America As a World Power

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America As a World Power America as a World Power L. Objective: I can describe the major events of the Cold War during Eisenhower and Kennedy’s administrations. 1952 to 1963 Context Dwight D. Eisenhower (IKE) As Eisenhower becomes president, Americans have an underlying sense of anxiety and fear because of The growth of international communism Accusations of domestic communism (both real and imagined) Nuclear annihilation America as a World Power: IKE “New Look” U.S. intervenes in USSR tests hydrogen Cuba to help Batista bomb Eisenhower Doctrine U-2 shot down 1952 1953 1954 1956 1957 1959 1960 CIA installs Shah of Iran Suez Canal crisis Castro overthrows Batista THE NEW LOOK 1954 John Foster Dulles – Secty. Of State • Changes defense posture of the U.S. • Emphasizes the idea of a “monolithic communist threat” orchestrated by Moscow “If you’re scared to go to the 3 Major Aspects brink, you are lost.” John Foster Dulles 1. Massive Retaliation: Willing to respond to any aggression with nuclear weapons The nuclear arsenal went from about 1,000 bombs in 1953 to about 18,000 bombs in 1961 Brinksmanship: Make Soviets believe any conventional aggression would lead to nuclear war Use this to answer questions on the assignment sheet. 2. Alliances Encircle communism with allies and use their manpower to meet local aggression Example: SEATO – Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 3. CIA & Covert Action - Became a major element in fighting Communism & overthrowing anti-American leaders Example: Iran, Guatemala, Cuba - Budget increased from $4.7 million (1949) to $82 million (1952) Rationale for the Policy Cheaper! Reliance on airborne strategic nuclear deterrent reduced size of army & navy and defense budget by 17% (Ended with a $1 billion surplus in 1960) Feared public would find the price of fighting communism too high Applying the New Look Middle East Iran – 1953 Prime Minister Mossadegh nationalized oil industry owned by Britain in 1951 Britain imposed economic sanctions and Iran’s economy faltered. U.S. became concerned that the Soviets might assist Iran Eisenhower approved CIA assistance & with British help, Mossadegh was ousted in1953 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, took control with U.S. support. Remain allied to U.S. for 25 years until his overthrow in 1979 in Iranian Revolution Suez Canal Crisis – 1956 U.S. promised financial aid to help Egyptians build the Aswan Dam on the Nile River, but Egypt began to develop trade with USSR July 1956 U.S. withdrew its aid offer Gamal Nasser, president of Egypt, seized the Suez Canal October: Israeli, British, and French troops invaded trying to regain the canal. Condemned by the United Nations and U.S., the troops were forced to withdraw and return the canal to Egypt. This shows the location of the Aswan dam. Importance of the Suez Canal for trade Use this to answer questions on the assignment sheet. The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) Congress authorized President to use military force to defend any Middle East nation against an attack by any communist nation. America’s Involvement in Cuba 1952 . Military dictator Fulgencio Batista came to power with U.S. help to overthrow a moderate government . U.S. businesses invested a lot of money in Cuban economy 1959 Fidel Castro overthrew Batista In 1960, Cuba seized $1 billion in U.S. owned property, turning to USSR for military & economic support IKE cut off diplomatic relations, imposed economic sanctions on Cuba & had CIA plan for an invasion…Bay of Pigs during JFK’s administration U-2 FLIGHTS AND FRANCIS GARY POWERS (1956-60) Secret CIA flights were conducted over the Soviet Union from bases in Greece & Turkey Revealed no missile gap existed; instead, the U.S. actually had an advantage in the # of missiles. Look back at the graph on Slide 5 to determine the # of warheads in U.S. & Soviet stockpiles at the time. In 1960, a U-2 plane piloted by Gary Francis Powers was shot down over USSR. He was held hostage for 17 months. Videos to access Simple History - U2 Incident These are clips from the movie Bridge Answer questions on your homework of Spies that you are encouraged to assignment after watching this video. watch. If you have time, watch the entire movie. https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=RZZdpNV75iA Bridge of Spies U2 scene https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=TY8zAEpj-KE Bridge of Spies climax scene https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=tkADCuNii2I America as a World Power: JFK “Flexible Response” Peace Corp Khrushchev removed Alliance for Progress Cuban Missile Crisis 1961 1961 1962 1963 1964 Bay of Pigs invasion Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed with USSR Berlin Wall JFK assassinated Kennedy Administration “Flexible Response” Less reliance on nuclear weapons; more on troops and conventional weapons Expanded the Green Berets to use in limited wars Expand American influence through peaceful means Peace Corps – volunteers to battle hunger, disease & illiteracy in developing nations Alliance for Progress - $20 billion to Latin America to build schools, housing, health care services Bay of Pigs Invasion – April 1961 IKE had CIA plan an invasion to overthrow Castro. U.S. believed that it would spark a popular uprising JFK gave the green light to the plan On April 17, 1961, 1500 Cuban exiles attacked at Bay of Pigs U.S. refused air support to keep their involvement a secret The popular uprising did not materialize and 1,400 men were captured Huge embarrassment to JFK who negotiated their release with $53 million in food/medicine to Castro The Berlin Wall Kennedy met with Khrushchev in Vienna (June 1961) Khrushchev demanded U.S. withdraw from West Berlin which was in the Soviet zone Between 1949-1961, 3 million people had fled East Berlin Reflection of the “failure” of communism and economic collapse Kennedy obviously refused August 13, 1961 – Overnight temporary fortifications went up. It was replaced by 28-mile concrete wall through the city. Most visible symbol of the Cold War. Video Clip from Bridge of Spies of people trying to escape East Berlin https://www.yout ube.com/watch? v=- dy5SiGuRiI&featur e=emb_logo The Cuban Missile Crisis Summer 1962, U-2 flights showed Soviets installing ballistic missile launching capabilities in Cuba Clear threat to U.S. because Cuba is only 90 miles off Florida coast October 18 –JFK ordered a “quarantine” around Cuba Prevent the Soviets from delivering any missiles Demanded Soviets stop construction on missile sites or face Cuban invasion Secret negotiations Soviets remove missiles from Cuba US remove missiles from Turkey & Italy Very few people in the government knew about U.S. missiles in Europe pointing at USSR Khrushchev publicly announced removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba defusing the crisis Video: The History of the Cuban Missile Crisis https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b wWW3sbk4EU Answer questions on your assignment sheet as you watch this video. RESULTS 1963 – Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Banned atmospheric testing US/Soviet “Hotline” installed 1964 - Khrushchev lost power as a result of the perception of weakness toward U.S. If you have time the movie, Thirteen Days, looks at the Cuban Missile Crisis from Kenny O’Donnell’s perspective. He was one of JFK’s advisors. It’s available on HBO on Demand and Netflix..
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