“Historical Injustices in Comparative Perspective”

CONTRIBUTORS

Tsuneo Akaha Tsuneo Akaha is Professor of International Policy Studies and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California. He received his Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He has taught at USC, Kansas State University, and Bowling Green State University and held visiting positions at the University of Tokyo, Waseda University, Hokkaido University, the University of Shimane, and Seikei University. His research interests include human and nontraditional security and nationalism and regionalism in East Asia, Japan‟s foreign and security policies, and international migration. His recent publications include: The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Balancing Soft and Hard Power in East Asia (2010); Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia (2005); The Future of North Korea (2002); “Human Security in East Asia: Embracing Global Norms through Regional Cooperation in Human Trafficking, Labor Migration, and HIV/AIDS” (2009); “International Migration and Human Rights: A Case for Regional Approach in Northeast Asia” (2008); "Non-traditional Security Cooperation for Regionalism in Northeast Asia" (2007); "Russians in Contemporary Japan: Case Studies in Hokkaido and Niigata" (2005); and “Cross-border Migration as a New Element of International Relations in Northeast Asia: A Boon to Regionalism or a New Source of Friction?” (2004).

Daniel Butt Daniel Butt is Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Bristol, UK. He was previously Fellow and Tutor in Politics at Oriel College, Oxford; Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Social and Political Thought at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford; and Research Fellow and Tutor in Politics at Keble College, Oxford. His undergraduate and doctoral study was at Wadham College, Oxford. He is Director on the Courts and the Making of Public Policy programme for the Oxford-based

Young Jong Choi Young Jong Choi is a Professor in the division of international studies at the Catholic University of Korea. He received Ph D in political science from the University of Washington. Dr. Choi has written many articles in English and Korean on topics related to East Asian regionalism, including "Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Asian Perspective" and "Political Economy of Northeast Asian regionalism". He recently published a book in Korean, entitled A New Diplomatic Strategy for a Global Korea.

Ki-seon Chung Ki-seon Chung is Chief of Research and Development Department at the IOM Migration Research and Training Centre. She received her Ph.D. in Sociology from University of Maryland at College Park and her M.A. degree in Sociology from Sungkyunkwan University. She was Vice-president at the Korean International Migration Association and Vice-president at the Population Association of Korea. She also served as Member of Editorial Board at the Korean Sociological Association. Her research interests are in labor migrants, marriage migrant families, comparative studies on gender and family issues in Korea, Japan, and China and national identity and attitudes on international migration issues.

Geon-Soo Han Geon-Soo Han is Professor at the Department of Cultural Anthropology, Kangwon National University. He received his BA degree in Anthropology from Seoul National University and MA degree and Ph.D. in Anthropology from University of California at Berkeley. His research interests are in African Studies (Yoruba people in Nigeria), International Migration and African Diaspora, Transnational Marriage and Multiethnic Shift of Korea, Multicultural phenomena in East Asia and Migrant workers. His recent publications include “African migrant workers' view of Korean society and culture,” “Multicultural Korea: Celebration or Challenge of Multiethnic Shift of Contemporary Korea?,” and “Multicultural Fever and the Crisis of Korean Society.”

Jung-Sun N. Han Assistant Professor for the Division of International Studies and the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University, majoring in modern and contemporary Japanese history and culture. She has published "Rationalizing the Orient" (2005), "Envisioning a Liberal Empire" (2007). She is the co-author of Modern Japanese Cartoon Journalism and Colonization of Korea (2006, in Korean and forthcoming in Japanese in 2010) and is preparing for An Imperial Path to Modernity (forthcoming).

Jeong-Pyo Hong Jeong-Pyo Hong (홍정표: 洪停杓) is now the professor at Miyazaki International College (宮崎國際大學), Japan. His B.A. and M.A. are on Political Science, Korea University, Seoul in 1986 and 1991 respectively, and Ph. D. on International Politics, Peking University, Beijing, China in 1997. He was the assistant Professor at KDI School, Seoul in 1999; visiting Scholar at Michigan State University, the United States in 1999-2000; visiting Research Professor at Georgetown University, the United States in 2000-01; visiting Scholar at Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), Seoul in 2004; the assistant

Jung-Mee Hwang Jung-Mee Hwang is a Research Professor of Asiatic Research Institute(ARI) at Korea University. Professor Hwang received her Ph. D. from Seoul National University and was a researcher of Institute for Gender Research at SNU, a research fellow at KWDI(Korea Women‟s Development Institute). Her recent works include „Feminization of Migration and Marriage Migration in Korea: A Theoretical Inquiry‟(2009), „A Study on Local Community Participation of Immigrants and Supporting Policies for Integration in Korea‟(2009), „Korean‟s Attitude toward Multicultural Society and Ethnic Minorities(2007)‟. She also coauthored Asian Women Across the Borders(2009), and Issues and Prospects in Korean Gender Policy(2005).

Joo-Youn Jung Dr. Joo-Youn Jung is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at

Hwi-Won Kang Hwi-Won Kang is Associate Professor of the Department of Public Administration at Pyeongtaek University, Korea. He received his BA in Public Administration (PA) at Hanyang University, Korea, and his MPA at the University of Georgia and Ph.D in Political Science at Georgia State University, USA. His research interests include information policy, legislative redistricting, Christianity and politics, local politics, and multicultural society and governance. He is a past president of the Gyong-In Association for Public Administration (GIAPA). He has published several book chapters and research articles in work including Korean Political Science Review, Korean Journal of Political Science, Korean Public Administration Review, Korean Policy Science Review, Korean Journal of Local Government Studies.

Bi Hwan Kim Bi Hwan Kim (Ph.D University of Cambridge) is Professor of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University, where he has taught political theory since 1997. He is now serving as Director of Subcommittee for Political Theory of Korean Political Science Association. His present research interests are in contemporary western political theory, relationship between politics and law, democratic theories and the like. He published many articles and books, including “A Critique of Raz‟s liberal Perfectionism”, Government & Opposition, Vol. 31(1996), Political Thought of Blessing and Curse: 20th Century and Hannah Arendt(2001. in Korean), and Politics and Culture in Postmodern Times(2005. in

Eungi Kim Kim Eungi (Ph. D. in Sociology; University of Toronto) is Professor in the Division of International Studies at Korea University. His primary research interests are social change, culture, religion, multiculturalism, and comparative sociology. His articles have appeared in Social Indicators Research, Asian Survey, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Social Compass, Sociology of Religion, Social History, Review of Religious Research, and Korea Journal, among others. He current research projects pertain to cultural globalization, multiculturalism in Korea, and Korean Christianity.

Hee-Kang Kim Hee-Kang Kim is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration at Korea University. She got her Ph.D. of political science at the University of Chicago in 2005. Her research and teaching interests are in the fields of social/global justice, feminism, and multiculturalism. Her articles have appeared in various journals such asPublic Affairs Quarterly, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, and Women’s Studies International Forum.

Jae Cheol Kim Jae Cheol Kim is a professor at the Division of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea. He received his B.A. degree and M.A. degree from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and Ph.D. in political science from University of Washington. His recent publications include “The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in North Korea: A

Yunhee Kim Yunhee Kim is HK Professor, Hallym Academy of Sciences, Hallym University. She received her PhD in Korean History from Korea University. Her research interests focus on modern Korean history.

Eunkang Koh Koh Eunkang is currently teaching at Seoul National University of Technology. After receiving her Ph.D. in Philosophy at University of Hong Kong, she worked as HK Research Professor for the Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University. She studied Philosophy and Anthropology in South Korea, Great Britain and China. She received her B.A. and M.A. in Anthropology at Seoul National University, M.A. in Confucian Studies at Sungkyunkwan University and M.Phil in Social and Cultural Anthropology at University of Oxford. She is interested in explaining various social phenomena in East Asian countries by reconsidering the traditional philosophies of Confucianism and Taoism.

Jun-Hyeok Kwak JUN-HYEOK KWAK (Ph.D University of Chicago) is Associate Professor of Political Science at Korea University, where he has taught political philosophy and political theory since Fall 2007. He also serves as Director of The EAI Center for Values & Ethics, Chairman of the Editorial Committee of the Journal of Asiatic Studies, Head of the Division of Thoughts in ARI, and Director of The ARI Center for East Asian Thoughts. Before joining the faculty at Korea University, he taught political thought at Kyungpook National University. His research interests lie at the crossroads of political thought from Socrates to Machiavelli and contemporary political/social theory, with concentration on republicanism, nationalism, constitutionalism, democratic leadership, and human rights. His research

Hye-Kyung Lee Hye-Kyung Lee is Professor at the Department of Sociology & Media Information, Pai Chai University, South Korea. Since she got her Ph.D. degree in Sociology at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in 1988, she has published many papers on migration and transnational communities, gender and work. She was a coordinator of the Korea Migration Research Network (KMRN) from 2000 to 2003. There she co-authored, two books „Migrant Workers in Korea‟ (1998), „Works and Lives of Migrant Workers‟ (2003). Recently, she published articles on „foreign domestic workers‟, „marriage migration‟ and „Korean overseas students‟. She had served as a Women‟s Policy Advisor to the Major of Daejeon City from 2005 to 2006, as a Provost in Pai Chai University from 2007 to February 2009, and has served an advisory committee member for the Korean National Statistical Office, the Ministry of Gender Equality, the Ministry of Labor and the Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. Currently, she is the President of Korea International Migration Association (KIMA) from January 2009.

Jee Sun E. Lee Jee Sun E. Lee received her B.A. in Political Science at Stanford University. She received

Junghwan Lee Junghwan Lee is HK research professor, Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University. He earned B.A. and M.A. at the department of Aesthetics, Seoul National University. 2008, he received Ph.D. at the department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, with the doctoral dissertation, entitled, “A Groundwork for Normative Unity: Zhu Xi‟s (1130-1200) Reformation of the „Learning of the Way‟ Tradition.” His research interests are Confucian philosophy, Chinese intellectual history, and East Asian Aesthetics.

Na-Young Lee Na-Young Lee is assistant professor in sociology at Chung-Ang University in Seoul, South Korea. She got Ph.D. from the Department of Women‟s Studies at University of Maryland and worked at George Mason University. Her research interests cut across different fields of feminist theory, including postcolonialism, gendered nationalism, and gender & sexuality, particularly focusing on the issues of (military) prostitution, media representation, and gendered & sexualized space. She has published many articles and book chapters, both in Korean and English, including “Radical Feminism and Sexuality: Theorizing History and Politics.” Journal of Economy and Society 82, 10-37 (2009); “Historical Formation and Implication of the Women's Abolitionist Movement against Prostitution in Korea.” Journal of Korean Women’s Studies 25(1), 5-34 (2009); “Postcolonial Reading on Military Prostitutes in South Korea: Gendered Nationalism and Politics of Representation.” Journal of Korean Women’s Studies 24(3), 77-109 (2008); and “The Construction of Military Prostitution in South Korea during the U.S. Military Rule, 1945-1948,” Feminist Studies 33(3), 1-29 (2007).

Nae-Young Lee Lee, Nae-Young is a professor of Political Science Dept. at Korea University. Professor Lee is currently the Director of Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University and the Director of Public Opinion Research Center at East Asia Institute. His research interests are Korean politics, electoral politics, and East Asian political economy. Professor Lee received his Ph.D. in Political Science from University of Wisconsin-Madison. His previous positions include professor of School of International Studies at Kyunghee University, Research Fellow at the Sejong Institute, and Visiting Scholar of the Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He published numerous articles, and edited several books. His recent publications include , “Conceptualization and Measurement of Soft Power in East Asia," “Changing Ideological Orientations and Ideological Voting of Korean Voters,” “Comparative Analysis of South Korean and Mexican Views on the United States," "Changes in Korean Public Perception of the U.S. and Korea-U.S. Relations,".

Shin-wha Lee Shin-wha Lee, Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, received her Ph.D from the University of Maryland at College Park and held a Post-Doctoral Fellowship at Harvard University. She was Researcher at the World Bank, Research Associate at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sudan. She also served as Special Advisor to the United Nations, 'Rwandan Independent Inquiry,' and Chair's Advisor of East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), Coordinator of UNESCO Chair on Peace, Democracy and Human Rights, Visiting Professor at Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, Korean Delegate of the 2004 Korea-China-Japan Future Leaders‟ Forum and Visiting Scholar at East Asian Studies Program, Princeton University. She received Nakasone Yasuhiro Award of Excellence in 2008 and served as a full-time visiting professor at School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University and a Scholar-in-Residence at the Korean Permanent Mission to the United

Yong Wook Lee Yong Wook Lee is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests are in international relations theory, international political economy, Asian regionalism, international relations and comparative politics of Japan and Korea, and international migration and societal (in)security issues. He examines how identities and norms affect and are affected by states and their practices within domestic and international contexts. His first book (from Stanford University Press 2008), entitled "The Japanese Challenge to the American Neoliberal World Order: Identity, Meaning, and Foreign Policy," develops this issue into an analytical framework designed to demonstrate a causal mechanism through which identity shapes national interest. The book examines Japan's confrontations with the U.S. in various international finance and development forums, such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and Asian Monetary Fund. He received Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California. Before coming to Korea University, he previously taught at the University of Oklahoma, Brown University, and the University of Southern California.

Tze M. Loo Tze M. Loo is an assistant professor of history at the University of Richmond where she teaches East Asian history. She is currently working on a book manuscript which discusses Okinawa‟s relationship with Japan through the lens of cultural heritage. She is spending this academic year in Tokyo as a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Postdoctoral Fellow.

Melissa Nobles Melissa Nobles is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is also a faculty affiliate of MIT‟s Center for International Studies (CIS). Professor Nobles received her B.A. degree in History from Brown University and Ph.D in Political Science from Yale University. She has been a fellow at Boston University‟s Institute on Race and Social Division (2000-01) and at Harvard University‟s Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study (2003-04). Her teaching and research interests are in the comparative study of racial and ethnic politics, citizenship, and issues of retrospective justice. Her first book, Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics (2000), related book chapters and articles examine the political origins and consequences of racial categorization in demographic censuses in the United States and Brazil. Recent publications include her second book, The Politics of Official Apologies (2008) and “The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations,” forthcoming in the Annual Review of Political Science (2010).

T.J. Pempel T. J. Pempel (Ph.D., Columbia) joined Berkeley's Political Science Department in July 2001 and served as director of the Institute of East Asian Studies from 2002 until 2006. There he held the Il Han New Chair in Asian Studies. Just prior to coming to Berkeley, he was at the University of Washington at Seattle where he was the Boeing Professor of International Studies in the Jackson School of International Studies and an adjunct professor in Political Science. From 1972 to 1991, he was on the faculty at Cornell University; he was also Director of Cornell's East Asia Program. He has also been a faculty member at the University of Colorado and the University of Wisconsin. Professor Pempel's research and teaching focus on comparative politics, political economy, contemporary Japan, and Asian regionalism. His recent books include Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Cornell University Press), Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-

Gilbert Rozman Gilbert Rozman is Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where he received his Ph.D. and has taught since 1970. He specializes on Northeast Asia, examining both comparisons and mutual perceptions as a factor in international relations. His books include: Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (coeditor, M.E. Sharpe, 2006); Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (co-editor, Palgrave, 2006); Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia (co-editor, Palgrave, 2007); Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States (Palgrave, 2007); South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (co-editor), Palgrave, 2008); Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia (Palgrave, 2009); and U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia (co-editor, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010).

Kue-Jin Song Song, Kue-Jin is an HK research professor and a research manager at the Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University. Professor Song received his Ph.D. in Korean History from Korea University. He published two books, A Study on Korea Trade under the Rule of Japanese Imperialism and Modern Chinese Foreign Trade and East Asian Economy and several articles including, “The Introduction of the Concept of 'Nation' into the Korean Society and the Adaptation of Its Usage,” “The Production and Export of Korean Paper under the Japanese Imperialism,” “The Application and Modification of Japanese Custom Act into Chosun under the Rule of Japanese imperialism,” “Transition and Items of the

Barbara Stallings Barbara Stallings is William R. Rhodes Research Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, and editor of Studies in Comparative International Development. Currently, she is a visiting professor at Ewha Women‟s University in Seoul. Before arriving at Brown in 2002, she was Director of the Economic Development Division of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago, Chile (1993-2002) and Professor of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (1975-93). She has been a visiting scholar or professor at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia Universities in the United States and at the University of Tokyo and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore). She is the author or editor of 12 books and over 50 articles and book chapters. Her main areas of expertise are international political economy, international finance, and economic policy in developing countries. She has written extensively on comparisons of East Asian and Latin American economies as well as Japanese and Chinese relations with developing economies. Her most recent books are Finance for Development: Latin America in Comparative Perspective (Brookings Institution Press, 2006) and Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009, co-editor with Mireya Solis and Saori Katada).

Naoyuki Umemori Naoyuki Umemori is Professor of School of Political Science & Economics at Waseda University and Research Project Leader at Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration. He received PhD from the University of Chicago. His specialty is history of modern Japanese political thought. His research interests include social theory, nationalism, colonialism, Asianism, socialism, and anarchism. He has published numerous articles and books in Japanese including Benedict Anderson on Globalization (2007), “Politics of

Hong-zen Wang Hong-zen Wang is Professor and Director of the Graduate Institute of Sociology at the National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He has been working on ties between Vietnam and Taiwan since 1999. His research has focused on ethnic relations and industrial relations, and recently on migrant worker and marriage migration issues. Recently he works on the social statistics collection of migrants in East Asia, which sheds light on the historical and social differences in the imagination of an ideal state. He has published more than 20 papers on Taiwan-Vietnam relations in the past few years. His article published by PACIFIC AFFAIRS (UBC publisher) is awarded the Holland William Prize in 2005. He is awarded the outstanding research stipend by the National Science Council in 2005, IIAS (Netherlands)-NSC (Taiwan) scholarship in 2006, Faculty Visiting Scholar Award, Social Science, University of Western Ontario, Canada, 2007, and Outstanding Research Award, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan, 2009.

In-Jin Yoon In-Jin Yoon is a professor of the Department of Sociology, Korea University and the head of the Brain Korea 21 Project Group for Conflict Society. He is also the president of the Association for the Studies of Overseas Koreans and a civilian member of the Immigration Policy Committee. He graduated from the Department of Sociology, Korea University and received his MA degree and Ph. D. from the University of Chicago. He was an assistant professor in the Asian American Studies Department of the University of California, Santa Barbara before he became an assistant professor of sociology at Korea University. His major publications include On My Own: Korean Businesses and Race Relations in America, Korean Diaspora: Migration, Adaptation, and Identity of Overseas Koreans, South Koreans’

Xiaoming Zhang Zhang Xiaoming is professor of international relations at School of International Studies, Peking University (Beijing, China) where he was educated (BA in 1985, MA in 1988 and Ph.D. in 1993). He is the author of several books in Chinese, including George F. Kennan’s Containment (1994), Cold War and Its Legacy (1998), China’s Relationship with Her Neighbors (2003), and English School of International Relations: History, Theory and View on China (forthcoming in 2010). He was a fellow of Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1994), fellow of Korea Foundation at Korea University (January-April 1998), Fulbright visiting research scholar at Harvard University (1999-2000), guest researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, July-August 2000), visiting professor at Chuo University (July 2005), and senior visiting professor at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE, 2007- 2008).

Session Ⅰ Migration and Multiculturalism in East Asia

Chairperson: In-Jin Yoon (Korea University)

“Korean Multiculturalism: The Genealogy of the Concept, Shifting Meanings, Issues and Implications” Eungi Kim (Korea University)

“Why Taiwan's Domestic Violence Prevention Law Cannot Protect Battered Female Immigrants? - Ethnicity, Gender and Class blind in Current Law Discourses” Hong-Zen Wang, Anna Tang, Wen-hui (National Sun Wat-Sen University)

“International Migration and Multiculturalism in Japan” Tsuneo Akaha (Monterey Institute of International Studies)

“The Meaning of Transnational Space in Local Community: The Experience of Marriage-Migrant Women in Korea” Jung-Mee Hwang (Korea University)

Discussants Hwi-Won Kang (Pyeongtaek University) Hye-Kyung Lee (Paichai University) Kiseon Chung (International Organization for Migration) Geon-Soo Han (Kangwon National University)

A Rough Draft (Not to be cited without the author‟s permission)

Andrew Eungi Kim Division of International Studies Korea University

ABSTRACT

South Korea is rapidly becoming a multicultural society, as more than a million foreigners live in the country. The increasing ethnic diversity has heralded the widespread use of the concepts of multicultural society and multiculturalism. However, these terms have often been misused and misunderstood, as reporters and even scholars have used them indiscriminately and interchangeably, failing to distinguish between multicultural society as a fact, i.e., “ethnic diversity” or “ethnic plurality” in Korean society, and multiculturalism as a policy and ideology. In particular, the latter has been used without adequate understanding of the multiplicity of its meanings and implications. This paper aims to redress this problem by tracing the origin of the use of term damunhwa or “multicultural” and its related terms such as multiculturalism, multicultural family, multicultural children, and multicultural education. Through this exercise, the paper attempts to examine the process through which these terms came into use and to analyze how their meanings may have changed over the years, albeit their very short history. The paper also identifies the agents involved in the construction of those meanings and assesses their role in making these potentially alienating terms more palatable and tolerable. Lastly, the paper analyzes Korean multiculturalism from multidimensional approaches, discussing the applicability of the concept as a fact, ideology, policy, and process in the Korean context, thereby bringing into sharper relief a full range of cultural, social and political implications of the concept.

Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. South Korea (henceforth Korea) is rapidly becoming an ethnically diverse society. As of the end of 2007, the number of registered foreigners totaled 1,066,273, accounting for 2.2 per cent of the total population. The number of foreigners in Korea jumped 2.75 times since 1997 when the figure was 386,972. If the current trend continues, it is expected that the number of foreigners in Korea will reach the 1.5 million mark in 2012, 2.53 million in 2020, and 4.09 million by 2050 or 9.2 per cent of the total population, which would be similar to the proportion of foreign-born residents in the total population of England (9.7 per cent) in 2005. The increasing ethnic diversity has naturally spawned the rise of the concepts of multicultural society and multiculturalism as important keywords describing contemporary Korea. Although these terms are being frequently referred to in the media and the academia, they are often misused and misunderstood, as they are used indiscriminately and interchangeably. The most serious problem in that regard is the failure to distinguish between multicultural society as a fact, i.e., “ethnic diversity” or “ethnic plurality” in Korean society, and multiculturalism as a policy and ideology. In particular, the latter has been used without adequate understanding of the multiplicity of its meanings and implications. The question is: When did the discourse of multicultural Korea and multiculturalism first begin? Why did the discourse of multicultural Korea and multiculturalism become so popular? Is multiculturalism consistent with Korean values? This paper aims to tackle these questions by tracing the origin of the use of term damunhwa or “multicultural” and its related terms such as multiculturalism, multicultural family, multicultural children, and multicultural education. The paper also attempts to examine the process through which these terms came into use and to analyze how their meanings may have changed over the years. The agents involved in the construction of those meanings are identified and their role in making these potentially alienating terms more palatable and tolerable is assessed. Lastly, the paper argues that Korean multiculturalism needs to be analyzed from multidimensional approaches, examining the applicability of the concept as a fact, ideology, policy, and process in the Korean context, thereby bringing into sharper relief a full range of cultural, social and political implications of the concept.

THE DISCOURSE OF MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY IN THE NEWS MEDIA

In an ordinary usage, the term damunhwa, literally meaning “multiculture,” is used in Korea. When literally translated into English, it is a noun, but it is actually used as an adjective, as in “multicultural.” For example, in describing Korean society as a multicultural society, the expression used in Korean is that Korea has become damunhwa hashoe, with the latter meaning “society.” In trying to trace the first incidents of the use of the term damunhwa, the paper searched the newspaper archives being provided by Korea‟s leading Internet search engine, Naver (www.naver.com), which has archived articles from three newspapers, namely Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Kyunghyangshinmun, Dongailbo, and Maeilgyeongje, from 1960 to 1991. The articles which are indexed under this term have been based on the title and content. Other related terms such as damunhwasahoe (multicultural society), damunhwajui (multiculturalism), damunhwagajok (multicultural family), and damunhwagyoyuk (multicultural education) are automatically indexed, if any, by these newspapers because damunhwa is a prefix to these concepts. From 1960 to 1991, Kyunghyangshinmun and Dongailbo each makes just four references to those terms, while Maeilgyeongje has none.1 The first ever reference to the term damunhwa in the mass media was made in Korea on October 24, 1964 (p. 4) in an article in Kyunghyangshinmun. The article describes how the UN was at a turning point with the rise of the Middle East as a powerful force to reckon with and how the international political landscape was changing as the traditional allies of the United States are riding on the multicultural wave (damunhwa mulgyeol) to have a more independent say in diplomatic relations. The second reference to the term is made in the same newspaper nearly 20 years later in August 1983. The article recounts the popularity Jerusalem as a place of “pilgrimage” for Korean Christians and describes the ancient city as religiously plural (dajonggyo) and multicultural (Kyunghyangshinmun, 1983). It would be another three years before the term damnuhwa or damunhwajui is mentioned in any of its articles published in the newspaper. The first of the two articles with a reference to the concept reports on a conference involving professors of music education and describes their call for a more balanced music education (Kyunghyangshinmun, 1986a). The scholars argue that music education in Korea is centered too much on Western classical music and that there is a need for multiculturalism-centered (damunhwajungsimjui) music education as early as from elementary school, incorporating musical traditions of not only the West but also of Korea and Asia. The second article featuring damunhwa in 1986 was a piece written by a columnist for the newspaper (Kyunghyangshinmun, 1986b). The column, which was written in time for the 1986 Asian Games, takes note of the increasing prominence of Asia in the global arena in general and assesses the role of Korea in the Asian context in particular. Asia is described as a region of dainjong (multi-races), damunhwa (multi- cultures), daeoneo (multi-languages), dajonggyo (multi-religions) and daideology (multi- ideologies) but is on the verge of taking much more important role in the international community. For Dongailbo, the first article featuring the term damunhwa appeared in January 1983 (Dongailbo, 1983a). The article was a contribution by Hudson Institute researcher

1 In searching newspaper archives and scholarly works, the meaning of damunhwa (多文化) as “multicultural” should be distinguished from the meaning of damunhwa (茶文化) as tea ceremony culture. The latter word derives from dado or the art of ceremonial tea-making. Many articles in the 1970s and 1980s which featured the term damunhwa were about the tea ceremony.

Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. who writes about the role of South Korea in the creation of the Asia-Pacific community. He also warns against following the United States model of multiculturalism (damunhwajui), which he derides as an amalgamation of assorted cultures and as a blind openness to any culture. A second article in the same year is a translation of a commentary which appeared in U.S. News and World Report (Dongailbo, 1983b). The article describes the immigrant culture of the United States, where the country is characterized as no longer being a “melting pot,” but rather as a “salad bowl,” which is described as a representative of multicultural society in which different cultures are allowed to maintain their uniqueness and coexist. It would be another seven years before an article featuring the term damunhwa would appear again, in August 1990 (Dongailbo, 1990). The article recounts a cultural performance held at a Korean church on the eve of a Los Angeles festival celebrating Asia-Pacific cultures and mentions that understanding the city is impossible without knowing about its cultural diversity. The article also refers to a seminar on multiculturalism and the importance of multi-races in area cultures and arts. The fourth and last article on damunhwa from 1960 to 1991 in Dongailbo appeared in 1991 (Dongailbo, 1991). It is an account of a contributor‟s visitation to a naval Silk Road, which took him to Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, the latter of which is characterized by the writer as being concerned with creating unity from multi-cultures (damunhwa) and multi ethnic groups (daminjok). As the above discussion clear shows, the frequency of reference to the term damunhwa in two daily newspapers in Korea in the 1960-1991 period was negligible, with the term making appearances only eight times in total. It is safe to say that other daily newspapers in Korea, including Chonsunilbo and Joongangilbo, also made very limited references to the term during the same period. In fact, the same trend continues until the end of the 1990s. For Dongailbo, which reported on damunhwa only four times during the period in question, the frequency of the reference to the term has become noticeably higher since 2000, which is when the newspaper has comprehensively archived its articles: 11 times in 2000, 15 times in 2001, 8 times in 2002, 6 times in 2003, 10 times in 2004, 16 times in 2005, 60 times in 2006, 100 times in 2007, 298 times in 2008, and 947 times in 2009. The frequency of the reference is particularly high from the mid-2000s. This trend is also evident in two other daily Korean newspapers, namely Chonsunilbo and Joongangilbo. The following is the frequency of reference to the term damunhwa (multicultural) in the portal of Chosunilbo (www.chosun.com) in the 1990s and 2000s: the first and only time in 1993, once in 1994, twice in 1995, eight times in 1996, nine times in 1997, six times in 1998, four times in 1999, ten times in 2000, 19 times in 2001, 15 times in 2002, 14 times in 2003, 10 times in 2004, 18 times in 2005, 67 times in 2006, 193 times in 2007, 440 times in 2008, and 797 times in 2009. Joongangilbo shows the same trend, as damunhwa and its related terms appeared only sporadically in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, first reference was made in September 1985, followed by another

Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. reference in November 1987 and another one in October 1992. 2 From 1994, like Chosunilbo, there had been continuous references to the term, albeit only a handful or a dozen times annually, until 2005. It is from 2006 that the frequency of references increases sharply, jumping to the total of 20 in 2006 and 48 in 2007. Like other newspapers, the total of references soars to hundreds in 2008 and 2009. As can be seen clearly above, damunhwa was a negligible issue in Korean newspaper media until the end of the 1980s and was not much of an issue in the 1990s and up to the middle of the 2000s. Indeed, it is only from the mid-2000s that the newspaper articles mention damunhwa in the Korean context in earnest and in great frequency, making references to migrant workers and migrant brides as well as multicultural families. In the 1980s, references to the concept were largely made to describe cultures of other countries, particularly the United States. In other words, the concept of multicultural or multiculturalism was conceived purely as an external phenomenon, be it political or social. In the 1990s, some momentous changes in the international arena have prompted the Korean media to pay more attention, albeit in insignificant increment, to globalization and its accompanying values, one of which was multiculturalism. For example, the first reference to the term damunhwa (multicultural) or damunhwajui (multiculturalism) in Chosunilbo was made in March 1993 (Chosunilbo, 1993). The reference was actually made to damunhwajui in time for the start of Venice Biennale in June 1993. The theme of the 1993 Biennale, which is an art exhibition of contemporary art from all around the world, was multiculturalism, highlighting how art is a channel through which people of different cultures are brought together and allows a dialogue for peaceful coexistence among different cultures. The second reference to the concept is made in the newspaper in January 1994 (Chosunilbo, 1994) in view of one of the watershed events of economic globalization, namely the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). The article, written by the Korean Ambassador to UNESCO, argued that the upcoming ratification of the Uruguay Round represented, among others, a phased reduction of tariffs, opening of the Korean market to international banking and insurance, and opening of Korean agricultural market to greater importation of rice, all of which meant a greater integration of the Korean economy into globalized economy. The Ambassador also explained the need for Korea to become more cognizant of, and open to, diverse cultures outside of Korea, particularly multicultural societies, and suggested ways for Korea to globalize. Continuing with the globalization- multiculturalism nexus, the newspaper reported on the 1996 International Advertising Association Festival in Korea (Chosunilbo, 1996). Regarding the festival, several articles highlighted the increasing prominence of multicultural dimension in advertisement in the era of globalization. Also, one of the earliest mentioning of multiculturalism as a

2 The number of references is as follows: 1 in 1985, 1 in 1987, 1 in 1992, 4 in 1994, 5 in 1995, 6 in 1996, 10 in 1997, 3 in 1998, 9 in 1999, 6 in 2000, 9 in 2001, 21 in 2002, 9 in 2003, 13 in 2004, 11 in 2005, 20 in 2006, and 48 in 2007. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. philosophy and social policy was made by Chaibong Ham, the then professor of political science at Yonsei University, when he wrote a column in Chosunilbo in January 1997, describing his impression of a book entitled Multiculturalism written by Charles Taylor and introducing the reader to the basic essence of the debate revolving around the issue (Chosunilbo, 1997a). Furthermore, in his review of two books translated into Korean, namely Samuel Huntington‟s The Clash of Civilizations and Edward Said‟s Culture and Imperialism, Jeongin Kang argues that scholars like Said and Jacques Derrida see multiculturalism and multilateralism as ways, a third alternative way, to overcome Eurocentric worldviews and practices (Chosunilbo, 1997b). Many articles in the 1990s thus covered international events, such as international art exhibitions, conventions of international advertisers, and international film festivals, all of which empathized the increasing importance of the cognition of multicultural elements in everyday life, be it art, advertisement or movie. Reviews of books written by authors from multicultural societies or books dealing with characters living in multicultural setting also brought up references to those terms. Also, the United States was mentioned often as a society of multi-cultures, especially in light of Korean immigrants living in that country. Charles Taylor‟s book entitled Multiculturalism and his lecture in Korea also received some media attention, presaging a key social change that will grip Korea in the near future. Capturing the essence of the use of term „multicultural‟ in the 1990s was the term damunhwasidae (a multicultural era), that we are living in an era of globalization, in which many, disparate cultures come in contact, potentially causing conflicts, and in which there is greater competition the economic sphere. The term also implied that Korea was increasingly being integrated into the globalizing world, especially globalizing economy, and that the country was increasingly being exposed to, and influenced by, the diverse cultures of the outside world. In view of such change, Korean media began to emphasize how Korea needed to globalize, in order to keep abreast of rapid changes happening around the world, so that the country does not fall behind. Still, up to the early 2000s, the idea of multicultural society was mentioned as an external phenomenon, a social reality limited to the outside world, especially such immigrant society as the United States. There was still no earnest illumination of Korea as potentially becoming a multicultural society. And multiculturalism was referred to very superficially as an antonym of unilateralism, prejudice, alienation of minorities, intolerance, ignorance, injustice and close-mindedness. The concept was also perceived as a synonym of multilateralism, worldliness, openness, tolerance, and justice. Multiculturalism was never used in reference to a government policy, but more as minority groups having more say in politics and society in immigrant societies. One interesting development in the news media is the use of an expression that is rather uniquely Korean: the use of the expression “multicultural children” to refer to children born to interracial or interethnic couples. In the west, terms like biracial, biethnic

THE DISCOURSE OF MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY IN THE ACADEMIA

One of the best ways to ascertain the trend in the academia is to check the resources of the National Assembly Library, which keeps the most comprehensive information on books and journal articles published in Korean as well as master‟s theses and doctoral dissertations.3 A perusal of its website provides a wealth of information on the meteoric rise of the topic of damunhwa in the Korean academia. Like in newspaper articles, it is from 2006 that damunhwa becomes one of the most popular topics of research. Up to 1990, there was not a single book published on the topic (to be more specific, there was not a single book that bore the word damunhwa in its title), nor was there any master‟s thesis or doctoral dissertation devoted to the topic. However, there were four journal articles published in the 1980s which examined either multicultural education or the issue of multicultural reality in other societies (Japan and Canada).4 In the 1990s, there was still no published book about multicultural Korea, although there was a dozen imported books on the nature of multicultural Japan written in Japanese. Less than ten master theses bore the title during the same period, but they were mostly on multicultural education, with very little attention given to the Korean context. Nearly 50 journal articles bore the word damunhwa in their titles, with a large majority devoted to multicultural education in general, with only a scant attention given to the Korean context. Between 2000 and 2005, about a dozen books, imported books in Japanese, translated books, and reports on damunhwa were made available, but the focus was generally on multicultural education, with one book devoted to general discussions of life in a multicultural era, as in Damunhwasidaeui hangukin (Koreans in an Era of Multicultural Era) by Sunggon Kim (2002). Yeoleumsa. However, there is one unpublished report that is likely to be the first book-length manuscript on damunhwa in Korea, namely “Gukjegyeolhon ijuyeoseongui eoneo mit munhwa jeokeung siltae yeongu: Chollabukdo imsilgun (mit sunchanggun·namwonsi) ilwon sare bogoseo” (A Research on the Language and Cultural Adjustment of International Marriage Migrant Women: A Case Study of Imsil, Sunchang, and Namwon, North Cholla Province), which was . written by Hanseok Wang,

3 Another useful source is the Korean Education and Research Information Service (KERIS), but upon comparison with the National Assembly Library, KERIS was found to be slightly less comprehensive. 4 To avoid arbitrariness, only the books, articles, master’s theses and doctoral dissertations that bore damunhwa in their titles are counted.

IS KOREA REALLY A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY?

The question is: What makes Korea multicultural? Is Korea really a multicultural society? Can Korea become a multicultural society without the change in the current immigration policy of the government? Will the Korean government, which has thus far assumed zero-immigration policy, soon change its policies regarding immigration, naturalization, and citizenship? These seemingly basic questions have not been systematically analyzed. It is true that there are now 1.2 million foreigners living in Korea, but how many are staying in the country as permanent residents? To this question, the

5 Keeping abreast of this rising trend in research focus on damunhwa is the increasing number of research institutes which are devoted to multicultural issues in Korea. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. answer is perhaps less than one-fifth of the 1.2 million total, including migrant brides. The presence of the tens of thousands of multicultural children born in Korea adds to the multicultural picture. A large majority of foreigners in Korea are migrant workers who are staying in Korea for a short-term period. The Korean government, which has implemented various labor-importing programs since the early 1990s, has set the maximum period of work permit at three years with no chance of extension. Migrant workers are required to renew their status every year, which is aimed at preventing unauthorized change of their workplace. All the labor-importing programs have thus been temporary work permit programs designed to bring relief to labor shortage in labor-intensive, small manufacturing sectors. At the same time, the three-year limit for work permit in those programs is designed to prevent permanent settlement of foreign workers in Korea. These kinds of work permit system with no chance for renewal, let alone permanent settlement, indicates the low cultural receptivity to inbound immigration. This is not to say that Korea is the first country to have adopted the so-called “rotation system,” in which a host society receives groups of foreign workers in rotation and does not allow them to stay permanently. This system was first implemented in Germany, but what distinguishes the German situation from that of Korea is that the former has allowed transnational migrant workers to extend their stay beyond the period of initial contract as long as they found employment. With this rotation system, a large number of migrant workers come to Korea to work and then leave, as they are replaced by new arrivals. Of course, a considerable number of migrant workers do not leave Korea and stay as undocumented aliens. But, does that make Korea a multicultural society, as in the same sense as Canada, Australia, and the United States, where foreign-born permanent residents account for 20-30 percent of the total population? This is where the confusion rises. The government, media and the academia have somehow come to the conclusion that Korea has become a multicultural society and claimed multiculturalism as a way to go for Korea. While many ideas regarding multiculturalism have been mentioned and articulated in policies, articles and books, they generally lack comprehensive understanding of its multiple meanings, implications and practical problems.

MULTIPLE MEANINGS OF MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism refers to a set of ideas and policies advocating the acceptance, mutual recognition and promotion of the cultures of various ethnic groups as equals within a society (see Goldberg, 2009; Laden and Owen, 2007). The eminent philosopher Charles Taylor (1994) identified multiculturalism as the “politics of recognition” as well as the “politics of equal dignity” and the “politics of equal respect.” Taylor (1994:37) argues that we now live in an era dominated by “a politics of universalism, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens” and “the equalization of rights and entitlements.” Taylor (1994:25) writes: Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

The demand for recognition…..is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like person‟s understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characterics as a human being. The thesis is that our identify is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning some in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being [emphasis in the original].

Taylor (1994:36) continues:

The importance of recognition is now universally acknowledged in one form or another…..On the social plane, we have a continuing politics of equal recognition…..the understanding that identities are formed in open dialogue, unshaped by a predefined social script, has made the politics of equal recognition more central and stressful. It has, in fact, considerably raised the stakes. Equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it…..The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized. Not only contemporary feminism but also race relations and discussions of multiculturalism are undergirded by the premise that the withholding of recognition can be a form of oppression.

Based on the Canadian experience of multiculturalism, Harold Troper (1999:997) further conceptualizes multiculturalism as being comprised of three components: “the demographic reality of a….population made up of peoples and groups representing a plurality of ethnocultural traditions and racial origins; a social ideal or value that accepts cultural pluralism as a positive and distinctive feature of….society; and government policy initiatives designed to recognize, support….and manage cultural and racial pluralism.” What this shows is that there are multiple dimensions to the concept of multiculturalism. As Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliott (1992) argue, multiculturalism is a multidimensional phenomenon that can be analyzed in different ways. Specifically, they argue that multiculturalism must be viewed as a fact, ideology, policy, and process. Multiculturalism as a fact refers to empirical description of ethnic diversity, i.e., multicultural society refers to the existence of multiple cultural groups who are different in terms of beliefs and behavior and who wish to remain different at least in name, if not always in practice. Multiculturalism as an ideology refers to prescriptive, normative Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. statement of “what “ought to be” (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:326) —a set of ideals that exalt the virtues of tolerance and mutual respect. It also pertains to a set of ideas and ideals which recognizes diversity as desirable under the given circumstances. It defends the celebration of diversity as a “central and valued component” of cultural and social life. Multiculturalism as a state policy refers to the accommodation of diversity through the launch of state initiatives regarding the celebration of ethno-cultural differences and management of diversity and citizenship. At policy levels, a multicultural society indicates the presence of a political framework with which to justify and legitimize a variety of government initiatives toward managing ethno-racial diversity. A multicultural policy thus entails a reworking and transformation of pluralist ideals into a relatively coherent package of practices and programs around the attainment of “unity within diversity,” through which the values, norms and identity of ethnic groups are legitimized. Finally, multiculturalism as a process refers to how political sectors react to the changing dynamics of multicultural reality. It refers to the process by which racial and ethnic minorities compete with central authorities for achievement of certain goals and aspirations. Multiculturalism in this regard may be interpreted as a pragmatic response by various sectors to the rapidly changing, complex, and diverse society. Its status as a renewable resource of strategic value allows multiculturalism to be manipulated by both political and ethnic sectors, each of which is anxious to promote its own agenda. The state, for one, is supportive of multiculturalism for political reasons pertaining to the pursuit of “peace, order, and good government” (Fleras and Elliott, 1992:22). The political party in power views multiculturalism as critical for re-election. Racial and ethnic minorities may also turn to multiculturalism in an effort to take advantage of entitlements they can draw upon and benefits they can enjoy. Combining these dimensions, therefore, imparts a distinctive perspective on the “what,” “why,” “where,” “when,” and “how” of multiculturalism in a given society (Fleras and Elliott, 1992:47). Of particular importance in understanding multiculturalism is its policy implications. As Kymlicka (2005:73) argues, there are several variables or categories with which we can assess the extent of multiculturalism in a given society: constitutional affirmation of multiculturalism; recognition of dual citizenship; adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula; provision of funding for ethnic organizations to support cultural activities; and ethnic representation in the media. Also, government multicultural policies may include, but not limited to: 1. recognition of dual or multiple citizenships 2. government support for newspapers and radio and television programs in minority languages 3. support for multicultural education in which funding for minority language education is provided 4. adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula 5. support for minority festivals, celebrations, and holidays Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. 6. support for music and arts of minority cultures 7. acceptance of traditional and religious dress and other accessories in schools, the military, and society in general 8. programs to encourage ethnic representation in politics and media 9. programs to encourage ethnic representation in education, science, engineering, and the work force in general.

MULTICULTURALISM FOR KOREA?: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS

In the current discourse of multiculturalism in Korea, there is little discussion of the above characteristics. In fact, multiculturalism is often mentioned and discussed without a full understanding of its multiple meanings and implications. In other words, there is a lack of understanding about the nature, purpose, and properties of multiculturalism in the discourse of increasing ethnic diversity in Korea. Also, the categories and policy issues of multiculturalism certainly do not yet apply to Korean society, for it has never shown any interest in promoting the culture or identity of newly emerging ethnic groups. Even if the Korean government were to adopt multiculturalism as a public policy, the ideal of encouraging people to maintain their own ethnic cultures in Korea will be very difficult to maintain. Without their own school system, media supports, and sustainable cultural environment, ethnic groups in Korea will be bombarded with cultural influences emanating from the Korea-centric media, schools, and working world. Ethnic cultures all over the world experience enormous struggles in trying to maintain their languages beyond the first generation. And Korea is, and will be, no exception. Also, not all cultures will ever be of “equal” value in Korea. In reality, ethnic groups are under great pressure to Koreanize and conform to the Korean majority. The so-called multicultural policy in Korea has predominantly produced Korean-conformity and there has been widespread discrimination against non-Koreans, in whatever forms and nature, especially toward other Asians. Then why did the discourse on multiculturalism arise in Korea? Is multiculturalism consistent with Korean values? The shift from a migrant-sending country to a migrant-receiving country, and especially the influx of migrant workers and brides from other parts of Asia, seem to have helped usher in an active discourse on multiculturalism in Korea. The emphasis on ethnic homogeneity based on the notion of Koreans being the descendents of one, common ancestor has been complemented by a new emphasis on race relations and tolerance through greater sensitivity and education. This new emphasis has not yet led to the elimination of ethnocentrism and discrimination against “invisible minorities,” but it nonetheless marks a significant departure from the proverbial image of Korean identity and nationalism centered on the ideology of ethnic homogeneity. Critics, however, have argued that multiculturalism represents a type of image-framing by elites, Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. which seeks to give the impression of intergroup harmony while denying the problems of race, minimized as ethnic differences. Indeed, conservative Koreans generally view multiculturalism as a threat because its supposed assumption that all cultures are of equal value challenges the country‟s efforts to maintain its cultural continuity in the face of the onslaught of western culture. What all of this shows is that Korean perception of multiculturalism should be understood as a form of interculturalism, which emphasizes intercultural understanding rather than intercultural equality. Multiculturalism, as advanced by the Korean government, may also be a strategy of containment that defuses resistance on the part of ethnic groups and sustains the hegemony of the dominant cultural group rather than ensuring access and equity for all members of the society. Like in most multicultural societies, the Korean government and society as a whole have encouraged the preservation of certain aspects of culture, such as ethnic folk dances, cuisine, and arts. But the fostering of certain aspects of culture should not be confused with the preservation of a complete culture. These cultural fragments give minorities the illusion of preserving their ethnic identity, while at the same time ensuring Korean-conformity. Multiculturalism as the preservation of select cultural artifacts with more nostalgic value than importance in everyday life is referred to as symbolic ethnicity or partialized or fragmented ethnicity. While some segments of an individual‟s life (e.g., education and occupation) may be de-ethnicized, other aspects (e.g., kinship, friendship, language, cuisine) may retain links to ethnic heritage even as the person participates fully in the mainstream of Korean society. This pattern of affective ethnicity—a warm but superficial way of giving ethnic distinctiveness to individual identity in a society dominated by conformity and convention—is dominant in Korean society and is may well be what Korean society wants. It could also be that the aim of multiculturalism in Korea is psychological. To members of ethnic groups, multiculturalism gives them confidence in their own identity and instills mutual respect for each other‟s culture and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes, and assumptions for peaceful coexistence. To members of the majority, multiculturalism makes them feel good about their openness and tolerance. What this shows is that the best way to understand multiculturalism may not be in terms of programs or policies but as ideology. Multiculturalism is an ideology because it is prescriptive, i.e., it holds out ideals about the way things should be.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite all the indications that the country is steadily and somewhat rapidly becoming a multicultural society, the Korean government still insists on almost zero- immigration policy. In contrast to such “immigrant societies” as the United States, Canada, and Australia, that have more readily extended citizenship to new residents and encouraged their integration and assimilation, Korea remains a “non-immigration” country, Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. for its policy objectives have been to control inflows, restrict long-term stays, discourage permanent residence and limit citizenship. What all of this indicates is that while unskilled foreign workers are welcomed for what they do—providing cheap labor to cash-strapped small manufacturing firms—they are not welcomed for what they are, i.e., being foreigners (an unskilled foreign worker face double jeopardy for being a foreigner and for being a “colored” foreigner from a poor country). The same is true for foreign brides: they are accepted for what they do—filling in for the bride shortage and providing unpaid labor in maintaining the household—but not accepted for what they are. One positive change of late is that the government is changing its policy regarding foreigners from “control and management” to “understanding and respect.” More important than changes in law, however, will be a change in Koreans‟ mindset and attitude: they will have to realize that their society is gradually changing from a mono-racial society to a multiracial and multiethnic society and that this process is irreversible. It is probably this realization that multiculturalism is often mentioned as de facto public policy. As insinuated earlier, if the public become aware of all the different meanings, components and implications of multiculturalism, many would reject it as a public policy. Moving beyond the rhetoric of multiculturalism, one practical step Korea can take is to implement measures so that transnational migrant workers can enjoy the same legal and civil rights as resident citizens, including access to essential social services, personal security, equal treatment, freedom from harassment, and access to legal service in the case of criminal behaviors committed against them by their employers. Also, the presence of the large number of migrant workers—and the increasing number of offspring from marriages involving Koreans and foreigners—brings about the need to encourage tolerance towards different racial and ethnic groups. In this regard, elementary textbooks now include a section on multicultural children and multicultural families, highlighting the need to understand their cultural backgrounds and to develop more tolerant attitudes toward them. Also, major television networks have started to program shows featuring immigrant brides and multicultural families, all of which are ultimately designed to promote greater understanding of their presence in Korean society. Given that the increasing ethnic diversity in Korea is inevitable and irreversible, the Korean government should closely examine the policies and programs related to ethnic and racial issues in such immigrant societies as the United States, Canada, Australia and European countries to learn from their experiences. In this way, it can learn the most effective ways of promoting social peace and tolerance while preventing or minimizing ethnic/racial conflicts. The government can also learn not to make the same mistakes those countries had made. The Korean government should also seriously consider more open policies toward immigration. It is one way to address the chronic labor shortage Korea is destined to face due to record-low fertility rates. With increased immigration, more secure supply of laborers is assured .

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Draft, Please consult the authors if you want to cite this paper.

Hong-zen Wang Professor, Director, Graduate Institute of Sociology National Sun Yat-sen University, Email: [email protected]

Anna Wen-hui Tang Associate Professor, Graduate Institute of Sociology National Sun Yat-sen University, Email: [email protected]

Cross-border marriages in East Asia have attracted much attention in the past decade (Wang and Hsiao, 2009; Constable, 2005); . Topics on the motivation to migrate or to marry foreigners (Tien and Wang, 2009), the organization to mediate brides and grooms (Nakamatsu, 2009; Wang and Chang, 2002), life adaptation in host countries (Suzuki, 2009; Yamanaka, 2009), national migration policies (Belanger, Hye-kyung Lee and Wang, 2010), or bring-up of next generation of international families have widely explored. One specific issue is domestic violence in these international families, which is frequently reported in mass media, and creates a poor, miserable image of foreign woman in a violent masculine husband family, but very few researches have been done on this taken-for-granted discourse.

This paper does not accept such a classical reductionist hypothesis that most immigrant women are under violence threat. According to Wang's survey in 2000 that about 90% of interviewed Vietnamese women are satisfied or very satisfied with their current marriages (2001). Even those women under domestic violence threat, some of them can use different strategies to escape, while some cannot (Tang and Wang, 2009). Therefore, we do not intend to claim at all that most immigrant women through marriages are the victims of domestic violence. Instead, this paper tries to understand the structural constraints that prevent these immigrant women from seeking help provided by Domestic Violence Prevention Law (DVPL hereafter) enacted in 1998. Our main argument is: though the Domestic Violence Prevention Law provides different measures to support abused women, the institutional discriminatory settings that DVPL ignores, including family structures, community social relations, and sexist immigration control, leads to the ineffectiveness of its implementation.

