IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 32 - MAY 2020 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2020 IAI 1 University of Bologna and Radboud University. Federico Alagna isaresearcher on EUmigration policies and PhDcandidate at the on 11 March 2020, 2020, March on 11 2015-2020 operations Mediterranean 2 Us About 1 all naval assetsfrom the Mediterranean. operation but simultaneously withdrew March 2019,when theEUrenewed Mediterranean Seabetween2015and activities, saving 44,916 migrants in the performed search andrescue (SAR) arms embargo on . guard andenforcement of theUN activities for theso-called Libyan coast extended, also including training Its mandate wasthenprogressively smuggling intheMediterranean. established in2015tocombat migrant EUNAVFOR MED Sophia was first a substantially different mandate. being replaced by Operation Irini, with officially endedin late March 2020, maritime mission inthe Mediterranean, deadlocks, , theEU’s following months of negotiations and Amidst theCOVID-19 emergencyand by Federico Alagna the Urgency of “Doing Something” EU Mediterranean Policies and From Sophia toIrini:

EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia website: Sophia Operation EUNAVFOR MED Council of the , Union, European the of Council , https://www.operationsophia.eu/?p=581. http://europa.eu/!uk44kW 1 Sophia also Infographic -EU , last reviewed reviewed , last . 2 foremost , though it hadbeenone of some memberstates –firstand This decision stemmedfrom thevetoes BRI(2016)586639 en/document.html?reference=EPRS_ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/ System”, in 4 www.iai.it/en/node/10334 Commentaries IAI Sophia”, in of Operation Paradox The a Navy: 3 Announced inthewake of the Berlin of theUNarmsembargo on Libya. tasked with theimplementation Irini, on theotherhand,isprimarily The newOperation EUNAVFOR MED crossings into theEU. entry intheevent of irregular border applications borne bycountries of first responsibility of processing asylum issues, arisinginparticular from the had beenlongstanding controversial relocation of rescued migrants. on disembarkation points andthe in 2015–due toalackof agreement of Sophia’s strongest sponsors back

Giulia Mantini, “A Without Naval Mission EU Mantini, Giulia Anja Radjenovic, “Reform of the Dublin Dublin of the “Reform Radjenovic, Anja EPRS Briefings EPRS . , No. 19|33 (May 2019), (May , No. 19|33 . 4 , 1 March 2019, , 1March 3 These https:// From Sophia to Irini: EU Mediterranean Policies and the Urgency of “Doing Something”

Conference on Libya and the escalating is made to SAR activities, which are interventions on opposite sides by unlikely to take place in any event, Turkey, Russia and the United Arab considering that naval assets will not Emirates, and the EU pushed patrol areas traditionally associated through a renewed commitment to with migration routes.8 enforce the UN arms embargo as part of the Berlin Conference conclusions.5 Albeit different in their mandates, Operation Sophia and Operation

