Center for Security Studies

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 Key Developments in Global Affairs

Editors: Jack Thompson, Oliver Thränert

Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Michael Haas, Jeronim Perović, Jack Thompson, Lisa Watanabe

CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends

Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019: Jack Thompson, Oliver Thränert Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger

Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland

This publication covers events up to 1 March 2019.

© 2019, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich

Images © by Reuters

ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-66-0 CHAPTER 4 Russia’s Renaissance in the Arab World Lisa Watanabe

In order to secure its status as a major external powerbroker in the region, Russia is reviving Soviet-era ties with a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as forging new ones. Moscow lacks a clear strategy – its approach is pragmatic, engaging a variety of regimes and employing a range of policy instruments. Yet it lacks the economic clout and desire to take on great power responsibilities in the region. Russia is likely to boost its regional profile through economic and military cooperation, as well as through diplomacy, capitalizing on the West’s absence or missteps.

Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes Syrian President Bashar al-Assad during their meet- ing in Sochi, May 17, 2018. Mikhail Klimentyev / Sputnik via Reuters

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Russia is returning to the Middle Not surprisingly, much attention to- East and North Africa (MENA). Fol- date has focused on Russia’s involve- lowing a temporary absence after the ment in the Syrian conflict. The de- collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s gree of Russian engagement in Syria, presence in the MENA region has as well as the benefits Moscow has been steadily growing since 2000. Al- reaped from it, have been consid- though the region does not have the erable. However, the Syrian case is, same significance for Russia as the in many respects, exceptional. Giv- post-Soviet space, China or India, en Moscow’s already close relations developments can negatively affect with the Assad regime and Syria’s Russian national interests and secu- importance for regional stability, the rity. Gaining influence in the region, Kremlin was willing to become heav- as well as recognition of its status as ily involved militarily, and even risk one of its major international stake- confrontation with the US, in order holders, is consequently important. to back Assad. However, Russia is less Moscow has accordingly sought to invested elsewhere in the Arab world re-establish relations with tradition- and has thus far exercised caution in al partners across the Arab world, as its actions. Its engagement takes a va- well as to develop ties with a number riety of forms, depending on the con- of other countries in the region. In the text. This chapter looks specifically at Arab world, relations have generally how Russia has succeeded in reviving been forged or deepened through in- relations with two of its traditional al- crementally developing economic and lies, Algeria and Egypt, and is seeking military-security cooperation. Howev- closer links to another Soviet-era ally, er, since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Libya. Together, these cases help to il- the Syrian conflict, Moscow has also lustrate that, although Russia is seek- been engaging militarily and using ing to gain a firmer foothold in the high-powered diplomacy as additional MENA region, its expanded presence foreign policy instruments. Although has often been at the behest of local there are many similarities with the actors and frequently in response to a Soviet form of engagement in the re- void left by the West. gion, Moscow’s current approach is distinctly non-ideological. This, as Russia’s Return to the well as Moscow’s emphasis on state-led MENA Region transition to democracy, makes Russia Russia has a historical legacy in the an attractive partner for many regimes region to build on. Soviet support for in the Middle East and North Africa. pan-Arabism led to strong ties with

66 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD several countries in the Arab world, role in facilitating the development of particularly throughout the 1950s and Moscow’s presence in the region. Rus- 1960s. At this time, especially close sia is willing to work with existing re- ties with Algeria, Egypt, and Syria gimes on all sides of regional divides. were forged. As Egypt moved closer to Russia also recognizes that many local the United States in the early 1970s, regimes do not wish the United States Libya replaced it as a key Soviet ally to dominate the region, and has in the MENA region. The collapse of seized upon opportunities created by the Soviet Union would cause rela- a desire on the part of some regimes tions with these states and other allies to diversify their strategic partners. It in the MENA region to come to a near has also typically stepped in when a standstill. The exception was Syria, lack of robust Western engagement with which Russia maintained fairly has been evident. strong ties. Russia’s relative absence from the region continued during the Nothing has done more to consoli- 1990s, as it grappled with its own in- date Russia’s return to the region than ternal challenges. its intervention in the Syrian conflict. Moscow has employed a wider range When President Vladimir Putin first of policy tools in the Syrian context took office in 2000, this trend was -re than elsewhere. In the 2000s, as Mos- versed. Ties with Soviet-era Arab allies cow forgave three quarters of Syria’s have been revived and strengthened Soviet-era debt, Russian arms sales as part of a broader aim of increas- to Syria increased, and Damascus ing Russia’s presence in the MENA agreed that Russia could renovate its region, and being recognized as one Soviet-era naval base at the port of of its powerbrokers.1 Moscow has Tartus.2 Then, after the civil war be- also forged relations with a number gan in 2011, Moscow used diploma- of other Middle Eastern countries, cy to try to prevent United Nations including Israel, Iran, Jordan, Leba- Security Council (UNSC) resolutions non, Turkey and Gulf Cooperation from being used to facilitate regime Council (GCC) states. It has generally change, as had been the case in Libya focused on incrementally building up in 2011. While Libya was not strate- relations by using a number of poli- gically important enough to risk con- cy tools, including arms sales, broader frontation with France, the United trade relations, and cooperation in the Kingdom, and the United States, Syr- military-security and energy spheres. ia was different. Moscow’s relations Pragmatism has played an important with the Assad regime were relatively

