Thirteen Days of Terror: An Interview with Syndicate Reporter Charles Bartlett and His Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Gavin Hunter Percy Advanced Placement United States History Instructor: Mi'. Alex Haight February 10,2003

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8804 Postoak Road • Potomac, Maryland 20854 • (301) 983-5200 • Fax: (301) 983-4710 • http://ww\v.saes.org Table of Contents

Release Form 2

Statement of Purpose 3

Biography 4

Historical Contextualization 5

Interview Transcription 14

Historical Analysis 33

Appendix 38

Bibliography 44 Percy-3 Statement of Purpose

The purpose of this project is to gain a better understanding and comprehension of

the Cuban missile crisis though a primary resource. Charles Bartlett is a well known

syndicated journalist and was a participant in several of the events that brought the

Unhed States to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962. The interview whh Mr.

Bartlett gives one unique insights into events extensively covered by renowned historians, but where differences of opinion and emphasis do exist. Mr. Bartlett's inside view of the key participants involved, plus broad understanding of the policy process, gives a fresh perspective and is a fascinating read. Percy-4

Biography

Charles Bartlett was bom on August 14, 1921 in Lake Forest, Chicago. He attended the St. Mark's School in Lake Forest before attending Yale. Mr. Bartlett graduated from Yale in 1943 whh a Bachelors degree. Afrer college he served his country by joining the Navy, and was enlisted as a Naval Intelligence officer for three years. Mr. Bartlett left the Navy in 1946, and became a correspondent for The

Chattanooga Times, a newspaper owned by The New York Times. After serving as a correspondent for a year and a half, Mr. Bartlett expressed interest in taking a job in

Washington D.C. From 1948 to 1962 he was a correspondent for The Chattanooga

Times in Washington D.C; gaining several contacts and earning a reputation as a prestigious reporter.

For the next two decades, Charles Bartlett became a syndicate reporter for The

Chicago Daily News and The Chicago Sun. During that time, Mr. Bartlett received the

Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 1956. In 1965, Mr. Bartlett co-authored "Facing the Brink" with Edward Weintal. In 1981, he became the Director of the Committee to

Limh Congressional and Presidential Terms. In 1983, he became the Director of the

Jefferson Foundation which related to Constitutional change and term limitation. Mr.

Bartlett is also a board member of the Visitors of the Georgetown School of Foreign

Service and the William E. Simon School of Business.

Today, he continues liis profession by writing the Washington Focus Newsletter.

Charles Bartlett is married whh four cliildren and resides in his home in Washington. Percy-5

Thirteen Days of Terror

The sixties proved to be one of the most fascinating decades of this century; emerging from the fifties with revolutionary technology, music, and styles that defined a generation of America. The Cuban missile crisis was a pivotal point in America's history, where the entire country stood still for thirteen days, wahing for a resolution to what seemed an endless nightmare.

In 1961, John F. Kennedy, a democrat from Massachusetts, was voted into office as America's first Roman Catholic President. During President Kennedy's inaugural address, he asked the public, "Ask not what your country can do for you^—ask what you can do for your country." This statement was a cornerstone for what the Kennedy administration stood for and what they wanted to accomplish. In general, President

Kennedy wanted to get the country moving again. Economically, his programs launched

America on its longest sustained expansion since WWII. Kennedy was also hailed as a civil rights activist; fighting in congress for a new civil rights legislation, allowing

African-American's more rights. Furthermore, President Kennedy wanted America's wealth to be spread to developing counties around the world and for human rights to be the primary focus of this ultimate goal. To accomplish this revolutionary task he founded programs such as the Peace Corps and Alliance for Progress. Although America's economy was thriving and Kennedy's presidency was looking prosperous, the rising rivalry between the worids only other super power grew stronger.

Russia, or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as it was known during

Kennedy's era, was the other world super power besides the United States. Nikha

Khrushchev, communist leader, was the first secretary of the of the Soviet Communist Percv-6 party from 1953 to 1964. War had played a major role through out Klirushchev's life.

He served as a czarist in WWI form 1914 to 1918. Later that year he joined the communist party, as well as the Red Army, were he served as a soldier during the

Russian civil war, During WWII, Klirushchev served as a political advisor to the political department of the Red Army, Nikita Klu-ushchev's reputation and military experience would serve to be a platform for his pohtical future.

In 1953 Khiushchev became first secretary of the Central Committee and leader

of the communist party. In 1956, he gained great recognhion for denouncing Stalin and his methods, despite the fact that he himself was involved with many of Stalin's crimes.

As the decade of the sixties emerged, Kliiaishchey's foreign policy troubled the United

States due to the fact that he favored nuclear weapons over conventional armies. This foreign policy, in combination with President Kennedy's concern whh the spread of comniunism in the world, served as a catalyst to growing tension between the two countries.

Pursuing his fight against communism, President Kennedy took particular interest in the small island of Cuba. Fidel Castro, a member of the Communist party, had risen to

power by force, proving to be quite influential as a leader. Castro had joined a rebel movement in 1952 when Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar took control of the Cuban government. After being jailed and exiled, Castro finally overthrew Batista using guerrilla warfare, driving him out of the country. This caught the attention of President

Kennedy and the American public.

As diplomatic relations between Cuba and the Unhed States deteriorated, new

options were discussed about how to handle the rising tension. One such option Percy-7

discussed was the Bay of Pigs invasion. In this option, Cuban exiles would attempt to

gain local support in Cuba and overthrow Castro and his regime. The Kennedy

administration agreed that this was a possible and realistic opfion, so, on April 17, 1961,

roughly 1300 Cuban exiles whh American military training, and weapons landed on

Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) and begun an invasion. The exiles intended to cross the island to Havana while gaining local support. However, they were quickly stopped by

Castro's army. By April 19, 90 exiles were killed and the rest were taken as prisoners.