One common explanation for why a Taiwanese man might seek an overseas bride is his disadvantaged socio-economic status in the domestic marriage market (Wang and Chang, 2002). Another important factor is Taiwan's gender culture of masculinity. Those men who marry Vietnamese women would like to find a subservient wife for the family, and to reproduce their masculinities in this cross-border family formation process (Wang and Tien, 2009). The patriarchal Taiwanese family system puts a greater emphasis on the parent-son relationship than the husband-wife relationship. The roles that a woman plays in this system include wife, mother and daughter-in-law. She is expected to be a subservient wife, a servile daughter-in-law, and a son's mother. A woman in a Chinese family marries not for her future life with a husband, but for the husband‟s family. She has to learn how to serve her parents-in-law first, in the name of filial piety (Wolf 1972). It is commonly believed that a married daughter is 'poured out water' and that she would be better not to return to her natal family. Therefore, a newly wed woman in Taiwan needs to learn how to negotiate new, multiple and complicated patriarchal family relations to survive. Though this family system is not fixed without changing, its patriarchal norms are hard to escape for married women. Currently daughters-in-law have two ways to face this system: either self-persuasion and be resigned, or be hopelessly resistant. When they have no resources to fight against powerful patriarchy, they try to persuade themselves to accept this ideology. Those who do not accept it might fight, but they have very few avenues of escape. When Vietnamese women come to Taiwan, they are expected to follow the norms set by this patriarchal system, but since they are from a different gender culture background, and have different norms or expectations, it causes great tension between the two social norms. There is one common explanation of why a Vietnamese woman would want to marry a Taiwanese man: global hypergamy, i.e., people from the poor third world would like to marry rich people in the first world. GDP per capita in Vietnam in 2007 was only US$780, while Taiwan‟s was about US$16,000. The income gap creates the expectation that by marrying Taiwanese, these Vietnamese women could earn some money for their natal families. However, as Constable (2005) says, it (global hypergamy) is useful only insofar as it can be used to raise questions rather than to address them. The movement of women through marriage is the outcome of mixed motivations that are embedded in very different social structures, which cannot be reduced to only one economic factor. These Vietnamese women marrying Taiwanese often say "I want to work in Taiwan to send money home to my parents," and such a statement is a mixture of the role of filial daughter and being a working woman, which should be understood in Vietnamese social cultural contexts. Pursuing a transnational marriage for a Vietnamese woman should not be reduced to economic motivation. They have the role of filial daughter to fulfill. No matter what the life in Taiwan is, most Vietnamese wife tries to send home money to support the natal family, as the data Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. shows that 90% of the families have better economic life after their daughters married Taiwan (Chien, Van, and Quang 2004). It is an act to show her filial piety to parents, and should not be regarded as only for materialist goal. It is a life-long duty for these women to care their natal family (Fung 2009). In addition, compared to Taiwan's low female labor participation rate (49% in 2008), Vietnamese women are highly involved in labor market (labor participation rate is 78% in 2001). The Vietnamese society is more supportive of female labor participation than Taiwanese (Barbieri and Belanger 2009) and therefore when Vietnamese women migrate to Taiwan, they have to face a totally different gender culture expectation, which encourages females to stay at home to care the whole family. Vietnamese immigrants can not understand why their husbands are so worried about their desire to work, while Taiwanese husbands can not understand why their wives are so determined to find a job, contradicting to their imagination of a traditional wife (Wang and Tien, 2009; Thai 2008), as one husband complained the Taiwanese government never 'teaches' these immigrant wives that "in Vietnam it is female going out to make money, while in Taiwan it is male going out and female staying at home to care children.... These women should understand Taiwan's custom. They should not leave children alone and do whatever they like in Taiwan." The interviewee are mostly from poor rural area except one who lived in Ho Chih Minh City and her father was a businesspeople. They had to help their family on farming to make a living. They had imagined to find a job in Taiwan through marriage so that they can contribute more to their family finance, as Khoa said that “I didn’t care if my husband is old or ugly even though he is 34 years older than me, it’s still fine with me. My father worked so hard and my family is still very poor. What I really want is to help my family through marrying a Taiwanese man”. The strong desire to improve family economy is a mixture of cultural and economic reasons, so it is too simplistic to say that a woman from less developed country marrying a man in higher income country is based on the motivation of economic reason as hypergamy thesis describes. Besides, for these women to work does not only for the pursuit of financial gains, but also a search for independence and broadening social life in the new environment. In addition to the gender cultural barrier for a migrant woman to go out of family to find a job, she will also face the language problem. Most of them are not ethnic Chinese, and cannot speak either Mandarin or Hokkien which are commonly used in Taiwan. Therefore, they are hard to find a job before they can command the language well. They can normally speak basic Taiwanese language after one year, but then most of them are pregnant. After they have a baby, they are required by the husband‟s family to take care of the baby. Even if they can find a job, the monthly income is normally less than NT$15,000 (ca. US$450), and it is not economically rational to send the baby to a full-day child care center or hire a nanny, which costs around NT$10,000 (US$350). Besides, many of them live with in-laws, and they are expected to look after sick, elderly relatives, and do the domestic work, so it is almost impossible to get a job outside the family. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Though it is regarded as appropriate that daughters go to work and send money home to help their natal families in Taiwan, it would be regarded as a betrayal and not faithful if they still send money home after marriage. Some women save the money secretly and remit money stealthily, which could cause serious disputes if the husband‟s family learns of it. Such a conflict is especially serious in a transnational family where the husband‟s family and the Vietnamese wife have different expectations of the use of income earned by the wife. Following we will explore the life change of these immigrant women after they arrive Taiwan. Facing different social conditions, they have different strategies to choose to negotiate the patriarchy family system. Step by step, they are able to find a way out of control under beneficial structural conditions, which in Taiwan are the Domestic Violence Prevention Law and small- and medium-sized enterprises based economy.

METHOD

This is a research project for three years that we successively interview female Vietnamese domestic violence victims and male abusers. It started from May 2008, and up to the end of 2009 we have interviewed 16 Vietnamese wives who asked for help from the Prevention Center for Domestic Violence of a local city government in Taiwan, and six husbands who had been reported as abusers. Three of them are husbands of the female interviewees. This research is partially sponsored by the local government, and one social worker is the team member. The social workers‟ casework records were available for our analysis. The intensive interviews ranged from May to August 2008, and follow-up were made afterwards. We got permission from the director of the center to conduct interviews in the Center. The social workers did casework interviews and we researchers sat in and observed. After social workers interviewed the women, we followed up with some questions. Among the 16 interviewees three cases, who had been to the Center before, had agreed to be interviewed by researchers alone without social workers at presence. All informants know that we are university professors and not social workers. In the interview process, the researchers assured the interviewees that what they talked about was only for research purposes. Because the interviewees trust the social workers, and in addition, university professor status also helps to gain their trust since it is regarded as the most prestigious occupation in Taiwan (Huang 2008), through this connection they also trust us and are very willing to talk about their life experiences and stories. Some interviewee even invited the authors to their home to be guests, with their husbands at presence at home. Some interviewees and researchers have become friends, who talked over mobile phones from time to time. Interviewees background is summarized in Table 1.

Every case took about one and half to two hours of interview time, and some cases took about 3 hours. All interviews were voice and video taped and were conducted with the permission of the interviewees before commencement. All conversations are proceeded in Mandarin, with a few words in Vietnamese. The conversations are transcribed into texts. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. The average age of our informants is 25 years old. The oldest is 33 and the youngest is 22. The average number of years they have lived in Taiwan is about 5.3 years in 2008. The longest is 10 years and the shortest is 2 years. Only two of them have Taiwanese IDs, the others have residency permission only. Four of them are applying for IDs and one is waiting for ID permission from the government. Six of them have no idea of the importance of an ID and even never thought about how to apply for a Taiwanese ID. All 16 informants lived with in-laws except one. Seven of them not only lived with parents-in-law but also other relatives. All of our informants have had relatives or friends who married Taiwanese men, earlier or later than them. Most of them met their husbands through a marriage broker, except one who was introduced by her brother-in-law. 8 of them have a son or one son and one daughter. The other 6 have one or two daughters. Only one informant has no child. All interviewees faced psychological or physical abuse at home. The abusers include husbands, mothers-in-law, sisters or brothers-in-law or the husband‟s children from a former marriage. Five of the husbands are unemployed, and six of them have unstable incomes.

These interviewed immigrant women are those abused women who experienced the structural constraints but in the end could resort to the use of DVPL to escape their predicaments. With their descriptions of the difficulties, we identify four constraints that all abused immigrants face, ie., family structures, regional disparity of service provision between rural and urban area, language usage, and immigration law based on sexism, which affects the effectiveness of the implementation of DVPL.

DVPL PRESUMES A NUCLEAR FAMILY STRUCTURE

Among our interviewees, as table 1 shows, only one out of 16 is nuclear family. In other words, it is a common phenomenon to live with in-laws after marriage. Such a family structure is different from the imagination of DVPL which presumes a middle class, heterosexual nuclear family, and neglects the fact that co-residence is common in these cross-border families. Besides husband's abuse, in-laws, especially mother-in-law1, is the major abuser in the extended family. An interviewee Luan said that

"my sister's family is not rich, but they are happy. She has freedom, and go anywhere she likes.... My life is different. After my marriage, I have to stay at home to take care of the bed-ridden father-in-law. My mother-in-law demands me to cook, to clean house. Not be able to go out. Mother-in-law prohibits me meeting friends.

1 The role of mother-in-law in East Asia is very unique, and it is often argued that her role is to consolidate the Asian patriarchy family system. See WOLF, KOREAN. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. She does not like my Vietnamese friends. I only stay at home to wash dish."

At one night she went to night market with her two kids, and returned home late. Her mother-in-law shut them out of the door, no matter how many times she knocked the door. After ten minutes the mother-in-law opened the door, took the two kids in, and locked her outside. Luan's sister's husband told us that

"the neighboring saleswoman suggested her to kneel down outside the door to beg her pardon, but even after two hours kneeling down, she was not allowed to come in.... Pathetic! Really pathetic!"

In addition to mother-in-law, another big issue is sex harassments from male family members. Whenever there are only Nhan and her father-in-law at home, it is the most terrible time for Nhan, for the father-in-law often sexually harasses her. Sometimes he asked her to 'take a rest in bedroom', or embraced her from the back when she hand washed clothes. Once she was sick, and told him that she would go to a doctor, he replied amatory "you don't need to go to a doctor. You only need a man to give you a shot!" Though the abusers can be other family members besides the husband in the co-residence place, the DVPL is not able to implement the Article 14 to order all abusers to leave: Curt can order the abuser(s) to move out of the residence of abused if necessary. It can also prohibit the abuser(s) using, making revenues from, or disposing immobile property of the residence.... Ordering the abuser(s) to distance from the following places: abused residence, school, working place or any place that the abused and its specific family members frequently visit.

The elderly care in Taiwan is normally shouldered by sons and their wives. It is almost impossible to order the husband to alleviate the domestic violence problems. If husband leaves, the immigrant wife still has to live with in-laws which brings great stress for her. If abusers are many, it is even more difficult to remove all abusers from the residence and leave the immigrant wife alone. In addition, most moveable property belongs to husband family, and without some important moveable property, eg., motorbike, the immigrant wife cannot go anywhere if she lives in remote area. The husband family can also dispose the property before the final verdict is made to evade the regulation. Therefore, all the interviewees with DVPL issued protection order still prefer to live alone outside husband family.

CLOSE COMMUNITY TIES HINDERS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT

DVPL also assumes that an individual is able to report domestic violence without Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. other intermediary. However, since the immigrant wife lives in a Taiwanese society, and could be quite isolated if there is no social connection to transmit the DVPL information. In addition, the husband family is embedded in the local social community networks, and therefore the community can also be a deterrent factor for abused immigrant wife to access assistance. Dense social networks can be an inhibiting factor to help abused immigrant wives to seek external resources. Since the husband family resides in the local community much longer than the newly arrived immigrant wife, it has its influence to prevent the „de-trailed‟ wife seeking help from the community. For example, Hien knew that she could go to police station to report domestic violence and seek help. One night her husband physically abused her, and she went to police station to report. After a short inquiry, the policeman called her husband to take her back home without passing the case to Domestic Violence Prevention Center. Hien was very frustrated, and complained that this policeman is her husband‟s good friend, who go out for a drink together from time to time. Next time when Hien was abused by her husband again, she went to the Domestic Violence Prevention Center instead and finally got assistance from official organization. Another case is from Luan. She has been issued of protection order, and can proceed to apply for quasi-naturalization without husband's consent. When she went to the registration office to apply, the civil servant at that office called her husband to make sure that he knew this application. In that district, social relations are dense, and the civil servants know all the residents there. Minh got worse treatment after her husband knew she applied for naturalization. The social worker complained that

An abused person with protection order can go to apply for quasi- naturalization without husband's consent, nor in need of his accompany to apply. The process from quasi-naturalization to naturalization is done by the registration office. Some civil servants in the office is too careful, and ring the husband all the time to make sure such application. But it is not necessary.

Even the neighbors helped Luan to report domestic violence, it is hard for them to be witness at the court if they have to face the breakup of social relations with husband family. It means that the abused immigrant wife will have difficulty to find someone to support her claim of domestic violence. For example, Luan's brother-in-law told us that

Two neighbors as witness went to family court. When they found out that the husband had been there, they ran away immediately....One neighbor is noodles stand owner, another one is fruits stand owner. They had been to Luan's family, and knew her mother-in-law talked something bad. They went to court to tell the judges how loathsome the mother-in-law is. But when they saw the husband they went away at once.

SEXIST IMMIGRATION CONTROL

Immigrant women through marriage to Taiwan are expected to play three roles, ie., good wife, good mother, and good daughter-in-law. Any deviance from these gender roles is regarded as 'bad woman', and should be pull back to the right track. To validate the control of wife's behavior, 'cultural differences' narrative is widely use. One interviewed husband said that

Our custom is different from Vietnamese. Here we men work out, women stay home. Everything should follow husband. When you (Vietnamese) come to Taiwan, you need to adapt yourself to Taiwan society, and should not insist your own ideas, insist going out to work. That is totally wrong! You cook Vietnamese dish, different from Taiwanese, and it certainly displeases mother-in-law. You need to learn cooking Taiwanese dish. As the mother of Taiwanese kids, you need to learn Chinese hard so that you can help their study, otherwise your kids will reduce our population quality, which is very bad!

His narrative uses 'cultural differences' to cover his gender roles expectation, ie., he wants his wife to stay at home to be good wife (deferral to husband), good mother (kids' study), and good daughter-in-law (not to displease mother-in-law). If she can not fulfill these roles, she should be controlled by different ways, including violence. Such a discourse is widely accepted by the society and state, and the immigration regulations put most effort in positioning these immigrants as „good‟ women. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. First of all, these immigrant women take the „family union visa‟ to stay in Taiwan. The yearly extension of this visa should be agreed by their husbands, and both of them need to go to police station together to confirm their marriages exist at that time. In other words, without husband‟s consent, the immigrant wife can not extend her stay in Taiwan, and will be deported when the visa date expires. It gives husband family a tool to control immigrant wife to be obedient. Hien described her situation that

"he always uses the renewal of residence status to control me. For example, he did not let me go to police station to apply until the last day, and said 'I won't let you fucking shit to apply'. When I wanted to apply for naturalization, he threatened to divorce me and said 'then you will have to leave Taiwan and not be able to see your son'."

If the immigrant wife reports domestic violence, it will deteriorate the relationship with husband family, and will be more difficult to get husband‟s consent to extend the visa. During the period of reporting domestic violence and the issue of domestic violence protection order by the court, the abused immigrant woman still has to live with her husband. If she decides to leave the family, she will risk herself to be „missing people‟ because the husband can go to police station to report her missing, and go to court to ask for divorce. Minh was deported to Vietnam because she left her husband before the issue of domestic violence protection order, and during her home-away period, her husband appealed the court to divorce her. Besides, she has no child to be „Taiwanese dependent‟, and can not stay in Taiwan. In addition to this visa extension control based on spouse dependency, the society and state have a specific discourse on 'good vs. bad woman', and only those 'good' women can stay in Taiwan. The government claims to crack down all 'faked marriages', but such a policy is based on sexist ideology that 'good woman' would never do any 'deviant behavior related with sex', and if she does something relating to sex, eg., erotic massage, she will be investigated. The current immigration policy for immigrant woman is that "to conform to the purpose of her stay in Taiwan", and if a immigrant woman works as a sex worker, a Karaoke bar attendant, or get any sex-industry related job, she will not meet the demand of 'good woman', normally defined as good wife, good mother and good daughter-in-law, and will be consider as a 'fake-marriage', and will be deported by police. It never asks why these women have to go into sex industry even many of them need to earn money for the family (Chen, 2010). Such a sexist immigration policy exacerbates to problem of immigrant's wife dependence on her husband. No wonder many husbands complain their wives working in sex industry, and therefore they have legitimate reasons to abuse their wives. When talked about his running away wife, who insisted to work and leave the child care to nanny, but promised to give him US$600 a month to pay the nanny, the husband said angrily that Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

you don't think it is very strange that she could make so much money? In addition to US$600 she pays the nanny, she also needs money for daily expenditure, which could reach US$1,000 a month. If she is not working as a prostitute, or has a man to feed her, how come she could earn so much without Taiwan's ID?

Another one complained that the government never clamps down on Vietnamese restaurants where attract many Vietnamese immigrants to gather.

These restaurants seem a place for them to relieve homesick, but many restaurants are doing something different.... They are the sources of our social disorder. Vietnamese woman coming here to be good a daughter-in-law, but it seduces her to do something immoral and create piles of social problems,"

he said. Nhan works 15 hours every day, from 5 o'clock in the morning till 8 o'clock at night. She takes every kind of job, including working in a breakfast fast food store, as saleswoman in a fashion clothes shop, or as dish washer in a noodles shop at night. In the first two years, it was fine. But after the third year her husband began to suspect she was engaging in adultery, and went to the workplace to harass her. He frequently checked her mobile to find evidence. Hien complained

I don't know why he always suspects I have boy friends. He checks my mobile phone, and tells me that someone sent me an SMS. How can it be possible? I don't even know any Chinese characters.

The social discourse on 'good woman', backed by state policy to expel those 'faked marriage' based on the imagination of excluding 'bad woman', creates a social control network that monitors the immigrant wife from performing the three roles: wife, mother, and daughter-in-law. One husband rationalized his abuse, and confessed that:

I did beat her. Yes, but that is not the point. The key point is that she continues to go out (to work in sex industry)!

So if an immigrant woman is regarded not performing well her expected roles in Taiwan, the husband family and the state have all the legitimate power to exclude her from seeking help. We also heard some social workers worried those 'bad' women who seek help from the Domestic Violence Prevention Center. One social worker told us that

More and more women exploited DVPL to divorce their husbands. They come to Taiwan to be a spouse, but if they do not play their spouses roles well, and use Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. different reasons to appeal divorce, I am really worried.

The deeply rooted sexist discourse on immigrant woman produces the state's policy, the social workers' attitudes toward immigrant women, and leads to the result that the DVPL does not help those 'bad woman', no matter what reasons cause these women turning 'bad'.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper explores the structural factors that inhibit immigrant women seeking help from DVPL. Based on interview data from 16 abused Vietnamese women and 3 abuser husbands, we find that extended family structures, dense community social relations, and sexist immigration control, constrain the effectiveness of DVPL in implementation. An immigrant woman embedded in such social structures need work hard to escape these constraints to report domestic violence. These structural constraints are the products of gender cultures in Taiwan. Expectation of getting a traditional woman from other countries to fulfill the gender roles raises much tension between husband family and immigrant wife. The state enforces this gender role by tight control 'faked marriage', which accepts only 'good woman' who can fulfill the imagined traditional gender role, and exclude those 'bad' woman who deviates from this role playing. When the society is getting used to gender equality in different social spheres, these immigrant women are still gendered in different discourses and practices.

BARBIERI, MAGALI AND DANIELE BÈLANGER 2009. Reconfiguring Families and Gender in Contemporary Vietnam. Stanford University Press and The East West Center.

BÈLANGER, DANIELE, HYE-KYUNG LEE, and HONG-ZEN WANG 2010. "Ethnic diversity and statistics in East Asia: 'foreign brides‟ surveys in Taiwan and South Korea", Ethnic and Racial Studies (forthcoming).

CHEN, MEI-HUA 2010. Xinghua de guojing guanli: jia jiehun chacha yu zhongguo yimind/ xinggongzuozhe de paichu (Sexualized border-control: The investigation of phoney-marriage and the exclusion of Chinese migrant / sex workers). Taiwan Shehuixue (Taiwanese Sociology) (FORTHCOMING).

CHIEN, TRAN VAN, AND DINH VAN QUANG 2004. Tim hieu thuc trang phu nu ket hon voi nguio Dai Loan: tai khu vuc dong bang song Cuu Long (Understanding the real situation of the women marrying Taiwanese in the east part of Cuu Long River). Hanoi: Uy Ban Dan So, Gia Dinh va Tre Em (Committee of People, Family and Children).

CONSTABLE, NICOLE. 2005. “Introduction: Cross-border Marriages, Gendered Mobility, and Global Hypergamy”. Pp. 1-16 in Nicole Constable (ed) Cross-Border Marriages: Gender and Mobility in Transnational Asia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

FUNG, HEIDI 2009. Transnational daughterhood: How Vietnamese marriage migrants in Taiwan practice their filial duties from afar. Paper presented at the symposium on Maritime Link and Transnationalism in Southeast Asia: Past and Present. Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University and Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS), Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

NAKAMATSU, TOMOKO 2009. "Global and Local Logics: Japan‟s Matchmaking Industry and Marriage Agencies". In Wang and Hsiao (eds), pp. 189-210.

TANG, ANNA WEN-HUI, HONG-ZEN WANG 2009. Fujia Lianhua (Lotus Chained by Husband Family: Walkout story of 16 abused Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Vietnamese Wives). Taipei: Juliu Publishing Company.

SUZUKI, NOBUE 2009. "Why Filipinas? Capitalist Modernity, Family Formation, and Masculine Desires". In Wang and Hsiao (eds), pp. 39-59.

THAI, HUNG CAM 2008. For Better or For Worse: Vietnamese International Marriages in the New Global Economy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press

WANG, HONG-ZEN. 2001. “Ethnicized social mobility in Taiwan: Patterns and strategies among Taiwan's small and medium-scale businesspeople”, Modern China, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 328-58. 2007. “Hidden Spaces of Resistance of the Subordinated: Case Studies from Vietnamese Female Migrant Partners in Taiwan”, International Migration Review, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 706-727.

WANG, HONG-ZEN and SHU-MING CHANG. 2002. “The commodification of international marriages: Cross-border marriage business in Taiwan and Vietnam”, International Migration, vol.40, no. 3, pp. 93-116.

WANG, HONG-ZEN and DANIÈLE BÉLANGER. 2008. “Taiwanizing female immigrant spouses and materializing differential citizenship”, Citizenship Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 91-106.

WANG, HONG-ZEN AND MICHAEL H. H. HSIAO 2009. Cross-Border Marriages with Asian Characteristics. Taipei: CAPAS, Academia Sinica.

WANG, HONG-ZEN and CHING-YING TIEN 2009. Who Marries Vietnamese Bride? Masculinities and Cross-Border Marriages. In Wang and Hsiao (eds), pp. 13-37.

WOLF, MARGERY. 1972. Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

YAMANAKA, KEIKO 2009. "Intermarriage between Nepali Migrant Men and Citizen Women in Japan". In Wang and Hsiao (eds.), pp. 147-175.

Tsuneo Akaha, Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies

Among the sweeping changes we see in Asian countries today are the ever-growing movement of people across national borders, a result of myriad supply-push, demand-pull, and network factors. The escalating scale and the growing complexity of trans-border human migration are straining the capacity of the institutions of governance in every country of Asia, whether developed or developing. Even though population migration is not necessarily a new phenomenon in this part of the world, its consequences are catching the region’s governments and peoples unprepared.1

Japan is a particularly interesting case against the backdrop of dynamic transformations the country is experiencing both domestically and in its foreign relations.2 The political system that created the second largest economy in the world is now experiencing demographic changes of an unprecedented scale in peacetime, i.e., an aging and shrinking population. Japan‟s postwar population growth ended in 2005. With its birth rate at 7.87 births/1,000 population and death rate at 9.26 deaths/1,000 population in 2005, the nation‟s current population of around 127 million is projected to shrink to about 115 million by 2030 and around 90 million by 2055.3 The demographic changes have created serious labor shortages particularly in the unskilled sector but also in the skilled sector. Japan‟s political system has been slow in appreciating the far-reaching implications of these trends. The government‟s response has been reactive rather than proactive, timid rather than bold, and highly selective rather than comprehensive. The public‟s response has also been ambivalent, some arguing for sweeping reforms in Japan‟s currently restrictive immigration policy to admit more foreign migrants to meet the nation‟s economic and social needs and others insisting on the preservation of the secure and stable social order they have long enjoyed and which they believe is predicated on the nation‟s racial and cultural homogeneity. Japan has long resisted and continues to resist a major overhaul of its restrictive immigration policy. Today, foreign residents constitute less than 2 percent of the entire population of Japan, including the so-called “old-comers”, Koreans and Chinese from

1 For a study of international migration in Japan and other Northeast Asian countries, see Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, ed., Crossing National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia, Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 2005. 2 Japan's GDP (PPP) in 2007 was $4.305 trillion and GDP per capita $33,800. 3 Information provided by the Employment Security Bureau of the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Tokyo, August 2008. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Taiwan who came to Japan during Japanese colonial control of their homelands in the first half of the 20th century and who have remained in Japan while retaining their Korean citizenship after the end of the Second World War, as well as their offspring.4 In recent years many developed countries have tightened immigration control in response to the growing population of undocumented or illegal migrants and for security reasons post-9/11, but their policies are far more liberal than Japan‟s.5 As we will see below, however, there are signs of slow awakening in Japan to the consequences of its aging and declining population, particularly the prospects of an economic malaise and a declining political influence in the world. There are growing calls among the business community in need of cheap labor and among human rights and other civil society organizations for a more liberal immigration policy. In addition, some local areas have attracted substantial numbers of foreign nationals, particularly Brazilians and other Latin Americans of Japanese ancestry who have come to Japan under a special immigration regime that gives them legal access not only to jobs in the skilled sector but also to unskilled employment opportunities, which are denied to all other migrants. Japan is also slowly and selectively opening windows of employment opportunities to foreign nationals with specified skills and qualifications in such sectors as geriatric care, nursing, high-tech industry, and financial services. Another sign of change is the “multicultural coexistence” campaign that the Japanese national and local governments have recently launched in order to improve the social conditions for foreign residents in the country. In the present analysis, we will examine how the balance between forces of resistance to immigration reform and forces for change is evolving. We will first look at the current immigration situation in Japan. We will then describe the nation's immigration policy and its key components. We will identify the sources of Japan‟s restrictive immigration policy and discuss recent efforts to gradually and selectively liberalize the policy. We will then discuss the multicultural coexistence movement at the national and local levels and its prospects.

THE CURRENT IMMIGRATION SITUATION IN JAPAN

4 The registered foreign population in Japan represented 1.74 percent of the total population of Japan in 2008. (“Heisei 20-nen sue ni okeru gaikokujin torokusha tokei ni tsuite” [Statistics on Registered Foreign Nationals as of the End of 2008], Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, Tokyo, July 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-1.html [accessed February 6, 2010]). 5 For discussion of developed countries' immigration policies in recent years, see, for example, Philip Martin, Manolo Abella, and Christiane Kuptsch, Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty- first Century, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007; Wayne A. Cornelius et al., eds., Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Second Edition, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004; and Philip Martin, Susan Martin, and Patrick Weil, Managing Migration: The Promise of Cooperation, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Although Japan is not known as an immigration country, either as a source country or as a destination country, migration is not entirely new to this country. The nation‟s isolation during the 1639-1853 period meant there were no significant numbers of foreigners entering Japan. Between 1853 and 1945, however, Japan opened its door to large emigration, including colonial settlement in Korea and Manchuria, as well as migration to North and South America. Japan also undertook forced migration of Koreans and Chinese in Taiwan when those territories were under Japanese colonial control in the first half of the 20th century. In the immediate postwar period (1945-51), the Allied Occupation imposed a strict control of both emigration and immigration. After Japan regained independence, it continued to restrict emigration to meet its expanding domestic labor demand accompanying its fast economic growth and also continued its restrictive immigration policy, except for the repatriation of Japanese from abroad. In the 1980s, as the value of the yen rose significantly and labor shortages grew, Japan became an attractive destination for foreigners. The formation of transnational migrant networks linking labor surplus countries, particularly those in Asia, to employment opportunities in Japan, also contributed to the growing foreign population in Japan. In the early 1980s Japan also began accepting refugees, particularly from Southeast Asia, and improving the human rights situation for foreign nationals living in Japan, especially the zainichi Koreans who had been forced to move to Japan during its colonial control of the Korean Peninsula, as well as their offspring. The Japanese government made these policy changes reluctantly, reactively, and slowly. Since the 1990s, Japan has maintained a restrictive policy toward foreign labor, opening its door only to immigrants of Japanese ancestry, industrial trainees and technical interns, and a small number of skilled workers. What is the current immigration situation in Japan? There are two sets of statistics that provide an overall picture of foreign nationals in Japan: (1) the number of foreign nationals entering Japan6 and (2) the number of foreign nationals registered in Japan.7 Both figurers have been rising rapidly in recent years. In 1990, 3.5 million foreign nationals arrived in Japan, but by 2005 the number had jumped to over 8.1 million and reached over 9.1 million in 2008.8 By country/area of citizenship/origin, South Koreans were the largest group with over 2.62 million persons, followed by Chinese from Taiwan (1.54 million) and Chinese from PRC (1.21 million). About 798,000 persons from the United States and nearly 513,000 Chinese from Hong Kong also entered Japan in 2008.9

6 The number represents the number of entries rather than the number of different foreign nationals arriving in Japan. That is, the same individuals who enter Japan multiple times are recorded those multiple times. 7 The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law requires that all foreign nationals who stay in Japan 90 or more days must register as “foreign residents.” 8 "2007 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 2, and 2009 Immigration Databook, Tokyo: Japan Immigration Association, 2009, p. 1. 9 2009 Immigration Databook, Tokyo: Japan Immigration Association, 2009, p. 1. Statistics Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. The number of foreign nationals registered in Japan has also been on the rise (Table 1). They include both permanent residents and non-permanent residents, as well as those who are resident in Japan for 90 days or longer. “Permanent residents” include “special permanent residents” and “general permanent residents,” the former referring to the zainichi Koreans and Chinese who retain their foreign citizenship but are permanently settled in Japan and the latter category including all other foreign nationals who have been granted permanent resident status. The number of special permanent residents was eclipsed by the number of general permanent residents in 2007 for the first time since the two separate categories were established in 1956. In 2008, there were 492,361 persons with general permanent resident status and 420,305 special permanent residents, together constituting 41.1 percent of the total registered foreign population in Japan. Non-permanent residents registered in Japan numbered 1,305,065 persons, or 58.9 percent of the total foreign resident population.10

Table 1. Registered Foreign Nationals in Japan by Country/Area of Citizenship/Origin Citizens hip/ 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Origin 1,512, 1,556, 1,686, 1,778, 1,851, 1,915, 1,973, 2,011, 2,084, 2,152, 2,217, Total 116 113 444 462 758 030 747 555 919 973 426 272,23 294,20 335,57 381,22 424,28 462,39 487,57 519,56 560,74 606,88 655,37 China 0 1 5 5 2 6 0 1 1 9 7 % 18.0 18.9 19.9 21.4 22.9 24.1 24.7 25.8 26.9 28.2 29.6 638,82 636,54 635,26 632,40 625,42 613,79 607,41 598,68 598,21 593,48 589,23 Korea 8 8 9 5 2 1 9 7 9 9 9 % 42.2 40.9 37.7 35.6 33.8 32.1 30.8 29.8 28.7 27.6 26.6 222,21 224,29 254,39 265,96 268,33 274,70 286,55 302,08 312,97 316,96 312,58 Brazil 7 9 4 2 2 0 7 0 9 7 2 % 14.7 14.4 15.1 15.0 14.5 14.3 14.5 15.0 15.0 14.7 14.1 Philippi 105,30 115,68 144,87 156,66 169,35 185,23 199,39 187,26 193,48 202,59 210,61 nes 8 5 1 7 9 7 4 1 8 2 7 % 7.0 7.4 8.6 8.8 9.1 9.7 10.1 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.5 Peru 41,317 42,773 46,171 50,052 51,772 53,649 55,750 57,728 58,721 59,696 59,723 % 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 USA 42,774 42,802 44,856 46,244 47,970 47,836 48,844 49,390 51,321 51,851 52,683 % 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 189,44 199,80 225,30 245,90 264,62 277,42 288,21 296,84 309,45 321,48 337,20 Other 2 5 8 7 1 1 3 8 0 9 5 % 12.5 12.8 13.4 13.8 14.3 14.5 14.6 14.8 14.8 14.9 15.2

spanning from 1978 to 2005 are available at the Japanese Ministry of Justice‟s website, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/050617-1/050617-1.html (accessed February 6, 2010). 10 “Heisei 20-nen sue ni okeru gaikokujin torokusha tokei ni tsuite” (Statistics on Registered Foreign Nationals as of the End of 2008), Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, Tokyo, July 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-5.pdf (accessed February 7, 2010). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Source: “Heisei 20-nen sue ni okeru gaikokujin torokusha tokei nit suite” (Statistics on Registered Foreign Nationals as of the End of 2008), Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, Tokyo, July 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-1.html (accessed February 6, 2010), http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-3.pdf.

The total number of registered foreign nationals stood at 782,910 in 1980, but it surpassed one million in the early 1990s and continued to grow, topping 2 million since 2005. By 2008, the number of foreign residents had reached 2,217,426, the highest level ever in Japan‟s history. North and South Koreans long constituted the largest ethnic group, but their number peaked in the early 1990s and has been declining since, largely due to natural declines and naturalization among the younger generations of zainichi Koreans who have become Japanese citizens.11 In contrast, the number of so-called "new-comers" from South Korea continues to grow, including university and pre-university students. Also increasing are Chinese nationals registered in Japan, many of whom are also university and pre-university students, as well as industrial trainees and technical interns. In 2007, Chinese nationals surpassed the Korean citizens in Japan, at 606,889 and 593,489 respectively. The number of Chinese residents in the country rose to 655,377 in 2008, representing nearly 30 percent of the total registered foreign population in Japan. They were followed by North and South Korean citizens (589,239 persons; 26.6%), Brazilians (312,582; 14.1%), Filipinos (210,617; 9.5%), Peruvians (59,723; 2.7%), and U.S. citizens (52,683; 2.4%).12 Brazilians of Japanese ancestry constitute most of the registered Brazilian citizens in Japan. Their number grew dramatically between 1988 and 1990 and continued to grow every year except in 1998, when it stood at 222,217, representing 14.7 percent of all registered foreign nationals in Japan. Their number peaked at 316,967 in 2007 but declined somewhat the following year, to 312,582, or 14.1 percent of the total number of foreign citizens registered in Japan. Peruvians of Japanese ancestry have also increased, from 41,317 (2.7%) in 1998 to 59,723 (2.7%) in 2008. Filipinos are also a growing presence in the country, their number rising from 105,308 (7.0%) in 1998 to 210,617 (9.5%) in 2008.13 As we will discuss later, registered foreign nationals in Japan are concentrated in large urban communities and areas with large manufacturing companies, particularly automobile and automobile parts manufacturers, and it is naturally in these areas that demands are growing for measures to improve the social and living conditions for foreign residents. Tokyo leads the list of such areas, serving as home to 402,432 foreign citizens, or 18.1 percent of the total registered foreign population in Japan, followed by Aichi

11 See, for example, Mika Mervio, "Koreans in Japan and Shimane," in Akaha and Vassilieva, eds., Crossing National Borders, pp. 141-162. 12 “Heisei 20-nen sue ni okeru gaikokujin torokusha tokei ni tsuite” [Statistics on Registered Foreign Nationals as of the End of 2008], Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, Tokyo, July 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-3.pdf (accessed February 6, 2010). 13 Ibid. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Prefecture 14 (228,432 persons; 10.3%), Osaka Prefecture (211,782; 9.6%), Kanagawa Prefecture (171,889; 7.8%), Saitama Prefecture (121,515; 5.5%), Chiba Prefecture (111,228; 5.0%); Shizuoka Prefecture (103,279; 4.7%), and Hyogo Prefecture (102,522; 4.6%).15 The growing number of foreign nationals coming to Japan, many with the intention to stay for extended periods of time, is a combined consequence of supply-push factors in the sending countries, demand-pull factors in Japan, and the migration-related networks that provide various links between would-be immigrants and their destinations in Japan. Economic reasons are the most important push and pull factors. Behind the economic pull factor in Japan are the low death rate, the low birth rate, and the resulting population aging and population decline, which in turn leads to labor shortages, particularly in the low-skill sectors of the economy, including the so-called “3D” (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning; known in Japan as “3K” [kiken, kitsui, kitanai]) jobs.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, LABOR SHORTAGE, AND MIGRANT LABOR

Figure 1 shows the changes in Japan's population from 1950 to 2008. The increase from 2000 to 2005 was a mere 830,000, or 0.7%, the lowest record of increase rate since the end of WWII. The population actually declined from 2004 to 2005 by 20,000, the first time Japan experienced a year-to-year decline in its population.16

14 Toyota is located in Aichi Prefecture. 15 “Heisei 20-nen sue ni okeru gaikokujin torokusha tokei ni tsuite” [Statistics on Registered Foreign Nationals as of the End of 2008], Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, Tokyo, July 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-4.pdf (accessed February 6, 2010). 16 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning and Statistical Research and Training Institute website, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/kokusei/2005/youkei/01.htm (accessed April 28, 2008). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Figure 1. Number and Rate of Population Change

Source: “Current Population Estimates as of October 1, 2008,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning and Statistical Research and Training Institute, Tokyo, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/2008np/index.htm (accessed February 7, 2010)

Japan's population is expected to fall from the current 127 million to 100 million by 2050. Over 21 percent of the current population is 65 years of age or older and by 2050 slightly more than one-third of the population is expected to be 65 or older. Government surveys show that the proportion of male Japanese with no intention to marry increased from 2.3 percent in 1982 to 7.1 percent in 2005 and their female counterparts grew from 4.1 percent to 5.6 percent during the same period. The number of children that those who plan to marry want to have has dropped from 2.33 in 1982 to 2.07 in 2005 among men and from 2.28 to 2.11 among women. 17 These trends have raised the specter of serious labor shortages in the country.18 OECD reports suggest that shrinking population growth and labor forces will have a large impact on living standards. Extrapolating current productivity trends with unchanged

17 Information provided by the Employment Security Bureau of the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Labor, August 2008. 18 An official from the International Labor Organization Tokyo Office said, “Japan must have a mid-long term perspective to look at and deal with the lowering birthrate.” (Authors' interview in Tokyo, August 20, 2008) Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. dependency ratios, Japan‟s living standard (measured by GNP per capita) will drop by 23 percent below the level Japanese citizens may have attained.19 Certain sectors of Japanese industry have become structurally dependent on foreign labor.20 Despite unemployment and recession, there are persistent labor shortages in Japan. Generally young Japanese, well educated and surrounded by relative affluence, refuse to do the so-called “3K” jobs.21 An official from the International Labor Organization Tokyo Office stated, "Migrants are vital to maintain a host country‟s economic prosperity because they do the work the host country workers do not want to do.” 22 Japan's restrictive immigration policies coupled with unmet labor market demand has encouraged increasing numbers of undocumented labor and side and back-door entries.23 Demand for labor is no longer sensitive to cyclical changes in the Japanese economy. That is, demand continues to grow or remains steady regardless of the cyclical ups and down of the economy. The current labor market demands are expected to continue to be steady.24 There is a great need in the service industry for geriatric care, manufacturing, and nursing.25 The demands for a more liberal labor migration policy come primarily from the corporate community concerned about the current demographic trends in Japan, namely the shrinking and aging population. Specifically, demands for more foreign labor are coming from the Japan Committee for Economic Development and the Japan Chamber of Commerce. Their demands helped lead to the creation of both the trainee and Nikkeijin programs. 26 In April of 1999, Japan‟s Economic Council released a report entitled “Consideration for Japanese Socioeconomy in the 21st Century” and recommended that Japan, “actively consider aiming to become a vibrant socioeconomy that is open to the world by orderly accepting migrant labor from overseas countries.”27 Nippon Keidanren, the influential national umbrella organization for large, medium, and small businesses in Japan, has voiced support for importing foreign labor since the 1970‟s. The Federation has described the goal of immigration as a “reinvigoration of the Japanese economy” and proposed an increase in the number of foreign students in Japan and the granting of

19 Peach, p. 35. 20 Ceri Peach, “Contrasts in Economic Growth and Immigration Policy in Japan, the European Union and the United States” in Douglass and Roberts, eds., pp. 30-31. 21 Ibid. 22 Author interview in Tokyo, August 20, 2008. 23 “Side-door” entries refer to those who enter Japan legally and then either extend their stay beyond permitted periods or are engaged in activities other than those for which they were admitted into the country. They are both illegal according to Japan‟s immigration law. “Back- door” entries refer to those who enter Japan illegally, such as on false documents or false statements as to their purpose or term of stay in the country. They are, obviously, also illegal. 24 Weiner, pp. 63-64. 25 Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu, p. 8. 26 Terasawa, p. 218. 27 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton, “Reinventing Japan: Immigration‟s Role in Shaping Japan‟s Future,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 50. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. automatic permanent residency to students that graduate from Japanese universities.28 In 2004, Nippon Keidanren, issued a set of recommendations for dealing with the impending labor shortage. 29 The recommendations included a call for legal, administrative, and corporate reforms designed to expand the size of non-Japanese labor force in the country and to improve the quality of employment system for foreign workers. The Federation put forth three guiding principles regarding non-Japanese workers: (1) acceptance must be well organized to ensure sufficient control over the quality and quantity of those accepted; (2) human rights and dignity of accepted non-Japanese workers must never be compromised; and (3) acceptance of non-Japanese workers must also benefit their countries of origin. Currently, as a general rule, Japan does not allow unskilled foreign labor in the country. Nor does Japan have a guest worker program. The two exceptions are, as noted earlier, foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry who are granted the right to work in skilled or unskilled sectors and foreign nationals enrolled in the industrial training and technical internship programs in the private and public sectors authorized by the Japanese government. The training system allows a foreign national to remain in Japan for three years, the first year of which is spent on language study and the remaining years for on-the-job training. The number of foreign nationals registered as trainees stood at 44,464 in 2003, but it grew annually and reached 88,086 in 2007, the vast majority of them being Chinese citizens (Table 2). There are clearly upward trends in the number of industrial trainees for all main nationalities and places of origin.

Table 2. Foreign Nationals Registered in Japan as "Trainees" by Nationality/Place of Origin 2007 Nationality/Origin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 % Total 44,464 54,317 54,107 70,519 88,086 100.0 China 30,763 40,136 40,539 52,901 66,576 75.6 Vietnam 3,528 3,491 3,380 5,148 6,704 7.6 Indonesia 4,234 4,189 3,440 4,407 5,069 5.8 Philippines 2,689 2,888 2,906 3,738 4,919 5.6 Thailand 1,314 1,566 1,692 2,121 2,583 2.9 Other 1,936 2,047 2,150 2,204 2,235 2.5 Source: Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan, Tokyo: Japan Immigration Association, 2008, p. 19.

The aging population and labor shortage in nursing and health care professions in Japan have forced Japan to open up employment opportunities for foreign nationals in these sectors, but the planned scale of such opportunities is quite small. In 2006, Japan and the

28 Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu, p. 7. 29 Nippon Keidanren, "Recommendations on Accepting Non-Japanese Workers," http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2004/029.html (accessed April 28, 2008). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Philippines concluded an economic partnership agreement (EPA) whereby Japan would accept 400 nurses and 600 caregivers from the Philippines. The program requires that nurses and caregivers receive Japanese language training and pass licensing exams in Japanese to be allowed to work in Japan three and four years, respectively. Japan concluded a similar agreement with Indonesia in 2007. According to this EPA, Japan was to admit 400 Indonesian nurses and 600 caregivers in two years, with the Indonesian nationals required to undertake language training and licensing exams in Japanese. Once certified, Filipino nurses and caregivers would be eligible to work in Japan for three and four years, respectively.30 A more sweeping immigration reform is unlikely anytime soon. A report from the Prime Minister‟s Commission on Japan‟s Goals in the 21st Century said that in order to compete in the future and increase its global stature, Japan must implement social changes and increase immigration. It calls for "a more explicit immigration and permanent residence system so as to encourage foreigners who can be expected to contribute to the development of Japanese society to move in and possibly take up permanent residence here.”31 Despite such official reports, the government„s actual response to the growing demand for unskilled foreign labor in the private sector has been slow and timid. There are currently three proposals on the table. A Justice Ministry proposal would allow a temporary 3-year work visa for unskilled and semi-skilled foreign nationals to undertake industrial and technical training. There would be no Japanese language requirement for them, but their visas would be nonrenewable. A Health Ministry proposal would provide on-the-job training to foreign nationals for three years and their visa would be renewable for an additional two years. To apply for extension, however, the foreign nationals would have to return home after the first three years. Finally, a proposal by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) envisages continuation of the current restrictive training regime but would allow foreign trainees to return to Japan for two years in certain labor sectors if they satisfied some conditions. Clearly, none of these proposals would be sufficient to meet the growing corporate demand for unskilled labor in Japan.

IMMIGRATION REFORM: FORCES OF CHANGE AND FORCES OF RESISTANCE

In 2008, a group of Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers, led by former LDP Secretary General Hidenao Nakagawa, recommended an overhaul of the nation‟s immigration system to increase the foreign population to 10 million, or about 10 percent of

30 David Adam Stott, “The Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership: Agreement between Equals?” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, http://www.japanfocus.org/-David_Adam-Stott/2818 (accessed February 7, 2010). 31 Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 50. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Japan‟s population, in 50 years. 32 While not particularly surprising by international standards, the proposal was remarkable for Japan with its long-established aversion to liberal immigration policy. The plan also called for changes to the resident registration law to allow children born in Japan to foreign parents to obtain Japanese citizenship. The current Nationality Law stipulates that one of the parents must be Japanese and that the parents must be legally married for their children to become Japanese citizens. The proposal envisaged the establishment of an Immigration Agency to ensure an integrated immigration regime encompassing multiple government agencies. The plan additionally called for extending the maximum term of student and working visas from the current three years to five years, making permanent resident status easier to obtain, and establishing more Japanese language and culture centers abroad and outlawing racism. The lawmakers also proposed the dismantlement of the foreign trainee program, which had become a means of employing foreign nationals as cheap labor, and to replace it with a job-training program for foreigners. Moreover, the proposal called for establishing a basic immigration law and a basic law on social integration of immigrants in Japan. It also called for the promotion of multicultural coexistence ordinance at the local level.33 Enactment of the proposed legislative reform would have brought about a sweeping reform to the nation‟s immigration system. However, the LDP‟s historic defeat in the general elections in August 2009 dashed any hope of drastic immigration reform in the foreseeable future. However, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which enjoys a simple majority in the House of Councilors (the upper house of Japanese Parliament) and which leads the coalition government headed by DPJ President Yukio Hatoyama, is currently considering proposing an important amendment to the Immigration Law. The change under consideration would give permanent residents of Japan of foreign nationalities the right to vote in local elections. The proposal would give local-level suffrage to both general and special permanent residents of Japan but for the time being the right to vote would be limited to the nationals of the countries with which Japan has diplomatic relations; therefore, North Korean residents in Japan would be excluded. The proposal cautions against seeking a reciprocal arrangement for Japanese citizens living in the countries that would be affected by the proposal as a condition for granting suffrage to their citizens permanently resident in Japan. According to the proposal, suffrage would be limited to the chiefs and assembly members of prefectures and municipalities (cities, towns, and villages). The proposal is also cautious about granting the right to foreign nationals to stand for public elections. It does not include national-level elections, recalls, or formulation of ordinances. Nor does it call for granting foreign nationals the right to serve in official public positions (koshoku). The

32 Jiyuminshuto Gaikoku Jinzai Koryu Suishin Giin Renmei, "Jinzai kaikoku! Nihongata imin seisaku e no teigen” (Open Door in Human Resources! Proposal for a Japanese-style Immigration Policy), June 12, 2008. 33 Ibid. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. proposal adds that the right to vote should not be imposed but left to the judgment and choice of the persons concerned. It is reported that Prime Minister Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa support the proposed change, but the Cabinet has not reached consensus on the issue. Unanimity among the Cabinet ministers is necessary to introduce a bill to Parliament. The DPJ must secure the agreement of its coalition partners, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the People‟s New Party (PNP), but the head of the PNP and Financial Services Minister Shizuka Kamei has publicly stated his opposition to the change being considered. He warns that granting permanent foreign residents the right to vote could incite a nationalist backlash during polling times and argues that those who want to vote in elections should be naturalized.34 The right of foreign nationals to vote in public elections has been a long-held demand of the special permanent residents in the country, most of whom are of Korean ancestry and nationality. It should be added, however, that even among foreign permanent residents, there is reluctance to push the suffrage issue. 35 Special permanent residents holding Korean citizenship numbered 416,309 persons in 2008, comprising about half of all permanent foreign residents in Japan, while there were 2,892 Chinese citizens with the special permanent resident status.36 The issue of foreign suffrage in Japan is not only a domestic issue. It is as important as a foreign policy issue. The most recent expression of the Korean demand for suffrage for its citizens who are permanently resident in Japan came on the occasion of Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada‟s meeting with South Korean Foreign and Trade Minister Yu Myung Hwan in February 2010. Yu reiterated the hope that Japan would grant local- level suffrage to permanent foreign residents in Japan.37 Several local assemblies have also expressed opposition to the granting of suffrage to foreign nationals in Japan. A recent Asahi Shimbun survey of prefectural governors indicated very cautious attitudes on this issue.38 They reflect a deep-seated belief among the Japanese citizens that the power to govern Japan should belong to Japanese citizens only, that Japan belongs to the Japanese. This seemingly nationalistic attitude reflects the

34 “Foreign Suffrage Can Fuel Nationalism: Kamei,” The Japan Times, online, February 4, 2010, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100204a5.html (accessed February 4, 2010). 35 “Gaikokujin sanseiken wareru iken” (Foreign Nationals‟ Suffrage. Divided Opinion), http://mytown.asahi.com/miyagi/news.php?k_id=04000001002100002 (accessed February 14, 2010). 36E-Stat, Seifu Tokei no Sogo Madoguchi, http://www.estat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001057947 (accessed February 14, 2010). 37 “Seoul Pushes Voting Rights,” The Japan Times online, February 11, 2010 (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100212a2.html (accessed February 12, 2010). 38 “Gaikokujin sanseiken wareru iken” (Foreign Nationals‟ Suffrage. Divided Opinion), http://mytown.asahi.com/miyagi/news.php?k_id=04000001002100002 (accessed February 14, 2010). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. inability of most Japanese to differentiate between nationality (an ethnic and cultural concept) and citizenship (a political and legal concept). The idea that nationality and citizenship are one and the same is a fundamental premise of the national identity of most Japanese. The isolation of Japan from the early 17th century to the mid-19th century, the period known as “Sakoku jidai”, established the insular outlook of Japanese people. The Meiji Restoration consolidated this view in the mid-19th century, after Japan opened its doors to foreign commerce and diplomacy. The “nationalization” of the identity of the people living within Japanese territories was an integral part of the modernization and westernization policies of the Meiji Government that emerged at the end of the isolation period. The establishment of a national parliament, a national army, and a national education system facilitated and was facilitated by the firm establishment of the national identity based on the myth of Japanese as a homogeneous people. In the conception of modern Japan, its territorial, political, legal, and cultural/civilization boundaries were identical. The idea was that the Japanese people were of the same nationality and the same citizenship, spoke the same language, were under the same central government under the same supreme leader (the Emperor), held the same understanding about their origin, and lived in the same territorial space. Once the myth of national homogeneity became officially sanctioned and promoted, it was used to “purify” the imagined national identity, with ugly and devastating consequences for the minority, be it an ethnic minority (e.g., the Ainus and the Okinawans), a political minority, or a social minority (e.g., the Burakumin). When Japan pursued an imperialist, militarist, and expansionist policy from the late 19th to the mid-20th century, it became necessary to make adjustments to the myth of national homogeneity, but the Japanese approach was full of contradictions. Under Japanese control Taiwanese and the Koreans were granted a quasi-Japanese status but never accepted as equal to the Japanese as they were ethnically and culturally not Japanese. While they were forced to “become Japanized” by undergoing Japanese education and adopting Japanese names, mobilized to fight on behalf of the Japanese Empire, and became an integral part of Japan‟s expanded territory and economy, both in gaichi (abroad) and in naichi (homeland), they were never considered full-fledged Japanese citizens with the same rights as the ethnic Japanese. Japan‟s defeat in the Second World War and its postwar democratic reform exposed the contradictions in the Japanese wartime approach, particularly between the Japanese myth of homogeneous nationality and the political and legal requirements of citizenship. The Koreans and the Taiwanese who had been incorporated into Imperial Japan were declared to be not Japanese citizens, and therefore not entitled to the postwar relief measures and welfare benefits that were extended to Japanese citizens. As noted earlier, those Koreans and Taiwanese who decided to stay on in postwar Japan were eventually granted the special permanent resident status with the legal right to employment, social engagement, and cultural activities. However, all manner of discrimination ensued, in employment, Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. marriage, membership in social organizations, and political participation. The local election suffrage being considered by the DPJ-led government now is a response – a long-delayed response – to the recognition that political participation is a necessary step toward full social integration of permanent residents of Japan.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN MIGRANTS