67 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 strong. Syria was also seen as central to zones to reduce the level of violence stability in the Middle East and thus and pave the way for political nego- critical to a range of Russian econom- tiations.4 By initiating an alternative ic interests. As a result, Moscow was mediation track to that of the Unit- ready to put its full weight behind the ed Nations, and one that exclud- Assad regime. ed the United States, Moscow used high-powered diplomacy to shift Defense of the Assad regime moved peace talks away from discussions of from diplomatic to military support in regime change, as well as to boost September 2015, when Russia inter- Russia’s legitimacy as a major interna- vened in Syria. This was the first time tional stakeholder in the Middle East. since the collapse of the Soviet Union that Russia had done so beyond its Intervention in the Syrian conflict “near abroad”. No doubt there was a is set to have a number of addition- fear at this point that the Assad regime al benefits for Russia. Substantial might collapse, spurring Moscow on. military cooperation between Russia However, Western hesitancy, especial- and Syria is likely to continue over ly on the part of the United States, the longer term. Some of Russia’s surely played a role in the Kremlin’s armed forces will remain in Syria calculus. Whatever the precise calcula- to help secure the Assad regime in a tions in Moscow, military intervention post-conflict scenario. The extent of paid off. Moscow’s air support turned Syrian dependence on Russian arms the balance on the battlefield in favor supplies means that Syrian armed of regime forces. By 2018, the Assad forces will continue to rely on Rus- regime controlled over half of Syrian sian weapons and materiel for some territory, compared to a mere quarter time to come. In addition, Damascus prior to Russian military interven- has agreed that Russia can expand its tion.3 One of Moscow’s key objectives Tartus naval base and use it, as well had thus been achieved. as the Khmeimim airbase, for several decades. Although the Tartus facility Once the Assad regime was in con- is small, its expansion will help Rus- trol of strategically important areas sia increase its presence in the Eastern of the country, Russia stepped up its Mediterranean and the Middle East.5 high-powered diplomacy. Along with Turkey and Iran, Russia launched the Moscow no doubt hopes that its Astana process in early 2017, which companies will benefit from recon- focused on establishing de-confliction struction efforts once the conflict

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Russia’s Trade Turnover with the MENA Region As of 2017 Turkey 3.68% Israel 0.43% Iran 0.29% ME and NA total 5.46% United Arab Emirates 0.28% Iraq 0.24% Saudi Arabia Kuwait Lebanon Yemen Russia Syria 0.55% Jordan Oman Qatar Bahrain Palestinian territories Egypt 1.14% Others 94.55% Algeria 0.79% Morocco 0.25% Tunisia 0.09% Libya 0.02%

Source: Federal Customs Service of Russia ends. Russian companies are eager to the opportunities created by recon- win lucrative reconstruction contracts struction will not be Russia’s alone, and are set to receive preferential but shared with a number of other treatment. Yet, so too are Iranian and international actors.6 Chinese companies. Reconstruction of Syria will also require a substantial Syria represents an example of Rus- amount of international aid and assis- sian engagement in the Arab world tance, and Russia alone will be unable that would be hard to replicate else- to finance this. The fact that Moscow where, at least for the time being. The has been attempting to secure Europe- Arab world, and the MENA region an and US funding for reconstruction specifically, is not a priority for Mos- efforts is telling. Although Europeans cow. Beyond arms sales, Russian trade and the United States are reluctant to with the region remains fairly mini- do so as long as the prospect of free mal. Outside of Syria, Russia has not and fair elections are not part of a invested enough to support a regime negotiated settlement, Beijing has al- to the extent that it has the Assad ready indicated a willingness to help regime, particularly if there is a risk finance reconstruction. Consequently, of conflict with the West. Although

