Copyrighted by Paul MeStallvrorth 1955 THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONGO QUESTION, 188L-191L DISSERTATION Presented, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University BY Paul McStallworth, B.A., A.M* THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY Approved by: Adviser ^ Department of T H E HON. J O H N A. KASSON. UNITED STATES TSTTNTSTEE, TO OETÎATANY. 11 CONTENTS PREFACE................................................. xi CHAPTER I - OUR EARLY INTEREST IN THE C O N G O ................. 1 CHAPTER II - THE PRE-CONFERENCE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE..... 3^ CHAPTER III - THE TISDEL TEMPORARY MISSION................. 71 CHAPTER 17 - PARTICIPATION - A BREAK \7ITH TRADITION........... 9$ CHAPTER V - KASSON AT THE CONFERENCE..................... 108 CHAPTER 71 - POST CONFERENCE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE ..... 129 CHAPTER 711 - THE REACTION OF THE CLE7ELAND ADMINISTRATION ... lUO CHAPTER 7III - A DECLINE OF INTEREST IN THE C O N G O .......... l6U CHAPTER IX - A RE7I7AL OF INTEREST ....................... l80 CHAPTER X - MISSIONARIES, MORALITY AND MAYHEM............. 209 CHAPTER XI - INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, MOGULS AND LOBBYISTS ... 2^8 CHAPTER X n - DIPLOMATIC EFFORT FOR R E F O R M ................ 297 APPENDIXES............................................. 3UU BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 371 111 ILLUSTRATIONS JOHN ADAM KASSON ......................... Frontispiece HENRY MORTON STANLEY............................... 2? HENRY SHELTON SANFORD,.............................. 6$ FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN.......................... 83 MAP OF THE CONGO ................................... 1$0 THOMAS F. BAYARD................................... 175 GEORGE W. WILLIAMS ................................. 199 CARTOON - IN THE COILS OF THE C O N G O .................. 239 JOHN TYLER MORGAN............................. 2?7 LEOPOLD II ........................................ 302 Iv PREFACE Sybil E, Crowe, in a distinguished monograph. The West Berlin African Conference 188I|.-188^, critically berated the part played by the United States in that memorable international gathering. This British author stated: The part played by her at the conference is of some interest but of no practical importance. It is indeed possible to conçare it with that taken by her at Paris in 1918. Secure, then as later, on the other side of the Atlantic, with little or no direct interest in the issues at stake, she could afford, then as later, to be magnifi­ cently Utopian in her ideals, but when it came to giving any material pledge of them she at once drew back. Thus her representative at Berlin in I88U and 1885 is to be found constantly advocating the widest possible applica­ tion of every possible liberal principle, from free trade and free navigation on the Congo and the Niger, and the abolition of the internal slave trade and the liquor traffic, doivn to the international relation of colonial occupations in Africa; yet she was the only one who had refused to give a pledge on entering the conference that she would ratify its decision, and in fact she never did ratify them.l The Crowe analysis appeared to this observer as the action of a man ivlth a telescope, who, due to the impact of a growing second world holocaust, looked through the wrong end. National policy inherently made the role of this country and its relations to other Powers of greater importance than the then available records revealed to this earlier writer. Moreover, trade with its various ramifi­ cations, in that imperialistic era, was of direct importance to all Powers, In addition, distance or the expanse of the Atlantic was, then as later, no guarantee of security. Action motivating each Power should have been of keen importance to their various representatives, to their contemporaries, and to ISybil Eyre Crowe, The West-African Berlin Conference I88U- 1885 (London: Longmans, Green and Co,, I9L2 ), pp. 97-90. V prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to have American warships make frequent visits by Africa, Asia, and South America because "the national flag must be carried to such coasts before the merchant flag can be safely or profitably exhibited. Feeling that our foreign commerce had been neglected by private individuals, he urged governmental support, stating that "the fostering, the developing, and directing of commerce by government should be laid down as a necessity of the first importance," In the decades between I87O and I89O, ovfing to industrial expansion our manufacturers began to accumulate surpluses and became interested in developing foreign markets. Our surplus was basically due to an increase in the cotton industry whose production by I88O equalled that of all