President Kennedy took frjll responsibility for the attack on Cuba. The day after the event, Kennedy was quoted saying, "Lyndon, you've got to remember that were all in this and that, when I accepted the responsibihty for this operation, I took the entire responsibilhy on myself, and I think we should have no sort of passing of the buck or backbiting, however justified." (Schlesinger 270) Although showing good character and judgment, the Bay of Pigs failure was still an embarrassment to the entire Kennedy administration; however, embarrassment was about to become the least of the United

States' problems.

Nikita Khrushchev saw the American failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion as an opportunity. In May of 1962, Khaishchev hypothesized the idea of installing intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba whh the direct intent of advancing on the

Americans already strong lead of developing and deploying strategic missiles.

Negotiations were struck up between Khrushchev and Castro discussing the issue. The installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba was considered a mutually beneficial deal. The

Soviet Union would have an equally threatening poshion on America and Castro would have the protection of the Soviet Union against further attempts on his life and his Percy-8

regime. "The presents of these missiles was designed to make the imperialists understand that, if they tried to invade Cuba, 'the war which they threatened to start stood at their own boarders, so that they would realize more realistically the dangers of thermonuclear war.'" (Schlesinger 728) Michael R. Beschloss notes in his book, The Crisis Years:

Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963, that Castro felt it necessary to accept the Russians offer because he "had no right to refuse." Better to risk "a great crisis" than wait

"impotently" for an American invasion." (Beschloss 391) After Castro's approval, the

Soviet Union moved quickly, and in secret, to build missile silos in Cuba. Wlien

American spy planes caught the missile silos being buih in Cuba a nightmarish stand-off between the two worid super powers took place for what lasted to be thirteen days.

On October 15, 1962, Richard Heyser, a U-2 pilot flew his spy plane from Texas to Orlando, crossing over Cuba. When Heyser returned, the film from his plane was escorted to a lab where it was to be analyzed. Military experts saw what they thought to be surface-to-air missile sites being built, however, the measurements did not add up.

The surface-to-air missiles, or SA-4, measure 25 feet in length, however, these missiles measure between 60 to 65 feet in length. These pictures along with the measurements confirmed that they were in fact SS-4 nuclear missiles. It was later discovered that the missiles were shipped in pieces on merchant ships, never whole, and that the soldiers were coming in on cruise liners, disguised as tourists.

On October 16, President Kennedy was informed about the missile situation during his breakfast. Shortly thereafter, Kennedy held an executive committee with his top 12 advisors to discuss the possible options. In the end it came down to just two options, the first of which was to order an air strike against Cuba followed by an Percy-9 invasion. The second option was to blockade Cuba entirely. There is somewhat of a debate among historiographies as to what the advisors really thought about milhary action at different times during the crisis. For instance, Robert Kennedy notes in his memoirs that, "The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in calling for immediate military action." (Kennedy 36) However, historian Michael R. Beschloss states that on "Thursday morning, October 18. At 11:10a.m., the President called Ex

Comm to the cabinet room. Sorensen reported that the Secretary of State favored a

'surgical' air strike without warning. This was opposed 'by the diplomats (Bolilen,

Thompson, probably Martin), who insist that prior pohtical action essential... by the milhary (McNamara, Taylor, McCone) who insist that the air strike could not be limited...by advocates of the blockade rout.'" (Beschloss 453) Furthermore, historian

Aithur M. Schlesinger, Jr. recounts in his book A Thousand Days, the notion of the advisors after an American U-2 was shot down over Cuba. "We had no choice, h was argued, but a milhary response; and our tactical analysis had already shown that strikes at the bases would be little use whhout strikes at the airfields, and strikes at the airfields of little use whhout further supporting action, so, once the process began, h could hardly stop short of invation." (Schlesinger 756) Kennedy, however, wanting to avoid military confrontation was leaning toward a blockade.

President Kennedy went to Connecticut on October 17, maintaining his schedule in order to keep the present conflict confidential. After fiilfilling the purpose of his trip,

President Kennedy returned to the White House in order to continue discussions on Cuba.

The Air Force was still adamant on the air strike which would essentially wipe Cuba off the face of the Earth but Kennedy was still pressing the blockade. On the night of Percy-10

October 17, another U-2 plane discovered SS-5 missile which are capable of reaching every corned in America. On October 18, President Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrie Gromyko to discuss matters including whether or not the Soviet Union had offensive weapons in Cuba. Kennedy read Gromyko a message saying that the US would not tolerate offensive weapons in Cuba. Although Gromyko denied that any missiles existed in Cuba, Kennedy decided not to show the surveillance photographs proving that there were.

As the week came to a close on Friday, October 19, President Kennedy had his staff write two speeches, one preparing the public that an air strike would take place and the other if a blocked were to be put into effect. Kennedy then proceeded with his planned schedule of campaigning in the Mid-west. The following day, the executive cominittee met to further discuss the options and go over the two speeches. The committee approved the speeches, then Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General called for his brother to come home. As not to draw attention to himself. President Kennedy reported that he was returning to the White House on doctors orders due to illness.

Kennedy returned to Washington D.C. for a meeting about the crisis, however, did not settle anything-meetings would continue the next day.

On October 21, President Kennedy had a meeting whh all of his top advisors.

