words I left out.
15030. Who is in charge of communications, in case of emergency, between the City and the pipeline company?
15031. MR. WHALEN: Well, there's various aspects to communication, in the event of a pipeline incident.
15032. Certainly, we would have an on site supervisor, as part of our response team, who would be the field representative, who would communicate directly with any City staff who were also at the response scene.
15033. We would also have a media spokesperson as part of the response team. That person would probably not be directly on site immediately. It's more of a corporate response -- or, sorry, a support function.
15034. And these roles and responsibilities are outlined in our emergency response plan.
15035. MR. QUINLAN: Thank you.
15036. Does the City and the applicant have a complete set of current maps of the entire network of underground pipes, power lines, wells, and structures of all types within the City of Saint John and its limits?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
15037. MR. MAYER: Speaking for ourselves, we do not yet have that detailed mapping.
15038. It's something we've already approached the City, and some of the other utilities for. They're getting that together.
15039. And we would be asking them for mapping not of the entire City, but just, like, locations around our preferred corridor, so that we can start to work towards where the pipeline would, you know, best be situated in that corridor.
15040. And as for what the City has, as far as mappings, and how detailed they are, I can't answer that question.
15041. MR. QUINLAN: Explain how and why the required level of security measures for the downstream pipeline is not affected by the security upstream LNG off loading operations?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15042. MR. WHALEN: Well, our pipeline security management plan is focused on the facilities that we'll be operating.
15043. And we really aren't here to discuss the terminal, and we really have no expertise to discuss the security that's related to the terminal.
15044. MR. MAYER: That's similar, I might add, to other facilities that -- infrastructure that the pipeline route traverses. Overhead power lines, you know, the big transmission lines, etc. We don't necessarily get involved with their security plans.
15045. You know, there's many other facilities in Saint John, and outside of Saint John, that could be security targets that, you know, we know exist.
15046. We maintain security on our system, and we think others maintain security on their system. And, you know, that's the respective responsibilities.
15047. MR. WHALEN: I could give you a real life example of what Mr. Mayer just described.
15048. St. Clair Pipelines also operates and maintains the Maritimes Canada system. 15049. And there's a large gas processing facility at the front end of the current 30 inch main line in Nova Scotia that's operated or led by ExxonMobil.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
15050. And certainly there's security measures in place at the gas plant in Goldboro.
15051. I don't have details or knowledge of what those security plans are. I know that they generally exist, but basically, that's the main supply for the existing system today, and again, we have separate security management programs and plans which really aren't meant to interact with the two.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15052. MR. QUINLAN: Thank you very much. Move on to the next.
15053. I asked this question a few days ago, concerning the buried pipeline. And I was asked to question that to Panel 4.
15054. Your pipeline will be buried three feet under -- this is what I hear, anyway -- three feet underground. Is that correct?
15055. MR. MAYER: Yes, approximately three feet. It's -- actually it's 0.9 metres in non-agricultural fields. In agricultural fields, or agricultural areas, then it's going to be 1.2 metres, which is a little bit closer to 4 feet of cover. And we have other cover requirements when we approach railways and road crossings and that sort of thing.
15056. MR. QUINLAN: What about frost heaving? Up to 30-inch pipeline, frost is known to go down at least four feet, would that put any strain on the welded joints or connections; a chance of rupture?
15057. MR. MAYER: Well, it does strain the pipe. However, the pipe has design factors into it though it will not affect the pipe in a way that it will cause it to rupture.
15058. I might point out that the 30-inch Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline mainline, runs in the same general vicinity and it also has the same kind of depth and cover requirements and as other pipelines do in other places in Canada, they’re even much more colder and the frost goes down deeper, more severe than it is here and it’s not really an issue for buried gas pipelines because of the stringent design codes that we have.
15059. So it’s already taken into account when we design the pipe; it has to be able to withstand those kind of forces and it does.
15060. MR. QUINLAN: What kind of material is placed under the natural
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
gas pipeline to support it in various soil conditions; such as swamp or bedrock?
15061. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe, Mr. Quinlan, that we have had extensive evidence, on the record already on that type of question.
15062. MR. QUINLAN: Okay, thanks.
15063. When the trench is dug through rock then the pipe is laid, what material is used to cover the pipeline over?
15064. THE CHAIRPERSON: Again, sir, I believe that’s already been addressed.
15065. That’s the difficulty of not being first in line with your questions, isn’t it?
15066. MR. QUINLAN: Have to go with the flow, I guess.
15067. There’s just one thing that popped up yesterday and I can’t make head nor tails of it. As far as the wall thickness of the piping, I got three figures here. One is 9.8, then 10.9, 15.7; which one is used for the line, the main line?
15068. MR. MAYER: Yes, the wall thickness for this pipe, because it’s grade 448 in Class 1 locations which were taken to be, basically in the rural portion of the full 145 kilometre pipeline.
15069. That pipe will be designed with a 9.8 millimetre thick wall and the pipe within the city will be designed to, what we call Class 3 requirements. It will have a 15.7 millimetre wall and a short length of pipe that we use for crossing roads -- or sorry, excuse me -- railways, will have a 15.9 millimetre thick wall.
15070. MR. QUINLAN: So the -- it may be a foolish question but I’ll ask it anyway. Fifteen point seven (15.7) is that the heaviest that you use?
15071. MR. MAYER: Yes, you could think -- we do have a small portion of 15.9 but it’s only a few hundred metres of pipe that we’re buying for that and that’s only for crossing railways where we are within seven metres of a railway track.
15072. So we have a short length of pipe that we’re going to be installing at different places where it’s 15.9. But the majority of the pipe in the urban section is going to be 15.7 millimetres thick.
15073. MR. QUINLAN: I’m not really into the metric system. The 15.7,
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Quinlan
what would that be in inches?
15074. MR. MAYER: That would be 0.618 inches. So, about 62 per cent of an inch, a little bit more than half an inch, a little bit less than three-quarters of an inch.
15075. MR. QUINLAN: Is that the thickness -- use that in warmer climates, the same as cold climates or would it vary in size as far as the weather is concerned?
15076. MR. MAYER: Are you saying that if we were designing this pipeline to be located somewhere else, somewhere where it’s a little bit warmer than here? If we were following our design standards that would not change, this is the same requirement all around.
15077. We do have some specific considerations for the far Arctic but I think just to answer your question, southern Canada, it’s the same kind of design that we apply.
15078. MR. QUINLAN: Could you bring up C-33-5-j, Risk Analysis Report, page 62?
15079. And that’s the view of Bercha Group quantitative risk analysis document and the risk analysis. Line 1.
“Any time the pipeline crosses a public street or is close to a building there is a risk posed to some portion of the public.”
15080. Could you explain the risk in the Old Black River Road area? How is Emera prepared to handle the fact that the pipeline crosses this road and residents beyond this area would be cut off from access to emergency services, as Black River Road is also a dead-end road?
15081. MR. WHALEN: Again, as we discussed yesterday, there’s, first of all, no requirement in the code, design codes or operating codes to prevent construction of a pipeline across a road or under a road that happens to dead-end.
15082. But that being said, for these unique instances and limited instances, the emergency response oversight in the municipality, I would expect, would be looking at alternate access in the unlikely event of such an incident.
15083. MR. QUINLAN: That’s all my questions I have today for the Panel.
15084. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Mr. P. Blaney
15085. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Quinlan.
15086. Okay, just while Mr. Blaney is coming back up. Come on up.
15087. I’d just like to remind all parties that for the parties who are registered at this hearing, when you’re called on the list, whatever rearrangements are made and that sort of thing, that’s your time to ask questions. And it isn’t appropriate to be passing questions once your time has passed, up to another party when it’s their turn to ask questions. It isn’t proper process.
15088. We did -- we were a little more lenient with it in the first couple of days as we were all settling into the process but it’s not appropriate and we will be strongly discouraging it from now on. Thank you.
15089. MR. RUFFMAN: Mr. Blaney thanks you for allowing us to work it. We think we’ve boiled it down to two questions.
--- EXAMINATION BY/ INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. BLANEY, (cont’d/suite):
15090. MR. BLANEY: Thank you.
15091. Will Brunswick Pipeline use US studies, such as those done by the US Department of Energy to develop their plans to combat terrorism? I understand that in the US such studies are subject to external assessment. That’s question one.
15092. MR. WHALEN: Yes. Those type of studies will be considered as we develop our security management plan and practices.
15093. MR. BLANEY: Thank you. And my final question, are you satisfied that you are taking appropriate security planning and prevention measures to ensure that there are no intentional breaches from terrorism and sabotage, given that such incidents may be more common or more severe than accidental breaches?
15094. MR. WHALEN: Well, what I can say is that we plan to fully comply with the pipeline security management plan requirements of our regulator, being the National Energy Board.
15095. I don’t think anybody can guarantee with any certainty or any high level of certainty what terrorists may plan to do or not plan to do but it’s up to us to show that we’re proactive in due diligence and have fully thought through a plan, both on the prevention side as well as in the eventuality of an incident.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15096. MR. DRAKE: If I can, Duke Energy, through St. Clair is actively involved in discussions with the TSA in the United States at this point. We have two people on staff who are dedicated to security and they are on the task team specifically dealing with this issue because I think a point of obvious nature, we are all learning as a community, not just in the US in Canada as well, about the nature of terrorism and terrorism threats and how to combat and how to identify it.
15097. I think that we participate in those committees for the expressed purpose of trying to be in front of it, not behind it. We have worked with them, literally, since 9/11 and have no intention of dropping off those committees.
15098. And they are quite intensive actually, they are full-time equivalent positions. That is what they do, is go to those jobs for the purpose of monitoring and discussing how to identify and deal with those threats. And we fully intend to keep exporting that insight back into our pipelines, not just in the US but here as well.
15099. MR. BLANEY: Could you please tell me what the TSA is in the USA?
15100. MR. DRAKE: The Transportation Security Administration was formed following 9/11, for the express purposes of dealing with terrorism threats to the transportation infrastructure.
15101. MR. BLANEY: I’d like to thank the Board very much for their time and patience. Thank you.
15102. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Blaney.
15103. Ms. Richard, please.
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS. RICHARD:
15104. MS. RICHARD: Madam Chair and Panel, I just had a question from yesterday.
15105. In Volume 9, 13055 was Ms. Armstrong, and yesterday afternoon, she had asked if they knew if there was a helicopter on site at the hospital, and the reply was that they didn't have that knowledge. Do they have that knowledge today?
15106. MR. WHALEN: I understand the answer to that is "no."
15107. MS. RICHARD: No? In the article this morning, it says in fact: (As
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
read)
"Hospital spokesperson, Patricia Crowdis confirms in an interview that the hospital does not have a helicopter stationed there."
15108. THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Richard, again, this isn't the time to introduce evidence, but ---
15109. MS. RICHARD: Okay.
15110. THE CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any further questions?
15111. MS. RICHARD: Yes.
15112. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
15113. MS. RICHARD: Could you bring up B-61? And it has -- there it is.
15114. I'm looking at the names -- these are the people in the Milford area that were met with by the company, and I'm wondering what street North Marine Services is, what street they would live on.
15115. MR. MAYER: Well, respectfully, that's -- that's really a question for our right-of-way group. They were members of Panel 1. But I can answer from my knowledge that North Marine Services is a company, and in that way, a company doesn't live anywhere. It just a company.
15116. MS. RICHARD: Oh, it's just a company. Okay, because the question was about HDD drilling in a residence. Okay.
15117. And this was a question from Panel 2, and they told me to bring it to 4. And my question is, how will Emera ensure that there will never be a blast in the quarry that will damage the pipeline where you are not the owners of the quarry?
15118. MR. MAYER: Well I guess that's a very good question, and you know, we can never be sure what they're going to do in that quarry. But you'll see in the reply evidence -- I think it's Exhibit B-40-b under Tab 1 -- you'll see a two-page report from our blasting engineer, who you know, subsequent to the meeting with the people in Milford where this concern came up, I had asked him to specifically go and take a look at the quarry, and you know, what's been happening around there and what's expected to happen around there, and report back to us on what we, you know, would expect to see as far as vibrations caused by the quarry at our pipeline location or proposed pipeline location, you know, in the general area of the preferred corridor.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15119. And so his results are here within his letter, and you see that he's reported to us, you know, very -- what we would consider to be very small vibrations, the kind of vibrations that would not raise any alarms with us. If we saw vibrations approaching the 50 millimetres per second peak particle velocity, we would have to study this issue a lot more closely.
15120. But you'll see down closer to the bottom of page 1 of that letter -- and he's quoting that -- in the second last line down there: (As read)
"Ground vibration measurements at this location have never exceeded four millimetres per second."
15121. That tells us right there that it's not a real concern to a pipeline operator.
15122. And then he goes on to talk about how the blasting operation at the quarry is actually -- the face of the blasting is moving further away from us. So then again we don't see that this is going to be -- it may be four now, but it changes to 14 next year, and keep on ramping up, getting close to 50. So as the face moves away from us, we're going to expect even less as far as vibrations go.
15123. So from an engineering point of view and operations point of view, speaking for Mr. Whalen, the kind of vibrations we would be experiencing in our pipeline, or we predict to be experiencing in our pipeline are so low that we would not be concerned.
15124. And we'd have to point out as well there are structures closer to this quarry than the proposed pipeline would be, and so if there was anything that was going to damage our pipeline from these blasting, those structures would be compromised in some way. These are structures that we had seen briefly in one of the exhibits -- was up here in the N.B. Southern Rail Yards, like the Irving equipment buildings, etc.
15125. So, you know, if these structures started crumbling from the blasting operations, it would definitely be an indicator that something is also happening in our pipeline. So I guess in that way, we'd have some indicators. But yeah, we've studied it and we've concluded it's not an issue.
15126. MS. RICHARD: B-17-mm, page 7, 1.2, paragraph 3, it says: (As read)
"All structures located within 200 metres of the blasting zone will be surveyed prior to the blast."
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15127. Is this a government regulation that homes within 200 metres would be surveyed or where is this from?
15128. THE CHAIRPERSON: Again, that information is previously on the record. I don't know if you were here yesterday or not, but perhaps again the panel could answer it very briefly. You don't have to go into the level of detail that was gone into before.
15129. MR. MAYER: Certainly. It's not a government regulation. It's our own specification.
15130. MS. RICHARD: It's your own, okay. Where blasting occurs at Bald Hill and the blasting that's going to occur down Milford Road, how will us residents prove what company did the damage to our homes, if there is any?
15131. THE CHAIRPERSON: Again, that has been well covered in the proceedings prior to this.
15132. MS. RICHARD: When is blasting scheduled for the Milford Road area if the pipeline is approved?
15133. MR. MAYER: Well we haven't hired a contractor yet, so we can't speak to those that we've hired to carry out the work and get specific schedules, but in general, we may be looking at some winter blasting for grade blasting.
15134. I explained, I think, yesterday about some of the sharp grade rock and some areas in Rockwood Park. And if it -- if it made sense for everyone, we might get out there in the winter of 2008 and do some blasting of that rock material if it's there in the Milford area where we end up with our detailed, you know, route.
15135. But the majority of the blasting would be for the trench, and that would be through the summer of 2008, I would imagine, beginning sometime in June and continuing on through June and July, and completion sometime mid-August. Just off the top of my head.
15136. MS. RICHARD: Thanks. Mr. Mayer, you were at the Milford Randolph community meeting that was held in July. Did Emera address HDD drilling at the public meeting at the Dennis Morris Community Centre? Did you address -- just hang on a minute -- at the Milford Community Centre where residents would be affected most by the noise of the HDD drilling?
15137. MR. MAYER: I do recall discussing the plans for welding up pipe
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
within Shamrock Park for pullback. I do know a few weeks before that meeting, we walked out to site with a number of people from Milford and talked about the HDD exit point.
15138. It was a matter of -- we had a brief presentation at that time, you'll recall, about the project going -- a very high-level overview, and then opened the floor to questions, and I was there to answer any questions that came from the floor. And in fact, I think I stood for four hours solid and let the questions come until they completely ran out.
15139. If I did address it, it would have been because a question came from the floor. If I didn't address noise and HDD, it's just a matter that nobody -- nobody raised it.
15140. So I -- I was standing. I wasn't taking notes myself, so I -- I can't really recall. I do know there was specific instances where we did touch on the HDD subject.
15141. MS. RICHARD: Because a resident had asked that: (As read)
"During construction, how often will crews be working and will they be doing evenings, nights and weekends, and what was the schedule for construction."
15142. Wouldn't that have been the time to let us know about the HDD drilling and the noise that would be happening in the area and the 24 hours a day period of work?
15143. MR. MAYER: Well, it all depends on the context that that was made, or that response was given. If we were talking at that time about general construction -- you know, as we were just talking here about the scheduling for blasting, for example -- if the context was I was responding to questions about the hours of operation for that general construction operation, then, no, I -- then I wasn't being specific to go outside of that to talk about the HDD.
15144. MS. RICHARD: Okay. Thanks. B-17-mm DR 1.23. And the question was: (As read)
"Will Emera be adding odour to the gas?"
15145. And the reply that I got was "no." And I think that's changed. Has it changed? There'll be odour added to the gas?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15146. MR. MAYER: Yes. That's a development that came out of our discussions with the Saint John Fire Department actually. And we've included in our reply evidence that we would be putting odorant into the gas.
15147. At the time when we were holding these community meetings and the time when, you know, we filed the original application even prior to those community meetings, our design did not entail odorant, but the Saint John Fire Department discussed with us some of the concerns and a recommendation that they made that we do put odorant in because of the way that they utilize the odorant as a means of delineating an area that has gas right now for the Enbridge Gas New Brunswick distribution system that's here right now, and it made sense to them that they would also rely on the same means for this gas transmission line, that they wouldn't have to change methods from one gas system to the other gas system, one odorized and one not.
15148. And that made sense to us, and you know, based on that recommendation, you know, we responded to that. I think it's covered off in the reply evidence in the section where we talk about all of our responses to the recommendations made by the Saint John Fire Department.
15149. So, you know, to answer your question, yes, the answer at the time was correct. That was not in our plans and was not in our application. Subsequent to that, it has changed.
15150. And I also want to add -- sorry, a follow-up to the previous question because I think this is important -- that when we were meeting in Milford and we were asked -- the questions were asked and answered, it was after the time that all the material was filed already with the Energy Board, and many of the people there were active intervenors in the process.
15151. And so matters such as noise, durations, etc. laid out in the Environmental Assessment were all there, materials many of the people in the community had. And so if there were any questions that they had on their minds at that time, they raised them at that meeting.
15152. As I say, I kept on taking the questions until the lights went out, and so whatever was on people's minds, we responded to. It wasn't that -- you know, I don't want to make it seem like I was ducking a question here. I was just trying to be responsive to whatever came from the floor.
15153. MS. RICHARD: I'd just make a little correction. There's only two of us that are intervening from the Milford area, and we received the books in July, after July the 4th, and our meeting was on the 17th. So, no, I didn't read 1,500 pages in that period of time. So, no, I didn't know about HDD drilling or I would have asked it.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15154. MR. MAYER: I'm sorry about that.
15155. MS. RICHARD: My next question is NEB 1.13, and it's at the bottom paragraph, and it says: (As read)
"The measures must be tailored to site conditions or the severity of undesired ATV traffic. In all instances, personnel have an will work closely with land owners and local ATV clubs."
15156. Where the proposed pipeline is to run the length of Milford Road and the property is owned by the Irvings, who are not residents of the area, how will the residents problems be addressed where we aren't landowners?
15157. MR. WHALEN: In that specific instance I would envision that we would work with the landowner and if ATV access was something that was accommodated by the pipeline route and was not there before the pipeline route was established, we would certainly bring that up to the landowner and recommend that access control measures be put in place.