Long-held views and attitudes toward foreign resident populations are difficult to change. The historical background briefly described above continues to influence identity politics among the Japanese in Japan today. This is evident in the discussion about security and public order in the country. An important part of the national identity among the majority Japanese population has been that theirs is a safe and orderly society and that ethnic and cultural homogeneity is necessary for social cohesion, stability, and safety. The latter are often seen as “outsiders”. There has been limited appreciation for multicultural society and little respect for equality between “ethnically pure Japanese,” which is a popular myth, and individuals with foreign or mixed cultural or racial background. The historical and cultural factors explain the strong sensitivity with which the dominant Japanese population view foreign residents and visitors in their country today. The Japanese public is easily alarmed by the media coverage of the illegal presence of foreign residents in Japan and about crimes allegedly committed by foreign nationals. The growth of foreign resident population in Japan has been accompanied by a rise in the number of violations of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law (hereafter Immigration Law). In 2008, the number of foreign nationals against whom removal or deportation orders were issued for violation of this law numbered 39,382, a decline from 56,410 in 2006 and 45,502 in 2007. 39 The vast majority of these cases involved visa overstays (31,045 persons in 2008, including 8,480 deportations). In comparison, the number of illegal entries into the country was small (6,136 persons in 2008). Among the violators of the Immigration Law in 2008, Chinese citizens were the largest group (10,963 PRC citizens and 264 Taiwanese citizens), followed by Filipino citizens (7,847), Korean nationals (4,993), Indonesians (2,284), and Thais (2,020).40 Visa overstayers numbered 100,000 in 1990 but had grown to 207,000 by early 2005. There has been concern that many visa overstayers are committing crimes. The concern prompted the Japanese government to organize a special task force to deal with it in September 2003. 41 The government has been tightening control and stepping up the

39 “Heisei 20-nen ni okeru nyukanho ihanjiken nit suite” (Immigration Law Violations in 2008), Ministry of Justice, Tokyo, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090217-3-1.html (accessed February 12, 2010). 40 Ibid. 41 Author interview with an official of the Ministry of Justice Immigration Control Bureau, Tokyo, August 12, 2008. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. prosecution of visa overstays in recent years. These efforts have been successful in reducing the number of visa overstayers, from 219,418 in 2004 to 113,073 in January 2009. 42 As well, visa overstayers receiving removal or deportation orders have also declined, from 41,175 in 2004, to 31,045 in 2008.43 However, visa-overstay continues an important issue in the country. As of January 2008, 24,198 Korean citizens had overstayed their visas, representing 21.4 percent of the total, followed by Chinese (18,385; 16.3%), Filipinos (17,287; 15.3%), and Thais (6,023; 5.3%).44 Significant numbers of foreign nationals have also been found engaging in unauthorized work, another sour point for xenophobic Japanese. In 2008, 33,471 persons were found in violation in this manner. Chinese nationals led the list of violators (9,583 persons from PRC, 155 from Taiwan, and 20 from other countries), followed by Filipinos (6,083), Koreans (4,077), Indonesians (2,162), Thais (1,694), Vietnamese (1,473), and Sri Lankans (1,278).45 Fortunately, these numbers have been on the decline in recent years.46 The criminality of foreign nationals has also become a popular theme among the anti-foreigner debate in Japan. In 2006, the National Police Agency of Japan identified 47,874 criminal cases involving "foreign nationals" 47 in Japan, the highest level ever recorded in the history of law enforcement in the country. In 2007, the number of cases dropped to 40,128, with Chinese citizens being involved in 35.3% of these cases, followed by Brazilians (11.3%), Turkish citizens (11.2%), and South Koreans (8.9%).48 Some law enforcement officials continue to believe that increases in foreign population in the country will result in increases in crime.49 Crimes committed by Chinese citizens, including members of organized crime, have become a source of xenophobia in Japan. There are two distinct Chinese populations in the country: a community of "old-comers", those who came and established permanent residence before WWII and their descendants; and "new-comers", those who have come to Japan since the opening of China toward the end of the 1970s, particularly since the 1990s. Daily press coverage and annual government reports on crimes committed by Chinese and the pernicious presence of Chinese organized crime in the country have hardened the

42 2009 Immigration Databook, Tokyo: Japan Immigration Association, 2009, p. 51. 43 “Heisei 20-nen ni okeru nyukanho ihan jiken nit suite” (Violations of the Immigration Law in 2008), Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, February 17, 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090217-3- 2.pdf (accessed February 14, 2010). 44 2009 Immigration Databook, Tokyo: Japan Immigration Association, 2009, pp. 49 and 51. 45 “Heisei 20-nen ni okeru nyukanho ihan jiken nit suite” (Violations of the Immigration Law in 2008), Homusho Nyukokukanrikyoku, February 17, 2009, http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090217-3- 1.html (accessed February 14, 2010). 46 2009 Immigration Databook, Tokyo: Japan Immigration Association, 2009, p. 43. 47 The report defines "foreign nationals" as citizens of foreign countries excluding permanent residents of Japan and US military personnel." These foreign nationals are called "rainichi gaikokujin," literally meaning "foreigners who are visiting Japan." 48 Statistics provided to the authors by an official of the National Police Agency, August 12, 2008. 49 Author interview with an official of the National Police Agency, Tokyo, August 12, 2008. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. xenophobic sentiment among some Japanese and been exploited by right-wing nationalists for their anti-Chinese political agenda. Another problem related to Chinese citizens in Japan involves the exploitation of unskilled Chinese trainees and interns in Japanese companies. Many cases have been reported of Japanese medium and small companies using the Chinese as cheap labor under the guise of "training".50 This has attracted the attention of human rights advocates in the country, and the Japanese government has begun to crack down on the abuse of this system by the employers and the unskilled foreign workers who would otherwise be unable to enter the lob market in the country. Also, as we noted above, some politicians are calling for scrapping the foreign trainee system to avoid its abuse by both employers and trainees. Comments by some public figures have added to the public frenzy about Chinese crimes in Japan. For example, Governor of Tokyo Shintaro Ishihara is known for his anti- Chinese views. On November 24, 1999, in a meeting with the chief of the National Police Agency Ishihara stated, "There are extremely large numbers of crimes committed by Chinese who are illegally in Japan. I don't know how the Chinese government understands this, but rather than extending economic aid to the country that makes nuclear bombs, [Japan] should spend it on public safety in Japan and anti-Chinese criminal measures."51 He is also quoted as saying, "About 600 out of the approximately 3,000 persons in jails in Tokyo are foreign nationals, and almost all of them are Chinese."52 As crimes committed by foreigners in Japan receive growing public scrutiny, calls have mounted for a more aggressive policy to restore public safety, stricter control of foreign migration into Japan, and even closer monitoring of foreign nationals in the country. A growing portion of the Japanese public fears a loss of public safety in their community. For example, a 2004 public opinion survey indicated that 18.8% of the respondents believed that public safety in their community had deteriorated, an increase of over 8% since 2002. As for the respondents' sense of public safety in Japan as a whole, as many as 75.4% said the nation's public safety situation had worsened, with only 16.9% saying the situation had improved.53

THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REGIME

Japan has no comprehensive immigration policy and provides many side-door and back-door avenues to accommodate foreign labor needs. The immigration policymaking

50 See, for example, Dojiong Zha, "Chinese Migrants in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Niigata," in Akaha and Vassilieva, ed., Crossing National Borders, pp. 120-140. 51 "'Gaikokujin hanzai no taihan wa chugokujin' no osoroshii genjitsu" (The Fearful Fact That "A Majority of Foreigners' Crimes Are by Chinese"), Themes, March 2001, p. 118. 52 Ibid. 53 Fumio Mugishima and Noriyuki Nagafusa, "Hanzai ni taisuru fuankan nado ni kansuru chosa kenkyu" (A Survey Research concerning Sense of Fear toward Crimes), pp. 11-12. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. process in Japan has been described as a “policy mix,” at times involving 17 different ministries and government agencies. At times, immigration policies have been determined by competition between ministries. Neither the Prime Minister‟s Office nor political parties have been key figures in shaping immigration policies. Instead, they have formed informal committees and study groups.54 The current immigration system is based on the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Originally enacted in 1952, the law provides the basic framework of immigration policy in postwar Japan. Another important part of the immigration system is the Nationality Law. This law is not designed to facilitate but rather to restrict the acquisition of Japanese nationality by resident foreigners through naturalization. Citizenship is generally granted on a case-by-case basis. This means that many Japanese born Koreans do not naturalize.55 Finally, the alien registration system is used to monitor and control foreigners in the country by requiring every foreign national staying in Japan 90 days or longer to register with their local government and to report a change of residence in a timely manner. In 1989, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was revised in response to the growing cross-border population movements and the sharp rise in the number of visa overstayers mentioned earlier. This Act established 28 categories for legal residence and 14 for legal employment.56 Further immigration reforms, such as the 7th and 8th Basic Employment Measures Plan from 1992 and 1995 and the Economic Plan for Structural Reform of the Economy and Society (1995), have basically maintained and reaffirmed the previous restrictive policies. 57 The revised system confirmed the basic principle of not accepting "unskilled" foreign labor and introduced employer sanctions to discourage "illegal" employment of de facto "unskilled" labor, targeted at the trainee system and the Nikkeijin population (foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry). Besides officially rejecting the unskilled, the other cornerstone of Japanese immigration policy has been to limit the stay of migrants and assuring their return to home countries after 2-3 years.58 The current policy admits foreigners only for a restricted length of time and accepts only technically specialized workers and semi-skilled technicians. Visas can be given for up to three years but immigration authorities are hesitant to give them for that long. Seventy-five percent of workers receive visas lasting six months to one

54 Michael Weiner, “Japan in the Age of Migration,” in Mike Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts, eds., Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 59. 55 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton, “Reinventing Japan: Immigration‟s Role in Shaping Japan‟s Future,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 45. 56 Ibid, p. 60. 57 Ibid, p. 61. 58 Katsuko Terasawa, “Labor Law, Civil Law, Immigration Law and the Reality of Migrants and Their Children” in Douglass and Roberts, p. 218. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. year. Even the foreign spouse of a Japanese citizen with a spousal visa is given a limited term employment contract, usually for six months to one year.59 Japan has no system of accepting foreigners as permanent residents at the time of initial entry.60 The immigration control regime establishes the status of residence system for foreign nationals legally entering and residing in Japan, deportation procedures for foreign nationals who commit crimes in Japan, and procedures for the recognition of refugees in fulfillment of the country's legal obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which Japan ratified in 1981. The residence status of foreign nationals in Japan is classified into the following categories: (1) diplomat, official, professor, artist, religious activities, journalist: eligible for employment without landing permit; (2) investor/business manager, legal/accounting services, medical services, researcher, instructor, engineer, specialist in Humanities, intra- company transferee, entertainer, skilled labor: qualified for employment but subject to landing permission standards; (3) cultural activities and temporary visitor: not permitted to work, not subject to landing permission standards; (4) college student, trainee, and dependent: not permitted to work, subject to landing permission standards; (5) designated activities: permitted to work depending on the nature of the activity; and, (6) permanent resident, spouse or child of Japanese national, spouse or child of permanent resident, and long-term resident: permitted to work. The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act provides for deportation procedures, which include examination by an immigration inspector, a hearing by a special inquiry officer, which may result in the filing of an objection by a foreign national who has been ordered for deportation, and the Minister of Justice's decision on the objection and, if the objection is denied, the ministry's order of deportation. The Japanese refugee system has been very restrictive. The first refugee cases were those of Indo-Chinese refugees in the 1970s and only a few of them resettled in Japan. Japan signed the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1981 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1982. Japan's restrictive application of domestic and international law resulted in the very small number of asylum seekers receiving refugee status in the country. Between 1982 and 1997, out of 1,570 applicants, only 211 were granted refugee status. Since 1998, the number of recognized refugees has ranged between 16 (in 1999) and 26 (in 2001). By 2004, Japan had approved only 330 cases out of 3,544 applications. The number of applications has also been declining in recent years, with 41 individuals out of 816 applicants in 2007 receiving refugee status. Another immigration issue that is attracting growing attention is trafficking in persons. For long Japan's response to this problem was quite passive and ineffective,

59 Terasawa, p. 222. 60 Hiroaki Miyoshi, “Policy Problems Relating to Labour Migration Control in Japan” in Roger Goodman, Ceri Peach, Ayumi Takenaka and Paul White, eds., Global Japan: The Experience of Japan‟s New Immigrant and Overseas Communities, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 57. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. despite the mounting criticism inside Japan and outside that large numbers of foreign nationals, particularly women, were being trafficked to Japan and that in many of these cases Japanese and foreign organized crime was involved. In December 2002, Japan signed the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children and ratified the Protocol in June 2005. The U.S. Department of State's "Trafficking in Persons Report" in 2005 placed Japan on the “Tier 2 Watch List,” highlighting the nation's inadequate efforts to crack down on this heinous crime. In response, Japan amended its Penal Code in 2005 and established human trafficking as a crime. Additionally, an Anonymous Reporting Line was created whereby an informant can report suspected trafficking activities to authorities other than the police and receive a cash reward.61 The latest statistics show that Japan protected 43 women victims of human trafficking in 2007, including one Japanese.62 Human trafficking involving Japan is an international phenomenon that also involves several other countries in the region. In view of this, Japan is stepping up its international cooperation. Japan has also begun to crack down on the abuse of the "entertainer" visa. "Entertainer" is defined as someone employed in "activities to engage in theatrical performances, musical performances, sports or any other form of show business." 63 This visa category has been notorious as a side-door channel for human smuggling and trafficking to Japan, including for prostitution, mostly at the hands of foreign and Japanese criminal organizations. This visa category was first revised in February 2005 and again in March 2006. During the revision process, officials from the Ministry of Justice visited each agent using entertainment visas to verify the legitimate use of the visas. Those in violation were blacklisted from applying for entertainment visas in the future.64 Figure 2 shows trends in the number of human trafficking cases in terms of the number of arrests, persons arrested, and victims. Until 2005, all numbers increased but since then they have declined. It is unclear whether the actual number of human trafficking cases has also declined, since many cases are likely to remain beyond the control of the law enforcement authorities. Government officials acknowledge that they are unable to fully assess the human trafficking situation due to inadequate staff and resources dedicated to this problem, and appeal to the public to bring information to their attention about suspected trafficking cases.65

61 Mr. Goto, interview by authors, Tokyo, Japan, August 12, 2008. 62 Ibid. 63 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Appended Table 1. 64 Author interview with an official of the Ministry of Justice, Tokyo, August 12, 2008. 65 Author interview with an official of the National Police Agency, Tokyo, August 12, 2008. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Figure 2. Trends in the Number of Human Trafficking Arrests and Victims in Japan, 2001-2007

Source: Constructed from data on National Police Agency website, http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/index.htm (accessed July 15, 2008)

Figure 3 shows the trends in human trafficking victims by nationality in recent years. The number of victims of each the four main nationalities, Columbia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, has declined after reaching their respective peaks in different years.

Source: Constructed from data on National Police Agency website, http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/index.htm (accessed July 15, 2008)

ABSENCE OF INTEGRATION POLICY

Japan does not have a comprehensive integration strategy. In fact, no national integration policy exists.66 The failure at the national level has left integration in the hands of local governments and NGOs, especially in areas with high Nikkeijin populations. 67 Wayne Cornelius commented, “[L]ocal government authorities seem far more willing to accommodate immigrants than their national government counterparts, especially in company towns where the health of local businesses (and therefore the flow of tax revenues) is heavily dependent on the continued availability of foreign labor.”68 On April 1, 2000, the Bill to Adjust Related Laws in Order to Promote Decentralization was passed. This meant

66 Takashi Machimura, “Local Settlement Patterns of Foreign Worker in Greater Tokyo: Growing Diversity and Its Consequences,” in Douglass and Roberts, eds., p. 176. 67 Weiner, p. 59. 68 Quoted in Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 32. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. that prefectural governors and local mayors were no longer considered national government officials and that local government duties were autonomous or legally delegated national government tasks. This legislation reaffirms the trend toward local involvement in immigration issues.69 Japan‟s lack of involvement in integration measures has directly impacted migrants, especially Koreans, Chinese and Nikkeijin. 70 From the early 1980s, zainichi Koreans throughout Japan have protested treatment by the Japanese and today many Koreans in Japan continue face prejudice and discrimination.71 Some of Japans‟ reluctance to engage in the immigration debate is directly linked to the experiences with Koreans. Japan‟s less than welcoming reception to foreign workers has been shaped by unresolved history with Koreans.72 However, modern Japanese society seems to be accommodating, especially to the Chinese, better than in the past. Since the 1970‟s negative attitudes have been declining towards Chinese populations.73 Intermarriage is also growing and intermarried Filipinas in Japan made up 57% (96,552) of spousal or other familial visas in 2002.74 Since 1996, Filipina-Japanese marriages comprised the second largest group of intermarriages after Chinese women to Japanese men according to Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare statistics from 1993-2003.75 The fact that liberalized immigration policies need to accompany integration policies can best be seen with the admission of the Nikkeijin. The 1990 Immigration Control Act created the Nikkeijin program which the Japanese government thought would be a way to expand foreign labor in a culturally safe fashion.76 However, many Japanese do not consider Nikkeijin to be Japanese in any manner except perhaps in phenotype. Culturally and linguistically Nikkeijin are generally not Japanese. Many of them have complained of Japanese discrimination and press reports have shown that children of Nikkeijin are bullied at school. Many Nikkeijin report that Japanese discrimination is covert as opposed to overt; however there was the case of Herculano, a 14 year old Nikkeijin beaten to death by a Japanese gang in Aichi prefecture in 1997.77

69 Ibid, p. 34. 70 Daniela de Carvalho, “Nikkei Communities in Japan,” in Goodman, et al, p. 195. 71 Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak, “Foreigners Are Local Citizens Too: Local Government Respond to International Migration in Japan,” in Douglass and Roberts, p. 263. 72 Papademetriou and Hamilton, pp. 43-44. 73 Tsu Yun Hui, “From Ethnic Ghetto to „Gourmet Republic:‟ The Changing Image of Kobe‟s Chinatown and the Ambiguities of Being Chinese in Modern Japan,” in David Blake Willis and Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, eds., Transcultural Japan: At the Borderlands of Race, Gender, and Identity, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 137. 74 Nobue Suzuki, “Between Two Shores: Transnational Projects and Filipina Wives in/from Japan,” in Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu, p. 69. 75 Ibid. 76 Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 37. 77 Carvalho, p. 198. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Compared to other developed nations, Japan has not embraced multiculturalism and minorities are still pressured to culturally assimilate to avoid discrimination.78 In Japan foreigners tend to be isolated in social enclaves clustered in certain areas. Many migrant workers feel isolated from the Japanese community and usually do not live or work in close proximity to one another. There are few opportunities to make social contact with Japanese and migrant workers may feel like invisible residents in Japan.79 It is hard for foreigners to find housing and even worse for undocumented workers who have no character references and whom landlords often refuse to rent to.80 This isolation is especially true for the children of immigrant workers, particularly for Nikkei children. A survey by the Ministry of Education in 2000 showed the number of students at public elementary and junior high school that needed Japanese language rose from 5,463 in 1991 to 16,835 in 1999. In the case of junior high school students, only 36.2% of children enrolled for three years or more could “generally read” Japanese and 28.7% could “generally write.” Despite these problems with Japanese language, most prefectures do not have any programs aimed at these children.81 Attitudes expressed by government ministries involved in shaping immigration policies often portray foreign labor migrants in a negative light, engendering negative public opinion. For example, the Ministry of Labor has argued that the admission of unskilled workers will lead to an “avalanche” of foreigners who will undermine the Japanese labor market and social cohesion.82 The Ministry of Labor has also publicly supported arguments that as foreigners stay longer, and as families join them, social infrastructure costs (costs for interpreting, housing, education, health and sanitation) will exceed economic benefits of increased migration.83 The fact that the very ministries involved in immigration issues portray immigrants in such a negative light has huge consequences on public opinion and therefore acceptance and integration (or lack thereof) of migrants in Japanese society.

MULTICULTURAL COEXISTENCE MOVEMENT

The presence of foreign-born residents is seen in both urban and rural communities throughout Japan although the density or concentration of their presence varies widely. Their occupations and professions are diverse, including high-tech engineers, white-color office workers, manual laborers, college students, industrial trainees and technical interns, scientists, artists, lawyers, professor and teachers, entertainers, etc. Marriage between

78 Willis and Murphy-Shigematsu, p. 17. 79 Machimura, p. 186. 80 Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 35. 81 Hiroshi Komai, Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan, translated by Jens Wilkinson, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001, pp. 113-114. 82 Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 48. 83 Ibid. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Japanese citizens and foreign nationals has also grown. In earlier decades international marriages involving Japanese were very few and most of them involved Japanese and Korean spouses resident in Japan. In 1965, for example, Japanese marriages accounted for 99.6 percent of all marriages in Japan. In 1981, international marriages stood at one percent of the total number of marriages, but their share grew to 3 percent in 1989, and 5.5 percent in 2004, excluding those living abroad. The nationalities of foreign spouses have become much more diverse, with Korean men‟s share dropping from 80 percent in 1965 to less than 20 percent in 2003 and Filipino men becoming the largest foreign spouse population in Japan by the early 1990s.84 In 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communicates adopted a “Plan for Promoting Multicultural Coexistence in Local Communities” and called on the prefectures and large municipalities to establish guidelines and plans for promoting multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyosei). It is defined as “the coexistence as members of the local community, of people of different nationalities and ethnicities recognizing their cultural differences and striving toward equal relationships.” Many local governments are now developing guidelines and plans toward this goal and some prefectures, such as Miyagi and Shizuoka, have even passed ordinances.85 The ministry‟s plan calls for communication and living assistance to foreign residents, the former having to do with the provision of essential information in various languages and the latter designed to promote foreign residents‟ access to education, medicine, and employment. These efforts are laudable but they are far from adequate in meeting the needs of the foreign nationals resident in Japan permanently or for extended periods of time. For example, as a Japanese observer notes, it takes a minimum of ten years of residence in Japan to obtain the permanent resident status whereas naturalization requires only five years.86 This deprives many foreign nationals who want to retain their citizenship but live in Japan of many rights, including the right to work. There are also foreign nationals who have lived in Japan for ten years or longer but who are in the “irregular resident” status. Many children who have been educated in Japan are also not considered permanent residents.87 Japan‟s Nationality Law requires foreign nationals to give up their current citizenship in order to become naturalized Japanese citizens. The Japanese government is reluctant to consider dual or multiple citizenship. It also restricts the use of Chinese characters in names for people wishing to be naturalized. It poses an obstacle to Korean

84 Sakuma Kosei, “Gaikokujin no kodomo no fushugaku” (School Nonattendance of Foreign Children), Tokyo: Keiseo Shobo, 2008, pp. 14-15. 85 For a recent discussion of the “multicultural coexistence” movement in Japan, see Kondo Atsushi, “Zainichi gaikokujin wo do ukeirete yukunoka_Tabunka-kyosei shakai no kadai to tenbo” (How to Accommodate Foreign Residents in Japan: Agenda and Prospects in a Multicultural- coexistence Society), Gaiko Forum, May 2009, pp 48-51. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. couples who want to obtain Japanese citizenship by not recognizing different sur names for the couple.88 South Americans of Japanese ancestry are also challenging the educational system in Japan. Many children do not have adequate language proficiency to follow class lessons, many of them failing to attend school or dropping out. Although the national and local governments are promoting special Japanese language and other supplemental classes to assist students with language and cultural difficulties, the scale of such programs and the resources dedicated to them are woefully inadequate to cope with the mounting challenges in communities with large numbers of Nikkeijin.89 More fundamentally, the assumption of cultural homogeneity is being challenged by the diverse cultural backgrounds that foreign pupils and students bring into the classroom. Some observers are raising fundamental questions about the purpose and philosophy of public education with respect to the values that schools are expected to nurture among their pupils and students. Is it multicultural integration, which would respect and even promote cultural diversity in the society? Is it cultural assimilation, which assumes that in order to succeed in Japanese society one needs to become culturally Japanese, whatever that means?90 While these debates proceed, discrimination on the basis of citizenship and physical appearance continues – in employment, in housing, in commerce, in education, in social welfare, and in virtually all other aspects of life in Japan.

CONCLUSIONS

Japan‟s postwar immigration policy has largely met the nation‟s desire to limit the ethnic diversification of its population. The government has defined the Japanese as a homogeneous people and by and large the people have long accepted this definition and maintained a sense of national identity based on the myth of cultural homogeneity. However, the immigration policy has failed to meet the nation‟s changing economic needs and demographic challenges, creating labor shortages and cultural and tolerating various forms of discrimination against the growing non-Japanese populations in the country. In reality, despite the restrictive immigration policy of the Japanese government, international migration to Japan, both legal and illegal, has grown and Japan has had to crack down on illegal foreign labor. It is almost certain that international migration to Japan will continue

88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 For discussions on the requirements of multicultural coexistence in the educational system, see Miyajima Takashi, Tomoni ikirareru Nihon e (For a Japan that Enables Coexistence), Tokyo: Yuhikaku , 2003; Tajiri Eizo, Tanaka Hiroshi, Yoshino Tadashi, Yamanishi Yuji, and Yamada Izumi, Gaikokujin no teiju to Nihongo kyoiku (Long-term Settlement of Foreigners and Japanese Language Education), Expanded Edition, Tokyo: Hitsuji Shobo, 2007; and Sakuma Kosei, Gaikokujin no kodomo no fushugaku (School Nonattendance of Foreign Children), Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2008. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. to grow. Therefore, Japan must find a sustainable balance between the political need to limit the ethnic diversity of its population on the one hand and, on the other, the economic need to open its labor market to more non-Japanese workers, in both the skilled and the unskilled sectors. As foreign residents have grown and will continue to grow, however, the government must tend not only to the economic dimension of foreign migrants but also to their impact on Japanese society more broadly. Japan‟s immigration policy has been woefully inadequate in terms of justice and fairness. Until recently there has a highly complacent attitude among the national and local government officials toward the exploitation of foreign workers as cheap labor and even toward undocumented workers.91 By retaining policies that prohibit employment of non- skilled foreign labor, inadequate enforcement, and a legal framework that criminalizes undocumented foreign workers, Japan has created a system that discriminates against and assists in foreign labor exploitation.92 The government‟s approach to the problem has been one-sided; it has tightened border control and cracked down on violators of the Immigration Law one the one hand, but it has been slow in liberalizing the regime for foreign employment. If the principles of good governance are to guide Japan‟s immigration policy, the nation must give due consideration to the following points.  Japan must liberalize its immigration policy, opening its door more widely to foreign nationals who wish to pursue the economic, social, and cultural opportunities the country has to offer.  Japan must open its labor market to foreign workers in order to meet its domestic economic needs. To the extent that a significant part of illegal migration in Japan is a result of the gaping gap between market demand for labor and legal restriction on immigration, the liberalization of labor market will help to reduce the illegal status, vulnerability, and exploitation of many foreign migrant workers in the country.  At the same time, Japan must take effective action to contain the negative consequences of illegal migration, crimes, and other unlawful and socially unacceptable behavior of foreign nationals but the action should be no more or no less rigorous than its law enforcement action against Japanese citizens who violate the nation‟s laws. Failure to take fair action that is both effective and fair will exacerbate the xenophobic sentiment that is already visible in the country.  Japan must protect the human rights of foreign nationals in the country, be they permanent residents, temporary residents, or short-term visitors, and regardless

91 Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 34. 92 Weiner, p. 59. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. of their legal status in Japan. Considering the vulnerability of foreign workers, particularly, Japan must be vigilant against the violation of their human rights.  In view of Japan‟s growing importance in international immigration, the nation should adopt international rules and standards concerning international migration and enforce them without fail.

Japan has joined the following international treaties relevant to the human rights of migrants and other border-crossing individuals:  UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD; adopted in 1965; entered into force in 1969; ratified by 170 as of March 1, 2005);  UN International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR; adopted in 1966; entered into force in 1976; ratified by 154 states as of March 1, 2005);  UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR; adopted in 1966; entered into force in 1976; ratified by 151 states as of March 1, 2005);  UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW; adopted in 1981; not yet in force; ratified by 179 states as of March 1, 2005);  UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC; adopted in 1989; went into force in 1990; ratified by 192 states as of March 1, 2005);  Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Trafficking Protocol; adopted in 2000; entered into force in 2003; ratified by 87 states as of September 4, 2005);  UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention; applied to refugee situations before 1951; adopted in 1950; entered into force in 1954; ratified by 142 states as of March 1, 2005) (Refugee Convention); and,  UN Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol; applied to refugee situations after 1951; adopted in 1967; entered into force in 1967; ratified by 142 states as of March 1, 2005).

However, Japan has not ratified the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW; adopted in 1990; entered into force in 2003; ratified by 27 states as of March 1, 2005). Nor has Japan accepted the ILO Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Convention No. 97; adopted in 1949; entered into force in 1952; ratified by 42 states), ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Convention No. 143; adopted in 1975; entered into

93 Papademetriou and Hamilton, p. 4. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. The Meaning of Transnational Space in Local Community : The Experience of Marriage-Migrant Women in Korea1 (Draft)*

Hwang Jung Mee

HK Research Professor, ARI

INTRODUCTION

The inflow of migrants into Korea has been increased since the late 1980s, and so called foreign residents which include migrant workers, marriage migrants, students and short-term residents amount to more than 1 million, or near 2% of the total population.2 Unlike migrant workers who should go back home when the employment contract expires under the current employment permit system, foreign spouses of Korean husband (and wife) can be seen as „settler type‟ immigrants, because they are eligible for Korean nationality after a certain period of residence and fulfilling some requirements. There has been an influx of Korean-Chinese women since the mid-90s, and then Southeast Asian (Vietnamese, Thai, Filipina) and Mongolian women since the 2000s, which was accelerated by international match-making brokers. Marriage-migrant women and families of cross-border marriages are now subject to increasing attention in the academia and policy circles, for it is widely accepted that they signify the transformation of Korean society from the age-long “one nation, pure blood” state into a “multi-cultural” society. New policies were introduced such as legislation of the Foreigners Treatment Act(2007) and the Multi-cultural Family Support Act(2008), installation of nationwide Multi-cultural Family Support Centers and various service programs for migrants.3

* Please do not quote. 1 Interviews with migrant women quoted in this article were originally a part of joint research which was financially supported by Korean Women‟s Development Institute (KWDI) last year. As a result of that joint research, a policy report (“A Study on Local Community Participation of Immigrants and Supporting Policies for Social Integration in Korea”) was published in 2008. Although referring to the same interview data, my arguments in this article are based on a separate and independent analysis. 2 According to statistics by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, there are 1,106,884 foreign residents (including naturalized and undocumented residents) in Korea as of April 30, 2009, accounting for about 2.2% of the total population (“My Region” under the MOPAS website: www.laiis.go.kr). Meanwhile, statistics by the Ministry of Justice count 1,158,866 foreign residents as of 2008, or 2.34% of the population (Korea Immigration Service under the Ministry of Justice, 2008: 273) 3 The term „multi-cultural family‟ has distinctive meaning in Korean policy. It refers only to the Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Regarding that gender has been regularly sidelined or even omitted in scholarly research on international migration (Pessar and Mahler 2003; Piper, N. 2006), the explosion of cross-border marriage and big policy concerns on marriage migrant women in Korea seems like very extraordinary. Not only Korea but also Taiwan and Japan have also seen a significant increase in international marriages between the native man and other Asian women since the 1980s. According to Kim Hyun Mee(2007: 102), these countries are all promoting international marriages to resolve the problem of declining birth rate by encouraging native men who find themselves in a more inferior position in the marriage market to meet foreign bride. We can find out several different perspectives on migrant women in previous studies which deal with cross-border marriage in Asia. Firstly, these women are regarded as victims of patriarchal familial relations in both sending and receiving countries. There are a lot of stories of poor parents in developing countries who marry off their daughters to wealthier countries and receive remittances to rely on their livelihood. On the other hand, husbands and parents-in-law in the host country would look down on „foreign bride‟ just because they are from under-developed countries, and impose heavy domestic work on them with harsh patriarchal control. Advocates of this perspective strongly emphasize the risk of human rights violations that can occur in the process of international marriage. However, some researchers argue that these women are not so weak and helpless. Women can decide to marry abroad in search of new opportunities, or to free themselves away from the patriarchal familial relations or unhappy marriage and life with no hope. This perspective regards marriage migrant women not as passive victims, but as active adventurers who bravely explore alternative life (Nakamatsu 2003). In reality, the experiences of marriage migrant women are very diverse according to the context of migration. It is important to regard both sides relevantly to maintain a balanced view. Certainly, there is structural hierarchy which admits more power to men from developed countries than women from poorer countries. Racial/ethnic stereotypes and cultural prejudice on „foreign bride‟ still restrict their choice. However, even if they have very small room to maneuver in patriarchal families and also in social relations that discriminate against both migrants and women, they still live as the agent of their own lives, continuously negotiating and choosing to improve their position. It can be described as contradictory position of migrant women (Wang 2007). In this paper, I‟d like to examine migrant women‟s choice and practice in their everyday lives more precisely, with particular focus on transnational practice and local community. Notwithstanding that transnationalism is one of booming concepts among migration studies (Faist, 2002; Guarnizo et. Al., 2003; Levitt et. Al.,2003; Itzigsohn and

family composed of Korean and foreign spouses (and their children of mixed background). According to Kim Hyun Mee(2007), “the concept of „multicultural families‟ is appropriated by the Korean government, which does not recognize the different cultural backgrounds and aspiration of migrant women.” Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Saucedo 2002), transnational aspects of marriage migration have rarely analyzed or discussed. There could be two reasons. First, most of the studies on marriage migration, especially policy related studies, tend to concentrate on whether marriage-migrant women can be successfully assimilated and incorporated in new family relation as wives and mothers. This is an important point of interest, but we cannot underestimate the fact that these women‟s relation with home country will continue and increase further transnational networks. On the other hand, recent migration studies which focus more on transnational aspects such as transnational trade network and political influence of immigrants on their home country do not leave much space for women. It can be explained that women usually have less resources in economic and political sector so cannot play an important role in expanding economic exchanges between their home country and host country, or heighten their political voice in the host country while exerting a certain amount of influence in the political situation back home transnational business. However, this approach tends to ignore cultural and subjective dimensions of transnational relations. This study starts from the assumption that marriage-migrant women in Korea are also agents of transnational practices. Based on the in-depth interviews with 30 migrant women, I‟d like to analyze the types and contents of transnational practice and their potential in local community context. Hereinafter this paper is structured in three main parts. The next chapter presents a brief reviews on theoretical background and major concepts. In the next part, analysis of in-depth interviews is presented in three parts: marriage migrant women‟s ties with their home country; networks with other migrants in Korea; and their own sense of belonging and perceptions of their national identity. The last chapter presents the theoretical significance of the marriage migrant women‟s transnational practices, policy implications and future research topics.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

1) Transnational migration and transnational practices The mainstream of international migration in the late 20th century can be categorized as following three types: permanent settlement, temporary labor migration, and asylum seeking (refugee). However, the tendencies of the last two decades have been towards a diversification, proliferation and intermingling between above three types. All forms of migration have become closely linked and interdependent. Permanent and temporary migration cannot be clearly separated and tend to stimulate each (Castle 2002: 1151-3). Scholars are newly focusing on migration as a transnational phenomenon. It is no longer a one-way relocation of leaving one‟s home country and settling down in the host country, so the frame of “emigration-immigration-assimilation” does not explain all of migration phenomenon. . In other words, there is now a clear trend of research where migration is viewed from the light of “transnational migration” (Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003). Immigrants redefine but not break their ties to their country of origin, and Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. they create a multiplicity of ties in different areas of social action that transcend national barriers In a similar context, Faist (Faist, T. 2000) focuses on the transnational social space that is recently emerging in international migration. He differentiates between “transnational kinship,” “transnational circuit” and “transnational community” based on the type of resources being exchanged in the transnational space, and the principles under which relations are maintained. Transnational kinship is where the migrant maintains his/her relations with the family back home, sending remittances and exchanging visits. Transnational circuit goes beyond family relations, with the migrant cooperating with other migrants from the same country and exchanging mutual benefits as “insiders.” Transnational community goes a step further, where they form a sense of homogeneity and symbolic solidarity as one ethnicity. . Although there is a growing body of research and discussions on the transnational network and practices of migrants, that does not necessarily mean that there is a clear consensus on definition and significance of transnational practice. In fact, as the context and background of migration is very diverse, the transnational practice of immigrants would take shape in different ways depending on their social, economic and cultural circumstances. Levitt et al.(2003) argue that transnational migration is broadening the horizon of migration studies in general, and outline several theoretical points (Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003)4. Transnational migration is embedded in a multi-layered social field, and their lives must be studied within the context of these multiple strata. Individuals‟ transnational experiences must be understood with reference to their families and household, their participation in political, religious and community organizations, and their relation to the national and international policy regimes within which transnational activities take place. They also point out that the aspects of migrant‟s lives that were largely ignored by much of the early transnational migration scholarship such as religion and gender ought to be taken into account. Much of transnational political and economic life involves observable actions, such as investing or voting, which can be easily measured and interpreted. But religious and family life tends to be more subjective, involving imagination, invention, and emotions that are deeply felt but not overtly expressed. These aspects of transnational lives are more difficult to capture but, nevertheless, critical for the emergence of transnational identities and landscape. Transnational practices cover all spheres of social action. They can be separated, for analytical purposes, on three different fields of social action: economic, political and sociocultural (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999). Sociocultural transnationalism concerns the emergence of practices of sociability, mutual help, and public rituals rooted in the

4 Levitt et al. lists a total of 9 assumptions, but only the ones relevant to the discussion in this paper are introduced here. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. cultural understandings that pertain to the sense of belonging and social obligations of immigrants (Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002: 768). Considering these discussions, it is important and necessary to expand research concerns about marriage migrant women into transnational practices of multiple social fields. If previous researches emphasize the role of marriage migrant women as wives, mothers, and daughters-in law in Korean family, it is worth exploring transnational dimensions of their everyday life that are not overtly expressed. In this article, I‟d like to look into sociocultural transnationalism of these women; for example, their ties with country of origin, relation with other immigrants and concerns of immigrant community, and their identity and cultural values.

2) Research questions and methods This study proposes three research questions in observing the transnational practices of marriage migrant women and interpreting their meaning in Korean context. First, what kind of relationship do they maintain with country of origin after their migration into Korea, and what does such relationship mean to them? Second, what type of relations do they have with other immigrants in Korea? In particular, what are the differences, if any, between their relations with migrants from the same country and from different countries? Third, what do they think about their own national identity, what kind of meaning to they subjectively ascribe to their “self” as they stand between home country and Korea? To answer these questions, in-depth interviews were conducted with 30 marriage migrant women. The interviewees were contacted through several Multi-cultural family support centers and NGOs which are running community programs and services for migrants in different regions. Most of the interviewees are participating in education programs for migrant women and/or civic activities, and some of them are active in their community activity.5 Interviews were conducted from August to September 2010 by the researchers visiting each region. By home country, there were 10 cases from China, 7 from Vietnam, 5 from the Philippines, 4 from Japan, and 1 each from Thailand, Cambodia, Russia and Mongolia. The age group was quite diverse, from the 20s to 50s. The period of residence in Korea was also widely distributed, from 2 years to 30, with about half the women with 10 or longer years. The interviewees were marked by a considerably high level of education, and relatively few of them met their husbands through match-making agencies. Most of the women were fluent enough to conduct the interview in Korean, with experience in multi-cultural education, counselor interviews and Korean language education. Many of them were actively involved in different activities such as interpretation, multi-cultural lecturers, native language teachers, and migrants‟ self-help groups.

shows the interviews‟ demographics.

5 Because of this sampling method, there is a possibility of over-representation by marriage migrant women participating in the support centers or NGOs. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Table.1 Category No. of Cases % Total 30 100.0 Large cities 33.3 10 Regional size Small/medium cities 30.0 911 Counties (Eup / Myeon) 36.7 20 ∼ 29 5 16.7 30 ∼ 39 17 56.7 Age 40 ∼ 49 7 23.3 50 or older 1 3.3

China 10 33.3 Japan 4 13.3 Vietnam 7 23.3 Philippines 5 16.7 Home country Thailand 1 3.3 Cambodia 1 3.3 Russia 1 3.3 Mongolia 1 3.3

High school or lower 9 30.0 Education Dropped out of college (incl. 2-year colleges) 7 23.3 (in home College (incl. 2-year colleges) 11 36.7 country) Graduate school or higher 2 6.7 No response 1 3.3 None 4 13.3 1 7 23.3 No. of children* 2 14 46.7 3 or more 5 16.7 5 years or less 5 16.7 Period of 6-10 years 11 36.7 residence in 11-15 years 10 33.3 Korea 16 years or longer 4 13.3 No. of children: If the respondent is re-married, the number includes both her birth children and children under her care.

TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MARRIAGE MIGRANT WOMEN

1) Ties with the country of origin Most of interviewees maintain their ties with their family in the home country. Many were sending remittances, visiting home regularly or having their parents visit them. In some cases, they directly and indirectly lead family members - parents, brothers, sisters and aunts – and friends to come to Korea for employment, study, and international marriage. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Although family reunion for immigrants is generally not permitted in Korea, the tendency of chain migration can be observed in some cases. One Vietnamese woman had her younger brother in employment in Korea.

“My brother came to Korea to work. He was studying in college and came here to earn money. He‟s now working in a factory in Busan. My mom and dad are having a rough time now. A lot of debts, you know. So he says he‟ll work for maybe 5 years, pay off the debt, save some money and go back home, open a shop or learn some skills and keep working.” (Case 21, age 24, from Vietnam)

Such series of migrations are more common among Korean-Chinese people, for current policy is more generous to ethnic Koreans. One Korean-Chinese woman who has stable job as language instructor tells us that she brought her mother in Korea to live together. Most of interviewees send remittances to their families back home even if they were not very well off. One Filipina woman who immigrated into Korea 30 years ago, is still sending college tuitions for her nephew and niece in Philippines. Not only affection to family but also philanthropic motives to help their home country can be observed in several cases. One woman from China is sending school tuition fees for poor children in her home town who had no family relations with her. And members of Filipina community group once collected money to help an orphanage in their home country.

“When I was in China, I sent about 500,000 Korean won a year as tuition for 5 students in Liaoning Province who had no parents. I kept it up even after coming to Korea. Not for a special reason but because I get a sense of fulfillment and I feel like I‟m helping myself too.” (Case 1, China)

These interviews show that many women have emotional ties and continuous affections with the country of origin (long) after their migration, and those transnational relations are not confined to family relations but include philanthropic motives. Itzigsohn and Saucedo(2002) defines these transnational practices as „linear transnationalism‟, for these are basically continuation of the ties that link immigrants to their families and place of origin. There is also more strategic approach to utilize linkages with the home country for their children‟s education. While worrying about possible discrimination against their children due to their mixed ethnic background, they define their own education strategy, such as developing bilingual skills or using their family network to their advantage. In particular, several women from China and Japan are planning to send their children to their parents‟ for primary school education or advanced language education.

“I have a daughter and I think she should be good in English, Chinese and Korean, those three languages. Because business is becoming more global so I think foreign languages will be more important than anything. But I‟m not teaching her Chinese yet. Don‟t want her to mix up Korean and Chinese. She can later go to high school in China. There will be many ways, because I have a brother in China, and my parents too.” (Case 11, from China/ Korean-Chinese)

One interviewee from China believes that her children need international experience to overcome discrimination against mixed-blood in Korea and to learn mature and generous attitude to ethnic difference.

“People come to Korea thinking it‟s a dream land. Me, other women, I‟m sure they all thought that. But once you‟re here, Koreans discriminate you just because you are from China, Thai, and so on, even though they (Koreans) do not know much about those countries... I think people need to travel a lot, experience a lot, to get more balanced attitude toward foreigners. So when my children reach 10, I want them to travel to different places, to China or other countries. If not, they will just be „toads in a well‟.” (Case 4, from China)

It can be said that linear transnationalism or transnational practices to maintain linkages with the country of origin are prevalent among marriage migrant women in Korea, relying on these interviews. These transnational practices will spread widely and become even more brisk as the children of marriage migrant women, that is, the 2nd generation immigrants grow up. On the one hand, it depends on resources they have, because financial constraints could limit opportunities for transnational exposure that they wish for their children and themselves. But on the other hand, transnational ties would provide alternative opportunities to cope with lack of resources or discrimination in Korea. Linkages between the migrant women and country of origin are likely to consist and expected to derive additional transnational practices and new strategy to utilize their international network in the future.

2) Community-building among migrant women ① Informal gatherings of migrant women: uni-national and multi-national

Most interviewees professed that they were isolated and closed off at home in early period of immigration. Lacking Korean skills, they felt hard to communicate with their Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. husband let alone friends or neighbors. These women find decisive chances to be out of such isolation from social gatherings with other migrant women in similar situations. Some women built online chat rooms for intimate relations between migrant women, and other women visited church, village office, Multicultural Family Support Centers, and civil organization which provide various support and education programs for migrants. Among various types of relation and network, I‟d like to divide some groups composed of same nationals and other groups building multi-national friendships. The uni-national groups usually start out as informal social gatherings. It is usually a group of 5-10 women from the same country getting together regularly to cook their native food and share their life stories, concerns, and talks of their children. Most of the interviewees were participating in such informal social meetings.

“Meeting Filipina friends, just talking, and helping each other if they have some problems or difficulties, and if they‟re living with sick mother-in-law, we say „hey, cheer up!‟... After church on Sunday they come to my place and we cook Philippine food, and we usually meet on birthdays, too.” (Case 9, age 36, from Philippines)

Meanwhile, some would initiate their own community using the Internet. One woman from Japan started an online community out of wish to meet friends from the same country.

“I wanted to meet other Japanese, so I opened the [Internet] chat room, and that‟s how we met. I made it in 2002, and now there are about 40 members...You can‟t tell who‟s Japanese by appearance alone. There was only the Internet to turn to, so I thought I should open a chat room there. When we get together we chat, save money together, go to different places, eat together. About once a month.” (Case 23, age 24, Japanese)

There are even meetings together with husbands. Korean husbands wishing to help their wives adjust to life in Korea opened Internet chat rooms, organizing meetings of international couples.

“First there was the Korean-Vietnam family meetings that my husband found out on the Internet. So the Vietnamese friends and their husbands would meet once a week, but now that I‟m working [and don‟t have enough time] it‟s only about once a month. Usually it‟s around 10 families. Some friends who just came from Vietnam don‟t know about Korea so we tell them what it‟s like here.” (Case 21, age 24, Vietnam)

“This Vietnamese friend, she didn‟t speak Korean and asked for help. I got to know her through another friend, and she was in Korea for only a month and her husband was saying he couldn‟t live with her, that he would divorce her and send her back to Vietnam. So I told her „It‟s your husband‟s fault, you can stay here,‟ that‟s all I said...And 2 years later that man, he met my husband in the online chat room and got angry with him, saying „Your wife said this and that to my [former] wife,‟ which was so maddening. That man gave her some money and sent her back to Vietnam and married another Vietnamese...Things like that are really upsetting.” (Case 21, age 24, Vietnam)

Interestingly, many migrant women maintain close friendship with women from not only their own country but also from different countries. In such multi-national gatherings, language can be a barrier and sometimes they would “gesture with hands and feet” to communicate, but often they become better friends than those from the same country. They say they can be close friends because they meet “heart to heart” and that language is not such a big problem. (Case 1)

“I go to this meeting with other migrant women once every two months. They‟re personal friends, or neighbors, from China, Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. When we get together we just talk about what happened in between, about our children, husband, our arguments...And it‟s so much fun. The „unnis‟ (friendly term for “older sisters” or “older female friends”) from Japan, they really can‟t pronounce [Korean]. Those unnis are all older, in their early or mid-40s, but the Vietnamese friends are all in their early 20s. So there‟s this 20-year age gap, right. If we don‟t understand their Korean pronunciation, we say, „Unni, unni, what are you trying to say?‟ So I would try English and that doesn‟t work. I learned British English in China. Here [in Korea] they speak American English so the pronunciation is somewhat different, but the Japanese unnis, they are [their English pronunciation is] even more so [worse]. We tease them, „Unni, what‟s this? Say it again,‟ and they get shy and say no (laughs).” (Case 2, age 38, from China)

“When I meet other migrant women, I feel at ease. It doesn‟t matter where [which country] they‟re from, I feel more at ease and we just click better. I think, living in Korea, we become alike in certain ways without intention. Like caring about your children‟s education, planning for their future schools, your plans for the future, and we also talk a lot about our job. We just share a lot and connect very well.” (Case 14, age 34, from China)

② Building a network of relations and migrants’ community Informal meeting of migrant women to eat and chat together are sometimes transformed into more intentional grouping with a common purpose. In the process of this transformation, individual women who have stable job and financial resource usually take important roles, for example, providing values and aims of their meeting, recruiting members suitable to their purpose, and mobilize financial resources and supports from Korean civil society. During the interviews, we can examine interesting cases of women to initiate migrants‟ community composed of women with multiple backgrounds, as well as groups based on the same country of origin. Case 17 woman is actively participating in a self-help group of Filipina women. She explained the motives and process of their group like this;

“We got together by chance on our children‟s birthdays. One day someone said, why don‟t we make a group, let‟s do it! And it‟s been 4 years now. We wanted to start an English instructor training program for our job, and that was our first project. Then someone said we could apply to the project of a supporting center located in Ansan city. So we prepared for that and did some paper works, then we got it, the English instructor training for about 8 weeks... Our recent project was multicultural street festival held in Incheon city last June. We had cultural performance at that festival, and our children also made a group and took part in performancse such as theater, psycho-dramas, and singing group...They‟ve become quite close, helping each other, becoming better friends ...you know.” (Case 17, age 58, from Philippines)

“I am running a group called Rainbow House. It‟s where we teach our children. We can‟t afford to send our children to private academies. So I was thinking about how our children can do better in Korea and not fall behind Korean students, and how we can take advantage of the mothers‟ strengths and make their lives in Korea better. So the mothers teach foreign languages to the students, Chinese on Monday, Japanese on Wednesday. But what we do most is reading, to have them read a lot of books. We have 5 regular members, from China, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, and about 30 non-regular members. It‟s been about 6 months...and we show our activities on the Internet. Our goal is to build something like a community center operated by migrant women for themselves independently in 10 years. So we‟re looking 10 years ahead, although we don‟t know who‟s going to get it done in the end.” (Case 4, age 38, from China) ”

From these interviews, we can find common features and distinctive characteristics between two type of community, that is, uni-national and multi-national communities of migrant women. To mention common points, one of important goals of these groups is better education of their children, and the role of leaders is very important to provide directions and strategies, to mobilize resources for their activities. If we examine transnational dimensions of their activity, there are more differences than similarity. The Filipina group keeps in touch with their country of origin by cooperation with the Philippines Embassy in Korea, and they also collected money for an orphanage in Philippines. In contrast, the Rainbow House group does not have such relations in community level, for they are composed of multiple ethnic members and their activities are based on local community of mothers. However, it is possible to see them as directing transnational practice inside their community, interacting between members with different cultural backgrounds, learning and teaching foreign languages each other.

3) Migrant women and transnational identity

Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Among our interviewees, all of the Japanese and one Filipina retained their nationality of origin, and other three women have acquired permanent residency in Korea. Most of other interviewees have already acquired or applied for Korean nationality.6 To examine their sense of identity, I asked these women “to which country do you think you belong.” Their sense of belonging to nation-state or nationality exhibited different patterns regardless of naturalization. Some women responded, “I am Korean since I‟ve been naturalized,”7 while many others answered they are still Chinese or Filipina even though they are living in Korea. Interestingly, a significant number of women responded that they cannot choose only one between the home country and host country. This implies that migrant women can develop and maintain transnational identities although they are living with Korean family member for considerable years. Some of interviewees say they do not belong to any country, and perceive it as an unfavorable situation. They describe themselves as „in-between‟, being neither Korean nor their nationality of origin. They emphasize that legal citizenship is not sufficient for being treated and accepted as equal as native Koreans. They even offered the critical view that Koreans would never see them as “pure Korean,” and thus they can never be fully Korean. On the other hand, their childhood experience and cultural backgrounds are still very important to them. One woman even revealed her existential dilemma, saying “I‟m always thinking that I‟m caught in the middle. I don‟t belong to this country or that country.” These attitudes can be categorized as negative attitude of transnational identity. But some other women actively expressed more independent thoughts. They would say, “I wish you wouldn‟t ask me about what country I belong to. I‟m just me,” concluding that “nationality is not important” in their lives. These women were very active in community activities in Korea, as well as in socializing with women not only from their country but from other countries. Other interviewee stated that a sense of identity that exclusively limits them to a certain place (country) does not mean much to them. It is a positive attitude to understand their status as a migrant in between two cultures more progressively, and actively embracing that status. This sense of detachment from exclusive and singular concepts of national identity shows that some of marriage migrant women tend to internalize a transnational identity from their own experience. They are highly

6 Some women stated that they gave up on acquiring Korean nationality because of the financial burden, while some explained that they applied but were rejected for reasons they were not aware of. A foreign woman married to a Korean can apply for naturalization 2 years after marriage, with her husband‟s approval and possession of 30 million won in deposit. But often there are 1-2 year delays due to administerial backlog, and even longer delays with no clear explanation. 7 One woman from China says that after being naturalized, she confidently declares herself Korean even when visiting home. Marriage migrant women also debate over whether to change their name to Korean at the time of naturalization. Some of them decide to keep their name, only to change when their children enter school. They are afraid that their children might be discriminated or harassed in school because of the mother‟s “strange” name. One Filipina said, “I changed my name to Korean when my child entered elementary school, and then I felt I really became Korean.” Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. interested in promoting mutual understanding and horizontal cooperation migrant women from different countries, rather than building a ethnic community. It can be categorized as positive attitude of transnational identity.