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Russia has succeeded in reviving ties personnel, formed a key part of Al- with other traditional allies, its level of gerian-Soviet relationship. However, engagement, as well as the benefits ac- even in the area of military coopera- crued from it, have been more modest. tion, Algeria began to try to diversify This is partly due to the extent of local its relations during the mid-1980s, demand for cooperation with Russia particularly as a result of improved and the latter’s own reluctance to take relations with France. Economic rela- risks for regimes that are not deemed tions between Algeria and the Soviet critical to Russian interests. That said, Union were never significant.7 In fact, Russia has successfully carved out a trade with the United States would place for itself alongside the United become far more important than that States and European states in Algeria with the Soviet Union towards the and Egypt, and is attempting to do so end of the Cold War. in Libya by drawing on its experience in the Syrian conflict. In the post-Cold War period, rela- tions between Algiers and Moscow In Algeria, Algiers Sets the Terms intensified in the 2000s, as Russia Algeria and the Soviet Union were sought to capitalize on the previous- allies during the Cold War. Yet, the ly close relations between the Soviet extent of their cooperation was al- Union and Algeria. This came at a ways limited by Algeria’s policy of time when Algiers sought to end its non-alignment. Relations with the international isolation following a Soviet Union were conceived in Al- decade of civil war. In 2001, the two giers as a counterweight to those with countries signed a strategic partner- France and the United States, rather ship that catalyzed an intensification than an attempt to align with the Sovi- of relations. One of the main ele- et Union. A window of opportunity to ments of the partnership focused on deepen Algerian-Soviet relations came arms supplies. The Algerian army in 1963, as a result of the War of the was largely equipped with Soviet ma- Sands between Algeria and Morocco teriel, which made Russia a logical over disputed border areas. The per- supplier. Moscow provided an addi- ception in Algiers was that the United tional incentive by offering to cancel States had lent support to Morocco in Soviet-era debt, which amounted to the conflict, rendering Algeria open 29 percent of Algerian foreign debt to overtures from the Soviets. From at that time, in return for orders of this point on, arms supplies, as well arms for the equivalent amount.8 The as the training of military officers and value of arms purchases from Russia

70 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD subsequently rose, with a significant These developments notwithstand- increase in the mid-2000s that coin- ing, the extent of ties between Russia cided with Algeria’s effort to mod- and Algeria is heavily circumscribed ernize its army. Military training and by Algeria’s fierce independence and sharing of experience, as well as intelli- economic nationalism. Strengthened gence sharing on terrorist-related top- relations with Russia have always ics increased. However, Russia failed been counterbalanced by relations in its bid to establish a naval base in with other countries. Although arms Mers Al-Kabir. From the perspective purchases from Russia increased in of Algiers, this would have amounted the first decade of the 2000s, Algiers to a violation of its independence.9 has consciously attempted to diversify arms supplies. From 2013 to 2017, Energy cooperation formed another Russian arms supplies accounted for key aspect of the strategic partnership. only 59 percent of total arms purchas- In 2006, Algeria’s state-owned hydro- es. The second and third largest sup- carbon company, Sonatrach, signed a pliers were China (15%) and Germa- memorandum of understanding with ny (13%).11 Algeria has also sought to the Russian state-owned oil and gas develop its own defense industry with companies, Lukoil, Gazprom, and the aim of increasing its autonomy. As Souyouzgaznef to collaborate on oil part of its aim to balance its strategic and liquefied natural gas exploration. relations, Algeria has sought greater In 2008, Sonatrach also granted Gaz- military cooperation with the North prom exploration and exploitation Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rights in the El-Assel gas field. Several within the framework of the Mediter- years later, in 2014, Sonatrach invit- ranean Dialogue, particularly in the ed Gazprom to explore and develop area of counterterrorism. Counterter- 30 gas fields as part of the Algerian rorism cooperation between Algeria government’s drive to discover new and the United States has also been hydrocarbon resources. The same year strengthened since the 9/11 terrorist also saw Russia’s state agency in charge attacks.12 of nuclear energy, Rosatom, and the Algerian ministry of energy sign a bi- Apart from arms sales, Algeria’s trade lateral agreement to construct, oper- with Russia remains relatively modest. ate, and service nuclear power stations Even in the energy sphere, Russian in- and research reactors across Algeria, vestments are relatively insignificant with the first power plant set to be compared to those of other coun- constructed by 2025.10 tries. Despite the inroads that they

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Russia as an Arms Supplier: Algeria and Egypt As of 2017

Others 12.60% Others 15.57% France 37.19%

Germany 12.78% Algeria Egypt 5.42 TIV 6.57 TIV

China 15.33% Russia 21.17%

Russia 59.29% USA 26.07%

TIV: Volume of arms exports – the SPIRI Trend Indicator Value (TIV) relates to actual deliveries of major conventional weapons based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons. Source: SIPRI have made in the hydrocarbon sector, Entry Points in El-Sisi’s Egypt 80 percent of the total hydrocarbon For several decades during the Cold production is owned by Sonatrach, War, Egypt was one of the Soviet and the remaining 20 percent is dom- Union’s principal allies in the Arab inated by Western companies, primar- world. Ties deepened in the 1950s, ily American and British.13 Though as relations with the West soured fol- intensified Algerian-Russian coopera- lowing the 1956 Suez Crisis. Egyp- tion, particularly in the gas sector, has tian-Russian ties were deepest in the generated fears that the two countries military sphere – Egypt wished to could collude in setting gas prices and strengthen its army and the Soviet restricting supplies to Europe, which Union was ready to supply arms on relies heavily on both countries for its favorable terms, as well as train Egyp- gas, Algeria’s energy interests do not al- tian military officers. Military coop- ways overlap with those of Russia. Al- eration reached unprecedented levels giers values its reputation as an auton- after Egypt (then known as the United omous actor in the energy sphere. The Arab Republic) was defeated by Isra- importance of Western investment in el in the 1967 Six Day War, and the Algeria, as well as the role of Europe Soviet Union acquired access to Egyp- as its main gas customer, means that tian naval and air bases. Economic and Algeria has little incentive to engage in technical assistance also formed part price setting or the restriction of sup- of the Egyptian-Soviet relationship. plies with Russia.14 The Soviet Union helped finance and