The premises of the discussions were the two options: air strike or blockade. The head of

Strategic Air Command (SAC) informed the president that they (the Air Force) would be able to destroy all the missile that they knew about (if there were ones unaccounted for it could be a fatal mistake for America).The president also asked about the amount of casualties involved with such a massive strike. SAC estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Percy-11 casualties. This factor largely contributed to Kennedy's decision of going with the blockade. That night, another U-2 pass over the island showed that MJGs (Russian fighter jets) and SAM missile sites were also being built.

On October 22, U.S. Senators were brought to Washington for a briefing on the build up of offensive weapons in Cuba. Most of what the Senators heard startled them enough to want an air strike. They were also informed that the Soviet field commanders were given orders to launch the nuclear missiles in case of an invasion. Furthermore, naval ships were prepared for a blockading of Cuba and the inilitary was brought up to

DEFCON 3. Specific instructions were given to the proper military personal to launch

America's missiles after the Presidents speech was given, if necessary. In addition, twenty planes armed whh nuclear bombs were given instrucfions to deploy for Russia is necessary. That same day. President Kennedy sent a letter to Khaishchev with a copy of his speech in it, listing the demands of America: "First, to halt this offensive build up, a strict quarantine of all military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated.

Second, I ha\>e directed the continued and increased close surx'eillance and it's military build up. Third, it shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the

Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response on the Soviet

Union."

On October 23, Kennedy ordered a low level reconnaissance pass over Cuba.

This revealed that the Russians were commencing launch test of the missiles whhout launching them. Kennedy also signed a treaty with the Organization of American States confirming the option of the blockade. Ships were immediately deployed to Cuba and Percy-12 ordered to fire at any ship that did not stop for inspection. On Wednesday, October 24,

Russian ships arrived at the quarantine line where American ships were positioned to inspect. EXCOMM had concerns about the Russian submarines that accompanied the ships and whether or not the captains of the Russian boats had received orders about what to do from Khixishchev. Kennedy never lost his nerve though. In an article written by

Charles Bartlett for The Saturday Evening Post, he writes, "Once or twice," an

EXCOMM member recalls, "the President lost his temper on minor matters. But he never lost his nerve." Bartlett goes on ftirther to say, "A President's nerve is the essential factor when the two great nuclear powers are 'eye ball to eye ball'." (Bartlett 20) To their luck, the Russian ships stopped at the quarantine line, however, tliis was not the end of the confiict.

October 25 marked the day in which Americas military was brought to the highest alert ever, DEFCON 2. Furthermore, the Russian ships began to move closer to Cuba.

President Kennedy, still desperate to avoid military confiict sent advisors to the United

Nations. The Soviet parties refused to answer ant questions so the Presidents advisors simply showed the reconnaissance photographs and explained the power of the missiles

(each missile in Cuba was equivalent to 50 times Hiroshima). On the 27^ of October, a

U-2 plane was shot down over Cuba. A Soviet commander gave the order believing that it was the last recon mission before a strike. Khnishchev also sent another letter to

Kennedy demanding that America remove missiles from Turkey and to make a public statement that they would never again invade Cuba. "Robert Kennedy suggested that the

President simply interpret the Friday-night letter as a proposal for an acceptable deal, ignoring all the other implications. The President agreed." (Bartlett 18) President Percy-13

Kennedy only responded to a previous letter from Khrushchev demanding a public statement about never again invading Cuba. On Sunday, October 28, Klirushchev made an announcement over the radio, in Moscow, stating the removal of missiles and all offensive weapons in Cuba. A few weeks later, Kennedy said, "If we had invaded

Cuba.. .1 am sure the Soviets would have acted. They would have to, just as we would have to. I think there are certain compulsions on any major power." (Schlesinger 759) Percy-14

Interview Transcription

Interview date: December 23, 2002 Location: 2208 46*" Street NW Washington D.C.

Pre-interview: Gavin Percy: This interview will take place in December Twenty-third.

My interviewees name in Charles Bartlett and the interview will take place at his home office at 2208 46"" Street in Washington D.C.

Gavin Percy: Could you please tell me a Ihtle bit about your childhood, where you grew up, what schools you went to? I know you said you went to Yale and Wake Forrest.

Charles Bartlett: No...I grew up in Lake Forest. I grew up in Chicago, Lake Forest. I went to school at the age of 12 at St. Mark's. I went there for five years then I went to

Yale. Then I went into the Navy. Then I became a newspaper man after I left the Navy, but I was in the Navy for four years. Then I became a correspondent for The

Chattanooga Times, a newspaper owned by the New York Times. It was a very, very good newspaper at that time. Tn a year and a half I told them I wanted to go to

Washington, I had some promising jobs up there, and they said why don't you become a correspondent for The Chattanooga Times because you'll have much more freedom if you are only representing one guy. If you're a bureau you're put on a beat and you'll be stuck on that beat and in not just one part of Washington. If you're there all by yourself you can go anywhere you want and you can cover anything you want and you'll have more freedom. That was very good advice and I took it. So I came up for them, and was there... for a good while. As a matter of fact, as a result of that damn thing. The

Chattanooga Times editorially loved Adlai Stevenson and they didn't support me as Percy-15 much as I thought they should [chuckles]. So I was mad as hell so I took a job at the

Chicago Sun Times. There I got in to writing a column. I was wrifing a syndicated column. They had a good syndicate, and that was good. That's the story.

GP: Could you go into syndicate reporting a little bit? What is that exactly, and how is that different fiom other kinds of reporting?

CB: You sign a contract with a syndicate. You promise to deliver three columns-I promised to deliver four columns, which was a terrible mistake [laughs], but you deliver three columns a week, four columns a week, and you fax them to the syndicate, and they dispense-they have a salesman who sells your column to the edhors and they dispense the column to the places they have been able to sell it to.

GP: Oh okay. How long had you been in journalism before the actual Cuban missile crisis happened?