15158. MS. RICHARD: Another question is, how will Emera with ATV riders who are not members of a club?
15159. MR. WHALEN: We address access control related to ATV's frequently on our existing pipelines. What we've found is that a lot of times the issues related to ATV traffic are certainly outside of ATV clubs. ATV clubs tend to be well organized and law abiding folks.
15160. Whereas it's like a lot of instances, there's the one or two percent that give ATV riders a bad name. So I mentioned that we work with ATV clubs but certainly a lot of the times that we're putting access control measures in, it's for the people outside of those clubs as well. In fact, they're usually the issue.
15161. MS. RICHARD: IR NEB 2, page 14, request B, the NEB had asked how access to the Milford area would be affected during construction and operation of the pipeline failure. And the reply was that there would not be -- impede in any way during construction or operations.
15162. And my question is that the length of the stringer truck cab and an 80 foot pipe, how will a truck turn on the Milford Road that is 50 feet wide without impeding the traffic on our only exit or entrance?
15163. MR. MAYER: Well, that's a good question. The answer is that the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
pipe that we use in the city portion we will be getting in 40 foot lengths so we don't have those long 80 foot length trucks trying to turn and negotiate the city streets. And we would keep the 80 foot lengths of pipe for the more rural areas where we have special trucks that have rear steering and can get around the corners where the corners are wider and that sort of thing. Because it is a concern in the city, you just can't negotiate, you know, those kinds of roads with such a long load.
15164. MS. RICHARD: Thank you. B-17-mm, 1.22. And my question is if another company was to buy the proposed Brunswick Pipeline could they raise the pressure from 1440 psi's in the future if they apply to the NEB to do so or if it was even your own company?
15165. MR. MAYER: Can you just read back the question. I was just flipping it up at the same time. I didn't realize it was going to come up on the screen so fast. Could you just repeat your question for me please?
15166. MS. RICHARD: What I want to know is the 1440 psi's if it was applied back to the National Energy Board, could that pressure be put up higher than what it is?
15167. MR. MAYER: No it could not unless the design code dramatically changed. This is as much as this pipeline could possibly take under the regulations and the design codes we have right now.
15168. MS. RICHARD: NEB 1.8, Information Request of July the 20th. Has Emera changed the class design 3 for the proposed Emera Brunswick Pipeline, has it changed since July the 20th response?
15169. MR. MAYER: Well, there was an update to that. And then we found a correction that was -- had to be made and I believe it's just been recently filed so the table that we have up here there's -- there are two changes. This is the first table that we presented. But there's two changes that we could note.
15170. And it's the, call it the second last row from the bottom where it's KP start of 31.152. And I'll use my pointer over there to point that out to you. You see where it says 31.152. From this KP marker to 45.006 which is the next number there, that actually that is a class 1 location, not a class 3 location. And the pipe will be designed to class 1 requirements not class 3 requirements.
15171. So those -- that was an error that was in this original table, not that we -- we didn't technically change our minds. We made an error when we put the table together and presented it in response to the IR.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15172. MR. RICHARD: C-59, DR 1.11. And the question was, what are the evacuation plans for the 60 homes north of Kingsville Road. And the reply that I received was Baldwin 1.11. And that is B-17-e, 1.11. And it says in the bottom paragraph about the unique issue of the Milford area. And it talks about the Milford overpass. It doesn't discuss the Kingsville Road area.
15173. And then in IR No. NEB 2, page 17, 2.12-a, they had asked where the proposed pipeline route intersects the areas access routes to the Milford area. And your response to them, to the NEB was refer to Milford access S-4 map. And how does Milford access S-4 address the 60 homes north of Kingsville Road?
15174. THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Richard, I have to commend you on your level of organization. You are rhyming off those exhibit numbers faster than I think most of us in the room could keep up. So you may have to go back and clarify a couple.
15175. MR. RICHARD: I'll slow down.
15176. THE CHAIRPERSON: No, no that's fine. It was just great but you may have to go back and clarify a little.
15177. MR. MAYER: I could attempt to answer. At least I think I'll take the first question I can remember which is the last one you gave me. The Milford access map, that was offered in response to really the first part of the request which was please indicate by way of map, aerial photograph or other suitable means where the preferred pipeline route intersects the access routes to the Milford area.
15178. And I think we went on later in the response to talk about access, you know, of other parts of that question.
15179. MS. RICHARD: Okay. So could you bring up C-59-6, written evidence attachment No. 3.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15180. MS. RICHARD: Can't see the lines. Page -- Kingsville Road is right here where my -- Kingsville Road is right here where the pipeline is going to be on this side of the road. Could you tell how the fire department is going to get down into there if there's a leak at that pipeline that ignites? Because it's all wooded area here, wooded area on this side and then water.
15181. MR. RUFFMAN: The Panel may be at a disadvantage, Madam Chair because the actual map shows blue water and the roads show very clearly. What's up on the screen I'm afraid didn't digitize very well. And I don't quite know the way around
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
this. And maybe Mr. Smith has had previous experience with such problems.
15182. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, my standard response to a problem like this is to recommend a break.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
15183. THE CHAIRPERSON: As is one of my panel mates. Let's take a 15 minute break. Thank you.
15184. MR. RUFFMAN: Thank you.
--- Upon recessing at 2:12 p.m./L'audience est suspendue à 14h12. --- Upon resuming at 2:35 p.m./L'audience est reprise à 14h35
15185. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, we have one filing if this is a convenient time.
15186. THE CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed, Mr. Smith.
15187. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, we're doing our best to clean up the outstanding undertakings from Panel 1 and I think we're getting pretty close. This one is a response to an undertaking given by Mr. Blair to Mr. Harms. Volume 7, paragraphs 10332 to 10334, this dealing with Bicknell's thrush. If we might have an exhibit number please?
15188. THE HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. That would be B-66, Pièce numéro B-66.
--- EXHIBIT NO./PIÈCE NO. B-66:
Response to an undertaking given by Mr. Blair to Mr. Harms concerning Bicknell’s thrush
--- (Document distributed/Document distribué)
15189. MR. SMITH: Sorry to interrupt.
15190. THE CHAIRPERSON: And I notice that maps have magically arrived when we take a break. So I'm assuming there's a basis for proceeding with your question, Ms. Richard.
--- RALPH MAYER, Resumed:
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
--- DR. FRANK BERCHA, Resumed: --- ANDREW DRAKE, Resumed: --- DR. JOHN KIEFNER, Resumed: --- MIKE WHALEN, Resumed:
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS. RICHARD, (cont’d/suite):
15191. MS. RICHARD: Yes. My question was, could you tell me how emergency personnel would access the area north of Kingsville Road -- and that's the intersection of Kingsville Road and Milford Road beyond that point where it's all wooded area on each side and it's water and the pipeline would be -- that would be in the hot zone if there was a leak that ignited there.
15192. MR. MAYER: Yeah, I believe you're saying that the pipeline that's located somewhere between Milford Road and Grand Bay as shown on the map denoted as No. 3 which you handed out during the break ---
15193. MS. RICHARD: Yes, that's right.
15194. MR. MAYER: --- that the pipeline's located in that area and it should somehow impede progress for the first responders down Milford Road, I believe the question is how would the first responders get there. Perhaps Mr. Whalen could explain again what the approaches would be.
15195. MR. WHALEN: It's really the same answer or type of response that we've testified over the last couple of days for instances where there's one access or a dead-end road. First of all, I understand that the detailed route certainly hasn't been established in this area and you know, based on this instance or the fact that it is the only way past that point.
15196. The final location of the proposed pipeline within the preferred corridor there will certainly take that into consideration. And by that I mean if practical will be as far away from the road towards the water as practical.
15197. That being said, in the particular instance if there was a worse case scenario or a pipeline incident again we would expect the first responders in advance would work with the residents and work with ourselves and to think about alternate means to get by that point.
15198. It could be that another access point would have to be established. It could be that they'll use alternate means to get by there, either off road equipment or even on foot. But that particular scenario would have to be addressed by first responders again with our input, and with the neighbourhood input.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15199. MS. RICHARD: Thank you.
15200. I'd like to bring up C-59-6, Written Evidence, Attachment 1.
15201. And is this the letter that you're talking about from J.D.I. Limited counsel on July the 17th: (As read)
"As a secondary means of access secured by Emera in the Lou Murphy Overpass is deemed an unsafe route?"
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15202. MR. WHALEN: Yes.
15203. MS. RICHARD: Could you please explain how this letter represents an agreement, where there are conditions attached? Where it says: (As read)
"We wish to confirm that should the Church Avenue Overpass Greenhead Road become obstructed, and we have sufficient alternative access across our property, J.D. Irving, Limited and its affiliate companies will provide access for emergency response vehicles and personnel."
15204. MR. MAYER: Could you read the first -- sorry. Can you repeat the first part of your question? We didn't quite understand that.
15205. MS. RICHARD: Could you please explain how this letter represents an agreement, when there are conditions attached? The conditions I'm seeing is: (As read)
"And we have sufficient alterative access across our property."
15206. MR. MAYER: Well, I suppose, you know, I understand how you read that to be a condition.
15207. I see that they're -- they are qualifying their access.
15208. What happens if they were in the process of trenching in a new water line there or something like that, and temporary -- temporarily that day, when that access was needed, it wasn't available because of, you know, something else that was going on.
15209. You know, I can only respond in that respect that I've seen the road.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
It's not a storage site. It's not normally blocked. It's -- it is a road. They've built it for purposes of gaining access between two major facilities.
15210. I trusted, when I received that letter, that that was just a minor qualifier, and not an insurmountable condition.
15211. MS. RICHARD: Thank you.
15212. Will there be a legal and binding contract signed by J.D.I. Irving, guaranteeing access for the emergency personnel?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15213. MR. MAYER: Not that I'm aware of.
15214. They say they'll be meeting with the City of Saint John. I don't believe that the first responders would require a legal and binding contract with J.D. Irving, Limited for access across their property.
15215. It's not something that we were going to pursue, in any event, is to obtain a legal and binding contract between those two other parties.
15216. MS. RICHARD: Thank you.
15217. So, anything -- I'm confused now. All of this has to go back to the City?
15218. Because my next question was, what are the assurances that future management will not use this property for other uses, during the 50 plus years, the life of this pipeline?
15219. MR. MAYER: Well, I suppose, there's no assurances as in any time a pipeline crosses a public road that is the only access into a community.
15220. As Mr. Whalen has talked about, the first responders need to deal with an incident, say, at the pipeline crossing. And if they need to get into the community beyond that crossing, they'll have to find ways and means in order to do that.
15221. There's -- this letter is one step towards gaining access, and there is definitely not the only means that the first responders will have. They have many other ways and means at their disposal, in order to do their job.
15222. And as I said before, even without this letter -- even without the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
pipeline, if there was a major traffic accident on that Greenhead Road, a tanker truck rolled over and spilled fuel, and a huge fire, blocking travelled access along the Greenhead Road, you know, what do our first responders do now, in that situation?
15223. They are able to deal with a situation, get around that, assist, and do their work on the other side of the obstruction. And we trust that that will maintain the case with the gas pipeline, in the remote -- the very, very remote chance that something should happen to the gas pipeline right there, right at that crossing.
15224. MS. RICHARD: Okay, thanks.
15225. NEB 2, page 18-D, paragraph 2.
15226. I'm sorry. It's C-59-6, Attachment 2. And it's the map that's not going to show any roads. It's this map.
15227. To the NEB, it was stated that J.D.I. has provided assurances that access would be available, even through the lands that may be gated and locked.
15228. And in that Attachment 2 map, could you show me what -- how you would get to the gated area, if there was a pipeline rupture at the overpass?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15229. MR. MAYER: I'm just a little bit confused on where -- like, I know it doesn't show up on the stuff that's on the screen, but the map you provided before us is numbered map 2, which is a better representation of this map that's in the evidence.
15230. And are you asking us how we would get to the gate, or how would we get to the pipeline?
15231. MS. RICHARD: No, how you would get to the gated area? How the fire department would get to that gated area, without using the overpass or the bypass road.
15232. Because if there was a leak in that area, and there was a fire, they would not be able to use either one of those routes.
15233. How do they get to the gated area, to get to the residents in Milford, if someone was to have a heart attack?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15234. MR. MAYER: Well, for one, the map that we had up previously showing the red line with the Irving Access Road, it follows underneath the Greenhead Road, comes out into this area of the Irving property, which is near where you've indicated on this map No. 2 as Irving Gates.
15235. And I would assume that they would take a route like that, or they would cross from Dever Road into the Irving properties through other means, to get to that Irving Gates.
15236. The first responders have, you know, very robust, sophisticated equipment, different kinds of equipment, etc., and they can traverse many obstacles, if they have to get to a location.
15237. So, you know, I would think that they would be using all those means in order to get to those gates, if they had to.
15238. MS. RICHARD: So, there is no other road, except for the Milford Overpass, and the bypass road, to get near the gated area, and you're saying the fire trucks would go through, somehow get in near this gated area, through a wooded area?
15239. MR. MAYER: Well, I'm sure that if they needed to get there, as Mr. Whalen said, by foot, by all terrain vehicle, driving over the tracks with their fire equipment or what have you, they would do what they had to, in order to get in.
15240. Again, it's -- really, it's in their hands.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15241. MS. RICHARD: This is the overpass. This is the bypass road underneath it. Down here is the gated area. Oops, I lost it. Down here is the gated area. So, you're saying that the fire department would come from the west, to get into that area?
15242. I've been down through with the Fire Chief, and it's -- all the railroad tracks along there, there's 10 tracks that are storage there. That's where they store the trains. 15243. I don't understand how you're saying they'd be able to get in.
15244. MR. MAYER: Well, again, I'm speaking hypothetically here about how they would get in.
15245. I'd have to go talk to them about what equipment they have, and -- but I do know, if we could move the map up a little bit -- no, up. Sorry. Move the whole
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
map upwards, so that we see more of the bottom of the map. Yes, that's fine.
15246. If you could just zoom in on the bottom left hand corner of the drawing, or the map? Right to the corner, yeah. Thank you.
15247. I'll use my pointer now.
15248. That there's access gates up in this area here. And you were wondering how, if there was some incident, where a pipeline could be crossing this road.
15249. Now, I don't know where, exactly. We haven't determined the detailed route yet, but we're going to try. And we -- crossing this road at a place that, you know, we do not impact on the alternate access route, as best we can.
15250. And, so, if there was an incident on this pipeline crossing, wherever it might be, and for some reason you could not -- or the fire department, the first responders, could not follow Greenhead Road, how would we get -- how would they get to these gates in here?
15251. Well, there's two measures. One is, if the incident does not impact the Irving private road, they would come in from the pulp mill side, that's off to the right hand side of the map, follow that red line indicating their road, and get back into here, out through the gates, and into the community of Milford.
15252. The second means is to come down this city street, into these industrial properties here, cross over the tracks, into this area, and then, again, help out in whatever means they need to.
15253. And that's what they would do, until whatever the effects of the pipeline incident were such that they can then go back to having access along Greenhead Road.
15254. Now, this may not be public access for quite some time because of the incident, because of that accident investigation. You know, that sort of thing would have to be determined.
15255. But, by all means, as soon as it's safe for the first responders to travel by the incident area, they would -- I'm speaking on their behalf now. I'm sorry. But I'm sure that they would access, you know, across that area, and if it's necessary, ambulances and that sort of thing could travel by, etc.
15256. That's all I can offer at this point, as far as, you know, what the first responders might do at this situation with this configuration.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
15257. As I've said, we have many places, even on this route, definitely all across Canada.
15258. I could think of the example of the Halifax lateral that crosses a road which is the only access into the provincial jail in Dartmouth. And beside the provincial jail there's a psychiatric hospital as well.
15259. So, there's another situation where a pipeline -- transmission pipeline crossed the road into, you know, another very important, you know, facility. In this case, it’s a community, if you’re in Milford, but in that case, it’s a facility. It’s something that the first responders need to deal with and do deal with effectively, every day. I could only suppose that they would also be successful in dealing with these issues here.
15260. MS. RICHARD: Thanks.
15261. Could you bring up C-33-5-h? It’s the Risk Analysis report, page 51, picture 2.
15262. Where this arrow is, is approximately, what we’ve been told, where the pipeline will be crossing the bypass road, which is approximately 50 feet to 100 feet from the overpass. Is that right; 50 to 100 feet?
15263. MR. MAYER: I thought you said the -- I think there’s two things in there. One, you said that the access road is 50 feet from the overpass. As I said before, the access road goes underneath the overpass.
15264. MS. RICHARD: I meant to say, the pipeline will be crossing at this location, under the bypass road, which -- where the pipeline would be approximately 50 feet from the Lou Murphy Overpass.
15265. MR. MAYER: Well, that’s one possible scenario. I think that we were indicating when we were out there the day; that we were going to be trying to cross the Greenhead Road as far as we can away from the overpass. There are some restrictions with the church, I believe St. Rose’s Church on the other side and there are some homes on this side.
15266. So we have to give consideration as to where we could set up to bore underneath that overpass, where we would start and where we’d end. Dealing with those, we’d need to engage our contractor and some other engineers and talk to the city about the strength of that embankment and what we can do there, et cetera.
15267. So we’re going to try as best we can, to stay as far away from here as
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. D. Richard
possible; trying to deal with those other obstructions.
15268. And then, yes, and come through into this area somewhere. This is all within the preferred corridor and then get across the -- this is the private Irving access road we’ve been talking about and there’s a good picture of it here -- and get across and then, you know, continue on with our route.
15269. So that’s what we had discussed out onsite, when we did that visit with the Milford residents.
15270. MS. RICHARD: Thanks. That’s all I have.
15271. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms. Richard.
15272. MR. RUFFMAN: I just wanted to note that when Eugene Gould was asking questions, the discussion arose around would or should and whether would should have been should or whether should could have been would.
15273. And I should point out Mr. Gould was a school teacher and he may have even taught one member of the Panel and he’s not quite sure he recognizes a 13- year old boy.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
15274. THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Rooney, please?
--- (No response/Pas de réponse)
15275. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Sauerteig? Mr. Sauerteig, do you have questions of Panel No. 4?
15276. MR. SAUERTEIG: I thought there was something else ahead of me.
15277. THE CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Rooney was to be ahead of you.
15278. MR. RUFFMAN: I believe there’s been an agreement between Mr. Sauerteig and Dr. Moir, that may or may not have been communicated properly. But Dr. Moir, I think, you’re willing to give way to Dr. Moir?
15279. MR. SAUERTEIG: This is what I thought was agreed.
15280. MR. RUFFMAN: Yes.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. R. Moir
15281. THE CHAIRPERSON: All I’m saying, is the Panel’s always the last ones to know.
15282. Dr. Moir, please?
--- EXAMINATION BY/ INTERROGATOIRE PAR DR. MOIR:
15283. DR. MOIR: Thank you, Madam Chair and the Board and the Panel, for allowing me to get in because I should be creating exams for my students and they’re probably happy that I’m not.
15284. I’m only going -- well, if you don’t mind, I can pass this on as the two pieces of evidence that I hope to ask specific questions on. And again, I’m hoping I can keep this fairly straightforward with mostly yes and no answers.
15285. If I’ve read the application correctly, the proposed preferred pipeline route will include six valve sites, one metering station and one launcher receiver station. And I’m willing to be corrected on that, in terms of numbers.
15286. I’m sorry, I don’t have the reference, but going through, there are a number of times these are referred to. These stations are to be fenced and locked and monitored or in other places they say regularly inspected for safety and security. Is this ---
15287. MR. WHALEN: Yes, that’s correct. Anything that involves aboveground facility would be fenced and locked and monitored on a regular basis. Yes.