CONCLUSION: Marriage Migrant Women’s Transnational Practice and their potential for Local Transnationalism

Through the in-depth interviews with migrant women, I tried to examine the types and patterns of their transnational practice which can take place in their ties with the country of origin, and in their relations with other immigrants living in Korea. Marriage migrant women‟s transnational practices mostly appear in informal realms such as family life and intimate relationship, rather than in formal realms like political or economic activities. There are three different explanations for the emergence of different transnational practices. Itzigsohn and Saucedo(2002) categorize these as linear transnationalism, resource transnationalism and reactive transnationalism. If immigrants engage in transnational practices due to their emotional ties with the country of origins, that can be described as „linear transnationalism‟. If immigrants who have greater amount of economic resources engage in transnational practice actively, that will be explained as „resource transnationalism‟. If immigrants engage in transnational practice because of negative treatment and discrimination they experience in host countries, it can be explained as „reactive transnationalism‟. Using these categories, linear transnationalism is most prevalent type in the experience of marriage migrant women in Korea. Most women we interviewed maintain ongoing linkages with their families in country of origin, even long after their migration. They hope that their children would develop foreign language skills and gain international experience through their transnational network. It is possible to anticipate that these transnational ties could be enlarged as their children grow. Organized immigrant communities usually provide important opportunities and channels for immigrant people to extend their transnational practices. However, immigrant communities and ethnic organizations are not active in Korea due to its rather short history if immigration and policy regulation against family reunion of immigrants. In our analysis of community level activity among marriage migrant women in Korea, the meaning of transnational practice is rather ambivalent. As we‟ve seen, Filipina women group do have relation with their country of origin in group (or community) level, but it is hard to find another cases of ethnic community which actively engage in transnational relation. We do not have enough cases to generalize this tendency. On the other hand, many migrant women are taking part in multi-national community rather than uni-national group. Their activities as a group are mostly confined to local and national boundary of Korea, however. They do not have distinct transnational relation except intra-group interaction between members Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. from different countries. It is very interesting that their activities are not overtly transnational but implicitly transnational: meeting people from other countries, learning foreign language, communicating with people from diverse cultural backgrounds, and dreaming on more independent future life of autonomous immigrants. I think they have a lot of potential for local transnationalism. As reviewed so far, different types of transnational practices occur in the everyday lives of marriage migrant women. Their living conditions and social relations would have different types of impact on their transnational practices, either promoting or curbing them. There should be additional analysis to determine whether the instances of transnational practice observed in this study will further expand or decline in the future, and if they expand, what impact it would have on the lives of the migrant women.

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Session Ⅱ The Rise of China and a New Order in East Asia

Chairperson: Shin-wha Lee (Korea University)

"The Rise of China and China's Idea of Peace of Northeast Asia" Dingli Shen (Fudan University)

"The Politics of Boundary Making in East Asian Financial Regionalism" Yong Wook Lee (Korea University)

Discussants Jae Cheol Kim (Catholic University of Korea) Barbara Stallings (Brown University)

Yong Wook Lee, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations Korea University Tel: 82-2-3290-2181 E-mail: [email protected]

02/28/2010 Draft prepared for 2010 ARI‟s International Conference Please Do Not Quote without Permission

A central paradox of modernity, then, is that a wide range of cultural forms can be found in different nations’ instrumental institutions despite the fact that all of those institutions are purportedly oriented to [presumably] a unitary set of economic laws— Dobbin1

INTRODUCTION

One of the most conspicuous phenomena in East Asian economic relations in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (hearafter AFC) is arguably the emergence and development of what Grimes calls “East Asian financial regionalism.”2 Grimes defines East Asian financial regionalism in terms of “[East Asian states‟] attempts to reduce currency volatility, to create frameworks to contain financial crises, and to develop local financial markets.”3 Under the auspices of ASEAN plus Three, which was institutionally created in 1999 by East Asian states4 as a forum for regional economic cooperation, East Asian financial regionalism is manifested and developed through three major initiatives: the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) (2000) as a framework to contain financial crises, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) (2002) for development of local financial markets, and the agreement to conduct in- depth research on the feasibility of the Asian Currency Unit (ACU) (2006) for management of currency volatility (exchange rate and currency arrangement).

1 Dobbin 1994, 14. Parenthesis added. 2 Grimes 2009. 3 Ibid., 2. 4 By East Asian states I mean in this paper ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, and Korea) countries that have collectively made substantial degree of regional economic cooperation. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Apart from more formal and institutionalized form of regional economic cooperation in contrast to the informal and loose one before the AFC, what is most critical of this regional development is the exclusion of the U.S. from all these regional economic institutional building efforts.5 In other words, East Asian states, for the first time in a long while, have started to define Asia or East Asia without the make-up of the Asia-Pacific in their efforts at regional institutional buildings. In terms of levels of “regionness,” the post-crisis Asia seems to have moved from “regional complex” to “regional society/regional community” capable of “articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region.”6 What explains the development of the exclusive East Asian financial regionalism? Is it a result of East Asian states‟ attempts to balance against the U.S. to adjust the change in the distribution of international/regional power structure and/or relative gain in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, as neorealists would have us believe? Or, is it the product of either East Asian states‟ attempts to reduce transaction and information costs associated with their intraregional economic interdependence or of private sectors‟ (big business) pressure, as neoliberals would claim? Although these rationalist accounts are suggestive, they are not empirically corroborated.7 Rationalist account cannot capture the timing and content of emerging East Asian financial regionalism. First, there have not been any meaningful indications of changes that occurred in the military and economic power structure of the region before and after the AFC.8 Second, because of the negative effects of economic difficulties accrued during the crises, the share of the intraregional trade for East Asia has declined in the post-crises era while overall export performance of each state in the region has risen consistently. This simply means that Asian states have relied more on external markets for their exports. As such, this “material” incentive for interregional trade could have led them to pursue a regional arrangement that would include as many an important external trading partner as possible in an attempt to capitalize on their markets. The exclusion of the U.S. would not be a logical conclusion threaded from this line of analysis. Lastly, the domestic interest group version of neoliberalism9 does show the limitation to account for the exclusion of the U.S. Private sectors in the region have been at best ambivalent about their

5 Also excluded are such other Western members as Australia and New Zealand, which have been active in the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 6 Hettne and Söderbaum 2000, 3-4. According to Dieter and Higgott (2003), Asian “monetary” regional integration does not follow trade-driven conventional regional integration process. See also Pempel (ed., 2004) for the urge that we have to understand Asian regionalism (or regionalization process) on its own terms. 7 Due to space limitation, I briefly point out the shortcomings of each rationalist approach. 8 Ravenhill 2002, 169-172. 9 Moravcsik 1997. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. governments‟ initiatives on exclusive regional groupings. 10 Moreover, the prime drivers of the post-crisis regional integration pushing for the desirability of a more intensified government-involved regional institutionalization have been policy elites comprising government officials and members of epistemic communities.11

Building on previous constructivist works that emphasize the importance of the perception and the decisive role of the Asian financial crisis in directing the post- crisis East Asian regionalism (i.e., the politics of resentment on the part of the crisis- affected Asian countries for U.S./IMF neoliberal intrusion of their political economy and domestic governance systems12),13 I account for the development of the exclusive East Asian financial regionalism by demonstrating the linkage between the particular forms of regional institutional development and the perceptions and self- understanding of relevant regional actors. As discussed below, however, previous constructivist studies tend to fall short of clearly identifying the content of shared regional identity (or regional collective selfhood), which serves as the underlying historical ground/logic (or “constitutive rule”14) upon which the post-crisis East Asian regionalism has been institutionalized at the expense of U.S. membership. As a result, this underspecification has not been helpful in both explaining where the post-crisis East Asian regionalism came from and capturing what is needed to make reasonable prediction on where it is likely to be institutionally headed. I attempt to fill this gap by taking a historically sensitive evolutionary perspective of East Asian financial regionalism that highlights the processual, interactive development of the kind of collective self-understanding, solidarity, or groupness that can make collective action possible in a certain way over others. In so doing, I employ a combination of induction and deduction. Analytical steps taken in this paper are as follows: I do not a priori assume the existence of a certain identity

10 Hund 2003; Ravenhill 2003, 173-174. See Frieden (1991) for the influence of sectoral pressures on states‟ policy toward monetary regional cooperation. 11 Tsunekawa 2004. See also Bowles (2002) and Amyx (2004a) for similar observations. Bowles even challenges the conventional understanding of the market-driven precrisis Asian regionalization. Bowles says (2002, 246), “These analyses [the market-driven view] tended to overstate the role of „the market‟ in fostering integration in region. They present us with some of a paradox in that most of them accept that [Asian] national economies can be described as „developmental states‟ where governments play key roles in „guiding the market‟ but where, it seems, inter-national and intra-regional integration are played out beyond the reach of the state. Such a paradox is, in fact, a false one and is solved by a better appreciation of the role that the state played in fostering intra-regional trade and capital flows.” 12 Higgott 1998. Stubbs 2002. 13 Calder and Ye (2004) use the concept of “critical juncture” to capture the role of the Asian financial crisis in “narrowing the organizational gap” (by the post-crisis Asian institutional buildings, such as APT and the Chiang Mai Initiative). 14 Onuf 1989. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. conception shared among East Asian states. Instead, with the method of induction, I analyze a series of East Asia states‟ confrontation with the U.S. in various regional forums to uncover the content of an emerging regional collective identity shared among East Asian states. My finding suggests that East Asian states have confronted the U.S. in their collective understanding of the legitimate role of the state in instituting and safeguarding the so-called self-regulating market for economic development and stability. From this inductive observation, I deductively posit that this shared “economic policy paradigm,” defined here as “the institutionalized principle(s) of policy action that structure the very way in which policy-makers see the world and their role within it,”15 has shaped the development of East Asian financial regionalism in the way it has been. In other words, I try to demonstrate that this “institutional rationality” embodied in economic policy paradigm (historically and culturally developed cause- effect designation about economic governance 16 ) informs Asian states of the conception of rational economic order that manifests in the form of exclusive monetary cooperation. I illustrate this theoretical underpinning by examining the ways in which the CMI (2000) has developed over the last nine years since 2000. The Chiang Mai Initiative is regarded as the most important institutional development that defines the post-crisis Asian monetary cooperation. 17 For specific empirical discussion, I develop below a couple of testable hypotheses drawn from the inductive observation as noted earlier. In so doing, I also aim to make a theoretical contribution to the existing literature of constructivism. To my knowledge, the current status of constructivism in the study of regional integration falls short of offering a conceptual apparatus (and conceptual vocabulary) that helps shed light on a mechanism through which collective identity-driven institutional rationality is translated into or shapes the concrete institutionalization of regional integration. As a way to account for this theoretical gap, I draw on theoretical insights from organizational institutionalist literature that explains how institutional change occurs in the interplay of regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimensions of a given institution.

15 The definition comes from the combination of Peter Hall‟s (1992) notion of “policy paradigm” and Dobbin‟s notion (1994) of “industrial policy paradigm.” According to Dobbin (1994, 19), policy paradigm comprises “both practices, in the form of policies, and means- ends designations, in the form of the tenets of governmental action.” 16 “Institutional rationality” is conceptually similar to Dobbin‟s notion of “cultural rationality.” In Dobbin‟s words (1994, 2), “[N]ational traditions influence policy-making by contributing to collective understandings of social order and instrumental rationality. History has produced distinct ideas about order and rationality in different nations.” 17 This working paper is part of a larger book-length project that encompasses the CMI, the ABMI, and the ACU as noted earlier. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. To clarify the scope of my arguments, I discuss here what this paper does not do below. There are three interrelated issues to be clarified. I do not claim to offer the airtight linkage between collective identity-driven institutional rationality and the particular institutional shape of, say, the CMI. Since this paper does not engage in the detailed dynamics of East Asian states‟ negotiations in institutionalizing the CMI, my claim cannot but be modest. As such, my empirical and theoretical arguments are limited to identifying the parameters of the institutional preferences informed by the emerging East Asian collective self-understandings. I use the development of the CMI in a suggestive manner. Relatedly, I do not make any claim about the “real” intention/motivation of East Asian states‟ identity discourses when I analyze them. This question is pertinent, but, for this paper that aims to uncover the institutional parameters and their associated applications to the development of the CMI, the issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. This will be done in the future by studying the actual bargaining and negotiation processes. Lastly, given the emerging and still contingent nature of regional institutional buildings in the post-crisis East Asia, the implications borne out of this study for the future of East Asian financial regionalism are nothing but speculative. It is precisely because doing so demands that we come to closure on issues that we are only just beginning to grasp. That said, this paper proceeds as follows. Section II suggests a more specified version of Constructivism in analyzing the institutionalization of regional integration through the politics of inclusion and exclusion. Section III inductively uncovers the content of an emerging East Asian regional identity upon which the U.S. is excluded from the post-crisis East Asian regional institutional buildings. Section IV studies the emergence and development of the CMI in light of collective identity-driven institutional rationality developed in Section III. Section V concludes the paper with a few reflections on the future development of East Asian financial regionalism and the role of U.S. in it.

IDENTITY AS REGIONAL BOUNDARY MARKER

In constructivist theorizing of regionalism, regionalism essentially involves the politics of identity (or the politics of “historically variable relational embeddedness” in Somers‟ words18). On the one hand, regions are politically and socially constructed and contested. They are not the outcomes of the naturally given. On the other hand, any regionalism inevitably draws lines, creating borders between members and nonmembers. In other words, the establishment of the self is always practiced by drawing the boundaries of the self in relation to significant others. Regionalism needs a boundary to differentiate insiders (members) from outsiders

18 Somers 1994. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. (non-members). A regional sense of “we-ness” demarcates insiders from outsiders and determines the boundaries of the region. As such, a sense of “we-ness” is empirically observable from the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the formative processes of the establishment of the regional boundaries.19 As Pempel notes, regions “vary with the policy issues that confront a region.”20 In this constructivist vein, quite a few studies indeed tackled the puzzle of the exclusive form of the post-crisis Asian regional institutional building processes. For example, Higgott, Bergsten, Dieter and Higgott, Stubbs,Terada, and Yu all identify the ASEAN plus Three (APT) process as a clear, institutional manifestation that reflects a deepening sense of regional “we” consciousness in a more tightly defined East Asian context.21 They commonly point to the importance of these states‟ shared experience of the Asian economic crisis, which is inseparable from their “shared” resentment at the U.S.-led IMF responses to the crisis.22 The Asian economic crisis fostered a sense of common identity, and Asian states‟ new quest for the exclusive form of East Asian regionalism after the crisis is anything but the effect of the consolidated East Asian regional identity on Asian states‟ interests and strategies. This positive correlation seems to offer a better explanation for East Asian states‟ increased interests in the exclusionary East Asian regionalism. Constructivist scholarship on East Asian regionalism, however, has not so far offered a shared consensus on what constitutes “East Asia,” a regional identity construct that has a significant causal power on the formation of East Asian regionalism.23 If Katzenstein is right in suggesting that “regions are social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political practice,”24 the clarification of the

19 For identity-based constructivist theorization of the formation of international (regional included) institutions, see Wendt 1994; Checkel 1999; Cronin 1999. 20 Pemepl 2004, 25. 21 Higgott 1999; Bergsten 2000; Dieter and Higgott 2002; Stubbs 2002; Terada 2003; Yu 2003. 22 For the politics of resentment, see Higgott 1998 and Hughes 2000. 23 The factors underlying the formation of a specific East Asian identity so far suggested are as follows: common recent historical experience (i.e., colonial experience and the surge of nationalism); some key common cultural traits (i.e., the acceptance of hierarchy and a respect for authority); similar distinctive economic institutions and approaches to economic development (developmental states); cross-cutting patterns of FDI; a specific regional form of capitalism (Asian state-led capitalism); and Asian values/Asianness (as opposed to Western liberal political values). See, for example, Dieter and Higgott 2002, 32; Stubbs 2002, 444-445; Terada 2003, 253-256; Yu 2003, 276-283; Nabers 2003, 124-129; and Oga 2004, 300-302. 24 Katzenstein 2003, 105. More recently, Katzenstein (2005) suggests three approaches to defining regions, materialist (geopolitics), ideational (critical theories of geography), and behavioral, the last of which means that regions are basically what they politically, socially, and economically do. One notable “behavioral” example from Katzenstein is Greater Carribbean region for slave trade, which flourished between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century, but no longer exists. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. content of such a shared identity as “East Asia” is indispensable to providing the basis for the nature of Asians‟ attempts to exclude the U.S. from their regional institutional building efforts. As developed in an identity-based causal model elsewhere in constructivist scholarship, the content of East Asian identity is the fundamental source of the causal relationship that critically affects states‟ decision as to on what basis to pursue regional integration with whom.25 In other words, the content of East Asian identity gives a directionality of whom to include and exclude in the region. As such, the current status of constructivist scholarship on East Asian regionalism, which shies away from stating the content of East Asian identity in a compelling fashion, provides no credible empirical basis upon which a sense of East Asian collective identity distinguishes “us” from “them” in constructing the exclusionary regionalism. All in all, if one agrees with Bowles on characterizing the post-crisis Asian regionalism as “bringing the state back in, keeping [United] States out,”26 one has to locate a firm ground upon which this has been taking place in the post-crisis Asia. The content of East Asian identity is a “generative grammar” or “taken-for-granted constitutive rule” that guides the operation of the structure of identity and interests.27 Furthermore, the current status of constructivism in the study of regional integration has yet to offer an apparatus that conceptually links between collective identity-driven institutional rationality and the concrete institutionalization process of regional integration. In this regard, the theoretical insights from organizational institutionalist literature are useful to establish such a conceptual linkage in sequential terms. According to Scott, for example, an institution consists of three basic dimensions, namely regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive dimensions. The regulatory dimension entails legal, constitutional, and other rules that constrain and regularize behavior. The normative dimension consists of principles that prescribe the goals of behavior and the appropriate ways to pursue them. The cultural-cognitive dimension involves the culturally shaped, taken-for-granted assumptions about reality and the frames through which it is perceived, understood, and given meaning.28As such, when one tries to explain institutional change, one has to be specific about which dimension of the institution is under investigation for the clear analytical and empirical focus associated with the different methods of data gathering. What is intriguing about this three-dimension analysis for this paper‟s purpose is the sequential relations of the three dimensions that lead to institutional change

25 Berger 1998; Abdelal 2001; Abdelal, Herrera, Johnson, and Martin 2001; Hopf 2002; Lee 2006. 26 Bowles 2002. 27 For the discussion of the structure of identity and interests, see Wendt (1992) and Rodney Hall (1999). 28 Scott 2001, chapter 3. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. hypothesized and tested by organizational institutionalists. Campbell, for example, specifies that institutional change tends to start from the change in the cultural- cognitive dimension, which in turn leads to the change in the normative and regulative dimensions of the institution.29 Here, the content of collective identity is regarded as important as one type of the cognitive framework that affects how actors perceive their interests as they build institutions.30 Campbell offers one such example from Hattam‟s work that demonstrates the sequential change from the cultural-cognitive to the regulatory institutional dimension. To quote it at length:

For example, Victoria Hattman (1993), analyzed changes in U.S. labor movement showing that one reason why unions redirected their efforts to advance workers’ interests from legislatures and courts to the shop floor and factory gates was that their identity as a class changed. During the early nineteenth century, they viewed themselves in republican terms as a class that included both workers and other productive economic actors, including manufacturers and industrialists. Hence, they pursued their interests, just as business did, through the legislatures and courts, often seeking equal protection under the law. But after the civil war, unions redefined themselves in more modern terms as representatives of a proletarian class whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of the business community. Thus, they confronted capitalists in the factories to advance their interests and shifted their energies from trying to influence one set of institutions, the law, to another set of institutions, formal labor-management agreement.31

As such, if one broadly conceptualizes East Asian financial regionalism as an example of the institutional change from the inclusive (or open) to the exclusionary regionalism, this sequential insight from organizational institutionalist literature (along with the three conceptual dimensions of institution) gives one a good piece of theoretical and empirical guidance for his/her research. Theoretically, the sequential insight offers a more specified testable or trackable hypothesis for the relationship between collective identity-driven institutional rationality and the concrete institutionalization process of the exclusionary regional integration. Empirically, the three conceptual dimensions inform what and how one should look for the evidence. In the case of the cultural-cognitive dimension, for example, one needs to empirically

29 Campbell 2004, 69-74 and 145-151. 30 Brubaker (2004) offers a cognitive perspective on ethnicity, which can be useful for the conceptualization of region as well. Brubaker (2004, 81) says, “ethnicity and nation [region] are … ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one‟s problems and predicaments, identifying one‟s interests, and orienting one‟s action.” Parenthesis added. 31 Ibid., 97-98. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. track the dominant discourse and thought of, say, Asian policy elites to determine how their cognitive conceptions of East Asia and the U.S. have changed. In the case of the regulative dimension, one needs to pay close attention to the institutionalization of the formal means (i.e., regulations, rules, and enforcement procedures) of regional integration, such as the development of the Chiang Mai Initiative. In what follows, I attempt to empirically show the validity of the sequential framework. Noting that the previous studies‟ underspecification of the content of East Asian identity is due largely to their failure to situate the formation of East Asian self- understanding in historically specific relational settings (or issue-specific relational settings), I offer the content of an emerging, regionally shared identity called “East Asia” in the sphere of regional economic integration (the cultural-cognitive dimension). This effort would eventually help to address my central research question of what explains the emergence and development of East Asian financial regionalism. Then, I link the cultural-cognitive dimension and the regulatory one by illustrating the development of the CMI since 2009 with specific, testable hypotheses.

UNCOVERING EAST ASIAN REGIONAL IDENTITY

In this section, I aim to empirically uncover the content of East Asian identity that generates the exclusion of the U.S. from the post-crisis Asian regional institutional building processes. 32 Since the content of identity is socially and discursively constructed in relation to that of another identity construct in a given issue area, I presents an analysis of how an identity of East Asia (or Asia) has been discursively produced and reproduced in relation to the U.S. (or the West) by Asian political elites who spearheaded the formation of the post-crisis Asian regionalism.33 A method of inductive uncovering of the content of East Asian identity is to find a “(common) generative grammar” upon which East Asian states coalesced in confronting the U.S. in various regional forums. By analyzing a series of East Asian states‟ resistances to U.S. (or Western) imposition of “disembedded” liberalism34 onto Asia and their discursive legitimation of those resistances, I demonstrate that the content of East Asian identity shared among East Asian states (ASEAN plus Three) is embedded in their shared understanding of the legitimate role of the state in instituting

32 This section builds on Kim and Lee (2004). 33 In conducting discourse analysis below, the question of whether speakers really mean what they say (the deeper intentions of the speakers) is not important here (although it is pertinent). As noted at the outset of this paper, I am more concerned with the question of how meaning (associated with collective identity) is generated, structured, and shared among the relevant actors. See Waever (1995) for his discussion on the advantage of discourse analysis for this type of analysis over psychological approaches studying perceptions and beliefs. 34 Polayni 1944; Ruggie 1982. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. and safeguarding the self-regulating market. U.S. imposition of “disembedded” liberal order onto East Asia throughout the 1990s has played a pivotal role in differentiating insiders from outsiders, thus creating a space for the development of such a shared regional identity as East Asia that believes in governments assuming much more direct responsibility for economic development and stability.35 In empirical analysis to follow, I sketch out three key events that have shaped the emergence and consolidation of East Asian identity: APEC Osaka meeting in 1995, Japan‟s AMF proposal in 1997, and the development of ASEAN plus Three (APT) in the post-crisis period.

APEC Osaka Meeting and Asian Coalition Since the APEC came into being in 1989, a difference of emphasis (if not a conflict of interests) on the main institutional purpose of the APEC between the U.S. and Asians member states has been observed. While the U.S. prefers to use the APEC as a forum that facilitates trade and investment liberalization processes by negotiating binding trade and investment rules, Asian states assign a relative weight to APEC‟s role of development cooperation. 36 The U.S. increasingly pushed for the institutionalization of the APEC along liberal lines in the early 1990s, and its efforts bore a fruit with the Bogor Declaration in 1994 that laid out a liberalization timetable for member states. The Bogor Declaration was, however, not wholeheartedly entertained by every member state. For example, Malaysia, Thailand, and China (along with some other states) did not hesitate to express their reservations about the declared liberalization processes. Japan and the Philippines were not enthusiastic about it. In this context, Japan hosted the APEC Annual Meeting in Osaka in 1995. The major issue in Osaka was whether or not to further expand and spell out more specific goals for the APEC liberalization processes that had gained a sizable momentum from the Bogor Declaration. Many Asian member states became increasingly wary of U.S.-led liberalization agendas that essentially meant the considerably reduced role of the state in organizing both international and domestic economic activities. As such, the choice presented for member states in the Osaka meeting was whether to endorse U.S. (or Western) free market ideals.37 Depending on the negotiated outcome(s), the Osaka meeting could have been a defining moment not only for the future of the APEC in terms of the main institutional purpose, but also for Asian regionalism; liberalization or development cooperation? What came out of the Osaka meeting was the first, embryonic form of East Asian developmental alliance that “succeeded in eviscerating virtually all traces of the

35 Amsden 1989; Wade 1990 and 1996; World Bank 1991 and 1993. 36 Funabashi 1995; Baker 1998; Tussie 1998; 37 Johnstone 1995a and b. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. type of liberalization program sought by the United States.”38 Instead of a more structured, rule-binding liberalization processes advocated by the U.S. and Australia, the liberalization process that emerged from the Osaka meeting was “voluntary, unilateral, consensus-based, non-binding, lacking common timetables, and uncertain as to comprehensiveness and comparability of members‟ effort.” Apart from ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and Korea (Plus Three members) joined their forces to restore balance to the overall APEC agenda, which they claimed had become too heavily skewed toward liberalization. In effect, Yoshiro Sakamoto, vice-minister of international affairs of the MITI, argued that “Japan should keep step with the rest of Asia by agreeing only to those U.S. proposals that are acceptable to the whole of Asia.”39 According to an internal MITI memo, the economic liberalization initiated and pushed by the U.S. seems to be “forcing Minor league players to play in Major league games.”40 These sorts of confrontation between Asian member states and Western member states on the main institutional purpose of the APEC have been continuing until today. As Berger puts it, one of the principal reasons for APEC‟s failure to fulfill the hopes of its supporters has been its inability to accommodate and represent the very different “Asian” and “Western” impulses contained within it.41 The importance of these confrontations lies in sowing the seeds for developing a regional identity as East Asia, as Asian member states socially and materially interacted with their Western members, notably the U.S. As Webber aptly puts it, “the creation of an at least limited sense of identity among East Asian states can be attributed to the perception of sharing a common opponent in APEC conflicts.”42 The Osaka meeting provided a venue for registering an embryonic, intersubjective understanding of what constitutes “East Asia (or Asia)” among the future ASEAN plus Three members. If Mahathir‟s earlier East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) proposal “removed the taboo” on the Japanese Greater East Asian Co-prosperity concept, the APEC ironically provided the venue for “rediscovering” and “reasserting” “Asianness.”43

The Asian Monetary Fund As noted above, the most important change in Asian regionalism after the Asian financial crisis is the emergence of an Asia-only form of regional economic

38 Rapkin 2001, 389. 39 Cited in Rapkin 2001, 400. 40 Cited in Oga 2003, 304. On the same page, Oga cites another diplomat as saying, “the U.S. has neither the will nor the ability to liberalise further. They still have a 30 to 40 per cent tariff on textiles, 25 per cent on trucks, and double-digit percentages on glass. They have continued to protect these areas.” 41 Berger 1999. 42 Webber 2001, 357. 43 Oga 2004, 305-307. Similarly, see Terada 2003. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. cooperation that excludes the U.S. In this context, the significance of Japan‟s Asian Monetary Fund proposal (with support from Asians states), which was announced by Japanese Finance Minister at the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF on September 21, 1997, is the proposal‟s intentional exclusion of the U.S. from AMF membership. Why did Japan propose the creation of the Asian Monetary Fund? What was the basis upon which Japan excluded the U.S. from membership? Why did Asian states support Japan‟s initiation? As I argued elsewhere,44 the immediate cause of Japan‟s AMF proposal lies in Japan‟s interest (as a leader of state-led economic development model) in defending the Asian model of economic development against the U.S.-led IMF bailout operation in Thailand. But Japan‟s confrontation with the IMF did not come automatically, as evident in Japan‟s insistence that Japan provide the Thai government with its financial assistance on condition that the Thai government would seek the IMF help first. Japan‟s serious consideration of creating the AMF came only after “the discursive demolition of the Asian development model („crony capitalism‟)” by the U.S. Treasury Department (Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers) and the IMF. 45 Summers, for example, asserted that “ the problem with this model of economic development is that while it is was built on the fundamentals-on high savings, high levels of education, and hard work…[it]…favored centralized coordination of activity over decentralized market incentives. Governments targeted particular industries, promoted selected exports, and protected domestic industry. There was a reliance on debt rather than equity, relationship-driven finance not capital markets, and informal rather than formal enforcement mechanisms.” 46 Sakakibara, vice-minister of the MOF (Ministry of Finance), who was known as the architect of the AMF proposal, recollected from his conversations with Rubin and Summers:

…I was saying from the outset that this [the Thai crisis] was a crisis of global capitalism. But in 1997, Larry’s view and Bob Rubin’s view were that it was an Asian crisis, and especially Asian policy management was the problem- Asian governments, Asian corruptions and collusions, and the Asian structured economic system, which is close to the structure of the Japanese…47

In this context, after several consultations with Asian countries, Japan (the MOF) finally decided to launch the AMF as a regional financial mechanism for quick disbursement of funds for the crisis-affected countries to be able to defend the Asian model of economic development against the U.S.-led IMF‟s imposition of neoliberal

44 Lee 2006. 45 Hall 2004. 46 Summers 1998. 47 Interview with Sakakibara, May 15, 2001, PBS. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. economic order onto Thailand and the other affected countries. But once Japan‟s ideas of excluding the U.S. from the AMF got circulated, Japan faced strong opposition from the U.S. and the IMF even before its official proposal for the AMF on September 21, 1997. Such staunch opposition from the U.S. and the IMF was offset by enough encouragements from the Asian states. Japan went ahead without any modification in the membership (ASEAN plus Three states included), and Japan‟s finance minister (Hiroshi Mitsuzuka) officially proposed to create the AMF at the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF. And both Mitsuzuka and Sakakibara emphasized that the AMF would have a “unique” focus on the Asian countries‟ “specific” needs. Sakakibara later noted that the exclusion of the U.S. was intentional so that the “Asian” leaders could discuss regional financial problems without U.S. pressure48 and that “it was the desire to create an policy alternative to the IMF prescription that motivated the proposal to create the AMF.”49 The AMF was not realized in the end as Japan finally retracted it at a meeting of finance and central bank governors from fourteen Pacific Rim countries in Manila on November 18 and 19, 1997. But the importance of Japan‟s AMF proposal spurred by Asian states‟ support deserves a special attention for the current discussion of the development of the content of East Asian identity. This event brings to the fore a concrete manifestation of the source of a regional identity that demarcates insiders from outsiders. By excluding the U.S. from membership, it reconstituted the boundaries of the region since the first attempt in 1990 by Mahathir, Malaysian Prime Minister. The original members of the AMF now constitute the ASEAN plus Three and made a first step toward the AMF in the form of bilateral swap arrangements among central banks called “Chiang Mai Initiative” on May 6, 2000.

The ASEAN plus Three With the advent of the ASEAN plus Three (the APT) in 1997, a certain hierarchical structure of East Asian regionalism has emerged. While the ASEAN plus Three as intra-regionalism (an Asian-only form) is designated as the head of the agenda, the APEC as interregionalism comes to occupy the second place in the sphere of economic cooperation. 50 However, the ASEAN plus Three fora began quiet modestly. For example, no joint statement was made by its first Informal Summit Meeting in 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, and the term “ASEAN plus Three” itself was cautiously and rarely used in the first two meetings. It was not until the 3rd Informal Summit Meeting in Manila, November 1999 that the “Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation” was issued for the first time by the thirteen heads of governments.51 Of

48 Interview with Sakakibara, cited in Katada 2001b: 11, footnote 26 in particular. 49 Sakakibara 2001, 2. 50 Liu and Regnier 2003, xxiv. 51 Terada 2003, 264. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. course, the Asian financial crisis provided an essential foundation in the form of a common experience for enhancing the significance of the APT process. Then, what would be the common experience that encouraged the momentum to precipitate the exclusionary character of East Asian financial regionalism? As alluded in my discussion on the AMF and noted by many scholars, the common experience that fostered a sense of common identity (East Asian identity) was East Asian states‟ shared “image of the region in adversity besieged by oursiders „ganging up‟ in their attempts to exploit the difficulties that East Asian governments faced.”52 As Higgott aptly puts it in his discussion of “the politics of resentment,” “Most East Asians feel that they were both let down and put down by the West.” And at the center of this humiliation lies in Western replacement (or reconstitution) of older social forms, such as “developmental states” and “East Asian miracles” with newer social forms, such as “corrupt” practitioners of “crony capitalism.” The U.S.- led IMF associated the Asian development model as “crony capitalism,” thus normatively, if not empirically, delegitimiting the Asian model while normatively, if not empirically, privileging market-based processes and outcomes.53 As such, the U.S-led IMF‟s discursive (and material) demolition of the Asian economic model in terms of “us” and “them” in a binary fashion generated the reversed version of “them” and “us” on the part of East Asian states on the same ground, which had been gradually fermenting through the confrontations at the APEC. The remark by the Thai Deputy Prime Minister Supachai reflects this binary structure of identities when he said that “We cannot rely on the World Bank…the International Monetary Fund but we must rely on regional cooperation.”54 Japanese finance minister Miyazawa firmly stated that “after the Asian crisis, Asian countries began to doubt the benefits of trade liberalization and that the APEC should answer this doubt.”55 Sakakibara goes even further by arguing that “if East Asia does not want to be divided and ruled as in the colonial days and in the more recent past, we need to form some types of regional cooperation of our own.”56 In late 1998, Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Phil called for an independent Asian Monetary Fund by endorsing the “Asian development model.”57 Korea‟s President Kim Dae Jung claimed that the APT “would also be able to speak for the region in discussions with other major economic blocs, such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Why should Asia, alone among the „three poles‟ of the global economy,

52 Ravenhill 2002, 175. 53 Hall 2004, 3. 54 Cited in Yu, 2003, 284. 55 Cited in Yu, 2003, 284. 56 Sakakibara 2001, 7 (italics added). 57 Cited in Sohn 2005, 491. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. not have its own grouping?” 58 In the fourth APT Summit in Singapore in November 2000, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh also claimed in his statement that what was important was that the leaders of the thirteen countries were starting to think as “East Asian.”59 Two quotes may summarize the emerging sense of East Asian identity with its cultural-cognitive dimension. If we are lax in these efforts [APT process] towards integration, we may invite more region-wide upheavals similar to the currency crisis. It is therefore important to understand how and in what sense this region, including Japan, is a community with common fate.60

There was much talk of the twenty-first century becoming the Asian century… The countries of East Asia continued with their ways of developing their economies… They were going to grow and they were going to continue to challenge the West… there is no reason why we should believe that what is being propagated by the West now – liberal democracy, free markets, a borderless world etc. would do any better in the long run.61

As discussed above, I have so far empirically uncovered the content of an East Asian identity that generates the exclusion of the U.S. from Asian regional institutional buildings in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The process of an emerging sense of East Asian identity in regional economic integration seems to have the quality of Peter Hall‟s notion of “a funnel of causation, in which a broad interpretation of major events and an associated set of preferences are developed in tentative terms and then consolidated as successive experiences are interpreted in the same terms.” 62 As much as East Asian identity is defined and discursively constructed in relation to the U.S. on the grounds of proponent and opponent of the U.S.-led “disembedded” liberalism, the very discursive condition that generates East Asia identity has an effect of excluding the U.S. from Asian regional institutional building processes. Ultimately, policy preference formation is “a process in which experience and interpretation intertwine.”63

58 Asiaweek, December 10, 1999. Furthermore, Sagong Il, chairman of the Korean Institute for Global Economics (the former economic advisor to President), claimed at the Chiang Mai meeting that “We need some kind of defense mechanism. Since not much is expected to be done at the global level, something should be done at the regional level.” Financial Times, May 6. 59 Cited in Soesastro 2001, 2. 60 Japan‟s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999) cited in Nabers 2003, 121. Italics added. 61 Mahathir (2000) cited in Oga 2004, 301. Italics added. 62 Peter Hall 2005, 153. 63 Ibid., 152. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. A testing ground for the empirical outcome can be done by analyzing the regional policy statements and initiatives launched by regional political elites. If the above analysis is valid in locating “the cultural dimension of regional institution buildings,” I expect that those policy initiatives for East Asian financial regionalism (“the regulatory dimension of regional institutional building”) would focus on developing regulatory mechanisms that would enhance (not reduce) the role of the Asian states in managing their participation in the global political economy. 64 Jayasuriya‟s concept of “regulatory regionalism” may capture the post-crisis regional institutional building efforts. 65 Building on Jayasuriya, Higgott suggests that regulatory regionalism “links national and global understandings of regulation via the region as „meso‟ level.” 66 Thus, regional policy coordination from regulatory regionalism is likely to be delegated to the state in a sovereignty enhancing way with emphasis on “a strong relationship between state form, the global economic and political orders and the emerging regional governance.”67 It is too early to confidently assess if the post-crisis Asian monetary/financial cooperation (or monetary/financial institutional buildings) has moved in the direction of regulatory regionalism. Regional initiatives are still developing and being proposed. As such, below I give a preliminary evaluation to the empirical expectation made above by illustrating the emergence and development of the CMI, as one important example of the post-crisis Asian monetary/financial cooperation. I do so with three specific hypotheses drawn from the “shared economic paradigm” observation. First, one expects to observe the continued exclusion of the U.S. from membership in the development of the CMI. Second, policy initiatives for East financial regionalism would focus on developing regulatory mechanisms allowing for the role of the state in managing U.S.-led globalization, such as mechanisms for monitoring capital flows and surveillance. Lastly, The CMI should continue to shift away from its IMF link in lending practice.

64 Vogle‟s (1996) concept of “re-regulation” is useful here. Domestically, I expect to observe the similar “re-regulation” policy-makings in Asian states, the study of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Amyx (2004a, 14) offers a compelling account of the increased role of the Thai government in re-regularizing the Thai economy by using state-owned banks rather than normal deficit financing to fuel economic activity. 65 Jayasuriya (2004) in Higgott 2006. In this respect, Hiwatari‟s (2003) attempt to deduce national policy preference for the forms of regional monetary cooperation from the concerned country‟s financial system structure (security-market-based or bank-credit- based) and external balance positions (capital-dependent or capital-sufficient) can be potentially incorporated into the collective, aggregate policy preference of East Asian states, as they all rely on bank-credit-based financial systems (this is a major characteristics of the so-called “the developmental state”). 66 Ibid., 14. A similar point is made by Sohn (2005). 67 Higgott 2006, 14. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. CHIANG MAI INITIATIVE

In May 2000, at the ASEAN+3 (APT) Finance Ministers Meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the finance ministers of ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea made it public that they had agreed to exchange data on capital flows and develop a network of bilateral currency swap and repurchase arrangements, collectively known as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). Since then, sixteen bilateral swap agreements (BSA) have been concluded by 2005 and nine BSAs have been modified up to date. Moreover, the network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSA) and repurchase agreements under the CMI has grown to total of US$ 90 billion as of April 2009 (The total size of the CMI has been increasing from US$17.0 (2002), US$31.5 (2003), US$36.5 (2004), US$52.0 billion (2005), US$75.0 billion (2006), to US$90 billion (2009)). Although the sheer size of each country‟s BSA support is insufficient compared to the commitments of the international community and IMF during the Asian financial crisis, it exceeds the amount of actual IMF disbursements as of early 1999 more than two-folds by 2005.68

Table 1. Comparison of IMF Disbursement and the CMI Units: Actual IMF Commitments US$ (billion) Disbursements CMI (20%) Country IMF Multilateral69 Bilateral Total As of 1/17/99

11.0 Indonesia 11.2 10.0 21.1 42.3 8.8 (2.2)

19.0 Korea 21.1 14.2 23.1 58.4 19.0 (3.8)

8.0 Thailand 4.0 2.7 10.5 17.2 3.1 (1.6)

75.0 Total 36.3 26.9 54.7 117.9 30.9 (15.0)

Sources: IMF, Issues Brief 00/05 (June 2000); Bank of Japan; and ADB.70

68 This is due to the fact that the total amount of the IMF packages for Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea includes the second line of defense commitments offered by the IMF. 69 World Bank and ADB. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Figure 1. The Agreement of the Swap Agreement under the Chiang Mai Initiative

Source: Bank of Japan, as of February 24, 2006. (Total swap size reached US$75.0 billion as of May 4, 2006)71

In the course of nine years of its development, the CMI has intensified regional monetary cooperation with added policy goals. The CMI was first conceptualized in the APT Summit in 1999 when the Asian finance ministers agreed to enhance “self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia.”72 As noted above, the APT Finance Ministers‟ Meeting in 2000 realized this in the form of the CMI.

70 Accessed at and . 71 Bank of Japan, Accessed at . 72 Quoted in the “Joint Statement of East Asia Cooperation,” November 28, 1999; accessed at . Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Subsequently, the CMI arranged a network of bilateral swap arrangement among central banks of East Asian countries (ASEAN plus Three) to provide a “balance of payment support” and “short term liquidity support.” Thus, the CMI was initially envisioned as the first-order defensive mechanism that provides a foreign exchange liquidity support. As Amyx acutely notes, of importance is the latter (“short term liquidity support”) that emerged out of the Asian financial crisis experiences. Unlike a “balance of payment support” linked to the recipient country‟s macroeconomic policy, in which the IMF plays a role through its conditionality principles on loan amounts, “short term liquidity support” provides a liquidity injection into the recipient country where capital is exiting rapidly without particular macroeconomic mismanagement. This provision, thus, does not require any IMF intervention.73 Masaru Hayami (the Governor of the Bank of Japan), for example, delivered a rhetoric in this vein right before the APT Finance Ministers Meeting in 2000 endorsing the need for a regional cooperation mechanism within the realm of globalization:

[I]t is also true that the extent of interdependence has become more widespread and deep as witnessed by the progress of the horizontal division of labor and increased capital flows in East Asia. In addition, since the bitter experience of the currency crisis in 1997 has made us recognize the risk of spillover and contagion, I believe that momentum for actively promoting regional cooperation as a device to support globalization has steadily increased.74

Another major step was taken on May 6, 2005. The APT further strengthened the CMI at the ADB annual conference in Istanbul, not hesitating to point out that it would be a “step toward multilateralization…a de facto Asian Monetary Fund may eventually be created.”75 The Istanbul initiative doubled the size of currency swaps under the CMI from their current level of $39 billion; increased the amount of emergency liquidity available without IMF conditions from 10% to 20%; and made bilateral swaps into two-way swaps, with the aim of making them multilateral in the future.76 Japan led this initiative with China‟s support.77 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kuroda, the New ADB President, who was among those to propose the creation of the AMF in 1997, spearheaded the Istanbul initiative. In April 2005, Kuroda created the

73 Amyx 2004b, 211-212. 74 Masaru Hayami, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the Asian Pacific Bankers Club, March 17, 2000; the speech is quoted at . 75 http://www.aseansec.org/afp/115.htm. 76 Asia Pacific Bulletin, May 13, 2005. 77 See Chey (2009) for a detailed analysis. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Office for Regional Economic Integration within the ADB to facilitate a regional monetary cooperation and appointed Kawai, another proponent of the AMF, as its head. At the ADB conference, Kawai went so far as to say that “the [strengthened] CMI has the potential to become an Asian Monetary Fund.”78 On the heels of this Istanbul meeting, East Asian states‟ effort to multilateralize the CMI began in earnest. From May 2006, ASEAN plus Three countries started to work on the details of multilateralizing the CMI by agreeing to discuss such key issues as the total size of the fund, the form of funding, the legal modality, procedures and voting shares, and the proportion of contribution each state makes.79 On May 5th, 2007, finance ministers of ASEAN plus Three (China, Japan, and Korea) historically and unanimously agreed to launch a multilateral currency swap scheme. This scheme was to materialize by multilateralizing the Chiang Mai Initiative. At the Kyoto meeting, Asian finance ministers did not shy away from saying that the envisioned multilateral institution would be an “Asian version of the IMF,” which was first proposed by Japan in 1997 at the Annual Meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Hong Kong. Furthermore, on May 3rd, 2009, ASEAN plus Three concretized the multilateral currency swap scheme by agreeing to make it worth $120 billion: China and Japan will equally contribute $38.4 billion each to the making of the multilateral scheme while Korea does $19.4 billion. The rest of the fund comes from ASEAN countries. Accordingly, voting shares were also finalized. China and Japan would have each 36 percent. Korea wields 16 percent. ASEAN countries collectively own 20 percent. The form of funding would be self-reserved reserve pooling. When it comes to the legal modality, it was decided to be a legally binding singly contractual agreement. As such, what started out as a mere mechanism to address short-term liquidity difficulties in the region has been increasingly becoming an institutionalized framework for region-wide dialogue and cooperation that circumferences not only self-help and support mechanism, but also capital flows monitoring, policy review, coordination, and collective decision-making. In fact, East Asian financial regionalism, as it stands now, is about to bear fruit of establishing a de facto Asian Monetary Fund, as evident above. At the APT Finance Ministers‟ Meeting in 2005, policy changes were focused toward measures that enhance the effectiveness of the CMI in: (1) integration and enhancement of ASEAN+3 economic surveillance into the CMI framework; (2) clear-defining of the swap activation process and the adoption of a collective decision-making mechanism; (3) significant increase in the size of swaps; and (4) improvement of the drawdown mechanism.80 Moreover, the finance ministers

78 Asia Pacific Bulletin, May 13, 2005. 79 Chey 2009, 452. 80 Quoted in the “Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers‟ Meeting,” May 4, 2005; accessed at . Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. agreed to integrate and enhance the APT‟s ERPD (Economic Review and Policy Dialogue) process into the CMI framework. The APT Finance Ministers‟ Meeting in 2006 pushed the objectives further, adopting a collective decision-making procedure for the swap activation and initiating study to examine possible options towards an advanced framework for the regional liquidity support arrangement (CMI multilateralization or Post-CMI).81 As discussed above, this multilateralizing effort made substantial institutional developments in 2009 toward an Asian Monetary Fund (fund size, contribution size, voting shares, legal modality, form of funding). What remains for a fully loaded multilateral institution are lending conditionalities for release of funds (along with the finalization of surveillance mechanism), borrowing quotas, and decision-making mechanism, for which discussion is currently under way. In sum, the development of the CMI for the last nine years shows the two pieces of preliminary evidence for “regulatory regionalism.”82 For one, one observes the CMI‟s gradual policy shift (the regulatory dimension) from “minimizing financial instability” (short-term liquidity provision) to “managing” regional monetary cooperation (i.e., monitoring capital flows and developing regional surveillance). For the other, one observes the incremental approach by East Asian countries in loosening their adherence to the IMF (Asian states increased the amount of emergency liquidity available without IMF conditions from 10% to 20%). If an Asian Monetary Fund is to materialize in the near future, one may expect to see the complete independence from the IMF in lending policies and prescriptions. Additionally, the U.S. has been constantly excluded from all these institutional developments. Taken all together, the three hypotheses drawn from the “shared economic paradigm” observation are empirically corroborated. Although it is not completely guaranteed at this point if the CMI eventually grows into an independent Asian Monetary Fund without a formal tie with the IMF, the movement in that direction has been noticeable from the beginning. For example, most of ASEAN members (most notably Malaysia, but not Singapore) advocated the complete independence of the bilateral swap arrangement with the IMF conditionality. According to Sohn, Japan and China emphasized the importance of forging a cooperative relationship with the IMF at an early stage of the BSA development to make it more credible.83 The main reason/justification for their urge to retain a link to the IMF was that the region lacked any system of surveillance, which would be necessary for liquidity support. China and Japan persuaded Malaysia and other

81 Quoted in the “Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers‟ Meeting,” May 4, 2006; accessed at < http://www.aseansec.org/18390.htm>. 82 Since I have not yet conducted the field work, my assessment below is only suggestive. For the future, interviews and participatory observation (I am currently working out on this possibility with the Korean government to be part of Korean delegation) will greatly strengthen or revise the discussion below. 83 Sohn 2005, 497-498. I heavily draw on Sohn‟s account for the discussion below. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. opposing members to accept the linkage of the BSAs with the IMF conditionality as a temporary arrangement until a formal surveillance mechanism is put in place. The opposing members agreed to the IMF linkage on the condition of establishing a study group to examine the types of monitoring and surveillance systems for an independent regional financial arrangement. Since 2001, the commissioned study groups have discussed the development of regional surveillance. In particular, the Asian Development Bank (the ADB) has supported this process and developed a prototype for a regional early warning system that might be the beginning of regional surveillance capacity.84 So far, the development of a full-blown regional surveillance system is still a working project. Once it is to materialize, however, it is likely to be the keystone in furthering a regional monetary and financial system that might reflect “regulatory regionalism” discussed above.85

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this paper, I defined the crucial characteristic of East Asian financial regionalism in terms of its exclusionary nature, particularly intentional exclusion of the U.S., and the emergence of more formal and institutionalized regional economic cooperation. And I also broadly endorsed constructivist scholarship on the post-crisis Asian regionalism that uses an identity construct (or variable) called “East Asia” to account for the emergence of financial regionalism in the wake of the AFC. At the same time, however, I elucidated uncertainties on which the current constructivist scholarship built their identity-based causal claims. The uncertainties are due much to their failure to specify the content of such a shared identity as “East Asia,” without which the nature of East Asian states‟ attempts to exclude the U.S. from their regional institutional building efforts cannot be adequately addressed. By tracking the development of East Asian identity in relation to the U.S. (or the West) in various regional settings, I find that the content of East Asian identity is associated with East Asian states‟ shared understanding of the legitimate role of the state in facilitating economic development and stability. This analysis suggests that the emergence of East Asian financial regionalism is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. East Asian financial regionalism is anything but a product of “punctuated equilibrium” as conceptualized by many writers and pundits. As much as

84 Hamilton-Hart 2005, 113. 85 If one follows the logic of this paper‟s arguments, one can expect that an emerging CMI- cum-AMF would likely have its lending conditionality and prescriptions different from those of the IMF when it is to be created in the near future. The regulatory mechanisms would be unlikely to encroach upon the active role of the state in domestic economic governance. Japan‟s two-step loan practice for its ODA policy emphasizing the role of the recipient government in allocating loans to the necessary places may be a window into the shape of the emerging institution‟s regulatory mechanisms. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. East Asian identity is defined and discursively constructed in relation to the U.S. on the grounds of proponent and opponent of the U.S.-led “disembedded” liberalism, I argue that the very discursive condition that generates East Asia identity has an effect of excluding the U.S. from Asian regional institutional building efforts.

Conclusions on the future development of East Asian financial regionalism are hard because they demand that we come to closure on issues we are only just beginning to grasp. The two Western members of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, the U.S. and Australia, have now begun to worry about the exclusionary APT that they are not a part of. In particular, the U.S. is in dilemma. On the one hand, the U.S. does not certainly want the emergence of an East Asia-only institution that would challenge the existing IMF-led financial system management with distinctive lending policies and prescriptions. As shown above, the post-crisis East Asian states want to build their own regional cooperative mechanisms in which to effectively respond to the global-regional dialectic with sufficient autonomy. Otherwise, there is no rationale behind East Asian states‟ effort to build the exclusive regional monetary/financial cooperation.86 On the other hand, the U.S. cannot object to its development outright. The attempt to block it may draw backlash in the form of growing anti-Americanism in the region, which may bring out an unintended consequence of tightening East Asian states further.87 Given the critical influence of the U.S. on East Asian regional development in both integrative and disintegrative ways, it is not easy to predict whether or not, for example, East Asian financial regionalism would eventually grow like the EU‟s monetary/financial arrangements. But what I can say from the above analysis is that the exclusionary character of East Asian financial regionalism might be less prone to change than before, as the change requires removing an institutionalized, shared perception that encourages the self-other distinction among members and non-members. Likewise, it may well depend on U.S. policy choice regarding the ways in which it deals with global financial crisis and its associated treatment of neoliberal economic order. Would the exclusion of the U.S. continue to be practiced in East Asia?

