STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 Key Developments in Global Affairs
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Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Jack Thompson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Michael Haas, Jeronim Perović, Jack Thompson, Lisa Watanabe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019: Jack Thompson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland This publication covers events up to 1 March 2019. © 2019, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-66-0 CHAPTER 4 Russia’s Renaissance in the Arab World Lisa Watanabe In order to secure its status as a major external powerbroker in the region, Russia is reviving Soviet-era ties with a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as forging new ones. Moscow lacks a clear strategy – its approach is pragmatic, engaging a variety of regimes and employing a range of policy instruments. Yet it lacks the economic clout and desire to take on great power responsibilities in the region. Russia is likely to boost its regional profile through economic and military cooperation, as well as through diplomacy, capitalizing on the West’s absence or missteps. Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during their meet- ing in Sochi, May 17, 2018. Mikhail Klimentyev / Sputnik via Reuters 65 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 Russia is returning to the Middle Not surprisingly, much attention to- East and North Africa (MENA). Fol- date has focused on Russia’s involve- lowing a temporary absence after the ment in the Syrian conflict. The de- collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s gree of Russian engagement in Syria, presence in the MENA region has as well as the benefits Moscow has been steadily growing since 2000. Al- reaped from it, have been consid- though the region does not have the erable. However, the Syrian case is, same significance for Russia as the in many respects, exceptional. Giv- post-Soviet space, China or India, en Moscow’s already close relations developments can negatively affect with the Assad regime and Syria’s Russian national interests and secu- importance for regional stability, the rity. Gaining influence in the region, Kremlin was willing to become heav- as well as recognition of its status as ily involved militarily, and even risk one of its major international stake- confrontation with the US, in order holders, is consequently important. to back Assad. However, Russia is less Moscow has accordingly sought to invested elsewhere in the Arab world re-establish relations with tradition- and has thus far exercised caution in al partners across the Arab world, as its actions. Its engagement takes a va- well as to develop ties with a number riety of forms, depending on the con- of other countries in the region. In the text. This chapter looks specifically at Arab world, relations have generally how Russia has succeeded in reviving been forged or deepened through in- relations with two of its traditional al- crementally developing economic and lies, Algeria and Egypt, and is seeking military-security cooperation. Howev- closer links to another Soviet-era ally, er, since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Libya. Together, these cases help to il- the Syrian conflict, Moscow has also lustrate that, although Russia is seek- been engaging militarily and using ing to gain a firmer foothold in the high-powered diplomacy as additional MENA region, its expanded presence foreign policy instruments. Although has often been at the behest of local there are many similarities with the actors and frequently in response to a Soviet form of engagement in the re- void left by the West. gion, Moscow’s current approach is distinctly non-ideological. This, as Russia’s Return to the well as Moscow’s emphasis on state-led MENA Region transition to democracy, makes Russia Russia has a historical legacy in the an attractive partner for many regimes region to build on. Soviet support for in the Middle East and North Africa. pan-Arabism led to strong ties with 66 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD several countries in the Arab world, role in facilitating the development of particularly throughout the 1950s and Moscow’s presence in the region. Rus- 1960s. At this time, especially close sia is willing to work with existing re- ties with Algeria, Egypt, and Syria gimes on all sides of regional divides. were forged. As Egypt moved closer to Russia also recognizes that many local the United States in the early 1970s, regimes do not wish the United States Libya replaced it as a key Soviet ally to dominate the region, and has in the MENA region. The collapse of seized upon opportunities created by the Soviet Union would cause rela- a desire on the part of some regimes tions with these states and other allies to diversify their strategic partners. It in