© 2020 IAI A decision was therefore made to Irini both fall into the category of EU redeploy EU naval assets to the foreign policy decisions taken under Mediterranean, this time to intercept political and popular pressure to “do arms deliveries, notwithstanding the something”, but lacking in political fact that a large majority of weaponry courage to do what is really necessary. is actually delivered by land and air, Their overall shortcomings in long- particularly that destined for Khalifa term planning and strategic thinking Haftar’s so-called Libyan National Army risk undermining both the tangible (LNA), which is presently battling the objectives of these missions and the ISSN 2532-6570 UN-recognised government in Tripoli.6 broader, intangible goal of reinforcing EU credibility. Operation Irini also has three secondary tasks, namely contributing In 2015, such pressure was related to “to the implementation of UN the thousands of people dying in the measures to prevent the illicit export of Mediterranean Sea and the demand petroleum from Libya”, assisting “in the by public opinion for the EU to finally development of the capacities and in act, after repeated calls (and failures) to the training of the Libyan Coast Guard do so.9 In 2020, the pressure stemmed and Navy” and finally contributing “to from the deteriorating situation in the disruption of the business model Libya and the EU’s inability to promote of human smuggling and trafficking a united and effective policy on the networks” – this last task exclusively conflict, while violations of the arms “through information gathering and embargo continued unabated in patrolling carried out by aerial assets Europe’s neighbourhood. above the high seas”.7 No reference The logic of this approach, persistent 5 David M. Herszenhorn, Matthew Karnitschnig and consistent over time, is reflected and Judith Mischke, “Big Powers Pledge not to Fight Each Other over Libya”, in Politico, 20 in the fact that action is in both cases January 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/ big-powers-eu-russia-germany--uk-us- eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/472/oj. turkey-pledge-not-to-fight-each-other-over- 8 Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Launches Naval libya. Mission”, in Politico, 26 March 2020, https:// 6 Luigi Scazzieri, “The EU’s New Libya Operation www.politico.eu/article/eu-launches-naval- Is Flawed”, in CER Insights, 8 April 2020, https:// mission-to-police-libya-arms-embargo. www.cer.eu/node/8505. 9 Niklas Nováky, “The Road to Sophia: 7 Council of the European Union, Council Explaining the EU’s Naval Operation in the Decision (CFSP) 2020/472 of 31 March 2020 Mediterranean”, in European View, Vol. 17, on a European Union Military Operation in the No. 2 (October 2018), p. 197-209, https://doi. Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI), https:// org/10.1177/1781685818810359. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 32 - MAY 2020 20 | 32 - MAY IAI COMMENTARIES

2 From Sophia to Irini: EU Mediterranean Policies and the Urgency of “Doing Something”

limited to what is strictly necessary to its first phase, EU rhetoric and public overcome accusations of EU inaction, discourse depicted SAR activities as even though the implications entail paramount.12 Since then, they have concrete challenges for long-term progressively lost centrality eventually sustainability and effectiveness. disappearing altogether in the present Operation Irini. Three sets of reasons The results were soon clear in the case of explain this transition. Sophia. Political tensions surfaced and

© 2020 IAI SAR activities were suspended as soon Firstly, the EU’s pursuit of as the general attention to the issue and externalisation policies has meant that the related public outcry diminished. most migrants are held before they In the case of Irini, the potential can even reach the Mediterranean, shortcomings of this limited maritime thus making migration less visible to approach have been pointed out from public opinion.13 Secondly, the policing the very beginning. They have to do, of humanitarian actors at sea and the in particular, with the risk of not being criminalisation of NGO search and able to enforce a comprehensive arms rescue activities in the Mediterranean ISSN 2532-6570 embargo, thus potentially reinforcing has further diminished publicity, one party to the conflict (Haftar’s LNA) working, alongside externalisation, to the detriment of the other (the UN- as a smokescreen to relieve public backed government in Tripoli).10 pressure on politicians and the EU or, for another segment of the population, The gradual disappearance of SAR to strengthen the image of EU activities in the transition from “old” to governments “tacking back control” on “new” Sophia and finally to Operation the issue of migration and SAR in the Irini provides one dimension of the Mediterranean.14 fragility of EU external action in the Mediterranean. The third element has to do with domestic politics in Europe and the The EU’s overall hostility to SAR – successive elections held in member and, ultimately, to migration – is a longstanding issue, effectively 12 Eugenio Cusumano, “Migrant Rescue as summarised in the concept of “Fortress Organized Hypocrisy: EU Maritime Missions Europe”.11 However, when Sophia was Offshore Libya between Humanitarianism and launched in 2015, and throughout Border Control”, in Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 54, No. 1 (March 2019), p. 3-24, https://doi. org/10.1177/0010836718780175. 10 Luigi Scazzieri, “The EU’s New Libya 13 This approach began in earnest with the Operation Is Flawed”, cit. and Tarek Megerisi, 2016 EU-Turkey Deal on migration and is also “EU’s ‘Irini’ Libya Mission: Europe’s Operation present, for example, in EU agreements with Cassandra”, in EUobserver, 3 April 2020, https:// Niger, in the Italy-Libya 2017 Memorandum of euobserver.com/opinion/147968. Understanding or in European support for the 11 See Jiska Engelbert, Isabel Awad and Jacco so-called Libyan coast guard. van Sterkenburg, “Everyday Practices and the 14 Shoshana Fine, “All at Sea: Europe’s Crisis (Un)Making of ‘Fortress Europe’: Introduction of Solidarity on Migration”, in ECFR Policy to the Special Issue”, in European Journal of Briefs, October 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/ Cultural Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April 2019), p. 133- publications/summary/all_at_sea_europes_ 143, https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549418823055. crisis_of_solidarity_on_migration. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 32 - MAY 2020 20 | 32 - MAY IAI COMMENTARIES