86 See Pascha (2007) for a detailed discussion on this point. 87 Bergsten (2007, 7) in Chey (2009, fn. 55). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

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Session Ⅲ Power Shift in Northeast Asia and Korea-China Relationship

Chairperson: Nae-Young Lee (Korea University)

"Commercial Space versus Security Space: The Complex Institutions of Northeast Asia" T.J. Pempel (University of California, Berkeley)

"China and Her Neighboring Countries: Historical Patterns and Process" Xiaoming Zhang (Peking University)

"The Change of Korea-China Relationship after the Modern Treaty System" Kyujin Song (Korea University)

Discussants Young Jong Choi (Catholic University of Korea) Joo-Youn Jung (Korea University) Yunhee Kim (Hallym University)

T.J. Pempel Professor, Political Science Department, University of California at Berkeley

Paper presented at the Conference on “Historical Reflections on Transnational Order in Northeast Asia and Current Issues.” Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University, March 12-13, 2010

The turn of century has seen a substantial increase in the formal linkages among East Asian governments. Particularly prominent has been the creation of a number of multilateral regional bodies focused on economic cooperation, among the most prominent of which are the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), two of its major initiatives--the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI)--as well as a second bond market measure, the Asian Bond Fund, advocated by the region‘s various central banks. An explosion of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) has also added multiple connections among a variety of East Asian governments. In addition to such economic bodies, new multilateral ties have been created in the security arena, most notably the Six Party talks dealing with denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) connecting China, Russia and four central Asian republics on issues of energy cooperation and military security. Beyond those two, though hardly full-fledged ‗regional institutions‘ as the term is usually used, a number of regularized trilateral summits have been added to the East Asian mix of multilateralism, the most notable among these being the trilateral meetings among the APT‘s ―plus three,‖ namely the ROK, China and Japan. This flurry of institutional construction across East Asia defies the predictions of realist international relations scholars who confidently asserted that the end of the Cold War would see East Asia revert to Hobbesian anarchy resulting in an outbreak of animosities, if not actual hostilities (Buzan and Siegel, 1994; Friedberg, 1993; Waltz, 1993 inter alia). Other realists suggested these states might systematically balance against the US as the new global hegemon or against China as the new rising threat to the status quo (Mearscheimer, 2001). Asia is hardly short of national rivalries and confrontational rhetoric, but to date Asia‘s regionalizing moves show no signs of such hard balancing against either the US or China. Rather they indicate far greater region wide cooperation. Yet if pessimistic projections about rising animosities and hard balancing fail to capture East Asian realities, it would be equally mistaken to blindly embrace neo- institutionalist arguments that such bodies in themselves automatically reduce national

competition in favor of new mechanisms of coordination. Nor are constructivists fully correct in claims that these bodies represent a collective march toward a shared vision of an East Asian community though a more compelling case has been made that ASEAN represents a minilateral security community (Acharya, 2001). To date these bodies show little concrete evidence of either overwhelming institutional prowess or regional comity. This is not, however, to deny their significance. East Asia‘s moves toward increased formalization of relations and the explicit creation of multilateral institutions pose at least three analytic puzzles. First and most obvious, why the sudden burst of multilateral enthusiasm? Second, though Asian governments have formed a number of new multilateral bodies in both economics and security, why is there so little if any overlap in the institutions set up or in their respective memberships? And third, why despite the effusion of new bodies have most of them achieved such limited policy successes to date? The explosion in regional linkages in East Asia defies easy categorization as evidence of the inherent analytic superiority of one theoretical paradigm over the others. Instead, as I will argue below, the large number of new institutional ties reflects a sequence of disjointed East Asian efforts to deal with discrete changes in the global and regional balance of power. The institutional responses have typically been ad hoc, often contradictory, but largely pragmatic. Collectively, they have created a set of regional institutions that allow the states of East Asia to deal with commonly perceived threats. But these threats are many and distinctive, with quite different manifestations in economics as opposed to security. Since key states in the region continue to identify their interests and challenges quite differently from one another as well as quite distinct in the separate spheres of economics and security, most have been reluctant to surrender significant components of their national autonomy to these bodies. As such, most regional bodies in East Asia continue to reflect the preeminence and driving force of individual state strategies rather than any collective predisposition toward regionalism or multilateralism per se. East Asia‘s proliferation of so many distinct institutions with different memberships and limited agendas thus differentiates the East Asian organizational matrix from regional bodies in other geographical areas, such as the European Union, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the League of Arab States. However effective or ineffective these other bodies may be in practice, their driving rationale—unlike the various bodies in East Asia--is the presupposition of a community of geographically proximate states sharing a range of overlapping goals with few built in limits on the issues they can address. East Asia shows no such rationale. This is not, however, to say that East Asia‘s new regional bodies do not reflect congruent perceptions on specific problems, nor more importantly for the future, that some of these institutions will not become more expansive in their agendas, more integrative of economics and security issues, and more powerful in the outcomes they generate. To date East Asian regionalism is a complex ‗ecosystem‘ of regional institutions, but the future may Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

see the enhancement of some and the diminution of others through a process I would call ―institutional Darwinism.‖ Some of these bodies will perhaps thrive, adapt, and ideally contribute to solving important problems. Others will fare less well, perhaps ―surviving‖ but proving limited in their ability to adapt with a consequent decrease in their relevance, or in extreme cases their complete disappearance. This paper develops its argument three sections. The first analyzes East Asia‘s recent flurry of institution building in the economic and financial areas. It demonstrates that these have been created mostly as a reaction to the devastation of the financial crisis of 1997-98 where East Asian governments have come to see themselves as sharing a common purpose, namely collective protection from the threat to their continued prosperity posed by from the most sophistical products of global finance--rapid fire currency transfers, derivatives, sweeping trade liberalization, securitization, and even in some cases, short term stock market speculation. If there is a common ―enemy‖ against which East Asian regional economic institutions are directed, it is the exogenous force of global capitalism. And it is against such forces that the member states of East Asian have collaborated in an institutional matrix aimed by some at ‗hedging‘ and by others at ‗soft balancing.‘ The second section examines the smaller number of state-to-state activities in hard security. It demonstrates that membership in these shows little overlap with that for bodies formed in the economic arena or with one another. That, I argue, is because, in contrast to East Asian regional bodies aimed at collectively buffering against the outside forces of global finance, East Asia‘s security bodies are all directed at regionally endogenous security problems of a much more particularistic character. Extant security institutions are less about balancing and hedging against extra-regional forces and more about collective efforts at coordinating solutions to intra-regional problems while hedging against the surrender of ―too much‖ national sovereignty to the institutions created. Certainly none resemble what realists would have predicted institutionally, namely ―hard balancing‖ against powerful states, whether against the United States as the global military hegemon or against a ‗rising China.‘ Instead specific combinations of Asian states, despite their divergent security profiles, have united to deal through different institutions with tangible, intra-regional but non-existential security problems. Finally, a third section analyzes why most of these bodies to date have limited their focus to the separate functional areas of either economics or security. As well, it examines why so few have achieved banner successes. It offers the suggestion, derived largely from comparative institutional analysis combined with recent developments, that three interrelated things may be happening in spite of such apparent institutional weaknesses. First, East Asia may be witnessing an increased spillover between economic and security institutions. Second, these bodies may be engendering a measure of socialization toward common goals such that today‘s limited successes may later flourish into greater achievements. And finally, it suggests that not all of the current institutions are likely to prove equally robust and that any new East Asian architecture that emerges from today‘s Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

complex mixture of regional bodies will be the result of a process of institutional Darwinism in which institutions that prove their worth survive and thrive while those that do not will languish or vanish.

ECONOMIC INTERCONNECTION AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Why have Asian states so suddenly embraced regionalism in finance following decades of nationally autonomous strategies? During the crisis of 1997-98, many of the countries of East Asia saw their previously comfortable positions in the global system tumultuously upended, revealing in devastating ways their common vulnerabilities to unmediated interactions with global finance. Neither prior amity among themselves, nor a long term agenda, drove this recent regional cooperation. Rather it was the mutual realization of the collective vulnerabilities that each state faced in the absence of some form of institutional buffering. Benjamin Franklin‘s admonition to the signers of the Declaration of Independence is apt: ―we must all hang together or we shall most assuredly all hang separately.‖ Regional multilateral institutions in finance offer East Asian governments a breakwater against the menacing global currents that might otherwise sweep away their autonomy over national monetary and currency policies (Cohen, 1993, 2000) as well as institutional mechanisms to engage in collective soft balancing against the overweening financial power and predispositions of the United States, the International Monetary Fund, and the so-called ―Washington consensus‖ (on such soft balancing see Paul, 2004, 2005; He and Feng, 2008, inter alia) Economic development has become the driving preoccupation of virtually every East Asian government and ―economic security‖ has been an integral component in achieving what most call ―comprehensive security.‖ As the Asian growth experience has made clear, military and security affairs are hardly the only power game in global politics. By the late 1970s, with a few notable exceptions such as the DPRK and Myanmar, the domestically dominant coalitions in governments across the region were according far higher priority to domestic economic development than to external security threats or territorial expansion (Frost, 2008; Mahbubani, 2008; Overholt, 2008; Pempel, 1999; Woo- Cumings, 1999 inter alia). In the apt phrasing of Etel Solingen (2007: 760), East Asia‘s rulers ―pivoted their political survival on economic performance, export-led growth, and integration into the global political economy.‖ Intra-Asian investment and the development of region wide production networks were integral to these regional economic improvements. A sequence of multinational companies headquartered in East Asia separated functions such as design, manufacture, wholesaling and retailing, thereby allowing them to fragment their operations across multiple locations and create truly multinational production networks (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001; Ravenhill, 2009; Tachiki, 2005). In the process, East Asia as a region

took shape as a natural economic zone bringing region wide economic benefits to mass and elite alike. Rising currency values were a key engine of this process, starting with the boom in the Japanese yen following the 1971 breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. A subsequent jump in the yen, along with increases in the Korean won and the Taiwanese dollar, followed in 1985, with the Plaza Accord and America‘s second major dollar devaluation. Simultaneously, cross border ethnic and family ties among diasporadic Chinese business people nurtured what Naughton (1997) identified as the expanding ―China circles‖ across ―Greater China‖ (Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 1997; Pempel, 2005a) and large parts of Southeast Asia. Then as China began its sweeping economic reform program in 1979, investments flowed in from Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Perkins, 2007: 47; Ravenhill, 2009). Indeed, today China has itself become the source of considerable outgoing FDI. Such investments and regionalized production networks allowed Asian firms and Asian national economies to become integrated into the global economy while at the same time becoming more interdependent on one another. Between 1986 and 1992, for example, the intra-regional share of exports from Asian countries expanded from 31 percent to 43 percent (Kato, 1999: 6; Pempel, 1995: 54, 66). By 2008, intra-Asian trade had risen to 56 percent of total Asian trade, a figure close to that of the EU. Meanwhile from 1980 until the crisis of 1997, Asian shares of global exports more than doubled to nearly 20 percent. Formal regional multilateral institutions remained marginal to this success. Indeed, the quest for national economic growth often worked at cross-purposes with cross regional governmental cooperation. Moreover, as John Ravenhill (2008: 43-44) argues, the cooperative East Asian economic climate allowed individual multinational corporations to operate fluidly across national borders thereby reducing, rather than accelerating, business pressures on governments to create new regional institutions. East Asia‘s expanding and interconnected economic linkages forged a latticework driven, not by governments, but by the commercial activities of transnational firms and investors (Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 1997; Pempel 1997; inter alia). A region-wide ―Asia factory‖ was the result, churning out increasingly larger portions of global manufactured goods through ―market-style network integration,‖ a pattern that contrasted starkly with Europe‘s reliance on formal state-to-state integration. (Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 1997: 3). This mutually reinforcing combination of market and corporate ties, links to global economic institutions and markets, and minimal regional institutions provided the undergirding for the ―Asian miracle,‖ the decade or more of exceptionally high rates of GNP growth in virtually all the countries of East Asia (World Bank, 1995). The undeniable merits of rapid economic growth were however shadowed by less obvious regional downsides: Asian economies, with their often neo-mercantilist approaches to development, became an ongoing challenge to prevailing US and IMF views on the most appropriate roads to economic growth as well as numerous entrenched interests in the developed world. Equally, the stunning Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

economic successes across East Asia made the region vastly more attractive to potential investors, most of whom were operating with exceptionally short time horizons and minimal interest in the long term well being of their investment targets. As Asian growth rates soared, trade and investment disputes with the West mounted while vast amounts of ―hot money‖ surged into the region as Western fund managers scrambled to ride the crest of Asia‘s growth (Winters, 1999; Pempel, 1999; Ravenhill and Noble, 2000; inter alia). Many of the Asian financial systems into which this ‗hot money‘ surged were, however, not sophisticated enough to absorb this new capital without serious destabilization. Equally problematic, high levels of short term Asian borrowing from Western sources was combined with long term lending in local currencies pegged to the US dollar. The result was serious liquidity problems once the dollar strengthened and loans in local currencies became increasingly expensive to pay back in now more expensive dollars. Local currencies collapsed; Western investments fled; and a number of Asian governments were forced to devalue (Pempel, 1999). In the process, prevailing patterns of economic development were too often revealed to be highly vulnerable while internal banking and monetary flaws in many Asian states became nakedly apparent (Hamilton-Hart, 2008). As the financial crisis began to unfold, only Japan endeavored to provide liquidity assistance with a proposed $100 billion "Asian Monetary Fund." That proposal was summarily rejected (Amyx, 2004: 201-207). China was reluctant to part with its own wealth simply to aid impoverished neighbors, particularly when doing so would enhance the regional influence of Japan. Even more damaging, US Treasury Secretary Rubin and his deputy Larry Summers were strongly opposed, characterizing the Japanese plan as a potential institutional competitor with the IMF and (less vocally) as something that would undercut American monetary preeminence and their own interpretations of the desirability of globalized finance (Higgott, 1998; Pempel, 1999b; New York Times February 17, 1999: A8). In the interim, the crisis wreaked havoc across the region. Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, lacking any viable alternative, were forced to comply with the conditions imposed by the IMF while several other countries across the region opted for de facto IMF solutions. The US in turn used the crisis to press for widespread investment opportunities for American companies in the affected economies as a precondition for aid. ―The IMF,‖ Summers crowed, ―has done more to promote America‘s trade and investment agenda in East Asia than thirty years of bilateral trade negotiations‖ (quoted in Hale 1998, 25). Eventually Japan emerged as a lender of last resort through the New Miyazawa Initiative (October, 1998) but by then the psychological and economic damage had been done. Widespread resentment swept across Asia at what was perceived as a globalized attack on Asian development patterns, particularly national autonomy in monetary and currency policies. Hot money and seeming political vengeance on the one hand, plus unresponsive global institutions on the other afforded ample ammunition to Asian critics arguing that Asian economies should buffer themselves through regional institutions. Not untypical were the comments of Thai Deputy Prime Minister Supachai “We cannot rely on Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the International Monetary Fund but we must rely on regional cooperation.” Following the crisis, Asian governments proved willing to surrender elements of their sovereignty in creating a series of regional institutions designed to mitigate the prospects for any repeat of the crisis. These institutions were to offer a hedge, a firewall or soft balancing against the worst excesses of unmediated globalized finance even as individual governments took steps to self-insure by accumulating large war chests of currency reserves. ASEAN, with long institutional experience and a measure of self-confidence as a multilateral body, was the most single-minded driver of this new regionalizing endeavor. Following its accession to the WTO, China also became an active promoter of regionalism, as much for diplomatic as for financial reasons. Japan, anxious to salvage some version of its Asian Monetary Fund and to provide mechanisms for internationalizing the yen and regaining elements of economic leadership in the region, was also enthusiastic, though always wary of doing anything that would compromise in its close bilateral ties to the US. The most noteworthy institutional push toward financial integration came from the relatively new ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The APT format had began in mid-1995 when ASEAN linked with China, Japan and South Korea to serve as a counterpart body with the European Union in what became ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). In 1997, the ASEAN governments pressed to heighten APT‘s independent role, expanding it from a series of meetings among senior officials to a meeting of finance and economic ministers and eventually to an annual summit of heads of state. Once in place, this body with its thirteen national members became the go-to regional body driving regional cooperation in a variety of areas of finance. Continued national rivalries and security competition across Northeast Asia left ASEAN free to take the APT lead by default. As Jones and Smith (2007: 152-53) have rightly pointed out in contrast to the predictions of realism that the strong will make the rules, ―a shared sense of weakness rather than strength facilitated ASEAN‘s capacity to transform the regional order‖ leading to a discourse that was ―conducted according to the non-legalistic, consensus-oriented ASEAN way that represented a distinctive alternative to European styles of diplomacy…‖ One of the first APT moves was the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of May 6, 2000. CMI expanded existing ASEAN currency swap arrangements (ASA) and added a network of bilateral swaps (BSA) among the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and the ROK. All were structured to provide emergency liquidity in the event of any future crisis (Amyx, 2008; Grimes 2006, 2009; Henning, 2009; Pempel, 2006, 2008a). Initially dismissed as involving only limited amounts of money and requiring that most swaps be congruent with IMF regulations, CMI has since expanded its web of agreements as well as the amounts involved. By 2010, a total of $120 billion is involved and in May 2009 the CMI put in place a multinationalization agreement that created a pooling of funds into a collective centralized reserve fund with a single contractual agreement for the Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

withdrawal of funds. CMI has also initiated a regional surveillance mechanism called the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, while in conjunction with CMI, China, Japan and Korea have provided technical assistance and training for the monitoring of capital flows among some of East Asia‘s less advanced financial systems (Hamilton-Hart, 2008: 120; Henning, 2009: 3). Asian governments also moved to create bond markets denominated in local currencies. The more advanced economies in Asia have begun to develop an enriched Asian Bond Fund through their regional central banks, while CMI has pushed a separate Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). Combined these two efforts offer an additional opportunity for regional financial collaboration that simultaneously reduces Asian dependence on the US dollar for financial reserves, currency baskets, and international transactions. Important components include a local-currency bond market with a regional clearing and settlement system, a bond rating agency, a trading system and other sophisticated features (Pempel 2008a; Grimes 2006). These bond markets are designed to enable Asian governments to mobilize regional savings for intra-Asian investment thus reducing the region‘s dependency on the US dollar. Locally denominated bond markets would also limit Asia‘s vulnerability to any American abuse of its position as the issuer of the world‘s most popular currency, a particularly strong fear following the 2008-09 crisis and America‘s mounting governmental deficit. Though still thinly traded the Asian bond markets have begun to generate some buyers. Between 1997 and 2006, there was a doubling in the local currency bonds issued by Japan, and a 7.7 fold increase in those issued by the eight other major economies in the region (Asian Development Bank, Asian Bonds online). The motivation to balance and hedge in East Asian finance is underscored by the fact that individual governments moved independently but along the same road to enhance their treasure chest of foreign reserves. East Asia‘s collective financial muscle has ballooned since the crisis. In 1998 total East Asian reserves totaled $742 billion. By the middle of 2009, the four largest economies in Northeast Asia alone held over $3.7 trillion in reserves which constituted two-thirds of the world total. The People‘s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority lead the way with $1.97 trillion as of August 2008, with Japan a powerful second at just over $1 trillion; Taiwan (not a member of APT) held an additional $291 billion while the ROK had $248 billion (IMF, 2008). Even relatively underdeveloped Viet Nam held $27 billion in reserves. While these accumulations may suggest ―wasted‖ capital that could otherwise be invested domestically, they also constitute a formidable regional breakwater and hedge against speculative currency attacks. Further they reinforce the export oriented policies of key reserve holders; such accumulations (particularly by China but also by most others) are congruent with the maintenance of weak currencies that allow national exports to be cheaper (and hence more competitive) globally. Finally, to the extent that they become increasingly effective these institutions will provide a powerful

collective cudgel for Asian governments in any negotiations with the IMF and the United States. Three points are worth stressing. First, as Kim (2004: 35) has argued, though regional, APT, the CMI and the various bond market efforts are not anti-global. They do not represent any clean break with existing global bodies such as the IMF, the World Bank or the like; they do not move Asia toward an alternative Asian currency nor do they challenge dollar supremacy (Cohen, 2008). Instead, they represent a collective Asian ―search for new and better ways of managing the forces of globalization to the region‘s advantage by combining the resources of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.‖ These regional institutions offer defense mechanisms against previously unmediated global economic forces even as Asian governments remain members of existing global institutions. For potential lenders such as Japan, Korea, Singapore and China, sufficient links to the IMF ensure there are no blank checks for potential borrowers thereby reducing the problems of moral hazard (Pempel 2008a). Second, these new East Asian regional institutions are no longer pan-Pacific in membership, as was true for earlier bodies such as APEC or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Instead, since the crisis, East Asian governments have increasingly embraced an enhanced and integrative regional latticework composed almost exclusively of East Asian governments (MacIntyre, Pempel and Ravenhill, 2008). The US is not a party thus giving these institutions substantial weight as an institutional balance wheel against US financial hegemony. The new regional bodies, along with enhanced Asian reserves, provide Asian governments with increased economic buffering against unwanted but powerful global financial movements. At the same time, to the extent that Asian governments prove capable of acting collectively in the financial area they gain enhanced bargaining leverage as a region in any recalibration of IMF voting weights where Asia now is severely underrepresented. Not irrelevantly, their ―exclusively Asian‖ character provides a demonstrable East Asian willingness to do what the United States has not done in the run up to the 2008-09 and what the IMF urged (unnecessarily) on East Asia during the 1997-98 crisis: balance one‘s budget and live within one‘s means. Finally, the new institutions are almost exclusively focused on finance, not on trade, where Asian interactions with one another and with the global economy were less dramatically affected by the 1997-98 crisis. Corporate and national interdependence in trade have proven quite independent of the forces of global finance where East Asia had been demonstrably vulnerable. Furthermore, collective East Asian dependence on exports to the US market demonstrates the limited significance of the new regional financial institutions in drawing any broader geopolitical conclusions about Asia becoming a region at odds with the US. East Asian trade proved less vulnerable to globalization but it has not been ignored in the wake of the crisis. As was noted the huge buildup in foreign reserves across much of East Asia supported these countries‘ heavy reliance on weak currencies and export-led economic policies. To date, major importers such as the United States have shown far more predilection to sustain their politically appealing policies of cheap imports and low taxes Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

than to press hard for currency revaluations across East Asia. As further evidence that trade need not be an area that pits Asia versus the West, there has been no major effort toward the creation of some sort of regional customs union or regional trade group. The more longstanding Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which includes the US, remains the most conspicuous regional trade institution. Yet, since 2001-2002, by which time APEC had hit something of a brick wall in trade liberalization and the WTO‘s DOHA round failed to reach agreement, most East Asian governments became active promoters of bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (Aggarwal and Koo, 2008; Amyx, 2004, 2008; Dent, 2003; Grimes, 2009; Pempel 2008a; Suominen, 2009, inter alia). Virtually non-existent in Asia at the time of the crisis, such pacts have quickly become a favored state instrument designed to enhance intra-regional trade ties while retaining national influence over trade policies in ways that are independent of the now stalled negotiations in the Doha Round and limitations in APEC. Still as Suominen (2009) points out, many of the intra-Asian FTAs involve protectionist components for politically sensitive sectors, most typically agriculture, hence making many of them potential impediments to more comprehensive global trade liberalization. Thus it is clear that East Asian governments, since the crisis of 1997-98, have moved aggressively to create hedges for their monetary and currency systems, to a large extent engaging in soft balancing against ―global finance,‖ US financial hegemony, the ideology behind the ―Washington consensus,‖ and the institutional preeminence of the IMF while at the same time remaining substantially plugged in to the global system. Finally, in trade, FTAs have enhanced intra-regional interdependence but in complex and non- exclusive ways. Some FTAs, such as China-ASEAN or Korean-ASEAN are quite explicitly intra-regional while others such as Japan-Singapore are simply bilateral and in a few cases (e.g. Brunei, Singapore, New Zealand, Chile) the pacts are both intra-regionally multilateral and extra-Asian as well. Clearly, Asian approaches to trade suggest that governments across the region remain more comfortable with global processes in that area than then they do in finance. In all cases though individual national governments continue to drive the process and any regional bodies remain their creatures, with very few limits on national autonomy. This pattern is true as well in security.

SECURITY: NEITHER BALANCE OF POWER NOR CONCERT OF POWERS

East Asia is rife with intra-regional security challenges but it has no clearly agreed upon external ―enemy‖ to match East Asia‘s collective trepidations about global finance. Rather, as Michael Yahuda (2004: 229) points out, ―the defenses of most East Asian countries are directed against one another.‖ Still, despite pervasive frictions and contrary to neo-realist predictions, East Asia has been free of shooting wars since the pullback of Viet Nam from Cambodia while the last real shooting war ended in Northeast Asia with the 1953 Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

Korean Armistice. Moreover, as Muthiah Alagapa (2003: 1-33) and others (e.g. Cha, 2007: 110; Goh, 2007-08: 113; Kang, 2003) have shown, the number of serious internal and international security problems in the region have declined; many have been resolved; and most have been stabilized. Military statistics underscore this improved security climate. As Solingen (2007: 757) points out: ―Existing disputes have been restrained as never before in recent history, and major powers have normalized diplomatic relations despite continued tensions…. Military modernization has not undermined macroeconomic and regional stability. Military expenditures relative to GNP have declined from 2.6% (1985) to 1.8% (2001), lower than world averages of 5.4% (1985 and 2.5% (2001), with parallel declines—in most states—in military expenditures relative to central government expenditures.‖ Despite periodic bursts of nationalist bombast, East Asian governments continue to prioritize economic development over irredentist territorial claims and military freelancing. As Armstrong (2006: 257-58) has phrased it ―although historical animosities and distrust among China, South Korea, and Japan, not to mention Russia, persist, in recent years, the conversations among the respective governments have tended to focus more on free trade areas and increasing cooperation at all levels‖ Nevertheless, numerous East Asian governments remain highly suspicious of one another particularly regarding their neighbors‘ enhanced abilities in areas such as power projection, cyber warfare, missile defense, and space militarization. As such, collectivist regional approaches in military security have been minimal. Until very recently, the main security architecture within the region involved the complex of bilateral military alliances (and other non-alliance arrangements such as that with Taiwan) between the United States and countries such as Japan, the ROK and the Philippines. Despite the demise of their major target, the USSR, and the economic transformations undergone by China, these alliances continue to give a ―hub and spoke‖ structuring to hard security relations across the region, reaffirming America‘s military predominance, As Walt (2009: 109) has argued ―Desert Storm, the Kosovo War, the ouster of the Taliban, and Operation Iraqi Freedom all demonstrated that the United States had unmatched military power—as if anyone had real doubts—but these actions did not provoke a wave of realignments toward the United States.‖ Barry Posen (2003) puts it differently. The US military, he argues, retains ―command of the commons,‖ i.e., it can operate with impunity in the air, on oceans and in space and can defeat any single power in a direct battlefield test. Given such awesome American military predominance as well as the conviction of many governments in Asia that American military prowess has been a stabilizing force in the region, the countries of East Asia have not sought to counterbalance the US. Instead they have come together (sometimes with the US) in a variety of forums aimed at a mixture of confidence building, non-traditional security, and specific problem solving. ASEAN has long represented something of a mini-lateral exception to the absence of regional security multilateralism. Originally formed in 1967 in response to collective Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

worries by the individual countries of Southeast Asia about their vulnerability to bullying by the major powers, ASEAN has in its forty plus years moved toward becoming a genuine security community. It actively helped to resolve the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict (Acharya, 2001); it has tentatively agreed with China to a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the East China Sea; and it has broadened its comprehensiveness by welcoming Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar as members, despite the communist or authoritarian nature of all four. Particularly significant, all of the ASEAN ten as well as China, Australia, New Zealand and India have signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation committing themselves to peaceful resolution of any conflicts among themselves. (On July 22, 2009, the US also became a signatory to the TAC). ASEAN has also been active in efforts to resolve non- traditional security problems that confront its members. Given this history, it was not surprising that ASEAN took the initiative in attempting to weave Northeast Asia into its own style of security cooperation by creating the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Buzan. 2001: 156; Goh and Acharya, 2008). As with the ASEAN Plus Three (noted above), the ARF was integral to what Evelyn Goh (2007- 2008: 121) has labeled an ASEAN strategy of ―omni enmeshment‖ through a series of formal institutions and governmental processes by which ASEAN patterns could be made region wide. The ―ASEAN way‖ would expand beyond Southeast Asia to become the ―Asian way.‖ Under ASEAN‘s mantle, the ARF has fostered confidence building measures (CMBs) including military-to-military exchanges as well as collective efforts to address non-traditional security problems such as small arms smuggling, trafficking in drugs and persons, illegal immigrants, maritime security, and money laundering (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2004). Nonetheless, ARF‘s successes have been constrained by the reluctance of some members to allow ARF to address the more taxing problems involved in preventive diplomacy, i.e. areas where nation states actually risk direct hard security confrontations with one another. Southeast Asia, through Singapore‘s International Institute for Strategic Studies, has also been the locus of the annual Shangri-la Dialogue process that since its formation in 2002 has brought together Defense Ministers and national military heads from a range of twenty-odd Asia-Pacific countries for discussions on outstanding security issues. Though set-piece speeches dominate the plenary sessions, the key to Shangri-la‘s appeal lies in the less formal bilateral meetings that occur behind the klieg lights, for which separate meeting rooms are reserved well in advance. These allow for top-level dialogues on bilateral and regional security matters. Shangri-la has limited organizational structure relying instead on the secretariats of the ARF. (International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009). Its significance however is demonstrated at a minimum by the fact that top level officials show up regularly to engage in ad hoc deal making behind the scenes. Meanwhile in an expansion of pre-existing bilateralism based on the American alliances, Japan, the US and the ROK forged the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

Group (TCOG) and have subsequently met as a trio while the US, Australia, and Japan are collectively involved in a similar but independent three party process that is also noteworthy as Japan‘s first explicit military agreement with a country other than the US. Such triangles seek to enhance the collective influence and coordination among the members, and might be seen as one possible exception to the argument that Asia has witnessed no balancing against a ‗rising China.‘ (But as will be noted below, other arrangements that include many of the same states involve explicitly cooperative actions with China.) Two additional regional bodies are focused on dealing with hard security confrontations but in very specific circumstances. The first is the Six Party Talks dealing with the nuclear activities of North Korea (DPRK) and the second is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), another body of six countries focused on security in East and Central Asia, particularly security from Islamic terrorism. Neither has a membership comprehensive of all East Asian countries; both are directed against intra-regional as opposed to exogenous threats; and each is quite particularistic in the security problems it addresses. The Six Party Talks (SPT) grew out of longstanding efforts, driven primarily by the US, to prevent the DPRK from pursuing a nuclear weapons program and to limit the possibilities for global nuclear proliferation. The problems go back at least to 1993-94 when the DPRK, claiming the need for security against a putatively hostile US, threatened to leave the NPT in pursuit of a nuclear program. Eighteen months later, following a serious risk of a US military strike (e.g. Perry, 2006), bilateral negotiations between the US and the DPRK led to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Under the agreement, the DPRK program was halted, the country remained within the NPT, and IAEA inspectors continued inspections of DPRK plutonium facilities. In exchange the North was given security guarantees and promised energy assistance, most notably two light water reactors. A mini-regional body, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established by the US, Japan and the ROK to deal with the energy components of the agreement (the EU later joined as a member of the KEDO executive board). Until 2002, despite much delay in delivering on promised aid, and recurring finger pointing about deliberate foot-dragging and mutual non-compliance, the Agreed Framework held ensuring a measure of tense regional stability. The final months of the Clinton Administration saw a conspicuous warming of bilateral ties as the DPRK sent its second-in-command, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, to Washington in October and Secretary of State Madeline Albright reciprocated with a visit to Pyongyang and a meeting with Kim Jong-il. A tentative visit by Clinton himself was considered until it became clear that time was too short, and, more critically, that the incoming Bush administration would not endorse such a move. Upon taking office, the Bush government rejected the Clinton approach, undertook a complete review of DPRK policy, and opted for a more confrontational stance, including accusations that the DPRK was secretly in pursuit of a highly enriched program (HEU), that it was part of an ―axis of evil,‖ Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

and that its leader was a ―pygmy‖ whom Bush ―loathed.‖ ―Regime change‖ became the overarching Bush goal (Pempel, 2008b; Pritchard, 2007). Meanwhile, Japan was simultaneously endeavoring to normalize its ties with the North, the only country with which it does not enjoy normal diplomatic relations. Following more than a year of secret meetings with the DPRK, Japan received assurances that the regime would acknowledge its role in earlier kidnappings of Japanese citizens and the path appeared clear for normalization. With those expectations, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi went to Pyongyang in September 2002. The fall of 2002 proved pivotal in what became a rapidly deteriorating diplomatic situation. In Japan, the government faced a firestorm of public opposition fanned by conservative politicians and the Japanese media at Kim‘s admission that the North had indeed conducted a program of abducting Japanese citizens decades earlier and at the dubious accounting for those declared dead by the North. Almost simultaneously, a US mission to Pyongyang confronted the regime with the claim that US intelligence showed that the DPRK was in violation of the Agreed Framework by undertaking a highly enriched uranium program (HEU) linked to Pakistan‘s A.Q. Khan network. In response (or as critics would contend, as part of a longstanding plan to develop a nuclear capability), the DPRK bolted from the APT, banned IAEA inspections, and began a rushed program of both missile testing and nuclear production (Pritchard, 2007). These events unleashed security uncertainties across Northeast Asia. Months of mutual recriminations between the US and the DPRK eventually led to the initiation of the Six Party Talks. ushering in a new multilateral process involving the two Koreas, the US, Japan, China and Russia. China has chaired the talks from the start but the negotiations made clear that all six parties had widely differing priorities. Five rounds of talks, starting in 2003 achieved little progress until July 2006 when the DPRK tested a series of missiles and then on October 9, an actual nuclear test. Pressures from Japan and China, the DPRK tests, and subsequently Congressional victories by the Democratic Party in November 2006 combined to soften the American stance including acceptance of bilateral talks outside the Beijing framework, specifically in Berlin in January 2007. Talks resumed on February 8, 2007 and a major agreement was issued on February 13 that was largely a reformulation of an earlier September 2005 agreement. Four points were critical to the agreements: 1) the verifiable and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; 2) a return by the DPRK to the NPT and the IAEA inspection regime; 3) guarantees by the United States not to attack the DPRK, a respect for its sovereignty, and the commitment to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the peninsula; and 4) promotion by all six parties of economic cooperation on a bilateral and multilateral basis (full statements and details at U.S. Department of State, 2007). By fall 2008, despite clear indications that the DPRK had transferred nuclear material and know how to Syria whose facilities were destroyed by Israeli bombers, the process had advanced substantially with the destruction of the DPRK‘s Yongbyong nuclear Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

facility and the presentation of what it declared to be the full and complete declaration of its nuclear history. The US responded by removing the DPRK from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. These successes led some to speculate that the SPT could be the basis for a new ―concert of powers‖ in Northeast Asia. Quickly however the bargains unraveled. The DPRK holds that the US changed the terms and advanced the timetable for verification, that Japan refused to supply its required quota of heavy fuel oil, and that the Lee Myung-bok government in the ROK was refusing to abide by agreements made by its predecessors. Critics of the North countered that hard-liners, succession problems, and a desire to enhance their nuclear credibility by further testing unleashed last minute DPRK resistance. Regardless, by summer 2009 Yongbyon had been restarted; the DPRK had launched a number of missiles and carried out a second and more successful nuclear test. The DPRK was also insisting that it would never return to the Six Party Talks instead demanding bilateral negotiations with the US from its now demonstrated position as a ―nuclear power.‖ As events spin forward, it is not clear if there is a viable future for the SPT. Advocates of multilateral and regional diplomacy press to resume the talks. But even though the UN Security Council has passed a unanimous resolution condemning the North and instituting a variety of economic sanctions it is not clear that: a) all parties, particularly China and Russia, will be equally tough in sanctions enforcement, or b) that sanctions, even if fully implemented, will be sufficient to force the North to return to the talks, to forego its nuclear program, or even more problematic, to forego its nuclear arsenal. If the Six Party Talks do in fact resume, they may serve primarily to ritualize the conflict, rather than to denuclearize the peninsula. One other regional security forum deserves attention, namely the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), even though it spills geographically beyond ―East Asia.‖ But with Russia and China as two of its six members it is an important part of the region‘s changing security architecture. China and Russia have long been concerned about the possibility of Muslim-driven separatism in Xinjiang and Chechnya respectively as well as the broader spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Their concerns are matched by those of their Central Asian partners. SCO began in 1996 (as the Shanghai Five) and was officially launched with its current six members on June 15, 2001--China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. SCO has, as its primary focus, internal military security and economic cooperation, particularly within the energy field. Extensive security and military cooperation has taken place among the members. Military forces have been reduced on the borders of member states while their six militaries have also held annual joint exercises (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2008). Beyond such actions, SCO has established a permanent secretariat in Beijing, a regional counter terrorism center in Tashkent, and it has undertaken activities in a broad range of areas from military and law enforcement to health care and cultural exchange (Cole and Jensen, 2009: 264-65) Despite this range of Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

cooperative activities, however, SCO, like ASEAN, is founded on a strong commitment to respect for national sovereignty. Since its formation, SCO has also welcomed a number of countries as observers, including Iran, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Turkmenistan. SCO‘s joint military activities are the only such actions by an Asian regional body. All of this raises the possibility that the SCO might emerge as an ―anti-NATO,‖ even though its charter states explicitly that it ―is not an alliance directed against other states and regions and it adheres to the principle of openness.‖ SCO certainly provides a potential challenge to US advances in the deployment of its missile defense systems. It has also made it more difficult for the US or NATO countries, now engaged militarily in neighboring Afghanistan, to think quite so easily about expanding their actions in Central Asia. And on July 5, 2005, SCO called on the U.S. to set a timeline for its withdrawal of military forces from the region while its August 2007 meeting in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, led to a reaffirmation that "Stability and security in Central Asia are best ensured primarily through efforts taken by the nations of the region on the basis of existing regional associations." (Kucera, 2007) Both the Six Party Talks and the SCO represent non-trivial moves toward security multilateralism that bring together highly contentious parties, although with very different targets and quite different implications for global security relations. Yet, both institutions are directed not at creating a security community to withstand or offset some external threat, but at structuring collective responses to specific intra-regional security challenges—North Korea in the case of the Six Party Talks and separatism and terrorism for SCO. In both cases the regional bodies are closer to a ‗concert of powers‘ than to a ‗balance of powers.‘ In this regard they complement geographically the already longstanding security concert among the ASEAN states. Collectively they represent regional multilateral efforts to deal with narrow but undeniable security challenges within the region.

FUSING ECONOMICS AND SECURITY?

The governments of East Asia, as noted above, have consistently given exceptional priority to their economic security and economic development. And Asia‘s economies are increasingly interdependent. Given these facts, can the hitherto separate areas of economics and security be fused in some institutional form that might foster more comprehensive approaches to issues in both areas, eventually fostering a deeper sense of regional community? Three institutional developments move partly in that direction: the East Asian Summit (EAS), the ―securitization‖ of APEC (Higgott, 2004) and a sequence of trilateral summits. EAS began in 2005. Its ambitious goal was to create a comprehensive ―East Asian Community‖ capable of cross-border collaboration on a host of issues, including, but not restricted to, economic cooperation and development as well as diplomacy and security. Initially opposed by many in Washington as either irrelevant without the US or as an Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

explicit threat to US interests, the EAS was pushed most strongly by Japan, Indonesia and Singapore, all of whom were troubled by the preeminent influence of the PRC within the APT. Hence, EAS emerged independently of APT with a broader membership that includes the thirteen APT countries plus India, New Zealand and Australia. In principle the larger membership should expand both the security and economic interests of the members, but with a consequent dilution of common purpose. The first two EAS meetings were long on rhetoric and short on tangible outcomes despite an ambitious framework for cooperation on energy, environment, economics, education and a host of non-traditional security challenges such as pandemic diseases. The second meeting also lent support to efforts at a more traditional security issue, namely denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This sweeping orientation was continued in the third EAS meeting in Singapore in November 2007. However the fourth meeting was rescheduled several times and eventually cancelled due to political turmoil in the host country, Thailand. EAS has yet to prove that it can become a viable and influential regional body. So far its actions have been largely stymied by competing national views on power and influence within the region leaving its messages largely advisory and admonitory. The cancellation in 2009 combined with Chinese skepticism about the potential for EAS to become more significant than APT leave its future rather uncertain. Meawhile, the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11 pressed APEC to move beyond its original focus on economic issues and to take positions on regional security challenges. Many members have been reluctant to mix the two types of issues and APEC‘s cache declined as many governments opted to advance their economic aims, not through APEC, but through the financial multilateralization and FTAs noted above. Still, APEC normally draws its members‘ leaders to its annual meetings, again offering the possibility for top level diplomacy on any issues they wish to discuss. Third, East Asia has witnessed an emerging geometry of overlapping but distinctive trilateral summits that also seek to fuse economics and security. In the section on security above, note was taken of those triangular arrangements that extended cooperation among partners in America‘s pre-existing ‗hub and spoke‘ alliance architecture. But two additional triangles structure quite different combinations that defy older Cold War arrangements. One grows out of the ASEAN Plus 3 (APT) process. As was noted above, APT has focused largely on financial matters, showing minimal interest in hard security issues. However the ―plus 3‖ leaders (Japan, China, and the ROK) long met in mini-summits in conjunction with the APT meetings to discuss any and all issues of mutual concern, including security. More recently, in December, 2008 in Japan and October, 2009, the three leaders from China, Japan and the ROK came together completely outside the auspices of APT for trilateral summits that ended with agreement to cooperate on all outstanding issues, economic and security (Iida, 2009). In a similar vein, China has proposed, and Japan and the US have accepted, that those three countries‘ have senior level meetings on a regular basis. Thus East Asia and the Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

Asia-Pacific now have a number of partly overlapping triangles, some of which reflect traditional security ties, but others of which forge new links that defy traditional security arrangements. All are dependent on top level dialogues among key national leaders. And as Haftel‘s research (2007) has demonstrated, the combination of economic interdependence and regular meetings among high-level officials has proven to be a powerful combination in mitigating violent conflict among states. The analysis of these various multilateral regional bodies makes it clear that the nation states of East Asia continue to be driven far more by their quite distinctive national agendas than by any preexisting region wide comity. Moreover, the drivers toward regionalizing finance remain distinct from those bodies driving security multilateralism. Aside from minilateral ASEAN and possibly the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the various triangles of leaders, none of these bodies aspires to be functionally comprehensive in the range of issues addressed. Similarly, virtually all of the new bodies are severely circumscribed in their administrative structures and policymaking autonomy; they are hardly institutions radiating deep levels of mutual trust, a common agenda, and a willingness to sacrifice large measures of state autonomy in pursuit of a common purpose. Instead they reflect the underlying wariness of their members about one another as well as their collective reluctance to surrender substantial national sovereignty. East Asian governments have approached the new regionalism as tentatively as the cautious man in the Korean admonition that ―one should tap even a stone bridge before crossing.‖ As a consequence, few East Asian institutions have to date achieved major policy breakthroughs or established their centrality as robust providers of regionwide solutions to complex problems. Thus, CMI was not activated when the interaction of high oil prices and domestic fuel subsidies worsened the budgetary outlook and caused a currency crash in Indonesia in the summer of 2006, nor was it used when the Thai baht tumbled in December 2007. And when Korea faced a liquidity problem in December 2008, it turned not to the CMI but to the US Federal Reserve. CMI retains considerable potential but its ability to stabilize exchange rates depends on the extent to which governments use it. So far they have shown a reluctance to do so (Eichengreen: 2007: 96). Similarly Asian bond markets have yet to establish themselves as powerful and fluid monetary instruments in local capital markets. National competition has also been a stronger driver than multilateral cooperation in the different postures taken by Japan, Korea, and China regarding FTAs. The ARF has achieved limited success in confidence building and non-traditional security cooperation, but it has not effectively dealt with any hard security problems in the region. The Six Party Talks looked as if they had made substantial progress by mid-2008 but subsequent events make any declaration of policy victories premature. And the EAS has so far proven longer on rhetoric than on substantive outputs. To date, although East Asian governments have moved toward greater institutional formalization and greater governmental cooperation their major moves in economics and Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

security have been driven by quite different agendas--financial bodies by collective efforts to insulate East Asia‘s national development efforts from any repetition of the tsunami driven by the tides of globalized finance, trade by the common desire to foster both intra- regional and global trade in the wake of slowdown in progress by APEC and the Doha Round, and security bodies by particularistic intra-Asian security challenges. And to date most bodies have been limited at best in their achievements. Given those experiences, is there much potential that these bodies will gain greater influence or that activities in economic and financial regionalism might become fused with those in security to undergird a broader communitarian approach to all major issues across East Asia? The answer to this question may depend heavily on process. Each individual institution noted above may well have been designed rationally to solve a particular nexus of cooperation problems in discrete issue areas (Koremenos, Lipson, and Sindal, 2001; Pierson, 2000). Yet, the countries of the region have not shown sufficient overlap in their perceptions and approaches to these discrete policy problems to impel them to create any single body aimed at ―regionalizing‖ a broad range of commonly analyzed problems. Instead, East Asia‘s institutional pattern has been a helter-skelter bevy of organizational forms, separate institutional targets, and both overlapping and conflicting membership and institutions that are typically highly consrtained in their ability to act autonomously and robustly. Yet comparative analysis has shown that institutions can evolve over time in both purpose and power (e.g. Thelen, 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005) in the process acquiring a prevailing role as the structurer of members‘ interactions (e.g. North, 1990; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). Thus East Asia‘s current state of numerous institutions advancing diverse goals and exercising limited power may well evolve over time toward greater institutional consolidation, enhanced member trust, and greater robustness in institutional power. Despite the limited successes of many East Asian multilateral bodies, the very fact of meeting regularly, of searching for areas of agreement, and of developing patterns of cooperation and trust are all probable outcomes of ―institutionalizing cooperation.‖ To the extent that current problems can be resolved, the opportunities and the mutual trust needed to address different and additional problems, whether regional or bilateral, go up. The early ASEAN and OSCE experiences reinforce this point. Importantly, ASEAN, the ARF, the Six Party Process, and SCO also provide powerful mechanisms for socialization of members into common patterns of conduct and collaborative norms, the end result of which is potentially greater understanding of competing national motivations and eventually, reduced conflict. Acharya (2001), Buzan (2003), and Johnston (2003) among others have provided compelling evidence that socialization of originally skeptical members has been a tangible benefit of various multilateral bodies in East Asia. Furthermore, institutions promise the possibilities of ‗spill overs‘ from one functional area to another as it becomes clear how problems in one area can not be Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

satisfactorily resolved without dealing with problems in cognate areas. Certainly East Asia‘s now multiple trilateral bodies are being driven by efforts to solve a bevy of functionally different issues and retain the possibility for various fusions and trade offs across economic and security issues. The forum with the greatest potential for linking security and economics may ironically be the Six Party Talks. All of the region‘s major players are involved and despite recent setbacks all but the DPRK remain committed to the Six Party process. If the current problems can be resolved, the mechanisms are in place for the SPT to continue as a process and to address future security problems. Furthermore, despite their differences, the participants all share one central objective to varying degrees, namely the reduction of the DPRK‘s threats to regional security and the integration of the DPRK into the regional economy. It is naïve to assume that greater economic interactions alone will eliminate security conflicts. But to hold out such a vision of growth and regional economic integration before the DPRK‘s leaders is likely to be a powerful motivation—at least for some of those leaders--toward changed behavior and closer ties with the immediate neighborhood. There is no guarantee of such an integrative and expansive institutional course; a host of factors will combine to shape the future of these bodies. But institutional experiences from elsewhere, including the European Union, ASEAN and CSCE, suggest that East Asia‘s now inchoate institutional ingredients might ultimately be brewed into a regionally- acceptable communitarian porridge. East Asian regionalism is thus likely to be at the early stages of what I would call ―institutional Darwinism,‖ a process of institutional competition and selection in which those institutions which prove themselves adaptable to changing environments and capable of generating trust among their members will expand and thrive while those that do not will languish and perhaps die. East Asia today is an ecosystem with numerous multilateral institutions, of various purposes and divergent powers. Yet, just like the survival of the fittest in the animal kingdom, East Asia‘s now multiple structures may well be poised to replicate a similar process. Those that prove effective and can generate support from members will survive; those that do not will perish. East Asia‘s future architecture is almost certain to reflect the results of such a process.

NOTES

This paper was first prepared under a grant from the East Asian Institute, Korea University. It was presented at seminars in Taiwan National University, Keio University, Korea University, and Beijing University, Beijing, China. I would like to thank the Luce Foundation, EAI and the hosting institutions and seminar participants for their support and helpful suggestions. Kristi Govella provided important research help. Useful comments were also provided by Stephan Haggard, Todd H. Hall, Peter J. Katzenstein, Ellis S. Krauss

and two anonymous reviewers. As usual, any remaining errors of fact or judgment remain my responsibility.

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China’s geopolitical location is quite unique. She has been surrounded by many continental and maritime neighbors on all sides over the past two thousands years. Today she has more neighboring countries than any other country in the world does, by sharing land borders with 14 countries, and maritime borders with 8 countries (two of them, North Korea and Vietnam, share both land borders and maritime borders with China). If we count those countries which do not share common borders with China but are geographically close to China in the category of China’s neighboring countries (such as Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives in South Asia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in Central Asia), then we could easily find out that China today is now surrounded by about 30 neighboring countries in the east, south, west, and north. In addition, several of China’s neighboring countries are big powers, such as Russia, Japan, India, and even the United States. I regard the United States as a “special neighboring country” of China, because the US has been the only super power in world in the post-Cold War era, she has had a great influence and played an important role in the surrounding areas of China. 1 As a result, to deal with the neighboring countries and ensure a favorable external security environment in the surrounding areas (or zhoubian waijiao in Chinese) has always been on the top of the policy agenda of the various Chinese governments. In fact, China is probably the only big power in the world that has been much concerned about her relationship with the neighboring countries by expending so many resources in dealing with her neighbors. But China’s relationship with her neighboring countries has a quite long history and it has always been in the process of change. It is the purpose of this article to describe and analyze the historical patterns and changing process of China’s relationship with her neighboring countries over the past more than two thousands years. From the Qin Dynasty until the end of the Cold War, there were three patterns of China’s relations with her neighbors, namely the Sino-centric pattern, the Western-dominated pattern, and the two supper powers-dominated pattern. A new pattern has been emerging in the post-Cold War era. An open regional community would be an ideal one, although there would be other possibilities. There are two critical factors or variables that have always been driving China’s relationship with her neighboring countries in the direction of change: the system-

1 See my definition of “China‟s neighboring countries” in Zhang Xiaoming, Zhongguo Zhoubian Anquan Huanjing Fenxi[China‟s Security Environment in Her Surrounding Areas] (Beijing: China International Broadcasting Press, 2003), “Preface”, p. 4. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. level variable (global and regional international systems), and the unit-level variable (including China’s domestic politics). We could see the interplay of the system-level factor and the unit-level factor in the historical evolutionary process of China’s relations with her neighboring countries.