CB: Well, as soon as I left the Navy which was in 1946,1 got into journalism. So that would be about 16 years.

GP: Oh, so about 16 years.

CB: Yeah Percy-16

GP: Alright, just to jump right into h, what exactly was your involvement during the

Cuban missile crisis? What exactly did you cover?

CB: Well 1 had two involvements. One was that... I was a friend of Jack Kennedy's; we had gotten to be great friends. After the war when we were all resting down in the East

Coast, I had-well Jack Kennedy and I had gotten along very well and so I was a friend of his, and then I was also a newspaper man, so I was coming in from both angles.

GP: Great. How long was it before the press in Washington, and around the country, knew that something was going on? Because a big effort was made to keep the Cuban missile crisis a secret for obvious reasons.

CB: Well h wasn't really a secret you see, h was just that the CIA had these over flights and they spotted the installations.

GP: Yeah, the U2's, right?

CB: Yeah they had the launching pads...and I think there were six of them at the time.

So the CIA knew about it, and the first I knew about it was when I talked to Kennedy.

He was campaigning up in Connecticut and I fiew up in a plane and on the way back I happened to bring up something on South America and his face went whhe and he said,

"my god I have problems in Latin America". That was all he told me... and I didn't push it any fiarther. So, meanwhile there was a senator called Ken Keating from New York, Percy-17 and somebody at the CIA was impatient that we [the press] weren't making more of a fuss about this, so they started leaking it to Ken Keating. So Ken Keating was making daily attacks on the administration. He was a Republican, and he was making daily attacks on the administration-urging them to get on this and really take the thing on. So it was a tough one for the President.

Kennedy didn't want to break the thing till they had h absolutely, and they knew what they were going to do, because we didn't know exactly how we were going to react to this thing. So he wasn't ready to make that announcement that we knew that those missiles were in place. And we really didn't know there were missiles-we saw these big tmcks carrying these big things, but we really didn't know. So anyway, my friend Ray

Klein, who was the Deputy Director of the CIA, he spotted these little placements, these launching pads, and that was it. At that point President Kennedy went into action. And the country knew something was down there because Ken Keating kept talking about it, but they didn't know what it was until Kennedy went on to make that speech in which he declared the whole thing.

GP: Yeah when he went public about it. How did people react when he [President

Kennedy] went public about h? I mean what was the general reaction of the American public?

CB: Well you see at that point of course the whole country was living under the missiles that were aimed at us from Russia, so it wasn't exactly a big deal. It was a threat, a new tlireat that was particularly of interest to the South East under the assumption that the Percy-18 missiles would only be able to reach them. 1 don't think the country was terribly

alarmed, but of course h was a national issue... we were under threat and it was up to the

President to deal with h...and EXCOMM. He started a thing called EXCOMM whh the key advisors and the principals in it, with all the people he wanted to hear from. He had

Bobby [Robert Kennedy] sort of in charge of that, so what they found is that if the

President wasn't at the meeting, everyone was more frank than if he was there. So he had

Bobby reside over these meetings and he would get ideas from people and get what they

really felt. It worked pretty well. The EXCOMM was a good idea.

GP: Who came up with the idea for EXCOMM? Was it President Kennedy, or was it

Robert Kennedy, or was h...what was his special assistant's name?

CB: Oh Kenny O'Donnell, you thinking about him. He was the guy in the movie...that's a very interesting story. Have you seen the movie?

GP: You mean the Thirteen Days movie, yeah, yeah I have seen that.

CB: Because they make a big thing about that...about a guy named Kenny O'Donnell and Kevin Costner plays Kenny O'Donnell. Well, Kenny O'Donnell was nothing.

Kenny was sort of the gate keeper you had to see if you wanted to see the President. And he wasn't really... well he had some political experience-I mean he was close to

Kennedy; he'd been with the Kennedy's a long time. However, they made him a central character in the movie, and the reason was that they wanted to produce the movie.. .this is Percy-19 really fi4nny...they wanted to produce the movie and they couldn't get the money. Well, finally they were able to sign up Kevin Costner who really liked the idea of the part, but obviously he didn't look like Jack Kennedy so he couldn't play Jack Kemiedy, so they had to give him a role that would be central. So they buih up the role of Kenny

O'Donnell.

GP: That's pretty interesting.

CB: Oh yeah... yeah, and that's how they got the movie, and that's how they got the money for h. Anyway, he wasn't really key, of course the key guys were

McNamara... and Bobby. Bobby turned out to have extraordinary good judgment during the whole thing. This was really his first test...outside the justice field. He had been sort of elected...he really hadn't had that confidence in the past, he hadn't done that well at

Virginia Law School; however, he was a very good politician. He really got into this thing, did a wonderfijl job, and really represented his brother, and had really good judgment about people. He did a hell of a job.

GP: How do some of the historiographies, or historical interpretations, differ on the

Cuban missile crisis, or is there a general consensus on most issues?

CB: I think people agree on most things...I don't think there is much mystery about it now. They did throw Khrushchev out after the thing [Cuban missile crisis] was over.

I've never really understood why the Russians reacted so strongly, but they did. I think Percy-20 everybody understands. The real question was whether they were going to attack us or use h [the missiles] as counter leverage. 1 believe that they [Russia] were putting these missiles in because it would give them...h was sort of a response to the knowledge that we had these missiles in Turkey. This really "Teed" them off and they wanted to have something that would counter balance that. The Cold War was really a wonderful thing in a way because each side had about the same amount of leverage as the other, and I think that Khrushchev thought that because we had these missiles in Turkey and Italy that we were sort of creeping up on him... I think he wanted to sort of balance that out a bit.