the MENA region to come to a near has also typically stepped in when a standstill. The exception was Syria, lack of robust Western engagement with which Russia maintained fairly has been evident. strong ties. Russia’s relative absence from the region continued during the Nothing has done more to consoli- 1990s, as it grappled with its own in- date Russia’s return to the region than ternal challenges. its intervention in the Syrian conflict. Moscow has employed a wider range When President Vladimir Putin first of policy tools in the Syrian context took office in 2000, this trend was -re than elsewhere. In the 2000s, as Mos- versed. Ties with Soviet-era Arab allies cow forgave three quarters of Syria’s have been revived and strengthened Soviet-era debt, Russian arms sales as part of a broader aim of increas- to Syria increased, and Damascus ing Russia’s presence in the MENA agreed that Russia could renovate its region, and being recognized as one Soviet-era naval base at the port of of its powerbrokers.1 Moscow has Tartus.2 Then, after the civil war be- also forged relations with a number gan in 2011, Moscow used diploma- of other Middle Eastern countries, cy to try to prevent United Nations including Israel, Iran, Jordan, Leba- Security Council (UNSC) resolutions non, Turkey and Gulf Cooperation from being used to facilitate regime Council (GCC) states. It has generally change, as had been the case in Libya focused on incrementally building up in 2011. While Libya was not strate- relations by using a number of poli- gically important enough to risk con- cy tools, including arms sales, broader frontation with France, the United trade relations, and cooperation in the Kingdom, and the United States, Syr- military-security and energy spheres. ia was different. Moscow’s relations Pragmatism has played an important with the Assad regime were relatively 67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 strong. Syria was also seen as central to zones to reduce the level of violence stability in the Middle East and thus and pave the way for political nego- critical to a range of Russian econom- tiations.4 By initiating an alternative ic interests. As a result, Moscow was mediation track to that of the Unit- ready to put its full weight behind the ed Nations, and one that exclud- Assad regime. ed the United States, Moscow used high-powered diplomacy to shift Defense of the Assad regime moved peace talks away from discussions of from diplomatic to military support in regime change, as well as to boost September 2015, when Russia inter- Russia’s legitimacy as a major interna- vened in Syria. This was the first time tional stakeholder in the Middle East. since the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia had done so beyond its Intervention in the Syrian conflict “near abroad”. No doubt there was a is set to have a number of addition- fear at this point that the Assad regime al benefits for Russia. Substantial might collapse, spurring Moscow on. military cooperation between Russia However, Western hesitancy, especial- and Syria is likely to continue over ly on the part of the United States, the longer term. Some of Russia’s surely played a role in the Kremlin’s armed forces will remain in Syria calculus. Whatever the precise calcula- to help secure the Assad regime in a tions in Moscow, military intervention post-conflict scenario. The extent of paid off. Moscow’s air support turned Syrian dependence on Russian arms the balance on the battlefield in favor supplies means that Syrian armed of regime forces. By 2018, the Assad forces will continue to rely on Rus- regime controlled over half of Syrian sian weapons and materiel for some territory, compared to a mere quarter time to come. In addition, Damascus prior to Russian military interven- has agreed that Russia can expand its tion.3 One of Moscow’s key objectives Tartus naval base and use it, as well had thus been achieved. as the Khmeimim airbase, for several decades. Although the Tartus facility Once the Assad regime was in con- is small, its expansion will help Rus- trol of strategically important areas sia increase its presence in the Eastern of the country, Russia stepped up its Mediterranean and the Middle East.5 high-powered diplomacy. Along with Turkey and Iran, Russia launched the Moscow no doubt hopes that its Astana process in early 2017, which companies will benefit from recon- focused on establishing de-confliction struction efforts once the conflict 68 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD Russia’s Trade Turnover with the MENA Region As of 2017 Turkey 3.68% Israel 0.43% Iran 0.29% ME and NA total 5.46% United Arab Emirates 0.28% Iraq 0.24% Saudi Arabia Kuwait Lebanon Yemen Russia Syria 0.55% Jordan Oman Qatar Bahrain Palestinian territories Egypt 1.14% Others 94.55% Algeria 0.79% Morocco 0.25% Tunisia 0.09% Libya 0.02% Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia ends.