72 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD provide expertise for domestic devel- conditional cooperation, which led opment projects, including the presti- to a steady increase in ties. Much like gious Aswan Dam.15 Despite the depth during the early decades of the Cold of their relations, Egypt’s need for an War, relations have become densest in ally that had influence in Israel, as well the military-security sphere. In 2014, as one that would be ready to work for an arms deal worth some 3.5 billion peace in the Middle East, led Cairo to USD was signed by Egypt and Rus- turn to the United States after 1972. sia, which was reportedly financed by Saudi Arabia and the United During the first decade of the 2000s, Arab Emirates. This was followed by Russia made some progress in rekin- the creation of a joint Commission dling ties with Egypt. US pressure to for Military-Technical Cooperation, embark on political reforms rendered joint military and counter-terrorism President Hosni Mubarak amenable exercises, and a 2017 agreement that to developing relations with Russia, grants Russia access to Egyptian air- particularly with regard to trade and space and the use of military bases and energy cooperation.16 The relationship vice versa. Egypt has also allowed the only really blossomed in the wake of deployment of Russian special forces President Mohammed Morsi’s over- to Egypt, near the Libyan border, in throw in July 2013. The coup and the order to carry out missions in Libya subsequent crackdown on Morsi’s sup- and provide assistance to a Libyan porters led the Obama administration militia engaged in counter-terrorism to suspend a considerable amount of operations in the eastern part of the military aid to Egypt, as well as to block country.17 deliveries of military equipment. An opportunity for Moscow to strengthen Economic cooperation has also in- its relations with Egypt thus presented creased, largely as a result of expand- itself, and Russia seized upon it. How- ing trade relations and the creation of ever, this was only possible due to a a Russian industrial zone in Port Said deliberate effort on the part of Morsi’s on the Mediterranean coast. This will successor, President Abdul Fatah El-Si- enable Russian companies to benefit si, to pursue a multi-dimensional for- from agreements Egypt has with Af- eign policy, aimed at reducing depen- rican countries, the European Union, dence on any one international power. Mercusor, and other Arab countries that grant preferential treatment for When El-Sisi became president in goods manufactured in Egypt.18 Co- 2014, Russia extended offers of un- operation in the energy sector has

73 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 also grown. In 2017, the Russian Russia can be expected to reap addi- state-owned company, Rosneft, won tional economic and political benefits additional rights to develop the Zohr from this. Even so, ties with Russia gas field. Increased cooperation in the do not represent alternatives to those energy sector is largely due to a 2015 with other major international part- agreement in which Russia agreed to ners in the West, notably the Unit- construct a nuclear power plant in ed States, or key regional partners, Egypt, 85 percent of which is to be such as Saudi Arabia and the United financed through a Russian loan. The Arab Emirates. Even in the military plant will be maintained over a 60 year sphere, where relations are densest, period by Rosatom.19 Russia’s share of Egypt’s arms market is still less than that of either France Closer ties with Egypt are also polit- or the United States.21 This is not to ically beneficial for Russia. In 2015, say that Russia could not gain a larger Egypt abstained from a UN Gener- share of the Egyptian arms market in al Assembly resolution calling on all the future. However, replacing major UN members not to recognize Russia’s weapons systems could not realistical- annexation of Crimea. Egypt has also ly take place over the short term. Arms largely aligned its stance on Syria with purchases from the United States are, that of Russia. In 2016, Egypt vot- moreover, part of the terms of the ed with Russia against a French draft 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and UNSC resolution for a ceasefire in Israel, and thus need to be maintained. Aleppo that would have included the establishment of a no-fly zone. At the Russia’s economic relations with same meeting, Egypt voted in favor of a Egypt remain fairly modest. Despite resolution tabled by Russia that would increased trade between the two coun- have enabled continued airstrikes and tries, Egypt’s trade with China, Saudi thus helped the Assad regime to re- Arabia, the US, and several European take Aleppo. More recently, in 2018, countries is far more significant. In- Egypt was a vocal critic of US, UK and vestment in Egypt is also dominated French airstrikes in Syria in response to by companies from Europe, the Unit- the use of chemical weapons.20 ed States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.22 Russia’s presence Relations between Egypt and Russia in the natural gas sphere is similar- are set to develop further following a ly overshadowed by other investors, 2018 agreement on a comprehensive which means that cooperation in the partnership and strategic cooperation. energy sector, as in Algeria, is largely