15288. DR. MOIR: Okay. In what substantive ways do the proposed security measures differ from those used at the Everett LNG facility, near Boston, Massachusetts?
15289. MR. WHALEN: I’m sorry. I’m not familiar with the security measures that may be in place at that facility in Massachusetts.
15290. DR. MOIR: Those facilities are fenced, locked and monitored regularly for intrusion.
15291. MR. WHALEN: If that’s the case, then I would see that there’s no difference.
15292. DR. MOIR: How many times was security breached at the Everett facilities between July and September of 2006?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. R. Moir
15293. MR. MAYER: I don’t believe this Panel knows the answer to that question.
15294. DR. MOIR: Okay. Would the answer ---
15295. MR. MAYER: We don’t really -- we’re not quite familiar with the security measures at the LNG tank.
15296. DR. MOIR: Okay.
15297. In 2001 to 2002, pipelines in how many different countries were the focus of terrorist attacks?
15298. MR. MAYER: We don’t have that answer off the top of our heads, sir.
15299. DR. MOIR: Okay. It is ---
15300. THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Moir ---
15301. DR. MOIR: Yes.
15302. THE CHAIRPERSON: --- the purpose of cross-examination is to test the witness Panel on the evidence that’s in front of the Board with respect to this application.
15303. DR. MOIR: Does that include the evidence I submitted as a reply to a specific request by Emera Brunswick Pipeline Corporation?
15304. THE CHAIRPERSON: It would, sir.
15305. DR. MOIR: And they do appear in my supplied evidence, C-23-23.
15306. THE CHAIRPERSON: That would be the best way to approach this; is to give us the exhibit number and then it can be pulled up.
15307. DR. MOIR: Okay.
15308. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
15309. DR. MOIR: Sorry.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. L. Thomas
15310. If you do wish to pull up C-23-23, my point is, these are identified throughout these reports, plus, I guess, my original written submission.
15311. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sir, if you could just tell us exactly where this information is and then we can all be on the same page, literally.
15312. DR. MOIR: I think it’s down from here. It would probably be around page 3. We would have to go down. We can keep going down past safety, cost development, emergency response. Is it in here? I’m sorry.
15313. Then it must be in my original submitted evidence. I’m trying to recall where I put this. But there are congressional research service reports and such that I cite.
15314. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sir, would you like to take a little bit of time and maybe get your references pulled together and we’ll go on and do another party and come back to you? I think it’s just going to be very difficult to have a productive discussion without the specific references.
15315. DR. MOIR: Okay. Yes.
15316. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, sir.
15317. I see Mr. Sauerteig has stepped out, so we’ll just continue on in the list. Except I’m getting a note.
15318. Thank you. We’ll go on to Dr. Leland Thomas, please.
--- EXAMINATION BY/ INTERROGATOIRE PAR DR. THOMAS:
15319. DR. THOMAS: Thank you, Madam Chair and Board.
15320. I just have a few quick questions here. It shouldn’t take long.
15321. It was stated yesterday that you won’t get involved in ATV created problems along the pipeline, unless the property owner complains. Is this correct?
15322. MR. WHALEN: In general, yes. That’s correct.
15323. DR. THOMAS: Thank you.
15324. Much of the proposed Brunswick pipeline will run over Crown lands. Is this correct?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. L. Thomas
15325. MR. MAYER: A good portion of it does. I think Panel 1 answered a percentage or something in one of their ---
15326. DR. THOMAS: I don’t need a percentage. Thank you.
15327. Who do you consider are the owners of Crown lands?
15328. MR. WHALEN: Well, they’re certainly managed by the Crown or by the province.
15329. DR. THOMAS: Would you consider the Canadian public as the real owners of Crown lands?
15330. MR. WHALEN: Yes. They’re public lands.
15331. DR. THOMAS: Thank you.
15332. Would you therefore act on complaints from the public regarding problems on Crown lands with ATVs, created by the pipeline route?
15333. MR. WHALEN: Certainly in the past, we would act, with respect to Crown land to complaints by the Province of New Brunswick Natural Resources Department Crown’s Land Branch, who I consider to be the people that manage those lands.
15334. DR. THOMAS: So if the public makes a complaint to the environment department for instance, and they relay that complaint on to you, then you will act on that complaint?
15335. MR. WHALEN: I’ll accept that, yes.
15336. DR. THOMAS: Okay. Thank you.
15337. Who will pay to remove garbage and repair damage due to ATVs on Crown lands, if that complaint is made to you, by the environment department?
15338. MR. WHALEN: We’ve never had that scenario that I can recall in the past. I think that’s something that we’d have to negotiate with the Crown lands branch.
15339. DR. THOMAS: You’ve never had a complaint about garbage along an ATV route from the environment department?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. L. Thomas
15340. MR. WHALEN: Not that I recall. No.
15341. DR. THOMAS: Okay. Thank you.
15342. Who will pay for ATV control measures on Crown land if the environment department makes a complaint to you about unauthorized ATV use on Crown lands, due to the pipeline?
15343. MR. WHALEN: Right. That’s at the cost of the proponent.
15344. DR. THOMAS: Thank you.
15345. So if I was to make a call to the environment department and they were to relay that complaint on to you, a complaint of garbage or other ATV created problems on Crown lands, I can expect that you make prompt and thorough -- have a prompt and thorough response to that complaint? You will clean up the mess and do whatever is necessary to control the ATV problem?
15346. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I just would ask Mr. Thomas, through you, to be careful with these scenarios. If, for example, there was a pre-existing condition prior to Emera Brunswick coming into the area, this isn’t like a super-fund liability where the pipeline is responsible for cleaning up any existing garbage dump or things like that.
15347. I just want to make sure that we are clear temporally, about the responsibility that’s being discussed here, for clean-up.
15348. DR. THOMAS: I think I made it clear, that this would be problems related to the Brunswick Pipeline.
15349. MR. SMITH: All right. Thank you.
15350. MR. WHALEN: You know, certainly we would review each of these scenarios on a case-by-case basis. We’d look at the factors involved. We would talk about whether it was directly related to the pipeline or not and determine liability jointly with the government department that we’re dealing with.
15351. DR. THOMAS: So this could be a long, drawn-out process, trying to get anything cleaned up?
15352. MR. WHALEN: Is that a question?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
15353. DR. THOMAS: Yes.
15354. MR. WHALEN: I can’t speculate. It would be on a case by case basis. A lot of that would be determined on the response timing of the government department, as well as ourselves.
15355. DR. THOMAS: Okay. Thank you. That’s all.
15356. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, sir.
15357. I don’t see Dr. Moir back in the room.
15358. Mr. Sauerteig?
--- EXAMINATION BY/ INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. SAUERTEIG:
15359. MR. SAUERTEIG: I’ll try to -- your questions.
15360. Madam Chair, members of the Panel, ladies and gentlemen, my name is Horst Sauerteig; I’m an intervenor, I represent myself.
15361. Most of the questions have been answered and I will try to do some mop up and if I am out of line please let me know.
15362. I understand that final right-of-way hasn’t been established. However, I would like to know what is the -- I’m talking about the Milledgeville crossing; I live in this area. What is the voltage in the power line which is parallel to your right-of-way?
15363. MR. MAYER: I was just checking with my staff, Mr. Sauerteig, and I was just checking with our staff that’s been discussing matters with New Brunswick Power and we never got an answer or we never asked that question about that facility. So, I’m sorry, I can’t answer you.
15364. MR. SAUERTEIG: Well, okay, so the next question is, then; between your pipe and the lines, wire closest to your -- the distance, this would be the same, unresolved?
15365. MR. MAYER: Yes, that is unresolved.
15366. MR. SAUERTEIG: Okay.
15367. MR. MAYER: We have to take matters, like the voltage in the line,
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
how it might impact on our pipeline, how our pipeline might impact on them and then we negotiate. Basically it’s not a negotiation, as a business deal but more of an engineering negotiation, to come up with an arrangement that means that both facilities would be safe and we just haven’t gotten to that level yet.
15368. MR. SAUERTEIG: Okay.
15369. So let’s say one way or another you come down to Milledge Avenue, how do you get across? I had asked this type of questions before and it was referred to your Panel.
15370. MR. MAYER: Well, we would hope to find a location on Milledgeville Avenue where we could bore across the road; potentially underneath all the existing infrastructure that might be running in the road; like sewer lines, water lines, telephone lines, cable.
15371. Sometimes the sewer lines are very, very deep and we may be below some water lines and telephone lines but above the sewer or vice versa. But we would hope to find a place there where we could do a bore without having to open-cut our trench through the road.
15372. If we did happen to have to open-cut, we call it the road, they would have to do it in the means where we could find detour routes or have the traffic restricted to one lane as we work on one-half of the road and the other lane as we work on the other half of the road. So we’d have to try and find some means of ensuring traffic flow, either through detours or through lane reductions.
15373. But if we are boring under the road then generally there won’t be any lane reductions, just maybe a slow down section, you know, through the work zone.
15374. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15375. Can this boring be done through solid rock?
15376. MR. MAYER: Yes. The contractors have equipment where they can actually bore through the rock.
15377. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15378. Since previous questioning of Panel 4 has established and since it’s on the hearing record 12,362 -- hearing record 12,362, since previous questioning of Panel 4 has established that leaks in a high-pressure pipeline are a distinct possibility and since the Houston detection system does not detect leak orifices of one centimetre, diameter or
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
less, and this is C-68-ec-1, page 42.
15379. Will the Panel please confirm that the possibility exists that in places where the pipe is located under asphalt paving or is otherwise constrained, the escaping gas could more laterally some distance and under confined spaces, where when mixed in proportion of 1 to 15 per cent with the air it might explode when ignited?
15380. MR. MAYER: You are correct, Mr. Sauerteig. There are instances, especially in distribution systems where gas escaping from a distribution line will rise up, hit maybe a frost layer or a pavement layer and then be trapped there; migrate along, finding a path with the least resistance and getting maybe to a building somehow.
15381. The reason why we put transmission pipelines in easements is we keep the buildings this way far away from our transmission line and we severely reduce the chances of that sort of thing happening. Because of the distance separation we have distribution systems go very close to buildings, in fact, they run right up to them in some cases.
15382. There’s been cases, they get reported in the paper and there are accident investigations where these sorts of things do happen. But it would be very, very rare for a transmission system, which is kept in an easement where we maintain our distances from buildings and structures for that sort of thing to happen because it’s a long way to go and it would be a long way for that gas to be finding its way there.
15383. It always wants to find the path of least resistance so the first opportunity it can, to get out into the atmosphere and dissipate, it will take that.
15384. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15385. I am going back to this Milledgeville situation, where behind the houses is an electric substation. My question is; how close to the electrical distribution substation must a sewer line or a manhole, filled with the 5 to 15 per cent diluted gas be, to cause damage to the substation when the mixture is ignited?
15386. DR. BERCHA: Well, in the extremely remote possibility, sir, where somehow a vapour cloud, a methane vapour cloud with a 15 per cent concentration minimum on its extreme, manages to migrate under some most unusual atmospheric conditions which will keep it down -- it tends to rise because it’s lighter than air -- it can go, in our calculations, it can go up to 800 metres.
15387. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15388. MR. MAYER: But I might add that vapour cloud might reach there
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
but it still may not knock out or cause damage to the electrical substation. We’re being very, very conservative in the answer that we’re giving you.
15389. As Dr. Bercha has testified, a flash fire can go right over a person and that person could come out unscathed. And so he’s trying to give you the extreme distance that a flash fire could reach. Even in that case it’s probable that equipment would be, as well, unscathed, as even a human would be in there and the equipment could be fine. But we’re just trying to be helpful for your answer.
15390. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. Thank you.
15391. The pipeline is buried in a depth which is exposed to freezing and therefore exposed to frost heave. It is being prevented by the friction of the moving gas with the wall of the pipeline? Am I correct with this assumption; that it doesn’t freeze up for reason of these frictions?
15392. MR. MAYER: No, it’s more of a factor of the strength of the steel in the pipe itself. It’s strong enough to withstand those kind of ground forces. The pipeline steel is very strong and the design factors used in the design of the pipeline ensure that the pipeline can stay very sound in a frost situation.
15393. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you very much, I had the wrong assumption.
15394. Next question; is the 13-inch diameter pipe with a wall thickness of 1.5 centimetres a seamless monolithic cylinder or does it consist of several welded cylinders which are then again welded together to become the more or less standard 40- foot pipe?
15395. MR. MAYER: No, we call that one joint -- one 40-foot joint of pipe. It is one cylinder. We have just one cylinder of pipe to make that one 40-foot length joint.
15396. We’ll actually, in some cases, weld two of those together to make an 80-foot joint and have it shipped here from the steel mill and we’ll use those 80-foot joints on the rural section and they’re made up of two 40-foot segments.
15397. MR. SAUERTEIG: Yes, I learned this today.
15398. My question is; your 40-foot cylinder is it seamless or does it have a 40-foot seam?
15399. MR. MAYER: It has a 40-foot seam.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
15400. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15401. Now, this was discussed before and if the judge says it is not a new question, well I -- if the wind drives a vapour cloud deriving from a pipe incident close to the refinery, into the congestion of pipes, vessels, and buildings in the refinery, does this create the possibility that gas which becomes trapped between the vessels, buildings, et cetera, will be diluted with air to become 5 to 15 per cent -- a mixture of 5 to 15 per cent air and methane, and will explode when ignited?
15402. DR. BERCHA: We looked specifically for those locations within the possible vapour cloud trail and we were not able to find any locations where there was sufficient confinement to allow a detonation or an explosion to occur and, of course, we also would need a hard ignition source, in addition to the confinement and certainly, the confinement wasn't there.
15403. And, the hard ignition source is unlikely to be in a refinery where work permits are required before welding and that type of activity. So, the short answer is, no, there are no possibilities of that happening.
15404. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. My next question; referring to the Bercha/Court questioning, and this is 12,456, why would a refinery be fire resistant, when even a small incident at the nearby gas pipeline might result in damage to pipes and vessels carrying or containing highly inflammable hydro-carbon products?
15405. DR. BERCHA: Well the containment -- the vessels and piping in a refinery, its sulphur are not flammable. They may indeed contain flammable fluids but of course, the outside of the vessels is designed, I know, to a fairly high level of fire resistance.
15406. I believe, if I'm not mistaken, storage tanks and all vessel piping will resist up to at least twelve and a half kilowatts per square metre for roughly 30 minutes; so I would call that fire resistant.
15407. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. Next question, and this was also properly discussed today, but I think I can follow this up. What is the purpose of an annual pipeline inspection with a flame ionization leak detector, which can detect pinholes?
15408. Can it detect small leaks, which are located on the asphalt paving?
15409. MR. MAYER: I can answer you, even though I'm not in the operations. But at one time, as a summer student, I used to do these surveys so I feel I
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
can answer this question.
15410. Yes, when you're trying to follow a pipeline and you come to a paved area, as you are doing your leak survey, the leak survey technician recognizes there's a chance that, that maybe in that area, that there is a leak it's dissipated somewhere else and so the techniques you -- what the leak surveyor does, is looks for cracks in the pavement and put his wand down, or his or her wand down, where the cracks are in the pavement, check manholes, sewage and run-off manhole covers and things like that, so that you're really looking for other sources, logical places where there was an effect from the paving.
15411. This is where the gas would come up, you know, around the perimeter of the parking lot, et cetera, and you’re usually within a short of distance of where the pipeline is. Can find some features like this that would be able to answer your questions, whether the gas line is leaking or is it secure.
15412. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. A follow-up question; does Emera accept pipe leaks for a period of up to one year, before being detected? You have only an annual inspection.
15413. MR. DRAKE: No, we don't. It's the easiest way to answer that. We go to great lengths doing other things, more aggressive, more proactive than the leak survey. Things that we look at the hostile corrosion growth rate for that pipe, which would typically be what, would cause a leak.
15414. Now, we ensure that other techniques that we're using to look for leaks are occurring on frequencies that are much shorter than those -- than that net corrosion growth would yield that problem.
15415. And, a leak survey is really just another line of defence that is looking at, you know, a completely different set of vehicles, a completely different set of tools. But, the in-line inspection tools are being scheduled to run on a frequency that would very, very conservatively identify metal loss before it became a leak.
15416. MR. SAUERTEIG: Yes, but this is done by your sophisticated PIG and this PIG is also run only once a year or ---
15417. MR. DRAKE: The in-line inspection tools are, well we're scheduling to run in-line inspection tools on a 7 to 10-year frequency. A hostile corrosion growth for the wall thickness of this pipe, if left unbridled, would be somewhere in the order of 15 to 20 years.
15418. So, we're trying to get in there, literally at worst case scenario, if we were in the most hostile corrosion environment, we're trying to schedule an inspection
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
with this smart PIG, as you call it, on the half life or better, of that corrosion environment. Does that make sense?
15419. MR. SAUERTEIG: Yes, thank you. If a leak is detected, what is the follow-up procedure?
15420. MR. WHALEN: The procedure would be that, for any leak that's detected, it would be repaired immediately. There's a variety of ways to repair the leak; you could put approved repair methods around the pipeline, called a clock spring, which is actually at the end of the day stronger than -- I believe it's, at least, as strong or if not stronger than the pipe itself.
15421. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. My next question is with safety personnel and also, this has been discussed today.
15422. Emera has planned the safety personnel and this is C-62-hs, 1.9, page 7, has the safety personnel of seven technicians for 345 kilometres of the Brunswick Pipeline and 90 kilometres of the Saint John Lateral; and two more technicians which are always on-call. And, these men are patrolling, daily, the open part of the pipeline, which is roughly 30 kilometres; this is shown in B-40-a, Attachment 7, page 3.
15423. Will Emera please demonstrate, with a work schedule, how this daily patrol can be achieved with these few personnel?
15424. MR. WHALEN: The daily patrol that we refer to is only for the urban section of the pipeline, so I guess, in this case, it's roughly 27 kilometres.
15425. MR. SAUERTEIG: I said 30.
15426. MR. WHALEN: Right. That would be where practical. I know currently, with a 16-inch pipeline through the City, we do a daily patrol. It's not on foot; it's basically a drive-by. We would intend to do the same thing for any part of the Brunswick Pipeline that's urban, that we could practically monitor, you know, by driving.
15427. And, that would be looking for -- it's just another measure, really, it's another layer, as Mr. Drake refers to, to look for unauthorized activity, anyone that may be digging, that we don't know about, or crossing over the pipeline with heavy equipment.
15428. So what I tried to describe here is the fact that, in the rural area, we do the weekly aerial patrols and in the urban area, recognizing the fact that there's higher likelihood of third-party activity, we ramp-up the frequency of those patrols.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
15429. There may be some instances, on the proposed urban Brunswick line that are not accessible by truck, for example. If that were the case, I wouldn't expect that they would be part of the daily patrol, but for someone to drive the 20 kilometres, every day, when we've got three or four technicians in the area, I think, is achievable.
15430. MR. SAUERTEIG: So, your right-of-way within the City of Saint John will be used by your motorized vehicles?
15431. MR. WHALEN: No, it would be any place where we could drive on a public road and observe the adjacent right-of-way.
15432. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. Now, with these four technicians, they are also supposed, besides driving on the road looking for the right-of-way, they are also supposed to investigate reports of smell or something, along the pipeline.
15433. After Houston and if there is a greater leak, more pronounced leak, is this detected by Houston? After Houston contacts a technician to investigate such -- what they have detected, after they detect the slow pressure drop, it will take 30 to 45 minutes for a technician to start investigating.
15434. Does Emera plan to undertake the necessary improvements which will shorten the time delay between the detection of a possible leak by Houston and when Houston decides on a course of action?