THE SINO-CENTRIC PATTERN

The first historical pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries is the Sino-centric tributary relationship, and it had lasted for about two thousand years. It is a very unique form of inter-state or international relations which was formed much earlier before the modern international relations developed in Europe, and quite different from the interactions of sovereign states. From the first unification of China by Emperor Qin Shihuang in 211 BC until the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, China had been the so-called “Middle Kingdom”. For about two thousands years, China had been the most developed and powerful country in East Asia. The Chinese rulers therefore used to regard their country as the only “civilized” entity or civilization in the world and treated her neighbors as “barbarians” or so-called si yi (four tribes), namely man, yi, di, and rong, although the “barbarians” did conquer the Chinese empires and established non-Chinese rules time and again, such as the Mongol Empire and Qing Empire, and then absorbed into the Chinese culture. 2 With the superiority (both real and perceived) in material and cultural terms, China had then been at the center of the East Asian regional international system or dominated the regional international system. Most of the neighboring countries paid tributes to the Chinese emperors from time to time, and a tributary relationship was formed and lasted for about two thousands years. The tributary relationship was the basis of the China-centered East Asian regional order. It should be pointed that, among China’s neighboring countries, Japan was an exception, by remaining outside the China-centered regional order for most of the time. Although the Japanese were borrowers of Chinese culture, and the Japanese feudal rulers did occasionally pay tributes to the Chinese emperors in order to facilitate trade, the geographic isolation (magnified later by human design) produced in the Japanese “a strong sense of self-identity and self-consciousness”.3 In the China-centered tributary relationship, there were actually not real state-to-state relations among the neighboring countries of China. In fact, the only external contact of a neighboring country was to pay tributes to the

2 John King Fairbank, Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 112-126, pp. 143-146; John King Fairbank, China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p.45. 3 Edwin O. Reischauer, Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity, enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p.32. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Chinese emperors on a regular basis, from once a year to once every 10 years. 4 China’s relationship with her neighbors could be characterized as a center-peripheral relationship. It is really a kind of unequal and vertical relationship, with China at the center and neighboring countries being treated as inferior. Some scholars named it as “hua yi oder” or “tributary system”.5 The Sino-centric tributary system was not only the result of the superior position China had enjoyed in East Asia, but also the natural product of the pre-modern world where several isolated and independent regional international systems coexisted. Before the European colonists conquered the world and the modern international system expanded from Europe to the other regions of the earth, there were several relatively isolated and independent regional international systems in the world. The China-centered East Asian international system was one of them. It was isolated from the other civilizations mostly by geographical barriers, almost free from the influence of the outside world. As a result, China could enjoy and maintain her dominant position in East Asia for such a long time. The China-centered East Asian regional international system was based on an unequal tributary relationship, and it was quite unique and fundamentally different from the modern interstate system or international system which was based on the principle of sovereignty. The China-centered East Asian tributary system lasted for about two thousands years, much longer than the modern states system. It was a unique regional international system or society, with its own organizing principles, rules, norms and institutions, although different from the anarchical international system of sovereign states. Neither could it be simply categorized as a hierarchical empire. Martin Wight named the China-centered East Asian regional international system as the “suzerain-state system”, differentiating it from the states system formed by “sovereign states”. 6 Hedley Bull regarded the China-centered tributary system or “suzerain-state system” as neither states system nor international society, because

4 In Qing Dyansty, Korea paid tributes to China once a year, Liu Qiu (Okinawa) once every two year, An Nam (Vietnam) once every three years, Xian Luo (Tailand) once every four years, Su Lu once every five years, and Laos and Burma once every ten years. Cui Pi, Dongbeiya Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu [History of Northeast Asian International Relations] (Changchun: Northeast China Normal University Press, 1992), p. 29. 5 The Chinese scholars haven‟t not reached a consensus on the time of the formation of the tributary system. Some scholars argued that it only existed in the Ming Dynast (1369-1644). Professor He Fangchuan argued that the unification of China by Qin laid the foundation for the formation of the tributary system and the tributary system developed to be an international relations system in Han Dynasty, although it was only at the preliminary stage. It had been undergoing evolution in the following Chinese dynasties, especially in Tan, Song, Ming and Qing dynasties. See He Fangchuan, “Hua Yi Zhixu Lun,” (“On the Tributary System”), Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Peking University), No. 6 （1998）, pp.30-45. 6 Martin Wight, Systems of States (London: Leicester University Press and London School of Economics, 1977), p. 23. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. it was a system in which only one state (the suzerain state itself) possesses sovereignty and maintains supremacy over the vassals.7 Within the tributary system, China was no doubt the leading power, or to use the contemporary term, a regional “hegemon”, by guiding and controlling the foreign relations of her neighboring countries. It is exactly one of Adam Watson’s hegemonic international systems in which we see “the role of hegemony and of great powers in the structuring of the international systems”. 8 But in sharp contrast to the Western hegemons or empires, China did not establish a direct control over her vassals. Neither were the tributary states China’s colonies. That is to say, China’s influence on her neighboring countries was mostly cultural and political in nature, rather than the direct control by territorial annexation and military occupation. In other words, the accommodation of China did not involve “a significant loss of national independence, as nearby states were largely free to conduct their domestic and foreign policy independent of China.”9 And in economic terms, the tributary system was a form of international trade in East Asia.10 The envoys of the vassal states used to bring their home countries’ products to China and traded them with that of the Chinese businessmen. And the value of the Chinese emperors’ return “gifts” to the tributary states was usually much higher than that of the paid tributes. To some extent, the Chinese emperors used the tributary system to maintain a good relationship with her neighbors and ensure her own national security. As one American scholar agued, the tributary system was basically a defensive system, based on Confucius morality and cultural superiority rather than treaties and military dominance. 11 Of course, the Chinese empires did use forces to establish and maintain a tributary relationship with a neighboring country from time to time, especially on the Korean Peninsula and Indochina Peninsula. China did occasionally launched military attacks upon some of her neighboring countries. For example, after overrunning the Chinese Empire, the Mongols attempted to invade Japan by sending troops against it in 1274 and again in 1281. They were the greatest overseas expeditions the world had as yet seen. But these expeditions were turned back more by the weather (the great typhoon, or “divine wind” as called by the Japanese) than by the relatively small groups of Japanese knights who tried to beat them off. 12 China’s relationship with the Korean Peninsula before the Opium War was one of the typical examples of the center-peripheral relationship characterized as the tributary

7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1995), pp. 10-11. 8 Adam Watson, Hegemony & History (New York and London: Routledge: 2007), p. 103. 9 David C. Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Economical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/2004), pp. 165-180. 10 Takeshi Hamashita, Jindai Zhongguo de Guoji Qiji [The International Opportunity for the Modern China] , Chinese translation (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1999), p.35. 11 John King Fairbank, Edvin Reischauer, China: Traditions and Transformations, Chinese translation (Nanjing, Jiangsu: Jiangsu People‟s Press, 1996), p. 349. 12 Edwin O. Reischauer, Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity, enlarged edition, pp. 55-56. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. system. For centuries, China had been the dominant power on the Korean Peninsula, by maintaining a relatively stable and close relationship with the countries in that area. The countries on the Korean Peninsula were basically autonomous in dealing with their domestic affairs and paid tributes to the Chinese emperors on regular basis. At times the Chinese rulers did send troops to invade or even temporarily occupy parts of the peninsula in order to maintain the tributary relationship. And at the invitation of the Korean ruler, China also sent troops to the Korean Peninsula to assist the Korean against the Japanese invasions from 1592 to 1598. Korea was treated by China as a younger brother and the bilateral relationship was surely unequal and hierarchical. But as argued by some researchers, the Sinocentric tributary system differed from territorial absorption and outright political domination, because that system was based less on force than persuasion, emulation, it was as much cultural as political. It also promoted bilateral commercial and cultural exchanges.13 From the late sixteenth century, China’s position on the Korean Peninsula began to be challenged by other powers, first of all, Japan. But before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Sino- Korean tributary relationship basically remained intact. In the China-dominated tributary system, the challenges to China’s national security mainly came from the Northern tribal nomads for over 2,000 years down to the 19th century. As John King Fairbank commented, “Inner Asia never ceased to play a vital military- strategic role on her continental frontier…Inner Asia produced mounted archers raised in the saddle, under tribal leaders who periodically united for invasion. The nomad cavalry invasions of North China grew more powerful and irresistible century by century. Early invaders were absorbed into border states. Later they set up Sino-barbarian dynasties—first along the Great Wall (the Liao Dynasty of the Khitan Mongols, 907-1125), then in North China (the Chin Dynasty of the Jurchen, 1125-1222), and finally over the whole country (the Yuan Dynasty of the Mongols, 1279-1368, and the Ch’ing Dynasty of the Manchus, 1644-1911).” 14 On the other hand, China also faced challenges from some of its tributary states and Japan (such as Hydeyoshi’s invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598), in addition to the Japanese pirates. In 1609, Ryukyu, a tributary state of China, was conquered by Stasuma, the great southern Kyushu feudal domain, and thereafter were a tightly held sub fief of Satsuma, although the Ryukyu’s kings were allowed to continue to pay “tribute” to China as a means of maintaining a clandestine foreign trade with the outside world in Satsuma’s behalf, till 1874. Further more, beginning in late 16th century and early 17th century, the Western colonialists appeared in the East Asia, by the ways of exploration, trade, and territorial conquest, which posed a great challenge to the tributary system. The colonial Russian empire even became a new neighbor of the Chinese empire by territorial expansions

13 Lee Chae-jin, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 1996), pp. 1-2; Choe Yong-shik, “A Look at Sino-Korean Tributary Relations,” The Korea Times, February 9, 1998, p. 12. 14 John King Fairbank, China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p.45 Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. in East Asia. But the China-centered tributary system had not collapsed until the beginning of the Opium War in 1840, the Qing Dynasty government even treated the West European countries as tributary states before the outbreak of that war.15

WESTERN-DOMINATED PATTERN

The second pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries is the unequal relationship dominated by the Western powers. It was the product of the Western colonial conquest and the expansion of the modern international system from Europe to the other parts of the world, including East Asia. It was also the result of the internal decline of the last Chinese empire. That pattern started as the Opium War broke out in 1840, and ended as the Second World War came to a close in 1945. Beginning in the mid-19th century, the Western colonial powers gradually opened the door of China and her neighbors by the use of force or threat of force. The Opium War, a turning point in Sino-Western relations, smashed China’s arrogance and cultural self- confidence. China was compelled by the British superior military force to accept unequal treaty provisions, first with Britain, then with France and the US, followed by a series of other unequal treaties. At the same time, most of the China’s neighboring countries (including China’s tributary states), became colonies or semi-colonies of the Western powers. As a result, the Western-centered international system expanded into East Asia and replaced the China-centered tributary system as the regional order. But on the other hand, the Western powers had not assigned an independent status or sovereign status to much of East Asia before the beginning of 20th century, even before the end of the World War II. Japan was the only exception. Shortly after Commodore Perry forced the Japanese to open their door to the West, Japan jumped up to be one of the “Western powers” or a “civilized” member of the Western-dominated international society, although there was a tension between Westernization and anti-Western attitudes in the process of modernization. 16 The Sino-British Opium War was also a turning point in the history of China’s relations with her neighboring countries. That war was a great challenge the European capitalism posed against the oriental feudalism, and a great challenge of the modern international system against the pre-modern China-centered East Asian regional international system.17 The Qing dynasty could not take an appropriate response towards the Western pressure and lost the war. For a full century after 1842, China remained subject

15 Cui Pi, Dongbeiya Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu [History of Northeast Asian International Relations], p. 29; Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), pp. 68-69. 16 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 183-199; Michael Green, “Japan in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, ed, .International Relations of Asia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 170-91. 17 China: Traditions and Transformations, Chinese translation, p. 278. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. to a system of international relations characterized by the “unequal treaties” forced upon China by the Western powers, beginning with the Treaty of Nanjing, and they were not formally abolished until 1943. 18 That is to say, since the end of the Opium War until almost the end of the World War II, China had not be recognized as a full sovereign state and a full member of the Western-dominated international society, but a semi-colonial and semi- independent country in the modern international system. Almost at the same time, China’s neighboring countries, such as Ryukyu Islands, Vietnam, Burma, and Korea, etc, were colonized by the Western powers one by one. The British and Russian even encroached upon Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia which were not China’s tributary states but parts of Chinese empire’s territory, administered by the Qing’s Li Fan Yuan. The Outer Mongolia declared independent in 1911 with the support of the Russian government. That is to say, beginning with the Opium War, China lost all of her tributary states, even parts of her own territory. As a result, the isolated pattern of China-centered tributary relationship gradually collapsed and was replaced by the pattern of the West-dominated interaction between China and her neighbors in East Asia. The basis or organizing principle of the second pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries was colonialism, power politics and international law. In the second historical pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries, the Western powers enjoyed dominant influence in China and her surrounding areas. To some extent, from the Opium War until the end of the World War II, China’s relations with her neighboring countries had to be regarded as China’s relationship with the Western colonial powers, because most of China’s once tributary states were then annexed or colonized by the Western powers. For instance, in 1909, the Chinese government established a consulate division in the capital of Burma, it was not the Chinese diplomatic mission sent to Burma, but a Chinese consulate agent stationing in a British colony, and it was part of Chinese embassy in London. 19 It should be pointed out that, after the Meiji Restoration, Japan, a neighboring country of China, joined the club of Western colonial powers in quite a short time, and then posed a great challenge to once the China-centered East Asian regional order and China’s own national security. Japan annexed Ryukyu Islands in later 1870s. As for the Korean Peninsula, China’s dominance in that area was also ended by the Japanese challenge. The Japanese strategists regarded the Korean Peninsula as a convenient “invasion corridor” to and from Japan and tried to keep Korean Peninsula under its control. Hydeyoshi invaded Korea in 1592, and with the help of the Chinese forces, Korean finally repelled the invaders

18 Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China‟s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 1. 19 Yu Dingbang, Zhong mian guanxi shi [History of Sino-Burmese Relations] (Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 2000), p. 251 Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. in 1598. 20 Strengthened by the Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan opened the “Hermit Kingdom” by force in 1876. The Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea developed into a war in 1894-1895. China was defeated and forced by Japan to recognize “the full and complete independence and autonomy” of Korea. The Sino-Japanese war in 1894-1895 inflicted a great human suffering and humiliation upon China and drove its influence away from the Korean Peninsula. From then on, China’s lack of a direct role in Korea had since then lasted for more than half a century. 21 In 1910, shortly after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), Korea was annexed to Japan. Japan did not lose her dominance over Korea until the end of the World War II.22 Even worse, shortly after Japan annexed the Korean peninsula, the Japanese military launched a full-scale invasion against China in 1930s and 1940s, posing the greatest threat to China’s national security. In a word, the second pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries was the result of the interplay of the system-level and unit-level factors, namely the expansion of modern international system into East Asia and the decline of the last Chinese empire. As the once Chinese tributary states became colonies or semi-colonies of the Western powers, China’s relations with her neighbors were reflected as the relationship between China and the Western powers. In that historical period, the greatest threat that China had been facing, came obviously from the Western colonial powers, including the Westernized Japan. China even fought several bloody wars with those countries, including the two Sino-Japanese wars (1894-1895, 1931-1945).

TWO SUPPER POWERS-CENTERED PATTERN

The third pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries was the two superpowers-centered Cold War pattern, and it lasted for about half a century. Generally speaking, it was not only the result of the world-wide East-West Cold War, but also the product of the Chinese domestic politics and its changing policy orientations during the Cold War. After the end of the World War II, China and her neighbors had a great opportunity to free themselves from the yoke of colonialism and imperialism, and became fully independent modern nation-states, and they succeeded by various efforts for national independence. China even became one of the five permanent members of the newly established Security Council, United Nations. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and other countries, joined the community of nation-states after a struggle for national independence. The Republic of China recognized the

20 Yang Zhaoquan, Zhongchao guanxi lunwen ji [Selected Essays on Sino-Korean Relations] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1987), pp. 100-160. 21 Lee Chae-jin, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations., p. 3. 22 Kim Hakjoon, Korea‟s Relations with Her Neighbors in a Changing World (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1993), pp. 579-587. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. independence of the Outer Mongolia in early 1946, and the independence of Mongolian People’s Republic was also recognized by the People’s Republic of China in Sino-Soviet alliance treaty signed in 1951. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Republic of Korea (ROK) were founded on the Korean Peninsula shortly after the end of the World War II. In a word, with the end of the World War II, China and her neighboring countries emerged as the modern nation states by joining the international society of sovereign countries. China’s relations with her neighbors entered into a new era. China could develop her relations with all of the neighboring countries on the basis of independence and sovereignty. At the same time, however，with the end of the World War II, the structure and process of international system was undergoing a dramatic change. The structural change of the international system plus ideological confrontation led to the start of the Cold War. 23 The Cold War imposed a great restraint on China’s relations with her neighbors and dominated the global and regional international politics for nearly half a century. During the four-decades Cold War, China’s relations with her neighboring countries reflected the Cold War confrontation, and to some extent, it was part of the Cold War. Soviet Union was no doubt the most important neighboring countries of China, and the United States also became a very special neighboring country of China which had a great impact upon China’s national security. Therefore, China’s relations with the two super powers in the Cold War, had been actually at the center of China’s relationship with her neighboring countries, and the development of China’s relations with her neighboring countries coincided with the development of China’s relations with the two super powers. In addition, China’s relations with her neighboring countries during the Cold War, to a great extent, had a close relationship with China’s policy orientation. That is to say, China’s domestic politics and different approaches towards the two super powers in different periods, had a great restraint upon China’s relations with her neighboring countries. Generally speaking, China’s interaction with her neighboring countries in the Cold War years, reflected the Cold War pattern and the dominant influence of the two super powers. From late 1940s until late 1950s, China joined the so-called Socialist Camp let by the Soviet Union and allied with her Communist neighbors (such as the Soviet Union, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.) against the US and her allies (they were also China’s neighboring countries, such as Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand.). China signed an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union in February 1950, and the USSR became the greatest friend of the newly-founded PRC. At the same time, the US was posing the greatest threat to the PRC’s national security as the US applied its strategy of containment toward the PRC, a close ally of the USSR. In the early 1950s, China fought a bloody war with the US on the Korean Peninsula (1950-1953 Korean War) by assisting the

23 Zhang Xiaoming, Lengzhan Jiqi Yichan [Cold War and Its Legacy] (Shanghai: Shanghai People‟s Press, 1998), pp. 1-36. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) against the US and her ally, the Republic of Korea (ROK). The Chinese paid a high price for that war. 24 The PRC also offered political, economic and military assistance to the North Vietnamese communist regime first against the French, then against the American.25 Further more, China and the US got involved into two regional crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954-1955 and 1958 respectively.26 In a word, from the founding of the PRC in 1949 until late 1950s, China’s relations with her neighboring countries was a reflection of the two camps’ confrontation, the US was then posing the greatest threat to the PRC’s national security. It should be pointed out that, in the 1950s, the PRC also took great efforts to develop a new kind of relationship with her neighboring countries by establishing diplomatic relations with those “neutral” neighboring countries in the Cold War. China established diplomatic relations with India (1950), Indonesia (1950), Burma (1950), Pakistan (1951), Afghanistan (1955), Nepal (1955), Sri Lanka (1957), and Cambodia (1958). 27 In addition, the Chinese delegation, led by Premier Zhou Enlai, also attended the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Countries held in Indonesia in 1955. The conciliatory and flexible diplomatic posture the Chinese premier demonstrated during and after the Bandung Conference, improved China’s image on the regional international stage and help China earn the trust of and support from those non-allied countries in her neighborhood. Maintaining friendly and stable bilateral relations with the neutral neighboring states, not only improved the Chinese security environment in the surrounding areas, but also gave China a great opportunity to move beyond the Cold War’s restraint. But unfortunately, China’s relations with the neutral neighbors were harmed by the ideological radicalism in the 1960s. Beginning in late 1950s and early 1960s, the East-West Cold War and China’s relations with the two super powers were undergoing great changes. The two super powers improved their bilateral relations after the end of Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. China’s domestic politics and her relations with the two super powers were also undergoing a dramatic change. The Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy started to “turn left” or

24 Pei Jianzhang, et al, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiao Shi, 1949-1956 [ A Diplomatic History of the PRC, 1949-1956] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), p.9; Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun Zongbu [At the Headquarters of the Chinese People‟s Volunteers] (Beijing: The PLA Press, 1989, pp. 659-660. 25 Pei Jianzhang, et al, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiao Shi, 1949-1956 [ A Diplomatic History of the PRC, 1949-1956], pp. 220-221; Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-1954,” The China Quarterly (March 1993); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950- 1975 ( Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina, 2000). 26 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 143-144. 27 Xie Yixian, et al, Zhongguo Waijiao Shi: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shiqi, 1949-1979 [A Diplomatic History of the PRC, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan People‟s Press, 1988), pp. 18-20; Han Nianlong, et al, Dandai Zhongguo Waijiao [Diplomacy of Contemporary China] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1988), pp. 476-477. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. radicalize, as demonstrated by the “Great Leap Forward” movement and the Sino-Soviet ideological debates. A rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship developed, and the Soviet Union gradually became the most dangerous and threatening neighbor of China. The two countries even had a border clash in March 1969. Further more, The Sino-Soviet rift had a great impact on China’s relations with the other neighboring communist countries. China’s relations with some of them (such as Mongolia) deteriorated. At the same time, Sino- American relations did not improve, even became worse, because the Kennedy and Johnson administrations regarded the radicalizing China as a more warlike and dangerous enemy than the USSR.28 As result, in the 1960s, China was very isolated on the international stage and faced threats from both of the two super powers, and China was forced into confrontation with two enemies: the US and the USSR. In the meantime, China’s “left” or revolutionary approach towards her neighboring countries also led to the worsening of her bilateral relations with some of her neighboring countries in the 1960s, especially with those countries in Southeast Asia. The Chinese tried to export revolution in her neighborhood by assisting the local communist parties in the Southeast Asia at the height of the Cultural Revolution which was quite harmful to the bilateral relations between China and the Southeast Asian nationalist “bourgeois” regimes. The Chinese were suspected of playing a role in the young radical officers-led coup in Indonesia on September 30, 1965, which resulted in the downfall of the “left” Shkarno regime and eventual breakdown of China’s diplomatic relations with Indonesia. 29 China also got involved in armed conflicts over territorial disputes with India and the USSR in 1962 and 1969 respectively. As a result, China was much feared or isolated by her neighbors in the 1960s. From late 1960s and early 1970s, with the worsening of the Sino-Soviet relationship and the improvement of the Sino-American relationship, China perceived the Soviet threat as being more dangerous than the US threat, and actually allied with the US and her allies (such as Japan) against the Soviet Union and her allies in the neighborhood. As a result, China normalized diplomatic relationship with some of her non-communist neighbors, including Japan, and some Southeast Asian countries. But in the meantime, the Soviet Union imposed a great pressure on China by stationing more troops in its Far East and Mongolia, beginning to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and Backfire intermediate-range bombers in the Far East in 1977, and expanding its influence in some countries bordering China, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, in an attempt to contain China.30 China’s relationship with India and Vietnam deteriorated, and China even had a border war with Vietnam in early 1979 shortly after the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in

28 Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948- 1972 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 223; Zhang Xiaoming, Lengzhan Jiqi Yichan [Cold War and Its Legacy] (Shanghai: Shanghai People‟s Press, 1998), pp.297-301. 29 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold Wa: Third World Intervention and the Making of Our Timer, paperback edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.187-189. 30 Kaneko Yuzeru, Sakaguchi Yoshiaki, Mayama Katsuhiko, “Japan‟s Security in the Change Eurasian Strategic Environment,” IIDS Security Reports, No. 3 (March 2003), pp. 1-37. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. late 1978. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, posed another great threat to the western part of China. Because of the hostility of the USSR and it allies in China’s neighborhood, China did not enjoy a normal bilateral relationship with all of her neighbors until late 1980s and early 1990s, when the Soviet leader Gorbachev’s “new thinking” diplomacy led to the improvement of the Sino-Soviet relations and China’s relations with Mongolia, Vietnam and India, also began to improve. In a word, the Cold War and the two superpowers had a great influence on China’s relations with her neighbors. To some extent, the two super powers dominated the development of China’s relations with her neighboring countries during the Cold War. The restraint of the Cold War on China’s relations with her neighbors was especially true in China-Korea relations. The end of the World War II and the onset of the Cold War led to the political division of the Korean peninsula. The two superpower’s rivalry, to a great extent, dominated the political development of the peninsula during the Cold War. On June 25, 1950, a bloody conflict between North Korea and South Korea erupted and developed into a large-scale “hot war” between the East and the West. The United States reacted to the war swiftly by sending its forces to rescue the ROK. American-led UN forces successfully repelled the North’s strike, then crossed the 38th parallel and moved on to the Yalu river, the borderline shared by the DPRK and the PRC. The newly-founded PRC, a close neighbor and political ally of the DPRK, came to aid the North Koreans by sending its forces to the Korean Peninsula to fight the UN troops. The PRC and DPRK had ever since been close allies against the US and the ROK until the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War years, relations between the PRC and ROK were virtually non-existent, “the two adversaries employed policies of containment, non-dialogue, and non-recognition against one another.”31 It needs to be pointed out that, we witnessed China’s new conception and efforts to overcome the superpowers’ restraint, or escape the ideological diplomacy towards her neighboring countries, for the purpose of ensuring a favorable international environment in the surrounding areas in the late 1980s, by taking an “independent” policy posture in dealing with her neighbors which paved the way for the post-Cold War China’s relations with her neighbors. De-ideologization was one of those efforts in China’s new policy orientation. China gradually recovered its regional identity and took economy-first policy in the neighborhood. The Chinese government announced a new party-to-party policy in early 1980s and has adhered to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the neighboring countries ever since which brought China and her neighbors closer. And China tried to take a balanced approach toward the two superpowers in late 1980s by taking an “independent foreign policy”. Although China continued to develop relations with the US, she also improved her relations with the USSR. The party general secretary of the USSR

31 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), p. 32. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Gorbachev paid a visit to China in the spring of 1989 which symbolized the normalization of the bilateral relations between Beijing and Moscow. China made its first purchase of Russian weaponry in 1990 in the wake of the post-Tiananmen Western Arms boycott, at a time when Russian worldwide arms sales were in decline following the defeat of former Soviet client Iraq in the 1991.32 China also signed its first border treaty with the USSR in early 1991.

AN EMERGING NEW PATTERN: A REGIONAL COMMUNITY?

Beginning in late 1980s and early 1990s, the international system has been undergoing a dramatic change again, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union resulted in the collapse of the bipolar structure and the end of the Cold War. This kind of political change has been bringing a far-reaching influence upon China’s relations with her neighboring countries. We have already witnessed the following changes in the relationship between China and her neighbors over the past two decades since the end of the Cold War. First of all, with the end of the Cold War and the removal of the political and ideological barriers, China succeeded in normalizing relations with all of her once neighboring adversaries, including Russia, Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and India. China has resolved all the land border disputes with her neighboring countries, except the one with India, although the Chinese disputes on territorial water with Japan and Southeast Asian countries are still there. China also established diplomatic relations with Singapore, Brunei, the five newly independent Central Asian nations, and the Republic of Korea after the end of the Cold War. In fact, the PRC has been maintaining a basically normal and stable relations with all of her neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. That is why some Chinese scholars argued in early 1990s that in the post-Cold War era, China began to enjoy the most favorable security environment in the surrounding areas after the founding of the PRC, even after the end of the Opium War. 33 Secondly, the number of China’s neighbors increased and some regional organizations emerged as important actors in the regional political, military and economic affairs. In Central Asia, five new independent states came into being after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. They are the new neighboring countries of China, and China established diplomatic relations with those countries in 1992. 34 Three of the Central Asian nations have common borders with China, and signed border treaties with China in 1994- 2000. ASEAN, a regional organization founded in 1960s, was expanded to include all of the

32 Samuel Kim, The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 338. 33 Xue Jundu and Lu Zhongwei, eds., Mianxiang Er Shi Yi Shiji De Zhonguo Zhoubian Xingshi (China‟s Security Environment in the Surrounding Areas in the New Millennium) (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 1995), p. 319. 34 Tian Zengpei, et al, Gaige Kaifang Yilai De Zhongguo Waijiao [Chinese Diplomacy since the Reform and Open Door] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1993), pp. 255-256. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. ten Southeast Asian countries after the end of the Cold War. ASEAN and the other regional multilateral organizations, such as APEC and ARF, are playing more and more important roles in the regional affairs, including China’s relations with her neighbors. That is to say, China has to deal with more neighboring entities, including the new neighboring countries and those non-state neighboring entities in the post-Cold War era. Thirdly, with the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the bipolar international system was replaced by the “uni-multipolar” international system35, and the United States became the most important player in China’s neighboring areas. It is not so hard for us to understand the increasing influence of the United States in the surrounding areas of China in the post-Cold War era as the US became the only superpower in the world after the collapse of the USSR. The US troops continue to station in Japan and South Korea. The US-Japan alliance has been greatly strengthened in the post-Cold War ear. The US launched a war in Afghanistan in 2003, and it has been dominating Afghanistan political development ever since. The Afghanistan War also helped the US to spread its influence into the Central Asia. The US has been getting involved into the regional “hot spots” in China’s neighboring areas, such as the North Korean nuclear issue. As the only superpower in the world, the US might try to contain the rise of a potential challenger, and take the rise of China into serious consideration. Some of China’s neighbors are also trying to use the American influence to balance China’s rising power. China’s relationship with the United States is going to have a great influence on the future development of China’s relations with her neighboring countries. Finally, but not the least of all, the end of the Cold War brought about the fast development of the regional multilateralism in China’s neighboring areas, and as a result, regional international institutions, such as regional multilateral organization, forums and conferences, have been playing a more and more important role in China’s relations with her neighboring countries. With end of the Cold War, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was enlarged to cover all of the Southeast Asian countries. ASEAN has been pursuing its goals to build a regional economic community, a security community, and a cultural community. Further more, ASEAN has been taking great efforts to promote East Asian regional multilateral cooperation by initiating or co-sponsoring the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus 3 meetings (ASEAN plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea), ASEAN-China free trade area, and East Asian Summit. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Six-Parties Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue, Boau Asian Forum, etc, have also been playing an increasing role in promoting the regional multilateral cooperation. The regional multilateralism has

35 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2 (March/April 1999). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. been a factor with increasing effect on the development of China’s relations with her neighboring countries in the post-Cold War era. 36 At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, China has also been in the process of change in a dramatic way. China’s power, especially her economic power has enjoyed a rapid growth speed. The so-called “rise of China” has become a massive cliché in the in the post-Cold War era, especially in the early 21st century. In late 1990s, there were still debates on whether China was a big power, as Gerald Segal raised the question “Does China Matter?” in Foreign Affairs in 1999.37 But in the early 21st century, “the rise of China as a great power has become nearly conventional wisdom among most scholars, pundits, and policy-makers in the West.”38 The effect of a rising China on the global and regional international society has been taken into serious account by the analysts ever since. In recent years, great quantities of ink have been spent on analyzing what this “rise” implies for the rest of East Asia, for the United States, and for the world. 39 As John Ikenberry elaborated on the rise of China and its impact on the future of the West in Foreign Affairs in early 2008. 40 “Peaceful rise”, a concept articulated by some Chinese strategists and then expressed by the Chinese top leaders in 2003, has become a research topic itself in IR scholarship. 41 Some of the Western observers found that with the increasing power, China has become much more confident and active on the world stage, or the rise of China is reshaping the strategic map in the world politics. 42A commentator

36 Chia Siow Yue, “The Rise of China and Emergent East Asian Regionalism,” in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of Chan and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc, 2004); Hugh De Santis, “The Dragon the the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism, World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Summer, 2005), pp. 23-36; Zhang Yunling, ed., Emerging East Asian Regionalism: Trend and Response (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005); Douglas Webber and Bertrand Fort, eds., Regional Integration in Europe and East Asia: Convergence and Divergence? (London: Routledge, 2006); Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., Asia‟s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 37 Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, No.5 (1999), pp. 24-36. 38 Samuel S. Kim, “China in World Politics,” in Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot, eds., Does China Matters? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal (London: Routeledge, 2004), p. 40. 39 Morton Albramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Chasing the Sun: Rethinking East Asian Policy (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2006), pp. 13-14. 40 John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberalism Survive?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.87, No.1 (January/February 2008), pp.23-37. 41 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: Then Ascension and Demise of the Theory of „Peaceful Rise‟”, China Quarterly, 190 (June 2007), pp. 291-310. 42 David Shambaugh, Power Shift: China & Asia‟s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Robert Sutter, China‟s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); John Mearsheimer, “China‟s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History, Vol.105, No. 690 (April 2006), pp. 160-162; David Scott, China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System (London: Routledge, 2007); Evan S. Medeiros et al, Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China‟s Rise (Santa Monica: The Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. argued that, “In the last few years, China’s foreign policy has both become much more active and reached out to parts of the world where its presence was marginal in the past.” 43 The irony here is that, as one China expert pointed out, China’s own assessments of trends in comprehensive national power in comparative terms are quite pessimistic about its ability to catch up to the US.44 And as a survey recently released by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and East Asia Institute found, the responses directly called into question the conventional wisdom that China was chipping into, if not overshadowing, US soft power and showed that the US continues to wield considerable soft power in Asia. 45 The “rise of China” and everything relating to change in China has been shaping the development of China’s relations with her neighboring countries, especially in terms of regional multilateralism or East Asian community building. In the post-Cold War era, China’s regional policy in her neighborhood has undergone transformation, by moving beyond the traditional bilateralism and embracing multilateralism, especially since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.46 In the post-Cold War era, China has been trying to use regional multilateralism cooperation as an important instrument to pursue a “favourable international environment” in the neighborhood to promote its modernization drive. Chinese leaders emphasized from time to time that China would stick to the strategy of peaceful development, and China’s development would be an opportunity, rather than a threat to its neighbors. But China’s growing power and influence in regional and global terms has already aroused fear and anxiety in some of China’s neighboring countries. Some of China’s neighbors were suspicious of China’s regional policy, especially during and after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. China has to assure its neighbors that it will be a responsible and benign power. 47 Multilateral cooperation might help to overcome the lingering mistrust of Beijing. As one scholar argued, “Politically, China’s embrace of multilateralism in Asia will also help to burnish its good neighbor image.” 48 On the other hand, as the economic interdependence between China and her neighbors further developed, the increasingly binding economic

Rand Corporation, 2008); Yong Deng, China‟s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 43 Jean-Perre Cabestan, “China Is Reaching Out to the New World,” Asian Perspective, Vol.30, No.4 (2007), p. 5. 44 Samuel S. Kim, “China in World Politics,” in Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot, eds., Does China Matters? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal, p. 40. 45 Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, eds., Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Publics Opinions, new results and analysis 2009 edition (Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2009), http: www.thechicagocouncil.org 46 Jianwei Wang, “Chinese Perspectives on Multilateralism Security Cooperation,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1998), pp. 103-132. 47 Chia Siow Yue, “The Rise of China and Emergent East Asian Regionalism,” Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc., 2004), p. 52. 48 Hugh De Santis, “The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism,” World Policy Journal,, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 23-36. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. interests encourage China to take an active attitude towards the regional multilateral economic cooperation with her East Asian neighbors. Even so, China has developed a more active attitude toward participation in regional multilateral institutions since the late 1990s, especially since the Asian financial crisis. In recent years, China has been playing a much more active role at ASEAN+3, APEC, and other regional multilateral institutions in East Asia, even taking a lead in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Further, the Chinese decision makers and intellectuals have demonstrated a great interest in the community building in East Asia.49 As commented by an analyst, “today, Chinese policy- makers see considerable potential for the progression of Chinese objectives in the region, and China’s economic and security interests are perceived as being best served by engagement and cooperation—both through bilateral relations with individual regional states and through multilateral processed including the active promotion of formal regional institutions.” 50 In the post-Cold War era, as the (global and regional) international system and China have been undergoing dramatic changes mentioned above, a new pattern of China’s relations with her neighbors has been emerging. This article begins with the main argument that (global and regional) system-level and state-level variables have always been driving China’s relations with her neighboring countries in the direction of change. The three historical patterns of China’s relationship with her neighboring countries were the results of the interplay of the two factors. The emerging pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries is sure to be same case, although it is still in the process of formation and at the present time its nature is not so clear to us. But I would like to point out that the three previous historical patterns would not be repeated again in the future. The Sinocentric tributary system could only exist before the modern international system expanded dominated the world when East Asia was isolated from the outside world. China has neither the will nor the capability to dominate her neighboring countries in the future.51 And China’s neighbors actually seem to fear rather than favor a hierarchical regional order centered on a hegemonic power. It is doubtable that Asian countries might wish to return to a hierarchical order centered on China which is similar to the Sinocentric tributary system, as argued by one scholar.52 Furthermore, the Western-dominated pattern would not be repeated again, because the colonialism was thrown into the historical trash can. Finally, the two superpowers’ struggle and East-West competition came to an end with the Cold War passing away more about two decades ago. I

49 Zhang Xiaoming, “The Rise of China and Community Building in East Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol.30, No.3 (2006), pp. 129-148. 50 Shaun Breslin, “Understanding China‟s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and Implications,” International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2009), p.817. 51 Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia‟s Past Be Its Future ?”, International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 149-164. 52 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Vol. 27, No.4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. don’t think a new Cold War in a bipolar context is coming. In this sense, the new pattern of China’s relations with her neighbors will not “resemble its past”, to use one scholar’s words.53 And I would like to say that three new patterns of China’s relationship with her neighboring countries might probably crystallize in the future. The first one would be the US-dominated pattern, that is to say, the US would dominated the development of China’s relations with her neighbors. Its precondition would be the decline of China and the formation of an unipolar international structure. The second one would be China-dominated pattern, namely China becomes a regional hegemon or leading power. But as I just mentioned, no country in China’s neighborhood would like to join a hierarchical regional order centered on a hegemonic power. The third pattern would be a regional community which includes China and all or most of her neighboring countries. China and her neighboring countries need to go beyond power-oriented realism and take great joint efforts to promote the community building process. It seems to me the US-dominated pattern is not going to be welcomed by China and China would strongly oppose it. The China-dominated pattern is out-of-date, and China’s neighboring countries would also strongly oppose it. The regional community might be an idealistic pattern. If a region-wide community which is similar to EU could take form in the future, a brand new pattern of China’s relationship with her neighbors is sure to emerge. But there is a long way to go, and its future is quite uncertain and unpredictable. Power politics might continue to be the dominant paradigm in China’s relations with her neighbors in the future. It is very important for China to find out which pattern is best to pursue its national interest, and acceptable to her neighboring countries. It seems to me, to promote an open regional community building process is probably the best policy choice for China.

CONCLUSION

China’s relationship with her neighboring countries has always been in the process of change. It is not a lineal development, because there were three different historical patterns of China’s relations with her neighboring countries, and the future pattern is quite unpredictable and full of uncertainty. Nevertheless, we still could find out the general direction of the development of China’s relations with her neighbors. China’s relationship with her neighbors moved from an isolated regional international system to a global international system, and its modernity and openness has been increasing. From the changing process of China’s relations with her neighbors, we could understand the general direction of China’s integration with the international society. The basic driving forces which have been moving China’s relations with her neighbors in the direction of change are the system-level and unit-level variables, and they

53 Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia‟s Past Be Its Future ?” Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. have always been in the process of change and interplay. They brought about the three historical patterns of China’s relations with her neighboring countries. And they are going to result in a new pattern of China’s relations with her neighboring countries in the future. It would be a great task for China to deal with her relations with the neighbors in an appropriate and creative way, by assuring its neighbors China’s rise will not come at the expense of her neighboring countries.

Song, Kue-Jin HK Research Professor, ARI, Korea University

INTRODUCTION

The power that led East Asia in the pre-modern era is China. The pre- modern East Asian regional order is described as the tribute system. The tribute system is built on the premise of installation, so it was important that China designate and proclaim another nation as a tributary state. The system was not necessarily a one-way imposition; it is possible to view the system built on mutual consent as the tributary state could benefit from China‟s support and preserve the domestic order at times of political instability. Modern capitalism challenged and weakened the East Asian tribute system centering on China, and the East Asian interstate relations became a modern system based on treaties. The Western powers brought the former tributary states of China into the outer realm of the global capitalistic system. With the arrival of Western imperialistic powers, the East Asian regional order faced an inevitable transformation. In this situation, Japan showed acceptance of the Western superiority in its relations with the West, while it tried to grasp the hegemony of the new regional order through the post-Meiji policies of strengthening the domestic economy and military. Japan brought into Korea the modern diplomatic system based on treaties by concluding the Treaty of Ganghwa and further tried to end the tributary system and create a new order in East Asia by winning the Sino-Japanese War and forcing the Treaty of Shimonoseki on China in 1895.1 One would think that the new Korea-China relations within the now modern treaty system would have been determined by the power and diplomatic skills of the two nations at that time. China, however, tried to hold onto the tribute system by emphasizing the tributary status of Korea in the document of the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade. Accepting this, Korea kept the pre- modern position as a tributary state of China, while it conceded with the modern treaty system in its new relationships with the Western nations. Therefore, Korea

1 Kim, Key Hiuk, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. found itself in dualistic interstate relations. This dualistic nature of Korea‟s diplomacy gradually became unifyingly modern as China‟s tribute system collapsed with its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and with the completion of the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China in 1899. There have been many studies on the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade, and the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China. A general agreement emerged on the idea that the Korea-China relations transformed into a modern one based on treaty after the Treaty of Commerce, but there are disagreements on the character of the relationship after the agreement of the Korea- China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade.2 Concerning the pre-modern Korea-China relationship, Koo Sun-hee has provided an important insight. He argues that though lacking in imperialistic aspects,China managed to continue the traditional tribute system, thus actually attempting to put Korea under its colonial rules.3 Many scholars of the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China have accepted this view and define the Korea- China relationship as that of the imperialistic power and the occupied. However, Koo‟s argument is not strong enough, as it does not provide enough evidence on China‟s imperialistic nature other than the fact that Chinese external pressure on Korea was aggressive and prohibitive to the latter‟s development into a modern independent nation. On the other hand, Larsen interpreted the Korea-China relationship as that of an “informal” imperialism.4 He contributed to the study of the Korea-China relationship by showing how China tried to maximize the imperialistic economic interest through the emphasis on China‟s technological empowerment and prevent Japan and Russia‟s influence over Korea through the adoption of the open ports system and by making use of treaties, international laws and “multilateral imperialism.” Nevertheless, his analysis does not differ so much from that of others, in that it lacks stronger factual evidence. This essay will attempt to demonstrate that, while the nature of the Korea- China relationship was becoming dualistic with modern influences, the pre-modern tributary system had a stronger foothold in Korea until the Sino-Japanese War.5 It

2 Analysis of greater depth can be found in Koo Sun-hee, “Research Trend and Analysis in the Historical Study of the Modern Korean-Chinese Relations”, The Issues and Study of Sino-Korean Relations in the Korean, Chinese and Japanese Academia (Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009). 3 Koo Sun-hee, Study of Korea‟s Policies towards Qing in the Modern Era (Hyean, 1999). 4 Kirk W. Larsen, Tradition Treaties, and trade : Qing imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910 (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Asia Center, 2008) 5 Here, we could highlight the studies on Yu Kil-jun‟s dual system theory by and Harada Kaeru and Chung Yong-hwa; but the focus of their work was not on Chosŏn-Qing relationship. See Harada Kaeru, Chosŏn‟s Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. is true that the Korea-China relationship changed after the Treaty of Kanghwa, but before then, the fundamental nature of the relationship remained the same. The customs of paying the tribute to China went on as usual; Kojong evidently did not change his view towards the relationship much either, as he sought Chinese military support to maintain his rule whenever political instabilities emerged. There were understandable attempts to change such realities but they all ended in failure. The real qualitative change in the Korea-China relationship took place after China lost to Japan and the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China was singed in 1899. Based on this view, this essay will examine how the Korea-China relationship evolved during the transformation from the dualistic interstate order to a modern treaty system.

MODERN TREATY SYSTEM AND THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM

When agreeing to the Treaty of Kanghwa, Korea meant to consider it as an extension of the previous relationship as neighbors under the tribute system, but Japan interpreted the incident as an establishment of the modern treaty relationship between the two countries. This treaty was only a beginning of the process, in which Japan tried to invade into Korean economy through the modern unequal treaties, and through which Korea received great damages. After 1882, a series of unequal treaties with the Western powers, including the US, England, France, Germany and Russia, was forced upon Korea. For the people of Korea for whom China had been the center of the world, a change equivalent to earth-shaking chaos began and the international events now affected their daily lives.6 After being brought into the modern treaty system, Korea tried to resolve the issues surrounding trade with China in order to fend off Japan‟s economic intrusion.7 When sending Uh Yun-jung to China to negotiate on trade, Kojong wanted new solutions for opening of the markets near the border areas requiring expensive security measures, as well as for the issues of tribute emissaries of the two parties. Most of the bureaucrats opposed this, considering it as an attempt to shift the

Opening and Modernization (Keisuisha, 1997); Chung Yong-hwa, Political Thoughts of the Civilization: Yu Gil-jun and Modern Korea (Moonji Publications, 2004). 6 Kim Dong-no, Modern Era and the Prelude for Occupation (Changbi Publishers, 2009), 32. 7 Akizuki Nozomi, “Process of Concluding the Chosŏn-China Trade Trade Rules,” Chōsen Gakuhō 115 (1991): 105. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. traditional tribute system.8 Some studies have considered Kojong‟s action as “an attempt to shift the Korea-China relations as an equal relationship under the common international laws,”9 but this view is problematic in that it overlooks Kojong‟s consistent dependency on China until the Sino-Japanese War. China took Korean suggestions on trade as a bold challenge to its authority, and considered Korean inquiry for China to send a residing envoy in Korea as a violation of the customary rules of the tribute system.10 In his meeting with Zhou Fu, Uh argued that this inquiry does not necessarily change the traditional relationship, but China rejected his claim.11 When the Military Uprising of 1882 broke out, Kojong sent a letter to Kim Yun-sik, an emissary to Tianjin and instructed him to ask for Chinese support. Accepting Korean request for military intervention, China sent troops to Korea. In the end, the uprising was brought under control by the Chinese military. In order to secure political stability and to calm down the public, Kojong stipulated plans for a political reform and sought Li Hongzhang‟s opinion through Cho Young-ha, a new appointee as an emissary to China, as well as his deputy Kim Hong-jip and assistant Yi Cho-yun.12 The Military Uprising provided China a good opportunity to legally strengthen its position as the ruling authority in Korea. Chinese intention of keeping Korea under its influence was realized by the continuation of the pre- modern tributary system, not a shift to an imperialistic approach. At the time of writing the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade, Li Hongzhang reported to Chinese authority the Regulations were written after enough consideration has been paid to the Huidian (the basic administrative laws of China) and the common international law; that it was different from a treaty; and that, even the Regulations somewhat changed the traditional ways and reflected new needs, it did not require China to make concessions to a tributary state.13 As for the meaning of the “tribute-paying country,” some have interpreted it as meaning “colony” in the world of the common international laws, but we should just see it as reflecting Chinese intention to protect

8 Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, Historical Documents of the China- Japan -Korea Relations during the Qing‟s last Era (hereafter, “Historical Document”) 2, April 22, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 591-592, 597. 9 Koo Sun-hee, Ibid.: 61-62. 10 Munhae Press, Documents of the Negotiation between China and Japan during Qing Guangxu reign (hereafter, “Negotiation Documents”: 3, April 22, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 17-18. 11 Historical Documents 2, April 22, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 591-601 12 Historical Documents 3, August 8, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 910-917 13 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 979 Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. the tributary system while acknowledging the common international law. Korean representative, Uh, debated with Chinese Zhao Fu and Ma Jianzhong regarding the contents of the Rule. Uh also admitted that the Rule‟s contents were in line with the traditional tribute system. While acknowledging the system, Uh requested that some revisions to be made lest Japan or the Western powers would also make similar demands. He especially questioned issues of extraterritoriality, fishing in the seas of the two nations, Chinese trade activities in Seoul and inner lands, and customs.14 China asserted that treaties can be only concluded between nations of comparable power, and the Korea-China “Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”, as the name shows, was different from a “treaty”.15 The Regulations was a special exception China made for the case of Korea, and it should be differentiated from other treaties Korea had with other countries. As for the request for revision so that the Regulations does not become an example for other countries, China disregarded it as Korean attempt to be its equal and evidence that Korea only fears Japan but not China. If Korea is worried that other countries would take advantage of the Regulations, China demanded, that Korea include a provision clarifying its status as Chinese protectorate state.16 With Chinese military presence after the Military Uprising, Korea had no other choice but concede to Chinese political and military pressures, and the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade was contracted in September 1882.17 Here, we should pay close attention to Chinese assertion that Korean status as a tributary to China needs no further clarification. This fact necessitates rethinking of the view that China tried to shift its relationship with Korea into a modern imperialistic one. Rather than considering Kim Yun-sik and Uh Yun-jung‟s acknowledgment of the provision on the protectorate status as “a failure to see China‟s intention of transforming Korea-China relationship to a modern imperialistic one,”18 we should now carefully criticize the failure of Korean ruling class centering around Kojong in making necessary reforms under the realities of dualistic interstate relations. Dispatch of traditional envoys to China, a symbolic practice under the tributary system, continued in until the break-out of Sino-

14 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 983 15 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 984 16 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign: 986 17 For more details, see Kim Jong-won, “Regarding the Chosŏn-Qing Land and Water Trade Rule,” Academic Journal of History 32: 1966. 18 Koo, ibid. : 87. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Japanese War, with Korea being the only country which dispatched emissaries after the 1884 Sino-French War.19 Although existing studies argue that Kojong tried hard to become independent from China, the very China-dependent attitude of Kojong provides evidence to the contrary. Even when Li Hongzhang was going to withdraw half of the Chinese troops from Korea, Kojong made a plea to make them stay.20 The dualistic interstate order originating from Korea was a fact that Western powers acknowledged. Although the Western powers had negative views about China‟s ruling authority on Korea, they acknowledged the special Korea-China relationship unless it did not go against their national interests. Even the US, towards which Korea had a favorable view, only kept its negative view towards China‟s authority over Korea but did not pursue to eliminate it. While the British are considered for having implemented the modern treaty system in Korea through the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea, they also diplomatically supported China‟s authority over Korea by making the British ambassador in China to have a secondary position for Korea and by only keeping a consul general in Seoul and a consulate in Chemul-po.21 The Western powers recognized China‟s authority over Korea, although not the suzerainty in the sense of the modern treaty system.