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Top 5 Trading Partners of Algeria and Egypt Turnover in billion USD in 2017 Algeria Italy 40% 60% 9.38 China 92% 8% 9.01 France 49% 51% 8.73 Spain 43% 57% 7.23 USA 35% 65% 5.31

Egypt China 92% 8% 8.79 Italy 66% 34% 6.39 Saudi Arabia 73% 27% 5.70 USA 75% 25% 5.22 Import Germany 89% 11% 5.10 Export

Source: World Bank limited to development of Egypt’s ci- eager to attract further Chinese in- vilian nuclear energy program. vestment.23 That said, Russia has made the most of an opportunity to Expanding relations significantly be- increase export revenues, and to gain a yond their current scope would prove firmer footing in one of Washington’s difficult, particularly as long as the traditional allies in the Arab world. Egyptian regime continues to seek a This alone is an achievement. balance in its relations with major in- ternational powers. Russia would not Echoes of the Syrian ‘Model’ only have to compete with Europeans in Libya and the United States, but also with As Egypt turned towards the Unit- China. Beijing recently concluded a ed States in the early 1970s, and the comprehensive strategic partnership Soviet Union lost a major ally in the with Cairo. Cooperation between the southern Mediterranean, the Soviets two countries has already led to Chi- took a greater interest in Libya, both nese investment in some of Egypt’s as a source of revenue and a means major domestic economic projects, of counterbalancing US influence in including the construction of a new the MENA region. The Qaddafi -re administrative capital, and Cairo is gime was interested in Soviet arms,

75 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 and sought an ally that could protect it transportation networks by Russia’s from US interference. As in the Alge- Gazprom. The Qaddafi regime also rian and Egyptian cases, Soviet-Libyan granted Russia access to the port in relations were strongest in the military Benghazi for its naval fleet.25 sphere. The Soviet Union began sup- plying arms to Libya in 1975. Over the When the rebellion began in early next decade, thousands of Russian sol- 2011, Russia took a pragmatic ap- diers were stationed there. Libya was, proach. It did not come to the aid however, not important enough to the of the Qaddafi regime, though it did Soviets to risk confrontation with the abstain from voting on UNSC Res- United States. Soviet-Libyan relations olution 1973, which called upon all cooled after the United States carried UN member states to use all neces- out airstrikes in Libya in retaliation for sary means to protect civilians against the 1986 bombing of a West Berlin regime forces. It did so partly because nightclub, which was believed to have it believed that the mandate was too been planned by the Qaddafi regime.24 broad and could be used to try to bring about regime change, and part- Relations between the Qaddafi regime ly because it was not invested enough and the West improved after Western in the Qaddafi regime to veto it. Al- sanctions imposed in response to the though the regime had purchased bombing of the Pan Am flight 103 arms from Russia, many of the other were suspended, in 1999, and then contracts it had agreed to in principle lifted, in 2004. However, in return for never materialized amid competition the surrender of Libyan intelligence with US, French, and UK interests in officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 Libya.26 attack, and the regime’s renouncement of its weapons of mass destruction As the rebellion descended into a civil programs, Qaddafi expected more war, cooperation between Russia and than Libya received. As a result, he Libya came to a virtual halt. As a re- looked to revive relations with Russia. sult of the NATO-led 2011 interven- In 2008, Russia forgave Libya’s 4.5 bil- tion, mandated by UNSC Resolution lion USD Soviet-era debt in return for 1973, Russia is thought to have lost contracts believed to be worth 5 to some 4 to 4.5 billion USD. It also lost 10 billion USD. These deals includ- the right to use the Port of Benghazi. ed arms sales, the construction of a Although Russian firms attempted to high-speed railway between Sirte and resume contracts for arms purchases, Benghazi by Russian Railways, and gas the construction of the high-speed