GP: You briefly went over the Executive Committee and the Key players. Were there any other key players besides McNamara and Bobby Kennedy? I mean, who was really influenfial and who was making suggestions and calling the shots? In that one room there was really a lot of intelligence and a lot of power.

CB: I just remember talking to Jack about h. I don't remember him being enormously impressed by anybody. He brought in wonderful people like Dean Atchenson.. .they brought in Bob Lovett fiom New York, they brought in some of the old boys who were really good - got their advice. The strength of the thing was more in that committee and sort of the consensus that came out of that committee. I think Bobby gets credh for orchestrating EXCOMM.. .1 can't think of any great stories.

GP: That's fine, that's fine. Anything you can remember can help me. What was the controversy about the two letters from Khrushchev? I know there were two letters sent. Percy-21 and the first one was sort of an under the table deal and had all the things that America would agree to.

CB: Well, when we were dealing with Klirushchev we didn't know who was calling the shots over there particularly, because you had the Central Committee and then you had

Klirushchev as the chairman. The thing you never really knew through most of the Cold

War was who was the guy with the power. So, these two letters - one was more conciliatory than the other - and I tliink Kennedy made the very wise decision to go with the conciliatoiy one and ignore the tough one and pretend that we are on the track towards agreement. You see what happened was...well, the communications on this thing were fascinating because the first thing I knew about the Russian game...well, I had this dear good fiiend in the Russian embassy who was the minister, the number two guy, and his name was Alexander Zinchuk. Zinchuk was a hell of a guy, a very bright fellow, and he came to me after his vacation in Moscow - this would have been the early part of

September - he had been away all summer. Anyway, he said, "Charley I have a message for the President from the Secretary General" (that was Khrushchev), "and he said he wants the President to know that he knows that he will be very busy this fall whh the political campaign, and he wants him to know that he will not in any way interfere with his concentration on American polhics" [laughs]. Slimy thing to do, eh? So he

[Zinchuk] said, "would you be kind enough to pass this on the President". I said sure, but that was the first thing I learned, and obviously this was enough to get Kennedy's eye off the ball. I think the Russians... well there were obviously bad judgments on that side, and then there was the judgment to go ahead with this thing which was crazy. This was all Percy-22 very encouraging for me because when you have a young friend in the white house, if you have a friend that is forty-three, you do wonder whether he's going to be up to it. It was a very testing moment...but Bobby did an excellent job, truly excellent.

GP: Yeah, you briefly mentioned about the coup, the whole controversy about the coup, did the White House know if there was a coup in Russia.,, whh the two letters?

CB: I'm not sure about that.

GP: There was a controversy at the time because when the second letter was sent it had those extra demands...

CB: Oh the question whether they had taken power away from Khrushchev. Well, as I said, you really didn't know who was calling the shot over there. You see we had these different ways of dealing. Bobby was dealing with Dobrynin, who was the ambassador.

Dobrynin was a very wily fellow, a wonderful bastard [laughs]. Bobby was sending messages through Dobrynin, and that was bypassing the state department, so the real traffic was going off the normal diplomatic path.

GP: Yeah that wasn't normal was it, to do it that way? Percy-23

CB: Well h was the first time h really...I'm not sure...I think Henry Kissinger began doing h a lot, but he kept it in the White House. Up to that point I don't think h had ever been done before.

GP: When the U2 was shot down, a lot of people in EXCOMM wanted to retaliate due to America's rules of engagement. What went into President Kennedy's decision not to retaliate?

CB: Well that's what they discussed. They had all the joint chiefs there., .he [Kennedy] told me, and Curtis LeMay, who was the General in charge of the Air Force, he said, "Let me go Mr. President. I can knock out all those damn things and that will end \t...\t will be over". Well, the President said, "Tell me general, if I give you a green light can you give me your absolute positive 100 percent assurance that you'll get every one of those missiles". General LeMay said, "Well one or two might get away" [chuckles]. Jack told me a chill went down his back and so he was never in favor of that. Also, there was no real hawk in these councils and I gathered it; there was really nobody really pressing for an invasion of Cuba. They brought some troops down to Florida to make it look like they were ready for h if they needed to do it, but there was no enthusiasm for invading Cuba.

There was no enthusiasm for bombing the hell out of Cuba. In other words, fiom the beginning h became a diplomatic exercise and it stayed on that base.

GP: That's good. Throughout the thirteen days, what do you think some of the pivotal junctures were in those sequences of events? What were some of the defining moments? Percy-24

CB: Kennedy, I think, felt a little lonely during that fime, so he invhed Martha and me down for dinner during those thirteen days. So anyway we went down [to the White

House] this one night, and he [Kennedy] said to me, "Well Charley this is it". He said,

"The Russian ship is now approaching my quarantine." He said this is a piece of war. I knew him pretty well but tliis was amazing to me because we had dinner and we were talking about how we were going to play tennis tomorrow. There was no heightened tension at the dinner table. He was marvelous. We talked about different things... it was very normal; however, we did know that at some point within the next few hours whether this war would come. After the dinner was over we went home early. He wanted to go to bed -1 wanted to go to bed - so at about 9:30 we left there and at about 10:15 I got a call and Jack said the Russians turned around. It was amazing.

GP: What key decisions were made by Kennedy that kept us from going to war?

CB: Well I think the blockade was a key decision.

GP: And when exactly was that final decision made that the blockade was going to be put into effect and not an air strike?

CB: Well I think that the air strike was never on. I honestly don't think that's what

Kennedy ever wanted...! mean that conversation whh Curtis Lamay really killed h

[laughs]. Percy-2 5

GP: Yeah, because pretty early on it was an option but nobody really wanted to do it.

