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PERSONAL RULE and PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS in AFRICA by Boniface Madalitso Dulani a DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State Un

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PERSONAL RULE and PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS in AFRICA by Boniface Madalitso Dulani a DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State Un PERSONAL RULE AND PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AFRICA By Boniface Madalitso Dulani A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Political Science 2011 ABSTRACT PERSONAL RULE AND PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AFRICA By Boniface Madalitso Dulani One of the major constitutional innovations that accompanied the transition from the authoritarian rule to more competitive and pluralistic modes of governance at the end of the 20th century in Africa was the adoption of presidential term limits. What have been the effects of term limits on personal rule in Africa? What do ordinary Africans themselves think about these rules? Why have some presidents passed legislation that has removed term limits when others abandoned similar efforts and stepped down? These were some of the main questions that this dissertation had sought to address. Through a methodological approach that employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodological tools, the study‘s major findings show that term limits were embraced as a tool for addressing a proclivity among African presidents for personalizing power and remaining in office for long periods. And despite the recent attempts to remove term limits, these rules have helped to transform the African presidency in very important ways. By providing proof that other individuals in society possess leadership abilities, leadership alternations resulting from tenure limits are helping to undermine the justifications for personal rule which were built on the premise that only certain individuals were imbued with leadership qualities. While term limits were widely welcomed and embraced by the public, recent African history has been dominated by attempts by incumbent presidents seeking to revert to the old norm of prolonging tenure. This suggests that, despite the transitions towards more competitive political systems, the culture of personal rule refuses to die. While a handful of these bids have been rejected, a high proportion have been passed, resulting in the removal of term limits in almost half of the countries that had only recently embraced tenure limits on the African continent. In trying to discern the reasons to explain the differential outcomes of the third-term bids in Africa, the study‘s major findings show that the attempts to remove term limits are affected by a host of institutional factors that either aid or frustrate these bids. On the one hand, several institutions, such as higher government legislative majorities, the military background of the incumbent president, the use of violence, ruling party cohesion, and traditions of respect for authority, aid the removal of term limits. On the other hand, institutions, such as the precedent of prior alternation, legislative fractionalization, aid dependency, ethnic fractionalization, and a united and active civil society, contribute to reject the bids to remove term limits. Another notable finding from the study is that patronage was not a sufficient strategy for removing term limits and that its effect was dependent on the state‘s ability to identity and punish patronage clients that defaulted by voting against the removal of term limits. In the final analysis, the study concludes by arguing that the bids to remove term limits reflect the enduring personalism in African politics and that informal institutions played a more critical role in influencing the removal of term limits, thus echoing the findings of other studies that suggest that informal institutions continue to play an important role in the African political arena, notwithstanding the transitions that sought to promote formal institutionalism. Copyright by BONIFACE MADALITSO DULANI 2011 DEDICATION To my Mom, Ms. Filless Nohito. We have come a long way together. Thank you for being part of this journey. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have been fortunate in my life to have been touched by the hands of so many wonderful people. To mention them all would entail yet another dissertation-length work. However, it begets me to thank the Fulbright Foundation for offering me a scholarship to come and study at the beautiful Michigan State University (MSU) campus in East Lansing. At the expiry of my Fulbright Fellowship, the Department of Political Science at MSU generously offered me Teaching and Research Assistantship positions, which have enabled me to reach the end of this academic journey. Although this work bears my name, it has benefited from the input of numerous individuals who have all made valuable contributions. I am particularly grateful for the generous support of my Supervisor, Prof. Michael Bratton. From the very beginning, Dr. Bratton demonstrated a profound interest in my research topic, helping me to shape my initial ideas into a manageable research project whose fruits are presented here. I thank him from the bottom of my heart. I would also like to register my appreciation for the valuable input from the members of my dissertation committee: Professors Brian Silver, Ravi Bhavnani, Eric Chang, and Anne Ferguson. Throughout this process, they have given generous input and time, working as sounding boards for some of my ideas and helping me to refine this work and bring it to its current form. Various colleagues and friends at MSU have also offered me abundant support and guidance. Dr Carolyn Logan, the Afrobarometer Deputy Director, has offered constant encouragement, and sometime prodding, to get me to finish this work. My friends Masayoshi vi Takahashi, Paul Nikiema, Wezi Mhango, Kingdom Kwapata, and many others not only offered intellectual support, but their camaraderie also kept me going, especially through the difficult times. The Malawi community in the Lansing area—Wilson Ndovi and his family, Alex Ndovie, Leo Zulu and his family, Steve Sharra and his family, and all the other colleagues—provided valuable friendship and support that is much appreciated. I am also indebted to a number of friends in Malawi and elsewhere. My best friend and colleague, Blessings Chinsinga, has always stood by my side, offering suggestions on this work and, more importantly, a shoulder to lean on. Henry Chingaipe and Chikosa Banda in the United Kingdom—we shared many thoughts and frustrations on Skype and on the phone during the preparation of this work. My wife, Monica and our two children, Tamanda and Kondwani, have had to endure so much in the course of this journey. I can never thank them enough for standing by me and enduring all the pains and frustrations as I went through this journey. Yet their faith and confidence in me never wavered. My Mom, my Sister Mary, and my Dad, relatives, and friends, have offered continued support and encouragement, longing to see this day when I finally take this step. I thank the Lord Almighty for giving me all these wonderful friends and family. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables .............................................................................................................................................. xii List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ xiv Key to Symbols and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... xiv Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.0 A Tale of Four Presidents .................................................................................................................. 1 1.0.1 Sam Nujoma: The Pioneer Third-Term President ....................................................................... 2 1.0.2 Fredrick Chiluba and the Fractured MMD in Zambia ................................................................ 4 1.0.3 Bakili Muluzi: No Third-Term Charm in Malawi ....................................................................... 6 1.0.4 Yoweri Museveni and the Quest for Indefinite Re-Election in Uganda ..................................... 9 1.1 Problem Statement ........................................................................................................................... 11 1.2 Study Justification ............................................................................................................................ 14 1.3 Research Questions .......................................................................................................................... 17 1.4 Research Design and Methodology ................................................................................................. 18 1.4.1 Large N Quantitative Analysis .................................................................................................. 18 1.4.2 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................ 20 1.4.3 Case Studies: Malawi, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia ............................................................. 22 1.5 Overview of Chapters ...................................................................................................................... 27 Chapter 2 ....................................................................................................................................................
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