76 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD railway, and natural gas development, are believed to have been assisting they suffered from Russia’s image as a Haftar’s forces either from eastern counter-revolutionary force that had Libya or from across the border in failed to support the rebels against the Egypt. In addition, reports that per- Qaddafi regime. As a result, Russian sonnel from Russian private security companies tended to lose out to US companies have also been deployed and European firms.27 to areas under Haftar’s control have emerged. Haftar has also been invit- However, the outbreak of civil war ed to Moscow, where he is believed in mid-2014 led to growing Russian to have lobbied for Russian arms sup- interest in Libya. Moscow initially plies, and, in 2017, he was invited to appeared to be trying to replicate in board a Russian aircraft carrier on its Libya what it has done in Syria. In the way back from Syria, during which he Syrian civil war, Russia stood firmly was rumored to have promised Russia behind the Assad regime. As a result, it access to the port in Benghazi. Mos- was able to use its influence with Assad cow has also printed 3 billion USD to become an indispensable interlocu- worth of banknotes for the GNA’s ri- tor in any negotiated settlement of the val, eastern-based government, much conflict. In recognition for its support, to the consternation of the Central Russia has secured the long-term use Bank of Libya in Tripoli.28 of air and naval bases, and hopes that its firms will benefit from future arms By providing Haftar with military deals and the reconstruction of the assistance and promoting him as a country’s infrastructure, including in potential future political leader, Rus- the energy sector. sia has not only helped his militia to fight radical Islamist forces, but also In the early phase of the Libyan con- to capture territory, including some flict, Russia put its weight behind a of Libya’s most important oil ter- former Qaddafi-era general, Khalifa minals. This has made him a neces- Haftar, who leads an eastern-based sary interlocutor in peace talks, even militia, which refuses to recognize the though he has sought to derail the UN-backed Government of National 2015 UN-brokered Libyan Political Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Haftar’s an- Agreement (LPA) that aims to recon- ti-terrorism narrative provided a con- cile Libya’s warring factions. Haftar’s venient guise for Russia to support his increased clout also reduced the like- campaign in eastern Libya. Russian lihood that eastern politicians allied special forces and military advisors with him would compromise with

77 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 their rivals in Tripoli. Amid the sub- It also became evident that Haftar sequent stalemate in the UN peace would be unable to conquer major process, Moscow came to be seen as population centers in Western Lib- one of the only countries, along with ya, including Tripoli and Misrata, perhaps Egypt, capable of convincing where powerful militias nominally Haftar to accept the LPA in principle loyal to the GNA are based. Haftar’s and to reinvigorate the peace pro- forces would have needed much more cess. Attempting to replicate the Syria substantial military assistance from model seems to be paying off. Russia to do so. While some observ- ers expected Russia to more heavily The ease with which Moscow was able intervene in Libya, Moscow has been to use high-powered diplomacy in reticent to do so. Libya does not have the Libyan conflict was partly made the same geostrategic significance as possible by the relative absence of the Syria. As a result, Russia altered its United States in the peace process. The approach to Libya over the course Obama administration chose to focus of 2017. It began to reach out to the on counter-terrorism in Libya, and prime minister of the GNA in Trip- was loath to get any more involved to oli, Fayez Al-Serraj, as well as repre- a country that appeared peripheral to sentatives from Misrata. Moscow also its core security concerns. This stance began to stress that it was pursuing a has largely been maintained under policy of equidistance with regard to the Trump administration. Europe, Libya’s factions, and the Russian Min- for its part, has been in disarray over istry of Foreign Affairs and the Duma Libya. Although the European Union established a contact group charged imposed sanctions on several political with forging contacts to help Moscow figures in order to help broker the LPA, engage with all relevant political fac- individual European states have failed tions in the country.29 to unite behind the LPA. France and Italy, in particular, have been working Russia’s current approach to Libya is at cross purposes in Libya, supporting pragmatic and limited by the com- different local factions and competing plexities of the Libyan conflict. Plac- as mediators in the conflict. Thus, a ing its weight behind Haftar helped void was left for Moscow to fill. Moscow consolidate its role as a key international stakeholder. However, However, bringing Haftar on board Haftar is no Assad. He is not the head the UN-backed political process of a regime that can prevail over op- proved more difficult than expected. position groups, but rather the leader

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Russia’s Engagement in Libya: Mid-2014 to 2018

10 5 7 9 12 15 1 2 3 4 6 8 11 13 14 16 2015 2016 2017 2018 Factions in Eastern Libya Factions in Western Libya 1 July 2014 Outbreak of Libyan Civil War 2 December 2015 Russia supports UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement 3 February 2016 Russian state-energy company, Rosneft, signs a cooperation and investment agreement with Libya’s National Oil Corporation 4 May 2016 Haftar-allied Central Bank of Libya issues banknotes printed by Russia 5 June 2016 Libyan militia leader Haftar visits Moscow for talks 6 November 2016 Haftar visits Moscow for talks 7 December 2016 Haftar visits Moscow for talks 8 January 2017 Haftar boards a Russian aircraft carrier and video-conferences with Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoygu 9 February 2017 Russian private security contractors sent to areas controlled by Haftar 10 March 2017 Prime minister of the GNA, Fayez Al-Serraj, meets with Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov 11 March 2017 US claims Russian Special Forces Operations unit deployed to western Egypt to assist Haftar 12 April 2017 Misratan delegation received in Moscow for talks 13 May 2017 Russian diplomacy helps bring about a meeting between Haftar and Al-Sarraj 14 August 2018 Haftar visits Moscow for talks 15 October 2018 British intelligence officials claim that Russia is moving troops and missiles into Libya 16 November 2018 Haftar meets with Shoygu in Moscow ahead of Italian summit on Libya