CB: No. The reactions to me were really pretty rational, and a lot of those details were in that aiticle ("The Whhe House in the Cuban Crisis") that we really had a lot of access on.

GP: Great. Where did Congress stand in supporting the Presidents decisions?

CB: They were good. Congress was fine-as I said Ken Keating got every body worked up a little bit before hand, but there was no...Congress was very quiet during this fime and I don't blame them [laughs].

GP: Were members of EXCOMM, specifically the military figures, trying to pin the

President into going to war?

CB: No. I don't think there was any pressure from the military to invade...they knew it would be a tough one. I think Curtis LeMay would have liked to drop those bombs. He seemed really anxious to. Also, there was an incident that you have probably heard about where McNamara questioned the firing on a Russian ship. You know what I'm talking about?

GP: Yes. Percy-26

CB: When we did this article the one man in Washington that was a friend of both of ours was Bob McNamara...and he wouldn't talk to us. He was smart because he knew this thing was probably going to cause a lot of controversy. We talked to the head of the

CIA, we talked to every body-but he would not talk. So anyway, T was never able to nail down that thing. The admiral that was involved was a very fine gentleman I knew slightly; a friend of mine was married to his daughter. Anyway, there was this confrontation in the Pentagon which was in that movie.

GP: Really.

CB: Yeah that really happened.

GP: So how accurate was the movie? I know that no body could shoot unless the

President said...

CB: Well the movie is pretty good, but it was hyped up a little. McNamara made h clear that he was in complete control of the military and that the military did not have any maneuverability. Bob McNamara is a pretty savvy guy and he just took over. He was it.

GP: What are some of the lessons that the next generation of pohtical leaders should learn from the Cuban missile crisis? Percy-27

CB: I think the obvious lesson is to negotiate. Always negotiate and don't just react with a one-two punch. For instance, right now thank god Powell has convinced the

President to go through the UN.

GP: Exactly, which leads right to my next question: What do you think President Bush should remember from the Cuban missile crisis in dealing whh our current difTicuhies with other so called rogue countries such as North Korea?

CB: [Without hesitation] You have got to give them a chance to back down. You can't put them [opposing forces] in a position to embarrass themselves. The trick in negotiation is to always leave the guy enough room to back down without looking like a coward. The thing that worries me with this present negotiation is that they are not giving Sadam enough room...I mean he's going to look like a coward to his people, and I feel badly about that. It seems to me that there are other ways, diplomatic ways, with out making him look like a fool. There are people in the administration, Wolfowitz particularly, who really want to disgrace Sadam and get him out. Bush I think shares some of that, therefore in this case... well Kennedy was never in any way anxious to make Khrushchev look like a fool or look like a coward. I think that was an important part of the success of this thing. Both sides treated each other with an amount of respect.

The situation in Iraq worries me a bit. They're squeezing Sadam so hard that there is really going to be no honorable exit. Percy-28

GP: Do you think that it is a question of moral with this administration though? I mean

Sadam has actually tested chemical weapons on his own people and has maintained a dictator leadership.

CB: Yeah, there is a problem there.

GP: He's just an evil guy. Does that play a factor in the decision making of the administration?

CB: You're right. Khrushchev was a much better man than Sadam. In fact I have always believed that if Khrushchev was left in there I think we would have setfled the cold war twenty years earlier. I think Khrushchev was a very benign fellow. I think the reason he got out was because the more militant people wanted to throw him out. He was a really conciliatory guy and Kennedy treated him that way and it worked out. But you're right we're not dealing whh a conciliatory guy [Sadam], we're dealing whh a monster, and when you deal with a monster you have got to play a little rough.

GP: Absolutely. Do you think that a situation like the Cuban missile crisis could happen today?

CB: I think that is why they are talking about this missile defense thing - I'm not a big fan of this missile defense thing because it doesn't seem very secure [laughs]. I remember somebody asking Defense Secretary Rumsfeld at a press conference - someone Percy-29

asked if h gave much protection and he said, "No, but it's better than nothing" [laughs].

Anyway, what they have gotten so far doesn't really excite me. But of course, the reason they are building it is because there is a possibility that some son of a bhch sitting over in

North Korea is saying, let's have h our way or we'll drop this thing on you,

GP: Is there anything in closing that you would like to talk about? Any last final

thoughts when you think of the Cuban missile crisis?

CB: I just feel that it really proved the good sense of Jack Kennedy and I think h justified himself as President by the way he settled that one. Also this whole Castro thing was so sad. T was actually for Castro in the fifties. We had a terrible president down in

Cuba named Batista. Well, Batista was a monster and was really just a tliief- taking all this money and doing nothing for no body. He was just a crook. They had this movement up in the mountains, and the guy that represented them in Washington became a friend of mine-a guy called Betincore. He was a very great guy who like me detested

Batista, and what he didn't know, and what none of knew in Washington at that point was that this thing had been taken over by the communists. So my friend, Betincore, he went in. He flew into Havana and they made him the head of the Bank of Havana. However, as soon as he got in he realized that this was a communist exercise and that the communist were in charge. So anyway, he had to figure how to get out and I remember

Castro coming up to Washington to speak to the editor's society of newspapers. Well my friend Betincore was in the entourage with Castro and I wanted to say hello to him. So, I went up afterwards and the guy wouldn't speak to me, and I remember being really hurt Percy-30 and thinking what the hell is wrong with this guy. Of course the reason was that at this time he was trying to get out of Havana and his wife as well. It was pretty tough but he did get her out and became a great anfi-communist, I think we al! got sucked in alittle bit in the fifties due to the fact that Batista is such a bum and that any alternative would be better for the Cuban people.