15435. MR. WHALEN: What we testified to, earlier today, as clarification, and it's also in our reply evidence, is that we will not wait for field verification by these technicians, in the event of an incident; the valves would be cycled immediately without this field verification.
15436. So, we don't really expect to add staff, over and above what's in the plan to reduce response time in the field, with that qualification, that we would not be relying on that response time and that verification, before the valves are closed.
15437. MR. SAUERTEIG: Yeah, I think you said that with a rapid pressure drop, Houston would close the valves automatically. But if it is not a rapid pressure drop, then the technician would be sent out and it would take 30 to 45 minutes, plus the reporting, until they find out what it is, then he reports to Houston, then Houston makes a decision, if it is economically, you know, makes the decision to close valves or not. And, I find that there is room for improvement.
15438. MR. DRAKE: I think that we may be mixing terminology here, for a second. I think we thought you were asking about ruptures, significant pressure drops and I think, you are asking about leaks.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
15439. In the event of a leak, I think, to be quite transparent, it's very unlikely that Houston, the gas control, will sense a leak with their SCADA System; that is not how we use the SCADA System, and it's not appropriate. Again, looking for leaks is a very reactive position.
15440. We want to minimize the reliance on reactive approaches. It's much more effective to be proactive and looking ahead of things that cause the leak than it is to wait for the leak and try to be quick to get to it.
15441. So, our emphasize syllable, if you will, is on prevention and inspection of the causes of leaks before they become significant. We do have the infrastructure and the tools to look for them if they occur, but we put much more emphasis on preventing them and identifying them at very early stages.
15442. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15443. I understand -- I listened this morning where you described that an automatic shutoff valve was unreliable and you would also go to the system we just discussed. But why is the reporting to Houston if -- if the shutoff valve is unreliable, why is the system to Houston more reliable?
15444. MR. DRAKE: That's a good question.
15445. I think that with automatic control valve technology, what it really is is a pair of sensors on the valves that pick up pressure drop across the valve and it's looking for a pressure differential over time, and it's at best an approximation of the kind of conditions that would simulate a failure.
15446. And its ability to do that effectively has been shown to be not reliable, that it is a much -- it takes a lot more information, the kind of information that people have the ability to discern, to make that conclusion.
15447. And because of that, we bring that information to Houston to let a person assimilate all that data to make a much more reliable and consistent interpretation of the signal.
15448. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15449. I refer to hearing record 12745 to 12756. Referring to the discussion between the Panel 4 and Counsel Court, a member of Panel 4 mentioned that Emera actually had 20 safety employees.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
15450. If the Board panel allows this new evidence, will the panel -- will this panel please advise of the following?
15451. Since 20 personnel have been mentioned before -- but I would be interested to learn about it; (a) where are they, each stationed?
15452. MR. WHALEN: Certainly. What I was referring to there is the entire operating team that is employed by St. Clair Pipelines that's under my management.
15453. That would include our team that operates and maintains the Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline facilities, as well as the additional four equivalent people that will be added in the event that we are to operate and maintain the Brunswick facilities.
15454. So, I could outline the location of the current 16 people, but again their task today is to operate and maintain the Maritimes and Northeast facilities both in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.
15455. We have an operations centre in New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, we have an operations centre in Fredericton, New Brunswick, and these people are dispersed along the existing Maritimes route, including Saint John.
15456. But the point, I think, that you're getting at is where will the people be living and stationed that are tasked with operating the Brunswick Pipeline, and our intent would be to have those people living in the Saint John area.
15457. MR. SAUERTEIG: Okay. Thank you.
15458. Please provide for each person a short job description. What are these 20 people doing? Are they taking the garbage out or are they looking for leaks?
15459. MR. WHALEN: Well, in general I could outline what we have. We have myself. I'm tasked with managing the overall team.
15460. And then we have a district manager in Nova Scotia and a district manager in New Brunswick, and then we'll have a team of currently eight multi- discipline technicians who are field-based, and we'll be adding an additional three, I believe, for the Brunswick line.
15461. These are the people that do the real work. They're in the field every day, they're multi-discipline in nature, so they're operating and maintaining all of the components related to the pipeline. They'll do corrosion work, they'll do measurement
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
work, they'll do the leakage surveys, the line locates and that type of thing.
15462. And then the remaining staff would be lands and public awareness people who deal with landowner issues and complaints as well as carry out our continuing education programs and public awareness programs, and then the remaining staff would be administrative in nature who deal with answering the phones, helping me with the budget and that type of thing.
15463. MR. SAUERTEIG: Okay. Thank you.
15464. For the overall monitoring of the pipeline, how many of these 20 people would be involved in monitoring the pipeline?
15465. We talked four, and I was a bit uneasy that you could do this with four people. Now we talk 20. Now, how many of the 20 will be diverted to monitoring, and is this on top of the four that you have?
15466. MR. WHALEN: Okay. What we've estimated is that in order to carry out the field component of the operation and maintenance of the proposed 145- kilometre pipeline, the Brunswick pipeline itself, that we will need an additional four full-time equivalent positions.
15467. Now, that being said, it could be that some of the existing staff perform some functions related to the Brunswick line and vice versa, but the overall net effect would be the need for four additional full-time equivalent people prompted by the addition of this 145-kilometre pipeline.
15468. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15469. What type of transport will be provided for each monitoring operation in winter and in summer?
15470. MR. WHALEN: We use a variety of means with the field staff in order to gain access for operation and maintenance activities.
15471. We have 4-wheel-drive vehicles, we have ATVs, we have snowmobiles, we have a vehicle called an Argo which is a tracked vehicle with a heated cab, and often we carry out these activities on foot as well.
15472. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15473. Next question. If ATVs or snowmobiles are used by the Emera monitoring personnel, how then can the use of the right-of-way by other and potentially
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
irresponsible people be prevented?
15474. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Sauerteig, I believe that's already on the record. I believe the question you're asking -- the evidence is already on the record.
15475. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you, madam.
15476. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
15477. MR. SAUERTEIG: Will Emera please outline the requirements for heavy equipment to cross a pipeline or work above the pipeline. I am in particular interested how firefighting equipment can cross pipelines to fight forest fires.
15478. MR. WHALEN: Well, we work very closely with the firefighting personnel in both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The folks I talked about who do the lands and public awareness work meet on a regular basis with private forest harvesters as well as the crown lands department and the forest fighting service.
15479. And in the event of a forest fire what we've experienced in real life is that these folks will -- depending on the situation and the particular incident, they'll get a hold of us and say, "We need to cross your pipeline with a piece of firefighting equipment."
15480. Then what we will do is we will look at that particular location and determine what the grade of the pipe is, what the wall thickness is, and whether or not we consider it an issue to cross the pipeline or not, i.e. if we can direct them towards a piece of heavy-wall pipe, which normally we can because we place a lot of heavy-wall -- or some heavy-wall at least in the rural sections as well where we anticipate either forest harvesting activity or a road crossing.
15481. And that -- as we've heard in earlier testimony, that wall thickness is able to withstand tremendous overbearing load. So, in the past at least my experience is that we work very closely and communicate and direct that traffic over a heavy-wall join of pipe.
15482. MR. MAYER: I might add that, you know, in general it might not take much direction, because the heavy equipment used by forest fires in the woods usually stays to the woods roads, and every time we cross the woods roads with the pipeline we put the heavy-wall pipe in so it can maintain or withstand that kind of surface loading.
15483. And even if there was a woods road that was built 20 years ago and then allowed to abandon because, you know, the forestry was done and it's no longer
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
being used, we know that in the next 20 years the forest is going to be grown up and someone is going to be using it again.
15484. So, we will install heavy-wall pipe there because, you know, we don't want to come back 20 years from now and have to change our pipe out.
15485. So, that said, we try and put this heavy-wall pipe in wherever there is a road or was a road so that when they go to use them for forest fighting with their heaving equipment they've got places to cross.
15486. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you.
15487. In Emera's reply evidence of October 20th, in Item 7.1.2, Enbridge gets the allowance to tap into the Brunswick Pipeline. This is 8- -- correction, this is B- 40-a, pages 17 and 18.
15488. What is the process to tap into an operating gas pipeline? Is the operation expensive and is it dangerous?
15489. MR. MAYER: This is an engineering question, Madam Chair. I see you're leaning forward.
15490. Is it expensive? It has a cost. It's part of like the facilities cost. So, if someone is contemplating a future project, the cost of making that tap would have to be accommodated by that project. So, that all goes into that project's economics.
15491. Is it dangerous? No, not if it's done properly, and there are various sophisticated engineering means, equipment, materials used in order to make this kind of a tap.
15492. MR. SAUERTEIG: Well, the tap depends on the size of the pipe which accesses the mainline, and I had expected that you describe some measurements like -- that you release the gas in a certain section before you can tap, that you purge the mainline, you do not weld, you have a special attachment to it.
15493. Would you please explain?
15494. MR. MAYER: Yes, we have special attachments that we can weld onto the pipe and then -- as the gas is still flowing, going to market, and we can then tap into the pipe and make this new connection without taking the existing pipeline out of service.
15495. So, we have the technology, the means today to do that, and whether
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. H. Sauerteig
we're trying to make a 2-inch tap into the line or even a 30-inch tap into the 30-inch pipeline. We have means to do that.
15496. DR. SAUERTEIG: That's the top then.
15497. MR. MAYER: But the 30-inch is the top. Can't go much bigger than that.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
15498. MR. SAUERTEIG: But I think if you tap -- you have "T" and you don't use tappings and -- but what I would ask you, if Enbridge is serious with accessing the Brunswick -- same Emera pipe -- Emera gas, why don't they put a "T" in now, put a -- a plant on the other side of the wharf and put it in some secured place and wait for it to happen later?
15499. MR. MAYER: That, sir, is definitely a question that you'll have to pose to the next panel or -- or not the next panel, sorry, but Panel 5.
15500. MR. SAUERTEIG: Thank you. That's the end of my questioning. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
15501. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Sauerteig.
15502. This seems like an appropriate time to take a break, so we'll be breaking for 15 minutes. Thank you.
--- Upon recessing at 3:56 p.m./L'audience est suspendue à 15h56 --- Upon resuming at 4:12 p.m./L'audience est reprise à 16h12
15503. MR. SMITH: We're ready to roll.
15504. THE CHAIRPERSON: Go ahead, Dr. Moir.
--- RALPH MAYER, Resumed: --- DR. FRANK BERCHA, Resumed: --- ANDREW DRAKE, Resumed: --- DR. JOHN KIEFNER, Resumed: --- MIKE WHALEN, Resumed:
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR DR. MOIR, (cont’d/suite):
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15505. DR. MOIR: Thank you. Sorry about that mistake. If we can pull up C-23-18, which is my written evidence, page 5? Thanks a lot.
15506. And if you pull down a little bit further so we can get the paragraph, "Nevertheless," and then "wilful damage," so we see those on the page as the sort of top paragraph and bottom paragraph.
15507. And it was my mistake -- I think what I was trying to do was establish what had been read in terms of the evidence that had been submitted when these reports were being -- these reports had been put together.
15508. And I think -- do I need to again establish that the six valve sites, one metering station, the fencing and all of this -- I don't need to.
15509. So in my evidence, I think it's evident in the sort of bottom of that first paragraph, security at the Everett facilities is comparable to the digital video retrieval system, including cameras, perimeter fence and card readers that Irving Oil had put in its terminal.
15510. And I'm not going to bring up the terminal issue as much as that's comparable to the fencing that's suggested by -- under this application, and that furthermore, the Everett facility was broken into.
15511. There was an unauthorized vehicle September 12th, unauthorized vehicle September 10th, and unlawful entry August 24th. And I want to highlight the fact that that entry was recorded on video, but it went unreported for five days. The fence was cut and they hung out on top of the LNG storage tanks, and an unauthorized entry with 15 illegal immigrants.
15512. Later on, I guess, down in the "Wilful damage to pipelines is not uncommon," we have a 2003 Congressional Research Services Report suggesting at least six countries had pipelines targeted and attacked between 2001 and 2002 alone.
15513. Dr. Luft and others, including Congressional Research Services, have pointed out that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have specifically -- sorry.
15514. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sir, that's great. Now that we've got the right exhibit and it's up, you might want to go ahead and pose your question now that we've got that information.
15515. DR. MOIR: Okay. I guess after all of that, including threats occurring in North America, what makes this pipeline different in that terrorism as a
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
threat is largely ignored? It is suggested that it isn't an important issue to be discussed.
15516. MR. DRAKE: I don't think we tried to dismiss it as not relevant. I think that we have tried to be very proactive in our involvement with the TSA and CSA standards. I believe Mike Whalen is actually on a Canadian panel looking at this issue as well.
15517. But what makes it different is -- and by the way, I am aware of the issues with regard to the references that you've made in your evidence about the US Senate and the US House special reports about terrorism. Osama Bin Laden is quoted as saying -- taking special interest in the pipelines and disrupting our energy supply.
15518. As a result of that, the TSA called a special council several years ago, which we participated in, to identify critical facilities and the characteristics of those critical facilities.
15519. Certainly -- and I don't think that that's confidential -- and that criteria is -- I don't think we're breaching any national security issues here by talking about that -- LNG tanks certainly are on that list. They are a single-point large point of disturbance and a huge fuel source. Certainly somewhere in downtown Boston, that's a very significant potential effect.
15520. But they gave us characteristics of -- you know, LNG tanks are different than pipelines. That's one issue, certainly. But for pipelines, I think they gave us several criteria, and they have asked us to go and identify -- evaluate our pipeline against that criteria and identify critical infrastructure -- is what they call -- and critical infrastructure, we're obligated to track with different criteria and different measures than we would normally apply.
15521. Particular interest has been paid to places of critical nodes on the system. And I think we broached this subject earlier about an energy hub versus a pipeline hub. While Saint John is an energy hub, it is not a pipeline hub.
15522. So terrorists typically would be looking for junctures of significant interaction with multiple pipelines where they could disrupt many, many pipelines, not a single pipe and a single source. They're looking for places where they're in tight supply markets that they could create some sort of disruption that would deteriorate fuel to a tight supply market.
15523. And again, not any national, you know, top secret stuff. You know, tight supply markets would be New York City typically and any other place that was fed a large -- very very large metropolitan areas fed by single supplies. So they look for those kind of fingerprints.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15524. Again, this pipeline doesn't meet that criteria. It's not a single supply to an extremely large metropolitan area that's relying on that for their power generation and heat.
15525. They also are looking for scale on impact to population. And scale on impact to population, they're talking about tens of thousands of impact, things that aren't really reflected on these drawings even. Downtown Boston, downtown Philadelphia, downtown New York City. And there are pipelines in those environments. Those are the ones that they're talking about as being critical infrastructure criteria.
15526. Other things that they've identified as critical infrastructure, to be quite thorough here, are above-ground facilities like compressor stations that are readily visible and easily attacked.
15527. I mean, a pipeline actually is afforded a great deal of protection by the fact that it's buried. It's more difficult to get to without being observed. If someone sees someone digging out there, they're "Hey, what are you doing out there?" That's not something the terrorist want. They want something they can hit very quickly.
15528. So above-ground facilities have a little bit different threshold than pipelines, so they look for compressor stations and meter stations that could create a big consequence with very little effort.
15529. So those are the fingerprints that we've been given through our work with TSA to deal with security. I appreciate the concern about it. It's very germane and it's a very real topic in today's world.
15530. And we continue to sit on those committees and continue to have those dialogues about characterization. We continue to track -- we are actively tracking as a part of the national infrastructure feedback from TSA and the FBI -- and I don't remember the acronym -- CSIS in Canada for feedback on threats.
15531. You know, they track the pulse of the communiqué in the world on terrorism, and they're looking for any signals that would change what those characteristics might look like. And we try to stay tuned in on that to keep those things, you know, so we can respond to those kind of -- that kind of input.
15532. But I tried to give a little bit more information here because I've heard this question come up many times, and I just want to try to be thorough so that we can help try to calibrate where we are in the Richter scale, so to speak.
15533. MR. WHALEN: I just wanted to add very briefly to what Mr. Drake
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
outlined, that St. Clair Pipelines, who have been contracted to operate -- well, build and operate and maintain this proposed facility -- we get a lot of our technical support from the group in Houston as well as the group in Boston, and I'd like to say that we really have double coverage on the security file.
15534. And what I mean by that is we certainly take advantage of all the work that Mr. Drake just described, and the fulltime staff that is dedicated within Duke towards security and terrorism. And in fact, what I described earlier in that we do have a security management plan, reflects that work in terms of our treat advisory levels and our required action based on these advisory levels.
15535. But because we're a Canadian operating company, we also work very closely with federal and provincial security departments, people like Emergency Measures -- or sorry, Emergency Preparedness Canada in Ottawa, the National Energy Board itself -- I described the fact that there's a requirement for a security management plan -- the CSA ad hoc committee to develop a consensus standard on security, which is going to start up later this month -- we're participating there -- as well as even on a provincial basis, there's a group in Fredericton that has an energy group or task group that looks at critical infrastructure from an energy perspective, and we're part of that group.
15536. So like I say, we get back to the fact that we really have this double coverage. We take advantage of the support and the intelligence that we have as being part of the Duke family on the US side, as well as the work that we do with Canadian, federal and provincial departments.
15537. DR. MOIR: Okay. Thank you. If -- you brought up, Mr. Drake, the issue of critical junctures between energy -- with pipelines. I guess more generally, this could be critical junctures between energy sources.
15538. So if a pipeline rupture and subsequent ignition takes place, perhaps through sabotage, perhaps not -- takes place in a pipeline in a utility corridor such as that proposed for Rockwood Park or that proposed when the pipeline follows the international power line from Point Lepreau to the United States, what is the risk of damage to the electrical power lines, and do power lines of this type melt, or can they melt under those circumstances?
15539. DR. BERCHA: Well, I think, Board Members and sir, we haven't finalized the route, the final route. I mean, we've got the route, but we haven't finalized the final location. And this is one of the elements that's going into the discussions with New Brunswick Power.
15540. Certainly if the pipeline were located directly beneath the power line, which it won't be, but in the extreme possibility, if there were an ignited rupture, I don't
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
think there's too much doubt that the power line would go out.
15541. Most of the failures, 98 percent of potential failures of the pipeline -- well, first of all, 90 percent are inconsequential leaks such as have been discussed here at some length, and roughly the next seven or eight percent would be holes which are not full severances of the pipeline, and their release is directional, not likely to be ignited, especially in a place like Rockwood Park where there wouldn't be readily available ignition sources. There is a possibility of auto ignition, but much lower with a leak than a rupture.
15542. So we're actually talking about a very small population of potential failures that could actually impact on the power line, and those would be the ruptures. And there's no doubt about it that that's under consideration. It's -- I think we've said before, in the risk area, we have -- on the one side of the teeter totter, we've got the frequency; the other side, we've got the consequence.
15543. Yes, the consequence of a rupture would be large. It's reasonably likely that it would be ignited, auto ignited even in Rockwood Park, but the frequency is extremely low, so that the risk is extremely low.
15544. MR. MAYER: And I just wanted to clarify the record that there will be cases where we have to cross the international power line, or other facilities owned by New Brunswick Power.
15545. But in our discussions with New Brunswick Power, we're trying to keep those crossing locations to a minimum, and we will have to make these crossings where, in order to avoid some environmental feature or some landowner use, we might have to go from one side of their power line easement to the other side.
15546. But again, like, as Dr. Bercha says, it's a matter of frequency, so then if you have these crossings, your frequency is even, you know, reduced down, because you're not running continuously along, underneath the power line. You're only making a few of these crossing points, trying to minimize them wherever possible, and only doing that when you have to.