Sources: Aljazeera; ECFR; Foreign Policy; Gulfnews; ISPI; Libya Herald; Libyan Express; Middle East Monitor; Reuters; The Arab Weekly; The Guardian; The New Arab of a militia that has the capacity to could be explored and exploited in control only parts of Libyan territory. the future. Keeping its options open With elections due to be held in 2019, makes sense, particularly since Rus- Moscow appears to be looking toward sian firms will have to compete with the future. As in Syria, reconstruction French and Italian ones that have a is likely to imply large contracts for stronger foothold in Libya.30 foreign companies, and Moscow will want Russian firms to benefit from The Road Ahead these opportunities. In addition, Lib- Russia is making inroads in several ya has large deposits of oil and gas that key states in the Arab world. The Arab

79 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019 uprisings, and the uneven response of in Syria casts additional doubt as to the West in responding to subsequent whether the United States is really developments, have created openings a major stakeholder in the conflict, that Russia has been able to fill, and to thereby boosting Russia’s image as an do so in a way that differs from Euro- alternative force for stability in the pean and US engagement.31 Moscow’s region. acceptance of existing regimes and emphasis on state-led transition to de- Although Russia lacks the economic mocracy make it a comparatively eas- power to become an alternative to ier partner than Europe or the United the West, it is likely to continue to States, even if the latter have in reality strengthen its presence in the MENA often balanced concerns about stabili- region through its pragmatic and flex- ty with democracy promotion. As a re- ible approach. Russia has traditional- sult, Russian engagement offers more ly supplied arms to many countries in options to states that wish to reduce the region. Their militaries are thus dependence on any one international familiar with Russian materiel and actor or resist pressure from civil so- may prefer it, particularly since it is ciety or external actors for democratic often sold on favorable terms. Russia’s reform. nuclear technological know-how is also of interest to many regimes in the Russian inroads in the Arab world region, and Moscow has proved ready also come at a time when the United to loan countries the funds to finance States lacks a clear strategy towards the the construction of power plants and Middle East and North Africa, and the reactors. Arms sales and energy coop- European Union still struggles to exert eration are thus likely to remain the influence. The Obama administration main policy instruments employed underestimated the gains that Russia by Moscow to engage regimes and to would reap from its military interven- garner influence in the region. tion in the Syrian conflict, as well as subsequent high-powered diplomacy. However, these vectors of influence Largely thanks to Russian interven- alone are not enough to secure Rus- tion, the Assad regime has survived, sia’s status as a key powerbroker in and now has no reason to accept a the region and, thereby, enable it to negotiated solution to the conflict influence decisions that are decisive that would threaten its survival. The to regional stability. As a result, Mos- Trump administration’s recent equiv- cow may be expected to invest greater ocations on the future of US troops diplomatic resources in the region’s

80 RUSSIA’S RENAISSANCE IN ARAB WORLD conflicts, taking advantage of oppor- 6 Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, “Geopolitics and non-Western Intervention in Syria: The Russian tunities to boost its profile where the Gambit in Syria,” DIIS Policy Brief, 12.2016; West is absent or divided. This is likely Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Sub-Committee on the Middle to stop short of taking on the respon- East and North Africa, US Policy Toward Syria sibilities of a major power in the re- (Part II), Statement of Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engage- gion. As the Libyan case demonstrates, ment, 29.11.2018; Guy Burton, “China and few states in the region are important the Reconstruction of Syria,” in: The Diplomat, 28.07.2018. enough for Moscow to put its full weight behind local regimes or con- 7 Zaki Laidi, “Stability and Partnership in the Maghreb,” in: Annals 481 (1985), 135 – 6; flict parties. Moscow is thus liable to Yahia Zoubir, “Russia and Algeria: Reconciling proceed with caution. Over the near Contrasting Interests,” in: The Maghreb Review 36:2 (2011), 100; Kassim Bouhou, “Alge- term, it may be content with carving ria-Russia: Military and Energy Cooperation,” out a greater role for itself alongside in: Actuelles de l’Ifri, 9.2008. the West and, in particular, the United 8 Zoubir, ibid., 113; SIPRI Arms Transfer States. Database. 9 Andrew McGregor, “Defense or Domination? Building Algerian Power with Russian Arms,” 1 Laszlo Poti, “Russian Policies Towards the Eurasia Daily Monitor 15:122 (2018); Kassim MENA Region,” MENARA Working Paper, Bouhou, “Algeria-Russia: Military and Energy No. 9, 8.2018, 12. Cooperation,” in: Actuelles de l’Ifri, 9.2008; Anna Borschevskaya, “The Tactical Side of Rus- 2 Stephen Blank, “The Foundations of Rus- sia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” in: Russia sian Policy in the Middle East,” in: Russia in in the Middle East, (eds.) Theodore Karasik and the Middle East, eds. Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (Washington: The Jamestown Stephen Blank (Washington: The Jamestown Foundation, 2018). Foundation, 2018), 4; Hugh Macleod, “From Syrian Fishing Port to Naval Power Base: Russia 10 Zoubir, “Russia and Algeria,” 120; Tobias Moves into the Mediterranean,” The Guardian, Schumacher and Cristian Nitoiu, “Russia’s For- 08.10.2008. eign Policy towards North Africa in the Wake of the Arab Spring,” in: Mediterranean Politics 3 Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, “Geopolitics and 20:1 (2015), 103. non-Western Intervention in Syria: The Russian Gambit in Syria,” DIIS Policy Brief, 12.2016; 11 Peter D. Wezeman et al. “Trends in Inter- Martin Russell, “Russia in the Middle East: national Arms Transfers, 2017,” SIPRI Fact From Sidelines to Centre Stage,” European Par- Sheet, 03.2018, 6; McGregor, “Defense or liamentary Research Service Briefing, 11.2018, Dominate?”. 2. 12 Yahia Zoubir, “The United States and Algeria: 4 Russell, ibid. A New Strategic Partnership?” In: Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 5:4 5 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Interests in Syria,” (2011), 15 – 18. Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.06.2014; Dmitri Trenin, “Putin’s Plan for Syria: How Russia 13 “Algeria – Oil and Gas – Hydrocarbons,” Want to End the War,” in: Foreign Affairs, Export.gov, 31.01.2019. 13.12.2017. 14 Zoubir, “Russia and Algeria,” 120.