GP: Andthatled totheBay ofPigs.

CB: Well you know I could have saved the Bay of Pigs. This is a great story. SO

Betincore called me and said, "Chariey they are about to make a hell of a mistake."

Kennedy had been in office about three or four weeks at this point, or something like that.

Anyway, h [Bay of Pigs] was all being organized down in Miami, and Betincore calls me and says "everybody knows it, every Cuban knows it, everybody in Cuba knows h-there is just no secrecy to this thing". He said, "we all know that they are training troops in

Guatemala and that they are gonna.. .this thing is going to be a disaster". So I said thanks and...well h's just that at this moment Kennedy just had so many problems and you can imagine being a new president you have all these appointments and all these people fighting over jobs and tliings-all kinds of things going on. So I said to myself I just can't lay this on poor old Jack. Well the next day I was walking on that oval in front of the

White House-Jack had asked me to come over and take a walk with him, and I had every opportunity to do h but I didn't do h because I didn't think that he needed another problem. So it was the stupidest thing I had ever done. So instead I went to Alan DuHts who was absolutely the wrong guy-and told him-he was the head of the CIA-and told him Percy-31 the whole story. I said that this man knew what he was talking about and he even knew

Betincore. So anyway he said, "Well I'll check into this and I'll call you". So later I got a call and Dulits said, Charley I've checked into h and there is absolutely no truth to h at all". Sure enough the boats went ashore... I really could have saved the day on the Bay of

Pigs. That is one of the great black memories I have of my life. Kennedy told me he didn't know anything about h and the said, "you know Charley I took the blame", and that was the smartest thing he did. He stepped right up and took the blame.

GP: What was President Kennedy like as a man? What was his character like?

CB: First off, he was more fun than any one you'll ever meet because he had more of a sense of humor. Second, he had a great mind set for President. In other words he didn't deal with any of the persiflage, he didn't deal with any of that chh chat-when he talked to you he went right to the issue-what you could help him with-what you knew. Let's say you were working in the government, he knew where you were good, what your specialty was, and what you two could talk about... so then you two could go right to it. He didn't play around, he had a really focused mind, and that was probably his greatest strength as a president... [long pause] He was a lousy gambler [laughs]. Just terrible. We used to play Backgammon...he was just no good. He had a great sense of humans and how we are as people-I think if he lived he would have been a very, very good president. It was a great asset having someone like Bobby-some body totally loyal to you. He was funny about that one time. This was something before your time, but the U.S. steel raised hs prices, and the bug job was to get the steel companies to roll back their prices. We were Percy-32 fighting inflation at that point and so there was a real confrontation-headline stuff really.

Anyway I had this guy who was a friend of the guys who were deciding what U.S. steel would do and he was calling me and I was calling Jack and h was a relay of sorts.

Anyway, he was the guy responsible for the steel finally rolling back their damn prices.

SO a day later Bobby called asking me how to get a hold of this guy. Well I said, "Why do you want him Bobby", and he said "I want to indict him as part of a conspiracy". I said, "You can't do that Bobby, he's not a stock holder and U.S. Steel had nothing to do with h-he was trying to help your brother and help the countiy". So he said to talk to

Jack so I called up Kennedy and...I said, "We got a problem" [laughs]. I said, "Bobby wants to indict Hal Courter". There was a long pause...and Jack said, "You know what this government needs don't you?" and I said, No, What's that?" He said, "He said we need an attorney general that we can fix" [both laugh]. Percy-3 3

Historical Analysis

History is the accurate documentation of the past which should be used to supply the people of the present whh wisdom and the opportunity to apply that wisdom to the future. Oral history is an incredibly valuable and essential tool that is used to fill in the gaps that other historical data camiot. The task of a historian is to accurately document the past; a task that will not be wholly complete until and unless the stories and memories of those who lived during those times are taken into account. This reason alone truly demonstrates the value of oral history. In addition to being a useful tool for historians, oral history may also contain fiaws. The source of information from which oral history comes from can be biased, flawed, and sometimes misinterpreted. No human being is perfect. Memories that were created when a person was young can be rewritten by their own mind. In other words, the person may not remember exactly what happened so his or her mind will fill in the gaps. Furthermore, a person's memories may also be biased toward certain subjects - making it difficuh for the historian to collect objective information. Despite these flaws, oral history serves a crucial purpose in piecing together the untold stories of the past. The interview with Charles Bartlett shows a unique and often overlooked side to the Cuban missile crisis; illustrating both the thoughts and views of key individuals, as well as events that happened beyond the public knowledge. Percy-3 5 closing that the Cuban missile crisis proved the good sense of President Kennedy, and justified him by the way he handled it.

Mr. Bartlett's account of the Cuban missile crisis is both thorough and provocative. Early on in the interview, he was asked how long it was before the press in

Washington and around the country knew of the escalating threat in Cuba, primarily because such a large effort was made to keep the incident a secret. Mr. Bartlett gave some interesting insight into the matter by telling how Senator Ken Keating was leaking it to the press. He said, ".. .there was a senator named Ken Keating fi'om New York, and somebody from the CIA was impatient that we [the press] weren't making more of a fuss about tliis, so they started leaking it to Ken Keating." (Percy 4) This illustrates the significant historical value to the interview; giving a deeper perspective on the crisis. For instance, in Michael R. Beschloss's book. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev

1960-1963, an authoritive and well-respected account of the Cuban missile crisis, h does not mention anything about how information was leaked to the public through Ken

Keating. Another interesting perspective that the interview was able to give was the personal view of the President. Due to the fact that Charles Bartlett was a personal friend to President Kennedy, he was able to say what the President was thinking about certain issues. For instance, when asked about EXCOMM and the key members in it, Mr.

