THE NAvY UNDER CHARLES I 1625-40 ANDREW DEREK THRUSH University College Ph.D. Dissertation C ABSTRACT This study is primarily concerned with how the Caroline Navy was run, both in theory and in practice. Previous assessments of early Stuart naval administration have generally been superficial and unsympathetic in tone, but this new work, in shedding fresh light on a variety of themes, attempts to offer a more detailed and balanced view of the quality of administration in the 1620s and 1630s. Starting with an examination of the Navy's senior executive, the thesis broadens out into a discussion of the role of the Navy Board and the manner in which the yards were administered. Here it is argued that the yards were a good deal better regulated than has sometimes been appreciated. It is also suggested that the Navy's ability to reform its own administration has been understated. In the second part of the thesis, two chapters are devoted to the question of finance, in which both financial procedures and management are discussed. In the final section, the Navy's ability to man, victual and prepare its ships for sea is scrutinised. Detailed consideration is also given to the Ordnance Office, which was responsible for gunning and munitioning the Navy's ships. In these later chapters considerable space is devoted to administrative deficiencies which persistently dogged the Navy, but the author argues that institutional factors, such as underfunding, were often to blame rather than mismanagement, a theme which is echoed in the final conclusion. -2- PREFACE In the process of writing this thesis I have incurred many debts of gratitude. I owe most thanks to my supervisor, Professor Conrad Russell, whose generosity with his time frequently exceeded the call of duty, and whose keen eye and sharp mind saved me from innumerable errors of Judgement. I owe scarcely less thanks to Mr. Roger Lockyer, who initially stimulated my interest in the early Stuart Navy while I was an undergraduate. Mr. Lockyer read the whole of the second draft, and made many perceptive observations which have served to improve the quality of the text. In addition, I should like to thank Dr. Roger Morriss of the National Maritime Museum for his comments upon Chapter 3, Mrs. Sabrina Baron for her observations on an early draft of Chapter 1, and Dr. David Hebb for many invaluable discussions at the outset of my research. As far as archives are concerned, I am deeply indebted to the Duke of Northumberland f or permission to examine the Northumberland papers, and to Lord Fairfax of Cameron f or allowing me to consult the Duchess of Buckingham's MSS. In addition, I am grateful to the staff of the Berkshire Record Office, the Birmingham Reference Library, the Bodleian Library, the British Library, the Ciwyd Record Office, the Derbyshire Record Office, the Devon Record Office, the Dyfyd Archives Service, the Hampshire Record Office, the Glamorgan Record Office, the House of Lords Record Office, the Kent Archives Office, the National Library of Scotland, the National Maritime Museum, the Public Record Office, the Scottish Record Office, the Society of Antiquaries, the University of London, the Victoria and Albert Museum and the West Sussex Record Office. This thesis would not have been started without the aid of a three-year -3- British Academy grant, and it might never have been finished without the award by the National Maritime Museum of the Caird Junior Research Fellowship for 1989-90. Both the Academy and the Museum deserve my deepest thanks. Throughout the text I have kept to the original spelling of quotations, but have lengthened abbreviations and added punctuation where necessary. Dates are given in the Old Style, but the year Is taken as beginning on 1 January. Richmond-upon-Thames, June 1990 -4- CONTENTS Abbreviations 6 Introduction 7 PART ONE: THE GOVERNMENT OF TIlE NAVY 1. The Senior Executive 23 23 1. The King ii. The Authority of the Lord High Admiral 44 66 2. The Administration of the Yards 66 I. The Navy Board: The Structure of Government The Navy Board: Administrative Constraints 70 ii. iii. Reform 85 102 lv. Storekeeping 110 v. Timekeeping vi. Theft 114 PART T1: FINANCE 3. The Mechanics of Naval Finance 123 1. Basic Finance 123 129 ii. The Private Purse iii. Private Profit 163 4. The Management of Naval Finance 170 PART THREE: SERVICING THE FLEET 5. Manning 202 248 6. VIctualling 248 I. Conditions of Service 252 ii. Finance 258 iii. Organisation and Personnel iv. Allowances 273 279 v. Procurement 284 vi. Delivery and Stowage vii. Surveys and Complaints 288 7. The Ordnance Office and the Navy 299 332 8. The Seaworthiness of the King's Ships 332 I. Hulls 348 ii. Masts and Yards 354 iii. Cordage 360 iv. Sails v. Conclusions 363 Conclusion 364 Bib) lography 370 -5- ABBREVIATIONS A.P.C. Acts of the Privy Council B.R.L. Birmingham Reference Library Bodl. Llbr. Bodleian Library Brit. Libr. British Library C.S.P.D. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic C.S.P. I. Calendar of State Papers, Ireland C.S.P.v. Calendar of State Papers, Venetian D. N. B. Dictionary of National Biography Derb. R.O. Derbyshire Record Office ii. M. C. Historical Manuscripts Commission K.A.O. Kent Archives Office Longleat Longleat House N .M. M. National Maritime Museum N. R. S. Navy Records Society P .R. 0. Public Record Office R.P.C.S. Register of the Privy Council of Scotland Scot. R.O. Scottish Record Office T.H.D.T. Trinity House of Deptford Transactions, 1609-35, ed, G.G. Harris, London Record Society, xix, (1983). W.S.R.O. West Sussex Record Office -6- INTRODUCTION The Navy inherited by Charles I in March 1625 was in better shape than it had been for many years. Following the end of the Elizabethan war with Spain in 1604 it had been allowed to decay under the benevolent auspices of the aged Lord High Admiral, Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham. Robert Kenny, in a vivid phrase, has said that Nottingham's subordinates on the Navy Board 'made the navy a fat, lifeless, supine organism which seemed to exist to be ravaged and robbed by Its own personnel'.' However, following a damning report compiled in 1618, the Board was suspended and a twelve-man Navy Commission was appointed in its place. In their task of reform the Commissioners were encouraged by the new and youthful Lord High Admiral, George Villiers, Marquis (later Duke) of Buckingham, who replaced Nottingham in January 1619. Over the next five years the Commissioners put the Navy's finances on a sound footing. They also disposed of a number of old ships and built ten new vessels In their place. The results were, by contemporary standards, highly impressive. By the accession of Charles I, the royal fleet consisted of twenty-five seaworthy capital ships and a handful of pinnaces. 2 This strength, remarked Sir John Coke, the leading Commissioner who was then in his sixties, was 'better then ever It was in my memorie and exceeded the Navies of former times'. 3 His observation was echoed by an anonymous tract writer in 1628, who commented that 'the shipping of England is at this present much more greater, and more warliker then it hath beene in any former age'. However, this same writer was 1 Robert W. Kenny, Elizabeth's Admiral: The Political Career of Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, 1536-1624 (Baltimore & London, 1970), p.293. 2 P.R.O., S(tate] P(apers]16/13/59, fleet list, n.d., (1625-6). This figure excludes the White Bear, which was unserviceable: BrIt. Libr., Add(itional] MS. 64884 fo.59. 3 Brit. Libr., Add. MS. 64889, fo.155v, Sept. 1626, (draft). -7- undoubtedly exaggerating when he added that Charles I possessed 'the most powerful navy that any king hath in Christendome', for the Spanish fleet was considerably larger than its Caroline counterpart.' Nevertheless, Spain's overseas empire meant that her naval strength was dissipated around the globe, unlike England's, which was concentrated exclusively in home waters. In 1626 Secretary of State Sir Edward Conway at least believed that this fact made it 'faisible for us to keep the seas against them'. Under Charles I the newly refashioned English Navy was soon put to use. In October 1625 a large fleet was despatched under the command of the experienced soldier Sir Edward Cecil with the aim of striking a blow against Spain. However, Cecil's attempt to emulate the Earl of Essex's feat In 1596 of seizing Cadiz ended in ignominious failure. The following year a fresh fleet was set out under Lord Willoughby. This time the ships got no further than the Bay of Biscay before fierce storms forced them to return home. The fault was laid at the door of the Navy's administration, and a Special Commission was briefly established to investigate the activities of the Navy Commissioners. No further expeditions were mounted against Spain after 1626, although the war continued untIl December 1630. The bulk of England's naval effort was instead diverted into a fresh conflict with France, which lasted until April 1629. In July 1627 Buckingham led a combined expedition to the lie de Re to assist the Huguenots of La Rochelle. However, he was forced to withdraw in November, and part of the blame for this defeat was laid on the Navy Commissioners for failing to keep him supplied. They were dismissed in 4 Longleat, Coventry MS. vol. 117 fo.25. The anonymous author's choice of words excluded from comparison the Navy of the republican Dutch, which was also larger than England's.