81 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2019

15 Gregory H. Bradford, “The Rise and Fall 25 Fasanotti, ibid. of Soviet Influence in Egypt,” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 12. 26 Gvosdev and Marsh, Russian Foreign Policy, 1976, 47 – 9; 63; 79. 313.

16 Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Christopher Marsh, 27 Schumacher and Nitoiu, “Russia’s Foreign Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors and Policy towards North Africa,” 100. Sectors (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 313. 28 Hamza Meddeb, “Opportunism as a Strategy,” 17 Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck and Vasily Kuznetsov, in: Diwan, Carnegie Endowment for Interna- “The ‘Comrades’ in North Africa,” in:Russia’s tional Peace, 22.11.2018. Return to the Middle East: Building Sandcastles? EUISS Chaillot Paper 146, 07.2018, 75; Ramy 29 Yuri Barmin, “Russia in the Middle East until Aziz, “Russia’s Alarming Attempts to Establish 2024: From Hard Power to Sustainable Influ- Influence in Egypt,” The Washington Institute ence,” in: Russia in the Middle East, eds. Theo- for Near East Policy, 24.5.2018. dore Karasik and Stephen Blank (Washington: The Jamestown Foundation, 2018). 18 “Russia, Egypt Agree to Set Up Industrial Zone in East Said,” Russia Briefing, 13.6.2018. 30 Anna Maria Dyner, “Russia’s Libya Policy,” in: PISM Bulletin, No. 6, 15.1.2019. 19 Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck and Vasily Kuznetsov, “The ‘Comrades’ in North Africa,” in:Russia’s 31 Shebab Al-Makahleh, “The Arab View of Return to the Middle East: Building Sandcastles? Russia’s Role in the MENA: Changing Arab EUISS Chaillot Paper, No. 146, 07.2018, Perceptions of Russia, and the Implications for 75 – 6; Lt. col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, “Egypt’s US Policy,” in: Russia in the Middle East, eds. Nuclear Deal with Russia,” BESA Perspectives Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (Wash- Paper, No. 710, 08.01.2017; Diarmaid Williams, ington: The Jamestown Foundation, 2018), 4. “Egypt Signs Agreement with Russia to Build First Nuclear Power Plant,” PEI Power Engineer- ing International, 09.05.2017.

20 Schumacher and Nitoiu, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Towards North Africa,” 101; Aziz, “Russia’s Alarming Attempts to Establish Influence in Egypt”; “Saudi Anger As Egypt Votes With Russia in UN Vote,” in: Middle East Eye, 12.11.2016.

21 Menna A. Farouk, “Egypt-Russia Partnership Deal Takes Bilateral Ties to New Heights,” in: Al-Monitor, 28.11.2018; Peter D. Wezeman et al. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, 03.2018, 6.

22 World Bank WITS database; “Egypt: Foreign Investment,” Santander TradePortal, last updat- ed 01.2019.

23 “Developing Egyptian-Chinese Relations,” in: Ahramonline, 20.12.2018.

24 Frederica Saini Fasanotti, “Russia and Libya: A Brief History of an On-Again-Off-Again Friendship,” Brookings Institution, 09.2016; “Libya-Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” www.country-data.com.

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