23Rd Novembor.1946. Softwaj^Orc in the Hurogfoorg by Egon Sohwolb. Logoi Offioor. COKTBWT F
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NUREMBERG PAPERS m / 7 Q - No. 4. 23rd Novembor.1946. UNITED NATIONS WAR HRTMRH (YMfrflflTnw| Soft Waj^orc In the Hurogfoorg By Egon Sohwolb. Logoi Offioor. COKTBWTfi. It Sea Warfare In the Charter and in the Indictment» , II. Crimeb comitted on the High Scaa in the General Peart af tho Judgment. i n . The Defendant Edo nit 2. Hie alleged implication in the cannon plan and conspiracy and his part in the crime against peace* IV. Doenitz. His indication in n r crimes. V. Analysis of the Judgment against Doenitz. VI. Doenitz' responsibility for the application of unrestricted submarine warfare In its application to British armod merchant ships* VII. Doonitz' responsibility for the proclamation of operational zones and tho application of unrestricted stfbmarine warfare by sinking neutral merchant vessels» VIII. ftie allegation that Doe nits deliberately ordered the killing of survivors of ship-wrooked vessels* IX. • Disregard of the Hesons Provisions, X. Doonitz1 responsibility for tho Caanando Order, for tho use of concentration oamp labour, and for violations of tho Prisoner of Tfcr Convention. XI. An attompt at establishing the principles on whioh the Court acted. XU. Reeder, His Implication In crimes against peace. XIn. Rooter. His implication in war crimes. XIV. Attempt at a sumAjy of tho Tribunal's opinion,. PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8758d0/ r I - 2 - I. Sea Warfare in the Charter and In tho Indictment. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal mention* warfare' at sea in its Article 6(b) only by saying that violations of the laws or customs of war shall include, but not be limited to, murder or ill- treatment of persons on the seas. The Indictment also doss not go into detail when dealing with war crimsB ooaodtted on tho High Seas. In Count “murder and ill-* treatment of civilian populations of or in occupied territory or on the high ^ seas" is contained under the heading "A” (page 34 of Coenand Paper The Indlotment sqrs of tho dofondant Boeder that he authorised, directed and participated in tho war crimes sot forth in Count 3, including particularly war crimes arising out of soa warfare, (p.40 of Canaond Paper 6696). The defendant Doonitz 1b charged in tho Indictment with havic« authorized, dhootcd and porticipatod in tho war crimes set forth in Count 3 of tho Indictment particularly crimes against persons and property on the high soaifrtidUfcidl*», «.... _ II. Crinos committed on the High Soas In tho General Etart of tho Judgment. The General part of the Judgment dooo not contain specific observations oli war crinos cocrdttod on tho high seas. The Judgment refers on pp.16887 and 16925 to the text of Art.6(b) of the Charter which has boen quoted in paragraph I of this paper; The Tribunal's opinion on questions of sea warfare is therefore only to be found in tho Judgment on the dofendants Doonitz, (pp.17023 et seq), and Boeder, (pp. 17031 et seq). III. The defendant Doonitz. His alleged implication in the coupon plan and conspiracy and his part in the crime against peace. Doonitz was indicted on Counts 1 (conspiracy), 2 (crimes against poaco) and 3 (war crimes). Tho Tribunal found him not guilt? on Q Count 1 of the Indictment and guilty of Counts 2 and 3* With regard to his allegod responsibility for the oaamon plan and conspiracy and with regard to his part in.tho crime against peace, the Tribunal otatod on p«17023: n Although Doonitz built and trained tho German U-Boat ana, the evidence does not show ho was privy to the conspiracy to wage aggres sive wars or that he prepared and initiated such tots. He was a lino officer performing strictly tactical dutios. He tos not present at tho important conferences when plans for aggressive wars were announced, and thero is no evidence he m s informed about the decisions roached thore, Doonitz’¿idydMfflSVoi^TOgo aggro s s ivo w o r slthi n t he meaning of that word os usod by the Chartoi?****^ubiflOTW 'JOTftrrf'wffch began taodiatoly upon tho outbroak of war, was fully co-ordinated with tho othor branches of tho Wohrmocht. ‘ It 1b cloar that his U-boats, few in number at tho time, wore fully prepared to wago war. It is true that until his appointment in January 1943» as Canmander-in-Chief ho was not an n0berbofohlshabor". But this statemnt underestimates tho importance of Doonitz* position. no was no more Arry or division coranandor. Tho U-boat arm was the principle part of tho German floot and Doonitz was its leader. The Hi#i Seas fleet made a few miner, if spectacular, raids during tho early PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8758d0/ .1 years of tho war but tho real damage to the enony v/as dono almost