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The European Union's Policy on Libya and the Operation Irini Merve

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The European Union’s Policy on Libya and The Operation Irini Merve Yavuz The European Union (EU) has always considered the Middle East and North Africa regions strategically significant. Especially for France and Italy this region has a special importance due to their colonial past. Today, these two states continue to be very interested in the region. In addition to historical ties, energy sources, security concerns stemming from immigration issues and economic interests have shaped the EU policy towards the region. While 6 % of the EU's total oil consumption is provided by Libya, Tunisia supplies 11.3% of the EU’s natural gas needs. In addition, according to the "Comprehensive EU Strategy for Africa" document published by the Commission in 2020, Sub-Saharan Africa hosts more than a quarter of the refugee population in the world. The EU is concerned about a refugee flow towards Europe via North Africa. Moreover, trade agreements between the EU and North African states clearly indicate that the region is economically important for the EU. The Arab Spring has emerged as a popular movement towards democratization in the Middle East and North Africa, beyond historical, identity or geopolitical interests. Liberal values such as free elections, multi-party political life and parliamentarism are also fundamental principles by which the EU defines its own identity. On the other hand, it is frequently argued that the EU does not defend these values about demand for democracy and equality for the Middle East and North Africa even though these values are also important for the idea of European integration. The EU has been widely criticized for its lack of common policy to defend these values during the Arab Spring. Libya has a central position in the EU's strategy for the region. Libya has a long coastline that is very close to the European Union and has the potential to be the source of a new wave of immigration to Europe. Libya's coast to the Mediterranean is 1770 km long. According to the data of Amnesty International, 60.000 people have been caught at sea trying to cross from Libya to Europe since 2016. This issue has been very important for the EU countries, especially for Italy. In addition, the fact that Libya has the largest oil reserves of Africa increases the importance of this country for the EU. It is also known that Libya has significant resources that have not yet been put into operation. Despite this obvious economic and strategic importance of Libya for the EU, the EU has had difficulty in developing a consistent and stable policy on Libya. This can be explained by the strategic competition between member states. The EU has difficulty managing different interests of its member states and developing a common strategy. During NATO's military intervention in Libya in 2011, it was observed that a common policy could not emerge among EU members. While France played a decisive role in the emergence of the intervention in Libya, Germany did not want to be involved in the operation. Germany as a member of the United Nations Security Council at the time, abstained from the vote on intervention in Libya. The German Foreign Minister of the time, Guido Westerwelle, stated that his country’s decision to not support the military action did not mean doing nothing. Germany has recommended increasing economic sanctions instead of taking military action. During the same period, the President of France Nicolas Sarkozy declared that "the people who demand freedom in Libya are in danger, it is our duty to respond to their demands". Recently, French President Sarkozy has been found guilty by the French judiciary for obtaining illegal funds from Libyan leader Gaddafi, whom he later tried to overthrow, to use in the French elections. Since the NATO intervention, the EU's policies to stabilize Libya have mostly been limited to mediation. However, these activities aimed at solving the crisis in Libya have been very weak and ineffective. As the conflict in Libya deepens, the EU has been watching this crisis as an external observer and trying to limit the ways this crisis affects Europe's security. The policy followed by the EU in Libya has led to doubts about whether the EU sincerely wants to contribute to the democratization process of Libya after Gaddafi. In particular, the policy of France, which has been close to General Haftar, who tends to establish the second Gaddafi regime in Libya, further limits the influence of the EU on Libya. The EU has tried to be involved in the developments in Libya through conference diplomacy. In this context, a conference about Libya was held in Berlin on January 19, 2020, with the initiative of the EU. In the statements made after the conference, it has been stated that the "Berlin Process" aims to support the United Nations for a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis and that military initiatives in Libya would not solve the problem. However, it has been observed that a group led by France implicitly has been supporting General Haftar's military initiatives. While the EU’s discourse about Libya has been to deny military options, in reality it has been evident that Haftar’s military control over Libya has been perceived as a solution by the EU. At the end of the negotiations in Berlin, the EU policy towards the Libyan crisis has become concrete with the Irini Operation. The EU decided to close Operation Sophia, which had been launched in 2015 to prevent refugee smuggling, and instead launched Operation Irini to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya on February 17, 2020. It has been announced by the EU that Operation Irini will also undertake the tasks of gathering information about illicit export of petroleum from Libya, supporting the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in their maritime law enforcement duties and preventing human trafficking. From the way the operation is implemented, it can be determined that the EU has started to use Operation Irini to get involved in the issue and to gain political control over Libya. Italian Rear Admiral Fablo Agostin has been appointed as the head of the operation and Rome has been chosen as the operation center. The EU has allocated a budget of 9.8 million Euros for Operation Irini. This budget is limited for a complex issue like Libya. Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, France, Italy and Greece participated in the operation with their air and naval forces. The most controversial activity of Operation Irini has been the inspection on the Turkish cargo ship "Roseline A" on November 22, 2020. A group of soldiers from the German Frigate Hamburg boarded the vessel in international waters, approximately 160 nautical miles north of the port of Benghazi without the permission of Turkey. The inspection was terminated upon finding out that no illegal materials were on the ship which was originally set out from Ambarlı Port in İstanbul with the aim of bringing paint, food and humanitarian aid materials to the Libyan port of Misrata. Although it is not possible to make inspections without the consent of the flag state according to the framework of the UN decisions, an action was taken by claiming that Turkey did not give any answers. Even though the Ministry of National Defence of Turkey clearly informed the EU side that Turkey did not allow any action to be taken, the EU continued the inspection. In the following days, Turkey argued that this action within the scope of Operation Irini was conducted in violation of the law and that the European Union carried out the operation in a biased manner for the benefit of General Haftar. On the other hand, Operation Irini has been limited to the sea and focused on preventing deliveries from the sea while military aid to General Haftar is mainly delivered by air from Syria and by land from Egypt. In addition, the operation was not supported by the necessary satellite systems which as a result concentrated the impact of the operation only on the ships in the Mediterranean. Consequently, this situation resulted in a strategic environment in favor of Haftar. Therefore, the EU’s Operation Irini has indicated that it has made the solution of the Libyan issue even more difficult with its shortcomings and controversial practices. .
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