15547. DR. MOIR: Yeah, I guess I see your point. I guess one of the issues with security would be, those would be reasonable points to look, if you could, for an attack.
15548. So, to follow along this line, sort of, assuming the transmission lines break, what's the likely effect upon the north-eastern US power grid? And I don't know if anybody can answer that, but ---
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15549. MR. MAYER: You're correct in that regard. We have a hard time answering your question there.
15550. DR. MOIR: Okay. And so, I guess, we don't know what fraction of electrical -- daily electrical demand we would be supplying through Point Lepreau, and what we would be doing to them?
15551. If I can pull up -- or have pulled up B-1-f. And I guess one of the best pages to pull up off of that is page 260. There is a line there: (As read)
"It is recommended..."
15552. No, let's see where it is. I can read the quote, and maybe you can find it, because I don't have the -- down to the paragraph: (As read)
"It is recommended a pipeline monitoring and surveillance program be implemented, such that the entire length of the pipeline right of way will be patrolled regularly, by foot and by air."
15553. And I -- I think I've got the right page number. I was using Adobe pages, but -- and you may be able to do -- use the little -- you found it? Thank you very much.
15554. So: (As read)
"It is recommended a pipeline monitoring and surveillance program be implemented, such that the entire length of the pipeline right of way will be patrolled regularly by foot and by air, to identify unauthorized activities within the right of way."
15555. I guess my first question about that is how do you define regularly patrolled?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15556. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe that has already been discussed, in the context of the record, previously.
15557. DR. MOIR: Okay, I'm sorry. I wasn't here for those, so I'll ask the next question, and again, I'd be happy if you say no, it's already asked.
15558. What's the projected cost of meeting these recommendations? If we follow the recommendation, what's the projected cost of regularly patrolling by foot and
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
by air, the entire length of the pipeline right of way?
15559. MR. WHALEN: Well, we've already made a commitment on the record to do these type of patrols and inspections, and they would be part of the operating and maintenance budget, which would be part of the operating and maintenance agreement signed between Brunswick Pipeline and the shipper. Or, sorry, the operating agreement between St. Clair Pipelines and Emera, which is really a topic for Panel 5.
15560. DR. MOIR: Okay. I guess my point was -- or I guess what I'm trying to ask is, will the public be asked to pay for any of these costs?
15561. MR. WHALEN: No, they wouldn't.
15562. DR. MOIR: No. Okay.
15563. Given the proposed utility corridor in Rockwood Park has been marketed to the City and to the greater Saint John public as a groomed trail system, how do you propose to guard it against unauthorized activities and maintaining -- yet maintaining open access to the Park?
15564. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe that also has already been discussed.
15565. DR. MOIR: That's been dealt with.
15566. THE CHAIRPERSON: But I don't know if the Panel has any further elaboration on that.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15567. MR. MAYER: No, we have nothing more to add.
15568. DR. MOIR: Okay. Thank you.
15569. If security is compromised along the pipeline route, who will pay for the response costs? Is that a public cost, or is that going to be a cost by Emera?
15570. THE CHAIRPERSON: And that also has already been addressed.
15571. DR. MOIR: That's been dealt with?
15572. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thanks.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15573. DR. MOIR: Okay, sorry.
15574. THE CHAIRPERSON: It's not a problem.
15575. DR. MOIR: Oh.
15576. THE CHAIRPERSON: You've just had other people ahead of you asking questions.
15577. DR. MOIR: That's all right.
15578. In B-17-dd-II, I received two replies. And I couldn't find the document over there to pull this up. I think it's in this area I [point] Roman numerals.
15579. Looking specifically at the issue about risk assessments based on terrorist attacks.
15580. And the reply I received, and I guess these appear on page 3 somewhere, down near the bottom. For I -- there's I-2 and then -- I-2 is -- I-1 and I-2, I guess.
15581. The reply to me, when I asked about risk assessments involving terrorists attacks, have they been conducted.
15582. One was about whether they'd been conducted and whether a comparison had been done between a land-based route or a marine route.
15583. And in both instances, no risk assessment has been -- it hasn't been conducted. It's not -- we don't have to present one.
15584. And I guess does this, in your opinion, meet National Energy Board files 172-A000-73? It's a letter, NEB Expected Elements For Emergency Preparedness and Response Programs.
15585. Is that a reasonable response, given my question?
15586. MR. MAYER: I think it's important to go back to the original question that was posed to us at the time. The question was: (As read)
"How have the applicants accounted for the possibility of attack upon the LNG terminal and the pipeline?”
15587. DR. MOIR: Can we go back to the questions, just so I can -- maybe
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
you're right.
15588. I did notice a number of times, I had asked about LNG, and you responded it's not LNG.
15589. So, if we can go up just a little bit further. Sorry, pull it down, there.
"The pipeline will deliver a non-negligible portion of the energy."
15590. So, I guess this question, if I'm reading it, specifically deals with the pipeline. So, it's not -- though I do agree that question 1 does refer to the terminal, it also says: (As read)
"And the pipeline."
15591. Question 2 talks about costs of sabotage and attack upon the terminal and pipeline. So again, a pipeline depended upon route. I guess terminal -- that would be a -- that cost doesn't matter. Or doesn't -- isn't germane to this.
15592. But it specifically does ask about the pipeline there. So, I guess ---
15593. MR. SMITH: I just ---
15594. DR. MOIR: Your answer is sort of -- doesn't address the pipeline issue, or sort of ---
15595. MR. SMITH: I think you started to clarify the question before he finished his answer. I just wonder if ---
15596. DR. MOIR: Oh, sorry, there.
15597. MR. SMITH: --- Mr. Mayer might be able to respond fully.
15598. DR. MOIR: Sorry.
15599. MR. MAYER: Yes. And I suppose, you know, we, perhaps did not respond to the pipeline side of your question, but Dr. Bercha has already answered questions in regards to that in previous testimony.
15600. DR. MOIR: Okay.
15601. And I don't know -- I asked the Board, Madam Chair, if -- there was a recent rupture near Cheyenne.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15602. And I've heard -- or I've been told that this was actually brought in at -- brought up here.
15603. And I don't know if I can ask questions relating the resultant effect of that, and comparisons to here.
15604. THE CHAIRPERSON: It has already been dealt with. Pose your question, and we'll see where we get with it.
15605. DR. MOIR: Okay. So, you'll stop me if I've -- thank you.
15606. THE CHAIRPERSON: I think I'm getting a reputation for that.
15607. DR. MOIR: Hey, no problem.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
15608. DR. MOIR: I -- so, first off, I'd like to ask, what's the height of the tallest building in Saint John, and in fact, it's the highest building in the province?
15609. THE CHAIRPERSON: And, sir, again, if you could just go straight to the meat of the question, as opposed to lead up questions?
15610. DR. MOIR: Oh, oh ---
15611. THE CHAIRPERSON: Just ask them what your question is.
15612. DR. MOIR: Fine. Fine, okay.
15613. Do you know the maximum height of the flame resulting from the pipeline rupture on November 11th near the Wyoming border? So, how high did those flames reach?
15614. MR. DRAKE: No, I don't know.
15615. DR. MOIR: We don't have an estimate of that?
15616. Do you know when the medium pressure 36 inch natural gas pipeline was constructed? What its year of construction was, vis-à-vis your proposed construction? Looking at technology?
15617. MR. DRAKE: I have it here, if you give me just a second.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15618. DR. MOIR: Oh, sure.
15619. MR. DRAKE: I route through -- root through.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15620. Is -- there might be some words in there. I -- where it's the question about when was the pipeline built? There seemed to be a descriptor in there about medium pressure. I don't understand that descriptor.
15621. DR. MOIR: I'm -- maybe I've made a mistake, then.
15622. I was under the impression that the pressure in the pipeline was lower than the one we're proposing for here. But maybe -- and I'm happy to say, if I -- if my information is wrong. I'm happy to say that that's ---
15623. MR. DRAKE: My understanding, that the pressure of that pipeline is about 1,000 pounds.
15624. But given its diameter of 36 inches, back to the mass flow discussion, so we can keep that alive in everybody's mind, it would have a mass flow rate equivalent -- very much equivalent to this pipeline.
15625. DR. MOIR: Oh. Okay. And so, do you remember when it was constructed?
15626. MR. DRAKE: My little note tab seems to have eluded me. I think it was in the early '80s.
15627. DR. MOIR: I guess it would be new evidence to suggest the -- what the web site says when it -- the ---
15628. THE CHAIRPERSON: That's correct.
15629. DR. MOIR: Okay. I'll bring it up in final argument.
15630. Was the pipeline buried?
15631. THE CHAIRPERSON: I just have to stop you there, too.
15632. DR. MOIR: Oh.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Continued examination by Dr. R. Moir
15633. THE CHAIRPERSON: There is not the opportunity to bring up new evidence in final argument, either.
15634. DR. MOIR: Oh, okay.
15635. THE CHAIRPERSON: Final argument is done just on the evidence that's on the record. And ---
15636. DR. MOIR: Okay.
15637. THE CHAIRPERSON: And then you can make points.
15638. MR. SMITH: Dr. Moir may find that there has actually been some discussion of those details, or some of those details, at least, earlier on this record.
15639. So -- but I think the new stuff off the website is ---
15640. DR. MOIR: Okay.
15641. MR. SMITH: --- a different story.
15642. DR. MOIR: Okay, sorry about that.
15643. Was the pipeline buried? I ---
15644. MR. DRAKE: It was buried. We do not know what depth, offhand.
15645. DR. MOIR: Sure.
15646. Can you describe the predominant land use, in the region of the rupture?
15647. MR. DRAKE: It appears to be very rural.
15648. DR. MOIR: And how many people died or were injured in this event?
15649. MR. DRAKE: To my knowledge, I think one person was killed, who was the operator of the equipment.
15650. DR. MOIR: Okay, I appreciate that. Thanks very much, and thank you to the Board.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. J. Thompson
15651. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Dr. Moir.
15652. Ms. Thompson? Ms. Jean Thompson?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS. THOMPSON:
15653. MS. THOMPSON: Good afternoon, Madam Chair, and members of the Board, and members of the Panel.
15654. In the matter of pipeline safety, the quality of gas being transported in the pipeline plays a vital role.
15655. Does the country of origin of gas play a role in gas quality?
15656. MR. WHALEN: I don't think that anybody on this Panel has an in depth knowledge of the answer to your question. But generally speaking, my understanding is that you are correct, that the quality would vary, depending on the source of the gas.
15657. MR. DRAKE: Particularly -- if I can add, the particular quality that varies is the heat content, not crossivity, CO2, those kind of things. You're typically just talking about the heat content of the methane itself.
15658. MS. THOMPSON: Thank you.
15659. Emera's application to the National Energy Board, page 13, paragraph 4 refers to sources of gas. And the sources mentioned are Trinidad, Algeria, Norway, European Russia, Murmansk, Nigeria, and Qatar. And in C-21-T-D-I-S-19 -- could I have that?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15660. MS. THOMPSON: The response -- the response to Teresa Debly, Pembina, states: (As read)
"Repsol anticipates its initial supply from Trinidad, Tobago."
15661. And what countries would be involved in other services in Repsol's affiliate portfolios or third-party sponsored supply projects?
15662. MR. MAYER: I didn't exactly catch your question there, but if it's dealing with gas supply, it is definitely a Policy Panel issue, if I could be helpful that
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. J. Thompson
way.
15663. MR. SMITH: Yes, the specific supply sources for Repsol would be the responsibility of Mr. Ribbeck, on Panel 5.
15664. MS. THOMPSON: You mentioned, yesterday, that the quality of gas is monitored and this gas sometimes has to be remixed before delivery to customers.
15665. MR. WHALEN: Our responsibility, as a pipeline operator, is to, as you point out, monitor, continually, at the tailgate or at the interconnection point between the terminal and pipeline of the gas quality, various parameters and the yardstick or the metric that we use in that analysis is the gas quality tariff.
15666. The tariff is something that's agreed to by the shippers or the users of the gas, the supplier as well as ourselves, being the pipeline transporter. So, if the gas doesn't meet that tariff, those tariff requirements, we wouldn't accept that gas into the pipeline.
15667. If, in unusual circumstances, a small amount of gas did get into the pipeline that didn't meet the tariff, there may be some operational considerations for blending that supply with other supply points, along the pipeline, but that's looked at on a case-by-case basis and it's not common at all, in my experience.
15668. MS. THOMPSON: Thank you. In my evidence, submitted to the National Energy Board, I referred to Washington gases problems, with natural gas from Trinidad/Tobago. And that would be Repsol's source. Now, how would you deal with these problems?
15669. MR. DRAKE: I think you're alluding to the fact that they had some significant frequency of leak increased in their distribution system.
15670. MS. THOMPSON: Yes.
15671. MR. DRAKE: I believe that it was attributed to the fact that they have couplings joining the joints together and that the gas was -- proposed to have been of such a dry quality that it dried up the seals in the coupling and created leaks at the coupling. It did not create rupture, kind of characteristic.
15672. This pipe does not have any such devices; it's fully welded, 100 per cent. The fact that the gas is dry is actually advantageous to us, but in that particular system, because it has these unusual coupling devices with these rubber seals, the seals
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
apparently dried out due to the gas quality being very dry and created some leaks around the seals.
15673. MS. THOMPSON: Thank you. I think that's all the questions that I have.
15674. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms. Thompson.
15675. Dr. Inkpen?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR DR. INKPEN:
15676. DR. INKPEN: Thank you, Madam Chair, Board, Panel members. I'll be fairly brief, so we can all go home.
15677. THE CHAIRPERSON: Oh, we have a little more to go before that.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
15678. DR. INKPEN: So, I can go home.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
15679. DR. INKPEN: I would just like to clarify something that came from Horst Sauerteig's discussion. It's just some engineering detail. The pipeline, as it is constructed, will it have any access points as it travels through Saint John or is it a single closed pipeline?
15680. MR. MAYER: No, it has no access points other than the blow-off valves; we've often attached new customers at -- through our valve sites and through those risers at the blow-off valves, without having to make these taps that Mr. Sauerteig had talked about.
15681. DR. INKPEN: So, it is possible then to – Well I don’t have to repeat that. So, where are these blow-off valves? Has that been covered, I can just look that up, for that matter.
15682. MR. MAYER: Yes, just quickly, it's just at every valve site, we have these blow-off valves.
15683. DR. INKPEN: Okay.
15684. I would just like to begin with a question regarding safety and its
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
relationship to pipeline routing. In Exhibit B-1-d, just waiting for Erin to bring that up, and it's PDF 247 of the QRA, on the bottom of the page, it states that;
"The preferred route, through Rockwood Park, presents significantly lower risks to the Saint John Regional Hospital than the northern route alternative, although all route alternatives are in the insignificant risk region".
15685. It's a little above, it's sort of repeated twice there. Though in the bottom, there are a few typos in the description.
15686. DR. BERCHA: Sorry sir, what's the question?
15687. DR. INKPEN: I was just making sure you found it.
15688. DR. BERCHA: We have it.
15689. DR. INKPEN: Is what you're saying that, though the risk of an accident, such as a rupture is low, it is better to site the hospital as far from the centre of an incident and, by doing so, one achieves an absolute reduction in risk?
15690. DR. BERCHA: That's generally correct. As you probably saw from our individual, specific risk transects, the risk drops off as you get further from the pipeline.
15691. And the reason for that statement is that, the preferred route is further from the hospital than the other two routes, which we didn't actually explicitly study for risk, but it follows logically from, looking at the transects; that they would have similar transects and, therefore, if you're further away, you're better off in terms of risk.
15692. And we have, of course, qualified the entire point there that -- on the risk that, even though the risk is lower for the preferred route, all of the risks from any location of the pipeline would be, in what we term "the insignificant region".
15693. DR. INKPEN: So you're saying, in the case of the hospital, that it is worthwhile, in fact judicious, to try and reduce even insignificant risk?
15694. DR. BERCHA: I'm actually not saying that, I'm just making the observation that the preferred route poses even less risk than the other routes to the hospital.
15695. DR. INKPEN: And presumably, in general, you need to balance this type of routing decision; that is a decision based on safety against other routing
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
constraints?
15696. MR. MAYER: I don't think that's a fair question to Dr. Bercha. It wasn't his responsibility to balance all the routing constraints. He was asked to provide a risk analysis of the proposed, preferred route to that time and that's the analysis that's in this exhibit that we're speaking to here.
15697. DR. INKPEN: But then, may I ask that question to you?
15698. MR. MAYER: No, that's a discussion that took place with Panel 1.
15699. DR. INKPEN: But, I'm speaking specifically of safety here, that -- in terms of discussing safety, this is something that you have to balance off against other constraints in determining routing?
15700. MR. MAYER: I really don't know the answer to that, but I can be helpful to you in that, the results of Dr. Bercha's study showed that the risks were insignificant and I'm sure that the team that was involved with the route selection took that into consideration.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15701. DR. INKPEN: So, specifically about safety then, have you had to modify your concerns and discussions about safety, as a result of the routing decisions from Panel 1, for instance?
15702. MR. MAYER: Well, once presented with the preferred route, we definitely had to apply our codes and standards towards the design. We'll have to continue doing that because the design is not complete. I don't want to be talking in the past tense here, because it's work that's ongoing. And so, and this is the situation with no matter what project we're working on, what routing decisions come into play.
15703. When we go to do the detailed design, we have to look at the location of that route. How it's located in relation to other things, such as landslide areas, populated areas, you know, special features like that, and make those designs -- put design considerations in place that would make sure that that pipeline can operate safely.
15704. DR. INKPEN: And would it be also correct to say that one could reduce the risk to the community of Saint John, in the area of safety to zero, if the pipeline route under the harbour had proved feasible?
15705. MR. DRAKE: We've talked about the harbour route, quite a bit, and we can talk about it some more, if you wish. I defer to you, Madam Chair.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
15706. THE CHAIRPERSON: No, thank you.
15707. DR. INKPEN: But my question isn't about the harbour route, I'm just talking about reducing risk, in fact.
15708. THE CHAIRPERSON: If you want to proceed and reframe your question, in the context of the preferred route, please proceed?
15709. DR. INKPEN: I think I will move along.
15710. I'm not sure which Panel member this would be to, but I'll read it. Can you briefly describe what your obligations would be, when working with a hospital -- administration of a hospital in an emergency planning zone?
15711. MR. WHALEN: If a hospital were to be within an emergency planning zone, as part of our Emergency Response Program, one component is an Emergency Planning Zone Continuing Education Program and our evidence outlines the elements in such a plan.
15712. But generally speaking, they are to educate those within the zone, on a location of our facilities, roles and responsibilities, in the event of an emergency or an incident.
15713. DR. INKPEN: And are these a legal requirement for this sort of activity under the on-shore pipeline regulations?
15714. MR. WHALEN: They are outlined in the on-shore pipeline regulation. I believe it may be Section 35.
15715. DR. INKPEN: And the process that you'd engage with a hospital would be started at what point in the life cycle of the pipeline project?
15716. MR. WHALEN: Well, as I described earlier the emergency planning zone would be established as part of the writing of a field emergency response plan. So the size of the zone would be determined as we're writing that plan. Which is a requirement to be filed and approved before the pipeline is put into service.
15717. DR. INKPEN: So you're saying then that you'd make contact for instance with a hospital administration at that time?
15718. MR. WHALEN: I would think that we would contact beforehand and have some education in place and established in advance of putting product into the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
pipeline.
15719. DR. INKPEN: And you would work with the various people within the hospital on those sorts of plans?
15720. MR. WHALEN: I can't speculate. I would imagine that we would try to establish a primary contact to deal with on that.