AMBIGUITY OF THE “KOREAN-RUSSIAN SECRET AGREEMENT” THEORY AND KOJONG’S ATTITUDE

The Kapsin Coup of 1884 was an attempt to consolidate Korean dualistic interstate order into the modern treaty system. It was an unacceptable event for China which was trying to defend the tribute system. China immediately intervened and suppressed the coup. The common supposition among the scholars is that Korea used the principle of “using barbarians to control barbarians” and had gotten Russia involved through a secret agreement in the hopes of containing China‟s influence given the changing status quo among the powers surrounding Korea after the coup.22

19 Kim Chŏng-gi, “Qing‟s Chosŏn Policies (1876-1894),” Study of the 1894 Peasant Wars (Yŏksabipyŏngsa, 1993): 42. 20 Im Kaye-soon, “Korean-Russian Treaty and Qing‟s Response,” Korea and the Powers before and after the Sino-Japanese War , (Academy of Korean Studies, 1984): 66. 21 Choi Moon-hyung, “Korea Policies of the Powers and the Circumstances in the Last Years of Chosŏn,” Korea and the Powers before and after the Sino-Japanese War (Academy of Korean Studies, 1984): 66. 22 Koo Sun-hee, Ibid.: 101-102. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Nevertheless, the specific contents of such secret agreement, nor the fact that such agreement existed, is yet to be clarified. It is highly probable that the secret agreement was in fact a rumor originating from the cautious eyes of the surrounding countries on the overly frequent contacts between Korea and Russia after the treaty had been signed between the two in July 1884. In fact, Chen Shutang reported to Li Hongzhang that Kojong did not seem to have been involved in the sending of the secret document. 23 Such uncertain rumor has become an acceptable theory concurrently as the movement to view Kojong as an independent-minded leader trying to fend off China‟s influence using the surrounding powers‟ competition, has gained supporters. The dualistic international order in East Asia surrounding Korea was becoming more complex at that time. As the Germans and Russians sought influence over Korea through the German Ambassador P. G. Möllendorff, the China- backing British and the Japan-backing Americans shared a mutual interest in preventing the Russia‟s southern expansion. Given the complexity of the situation, after the Tianjin Treaty, Japan momentarily condoned China‟s rights over Korea and showed more passive stance towards the Korea problem.24 The rumor about the Korean-Russian Secret Agreement was what spread under such circumstances. China did not trust the inconsistency of Kojong‟s words. China doubted that Kojong was setting a tug of war between China and Russia, as he requested Russia to keep five to six military ships at the Incheon port, but at the same time asking China to offer protection from Russia. China also interpreted that Kojong‟s involvement with Russia also had a political origin, as he doubted that the king‟s father Hŭngsŏn Taewŏn'gun was trying to regain power with Chinese support, and was also secretly communicating with Japan through Kim Okkyun.25 In actuality, however, Korean relationship with Russia at that time was not so close enough to talk about cooperation to chase China out of Korea. In fact Russia even threatened to occupy Cheju Island when Korea objected to Russia‟s dispatch of military adviser to Korea.26 Kojong asked China to dispatch troops after the secret agreement with Russia had been rumored.27 This could be evidence that Kojong worked hard to maintain

23 Historical Documents 4, June 17, 11th year of the Guangxu reign: 1885-1886. 24 Choi Moon-hyung, Ibid.: 19-26. 25 Negotiation Documents 9, September 22nd, 11th year of the Guangxu reign: 4-8. 26 Historical Documents 4, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign:1870-1871. 27 Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, “Chosŏn King‟s Secret Request for Military Dispatch and Stabilization of the” Preserved Official Records of Envoys in Korea, 01-41-001-03. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. his power rooted on the traditional tribute system. Kojong‟s request for the troops came out from anxiety about the spreading of domestic instability since the withdrawal of China troops after the Tianjin Treaty. In September 1885, Kojong dispatched Kim Ka-jin as a special emissary and pleaded with the China Emperor to dispatch his troops and help calm down and assure the people of Korea. Kojong assessed that Korea had overcome the past political uprisings with the assistance of the China, and especially in the case of the 1884 Coup, Chinese military presence could save Korea out of crisis and helped it gain political stability. Kojong said the following: “the people of Korea are frivolous and often cause conflicts...These internal conflicts did not influence other countries under the policy of isolation, but since the opening of trades with other countries in 1882, people live with foreigners at the same residences and domestic conflicts thereby causes harm to other countries.” Kojong felt unsafe as the domestic and international political events abruptly unfolded after withdrawal of Chinese troops, and so he requested the Chinese Emperor to send troops again to help him regain control over the people of Korea. Resending troops to Korea after China and Japan withdrew troops out of Korea after concluding the Tianjin Treaty was a complicated international problem. Therefore, Kojong‟s request could not be accepted. It only made Kojong an unreliable figure, and caused China to actively intervene in Korean political issues thereon. There is also a lack of evidence on the second Korean-Russian Secret Agreement supposedly initiated by Kojong and other Korean bureaucrats in July, 1886. Several sources confirm the sentiment in Korean court opposing Yuan Shikai‟s dominance. Sensing the anti-Yuan sentiment, Yuan could have initiated to dethrone Kojong by reporting China government that Korea was trying to approach Russia. O. N. Denny rejected the possibility of the secret agreement between Korea and Russia. Denny asserted that the talk of secret agreement was “an outcome of Yuan Shikai‟s pressure on Kojong to acknowledge a document he has never written.”28 Yuan‟s suggestion for dethroning Kojong was silently put down by Li Hongzhang, as the anti-Kojong movement was weak and clear evidence on the “Korea-Russian Secret Agreement” did not exist. Li did so because Japan strongly criticized the movement to dethrone Kojong and the Russian Embassy guaranteed that there was no such “Secret Agreement.”29

28 O.N. Denny, translated edition by Shin Bok-Ryong and Choi Su-kŭn, China and Corea (Jimmundang, 1999): 42 29 Negotiation Documents 10: 7 (December 27th, 12th year of the Guangxu reign). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. At the rumor of a movement to dethrone him, Kojong tried to dispatch envoys to various nations in order to overcome the crisis of his regime.30 This was possible because, although Korean relationship with China was based on the pre- modern tribute system, its relationship with Japan and other Western powers was based on the modern treaty system under the dualistic interstate order in which it placed itself. At that time, China could only try to suggest Korea not to send envoys to other countries based on the tradition of the tribute system, but not actually prevent it from doing so because Korea also participated in the modern treaty system. Nevertheless, Yuan Shikai tried to stop Korea based on the reasoning that dispatch of envoys violated the tribute agreement between Korea and China. On the other hand, Li Hongzhang who was actually in charge of the policy regarding Korea, accepted Korean action on the condition of “three step procedure (of reporting to China in foreign nations)” in other words, Li restricted Korean diplomatic rights as much as possible.31 As Pak Jung-yang did not follow the three step procedure with the objection of the US, China pressured Kojong into calling Pak back to Korea. After all Kojong had to accept the requirement. The continuation of the tribute system was reconfirmed when China sent traditional envoys to a state funeral upon the death of Queen Dowager Cho in April, 1890. Korea had requested China not to send the envoy as Korean fiscal condition was not good and it did not have enough resources to properly greet such an envoy. To this, China argued that it owed Korea a special obligation of caring for a tributary state as the rules of the system could not be easily changed, and promised Korea to help it reduce the financial burden of accepting the envoy. In the end, the envoy arrived through the sea route as one way of reducing the cost. Kojong went out of the palace to personally greet the envoy, and knelt down to offer a bow to the Emperor of China.32 Kojong‟s tendency to seek Chinese military support under the threat to his power became clear again at the time of Donghak Peasant Movement. When the peasant forces attacked several government offices in Jeolla Province and increased their influence, Korea again discussed the possibility of Chinese military dispatch. In a meeting with government officials, Kojong did express his reservation for the request for dispatch of foreign military forces. This, however, was nothing more than a political gesture. In secret, Kojong sent Sung Ki-woon to Yuan Shikai and

30 About this, see Lim Mingde, Yuan Shikai and Chosŏn, (Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, 1970): 159-172 31 Koo Sun-hee, Ibid.: 163. 32 Historical Documents 5, August 30th, 16th year of the Guangxu reign: 2826-2828. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. asked for military assistance. To this, Yuan argued that Korea could not resolve this situation by itself and was trying to get Chinese protection, and as a “grander nation,” China was obligated not to reject Korean call.33 Even if Korea had the premature concept of being independent from China and even if Kojong did try to end the tribute system as majority of scholars insist, ending the tribute system was a difficult task under the reality of politics dominated by Kojong and his followers. The rumor of Korea-Russian Secret Agreement well illustrates such reality. Although it is possible that Kojong may have developed the idea of making a secret agreement with Russia, there is no evidence showing that his ideas did actualize. Only is there enough evidence to the contrary that shows Kojong‟s continuing dependency on China in his frail attempt to protect his rule. To China which was trying to preserve its tribute system, its involvement in the issues of Korea was only natural. In the end, dispatch of the Chinese military provided rational for Japan‟s military dispatch, and the East Asian international order changed greatly through the Sino-Japanese War.

BREAKDOWN OF TRIBUTE SYSTEM AND TRANSITION OF KOREA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

In July 1894, the Japanese army broke into the Korea palace and invaded the Chinese embassy. At that time, Yuan Shikai had already returned to China and Tang Shaoyi, who handled the tasks in place of Yuan, also returned in August. Official diplomatic relations between China and Korea was temporarily suspended, which also meant that the tribute system came to a halt.34 The Chinese stance to retain the tribute system against the modern treaty system failed to establish the grounds to sustain the existing relationship with Korea within East Asia‟s rapidly changing circumstances. Upon his retreat from Korea, Tang Shaoyi commissioned the protection of Chinese people, their cargo and property to C. T. Gardener, the British Acting Consul General in Korea.35 Around the time of Tang‟s withdrawal, Gardener asked Korea to blockade the Chinese embassy, because of frequent theft by Japanese and Koreans. Korea drew up a relevant material and sent it to the

33 Negotiation Documents 1, April 29, 20th year of the Guangxu reign: 246-247. 34 For later diplomatic relations between China and Chosŏn, see Lee, Young-ok, “Diplomatic Relations Between Qing Dynasty and Chosŏn Dynasty (Korean Empire), 1895-” The Korean Academic Journal of Chinese Studies 50, (The Korea Society for Chinese Studies, 2004): 217-235.. 35 Kwon Seok-bong, “Post-Sino-Japanese War Korea-Qing Relations Studies” Korea and the Powers, before and after the Sino-Japanese War, (Academy of Korean Studies , 1984): 192-201. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. British embassy in response to Gardener‟s request and, accordingly, any negotiating matter related to the Chinese was placed under the jurisdiction of the British Consul General in Korea.36 In November 1894, however, the Korea government promulgated the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants, which restricted the Chinese residences, prohibited the entrance of the Chinese to the inlands, and further regulated procedure-expiration date of residence registration and procedure of residential transferral, prohibition of military supplies treatment, limitation of Chinese visitors to Korea, control and trial of judicial violations of the Chinese.37 Among these, a dispute rose on the policy that the jurisdiction of the Chinese in Korea completely belongs to the Korea government. In November 1894, Hillier claimed rights to dispatch an inspector official to the trials based on the Article 8, Section 3 of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea signed in 1883, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected his allegation by pointing out that he was not a Chinese official. 38 Therefore, the Chinese encountered a transitional circumstance where they were officially protected by the British Consul General, but supervised under the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants. In April 1895, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in order to conclude the Sino-Japanese war. The first clause of this treaty reads “China recognizes definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future”39 Accordingly, China officially recognized Korea as an independent state for the first time and abolished every tributary ceremony that China had requested on Korea. Because Korea was no longer a tributary state, there could no longer be a tributary system. Nevertheless, there were still many obstacles that the Korea-China tributary system would need to overcome in order to transform the relationship to a modern treaty system. Meanwhile, Britain, who was „officially‟ commissioned the protectoral rights of the Chinese living in Korea, was in a disagreement with Korea between the

36 Ibid., 192-194. 37 Annals of Chosŏn Dynasty: Kojong, November 20th, 1894 (Use original-text service of National Institute of Korean History), http://www.history.go.kr/. 38 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., 196. 39 See ed. Choi Deok-soo, Korean Modern History Seen through Treaties, (Yŏllinchaekdŭl: 2010). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. jurisdictional rights on these Chinese. In September 1895, Walert C. Hillier, the British Consul General in Korea met Kim Yun-sik, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to officially inform that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested Britain to take care of every matters related to the Chinese in Korea. Upon his acceptance, Kim requested that Britain also takes care of the Koreans living in China, and Britain complied. According to the series of bilateral agreements, the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants were withdrawn and the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Korea and UK came to effect on the Chinese in Korea.40 Soon after the end of Sino-Japanese War, China argued it was wrong to commit entire protection of the Chinese to the British Consul and dispatched Tang Shaoyi to Korea, not as a government official but under the title of a General Trade Councilor.41 Yet, Tang Shaoyi was not an „official‟ diplomat since there were no diplomatic ties between Korea and China at the time. Therefore, the British Consul in Korea still had the hold on the protectoral rights of the Chinese in Korea. Such transitional phase continued until the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China was contracted.42 Kojong eagerly pushed to conclude a treaty with China. In this behalf, Tang Shaoyi sent negative signals towards the contraction of the treaty, judging Korea not as an independent state since Kojong was residing in the Russian embassy.43 Thereupon, Korea mentioned that the king will return to the palace as soon as Russia sends troops and suggested that they send an envoy to China after the king‟s return. Tang Shaoyi, on the other hand, argued that a nation which could not stay independent without foreign military support was merely a vassal state that lacked sovereignty, wherefore China could not send an envoy according to international law.44 Although it had publicly recognized Korea as an independent state in accord to the Shimonoseki Treaty, China made multilateral efforts to sustain the existing tributary system. In July 1896, Tang Shaoyi took a sensitive stance by scrutinizingly reporting on the demolishment of the Youngeun Gate and the construction of the Independence Gate, which were Korean effort to display its

40 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., 207. 41 Ibid., 207 42 Koo Bum-jin, “Korea-Qing Diplomatic Conflicts on Interpreting some Provisions on „The Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China‟,” The Daegu Historical Review 83, (The Daegu Historical Society, 2006): 209-210. 43 During the Russian Legation (Agwan p'ach'ŏn), Kojong stayed in the Russian Ministry in Korea from February 11, 1896, to February 20, 1897. 44 Historical Documents 8, June 2, 22nd year of the Guangxu reign: 4856~4857 Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. independence to the outside.45 In October 1896, Tang Shaoyi reported that Kojong is strongly willing to send an envoy to sign up a treaty with China. In addition, Tang thought that an even treaty could not be made despite the shift in both domestic and foreign circumstances because Korea had remained as a tributary state for centuries. He suggested that in order to prevent Korea to send an envoy to conclude a modern treaty, it would be preferable to do as the British or Germans did: send a consulate general to discuss the details, notify the fact to Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and send a consulate en poste in each open port.46 China confirmed Tang Shaoyi‟s proposal and appointed him to the Chinese Consul General in Korea in November. Under the change in Tang Shaoyi‟s title and status lied China‟s calculus to prevent the visit of Korean envoy in the first place.47 Still, he did not possess bargaining rights since he did not inform Korea of his appointment to the Consul General. 48 Therefore, he had limitations in intervening to protect the Chinese, and he was also excluded from the conference on the management of foreign settlements by the embassies. 49 Meanwhile, in November 1896, Korea made a treaty proposal and attempted to dispatch Sung Ki-hun to China. The treaty draft by the Korea government‟s included an article, which stated that a Chinese who commits crime in Korea will be extradited to Korea, and vice versa. The other articles were identical to the treaties that Korea had signed with other nations.50 In February 1897, the movement to declare imperial regime and establish the Altar of Heaven was staged in Korea. Insisting that Korea cannot adopt the title „emperor‟ on equal terms with China, Tang Shaoyi attempted to stem this movement with other countries.51 In disregard of such efforts, Korea was renamed „the Greater Korea Empire‟ in October, established new diplomatic relations with each countries, and tried to sign a treaty with China. China did not approve the construction of the Altar of Heaven on the soil of the South Royal Villa – the former residences of the Chinese envoys. China also saw the title „emperor‟ for Kojong only as usurpation of the title, and observed whether other nations acknowledged the inauguration of the Korean Empire. China believed that Korea still does not have sovereignty due to the Russo-Japanese

45 Historical Documents 8, June 15, 22nd year of the Guangxu reign: 4869~4870 46 Historical Documents 8, 4958~4959 47 Historical Documents 8, 4968~4969 48 Lee, Young-ok, Ibid., 222. 49 Eun Jeong-tae, “The Conclusion of the Korea-Qing Commercial Treaty in 1899 and the Daehan Empire,” Academic Journal of History 186 , (The Korean Historical Association, 2005): 31. 50 Historical Documents 8, February 11, 23rd year of the Guangxu reign:: 4980~4990 51 Historical Documents 8, May 5, 23rd year of the Guangxu reign: 5009. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. secret agreement and therefore cannot conclude a treaty.52 Yet, Korea constantly attempted to sign a treaty with China through the influence of neighboring powers. In March 1897, Emperor Kojong had sound out Macdonald – the British Consul General in China, who came to present his credentials – on the prospects of a contract between Korea and China.53 After the establishment of the Korean Empire, he again put pressure on China in March 1898 through the Russian Minister in Korea, and also in the following May through each country‟s Ministers and Inspector General of Customs. They criticized that China‟s disapproval on signing the treaty was based on the intention to pose the Korean Empire subject to itself, and urged China to exchange envoys.54 In June 1898, Tang Shaoyi reported that sending diplomatic delegates is no longer evitable since Russia, Japan, and other powers are supporting Korean motion to sign a treaty with China.55 In August 1898, China finally sent an envoy to Korea under the judgement that it would be rather face-saving to send an envoy to Seoul before the Korean special envoy visits Beijing, and also that it is wiser to avoid suspicion from others by referring the context of the treaty from other countries‟ examples. Accordingly, China appointed Xu Shoupeng to the Imperial Inspector Minister en poste in Korea, and notified this fact to the Greater Korea Empire as well as every embassy in Korea.56 In August 1898, Jordan, the British Consul General in Korea, Brown, the Inspector General of Customs, Matyunin, the Russian Minister in Korea found out that the China would send a delegate to Korea to draw a treaty and objected to Tang Shaoyi for using the term „stationed‟ even before the treaty was signed, naming Korea as Korea, and for the form of the credential.57 In June 1898, China prepared a credential that named Korea as „the Greater Korea Empire‟ and Kojong as „the Great Emperor‟, since they could not afford to ignore the foreign powers‟ support for The Greater Korea Empire and diplomatic relations.58 This meant China‟s complete abandonment of its traditional tributary system as well as the acknowledgement that China would establish new diplomatic relations based on the modern treaty system. This also signifies the end of the transitional phase of Korean-Chinese relations after

52 Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 32. 53 Historical Documents 8, May 5, 23rd year of the Guangxu reign: 5021~5023. 54 Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 33. 55 Negotiation Documents 下, April 28, 24th year of the Guangxu reign: 989 56 Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 33. 57 Historical Documents 8, July 12, 24th year of the Guangxu reign: 5145~5150. 58 Eun Jeong-tae interprets China‟s such change is due to the Hundred Days‟ Reform. Yet, he does not specify the details. Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 33. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. the Sino-Japanese War.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODERN TREATY BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA

In November 1898, Xu Shoupeng prepared a draft of 14 clauses59 based on the treaties that Korea had signed with Britain, the United States, and Japan and reported it to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which later readjusted the draft into 17 clauses during an editorial debate.60 In January 1899, Xu Shoupeng opened a preliminary conference in the Chinese embassy in Seoul for the sake of a credential presentation.61 In February 1899, Xu Shoupeng presented his credential and submitted a commission of full powers to Emperor Kojong at the Hamnyung- jeon of Kyungun Palace. The press published this incident with heavy headlines and Koreans positively evaluated the signing of an equal treaty. 62 The plenipotentiaries of each party, Pak Je-sun and Xu Shoupeng, went through eight meetings for almost 6 months until the final draft was written in February 1899, and could finally exchange the instruments of ratification through the period of more than 10 months.63 The procedures to conclude the treaty was ran according to the State Council Official Regulations proclaimed in September 1898 through the 19th edict and the National System of The Greater Korea Empire in August 1899. The procedures included issuing commission of full powers, creating State Council‟s treaty draft, negotiating the carte blanched Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Council‟s request to the emperor for the approval of the treaty draft, the emperor‟s ratification, contracting a compatible treaty, and including it in the gazette, et cetera. The conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China was applied to the conclusion of treaties with Belgium in March 1901 and Denmark in July 1902.64 Although Korea prepared the materials for the contraction of the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China, in reality the negotiation between the two countries was led solely by the sources that China had prepared. China asserted that the sources were based on the treaties which two countries had previously

59 Lee, Young-ok, Ibid., 225. 60 See Kwon Seok-bong‟s “The Conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China,” Eastern Academic Journal 54-56, (Institute of Korean Studies at Yonsei University, 1987): 94-101. 61 Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 42. 62 Ibid., 42. 63 See Kwon Seok-bong, (1987) 110-126. 64 Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 43. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. signed with other countries, and that any different clauses from other previous treaties are the results of consideration for current circumstances of both parties for the sake of peace. In terms of principle, Koreans accepted the idea.65 Yet, unlike the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade, negotiation on the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China was prolonged due to some differences in opinion, the most controversial one being the debate on extraterritoriality and the abolition of the Chinese trade in Seoul. At the time Korea believed that a clause that negates extraterritorial rights should be added, stating that “a clause should be added in the treaty which states that the Korean authority should have control over the Chinese in Korea, and vice versa following the Western practices. 66” In response, Xu Shoupeng judged that the treaty between Korea and China should follow the examples of Western treaties signed with both Korea and China, according to which the jurisdiction of the Westerners in either Korea or China should be handed over to their home countries.67 There also was an internal debate on the abolition of extraterritoriality itself, but eventually the clause on extraterritoriality was stipulated with its essence being nationality principle of the defendant, the rights of the defendant‟s country to dispatch an inspector official to the trials and bilateral regulations.68 At the time, the clause on extraterritoriality was not only problematic to Korea-China relations, but also to the entire modern treaty system. Therefore, the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China included unequal elements that approved extraterritoriality similar in a sense to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the Unite Sates of America and Korea signed in 1882; yet, it can be evaluated as „equal‟ in that it was unequal to both sides.69 The Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants in 1894 did not allow the Chinese to enter the Korean inlands. However, according to the Regulations on Chinese Merchants legislated the General Trade Councilor Tang Shaoyi, “one who seeks to purchase local specialties outside must be guaranteed by one or two great merchants”.70 There are assessments on this effort as a desperate

65 Kwon Seok-bong, (1987), 108-111. Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 43. 66 Historical Documents 8, February 13, 25th year of the Guangxu reign: 5202. 67 Historical Documents 8, February 13, 25th year of the Guangxu reign: 5202. 68 Lee, Eun-ja, “A Study on the Korea-China relation as viewed through the China`s practice of Extraterritoriality in the Daehan Empire after the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China Period(1900~1905),” Myŏngchŏngsa-yŏngu 26, (2005): 93. 69 Kwon Seok-bong, 1987, 97-98. 70 Historical Documents 8, July 15, 22nd year of the Guangxu reign: 4906. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. countermeasure71 to prevent inland commerce by the Chinese, but it seems to be more of a part of the effort to alleviate the application of the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants. In fact, inland commerce by the Chinese rapidly grew since 1897 to surpass the extent before the Sino-Japanese war, and there were quite a number of influential merchants who resided in inland commercial centers.72 Korea also proposed the abolition of the Chinese trade in Seoul.73 Incessant conflicts occurred as the Korean‟s commercial supremacy suffered severe damages due to the Chinese trade in Seoul, which the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade had approved.74 In October 1898, the Independence Club and the Central Merchant Association of the Greater Korea Empire jointly appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prohibit foreign merchants from illegal residence in the inlands and to abolish the Chinese trade in Seoul through revision of the treaty. Pak Je-sun, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ordered local offices to prohibit inland commerce by foreigners, but also said that abolishing the Chinese trade in Seoul was difficult due to the costs.75 During negotiations with China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed the abolition of the Chinese trade in Seoul and explained that Korea‟s proposal is based on the premise that the Western countries they will follow China as stated in their treaties with Korea, if the Chinese government abolishes the Chinese trade in Seoul first. In response, Xu Shoupeng asserted that unless the regulations on the foreigners‟ rights to trade in Korean lands is repealed from the treaties between Korea and each country, it should also be specified in the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China, for the clause on the foreigners‟ trade in Seoul already exists in the treaties between Japan and the West.76 In May, Xu Shoupeng displayed an uncompromising attitude to Pak Je-sun that he is ready to rupture the negotiation if Korea insists to abolish the Chinese trade in Seoul. Pak claimed that solving the problem between China would justify the same request to other countries, since the Chinese trade in Seoul originated from the Korea-China Regulations for

71 Lee, Eun-ja, Ibid., 92. 72 Lee,Byoung-cheon, “The Influx of Foreign Merchants and the Response of the Korean Merchants in the Opening Era,” (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 1985), 144-160. 73 Historical Documents 8, February 13, 25th year of the Guangxu reign: 5202. 74 See Lee, Eun-ja, “The Study on the Korea-Chinese Relation Changed after the Sino-Japanese War (1895~1899) through Analyzing Legal Cases between Korea and”, Chungguk-hyŏndaesa-yŏngu 38, (2008); Lee, Eun-ja, “Sino-Korean Civil Lawsuit Cases during the Korean Imperial” Dongyangsahak- yŏngu 10, (2007); Koo Bum-jin, Ibid.; Lee, Young-ok, Ibid.; Ryota Ishikawa, “Commerce between Chosŏn and Chinese people in Case of Hansŏng during the Open-port Period”, Annual Bulletin of Chosŏn Studies 10, (Kyushu University, 2007). 75 The Independence News, October 10, 1898, Letter section; Ibid., October 18, 1898, Miscellaneous 76 Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., 47. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Maritime and Overland Trade; nevertheless, it was difficult for Korea to rebut China‟s logic as much as it was difficult to carry out a solution between other countries.77 Discussions on the treaty made a rapid progress as Korea eventually yielded and, thus, the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China could reach a conclusion in September 1899. The Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China, being signed under the Greater Korea Empire and international law, became a model for the treaties in the future. Despite inclusion of inequality, a general feature of modern conventions, the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China also was negotiable and mutually beneficial to an extent. Since the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China, the East Asian interstate order surrounding Korea was simplified into a modern treaty system. The road the Greater Korea Empire would take under the complicated East Asian interstate order was to overcome the inequalities of the modern treaty system and to defend its independence. Yet, Kojong remained dependent on foreign powers to maintain his own regime in every effort. He focused on removing his political rivals and in many cases he made dogmatic decisions on important security issues such as diplomatic and military policies kept secret to the state council meeting.78 As a result, there were various attempts to enhance national prosperity and defense through reformation, but these efforts failed to reach internal consensus.

CONCLUSION

As the Western powers stretched their influence to East Asia, the interstate order surrounding Korea changed from a tributary system to a modern treaty system. China tried to maintain the tributary relations with Korea, while Japan planned to invade the continent via Korea as its post. Moreover, Russia looked into Korea for the sake of advancing to the Pacific, and Britain struggled to contain Russia. Korean strategic importance was consequently amplified at the time. Nevertheless, the transition from a tributary system to a modern treaty system was by no means uniform and unilateral, but rather more complex and multilateral. Also, a certain period of transition was inevitable when a prolonged regional order came across a new one. Such aspects are typically evident in the East Asian interstate order surrounding Korea. Although Korea was incorporated into the modern treaty

77 Kwon Seok-bong, (1987), 120. 78 Hyun Kwang-ho, The Korean Empire‟s Foreign Policy, (Sinsowon, 2002), 16. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. system after the Treaty of Kanghwa, the East Asian interstate order surrounding Korea did not change straight into a modern treaty system but shifted to a dualistic interstate order in practice. China institutionally maintained the tributary system by signing the Korea- China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade. The superpower of the time that led the dualistic interstate order surrounding Korea was China. Because of China who did not recognize Korea as an independent state then, Korea had many limitations in active participation in the international society. Therefore, breaking away from China‟s external pressure appeared as an important objective. There had been some groups who attempted to promote internal reform and escape from China‟s interference but they failed due to China‟s intervention and Kojong‟s pro- Chinese dependent policies. Although Kojong also did have the intentions to alleviate China‟s tributary system in concert with the West, he prioritized stability of his power and repeated historical actions by requesting for Chinese troops when his regime was threatened. The dualistic interstate order came to an end with China‟s complete denial of the tributary system in the Shimonoseki treaty following the Sino-Japanese War. Yet, China still tried to preserve the special relationship with Korea by only permitting the recovery of relationship up to signing the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade and mutually sending the consular representatives. Therefore, the Korea-China relationship, not readily included in the modern treaty system, had a certain period of a transitional phase. However, China‟s effort to reinforce its influence over Korea by preserving the special relationship was no longer viable. In consequence, China decided to sign the modern treaty following the establishment of the Greater Korea Empire, and the active involvement of Britain, Russia and Japan, as well as to deal with the practical issue of protection of Chinese people. The Greater Korea Empire and China officially established a modern treaty relation after founding the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China in September of 1899. This incident marks the change of the interstate order of Northeastern Asia from a dualistic existence of a modern treaty system and a tributary system to a modern treaty system. The international community could only acquiesce in the Japanese colonization of the Greater Korea Empire after Japan – the nation that was rising as the dominant player in the East Asian interstate order around Korea – won the Sino- Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. However, on the surface the modern treaty

Session Ⅳ National & Transnational Identities in Northeast Asia

Chairperson: Jun-Hyeok Kwak (Korea University)

"Transnational Identity and Order in Northeast Asia" Gilbert Rozman (Princeton University)

"Transnational Identities in Modern Japanese Thoughts" Naoyuki Umemori (Waseda University)

“Political Order to Socio-Moral Equilibrium: Zhu Xi's Interpretation of "PingTianxia(平天下)" Junghwan Lee (Korea University)

Discussants Jee Sun Lee (Korea University) Jung-Sun Han (Korea University) Eunkang Koh (Seoul National University of Technology)

Gilbert Rozman, Professor of Sociology at Princeton University

International order depends on shared understandings. The Six-Party Talks from 2003 tested not only whether North Korea could be persuaded to share a vision of order in Northeast Asia acceptable to the other five countries, but also whether the other five would draw closer in their thinking. Holding aloft the banner of regional identity sets too high a standard for what may be possible, despite loose agreement on the notion of some day establishing an “East Asian community.” Calling for norms and principles centered on universal values also imposes a difficult challenge since China and Russia attribute to this concept sinister designs on undermining their political systems or civilization. On a more modest level, striving for parallel perceptions of regional order based on pragmatic interpretations of national identity might be seen as the threshold for sustained regional cooperation. Evaluating the way national identities in China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Russia are responding to recent challenges in Northeast Asia can help to assess the prospects in the coming years for forging a new regional order. As a layered framework combining regionalism and globalization, a viable order can be presumed to comprise three parts: 1) the core of China, Japan, and South Korea striving for an East Asian community (EAC); 2) the duality present in the Six-Party Talks (6PT) of five states facing the challenge of North Korea plus the broader grouping inclusive of the North; and 3) the image recently advanced by Australia and consistent with proposals by both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations of a U.S.-led Asia-Pacific community (APC). Below these themes are explored through the lens of national identity. Transnational identity supported by state leaders and institutions was stymied in Northeast Asia after the end of the cold war by an environment of intensifying national identities. Four states are among the small number around the globe boasting great power identities, each assuming it merits a special say in setting the direction for future global development. Signs of globalization aroused a backlash in each of them: China‟s critique of U.S. hegemonism amidst insistence on patriotic values not “universal” ones; Russia‟s angry rejection of “Atlanticism” while searching for the “Russian idea”; Japan‟s retreat to patriotism fearful of allowing its economic stagnation to transform into loss of its unique nature; and even a U.S. conservative advance targeting international institutions as well as multiculturalism. Three states are heirs to the longstanding Confucian civilization and after a period when each was recognized as an “economic miracle” each gained renewed confidence in its distinctive modernized identity, which it was reluctant to dismiss. In the shadow of the Asian financial crisis, South Koreans grasped for the Sunshine Policy as a substitute for Asian values that confirm their centrality; Japanese pressed for regionalism at ASEAN +3 as proof that they are “reentering Asia,” and Chinese took a more assertive

approach to multipolarity as they became more fervent boosters of exclusive regionalism than the Japanese.1 Also, we must be aware of the special legacy of communist national identities in China and Russia, with applicability also to North Korea.2 By 2005 strident opposition against a U.S.-led order was palpable. These three frameworks can inform any assessment of attempts to bring together individual national identities into a transnational community not as some idealistic process that fails to take into account today‟s reality but as a series of cautious steps with some, albeit limited, promise for a new regional order.3

UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY OF VALUES

Recently, informed individuals from diverse regions acknowledge that universal values exist, deserving of recognition from peoples all around the globe. Yet, differences have scarcely subsided over what is the full extent of those values, how do they relate to other values of a less universal nature, and how should priorities be established in pursuit of multiple values and the linkage of them to the interests of individuals, communities, and nations. Simplified assertions of “God-given values” that deserve urgent attention cannot overcome resistance steeped both in pragmatic concern for what serves national interests and contentious arguments over clashing conceptualization of values. Americans strongly support the universality of values, but that does not mean that they agree on how to pursue them or to respond to diverse views in a vital region such as Northeast Asia. 4 The

1 Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia: Korea’s Return to Center Stage,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 151-66; Gilbert Rozman, “Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 2, (Spring 2008), pp. 209-32; Gilbert Rozman, “Post Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional Institutions in Northeast Asia,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 65 (2010), pp. 2 Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson, eds., Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2006); Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2009); Gilbert Rozman, Ch. 1, “The Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership: How Close? Where To?” in James Bellacqua, ed., The Future of China-Russia Relations (Lexington, KY: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 2010), pp. 12-32.. 3 Gilbert Rozman, “Cultural Prerequisites of East Asian Regionalism in an Age of Globalization,” Korean Observer, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 149-79. 4 Some authors stress greater clarity and firmness about distinctive U.S. values and the cohesion of a Western democratic coalition. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), and Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Others favor U.S. leadership in searching for shared values through a common denominator alluring to China, Russia, and other states without prioritizing democracy. See G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon, eds., The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order (Lanham, MD: rowman & Littlefield, 2008): Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

intensifying U.S. division, exemplified in Congress, complicates global leadership. Yet, a residue of shared ideals remains in contrast to other past and present outlooks. We can differentiate at least four broad value orientations that have influenced international relations, but differ from current U.S. ideals. First, fundamentalist and racist values reflect exclusive thinking about the superiority of one‟s own group, limiting the possibility of learning from others or accepting coexistence on terms favorable to mutual understanding. They encourage going out to the world with a civilizing mission. Second, communist values advocate class struggle in favor of selected groups who are mobilized by an unchecked state intent on eliminating elite social classes and cosmopolitan groups. The result is revolutionary causes. Third, sovereign values signify strict boundaries inside of which the state‟s hold is potentially unfettered, as outside groups are treated primarily in terms of how they serve the interests of expanding state power. This produces a power- enhancing agenda. Fourth, we observe Asian values that downplay individualism in favor of family and community solidarity, which is buttressed by state claims to harmony. The outcome is priority on saving face and insisting on respect in inter-state relations. Often, combinations of these values operate in resistance to the mix of U.S. propounded values. China combines Confucianism, communism, and Asian values fueled by an “economic miracle” as its stress on sovereignty puts it in the forefront of resistance to U.S. values. Strong advocates of state sovereignty and Asian values may find common ground with the United States over other sets of values. This often is the case with respect to free market values, which set rules for interaction within and beyond state boundaries that rely on easy access to trade and protection for basic property rights. They spur a commercial orientation to opening new venues for greater profit, but they do not necessarily undercut values less conducive to freedom in another arena. It also may occur for universal values, narrowly interpreted, which support certain types of social or even political participation without codifying the principles of the enlightenment that center on humanist respect for the individual marked by human rights and full democracy. Finally, global community values are a new force recognizing the importance of saving the planet, overcoming new types of cross-border threats to well-being, and finding unprecedented mechanisms for order in an age of dispersion of weapons of mass destruction. This spurs the search for elements of world government, which divides the American public, and regionalism, which on the surface appears attractive to many people in Northeast Asia, but actually is interpreted so narrowly as to impinge very little on state sovereignty or Asian values.5

and Nancy Soderberg, The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005). 5 A succession of recent books has sought to capture the dynamics of the emerging region, but change has proven so rapid and the preoccupation with economic integration so compelling that they have generally caught only fragments, especially lack of consensus on universal values. See Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); T. J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

The United States firmly rejects fundamental and racist values as well as communist and Asian values, but it is ambivalent on sovereign values, inconsistently supportive of free market ones, and only superficially enthusiastic about global community values. U.S. preferences for universal values or freedom in the abstract do not suffice as a rallying cry. The United States has been under the impression, notably since the 1990s, that its two allies in Northeast Asia embrace the same universal values as it has long advocated. In the 1980s South Korea at last democratized, while Japan was drawn more fully into the U.S. defense orbit. While acknowledging their strong state protectionism, Americans did not doubt either country‟s full commitment to the values that buttress the struggle against threats to democracy, human rights, and a responsible international community. From this standpoint, apart from the period of trade tensions in the first half of the 1990s, they often overlooked value differences and the lasting importance of particularistic views rooted in historical issues and in continued preference for state-centered thinking. Even of late U.S. officials were so enamored of the rise of Japanese realist thinking that they were inclined to ignore the nationalist values centered on history that were driving this change.6 Also the tendency to dismiss South Korean progressives as just a reincarnation of the pacifist appeasers in Japan in the cold war while treating conservatives as sharing U.S. values and driven by realist thinking perpetuates misunderstanding about the values that were deeply rooted in an allied state. We need to take a closer look at the values of these states and animate the search for common ground on historical memory in a manner that puts liberal values in the forefront rather than blinding ourselves to their continued neglect. With Lee Myung-bak repudiating the progressive drift of South Korea and Hatoyama Yukio‟s rise as prime minister from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rejecting the revisionism of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the most divisive views are less prominent in these two allies, but consolidation of a three-way alliance as the core of the APC is difficult. Four values issues have lately monopolized thinking about East Asia, obscuring awareness of a set of four other issues of increasing significance as this region struggles for consensus in setting an agenda for peaceful competition and reconciliation. Without shifting attention to these long-overlooked issues, we may misunderstand the emerging challenges in this region and how the United States can best respond. On the list of well-recognized values clashes, few would disagree with inclusion of: 1) the split between the United States and China over democracy and human rights, which has existed since the Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949 and, despite normalization of relations in the 1970s, has now become the foremost divide among states integrated into the global system; 2) the split between Japan and China over interpretations of history, which was not addressed when Japan regained its sovereignty in 1951 or when the two normalized relations in the

2008), and Michael J. Green and Bates Gill, eds., Asia’s New Multilateralism (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009). 6 Gilbert Rozman, ed., U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

1970s and after 2001 flared to the point of undermining the prospects for regionalism;7 3) the split between South Korea and North Korea over legitimacy to rule their shared peninsula, which since the South democratized in 1987 and the North lost its unconditional support from communist allies in 1990-92 has kept unsettling the other states active in what became the Six-Party Talks with various ups and downs of nuclear weapons threats and summits aimed at reunification; and 4) the split between China and the de facto state of Taiwan, which in 1949-1992 was considered to be a struggle between two claimants to rule China and more recently has focused on whether rising Taiwanese identity backed by democratic rights is grounds for de jure independence or resurgence of a rising China insistent on regaining lost territory will force a timetable for unification. Many discussions of East Asia are content to point to the above list of four issues as the crux of the conflicts over values in the region. For some, they offer already familiar depictions of a region torn between the values championed by the United States and those it stridently opposes, although that requires a narrow prism for viewing the Sino-Japanese divide without taking seriously the clash over thinking about Japan‟s aggression to 1945. For others, this array of differences highlights the importance of patience in building trust as rapidly expanding economic integration and cultural ties bring increased convergence in values, despite evidence that the past decades of renewed interactions have not yielded the anticipated results. Neither side has paid much notice to other value differences that may shed additional light on the debate between divergent versus convergent values. If the advocates of enduring divergence urge the United States to stand firm behind values diplomacy and those of growing convergence propose that it concentrate on broadening the base for agreement while showing patience on values, an observer attentive to the wider context of value differences might suggest a third strategy of treating democracy, human rights, and history in the context of a single overarching values package with the United States championing a long-term time frame linking regionalism to globalization. Our list of four values issues now rising to the limelight encompasses: 1) the split between the United States and Japan over the history of the first half of the twentieth century, which for the second half of the century was obscured and only in 2007 became a subject of intense interest in Japan, with ramifications for how viable their alliance will be in dealing with new regional challenges, as seen in the North Korean nuclear crisis; 2) the split between Japan and South Korea also over the history of the first half of the past century, which was pronounced already in the search for normalization to 1965 and on many occasions over the following decades but acquired a qualitatively new seriousness in 2005 as the two differed on how to heal the region‟s past wounds and pursue regional

7 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, eds., East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2008); Gilbert Rozman, “Narrowing the Values Gap in Sino-Japanese Relations: Lessons from 2006-2008,” in Gerrit Gong and Victor Teo, eds., Reconceptualizing the Divide: Identity, Memory, and Nationalism in Sino- Japanese Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp. 26-52. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

reconciliation and, despite the good intentions of Lee Myung-bak when he took office and Fukuda Yasuo in his stint as prime minister, had again in mid-2008 suffered from revived tensions over history/ territory; 3) the split between the United States and South Korea over key moments in the history of the past century, which was little noticed until Roh Moo-hyun became president in 2003 and was deemphasized by Lee Myung-bak but may also reemerge if not properly handled, especially in the light of the Korean public‟s overreaction to a deal to resume imports of U.S. beef and the potential for divergence in dealing with North Korea; and 4) the split between China and South Korea that arose unexpectedly in 2004 over the ancient state of Koguryo and signals a sharpening clash between two states that in the first decade after normalization in 1992 appeared to take no notice of value differences and still are hesitant to reveal the full extent of their division that extends well beyond an obscure historical interpretation.8 These four value issues have little to do with democracy and human rights and do not hinge primarily on Japan‟s rampage across Asia from the 1930s. They shed light on what drives anxieties in this region in the current era of accelerated integration and slowly emergent regionalism. On the one hand, they point to the significance of the U.S. role in shaping the values agenda, affecting the transformation of the 6PT, the potential for an EAC, and the viability of an APC. On the other hand, the Koguryo dispute serves as a warning about the assertiveness of China, having firmly emerged as the chair of the 6PT, the driving force of the EAC, and the prime concern of an APC. Sino-U.S. value differences have risen to the forefront. The United States has long kept its focus on one set of value differences while trying to avoid being drawn into another. This strategy worked during the cold war when the Soviet Union loomed as a common threat to Japan and South Korea and then to China too. Even if the contrast between the “free world” and „totalitarianism” obscured the inconvenient facts of South Korean and Taiwan dictatorships through the mid-1980s and China‟s oppressive Cultural Revolution style of communism to 1976 followed by its hesitant political reform, the polarized world order marginalized other value issues. Also, through the 1990s U.S.-led globalization captured the spotlight as China, Japan, and South Korea scrambled in turn (sanctions after Tiananmen, tough trade talks even after the bubble economy collapsed, and the Asian financial crisis) to relieve the pressure. It was only after 2000 that value issues broke free of the earlier obsessions. Kim Dae-jung‟s Sunshine Policy, Koizumi Junichiro‟s Yasukuni Shrine commitment, Hu Jintao‟s shifting interpretation of China‟s “peaceful rise” and George W. Bush‟s “axis of evil” reference to North Korea all brushed aside previous inhibitions. Thus, even as attention was drawn anew to the existing

8 Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan’s Historical Memory toward the United States,” Gi-Wook Shin, “Values and History in U.S.-South Korean Relations,” Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan-South Korea Relations and the Role of the United States on History,” Cheol Hee Park, “Getting Away or Getting In: U.S. Strategic Options in the Historical Controversy between Its Allies,” Jin Linbo, “Sino-South Korean Differences over Koguryo and the U.S. Role,” and Scott Snyder, “New Grounds for Contestation: South Korea’s Koguryo-Era Historical Dramas and Sino-Korean Relations,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., U.S. Leadership, History and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

agenda of North-South reunification, Japan‟s revisionism, China‟s claims to regional power and Taiwan, and U.S. hostility to North Korea, another set of value issues was percolating below the surface. Gradually fine-tuning its strategy to the lingering issues, the United States has yet to grasp the significance of the other issues that were for a time being overshadowed. Anti-Americanism in South Korea, the collapse of civility between Japan and South Korea, the Koguryo issue souring the mood between South Korea and China, and last, the anxieties in Japan toward the United States with their growing references to history, all flared unexpectedly. In addressing immediate policy priorities centered on the lingering value issues, strategists may not yet recognize how they are becoming entangled with long- term challenges linked to the new concerns. In the search for mutual understanding as the foundation for stability in Northeast Asia, U.S. leaders strive to forge a foundation of common values. This requires a shared perspective on egregious violations of basic standards. After all, U.S. values rest not only on joint approbation of cherished rights and ideals, but also on shared condemnation of flagrant transgressions of the elementary standards of humanity. Prominent on any list of the most repugnant lingering U.S. symbols are: the unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan amidst its brutal war of conquest in China; Stalin‟s mass murders and unbridled cruelty to the Soviet people; Mao Zedong‟s totalitarian abuse of the Chinese people of a similar nature; and Kim Jong-il‟s total mind-control over his own people and Korean War atrocities. Any agreement on values would be expected to start with a clear consensus in rejecting these abhorrent phenomena. Especially in Northeast Asia where these negative symbols all have found expression, failure to reach agreement on past outrages has the potential to undercut apparent cooperation on values. Abe‟s group defended Japan‟s goals in its wars in Asia, rejecting the verdicts on Pearl Harbor and at the Tokyo Tribunal. In Vladimir Putin Russians find a leader who caters to the majority view that Stalin‟s role in history was largely positive. Hu Jintao continues China‟s glorification of Mao‟s overall role in history, capitalizing on its continuing rise to become more assertive about this. If Roh avoided any endorsement of the North Korean regime, his silence on human rights catered to a widespread view among progressives downplaying their tragic consequences. In the fall of 2009 the contours of globalization became more clearly defined and also vigorously contested. In September the United Nations gathering of heads of states saw states staking out their positions, including at the special session devoted to nuclear disarmament. Just afterwards, in Pittsburgh the G-20 met as the world economic crisis was stabilizing, becoming the first serious test of whether states could reach beyond one-time emergency measures to forge a new economic architecture. In November Barack Obama‟s travel in Asia put U.S. leadership on the line in specifying the links between globalization and regionalism. Then, in December Obama went further, accepting in Oslo the Nobel Peace Prize while clarifying the balance between war to enhance security and peace that could endure. Only a week later in Copenhagen world leaders faced the danger of climate change. Through all of these meetings the eyes of the world were transfixed not only by U.S. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

initiatives but also by the actions of China‟s leaders. The interplay of the two states now sets the terms of globalization and also of regionalism in Northeast Asia. Amidst the clamor over intensified struggles over globalization, many took less notice of the renewed pursuit of regionalism. After Hatoyama Yukio became prime minister of Japan in September he put priority on Asianism and realizing the goal of an EAC. At the October meetings of China, Japan, and South Korea and then ASEAN + 3 and the EAS as well as the December travel of Xi Jinping, expected successor to Hu Jintao in 2012, China‟s keen interest in regionalism was on display. If Lee Myung-bak scrambled not to be left behind as he faced criticism for drawing close to Obama, the focus centered on the balance between alliance ties to the United States and regional cooperation presumed to center on China. While some depicted this uncertainty in terms of the balance of power, others recognized it as a quest for transnational order in which state-centered national identities are tempted by both regional and global visions. None of the states active in Northeast Asia is comfortable with the civilization of globalization. All face an environment of pluralist civilizations with powerful groups in search of an identity rooted in the past capable of shielding their nation. 9 Under these circumstances the search for a regional community proceeds within narrow limits.

THE EAC AND THREE EAST ASIAN CORE IDENTITIES

To break free, to at least some degree, of the overwhelming grip of the United States on transnational identity with ramifications for national identity—Japan‟s narrow Yoshida Doctrine postponing serious debate on foreign policy, South Korea‟s obsessive anti-communism, and China‟s impasse in filling the vacuum after Mao‟s death without normalization with the Soviet Union--, aspirations were stirring for regionalism. As the most confident of this trio in the late 1980s Japan gave rise to the earliest exploration of Asian regionalism, reviving themes of the prewar and war periods that were already high on the agenda for progressives despite the cold war atmosphere and gradually proved to be irresistible for conservatives too. When Japan floundered in the 1990s and China was gaining ground, South Korea spawned an interest in regionalism as the culmination of its diplomatic diversification beginning with nordpolitik. Finally after 2000 China grew confident enough to picture itself as the center of the Asian region. Each state assumed that with the rise of a community of states in Asia it would balance the United States in identity terms as well as power, as it also gained an active leadership role. Japan‟s slogan was to reenter Asia, but more than entry was sought. South Korea‟s Sunshine Policy put it in the forefront in cooperation to bring North Korea into the regional fold. In turn, the core behind

9 Peter J. Katzenstein, “A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations: Multiple Actors, Traditions, and Practices,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 1-41. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

China‟s call for multilateralism was exclusion of the United States as sub-regions of Asia took shape (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO, being one) in a manner that revived sinocentrism, given the emerging balance. Cultural diplomacy on the basis of economic supremacy had been Japan‟s approach, and it became China‟s too, coupled with rising political and military clout that opposed U.S. power more directly. LDP leaders held up the banner of regionalism from the late 1980s and in 1999 Obuchi Keizo promoted ASEAN + 3 even after doubts that Japan could gain the leading role had multiplied. South Korean conservative leaders sought diplomatic diversification in the 1990s, but it was the progressive Kim Dae-jung who championed a vision group in ASEAN + 3 to seek an EAC. From 2000-2001 China became the most enthusiastic voice for such a community through ASEAN + 3. With the launch in 2008 of a separate three-way summit, new momentum could be detected, especially as these states increasingly relied on each other in the financial crisis and the DPJ took office pledged to redoubled Japan‟s efforts to forge and EAC. Yet, as seen in the discord in 2005 when the EAS was established over its functions and scope, different notions of what the EAC should be are rooted in conflicting views of one‟s national identity and how it relates to regionalism.10 Japan‟s interest in the EAC stems from a long-frustrated quest to balance relations with the United States, not so much for realist or economic reasons as for the objective of overcoming the abnormal postwar era of dependency by clarifying a distinctive national identity. It seeks confirmation of its claim to have pursued both in the prewar and postwar eras the rise of Asia free of Western imperialism and able to assert values that bridge the democracy and human rights advocated in the West and community-oriented values with stress on harmony deemed fundamental to Japan and at least some of its neighbors. Given the greater urgency long attached to this pursuit by Japanese progressives, we should not be surprised at the fact that the DPJ is more vigorous in pressing for the EAC, even after many in Japan and the LDP had become fearful that China would gain dominance. A closer look at Japanese national identity casts doubt on the prospects for the EAC. The ideological dimension shows the initiative over most of the post cold war era in the hands of staunch conservatives, whose revisionism alienates Japan from all of the victims of its aggression to 1945. Progressives have not recouped their losses since the 1980s and lack clarity on any ideological alternative. Centrists who might bridge the gap between the two sides have been weak and have failed to coalesce around any platform. As for the sectoral dimension, the high tide of strong overlapping economic, cultural, and political national identity of the 1980s has passed. Yet, Nihonjinron and other themes of cultural uniqueness

10 Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Gilbert Rozman, “New Challenges in the Regional Integration of China and Japan in 2005,” in Satow Toyoshi and Li Enmin,eds., The Possibility of an East Asian Community: Rethinking the Sino-Japanese Relationship (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobo, 2006), pp. 389-410; Gilbert Rozman, “South Korean-Japanese Relations as a Factor in Stunted Regionalism,” IRI Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 99-124. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

remain too embedded to permit agreement on a shared East Asian culture, especially one that unquestionably would be dominated by China‟s identity. Even as economic integration in East Asian continues, strong state guidance overshadows any shared identity, while separate political identities show no sign of attenuating. Whereas in Europe the vertical dimension of national identity saw profound changes as cross-national networks expanded after WW II on the basis of hundreds of years of cultural interconnections, in the core East Asian states international NGOs are much weaker and despite rapid modernization the state remains the overwhelming focus of identity. State-dominated pursuit of regionalism results in a contradiction between insistence on strengthening national identity and willingness to forsake some national prerogatives in support of regional trust and institutions. On the horizontal dimension, all three states have been preoccupied with the United States. Unless they can coordinate their thinking about its looming presence, there is little chance that they can agree on how to balance it with Asian regionalism as well as shared understanding about international responsibility. China‟s aim of weakening U.S. alliances and forging an exclusive regional grouping is directed against U.S. power and values and the principles of internationalism, while Japan and South Korea rely on U.S. power and values as well as internationalism as a check on China‟s potential regional hegemony. There is little common ground. The temporal dimension is especially divisive as East Asian states reflect on the past in pursuit of a shared identity for region-building. The premodern era is criticized in Japan and South Korea as sinocentric, while in China it seems to serve as a model for a new order. The transition from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s is denounced in China and South Korea as a period of mounting Japanese militarism and imperialism, while Japanese qualify their apologies with justifications and proud claims about their misunderstood intentions. The cold war era pits Japan and South Korea with memories of a necessary struggle in opposition to communist expansionism against China‟s rationale for supporting North Korea in the Korean War and resisting American imperialism. After decades of assuming that the period culminating in Japan‟s aggression was most divisive, observers found that the premodern era is at the center of Sino-South Korean mistrust and that the Sino-Japanese joint history textbook of 2010 reached a total impasse not over the period to 1945 but over the cold war era. So far, there has been little effort to address the post cold war era, presumed to be a time of common cause in building regionalism but in the future likely to be treated by China as a time when it struggled to overcome efforts to contain it and by the other states as part of a process of revival of sinocentrism. Gaps in national identity are not being bridged in the core states of East Asia. The reason is not so much lingering memories focused on Japanese aggression as it is Chinese identity intensifying in a manner that pits regionalism against internationalism and builds the former on sinocentric assumptions that cannot reassure its neighbors. From 2006 the nadir of Sino-Japanese relations was overcome in four summits that showed some moves to find common ground over history, but the value gap was not reduced. In 2009-10 the initial Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

distrust following Lee‟s election in Sino-South Korean relations was controlled, but again the value gap did not narrow. Hatoyama‟s enthusiasm for the EAC opened the door to a more forthcoming Chinese approach, as it eagerly responded. Yet, failure to recognize the importance of transnational values as a foundation for regionalism is likely to leave the community as little more than a façade bereft of substance on non-economic issues. Just as South Koreans soured on China after Roh‟s goodwill was insufficiently reciprocated, the much more skeptical Japanese will turn away from the EAC if recent assertive Chinese behavior is not tempered in an effort to reward Hatoyama‟s overtures.