3 From Sophia to Irini: EU Mediterranean Policies and the Urgency of “Doing Something”

states over the past years, including the Looking at the transition from 2019 European Parliament elections. Sophia to Irini, and how easily SAR Overall, the fear that a narrative of “out- disappeared from EU policy while being of-control” migration might further heavily curtailed in public discourse strengthen far-right populist and demonstrates the consequences of Eurosceptic parties has contributed policies approved out of short-term to further reinvigorate the already urgency, especially when such urgency existing support for harsher migration changes, blurs or disappears.

© 2020 IAI policies across the political board in Europe. It is also in this context, Significantly, these measures did not that the questionable thesis that SAR effectively improve the situation in activities constitute a “pull factor” for Libya or on migration policies, let migration towards Europe has gained alone the EU’s image as a responsible currency among many EU institutions and effective foreign policy actor. and member states.15 The price paid by the EU in terms of its credibility is well illustrated by the The result is that once the pressure to criticism coming from international ISSN 2532-6570 act lessened, so did the EU’s interest organisations, NGOs and human right towards SAR. Remarkably, similar advocates17 – not to mention impact trends are detectable also within those this is having on people whose lives are EU supranational institutions – the harshly affected by these policies. Commission and the Parliament16 – that in the past had shown more concern The question which is left open, for for SAR activities and the humanitarian the months and years to come, is to aspects of migration policies, often what extent the emergency approach criticising Council decisions that went shown by the EU on migration will in the opposite direction. continue to inform other foreign policy decisions related to the Mediterranean, hampering the EU’s external action.

15 Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Launches Naval Mission”, cit.; and Matteo Villa, “Migration and This urgency of “doing something” the Myth of the Pull-Factor in the Mediterranean”, should rather be re-directed to finally in ISPI website, 26 February 2020, https://www. resolve those internal contradictions ispionline.it/en/node/25207. and debates related both to the decision- 16 Consider, among other things, the lack of any mention of SAR activities in High Representative making process (from veto powers in Josep Borrell speech for the launch of Irini, the Council to the relationship of foreign rejection of a non-binding resolution on SAR affairs with other policy areas) and the in the European Parliament in October 2019, or the very harsh internal debate within the EPP diverging interests of member states on migration and how this reflects on the battle in substantive policy aspects. Without for leadership. See European External Action Service (EEAS), Operation IRINI: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep 17 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Borrell Following the Launch of the Operation, Rights, Lives Saved. Rights Protected. Bridging 31 March 2020, https://europa.eu/!Xf99YY; and the Protection Gap for Refugees and Migrants Jacopo Barigazzi, “In Libya, EU faces a Civil War in the Mediterranean, June 2019, https://rm.coe. of Its Own”, in Politico, 17 February 2020, https:// int/lives-saved-rights-protected-bridging-the- www.politico.eu/article/libya-eu-civil-war. protection-gap-for-refugees-/168094eb87. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 32 - MAY 2020 20 | 32 - MAY IAI COMMENTARIES

4 From Sophia to Irini: EU Mediterranean Policies and the Urgency of “Doing Something”

this, it is hard to imagine the EU as a credible and humanitarian actor in the Mediterranean, shaping long-term, comprehensive and consistent policies that are best able to serve EU interests while not sacrificing its fundamental values. © 2020 IAI 4 May 2020 ISSN 2532-6570 IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 32 - MAY 2020 20 | 32 - MAY IAI COMMENTARIES

5 From Sophia to Irini: EU Mediterranean Policies and the Urgency of “Doing Something”

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of Altiero Spinelli. IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and © 2020 IAI the Americas. IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), three book series (Global Politics and Security, Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

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