15721. DR. INKPEN: And now I would like to refer you to Exhibit B-26-b. And for the record, Madam Chair, I would like to state that though this response was filed by Emera on September 9th, I was never informed by e-mail. Therefore I was unable to use this information in the evidence I submitted.
15722. I sent an e-mail to the NEB staff informing them of this on September 28th, five days after finding the document on the NEB website. And I received no response.
15723. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sir, if you'd like to bring that up as a preliminary matter at a different point in this proceeding that would be the most appropriate way to handle that.
15724. DR. INKPEN: Thank you. It's a labyrinthine process we're engaged in here, just figuring it out, I guess. On page 1 in the response it states that Emera Brunswick has not been provided with the names of people to contact in regards to these structures. And is therefore unable to provide that information in this response.
15725. That is correct. I was asking about contact people that -- of hospitals that would be in emergency planning zones.
15726. MR. MAYER: Are you asking us if our response is correct?
15727. DR. INKPEN: Yes.
15728. MR. MAYER: Our response is correct.
15729. DR. INKPEN: Now, please look at page 6. It's the last page here. And you'll see that there's a hospital in Saint John that is within an emergency planning zone, which, as we just discussed, means there are certain obligations the pipeline company has to fulfil.
15730. Did you contact this Saint John hospital regarding it being in an emergency planning zone?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
15731. MR. WHALEN: To be helpful, sir, are we referring to the St. Joseph's Hospital and its proximity to the existing 16 inch Saint John Lateral?
15732. DR. INKPEN: I was unable to find out from anyone what this was referring to, actually so I don't know.
15733. THE CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps we could scroll to the page in front of this table and see if we can get a little context.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15734. THE CHAIRPERSON: Could you continue on a little further? The next page up, please.
15735. DR. INKPEN: If you just scroll up, just a little bit -- no, other way. You'll see just at the bottom it describes the Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline operate a natural gas transmission system in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. I won't read it all.
15736. MR. SMITH: And then if you just go to top of the next page, okay just stop there for a minute. So this is an M&NP database.
15737. MR. WHALEN: So it would appear that that's correct, that this is a hospital that is within the EPZ of a Maritimes Northeast Pipeline.
15738. DR. INKPEN: Can you provide the details of when you first made contact? Who that was with and the plans that you've already helped formulate regarding the pipeline?
15739. THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Inkpen could you explain the relevance of that to this particular application at hand?
15740. DR. INKPEN: Mr. Whalen referred just this morning to the need to keep accurate databases for containing this sort of information regarding contact people as this was a significant part of planning emergency response capability. And I would just assume that he would have that information available as this is a Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline.
15741. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I think we can get to where Dr. Inkpen wants to go but I think he has to respect the fact that this is Maritimes and Northeast and while St. Clair performs the functions under contract the specific details of the Maritimes and Northeast operations would be proprietary as between it and its consultants.
15742. However to try and be responsive if what he's trying to determine is
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
how does the emergency response zone or plan, how is it formulated and what is the extent of consultation with entities like hospitals. As a general matter from Mr. Whalen's experience we don't have a problem with that because I think that does operate on a high enough plain that it's not disclosing proprietary information or offending privacy laws either.
15743. DR. INKPEN: I'm trying to just determine that the companies in front of us have carried out what it is they have -- are expected to carry out. I'll -- maybe this can clarify from Volume VIII of the transcript, line 12037.
15744. Mr. Mayer was speaking two days ago and referring to working with the community. He states: (As read)
"We've been doing that -- actually Maritimes Northeast, we've been working with them in this city for a number of years now because we have a transmission line here right now."
15745. MR. SMITH: I think the answer, Madam Chair, is consistent with again the high level discussion of how these emergency response plans are formulated and then administered. We don't have a problem with a higher level discussion of how they work as Mr. Mayer did there, but asking specific details about specific individuals frankly gives rise to some sensitivities over privacy issues and you know, the proprietary aspects of the specific Maritimes and Northeast operation.
15746. I don't know that the specific identity of the person at that one hospital really is that significant for the line of questioning. Shouldn't be required to disclose it.
15747. THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Inkpen, if you have any further questions on the evidence based on the referral to this transcript section that you've given us or anything of a more general nature, please proceed?
15748. But we will not be going into the details of a pipeline owned by another company and the specific details of that planning document. Thank you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
15749. DR. INKPEN: Madam Chair, my issue here is I have been working with these hospitals over this time that Mr. Mayer has also, he says, been working with this community and I do not know who the contact is at the hospital and have been unable to find out if or when that contact was made. And my concerns are that this sort of pattern may follow with a much larger and much more significant pipeline in this community.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Dr. T. Inkpen
15750. THE CHAIRPERSON; And if you have any questions that relate directly to this application in that regard please go ahead and pose them but we will not be going into other pipeline -- applications for other pipelines or other pipelines operations within the context of this hearing. Just to mention, Dr. Inkpen, in final argument you're free to express your opinions at that point. And maybe that's what you might want to consider.
15751. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I hasten to intervene though, Dr. Inkpen adduced a limited amount of new evidence in his comment. And I wouldn't want it to sound like we were waiving our right to object to that type of thing in final argument.
15752. THE CHAIRPERSON: Just while that is going on, in fact the NEB is preparing some information on final argument that will be available to all parties to make it very clear to everybody what the content of final argument is.
15753. DR. INKPEN: I have just a few quick questions for Dr. Bercha. To what degree does the quality of risk analysis follow published best practices for such studies?
15754. DR. BERCHA: Well, I think perhaps to the highest degree. It follows the best practices for such studies, sir.
15755. DR. INKPEN: Are you able to name such -- some of the published best practices such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers or ---
15756. DR. BERCHA: Well, apart from my publications, I'd certainly refer you to our first reference, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers Guideline for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis is one that sets out the various steps of risk analysis and provides a myriad of related references on that.
15757. So I think I'll rest with that. I could probably give you a large number but through that particular volume you will find many other references.
15758. DR. INKPEN: Who were the independent peer reviewers of the quantitative risk analysis and what were their major findings and how were they resolved?
15759. DR. BERCHA: Could I ask you to repeat that? There was some coughing, I didn't quite hear it.
15760. DR. INKPEN: Who were the independent peer reviewers of the quantitative risk analysis, what were their major findings and how were they resolved?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
15761. DR. BERCHA: Of our quantitative risk analysis, sir?
15762. DR. INKPEN: Yes.
15763. DR. BERCHA: Well, we didn't solicit peer reviewers but it appears that a number of them emerged in this process and they were Mr. Wreathall and Mr. Kuprewicz, specifically. And I believe that we more or less made peace with Mr. Kuprewicz although that is up to him in final argument and I think we more or less see the risks the same way.
15764. In previous works utilizing the same methodology for the Board, in a number of previous hearings, at least three or four and other works that I've carried out for various Canadian Federal Government departments and US Government departments such as the Department of the Interior for which I might say we have a major ongoing contract, we have employed these techniques and they have come under public scrutiny in various hearings and have been reviewed by a variety of reviewers and generally the outcome has been a satisfactory one.
15765. DR. INKPEN: Thank you. That's the end of my questioning. Thank you very much, panel.
15766. In closing, I would like to reassure the Board and the NEB staff and the panel members and the police, both in and out of uniform, that I'm not carrying any concealed weapons and nor do I know how to use any. Thank you.
15767. THE CHAIRPERSON: There's no comment from the Board on that comment. It's a shame you felt the need to make it, I guess, from the panel chair.
15768. Mr. Laracey, are you ready with your questions?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. LARACEY:
15769. MR. LARACEY: Madam Chair, Board, Panel, Mr. Smith. I'll try to go as fast as possible.
15770. THE CHAIRPERSON: Don't rush. Just make sure you ask questions on material that hasn't already been asked.
15771. MR. LARACEY: There's been a lot of mentions on worst-case scenarios over the last couple of days.
15772. If we could just kind of look at the inverse of that, some best-case
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
scenarios, minor incidents, and the impact on the community or localized environments, small scale, micro type situations.
15773. What would the effects of a minor incident -- or would the effects of a minor incident have a greater impact on a smaller community segment?
15774. MR. DRAKE: Can you repeat that. I didn't hear all of that.
15775. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Would the effects of a minor incident have a greater impact on a smaller community segment, like a neighbourhood, for example, or a street?
15776. MR. DRAKE: Just for the purposes of trying to dial in here, I think we see in distribution systems that leaks can create a very localized event in the form of gas getting in a house, so to speak, and causing a very, very localized event to that house. So, something on the order of a leak could cause some kind of more localized event.
15777. I don't think -- I think we've talked many times that leaks on this system are not likely to behave as leaks on distribution systems because of their proximity to the structures and the nature of the -- what we do about leaks.
15778. But I only offer that as just -- I'm trying to reach out and meet in the middle.
15779. MR. LARACEY: No, that's great.
15780. MR. DRAKE: But I think those kind of things are -- could theoretically happen. I think a great deal is done to try to mitigate that from occurring and the likelihood is virtually non-existent on a transmission line, but it is not prevalent but more commonplace on distribution systems.
15781. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Do you feel that public perception could be affected by minor incidents, perception of the company or of the pipeline itself?
15782. MR. DRAKE: Frankly, I think it may already have been.
15783. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Would the frequency component of Dr. Bercha's analysis increase as the risk or the severity aspect decreased? Would there be --
15784. DR. BERCHA: Yeah. Well, essentially, sir, the more adverse the consequences, you know, the larger the release, the lower the associated probability, and that's simply the way it is empirically, not simply -- that's not the way we have arranged it by any means but that's a historical fact, that large releases and large accidents happen
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
much less frequently than small ones.
15785. MR. LARACEY: Okay. So, there would be a higher statistical probability of minor incidents regardless of pipeline size?
15786. DR. BERCHA: Well, generally, yes, that is correct.
15787. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Have you, Dr. Bercha, or the Bercha Group, done any recent studies or compilations on like current events or, oh, recent incidents like in relationship to risk analysis?
15788. Like do you keep up to date on very recent incidents?
15789. DR. BERCHA: I'm not sure what you mean, sir, by "very recent incidents" there.
15790. MR. DRAKE: In the United States, in conjunction with the integrity management protocol development, there was a contractor, Cheryl Trench, hired to do just exactly what you're talking about.
15791. She went back and did an analysis of all incidents for -- and tried to re- categorize them, tried to give better data on cause, root cause analysis to support the development of better measures to mitigate.
15792. MR. LARACEY: Okay. So, they do monitor -- there is a group that does monitor that type of situation. Okay.
15793. MR. DRAKE: Yes.
15794. MR. LARACEY: Would -- this information that would be obtained in such a study as that, would that affect a risk analysis, in this case Dr. Bercha's risk analysis?
15795. DR. BERCHA: Well, Mr. Mayer has assisted me here.
15796. While we maintain the most recent databases available from the Board in this case, we've used the statistics that the Board very judiciously collects for all pipeline incidents under their jurisdiction.
15797. Is that what you mean, sir? And if that is what you mean, then I would say we're up to date, as up to date as one could be.
15798. MR. LARACEY: Okay. What would you consider up to date or
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
current? Would that be like six months old or six weeks old?
15799. DR. BERCHA: Actually, two years is ---
15800. MR. LARACEY: Two years is current?
15801. DR. BERCHA: --- what is generally considered current in the ---
15802. MR. LARACEY: Okay. In the industry.
15803. DR. BERCHA: --- statistical assimilation of data.
15804. MR. MAYER: Let me just clear this up, because I think -- I hope that you're seeing on the same -- eye-to-eye here.
15805. Like there haven't been any incidents in the last two years, and so we've got -- in Dr. Bercha's work he's got up-to-date database. There hasn't been any change to that database in the last two years because there haven't been any incidents to add to it.
15806. So, it's not a two-year-old database, it's current as of now.
15807. MR. LARACEY: Okay. I accept that.
15808. Could you define "incident" or magnitude of incident? Is it the magnitude of the incident that dictates whether it makes it to the NEB or makes it to a part of an analysis?
15809. MR. WHALEN: Maybe I can help there.
15810. An incident -- as defined by the NEB and by the Onshore Pipeline Regulations administered by the National Energy Board administered by the National Energy Board, an incident means: (As read)
"An occurrence that results in the death of or a serious injury to a person, a significant adverse effect on the environment, an unintended fire, an unintended explosion, an unintended or uncontrolled release of gas or, finally, the operation of a pipeline beyond its design as determined under the CSA codes."
15811. MR. LARACEY: Okay.
15812. MR. WHALEN: So, that's what's defined as an "incident."
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
15813. MR. LARACEY: Thank you.
15814. There are more current incidents that have transpired in the last two years that obviously haven't been included in a study because they've happened within the last two years.
15815. The question would be, would two minor incidents per year in a localized area of any pipeline be considered average?
15816. DR. BERCHA: Just to clarify, we're talking about the National Energy Board database here.
15817. MR. LARACEY: Correct. But under the definition there's a number of factors that are within the definition. Release of gas would be one, so anything involving the release of gas would be classified as an incident, correct?
15818. DR. BERCHA: Yes, it would.
15819. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Death of an individual or related -- okay.
15820. So, minor incidents -- and we're not talking about catastrophic undertakings or anything, we're talking about very minor incidents. Would two minor incidents in an urban environment -- would that be acceptable or an average figure?
15821. MR. MAYER: Maybe I can also ask -- I don't mean to ask you a question, but do you mean by "minor incidents" as being ones that are not reported or not reportable?
15822. MR. LARACEY: Well, they've been reported. I'm not sure what the reporting requirements are to the NEB or whether these are public knowledge type events or -- again, as I said, I'm not sure what the actual word is, whether "incident" or "event."
15823. DR. BERCHA: Yeah. I guess to put it in simple terms, under the NEB regime all losses of containment of pipelines are reported.
15824. Therefore, I think minor incidents, which are leaks, even internal leaks, make their way to the database, and so if these occur, then indeed they become part of the database and they would have been considered as a starting point in the risk assessment.
15825. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Would -- I'm not sure how we can access -- whatever you want to call it -- current information if the Energy Board's -- or the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
reporting mechanism to the Energy Board isn't reflecting currently in the risk assessments.
15826. Like if the database is two years old and incidents have transpired within the last two years, they're not going to show up on the NEB reports?
15827. DR. BERCHA: Mr. Mayer didn't quite get it right there.
15828. When I said, in fact, that our statistical analysis is up to two years ago, that was correct. I did at another point say that there have been no ruptures for the last three years under NEB regulated pipelines. That is also correct.
15829. But the data that we used was from 1984 to 2004, because that is the span or the chronology of the data that are currently publicly available from the National Energy Board. So, we have used that, and I believe that this span of 20 years is a statistically significant sample of data.
15830. So, I think we can rely on that as a good starting point for the probability analysis that was carried out.
15831. MR. MAYER: And I apologize for the confusion there when I added onto -- earlier to what Dr. Bercha was saying. I thought everyone was trying to talk about major ruptures, you know, the three years.
15832. So, I'll take back everything I said there about that age of the database.
15833. MR. LARACEY: Yeah. Would a valve failure be considered -- on a high-pressure transmission line, would that be considered a minor incident or major incident?
15834. DR. BERCHA: Well, I guess, sir, we don't really differentiate between major and minor incidents.
15835. But, I think, at the outset of our panel here I defined the -- leaks and ruptures, and leaks are losses of containment which allow the pipeline to keep functioning, that is they don't result in a sudden shutdown, and ruptures are any releases which have the opposite effect, that is they cause the pipeline not to function anymore, and they could be -- you know, they could be 5-centimetre holes or they can be complete severances, but those are the ruptures.
15836. So, I guess we would perhaps call the leaks the minor incidents and holes and ruptures would be major ones.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
15837. MR. LARACEY: Valve failures, they're -- percentage-wise, would they have a significant percentage of failures or release of gas situations?
15838. DR. BERCHA: There is a category of failures for above-ground facilities, and they are actually fairly -- in the major releases they are a minor component. Around the leaks they constitute a significant proportion; mainly because there are various moving parts and flanges and so on.
15839. So, you can have minor leaks more frequently in above-grade facilities than, of course, the integral buried pipeline.
15840. MR. LARACEY: Do you have any knowledge or information on any recent valve failures in New Brunswick?
15841. DR. BERCHA: I personally don't, sir.
15842. MR. LARACEY: Say again?
15843. DR. BERCHA: I do not.
15844. MR. LARACEY: Okay. A lot of big words involved in the report there. We got risk spectrum, magnitude of consequences, fatality thresholds.
15845. Do you ever use terms of a less technical nature in regards to follow- ups or studies? Is there a more personal approach to risk analysis than ---
15846. DR. BERCHA: Well, sir, I can understand your concern there. This was a technical report that was carried out in a technical context, and I do apologize for some of the -- you know, some of the terminology which is quite well defined and specific, but is not something that's commonly used.
15847. Yes, we also do, occasionally, rewrite reports or parts of them, such as the executive summary in a risk layperson's language to try to communicate the ideas more clearly and -- I have tried to do that in some parts of the report such as the bar graphs showing relative risks. But certainly it's a fairly scientific report and therefore it does use the jargon of the business.
15848. MR. LARACEY: I may have already touched on this question, but I'm going to run it by anyway.
15849. Does your group -- Bercha group or any other group that you know of, do they -- they do do follow-up studies relating to these incidents. This may have already been answered already.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
15850. DR. BERCHA: Well, we've certainly done some forensic work. In fact, we are retained by a number of firms that are looking into what we call forensic investigations. These are, I guess, root cause and risk assessments after the fact. We've done that type of work. Of course, that is not the situation here.
15851. MR. LARACEY: This is kind of a general question, as to how would the company react to like individual consequences of an incident, if there's specifics like -- or would that be something that would go over to company policy or another panel?
15852. MR. WHALEN: Well, first of all, if we were to have an incident we would report it -- report it to the regulator.
15853. The procedure is that we first report the incident to the Transportation Safety Board. The Transportation Safety Board, I understand, has an operating agreement or some type of a Memorandum of Understanding with the NEB whereby they then hand the matter over to the NEB.
15854. We would probably phone the NEB as well as a courtesy, even though, you know, our first window is to the Transportation Safety Board. But certainly there would be a follow-up investigation internally with an investigative team to determine the root cause of the incident, and to try to prevent it from reoccurring.
15855. MR. LARACEY: Would there be any kind of company involvement on a personal level? Like would you go to the community or to the neighbourhood that would be affected by this? Like any public relations type undertaking, any personal contacts at all or is it all upper level ---
15856. MR. WHALEN: No, I would expect that depending on the severity of the incident that there would be an attempt made to meet with the local people and explain what happened and why it happened. Yeah, I would expect.
15857. MR. LARACEY: Now, who would -- now a lot of comments have been made regarding first responders. Who would be considered second responders here? The company?
15858. MR. WHALEN: I think the term "first responders" is really describing the Fire, the Police, the Ambulance, the people that would be responding to any type of emergency that affects the public.
15859. I've never really heard the term "secondary responders." Certainly we would respond as a field crew and work collaboratively with these first responders.
15860. MR. LARACEY: That's generally what I'm looking for. The
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
company does partake at one point after the first responders.
15861. So, in addition to or following the first responders, the emergency crews, there would be company employees that are involved in some sort of technical undertaking, ensuring the valves are shut down or anything that they could do relating to mechanical or technical -- do you have a team available to respond to ---
15862. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Laracey, I believe that has been covered pretty extensively in the evidence so far.
15863. MR. LARACEY: Okay. I might have missed that. What do you think would be considered a good response time for company representatives to any incident, minor incident?