exclusively by his submarines asthefcillionsaf tons of allied and neutral shipping sunk wi,ll tostify, Doenits was sololy In ohasge of this warfare, ; ®ho Naval War Oocuaond reserved for itself only the deoision as to the nunber of submarines in eaoh area, . Zn the invasion of Norway, for example, Doenitz made reocnaendations in October 1939 as to submarine bases, which he claims ware no more than & staff study, and in iioroh 1940, he made out the operational orders for tho supporting U-boats, as discussed elsewhere in this Judgment, Shat his importance to the German war effort was so regarded is eloquently proved by Raeder's reccnmendation of Doenitz as his sucoesoor and his appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943 as Coranander-in-Chief of the Navy, Hitlpr too, knew that submarine warfare wcus the essential part of Germany’s naval warfare. From January 1943» Doenitz was consulted almost continuously by Hitler, Hie evidence was that they conferred on naval problems about 120 times during the courso of tho war. As late as April 1945 when he admits he knew the struggle was hopeless, Doonitz as its Canoander-in-Chiof urged the Navy to continue its fight. On 1 May 1945 he became tho Head cf State and as such orderod tho Wohnaacht to continue its war in the East, until capitulation on 9 Hay 1945« Doonitz oxplainod that his reason for “those orders was to insure that the German c ivilian population might be evacuated and the Arny might make an orderly retreat frcn the East, In the view of tho Tribunal, the ovidenoo shows that Doonitz was active in waging aggressive war, " IV, Doenitz. His implication in war crlnes, The following is said with regard to Doenitz1 port in the canals si on of war crimes* " Doenitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936, to which Germany acceded, end which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930# The prosecution has submitted that on 3 September 1939, the German* U-boat arm began to wage unrestricted submarine warfare upon all merchant ships, whether enocy ar neutral, cynically disregarding tho R*otocol; and that a calculator effort was made throughout the war to disguido this practice by making hypocritical references to international law and • supposed violations by tho Allies, Doonitz insists that at all ttos the Navy remainod within tho confines of international law and of tho Protocol, He tostiflod that when the war began, the guide to submarine warfare was the Gorman Prize Ordinal»ce taken almost literally from tho Protocol, that pursuant to th~ German view, ho ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships in convoy, and ail that rofusod to stop or used their radio upon sighting a submarine. When his roports indicated that British merchant ships wore being used to give information by wireless, were boing armed and wore attacking submarines on sight, ho ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939 to attack all enony merchant ships without warning on the ground that resistanoo was to be oxpoctod. Orders already had been issued on 21 September 1939 to attack.all ships, including neutrals, sailing at night without lights in tho English Channel* PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8758d0/ On 24th November 1939, the, German Government issued a warning to neutral shipping that, owing to the frequent engagements taking place in the waters around the British Isles and the French Coast between U-boat3 and Allied merchant ships which «ere armed and had instructions to use those aims as «ell as to ram U-boats, the safety of neutral ships in those mters could no longer be . taken for granted* On the first of January, 1940, the German U-boat canmand, acting on tho instruc tions of Hitler, ordered U-boats to attack all Greek merchant ships in the zone surrounding the British Isles which «as banned by the United States to its own ships and also merchant ships of every nationality in the limited area of the Bristol Channel* Five days later a further order was given to U-boats to "make immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships" in an area of the North Sea, tho limits of which «ere defined. Finally on the 18th January, 1940, the U-boatn were authorized to sink, without warning, all ships "in • thoso waters near the eneny coasts in which the uso of mines can bo protended". Exooptions wore to bo made in tho cases of Uni tod States, Italian, Japanese and Soviet ships. o Shortly after tho outbreak of war tho British Admiralty, in accordance with tho Handbook of Instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy, aimed its merchant vossols, in many cases convqyed them with armed escort, gave orders to sond position roports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant vessols into tho warning network of naval intelligence.