Europe and England. Facilitating this tremendous increase were improvements in the various means of communication and transportation. These factors in turn tended to accelerate our demand for sub-tropical and tropical products. In addition. Big Business had the surplus capital for further exploitation,1? Vifithin the thirty year period from I87O to 1900, our foreign trade doubled and, simultaneously, the proportion of manufactured goods among exports increased from fifteen to almost thirty-two percent. This also meant that we were competing with other nations in the markets of the world. More important for this investigation, ^^Brainerd Dyer, The Public Career of William M. Evarts (Berkeley; University ofCalifornia Press, l933), p. ^^Ibid., p. 237. Cf. L^th Cong. 2nd sess. House Doc. No, 102, p . 3 3 7 IP Parker T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics (New York City: The Macmillan Company, 19^2), p. 26 et. seq. vi "entertaining, the exchanging of presents, and the negotiating of treaties or agreements»"^ Prior to the American Revolution, Yankee merchantmen cruised on the west coast of Africa to collect slaves. Despite the fact that Congress in 1808 forbade the trade, they continued to traffic long after the establishment of national independence. After I819, the Executive, through a Congressional Act, was empowered to prohibit this traffic by use of our national vessels.^ Significantly, naval officer L. H. Stockton, by cooperating :vith Dr. Eli Ayres and Bushrod Washington, was partially responsible for laying the foundation for the State of Liberia. As a result of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of August 9, 18U2, our Navy, along with Britains, had the responsi­ bility of the maintaining Atlantic squadrons to suppress the slave trade. Thus, indirectly, the Navy was allied with abolitionist and emancipationist groups wh3.ch sought the return of the slave of his native land.^ Another early indication of American interest in Africa was the T. J. Bowen Report on the Exploration of the River Niger in Africa which was submitted by Senator E, B. Washburne in connection with Senate Bill 60? in 1897. He held that the bill would promote and interest American traders in the rapidly-developing commerce of the African Continent. At the same time, with only slight addi­ tional outlay, it would suppress more effectively the remaining slave trade upon the West African coast. Specifically, the Bill ^Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of Americ^ Naval Officers, I778-I883 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1912), p. 327:----- ^Ibid., p. 399. ^Ibid., pp. 359-359. Vli sought: (l) an increase of efficiency of the African Squadron; (2) admission of all African products to American ports free of duty; and (3) the establishment of a steamship line direct to the African coast, including the equatorial section.^ Two years later, the threads of our interest in Africa were found in the initial instructions given to the Commander of our squadron on the coast of Africa. He was directed to protest the "rights and interests of our countrymen and our commerce in that quarter." An accompanying instruction ordered "the suppression of the slave trade by American citizens under the flag of the United States." Hence, commercial interest was sine qua non even prior to the Civil V/ar.^ Construction of a new Navy to meet new needs as a rising Power began in I883 with the authorization of three steel cruisers and a dispatch boat. Thirty additional vessels, including the second class battleships, Maine and Texas, were authorized in the next six years.? It has been maintained at home and abroad that we, as a nation, had no interest in expansion prior to I898. From the evidence of this research, it would appear that the intensity of vocal expres­ sion on trade expansion varied in the periods before and after I898. There were reasons, however, for the failure of the United States to expand its trade in Africa prior to I898. Our pause at the "water’s edge" was not for lack of exponents of Manifest Destiny, ^U. S. 3i|th Cong. 3rd sess., 18^7• Senate Misc. Doc. No. U6, Chp. I. ^U. S. Navy Dept., Confidential Letters, IV, Isaac Torrey to William Inman, July 6, 1859, Letters of Initialed Instructions. ^George T. Gore, A Navy Second to None (New York City; Harcourt Bruce, 19^0), Chaps. Ill-VI, vlll but rather, because responsible statesmen were not ready to go far afield. Even southward expansion was curtailed by antislayery forces. Since the country was saddled with debt following the Civil War, expansion in the Caribbean, along with the possession of Alaska was regarded as extravagant. Consideration for exten­ sion was swept aside whenever the Caribbean was hit by hurricane, earthwuake and tidal wave. It was further observed that domestic o expansion and growth were given prioriiy.