15864. THE CHAIRPERSON: And, sir, that's already on the record as well.
15865. MR. LARACEY: It's already covered, okay. Maybe we'll just move right along to the next phase here.
15866. Are there any differences in valve designs, if the valve can possibly be submerged?
15867. MR. MAYER: If you're meaning like underwater -- like a marine valve?
15868. MR. LARACEY: Correct.
15869. MR. MAYER: Yes, there are such devices.
15870. MR. LARACEY: Has there been any considerations for -- and it may be premature, this may be coming up at a later phase of the undertaking, but -- the Spar Cove site is susceptible to flooding on a frequent basis.
15871. So, would there be considerations either in the placement of the valve or the elevation of the valve or perhaps a different valve design entirely?
15872. MR. MAYER: Yeah, I think that what you're referring to here is a valve site that's on land that gets flooded out, and I can tell you that our operations group accuse the engineers all the time of putting the valves in the swamps.
15873. But the important thing there is making sure that we have a valve site surface that they can get in and operate on. The valve itself is buried, and it could be belo w the groundwater table. It's not affected -- you know, we don't have a special valve
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
for that. This is just, you know, the standard coatings. It's steel -- it's coated steel. It's down underground just like our pipeline is, protected by a cathodic protection system.
15874. So, nothing special has to be done in that regard.
15875. MR. LARACEY: Thank you. Would there be considered a greater risk in a valve site, rather than other portions of the pipe whereas it is exposed?
15876. DR. BERCHA: Well, I think, sir, I've already indicated that above- grade facilities are more likely to have accidental releases than the pipe that's in the ground and an integral welded piece.
15877. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Thank you. There was mentioned in the statement a little earlier, blow-off valves, and it may have been covered.
15878. There's a blow-off valve at the valve site on the Spar Cove Road?
15879. MR. MAYER: Yes.
15880. MR. LARACEY: Is this blow-off valve, is it utilized in any way for -- what are we going to call it -- operational under -- like maintenance? Do you do intentional blow-offs?
15881. MR. WHALEN: No, we don't.
15882. MR. LARACEY: No, okay. Do you think there would be an increase probability, or that the increase probability of minor incidents would have a detrimental effect on civic first responder assets and budgets?
15883. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe that's already been covered in the evidence.
15884. MR. LARACEY: It's already been covered?
15885. THE CHAIRPERSON: Yeah.
15886. MR. LARACEY: I can -- just cut me off if I'm covering something that's been touched on.
15887. Does the company compensator offset increase asset commitment costs?
15888. THE CHAIRPERSON: And that as well, sir, I believe has been
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. J. Laracey
covered.
15889. MR. LARACEY: Covered, okay. Would there be any change in the descriptors of civic assets that would be required? For example, rather than a conventional pumper truck they may require a 6-wheel drive Department of Transport type fire vehicles or 4-wheel drives or ---
15890. MR. WHALEN: Yeah. That's really a question for -- it's really a question for the Fire Department, although I don't expect so.
15891. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Your experience in other communities with their first responders, have they noticed or felt that there was a need for different types of vehicles rather than just conventional response vehicles.
15892. MR. WHALEN: No, not in my experience.
15893. MR. LARACEY: The word "tailgate" came up just a little while ago. I don't think we have to get into a big explanation on tailgating or anything.
15894. This -- would this be located before the Emera Brunswick junction or at Point A on your pipeline?
15895. MR. WHALEN: I was referring to the interface between the gas plant at Goldboro and the beginning of the 30-inch maritime system.
15896. MR. LARACEY: Okay. Thank you. I'll see if I can refine the question here. There's been terms that have been used throughout documents, tailgate, tailgating. Okay. I'm not sure whether this is relevant, because if it is before Point A, then it would be more relative to the LNG plant, and I don't want to go there.
15897. The term "tailgating," perhaps you could define tailgating?
15898. MR. WHALEN: I don't believe we used the term. I used it as an acronym, but basically it just describes the outlet side of a processing plant.
15899. MR. LARACEY: Okay. That's kind of what I was referring to.
15900. Can this point be accessed -- okay. Yeah, we'll be off on a different -- I think I'll let it go at that. I think it's a different panel.
15901. Thank you.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
15902. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Laracey.
15903. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, my understanding is there's one more -- I have nothing vis-à-vis Mr. Laracey. It's just about the schedule.
15904. If we are nearing completion of the panel, I would appreciate the Board's indulgence by sitting a little longer, if it were possible to release them, rather than carrying them over for a very, very brief amount of cross-examination in the morning.
15905. If I could just leave you with that thought. I know that Mr. Robichaud is approaching the mike.
15906. THE CHAIRPERSON: We'll keep it in mind and let's carry on and see where we get. And when we need to take a break, we'll take a break and we'll go from there.
15907. At this point, are there any other registered individual intervenors who wish to cross-examine Panel No. 4?
--- (No response/Pas de réponse)
15908. THE CHAIRPERSON: We'll move on to the government's list then.
15909. Environment Canada?
--- (No response/Pas de réponse)
15910. THE CHAIRPERSON: New Brunswick Department of Environment?
--- (No response/Pas de réponse)
15911. THE CHAIRPERSON: NDP and Dan Robichaud?
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. ROBICHAUD:
15912. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you very much. Good afternoon everyone. I'm Dan Robichaud. Okay, we'll take a stab at it and go from there. All right. C-33-5-j, page 63 from the Bercha Report, I guess. A comment there. (As read)
"The most important risk mitigation measure for this project is the emergency response capability."
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
15913. How does the first responders reduce any risk after the initial blowout with regards to Mr. Bercha's remark, or does it reduce any risk?
15914. MR. MAYER: Excuse me, can you repeat the question? It was very faint, and I don't think we caught all of it.
15915. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. Sorry.
15916. MR. MAYER: Thanks.
15917. MR. ROBICHAUD: The question was how does the first responders reduce any risk after the initial blo wout with regards to the remark?
15918. DR. BERCHA: Well, in the analysis, the risk analysis we did, we did not consider any reduction in risk due to first responders. The first responders could reduce consequences in some of the ways that have been discussed, secondary fires and so on, but in the actual risk assessment, we've assumed things, and more importantly people, will remain in the locations which they are when the incident occurs.
15919. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. Thank you. C-33-5-c, page 27, your historical chart, Table -- I guess it would be 6-1 from the Bercha.
15920. Would it be safe to say that corrosion, whether it be internal, external or stress corrosion, would be the greatest risk factor for any incidents?
15921. THE CHAIRPERSON: That has been covered previously in the evidence, Mr. Robichaud.
15922. MR. ROBICHAUD: Has it? Okay. I'm sorry. So can I ask the further question, was it not evaluated when choosing the preferred route to the proximity of the infrastructures?
15923. DR. BERCHA: Your question, sir, is whether corrosion was considered in choosing the preferred route?
15924. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yes. When it -- was it evaluated, when you were choosing the preferred route, into the equation?
15925. DR. BERCHA: I don't know, sir.
15926. MR. MAYER: Maybe I could explain. Dr. Bercha did not choose the preferred route.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
15927. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay.
15928. MR. MAYER: A proposed preferred route was developed by a routing team, as discussed by Panel 1. They asked Dr. Bercha to do a risk assessment on that proposed preferred route to see if there were any show stopper, if you have it, to their proposal. And the results of his report were that the risks were insignificant.
15929. So then the routing team then went on with those results and continued on with their work to draw their final conclusions. In that regard, the history of corrosion and all methods and modes of pipeline failures were considered when reviewing the proposed preferred route.
15930. MR. ROBICHAUD: In relationship -- C-33-5-d, page 29, we're still into the specific proposal of the corridor proximity - major urban infrastructure and population concentration.
15931. With that said, let's turn to page 71/72 of the same report. Refer to the box with a risk factor of 97.4 percent chance we'll have one failure along the route in 50 years.
15932. Would it be safe to say that in 25 years -- that's the application here that's before us here -- is it 48.7 percent chance that there will be a failure? Is that what I'm reading off of this?
15933. DR. BERCHA: Well, sir, I would direct you to my rebuttal of that. It's something that was done, with due respect, completely incorrectly.
15934. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay.
15935. DR. BERCHA: Now, you can see that the -- a probability of 97 percent is approaching a probability of 100 percent.
15936. MR. ROBICHAUD: Exactly.
15937. DR. BERCHA: If you were to take 60 years, it probably would be over 100 percent, and that, of course, is an oxymoron. You cannot have a probability that's greater than one.
15938. So that calculation was totally flawed, and I actually discussed it with Mr. Tracey, and he agreed to the correct approach, and that is given in my rebuttal.
15939. MR. ROBICHAUD: Reply evidence, Attachment No. 8, "Findings
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
and Concerns." I guess it would be C-33-5-d, page 28 to 33. I'm on page 32.
15940. Does the Office of Pipeline Safety in US take in account all incidents in North America? I guess, no, that was answered. I'm sorry.
15941. Does the office meet or set precedence for the NEB safety standards?
15942. MR. MAYER: Excuse me for a moment. We're just trying to flip up that evidence. You were saying it was reply evidence, page ---
15943. MR. ROBICHAUD: Page 32.
15944. MR. MAYER: Is it a certain tab under the reply evidence perhaps?
15945. MR. ROBICHAUD: Pardon me?
15946. MR. MAYER: Are you referring to an attachment to the reply evidence?
15947. MR. ROBICHAUD: The Findings and Concerns, 3.12. There we go.
15948. MR. MAYER: I think it's an attachment ---
15949. THE CHAIRPERSON: It's on the screen now.
15950. MR. ROBICHAUD: It's on the screen.
15951. MR. MAYER: Thank you.
15952. MR. ROBICHAUD: So the question was does the said office meet or set precedence for the NEB safety standards -- statistics.
15953. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Robichaud, I thought I heard you reply -- mention the reply evidence, which is what's on the screen now.
15954. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yes.
15955. THE CHAIRPERSON: Then I thought I heard you go on and make reference to an exhibit that was marked as "C". I just wonder if we're on the right -- if we're on the right exhibit here at this point for your question. Did you secondarily ask for "C"?
15956. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yes, I did. I may be wrong on that one because
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
we are with the right document that is on the -- on the ---
15957. THE CHAIRPERSON: Oh, okay. So this is where you want to be?
15958. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yeah.
15959. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sorry for interrupting.
15960. MR. ROBICHAUD: No, that's okay.
15961. THE CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you could pose your question again then.
15962. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. I'm just trying to see how -- I guess it would be the Office of Pipeline Safety in the US works with the NEB. And I'm just trying to see if they -- the said office meet or set precedence for the NEB safety standards.
15963. MR. DRAKE: No, they don't. The NEB is an independent entity. But the NEB and the DOT have signed a Memo of Understanding so that they collaborate with one another in the development of standards and share data between each other in both directions.
15964. MR. ROBICHAUD: All right. Transcript No. 4. I guess it would be 4817, they comment on the life period of the pipeline. My question would be how do you explain the incidents on record, and wouldn't those pipelines have an appropriate operation and maintenance program in place.
15965. Mr. McLelland had mentioned the lifetime of a pipeline could be indefinite.
15966. MR. MAYER: Well I could start off the explanation. When Mr. McLelland said the natural gas pipelines could be -- have an indefinite life period, I think you're making the assumption that if there's an incident on that pipeline, it's now dead. If there's an incident and it can be repaired, it can go back into operation and continue on its life. 15967. So bearing that in mind, you know, maybe that answers your question and the paradox.
15968. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. Mainly because of the fact what I'm trying to relate to is you're trying to give me the safe measures of all the risk, and if it's low. And why I'm saying that, if he's mentioning about the lifetime if it's appropriately maintained and -- is that -- would that have been one of the causes of any of these
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
incidents if it was not appropriately maintained.
15969. DR. BERCHA: Well, sir, one of the incidents discussed earlier, the El Paso tragedy, was deemed not to have been properly inspected and maintained, and the result, of course, was a catastrophic incident that has been discussed here at various points. So, yes, that can happen. I think Mr. Drake might add something.
15970. MR. DRAKE: I think with the exception of third party damage or sabotage, that most of the threats are the -- you know, are the result of some event happening that was not appropriately bridled with some mitigative effort.
15971. And I think that the integrity management plan that we have been required to develop in conjunction with this program, which is a -- is leveraged off of an extensive program that we acquire with St. Croix to our relationship with Maritimes, is quite extensive and we are glad to talk about it at great length.
15972. It is, I think, layered quite above industry standards, quite above regulatory requirements, in the effort of trying to bridle those threats to the maximum degree possible.
15973. MR. ROBICHAUD: The reason I ask that is because this city has a history that we've dealt with. Our ancestors had dealt with a great fire, and this is where I'm looking to believe the comments tha t it's going to be a low risk.
15974. But since an event happened years ago that the city had to deal with, that here we are in the doubting kind of, you know, feelings. And that's where I'm kind of in that category of ---
15975. THE CHAIRPERSON: Do you ---
15976. MR. ROBICHAUD: --- if the maintenance wasn't done, then of course we're going to maybe have something there. So -- sorry.
15977. THE CHAIRPERSON: Do you have a question, sir?
15978. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay, I'll go on. Now, I think you had spoke with Mr. Laracey about the first responders, and then of course dealing with the company involved.
15979. Who is in charge once the company is notified of emergency services? I know that the first responders will only look after the cold and the low zone that would not be affected -- or well, it will be affected, of course -- but they will not go into the hot areas. They would just end up waiting for it to be burnt off.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
15980. But once the company is involved and they've been notified, who controls the situation on site?
15981. MR. WHALEN: Our response team includes an on-site supervisor as well as an incident commander. However, the Fire Department is basically the authority on site as the overall incident commander.
15982. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. Let's go to C-33-5-d, page 31. And we're discussing the jet fire, regarding the 1985 incident near Beaumont. With the 30- inch pipeline and the psi of 990 per square inch, the burn area was 500 feet wide by 700 feet long.
15983. My guess to measure one city block would be something like 400 by 200. And my measurement is based on a lot of 40 by 100. Given the value of that, if we can assume a value of 400 feet by 200 feet, with the burn area shown in the table on page 31, a psi of 990 and the burn area that big, would the evidence comparable to the proposed pipeline at 1400 psi -- would it be safe to say that the burn area from any incident that would happen or could happen from this proposed pipeline would be equal to two city blocks?
15984. MR. DRAKE: I think we've discussed the impact zone at tremendous length. I'm glad to keep going if you wish, but I defer to you, Madam Chair.
15985. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe we have covered it extensively.
15986. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. Some people, I mean, may not understand because we're flipping back and forth from standard measurements to metric measurements and it's sometimes confusing. And if we put it into the reality here, that this community could understand, this is why I've gone into that line.
15987. Okay, next. In Canada, is there any regulation that the NEB has the proponent and the Community Liaison Representatives working out the differences, forcing to define the solutions between the two?
15988. MR. MAYER: Please define for us Community Liaison.
15989. MR. ROBICHAUD: From what I'm understanding, in the US, the government forces the pipelines to deal with the communities, to make them compatible and to work out their differences, where in Canada, I don't think there are any legal bindings to make you work with the community?
15990. THE CHAIRPERSON: I believe that falls under the Stakeholder
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
Consultation side, but if this Panel has something more to add to that.
15991. MR. MAYER: No, I don't think we can add or answer that question, in relation to the Canadian experience.
15992. MR. ROBICHAUD: Can I ask just an informative question, out of the Panel here, I respectfully -- respect all of you, of course. But, the experts here that are in front of me now, are you all from the US or are you all from Canada or -- ?
15993. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Robichaud, all that information was provided in their curriculum vitae, when they were accepted as experts.
15994. MR. ROBICHAUD: So, to refresh my memory, three or four out of five?
15995. This is why -- I mean that question was posed to understanding some of the American laws, to work together and I know that the experts, in North America, I always respect North America, not to distinguish between the two countries.
15996. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Robichaud, these individuals are here as expert witnesses and have been qualified as such, before the Board. Where the y reside is not material to the expert witness evidence that they're providing.
15997. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yes. I'm just trying to get to the US standards and the Canadian standards, which they should almost be mirror imaged because we're working with the same ideas or risks.
15998. THE CHAIRPERSON: If you have a question, I think this Panel is ready and willing to try to provide you the answers to your questions.
15999. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. If corrosion is the highest element of breakdown, will the Bay of Fundy moisture play, to any effect, of the pipeline?
16000. MR. MAYER: You are talking about moisture in the air, in the vicinity of the Bay of Fundy, in the area where the route is, no. Our pipeline is buried, it's in the ground, it's in ground water in some cases and in some cases it's dry. The Corrosion Protection System that we designed and installed on the pipeline protects it from corrosion. As well as the -- it's complimented by the coating system.
16001. MR. ROBICHAUD: Will the material specs meet or exceed the North American specs that all government work must meet?
16002. MR. MAYER: The material specifications meet or exceed the
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
requirements of the Onshore Pipeline Regulation which steer us towards the Canadian Standards Association Specifications. Those may or may not be specifications imposed on other governments, but this is -- our regulator, the National Energy Board, and we follow the Onshore Pipeline Regulations in that regard.
16003. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you.
16004. Dr. Bercha, the transcript No. 8, 12175, can you finish the response that you started? Is the answer, "Refer to the rural route of the pipeline", with the evidence that is submitted regarding history of incidents?
16005. DR. BERCHA: No. That, sir, was a general comment on our expectations, in the case of a rupture, that there would not, in general, be fatalities.
16006. MR. ROBICHAUD: So you couldn't apply that to the urban ---
16007. DR. BERCHA: Well, that is, as I said, our expectation regarding ruptures.
16008. MR. ROBICHAUD: Dr. Bercha, have you ever been involved in any risk assessment with any US incident on record?
16009. DR. BERCHA: Are you talking about forensic work, in relation to US incidents or what do you mean by that?
16010. MR. ROBICHAUD: Well, I'm looking through the chart for all the incidents that happened and, I'm sure that there were experts that did work on these and I'm just, kind of, wondering if you had worked on any of the pipelines that ever had an incident?
16011. MR. SMITH: Are you asking, did he analyze the incident, is that what you're asking, or I'm unclear of the question?
16012. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yes, any incident that is recorded. I'm just wondering if you had done any work on any of those.
16013. DR. BERCHA: Well, I've only use these records anecdotally to expand our understanding of incidents, but my company has not been retained to do forensic investigations or root cause investigations on any of the US incidents that have been cited.
16014. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16015. Mr. Kiefner, Reply Evidence, Attachment No. 5, page 2; history does repeat itself and your statement brings to mind, the question about the history of incidents. Did any incidents on record, in North America, conclude that a fatigue crack growth caused the incident?
16016. DR. KIEFNER: Yes.
16017. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you. Mr. Kiefner, have you worked on any pipeline application or installation that has been documented as an incident?
16018. DR. KIEFNER: I'm sorry; I didn't catch the very last part.
16019. MR. ROBICHAUD: Sorry -- worked on any application or installation that has been documented as an incident?
16020. DR. KIEFNER: Well, if you're asking -- I guess I still don't quite understand what you're asking -- if I worked on investigating failure incidents, I have.
16021. MR. ROBICHAUD: Yes.
16022. MR. MAYER: But, I think -- we're very confused here, because you're asking us if we've worked on an application that's been documented as an incident.
16023. MR. ROBICHAUD: Right.
16024. MR. MAYER: I don't know too many pipeline companies that apply to make an incident. An incident, in our definition, has been the failure of the pipeline systems.