Bartlett said, "I just remember talking to Jack about h. I don't remember him being enormously impressed by anybody." (Percy 7)

A majorhy of the information gathered during the interview concurred with the historiography of the Cuban missile crisis. For example, Mr. Bartlett was able to go in depth about the negotiations that took place between Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Percy-3 6

Dobrynin. "Bobby was dealing with Dobrynin, who was the ambassador.. .Bobby was sending messages through Dobrynin, and that was bypassing the state department, so the real traffic was going off the normal diplomatic path." (Percy 9) The importance of this backchannel was recounted by Michael Beschloss in The Crisis Years: Kennedy and

Khrushchev 1960-1963. He says, "At 7:45 p.m., fifteen minutes before the President's letter was to be made public, Dobrynin anived at the Justice Department. Robert

Kennedy gave him a copy of the letter to Khrushchev and warned that if more American planes were downed over Cuba, the United States would retaliate." (Beschloss 536)

Needless to say, it was Bobby Kennedy who delivered this critical message, not the State

Department. The historiography of the crisis covers well the nontraditional diplomatic paths used by President Kennedy; however, h is valuable getting these facts from a primary source.

Other informafion conflicted with the usually historical interpretations of the crisis. For instance, when the question, "Were members of EXCOMM, specifically the military figures, trying to pin the President into going to war?" (Percy 12) was asked, Mr.

Bartlett responded with a historically conflicting answer in some aspects. "I don't think there was any pressure from the milhary to invade...they knew it would be a tough one."

(Percy 12) This statement differs from some historical interpretations of the issue, desphe the fact that Mr. Bartlett did add the qualifier, "I think Curtis LeMay would have liked to drop those bombs. He seemed really anxious to."

In Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, he states, "The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in calling for immediate military action." (Kennedy 36) The latter statement well represents some Percy-3 7 historiographies. However, there are other interpretations which seem to back up Mr.

Bartlett. Michael R. Beschloss states, "Thursday morning, October 18. At 11:10a.m., the

President called Ex Comm to the Cabinet Room. Sorensen reported that the Secretary of

State favored a 'surgical' air strike without waniing. This was opposed 'by the diplomats

(Bohlen, Thompson, probably Martin), who insisted that prior pohtical action is essential...by the military (McNamara, Taylor, McCone) who insisted that the air strike could not be limited...by advocates of the blockade rout.'" (Beschloss 453)

Throughout this project I have learned many things as both a student and historian. I learned first hand the value of oral history. Even after all the research I had completed in order to frilly prepare myself for the interview, I still learned new information. I also learned several interviewing techniques during the process of this project. For instance, in preparing a wide range of questions for the interview itself, I also learned how to follow the flow of a conversation - taking advantage of opportunhies as they came tliroughout the interview. I even learned things about the technical side of interviewing. I discovered that depending on what kind of tape recorder you have, you must place it strategically to the interviewee; otherwise the sound will not be picked up, making h very difficuh to transcribe the interview afterwards. Finally, I internalized a more complete and in depth side to the Cuban missile crisis which allows me to have a more complete understanding about the topic. Percy-3 8

Appendix Percy-3 9

Fidel Castro President John F. Kennedy

Nikita Khrushchev Robert McNamara

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

McGeorge Bundy

Dean Rusk Percy-40

Executive Committee

Soviet Missile Inslallations In Oy ba GUAMAJAYtRBM SITES SANCRISTOeAL SA'GUA LA GRANDi WRCIP^ SITES" MRBMSITI^ 4 i 4 ^.'7^t M^d •^ w > i i i 4 :aA-2 SAM sties <24) " GROUND BASES (4} .v'* I ^ * ^ 1SSM m UISE SITES (5}^-«' ^L-EB AIRFJELOS (2)

*GM PATROL BASES (2)1 ^^f^^^' SITES <6)

*l^tlO-2lAIRFdELlDSm) Percy-41

A U-2 spy plane

A Soviet SS-4 nuclear missile

A low level reconnaissance plane

A Soviet SS-5 nuclear missile Percy-42

On October 18 Kennedy met whh Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko to discuss various matters, including weather or not the Soviets had offensive weapons in Cuba.

President Kennedy addresses the nation.

Adlai Stevenson confronts the Soviets at the United Nations. When Soviet Ambassador Zorin reftised to comment on the missiles in Cuba Stevenson presented the U-2 photographs. Percy-44

October 14, 1962: U-2 photograph of a truck convoy approaching a deployment of Soviet MRBMs near Los Palacios at San Cristobal. This photograph was the first one identified by NPIC on 15 October as showing Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Percy-45

Bibliography

Alsop, Stewart, and Charies Bartlett. "In Time of Crisis." Editorial. The Saturday

Evening Post 8 Dec. 1962: 15-21.

Beschloss, Michael R. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963. New

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.

Blight, James, and David Welch. On the Brink. Toronto: Collins Publishers, 1989.

Crankshaw, Edward. Introduction. Khrushchev Remembers. By Edward Crankshaw.

Trans. Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970.

The Cuban Missile Crisis. 13 Dec. 2002

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Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope Days of Rage. New York: Bantam Books, 1987.

Goldman, Jerry, and Giel Stein. The Cuban Missile Crisis. October 18-29, 1962. 8 Oct.

1997. 15 Dec. 2002 .

McNamara, Robert S. Introduction. ThirteenDays: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile

Crisis. By Robert F. Kennedy. New York: WW Norton & Company, 1969.

NIKITA SERGEEVICH KHRUSHCHEV. 16 Dec. 2002

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Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy In the Whhe House.

Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965.