16025. MR. ROBICHAUD: I'm trying to get more confidence with the Risk Assessment and I'm sure that the experts, over 20-30 years that you've always worked on different projects along the way, and this where I'm kind of trying to get more confidence in any of the evidence that was presented. So it's just one of those things that ---
16026. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I'm just wondering ---
16027. MR. ROBICHAUD: --- not the question.
16028. MR. SMITH: I apologize. I apologize. I just wonder how much this is assisting the Board in making its decision.
16029. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Robichaud, again, these individuals have all been qualified by the Board as expert witnesses and if you hit any questions as to
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
their qualifications or their experience, it would have been appropriate to raise that, prior to the qualification of the experts, when I raised that question.
16030. So, I think we can assume that they are experts in their field; that is what we've done and maybe we could move along to the next line of questions.
16031. Thank you.
16032. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you.
16033. Dr. Bercha, I don't mean to go in the wrong way but -- could it be not a reckless or, at least, most unwise, when the proponent wants the city residents to assume that a rupture failure will never occur?
16034. DR. BERCHA: Well, that would be incorrect. I don't know about reckless or unwise, but it simply would not be correct.
16035. MR. ROBICHAUD: I know I'm going to live here for the next 40 years, anyways, if I can live that long, but ---
16036. THE CHAIRPERSON: And there has been evidence on the record already about that aspect of things.
16037. MR. ROBICHAUD: Dr. Bercha, has the applicant developed and provided an early ignition pipeline rupture heat flux versus distance curve that publicly can be reviewed and defended?
16038. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sir that has been dealt with previously in the evidence.
16039. MR. ROBICHAUD: Sorry.
16040. Mr. Drake, with the demonstration that you spoke of, with the cross- examination from Ms. Higgins, considering the risk factor, did any of the post office, daycare, residents within the picture from Massachusetts, get any compensation for the risk associated with the pipeline?
16041. DR. BERCHA: I don't know the answer to that.
16042. MR. ROBICHAUD: B-40-a, Attachment 6, Inline Inspection, page 2; is it true to say that, due to corrosion, that the pipeline loses integrity of an average of three mil. a year? Is that what I'm getting from the evidence that was presented?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16043. DR. KIEFNER: We use those numbers based on standard analysis procedures. Those are not -- those are benchmarks associated with typical corrosivity in the soil. What actually happens, on a given pipeline, is various situation-specific.
16044. MR. ROBICHAUD: I'm a little bit confused here. But is it rightfully so that the US is -- the US and the Canadian guidelines for the pipeline industry -- the Panel is trying to separate the historical data for pipeline incidents. Can you explain why?
16045. MR. SMITH: I though that was well canvassed early on, with Dr. Bercha, Madam Chair?
16046. THE CHAIRPERSON: I do believe the matter has already been covered in evidence. Thank you.
16047. MR. ROBICHAUD: All right. The Fire Department tend to focus on penetration, resistance from third-party damage, when the design case is delayed rupture and much larger, potential impact zone, with high mortality. Is that quite true, Dr. Bercha?
16048. DR. BERCHA: Well, if you mean a delayed rupture, as opposed to an instantaneous rupture, I don't think there'd be any difference in the consequences.
16049. MR. ROBICHAUD: And I'm led to believe that it. like a third-party, is not going to damage this pipeline, through whatever means, even excavators. And so the true fact that any incidents would be more to corrosion for any ruptures, this is where I asked that -- is the fire department seen to be a little more off base, thinking that it's going to be a -- we're here in Saint John, we have these smaller lines coming through, and there has been a few incidents through contractors' negligence.
16050. And after that being said, we were always presuming that that might be the problem, where I tend to think, after all the evidence that has been looked at, that it's more to a corrosion effect breakdown.
16051. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Robichaud, that material has been covered on the record. Thank you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16052. MR. ROBICHAUD: It's been noted that there's a large distribution pipeline in urban areas already existing.
16053. In Ontario, is it not so that the urban area that houses a large pipeline,
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
is it a result of the communities grown into the rural areas now, rather than a rural setting, where it was originally designed?
16054. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Robichaud, could you explain to the Board the relevance of this line of questioning with respect to this expert witness Panel on engineering design and safety?
16055. MR. ROBICHAUD: Well, I'm sure that the engineering design is more so taking a look at the safety factors.
16056. And I presume with history, the first safety factor would have been in the rural areas for any distribution lines.
16057. And here we're attempting to put a distribution line through the city, which I would have thought the precedence would have been on the outskirts, where are rural, but now were coming in.
16058. And in Ontario, I did spend close to 15 years up there, and I know that Toronto is no longer just Toronto. It's grown another 40 ---
16059. THE CHAIRPERSON: And, sir, I believe the nature of your questioning is along the routing side of things, which was well covered in the record, the specific area that you're raising.
16060. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16061. MR. ROBICHAUD: Mr. Mayer, transcript No. 9, 14287 to 14288. Regarding the pipelines that refer to, they all have been designed for these urban areas.
16062. Can I ask the age of these pipelines mentioned?
16063. MR. MAYER: I think the -- there's a range of ages of pipelines that are displayed in attachment 2 to the reply evidence.
16064. I could think of some pipelines in that attachment that were built in 1957, and some pipelines in that attachment that were built in 1999, and perhaps in 2000. 2000, I think, is one of the most recent.
16065. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16066. MR. ROBICHAUD: Application 5.0, 5.1.2.3, Design, Engineering Design, Temperature.
16067. Does this pose an issue, should the buried pipeline be exposed due to necessary excavation, such as those cited by Mr. Drake, on Monday, during Mr. Court's cross-examination?
16068. MR. MAYER: No, it doesn't.
16069. MR. ROBICHAUD: No. Thank you.
16070. 5.1.2.5, Class Location. Is it correct to say that the acceptable limits were judged by the proponent, not the individuals involved?
16071. Page 42? Emera's application. 5.1.2.3, there we go.
16072. MR. MAYER: No, those are -- you're talking there about the minimum design temperatures?
16073. MR. ROBICHAUD: Oh, no. .5, I'm sorry.
16074. MR. MAYER: Okay, can you re-ask the question? Just the question part?
16075. MR. ROBICHAUD: Is it correct to say that the acceptable limits were judged by the proponent, not the individuals involved?
16076. MR. MAYER: I don't see ---
16077. MR. ROBICHAUD: It doesn't seem to be on there either.
16078. MR. MAYER: --- reference to the acceptable limits in that -- what's up on the screen here.
16079. MR. ROBICHAUD: Pull this out here.
16080. MR. SMITH: Was Mr. Robichaud referring to the pipe class locations, and that those are the factors he's asking whether were adopted by the proponent, rather than the individuals?
16081. MR. ROBICHAUD: Exactly. Thank you.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16082. MR. SMITH: Okay. In which case, I think the witness could answer.
16083. MR. MAYER: All these factors were either dictated by code requirements or, in some cases, we exceeded code requirements, picking more conservative values.
16084. MR. ROBICHAUD: A little further on, on there, 5.1.2.7, Cover Requirements. Why different depths? Could it ---
16085. THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. -- oh, I was going to say, that information was covered in our discussions with Panel No. 1. They went into the rationale for that, so it's already on the record.
16086. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay.
16087. 5.1.2.8, the Coating System. Field Coating. What are the hazards of this coating?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16088. MR. MAYER: Are you referring to health hazards?
16089. MR. ROBICHAUD: I would think health hazards probably would be one factor.
16090. MR. MAYER: Well, there are certain precautions that the people handling and applying the coating materials must take.
16091. And it's in accordance with the -- you know, there are health and safety plans.
16092. You know, MSDS sheets have to be produced and known to the workers, etc. Protective clothing, respiratory gear, in some cases.
16093. It depends which coating system will be applied in the field.
16094. MR. ROBICHAUD: Will they be done in shop, or on site?
16095. MR. MAYER: They will be field applied, on site, for the girth welds.
16096. MR. ROBICHAUD: Corrosion. 5.1.2.9, Corrosion Protection? What is the heat tolerance on these coatings?
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16097. MR. MAYER: I believe in Fahrenheit it's 160 to 180 degree range.
16098. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you. What is the life span of these coatings?
16099. MR. MAYER: They'll be indefinite, as the life span of the pipeline.
16100. MR. ROBICHAUD: Is this the highest standard in the industry, in North America?
16101. MR. MAYER: It's the appropriate standard for buried pipelines.
16102. MR. ROBICHAUD: How did you decide on two kilometre intervals, and are they adequate?
16103. MR. MAYER: They are adequate for monitoring the corrosion system. And it's a design consideration. It deals with access, things like that.
16104. MR. ROBICHAUD: When will the designer complete his or her design?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16105. THE CHAIRPERSON: Are you referring to the detailed routing, Mr. Robichaud?
16106. MR. ROBICHAUD: Oh, I'm sorry. We're into the launcher receiver facilities here.
16107. THE CHAIRPERSON: I'm ---
16108. MR. ROBICHAUD: Still lost?
16109. THE CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I'm having trouble following you, Mr. Robichaud.
16110. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay.
16111. THE CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you could let us know if there's a particular section that you're asking a question about, and then clearly phrase that question, so that we can following along with you.
16112. MR. ROBICHAUD: Sorry.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16113. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay. We're into the 5.1.3, the Pigging Facilities Design and Construction. Why two sets of launcher receiver facilities, one at the beginning, one at about halfway point?
16114. MR. MAYER: It just limits the full length of the pig run that we would have to do when we're in operation. This way we can have a shorter run. We don't have to go the whole way with that -- those tools. It's just an operational consideration.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16115. MR. ROBICHAUD: 5.1.3.4, Pipe Material. This is the question, when will the detail design be ready. Sorry.
16116. MR. MAYER: The detail design will be ready in the summer of 2007.
16117. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you.
16118. Custody Transfer Station, 5.1.4.2, page 46. Who is responsible for the custody transfer station terminal on the pipeline?
16119. MR. MAYER: Emera Brunswick is responsible for that custody transfer station.
16120. MR. ROBICHAUD: The Appendix 10, we have -- 1-1.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16121. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay, I'll move on.
16122. What is an engineering alliance firm?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16123. MR. MAYER: I am sorry. You said attachment 10. We assumed it was part ---
16124. MR. ROBICHAUD: Okay, what -- I was going to go back to that.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16125. I'm trying to find the diagram itself, SKO1, Appendix 10. There is a drawing there that I've ---
16126. MR. MAYER: Yes, I have it.
16127. MR. ROBICHAUD: Where exactly is the responsibility divided between the terminal and the pipeline on this drawing?
16128. MR. MAYER: It's not shown on this drawing.
16129. MR. ROBICHAUD: No? Okay.
16130. Industry Standards, 5.2.2. As industry experts, do you know if there is presently any pressure to increase or evolve these standards?
16131. MR. MAYER: Well, I actually sit on the CSA subcommittee -- technical subcommittee for construction. And I'm a member of a code committee that does evolve these standards.
16132. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you.
16133. Emera's application again, page 49, 5.2.4.1, Construction Safety.
16134. Are MN&P standards harmonized for Canada and US?
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
16135. MR. MAYER: They are somewhat harmonized. And then the -- there's various portions of the policies and procedures that are applicable in Canada and the United States.
16136. So, they're harmonized to a certain level. There's certain health and safety requirements that are -- have to follow regulations, and in that case they do deviate.
16137. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you. 5.2.4.3, the joining program. When will the joining program be ready? Page 49.
16138. MR. MAYER: That will be ready late next summer should we get certification.
16139. MR. ROBICHAUD: Mr. Drake, you spoke of downtown Boston and other downtown city centres that have pipelines already existing.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. D. Robichaud
16140. How long has this pipeline been in Boston?
16141. MR. DRAKE: I believe that downtown Boston has had pipelines of many different kinds, distribution systems and transmission systems together, for a very long period of time, well in advance of the 1940s, into the early 30s, I believe.
16142. MR. ROBICHAUD: Is there any state in the US that has either tried to avoid or tried to get rid of an LNG plant or pipeline in their area?
16143. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, I'm not sure how you respond to that. The LNG plant is not relevant to the proceeding. I'm not sure how it helps the Board decide this case.
16144. MR. ROBICHAUD: I'll move on.
16145. THE CHAIRPERSON: Please move on to your next line of questioning.
16146. MR. ROBICHAUD: This could be the last one.
16147. The Emera reply evidence, page 2, 2.2, "Reply": (As read)
"Canada needs the Brunswick Pipeline."
16148. If the proposed pipeline is a transmission line to the US, why is this statement on record, and would the statement be misleading on the purpose of this pipeline?
16149. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, he is ahead of his time. I think that would be Panel 5.
16150. MR. ROBICHAUD: Thank you. Then that's everything for today. Thank you.
16151. THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Robichaud.
16152. I'm going to suggest we take a 15-minute stretch break and then come back and finish off.
16153. MR. SMITH: Thank you, Madam Chair.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. S. McGrath
16154. THE CHAIRPERSON: We'll reconvene at 6:45.
--- Upon recessing at 6:28 p.m./L'audience est suspendue à 18h28 --- Upon resuming at 6:49 p.m./L'audience est reprise à 18h49
16155. THE CHAIRPERSON: Nova Scotia Department of Energy?
--- RALPH MAYER, Resumed: --- DR. FRANK BERCHA, Resumed: --- ANDREW DRAKE, Resumed: --- DR. JOHN KIEFNER, Resumed: --- MIKE WHALEN, Resumed:
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. McGRATH:
16156. MR. MCGRATH: Thank you, Madam Chair.
16157. Panel, I'll be very brief. I only have a few questions and, Mr. Mayer, I think you probably have the honour on what probably is going to be all three of them.
16158. During cross-examination by Mr. Court I believe the panel indicated that there were going to be no pressure reduction stations as part of the Brunswick Pipeline, and I just wanted to confirm that the design of the pipeline will accommodate such facilities at a later point in time.
16159. MR. MAYER: I suppose it depends on, you know, what the issue is, but we can take -- the pipeline material can be tapped into or we can shut in the pipeline and cut a "T" into it in order to make connections to it.
16160. If off of that connection a pressure reducing station had to be built, then yes, that's possible from an engineering point of view.
16161. MR. McGRATH: And I guess just a little bit more generally then, there are no factors or constraints that you're aware of that would limit the ability to connect future facilities to the Brunswick Pipeline?
16162. MR. MAYER: I can answer from the engineering point of view there's no factors or constraints, but you'll have to ask the policy panel about other issues.
16163. MR. McGRATH: I was looking for just the technical point of view, not the commercial point of view.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Mr. S. McGrath
16164. And as I understand it based on IR responses, there is a point on the Brunswick Pipeline near the Canada/US border that may be as close to 10 or 15 metres away from the Maritimes and Northeast Canada Pipeline.
16165. There's no design or construction-related issues that would preclude connecting the Brunswick Pipeline to the Maritimes Canada Pipeline at that point, would there be?
16166. MR. MAYER: None that we're aware of, but no engineering studies in that regard have taken place so it's hard for us to be definitive on that.
16167. MR. McGRATH: And would you be in a position to provide an estimate or a range of costs for a 10- or 15-metre span that would connect those two facilities?
16168. MR. MAYER: The cost estimates were all handled by Panel 1.
16169. MR. McGRATH: The cost estimates for this project. I was just wondering if there were any engineering rules of thumb or anything that would put you in a position to ballpark such facilities.
16170. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, if I might. With respect, those are access questions. I'm not saying my friend can't ask them, but I would suggest they would be best placed to Panel 5 for -- and not to be obtuse.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
16171. MR. SMITH: I'm just too tired to be obtuse.
16172. The reason is the policy stipulates that the requesting company would build over to Emera Brunswick, and so I would just suggest that he wanted to pursue it, he pursue it with Panel 5 rather than this panel.
16173. MR. McGRATH: The question was looking for sort of rule-of-thumb cost estimates, but if my friend says that I can pursue that with 5, I'm happy to do that, Madam Chair.
16174. There was also some talk of -- or mention of the fact that no compression has been included as part of the design of the Brunswick Pipeline, so I assume that the Canaport facilities are providing any necessary push.
16175. And I'm wondering what design assumptions were made with respect
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. M. Yuzda
to compression and supply from the Canaport facility.
16176. MR. MAYER: Yes, the design assumptions are that they will not deliver over 1440 psi pressure into our system and their contracted volume is 750 million.
16177. MR. McGRATH: Thank you.
16178. THE CHAIRPERSON: Does Board counsel have any questions?
16179. MS. YUZDA: Thank you, Madam Chair.
--- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS. YUZDA:
16180. MS. YUZDA: Good evening, gentlemen. My name is Marian Yuzda and I'm Board counsel.
16181. Ms. Dutcher, if you could please pull up Exhibit B-1-a, Adobe page 66, at paragraph 6? That would be the paragraph that starts: (As read)
"For operational balancing --"
16182. In the application to the Board when you discuss the distribution of natural gas in the United States and how it could offer operational balancing for short- term peaking demand of the northeast market by selling gas into the daily market, Emera states that: (As read)
"This gas may be available to the pipeline to help in maintaining the operational integrity of the pipeline during peak demand or supply interruptions from other sources."
16183. Now, at Exhibit B-23-a, at Adobe page 3, paragraph 2 -- and that is the response to NEB IR-2.2(b) -- Emera states that: (As read)
"It is important to note that the Brunswick Pipeline does not require any specific minimum flow rate to ensure operational effectiveness."
16184. In responding to the Board's IR, to that particular IR, did you interpret the term "operational integrity" to be synonymous with "operational effectiveness"?
16185. I suppose, Mr. Whalen, this may be a question that I'll direct to you.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. M. Yuzda
16186. MR. SMITH: Madam Chair, the -- I'm just looking at the list of panel responsibilities and it may be that this panel can offer something on it, but I think it's -- the responsibility of Panel No. 5 was NEB-2.2(b).
16187. I've got heads vigorously nodding in two different directions.
16188. MR. WHALEN: We would agree.
16189. MR. SMITH: Well, I know you do but ---
--- (Laughter/Rires)
16190. MS. YUZDA: With that, gentlemen, I'll reserve my questions for Panel 5. Thank you.
16191. Thank you, Madam Chair, Board Members.
16192. THE CHAIRPERSON: The Board has -- Board Members have no questions of you.
16193. Are there any matters still to be cleared up, Mr. Smith? I believe there's one outstanding undertaking that's perfectly clear that it won't be examined on?
16194. MR. SMITH: Correct. Dr. Bercha was going to take that one away and try and respond in a timely way. And I have no re-direct, Madam Chair. So may the panel be excused?
16195. THE CHAIRPERSON: That sounds like they're leaving the dinner table in my world.
16196. Yes, the Board thanks Emera Panel No. 4 very much for your participation in these proceedings, and you are excused.
16197. MR. SMITH: And they'll leave the cutlery behind.
--- (Laughter/Rires)
16198. MR. MAYER: Thank you, Madam Chair.
--- (The panel withdraws/Les témoins se retirent)
16199. THE CHAIRPERSON: I just have one note before we adjourn.
Transcript Order GH-1-2006 Emera Brunswick Panel 4 Examination by Ms. M. Yuzda
16200. Board counsel would like all parties to let them know whether and how long they might cross-examine Emera's remaining panels, and that would be Panel No. 3, Mr. Jensen, and Panel No. 5, policy.
16201. I think we continue to endeavour to try to make scheduling estimates. I'm not sure that we've been terribly successful with them at this point, but if people -- if parties could please let Board counsel know of any estimates that they have available, that would be very useful.
16202. And with that I will again, for the second night in a row, thank everyone for their patience in sitting longer than originally intended.
16203. We'll reconvene tomorrow morning at 9:00. We'll sit till noon. We'll break for an hour. We'll sit from 1:00 to 5:30, and then we'll sit from 7:00 to 9:00.
16204. So, have a good evening everyone. Good night.
--- Upon adjourning at 7:00 p.m./L'audience est adjournée à 19h00
Transcript Order GH-1-2006