THE 6PT AND FOUR GREAT POWER NATIONAL IDENTITIES

The United States, China, Russia, and Japan are great powers with a strong sense of entitlement to leadership in Northeast Asia. Accustomed to guiding its allies toward a regional order based on containing threats and sharing universal values, the United States seeks to fortify alliances with Japan and South Korea, to steer the 6PT toward a regional framework based on shared norms and principles, and to deny any exclusive regionalism with more than a limited economic agenda. U.S. national identity rests on a history of fighting totalitarianism and militarism. It also centers on pursuing freedom in the face of human rights violations and anti-democratic forces. Yielding to North Korean nuclear blackmail or Chinese hegemonic ambitions would be a nightmare not only for the U.S. role in the region but also for its global ideals and interests and self-pride. Confident in the 1990s about its triumphal conclusion of the cold war and brazen under George W. Bush through much of the past decade in its claims to world leadership, it has lowered its expectations. Yet, pressure from conservatives to uphold an anti-globalist national identity makes even modest compromises with rival China and demonized North Korea difficult. As some vilify Obama for being un-American, apologizing, and failing to defend American values, U.S. room for maneuver is continuously limited. Obama not only strives to reduce the emotionalism of national identity as a factor in domestic and international relations, as a person of mixed-race, he also epitomizes the image of a leader who is able to negotiate identity boundaries. He has reached for a new spirit of bi-partisanship without success and is fashioning a global moral narrative, which is being tested by all of the countries in Northeast Asia except South Korea. Above all, it is China with its clashing narrative that stands in the way of globalization as well as an inclusive approach to regionalism. As his image of forging a world community based on multiple partnerships rather than a balance of power grows clearer, Obama faces staunch resistance from China‟s obsession with sovereignty and competition between powers. To the extent that serious problems persist and are blamed on China‟s truculence, a renewal of intense U.S. national identity can be expect, casting blame on China as a rival. In 2006-2008 the 6PT venue had its maximum potential to bridge the differences between great powers, especially Sino-U.S. divergence over regional security and the future Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

of the Korean peninsula. After facing Chinese reluctance to become involved in 1993-98 despite U.S. compromise on the 1994 Agreed Framework and Chinese blame on it in 2003- 2006 for taking too hard a line in the Six-Party Talks, Washington pursued a conciliatory approach for stage-by-stage resolution of the second nuclear crisis including a wide-ranging agenda through five working groups formed by the Joint Agreement in Feb. 2007. Striving hard to cooperate with Pyongyang while coordinating with the other four parties, notably Beijing, Obama found in 2009 that Beijing was less concerned about a nuclear North Korea than other priorities. Although in response to a new barrage of missiles and a second nuclear test Beijing voted for sanctions at the UN Security Council, it watered down the resolution and continued economic assistance to the North in ways that undermined the solidarity of the other parties. With Iran‟s nuclear weapons program posing a parallel challenge, Beijing‟s reluctance to pressure Iran as well as its soft position toward North Korea contrasted with Moscow‟s newly cooperative posture. With its ambivalent stance on nuclear proliferation, China dashed hopes for a new regional security architecture based on the 6PT. It rejected appeals to activate five-party talks to enhance coordination until the North returned to serious negotiations. When the Obama administration announced new arm sales to Taiwan, consistent with policies of previous U.S. presidents, China suspended military exchanges. Aloof to opportunities to advance ties with a president eager for engagement and multilateralism, it grew more assertive in line with its accelerating military build-up. Despite shared national interests in stabilizing the Korean peninsula and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, China was letting the best opportunity for increasing regional trust pass. Its motivation could not be traced to U.S. unilateralism or pressure on China. Rather new confidence in China‟s economic clout, military might, and diplomatic range brought to the surface an arrogance about China‟s right to dictate the terms of Taiwan‟s reunification and reshape the world order, which can be traced to longstanding strategic thinking as well as a spike in national identity intensity seen in each of the dimensions on which this rests. Security is far more important than economics or culture in building trust among nations. By choosing to take a more aggressive posture on a series of security issues, China is signaling that it prefers a divided transnational order at least until it achieves certain objectives, which may include Taiwan‟s capitulation on the terms of reunification and a weakening of U.S. alliances. Refusing to develop a security community in dealing with North Korean belligerence, China has placed a big barrier in the path of community building both regionally and internationally. Its stance on security alienates U.S. leaders, although in early 2010 they continued to give China every opportunity to agree at least to a sanction regime for Iran and continued sanctions on North Korea regardless if it decides to return to the 6PT. It also has the potential to alienate the other states active in the talks. Although many overlook Russia as an actor in Northeast Asia, its relationship to China has considerable bearing on the prospects for regional cooperation, especially in regard to North Korea. Seoul has repeatedly beckoned to Moscow to join in long-range Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

energy projects, recognizing its presence. Tokyo has allowed territorial claims to distract it from region-building overtures, although cavalier treatment of foreign investment may play an even larger role in its lack of attention to Moscow. Yet, the 6PT make clear that Moscow is most attentive to Washington, which it frequently berated for failing to offer Pyongyang reasonable compromises, and Beijing, whose coattails served Moscow‟s great power aspirations. After Bush shifted to a more conciliatory approach to North Korea in 2007 and Obama pressed the reset button on Russo-U.S. relations in 2009, Russia could see more merit in cooperating with the United States, even in Northeast Asia. The abrupt change in the world order in 2008-10 gave Russia an impetus to look anew at Northeast Asia as at other environments where it had opposed U.S. policies. A fall in energy and natural resource prices lowered its expectations. China‟s rapid rise and newfound assertiveness, including in Russia‟s backyard in Central Asia, aroused concern. Lee‟s energy diplomacy and wide-ranging initiatives in Asia and Hatoyama‟s targeting of Medvedev at the start of his time as prime minister along with desire for a breakthrough in Asia to prove he has a new foreign policy different from that of his LDP predecessors beckon to Moscow. With North Korea behaving unpredictably and China hesitant to rein it in with its unique economic clout, Russia became more important to the trio of allies in managing regional security. If it firmly supported Obama‟s dual approach consistent with Lee‟s “grand bargain,” China would feel more pressure to extend its cooperation in a sort of 5 + 1. Russian national identity has targeted that of the United States, but it has room for change, seen in the 1990s, in contrast to China‟s greater consistency since the 1980s. While the 6PT were launched in 2003 with limited objectives, they have become an indispensable mechanism, whose loss would signal a sharp downturn in the capacity of concerned states to deal with security issues. Their focus on denuclearization in return for rewards to North Korea has masked broader significance for further negotiations that can build trust in dealing with the manifold issues in Korean reunification and in regionalism. Regardless of whether North Korea becomes a shared security threat or a joint challenge in reintegrating the regional economy, the 6PT are becoming essential for community-building. It would be short-sighted to plan for regionalism without extending this framework, including the fifth working group established in 2007 to forge a regional security architecture. As in the case of the EAC, China wields a veto. In the former case, it welcomes economic coordination that excludes the United States, but the future of the 6PT depends on China‟s willingness to accept the United States as a partner in forging a security framework in which U.S. alliances retain their importance.

THE APC AND U.S-LED TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY

U.S. efforts at forging a shared identity since the end of the cold war have not been met with success. In 1991-93 aspirations for a new world order and a strong push for democratization and human rights floundered against the primacy of vested economic Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

interests, including in the United States itself. In 1993-97 hopes for turning APEC into an organization focused on economic openness, especially through financial deregulation, stumbled against claims to Asian values and protectionist priorities. In 1999 the theme of humanitarian intervention took center stage, relying on NATO rather than the Security Council to subdue areas with a potential for genocide or civil war. George W. Bush‟s “coalitions of the willing” in 2001-2004 strove to mold a world order supportive of U.S. unilateralism and preemption, but that reached an impasse in his second term. Finally, Barack Obama‟s multilateralism and inspirational bridging of differences proved to be stillborn in 2009 when other states refused to compromise and the Republicans chose the politics of a domestic “cold war” without any interest in bipartisanship. Democracies are too divided in their interests to stand together, while China‟s rapid rise stands in the way of any organization of states established in order to effect its containment. As many states hedge against China‟s potential hegemonism and react nervously to its assertive moves against universal values and U.S.-led management of destabilizing situations, we can anticipate steps to form a community crossing the Asia-Pacific. Its core will be two longstanding alliance networks: the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea nexus in Northeast Asia; and the U.S-Australia nexus supplemented by U.S. ties to Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Nobody should anticipate a formal league of democracies or a full-fledged alliance system such as NATO. Yet, recognition that APEC is too large and unwieldy and that India is inclined to strengthen ties with the United States and states cooperating closely with it gives impetus to the search for another venue with the potential to gain the attributes of a community. We follow the example of Australian president Kevin Rudd in labeling the desired entity the APC. This was the long-term objective of many backers of APEC, who sought to strengthen it in the face of trade tensions in the 1990s, concern over the spread of terrorism in the 2000s, and general awareness of the need for new institutions to cope with rapid changes in Asian states and in the role of the United States in Asia. Yet, even as U.S. opposition stymied supporters of Mahathir‟s proposed East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) early in the 1990s, Japanese resistance played a large role in the mid-90s in keeping APEC from strengthening. As U.S. leaders kept striving to boost its role in addressing security concerns as well as other significant political matters, China pointed to Taiwan‟s presence to insist that its functions be kept narrowly economic. There is no longer any prospect that APEC can become a venue for community building. Obama‟s November 2009 visit to Singapore for the APEC meetings and stops in Japan, China, and South Korea showed the limits of his initial multilateral approach in Asia. Both the troubled start to his relationship with Hatoyama and the disappointment in the way China treated him and his global agenda demonstrated the limits achievable by U.S. goodwill. In the face of many difficulties, Obama will have to reframe his quest for multilateralism. Perhaps, the greatest concern across the region is that he will concentrate U.S. attention elsewhere, as Iran/Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan divert attention and also Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

resources to Southwest Asia. Yet, China‟s military rise and rapid advance from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean leave no room for a disconcerting U.S. retreat. A different path is likely to be sought for building an APC that leaves room for China on terms it will presumably reject and draws other states closer in a joint quest to engage China even if jointly declared values and tighter security cooperation point to a hedging strategy. The starting point for consideration of the APC may be Obama‟s trip to Australia and Indonesia in March 2010. After all, Kevin Rudd recently proposed this idea, as his country increases its role around the Indian Ocean and solidifies its exceptionally close relations with the United States. Reigniting Indonesian fascination with his childhood stay in Jakarta, Obama also has an opportunity to reaffirm his engagement with Muslim nations as a cornerstone in values of promoting multiculturalism and bridging divides across civilization so long as they reject terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Before long Obama should also visit India to solidify improved ties, while also demonstrating to Pakistan the U.S. desire to stabilize tensions both in Afghanistan and South Asia. Yet, the U.S. strategy in Southeast and South Asia will not succeed if it is not anchored in alliance ties in Northeast Asia. The challenge remains as it has been since the 1950s to convert narrowly focused alliances with Japan and South Korea into a triangular framework that operates effectively in Northeast Asia and connects to a maritime Asia-wide system. Only by breathing new life into U.S.-Japanese relations after the troubled start under Hatoyama can the foundation for the APC, which many assumed to be present in the period of personal trust between Koizumi and Bush, be deepened. The DPJ has said it seeks a more equal alliance and closer ties to South Korea; so it may clarify the present confusion over its priorities by working with the two states to recast relations. This task is facilitated by a shift under Lee Myung-bak to firm support for shared values, coordinated treatment of North Korea, and triangularity including Japan. As a consequence public opinion in each nation toward the other has improved. Moreover, Hatoyama is pursuing Lee more vigorously than any Japanese leader has pursued his South Korean counterpart. While on the history issue this has reassured Koreans, on regional policy it leaves doubt on how a balance will be reached between the EAC and a triangular alliance. Confusion about Japan‟s priorities makes pursuit of an APC difficult, but the fact that revisionist thought in the LDP may have lost its veto over ties with South Korea may open the door to an unprecedented level of triangularity as well as new thinking about U.S. relations. India is a democratic state suspicious of China‟s rise that became the target of both U.S. and Japanese leaders by 2005 as a critical partner in the reorganization of Asia. It has been torn between supporting U.S. policies toward Myanmar, Iran, and other states condemned by many democracies and countering China‟s expanding ties to these states with its own overtures. U.S. reliance on Pakistan in the war in Afghanistan puts limits on Indian trust of the United States. Japan‟s wavering approach as its ties with China have vacillated also complicates matters. In early 2010 Lee Myung-bak visited India as part of his new Asian initiative. The situation remains in flux, depending on how the Afghan war unfolds Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

and also on the new uncertainty in Sino-U.S. relations. If U.S., Japanese, South Korean, and Australian thinking is aligned in beckoning to India, then prospects will be enhanced for community building. The APC would do well to stay away from a vigorous democratization agenda. It can better lead by example without hiding its own value preferences, as is inevitable if China‟s voice is heard. The main challenge is maintaining order through building trust, as in restraining North Korea, supporting confidence building between Beijing and Taipei, and preventing militarization of the Indian Ocean through new naval bases and tensions. If keeping the APC informal without another round of annual summits serves stability and makes it easier for countries to cooperate without raising the specter of containment, then this may be desirable. As in the case of the ideal 6PT with a rump group of 5 and a desire for North Korea to sign onto their agenda, the ideal APC could be envisioned as a core group of states with shared values and security objectives eager to bring China into the fold. Their cooperation would lessen the chance that China could divide and conquer, while also increasing the likelihood that each state‟s approach would be balanced without the spikes in alarm that could easily arise as China‟s relative power keeps growing.

CONCLUSION

National identities remain strong in Northeast Asia, while suspicions of a global identity are unlikely to be overcome quickly. The foundation for shared regional identity was weak in premodern times, was damaged by Japan‟s aggression in the first half of the twentieth century, and remains shaky amidst the confusing diversity of initiatives since the end of the cold war. In this situation, no one transnational identity holds promise. It follows that a multilayered approach has the best chance of capturing the plethora of community- building aspirations in the region. Three layers could coexist as Sino-U.S. relations evolve and other states find their place between these two dominant powers. Each layer has identity implications, and the balance among them will depend not only on how they boost transnational identity but also on how national identities develop. The EAC has been an objective since 2005 for the 13-state ASEAN + 3, and in 2009 became a goal also of the three states not in ASEAN but in the lead economically. Given the diversity of ASEAN, this core grouping of states sharing a Confucian legacy may have an advantage in community building. Yet, China‟s shift toward sinocentrism and the lack of balance from the other two states limits this prospect. Chances will be increased if alternative communities develop simultaneously, in which China accepts emerging norms and principles of a global community. Above all, this means forging the 6PT into a security community based at least initially on 5 +1, as Russia seeks balance in the region rather than accepting Chinese hegemony and the United States leads in the quest for consensus in managing North Korea, a process that accelerated in 2003. Rather than give China a veto over all community-building, the states interested in strengthening universal values need to Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

give organized expression to their joint commitment through a separate layer for which the label APC has been suggested. This too is best expressed in a dual form, starting with a coalition of allied and others inclined to share security concerns and values and leaving the door open for China to declare its support for these priorities. Regional order cannot be built on either extreme of pretending that values do not matter or idealistically claiming that values are shared when they are not. Indifference to national identities does not contribute to consensus on regional or global identities. In the context of each of the three layers groups of states may strive to narrow the gaps in their national identities while gradually seeking common visions for broader identities. Only in this way can we anticipate that a regional order will take shape capable of managing the dangerous tendencies for conflict as China arms at a rapid rate and aims to regain Taiwan and extend its power even as nuclear weapons proliferate and terrorism is on the horizon.

Junghwan Lee HK Research Professor, Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University

The Main Objective of My Work Mengzi said, “The Way lies in what is near, but people seek it in what is distant; one‟s task lies in what is easy, but people seek it in what is difficult. If everyone would treat their kin as kin, and their elders as elders, the world would be at peace (ping tianxia 天下平).”1 孟子曰,“道在爾而求諸遠,事在易而求之難.人人親其親,長其長而天下平.

In this terse remark of Mencius, one of the Confucian sages, an attentive reader may notice a certain explanatory gap. What is puzzling, at least to our eyes, is that Mencius suggests here individual moral actions in the narrow boundary of one‟s own family as the sufficient, not merely necessary, condition to achieve worldly peace. This great leap from individual morality to the peace in the world, however, is not unique to Mencius. An extended, though still highly brief, version of this view is found at the Great Learning. The main objective of my work is to explore an orthodox account for this issue set forth in Zhu Xi (1130-1200)‟s interpretation of “ping tianxia” in the Great Learning. “Ping tianxia” (平天下), an idiomatic expression, broadly indicates a certain political and social order in a greatest scale. Semantically, due to its broad usage in various contexts, this short phrase can be diversely translated in modern English. Yet, it seems there is a certain agreement. James Legge (1815-1897), a noted Scottish sinologist, rendered it into “The making the whole kingdom peaceful and happy.”2 In the latest translation of the Great Learning by Andrew Plaks, this term is translated into “bring peace to the entire world.”3 In a similar vein, the RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism edited in 2003 suggests “Making the world peaceful.”4 While agreeing that the character “ping”

1 For translation, Bryan W. Van Norden, “Mengzi (Mencius),” in P. J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, eds., Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.,2005), 138. 2 James Legge, The Great Learning, in Confucius and James Legge, Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean (New York,: Dover Publications, 1971), 373. 3 Andrew H. Plaks, Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (the Highest Order of Cultivation and on the Practice of the Mean), Penguin Classics (London ; New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 15. 4 Todd Cameron Thacker, "Ping Tianxia," in RoutledgeCurzon encyclopedias of religion, ed. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. denotes a certain peaceful and orderly condition, they differently translate “tianxia”: the first translation connotes peace within the territory of a state, while the others imply peace beyond it. Even in the first translation, as its literal meaning “under the heaven” suggests, however, the term “tianxia” has the connotation of beyond-the-territory-of-a-state, indicating the widest territory of the Song of Heaven which is comprised of many feudal states in the pre-Qin historical context. When applying this concept in a modern context, its underlying implication of transnational or international order leads us to raise a question about who should take the responsibility for it. One may tend to think of a super power or an international organization, which is reminiscent of an imperialistic order as well. Yet, as Mencius remark quoted above implies, a Confucian thinker may present a different answer. None of the translations quoted above do not duly reflect indisputably the most important interpretation presented by Zhu Xi. His commentary on the Great Learning, as is well known, has had enormous influence over the Northeast Asian intellectual world. In 1244 when he was enshrined as a Confucian sage in the National Confucian Temple, the court of Song China (960-1279) also canonized the Four Books— the Great Learning, the Confucius‟ Analects, the Mengcius, and the Great Mean—systemized initially by Zhu and recognized his commentaries orthodox. Since then, all candidates for the civil service examination, constituting the majority of the educated class in pre-modern China, were required to follow Zhu‟s guidance in reading these classics until 1905 when the examination system was abolished. Concerning the issue of worldly peace and order, Zhu Xi put forward his vision, which is markedly different from a politics-centered perspective. In interpreting “ping tianxia,” he envisioned equilibrium of a community established in relationships between its members. Particularly, he underscored the role of each and every member as a moral agent in establishing or maintaining such relational equilibrium. And he also drew from the Great Leaning a variant of the golden rule—“xieju 絜矩” or “measuring the mind of others with my mind”—, presenting it as the practical principle applicable to all relationships so as to achieve equilibrium in a community. In the following, while elaborating on each of these key concepts, I will pay special attention to the question of how he envisioned the equilibrium of the entire human community—the ultimate end of all social and political actions—on the basis of individual practice of this moral principle.

FROM POLITICAL ORDER TO SOCIO-MORAL EQUILIBRIUM “Guo 國” (a Governmental Organization) versus “Tianxia 天下” (the Entire Community)

Xinzhong Yao (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 480. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Though it requires further study, while by “guo 國,” Zhu referred to the court and governmental organizations presided over by the emperor, by “tianxia,” as its literal meaning, “under the Heaven,” suggests, he comprehensively indicated the entire community (sometimes beyond the territory of a state) and its all constituents (particularly the people), in which the government is included merely as a part. So the phrase that ruler “gains guo” narrowly means the condition that the ruler seizes the means to govern the people and its resources, the ruler of “tianxia” broadly signifies the sovereign who has voluntary supports of the people and realizing the political and social ideal in reality.5

“Ping” of “ping tianxia”: Political Unification or Equilibrium With regard to “ping tianxia,” what makes Zhu‟s interpretation genuinely distinctive lies in his interpretation of the character “ping.” Ping originally means a weighing balance, and various connotations such as level, even, equal, and equilibrium are derived from it. In this vein, “ping tianxia” often refers to political unification and following political and social peace. For example, this phrase was employed to eulogize the status quo that Zhao Kuangyin 趙匡胤 brought an end to political chaos ensuing the disintegration of the Tang dynasty and thus founding a new dynasty, the Song.6 Here, “tianxia” has a strong connotation of multitude of regional powers, and “ping” also indicates a certain political order imposed upon such multiple political authorities. Contrastingly, Zhu Xi rendered “ping” into “pingjun 平均.”7 He illustrated it as follows:

When enabling each person to attain one‟s own allotment and wishes in the relationship between I and others, all relationships of the upper and the lower as well as four sides will be equal, orderly, and square, and the entire community will be in equilibrium.8 使彼我之間各得分願,則上下四旁均齊方正,而天下平矣.

In this highly abstract statement, Zhu illuminated that the equilibrium of the entire human community was predicated on its individual members, bringing us back to the original question I have posed in the beginning. Evidently, an enormous explanatory gap is

5 For this, see Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 4 of Chapter 10. 6 Shi Jie 石介, 『Culai ji 徂徠集』, (Siqu quanshu edition), 10.3a. 7 In so doing, he presumably consulted with the sentence, “The character is cultivated; the family is regulated; and peace and order are secured throughout the kingdom,” (修身及家.平均天下) in the chapter of “Record of Music” in the Book of Rites. He also quoted this phrase from the “Record of Music” verbatim in the preface to his commentary on the Book of Poetry. 8 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. involved in this statement. Particularly, it shows a great leap from the personal area of “attaining one‟s own allotment and wishes” (I will explain what this phrase means shortly) to the achievement of a worldly order. Nor does it directly involve mediators like state- power between these two polarities in the social and political scale. As it will be explicated through this work, this fragmental quotation, in fact, adequately encapsulates the entire scheme of Zhu‟s interpretation of “bringing equilibrium to the entire community.”

“Measuring” as the Principal Principle in Achieving the Equilibrium Chapter 10, where the idea of “ping tianxia” is explicated, is the longest one in the Great Learning. Calculating with characters, it is more than one thirds of the entire text. Its contents are also diverse, extending from filial piety to managing the state‟s resources, and to “ping tianxia.” In summarizing it in terms of central themes, Kong Yingda classified this chapter into three distinctive parts; (1) “the way of xieju (絜矩)” (2) “distributing wealth (sancai 散財) to the people,” and (3) “employing moral men and distancing immoral men.”9 In contrast, Zhu Xi proposed that throughout this chapter penetrates a single principle, which is “xieju.” In his commentary to Section 2, Zhu noted that “what to hold on is simple, but the range of its applications and effects is broad. This is the essential way to “bring equilibrium to the entire human community. The intent of the entire chapter is derived from this.”10 In the concluding remarks on Chapter 10, he stated that “the import of this chapter is that what one should endeavor lies in „Assimilating (tong 同) what one likes or dislikes to those of the people‟ and in „Do not monopolize material benefits.‟ It, thus, extensively [explains] the meaning of xieju.”11 Zhu conceptualized this “essential way” as “measuring the mind of others with my mind.”

Two Distinctive Descriptions on “xieju (絜矩)” in the Great Leaning There is little evidence that before Zhu the simple phrase of xieju had been singled out from the text and exalted as a principal principle to achieve the ideal of ping tianxia. Nor does it appear in any other classics, but only twice in two sections of the Great Learning, thus precluding the possibility of cross-textual interpretation. Moreover, these two sections show notable differences in describing this concept. Xieju appears twice at Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 10. Section 1 reads as follows:

9 Kong Yingda 孔穎達, "Liji Zhengyi 禮記正義," in Shisan jing zhushu 十三經注疏, ed. He Xiu 何休 and Xu Yan 徐彦 (Beijing 北京: Beijing daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 2000), 1876a. 10 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 2 of Chapter 10. 11 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, the Concluding Remark of Chapter 10. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. When those in superior positions treat the aged as befits those of venerable age, then the virtue of filial respect will be promoted among the people at large. Likewise, when those in superior positions treat their elders as befits those of older years, then the virtue of respect for elder brothers will be promoted among the people at large; and when those in superior positions show compassion toward defenceless orphans, then the people will refrain from rebellious behaviour. This is the basis for the dictum that the man of noble character possesses the way of „measuring by the carpenter‟s square.‟12 上老老而民興孝，上長長而民興弟，上恤孤而民不倍，是以君子有絜矩之道也。

Section 2 immediately ensues as follows;

Behaviour of the sort one abhors in one‟s superiors ought not be practiced in commanding one‟s subordinates; and behaviour that one abhors in one‟s subordinates ought not be practiced in serving one‟s superiors. Behaviour that one finds abhorrent when observed in those with greater precedence ought not be practiced as a basis for taking precedence over one‟s inferiors; and behaviour that one finds abhorrent when observed among those of inferior status ought not be practiced in following the lead of those in more advanced positions. Behaviour that one finds abhorrent when observed in others, on one‟s right or on one‟s left, ought not be practiced in one‟s dealing with those on the other side. This is what is meant by „measuring with the carpenter‟s square‟.13 所惡於上，毋以使下；所惡於下，毋以事上；所惡於前，毋以先後；所惡於後，毋以從前；所惡於右，毋以交於左；所惡於左，毋以交於右：此之謂絜矩之道.

Descriptive Differences Comparing these two sections, one can find notable differences in describing xieju. Based on the political hierarchy, particularly between the ruler and the ruled, Section 1 concerns unilateral, top-down moral influence. In this relationship the ruler is identified as an active agent, while the people are depicted to be passive beneficiaries of such moral leadership. In short, the practice of “measuring by the carpenter‟s square” is understood in the political realm. In contrast, in Section 2, this top-down relationship is replaced with a highly abstract structure of multiple relationships. No particular relational contexts such as the ruler-the ruled are offered. The main agent, though not explicitly mentioned, is also ascribed to the first person in general or “I.”

12 For translation, Plaks, Ta Hsüeh and Chung Yung (the Highest Order of Cultivation and on the Practice of the Mean), 15. 13 Ibid., 15-6. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. In addition, in Section 1, the responsibilities that the main agent ought to practice are specified. In contrast, Section 2 sets forth an abstract form of multiple relationships, symbolically represented with six directions, without identifying specific responsibilities to fulfill. Rather, Section 2 focuses on understanding of responsibilities of the first person, to be specific, inferring “my” proper attitude toward one in a given relationship through reflecting on the improper attitude of another person toward me in the similar relationship. Lastly, Section 1 describes xieju in a positive manner, while Section 2 consistently points out a negative (“ought not”) attitude in the relationships. Such distinctive accounts of xieju give rise to a hermeneutical problem. In order to coherently conceptualizing it, it is required to lay a common foundation and thereby integrating these two descriptions into a single explanatory structure.

An Orthodox Interpretation of “xieju” before Zhu Xi Both Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda, who provided an orthodox commentary to the text before Zhu, rendered “xieju 絜矩” into sympathetic, but unilateral, rule of actions practiced by the ruler or the ruling class upon the people. Concerning Section 1, Zheng translated “xie 絜” into “to hold” (qie 挈), and “ju 矩” into “law” (fa 法) in a broad sense, thus interpreting the phrase in the meaning of “holding and practicing” (zhi er xing zhi 執而行之) laws or legislation and enforcement of laws by the ruler. (In a loose Chinese sense, „fa‟ here comprehensively encompasses all types of laws including moral standards and ritual codes in addition to legal laws and regulations) Following Zheng, Kong also interpreted it into “because of holding on the way of laws, his actions do not make errors; and when imposing (jia 加) it upon others, the others will follow it.”14 Concerning the xieju in Section 2, Zheng Xuan commented that “the way of „xieju‟ is to adequately hold on that which is in the self, and thereby being sympathetic (xu 恕) to the people. The essence of governing the state is exhaustively in it.”15 After reiterating this expression of Zheng, Kong interpreted it into “amplifying [the benevolence in] the self (or being sympathetic to the self), and [then] interacting with others” (shuji jiewu 恕己接物).16

14 孔穎達, "Liji Zhengyi 禮記正義," 1876a. 15 Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, "Liji Zhengyi 禮記正義," in 『Shisan jing zhushu 十三經注疏』, ed. He Xiu 何休 and Xu Yan 徐彦 (Beijing 北京: Beijing daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 2000), 1869a. 16 孔穎達, "Liji Zhengyi 禮記正義," 1877a. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Zhu Xi’s Interpretation of “xieju” Zhu Xi straightforwardly refuted Zheng and Kong‟s interpretation of “xieju.”17 Adopting Fan Chunren‟s 范純仁 interpretation instead, he translated “xie” as “duo 度” or “to measure (or to fathom) the mind of others with my mind” (hereafter, “measuring”) so as “to understand” (zhi 知) others, and “ju 矩” as its purpose or consequence, “thereby making

[it] square.” (suo yi wei fang 所以爲方).18 In terms of causality, this definition is reminiscent of the previously quoted description that “when enabling each person to attain one‟s own allotment and wishes … the world will be in equilibrium.”19 To one of his disciples (Chen Chun 陳淳) who expressed his difficulty in understanding this comment, Zhu replied as follows:

What [I] abhor in relation to the left is that the one on [my] left side encroaches upon the right border of my area, so that I abhor it. Then, I do not treat a person on my right side likewise, and do not encroach upon the left border of the person on my right side. Thus, the left border [in general] will be clearly demarcated. Likewise, measure it with that which I abhor in relation to the right side. Then, the right border [in general] will be clearly demarcated. The cases of the upper and the lower, and of the front and the back are all same. All the sides [I] face will be even and equal, and the demarcation of the borders will be square and orderly without the problems of disparities of wider and narrower [on every side].20 所惡於左.便是左邊人侵了自家右邊界分.而我惡之.故我亦不以此待右邊人.而不侵他右邊之左.如此方得左邊界分分明.又以所惡乎右者度之.方得右邊界分分明.上下前後亦莫不然..則四至所向皆得均平.而界分方整.無偏廣偏狹之病矣.

In this description based on Section 2, the political undertone is markedly diminished, and an abstract form of reciprocity in multiple relationships replaces it. However, presumably for many of readers this description still does not sufficiently explain

17 Zhu Xi 朱熹, 『Daxue Huowen 大學或問』 in 『Si Shu Huo Wen 四書或問』 (Shanghai: Shanghai gu ji chu ban she : Anhui jiao yu chu ban she, 2001), 35-6. (Hereafter, Daxue Huowen) 18 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. Also see, Ibid., 35-6. For Fan’s interpretation, see Wei Shi 衞湜, ed. 『Liji Jishuo 禮記集說』, Siku quanshu edition ed., 152.26b-27a. For Zhu’s encountering moment of Fan’s interpretation, see Zhuzi Yu Lei. Zhonghua shu ju ed. (1994), 16.368:1. (Hereafter, ZZYL) 19 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. 20 Zhu Xi 朱熹, “Da Chen Anqing 答陳安卿,” 『Zhu Xi Ji 朱熹集』, ed. Guo Zhai and Yin Bo dian, Di 1 ban. ed., 10 vols. (Chengdu Shi: Sichuan jiao yu chu ban she, 1996), 57.2918. (Hereafter, ZXJ) Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. how the principle of reciprocity is relevant to the underlying premise that the equilibrium of the entire human community is contingent on whether each individual member “gains one‟s proper allotment and wishes” or not.

MEASURING AND EQUILIBRIUM 1: EQUITY, RECIPROCITY, AND COMMONALITY

Common Values and Moral Standards: Equity in a Hierarchical System The proceeding statement apparently contains an oxymoron in ordinary Chinese semantics. “Fen,” which I have tentatively translated into allotment, has a strongly sense of “to divide” or “to distinguish,” often referring to social discrimination according to ranks in a hierarchical system. The six directional points in Section 2 also imply different positions in a multi-dimensional social structure. On the contrary, “junping” literally has connotations of fairness and equity, in specific, equal attainment of “one‟s proper allotment” in this statement. Then, as one of Zhu‟s disciples raised, a question arises how can “human world with the discriminatory statuses among Son of Heaven, feudal lords, ministers, literati, and commoners be made even and equal?” In reply, Zhu stated that the state of being “even and equal” here does not mean perfect equality ignoring a hierarchical system. Individual “proper allotment and wishes” do not presuppose equal status among individuals. Its actual position varies in the web of relationships, as the six directions represent. For example, the pair of the upper and the lower mostly indicates a hierarchical relationship between the superior and subordinate positions. Nonetheless, the point that Zhu put greater emphasis on here is equity and commonality among individuals. “One‟s proper allotment and wishes” in this context mainly indicate a set of social, moral, and family values and moral standards such as filial piety and caring for one‟s own family, which every human being commonly pursues as well as ought to conform to. Accordingly, “even and equal” refers to the condition that each and every individual can put such common values and rules into practice.21 According to sumptuary regulations, each member is required to differently, therefore unequally, carries them out. However, such common values and moral standards are fundamental for every member in a community to manage his or her life in a proper way, therefore, he or she not only has moral obligation to commit himself or herself to such values and moral standards, but also has a basic and equal right (in a weak sense) to pursue them, “regardless of all kinds of differences in social standings, intelligence, natural disposition, etc.”22 In the previous question, figuratively, Zhu Xi put emphasis on the part that each of proper allotment has its own, so to speak, a territory with borders, which each individual can

21 ZZYL.16.364:3 22 Daxue huowen, 35. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. claim. Therefore, it is judged to be wrong to “encroach” upon the territory of a person in this relationship. The preservation of this individual allotment is identified as the main foundation of the ultimate relational equilibrium—“even and equal” and “square and orderly.” He also put it in a negative manner as the ideal condition that “there must be not even one single man who cannot attain [his own allotment and wishes]” (buke shi you yifu zhi buhuo 不可使有一夫之不獲),23 so that no one in the world would “deplore inequity”

(不均之歎).24 In this explanation underlies Zhu‟s belief in commonality of the human mind (or human nature), which he put into “the same [mechanism] of the human mind.” (renxin zhi suo tong 人心之所同)25 According to personal dispositions and social circumstances, people may have different interests and goals. But when they have genuine knowledge about this commonality, they can also learn about values and moral rules common to all. For the same reason, because the genuine validity and authority of values and rules derive from this commonality, if I sincerely wish something, I can infer from it that others also have same wishes. From this, it also derives that one has a moral responsibility to enable others pursue this set of common values and moral rules. According to this line of thinking, Zhu interpreted “measuring” as a practical reasoning that “on the basis of such commonality, the man of noble character (or those with political authority) ought to measure (or fathom) [the mind of] others, thus enabling each and every person to attain one‟s own allotment and wishes in the relationship between I and others.”26 Put it differently, “measuring” is a practical reasoning (1) to transcend all types of differences between I and others, (2) to understand values and moral standards common to both I and others, and (3) from it to infer my responsibilities to enable others to pursue such common values and moral standards.

“Measuring” in the Political Realm With regard to “evenness and equity,” Zhu often ascribed responsibilities to the state. However, he stressed that the relationship between the ruler and the ruled be regulated by the principle of “measuring”, instead of political authority. He held the view that genuine common values and moral standards are not “an artificial construction (in Mencius and Zhu‟s term, “waishuo 外鑠”) that require forcible

(qiang 强) imposition,”27 because they originate in commonality of the human mind. From

23 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. Also see, ZZYL.16.361:2. 24 Daxue huowen, 35 and 36. Also see, ZZYL.16.361:2; 361:4, 362:4 25 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. 26 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. 27 Daxue huowen, 32 and 36. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Section 1, he inferred not only responsibilities of “those in superior positions” to guide the people in moral direction; he also held the view that the effectuality of such top-down moral influence—“moral practices of the superiors are imitated by the subordinates as quickly as shadows and echoes” (or “the effect of the moral practice by the superiors over the subordinates is quicker than shadows and echoes”)28—demonstrates such commonality. In specific, concerning “laolao 老老” and “changchang 長長” in Section 1, Zheng Xuan interpreted them as direct caring for the aged and the elder in general by the ruler. In contrast, Zhu adopted the previously quoted phrase from the Mencius that “treat their kin as kin, and their elders as elders,” contending that such exemplary moral actions by the superiors within one‟s own family would “stir up” innate common moral sensitivity and motivation of the people to choose common moral values and responsibilities over personal concerns.29 On this basis, Zhu Xi inferred the practice of “measuring” as a political principle that the state is obliged to enable each and every person to pursue such common values. In a positive manner in relation to Section 1, as is discussed above, the state (more specifically, those in officialdom including the emperor) has the duty to take the lead in putting common values into practice in accordance with moral rules, thus enlightening the people to understand the genuine value of such practices and motivating them to voluntarily pursue it. (This is equivalent to the “illuminating the [innate] luminous Virtue and thus renewing the people” in the Great Leaning). Putting it in a negative form, Zhu more often referred to “governance” (zhengshi 政事), particularly negative impacts on the people such as heavy taxation, monopolizing resources, untimely labor services, and so forth.30 The practice of “measuring” here means that those with political authorities understand negative impacts of such policies over the people, and do not disturb economic and social conditions that enable the people to properly pursue their common moral interests (i.e., “one‟s own allotment”) such as caring for their own families. (In the previous quotation such negative political actions are counted as a sort of “encroachment.”)

MEASURING AND EQUILIBRIUM: THE CENTRALITY OF THE MORAL SELF AND SOCIO-MORAL

28 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Section 1 of Chapter 10. 29 When defining “ping tianxia” in this sense, Zhu Xi certainly kept in mind that the original text in the opening chapter of the Great Learning which puts “ming mingde yu tianxia 明明德於天下,” instead of “ping tianxia,” in the sequence of the Eight Items. 30 ZZYL.16.361:1, 361:5, 362:1, 361:3, 364:2, 365:1, and 368:3. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. EQUILIBRIUM

The preceding interpretation of “measuring” in the political realm is congruent with understanding “ping tianxia” as “evenness and equity”—an equilibrium created by the political and economic conditions that ensure all people to pursue common values. In it, based on the political hierarchy, the main agent to practice “measuring” is confined to the emperor and officials. As is represented by the six directions in the proceeding quotation, however, in conceptualizing “measuring,” Zhu referred to a wide range of agents in diverse contexts. Most broadly, it relates to a state (guo 國) in international relations.31 More often, he took the example that a household encroaches on the land of its neighbor.32 Narrowly, he also applied it to a situation that three persons sit in a row: sitting in the middle, if I spread my legs over the proper space allowed to me, it would disturb the other two persons sitting beside me.33 Such diversities with regard to main agents and contexts lead us to the original question I have raised in the beginning how Zhu explained the leap from the personal realm to the equilibrium of the entire community. In this light, while the preceding interpretation of “measuring” centers on understanding common rules and values applicable to all, the following one will focus on how to understand specific relational rules relevant to specific social and political contexts.

Main Agent In the Catechistic Sub-commentary to the Great Learning, Zhu put his typical explication of “measuring” as follows:

When measuring (or fathoming) the mind of others with my mind, [I can] understand what others abhor are not different from what I abhor, and then I am not willing to impose upon others what I abhor. If I myself consistently practice [this, in all] relationships between I and others, of the upper and the lower as well as the four directions, everyone will gain one‟s proper allotment; they will not encroach upon each other‟s [allotment], but each of them comes to the center; when comparing every territory that each person occupies [in relationships], diverse disparities (lit., the wide and the narrow, the long and the short) will be [removed, and everything will be] equal like one. [Consequently], [everything will be] neatly square and right, therefore there is no part which has either

31 ZZYL. 15.262:4. 32 ZZYL.16.363:3 and 16.364:1. 33 ZZYL.16.426:2. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. excess or deficiency [in the world]. This is so-called “measuring.”34 以己之心度人之心.知人之所惡者不異乎己.則不敢以己之所惡者施之於人.使吾之身一處乎此.則上下四方物我之際各得其分.不相侵越而各就其中.校其所占之地.則其廣狹長短.又皆平均如一.截然方正.而無有餘不足之處.是則所謂絜矩者也.

In this description is found an underlying premise that the practice of “measuring” by an agent will consequently bring out the state of being “square and right” not merely in my personal relationships but also in relationships in general.

Two-Agents versus Three-Agents The “measuring” described here as a moral practice of “understanding” others is certainly analogous to reciprocity or the golden rule that “do (not do) to others what you would (not) like to be done to you.” As is widely known, the golden rule is also rooted in the Confucian ethics. With regard to reciprocity, the following passages on “xu 恕,” set forth in the Analects, are often cited.

Zigong asked, “Is there one teaching that can serve as a guide for one‟s entire life?” The Master answered, “Is it not „sympathetic understanding‟? Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire.” 35 子貢問曰,“有一言而可以終身行之者乎？”子曰,”其恕乎.己所不欲,勿施於人.”

What I do not wish others to do unto me, I also wish not to do unto others.36 我不欲人之加諸我也,吾亦欲無加諸人.

In his commentary to the Analects, Zhu Xi recapitulated this rule into the phrase of “extending the self to others” (tuiji ji ren 推己及人),37 and also applied it in interpreting Chapters 8 and 9 of the Great Learning. This rule makes a contrast with more common descriptions on human relationship in the Confucian tradition. While the latter specifies a moral rule between two agents in specific positions such as filial piety and affection in the father-son relationship, the former in an abstract form concerns reciprocity between two persons disregarding their positions.

34 Daxue huowen, 36. 35 The Analects, 15,23. For translation, Edward Slingerland, "The Analects," in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, ed. P. J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2005), 45-6. 36 The Analects, 5.12. For translation, Ibid., 15. 37 Zhu Xi’s Commentary to the Great Leaning, Chapter 9. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. While similar, the “measuring” described by Zhu in the previous quotation makes notable contrasts with reciprocity or “sympathetic understanding.” Firstly, instead of postulating equal status between agents, it puts the first agent at the central position in multiple relationships, symbolized by “the center” and the six surrounding directions. Put it differently, reciprocity mainly concerns a common rule equally applicable to both I and others, the “measuring” is about understanding “my” proper attitude toward others in different positions. Secondly, the “measuring” practice described here focuses on the first person only, not involving reciprocal relationships between two agents. From the perspective of reciprocity, if someone treats me in an improper manner, I can infer from it not only that I should not treat him or anyone else in the same improper manner, but also that I can also justify retribution to him or request him not to behave so. Simply put, a rule inferred in accordance with the principle of reciprocity binds both the first and second persons. Therefore, reciprocity is suitable for understanding not only responsibilities but also rights. In contrast, the “measuring” is more unilateral than reciprocal, focusing on the responsibility of the first person only. Here, the first person has the responsibility not to treat others in the way that he judges to be inappropriate, but does not have the right to return such improper behaviors to the wrongdoer. For a similar reason, thirdly, my proper attitude is determined according to the position of the second person in the relationship. For example, the attitude that I infer to be right in relation to, for example, one at a lower position cannot be applied to my relationship to another at a superior position. In the superior-subordinate relationship, a rule inferred through the practice of “measuring” is relevant either to the case of from the lower to the higher or that of from the higher to the lower, but not both of them. Fourthly, as Zhu Xi pointed out, the passages quoted from the Analects relate to the relationship between “I vis-à-vis another person, involving two persons; [however,] the “measuring” involves three persons.”38 The difference between two-agents and three- agents may look trivial, but there exist a substantial difference in framing reciprocity. As discussed above, the rule of reciprocity in the two-agent model can be employed universally; yet, it is suitable only for reciprocal relationships, which can hardly be extended to different sorts of relationships. In contrast, by bringing to light the three-agent structure—“I” at the center with two opposite ends—embedded in Section 2, Zhu Xi was able to construct a dynamic model, extending to the entire web of human relations in diverse positions.

Equilibrium in a Jungle-Gym Structure In rendering “ju 矩” (which I translated into “thereby making [it] square”) of “measuring” into “square and right” (fang[zheng] 方[正]), Zhu envisioned a three-

38 ZZYL.365:1. Also see, ZZYL.361:5 and 365:2. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. dimensional intersection of human relationships. In a letter addressed to Jiang Mo 江默 (jinshi of 1169), who asked a further explanation of this graphic description, Zhu attached the following two diagrams so as to visually illustrate the state of being “square and right.”39

This simple figure is comprised of one side-view diagram (cetu 側圖) and one bird-eye‟s-view diagram (ditu 地圖). When integrating them into one, we can visualize a three-dimensional structure with three lines crossing a central point. (See Figure 2)40 In this structure, this central point is occupied by “I” (ji 己), and each of the six ending points of the three lines indicates the upper

39 ZXJ, “Da Jiang Degong 答江德功,” 44:2120. The diagrams are borrowed from electronic version of SKQS. 40 I borrowed the jungle gym figure from the website source, “http://www.math.ucla.edu/~bon/jungle.html,” March 1, 2010. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. (here, top) and the lower (here, bottom) (shangxia 上下), the left and the right (zuoyou 左右), and the front and the back (qianhou 前後), respectively. Apparently, this structure is too restricted to encompass the entire human community or tianxia, but the following verbal explication suggests that this simple structure can be extended infinitely. It reads:

Think with the three examples [lit., phrases] of “the upper and the lower” “the left and the right” and “the front and the back” [in Chapter 10], then you can see it. “Xie” means to measure. … The mind has no difference between his [mind] and my [mind]; reflex that [mind] and compare it with this [mind]. If I abhor the way that my superior (lit., the upper) treats me, then [I] can understand that the mind of a subordinate (lit., the lower) will be like that of mind, [if I treat him in the same way my superior do to me]. Therefore, I will not treat the subordinate in the same way (lit., with the mind) that I blame the superior [for]. Then, I will be at the center, and gain a good space both from the upper and from the lower (or occupies good positions both with the upper and with the lower), and it (i.e., my relationship both with the upper and the lower) becomes equal and square. … If I treat the subordinate in the same way that I blamed the superior for, the upper will be longer and the lower will be shorter, so it becomes not square. … If everything is done like this, there will be nothing that is not unequal.41 只把上下·前後·左右等句看.便見.絜度也. … 心無彼己之異.只是將那頭折轉來比這頭.在我之上者使我如此.而我惡之.則知在我下者心亦似我如此.故更不將所責上底人之心來待下人.如此.則自家在中央.上面也占許多地步.下面也占許多地步.便均平正方.若將所責上底人之心來待下.便上面長.下面短.不方了. … 每事皆如此.則無所不平矣.

Here, the state of equilibrium in multiple relationships is illustrated figuratively in terms of space between two points. In this structure, the first person is placed at “the center” and surrounded by six points in all six directions. The state of being “even and equal,” narrowly speaking, represents the equal extent of space lying between the center and each of the surrounding six points. Correspondingly, the

41 Zhu’s conversation with Xu Yu 徐宇 from Yongjia. (ZZYL16.363:2) Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. state of losing equilibrium—indicated by “being unequal” or “the problems of disparities of wider and narrower” (pinguang pianxia zhi bing 偏廣偏狹之病) in a previous quotation—is depicted as unequal distances between the center and peripheral points. Describing from the first-person perspective, my inappropriate action toward anyone around me is considered to break out this even condition in this multiple relationships. For example, my action to “treat the subordinate in the same way that I blamed the superior” is considered to encroach upon the territory of the subordinate, resulting in making the distance between I and the subordinate irregular (“shorter,” in the quotation). However, the ultimate impact of such inappropriate action of mine may go beyond a particular relationship between the two persons. Even though he did not provide a detailed account, Zhu Xi might envision an interlocking structure of causal chains in a human community. When we attach each ending point of all six directions in the previous three-dimensional diagram with another diagram, and continue this attachment in all six directions, it will form a grand structure extensively prolonged. (It will help to imagine a large extension of a jungle-gym structure. See Figure 3)42 In this structure, every intersection is connected by a line (i.e., a relationship) to another intersection. From the first-person viewpoint, the intersection I occupies is “the center” of relationships, and the intersections around the center refer to second- or third- persons in relationships. Yet, no definite distinction between I and others exists in this structure. Depending on where to locate the center or “the self” (ji 己), every intersection can be either the center or a peripheral position. Particularly from the viewpoint of the whole structure, however, every intersection corresponds to the center or a main agent to maintain the equilibrium of this structure; if a center does not work properly in keeping its own position but “encroaches upon” the space lying between, for example, itself and the left center, the entire structure will be damaged to that degree. In this sense, each line between two intersections does not simply stand for a particular relationship between two agents, but also for a transmitter of a certain, particularly negative, impact from one center to another. In this structure, a certain impact of one agent may be transmitted endlessly along the line. For example, “my” encroachment of the border of the left center can prompt this left center as another main agent to encroach the border of another left center to regain of his “proper allotment.” For example, if a neighbor on my left encroaches upon my land, it damages the economic means with which to care for my family and perform moral practices. Then, this deteriorated economic condition may motivate me to encroach upon the land of a neighbor on my left. Likewise, this malicious impact can be transmitted endlessly in the left direction. In this chain of impacts, this transmission will continue and eventually disturb the equilibrium of the entire structure,

42 I borrowed the jungle gym figure from the website “http://www.math.ucla.edu/~bon/jungle.html,” March 1, 2010. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. unless it is ended at a point. Then, a question arises about the main agent who is responsible for bringing an end to the transmissions of negative impacts. In this structure, as mentioned above, each intersection is the center of impacting others as well an object passively affected by the actions of another, and the transmission can continue endlessly along the line. But this statement is true, only insofar as each center (or an agent) functions as a reflexive transmitter with no moral will. Conversely, the “measuring the mind of others with my mind” implies voluntary capacities of each individual agent to behave otherwise than a transmitter of negative impacts. Specifically, it means, first, the ability to “understand” (zhi 知) the mind of others, thereby understanding my appropriate attitude toward them, and, second, the will power of “not doing” (wuyi 毋以) that which he has understood inappropriate.43 (Corresponding to “understanding that the mind of a subordinate will be like that of mind” and “not treating the subordinate in the same way that I blame the superior [for],” respectively, in the previous quotation) From the viewpoint of this whole structure, it seems insignificant what specific position I am currently occupying in it. Nor is it significant the actual impact that my personal action, either appropriate or inappropriate, has on the entire structure. However, the underlying hypothesis is that what if every member of a community behaves as I do. As is pointed out previously, everyone is the main agent in this structure. Therefore, the equilibrium of the entire society is contingent on the ability and practice of each agent in maintaining the proper relationships in which he is currently involved on the one hand and in cutting off the chains of negative impacts on the other. In sum, the “measuring” practice requires each and every member of a community think and act as the voluntary moral agent, rather than a passive second person. Therefore, in describing the equilibrium of the entire human community, Zhu consistently put emphasis on the “centrality” (zhong 中 or

zhongyang 中央) of the self and its “consistent practice of” the “measuring,”44 as well as

“self-governing” (自治) instead of governing others.45

CONCLUSION

Up to this point, I have attempted to fill in the gap present at a political strain in the Confucian tradition by exploring Zhu Xi‟s explication of “the equilibrium of the entire

43 For Zhu’s emphasis on “no doing” (wuyi 毋以),” ZZYL.16.362:1. 44 ZZYL.16. 363:1, 364:1, 364:4, 365:1, and 365:2. 45 Daxue huowen, 33. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. community.” This concept had been best regarded as an ideal, or narrowly as a political condition eulogizing the foundation of a new dynasty. In contrast, Zhu‟s interpretation offered an explanatory structure envisioning this ultimate end of all social and political objectives. This structure was designed to efficiently underscore the significance that each and every member could, and should, participate in establishing, maintaining, or restoring this highest equilibrium, more importantly, within the circumstance that he or she might be currently involved in. Particularly, by rendering xieju into “measuring the mind of others with my mind,” he washed off its thus-far strong political implication on the one hand, and instead put on view a moral principle practicable by all members of a community to reach this ultimate end on the other. Zhu Xi‟s interpretation of the equilibrium suggests a substantially different socio- political model both in retrospective and prospective perspectives on Northeast Asia. Particularly, the political history of late imperial China has been characterized by its autocratic regime—the emperor sitting at the top of the political hierarchy wielded an unrestricted power over society. Zhu‟s model instead presented an alternative perspective in structuring a new model of a community in which the political authority takes a part, while the roles of individual members are highly estimated. In addition, Zhu‟s interpretation also opens up the possibility that the idea of “ping tianxia” can be revived in present discourses on domestic, international, and transnational order. As I have pointed out above in a passing manner, this phrase has a connotation of imperialism. Specifically, as it is often translated into “bringing peace to the world,” a legitimacy question follows; which state or organization should take the leading role in bringing such consequence about beyond its own territory. In contrast, Zhu demonstrated a model of national and international order which does not need to presuppose a single main agent to take control of the whole; as an alternative, it suggests an equilibrium undergirded by the principle of “measuring” and the commitment of individual moral agents to it. Lastly, I would like to briefly point out two drawbacks, among many, contained in Zhu‟s model. Firstly, based on the premise that each member would act as a moral agent, it can hardly address the problem of self-interested wrongdoers. This model suggests that the first agent reflect on the negative impact which a wrongdoer has inflicted on the self so as to infer a proper attitude toward another. Yet, it does not specify what I should do upon the wrongdoer in order to preserve my “proper allotment and wishes.” This situation usually invites the interference of the third party, and Zhu also did not deny the role of the government as the third party to redress this problem or to enforce punitive laws.46 Contrastingly, concerning the international relations, at least in the current situation, this model cannot suggest a solution to this problem without presupposing a third-party transcending the authority and interests of particular states. As much as we put emphasis on

46 Zhu Xi once said, “If the household on my left encroaches upon my field by five acre, I would file a lawsuit against him.’ (ZZYL.16.363:3) Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. the role of the third party, it would undermine the genuine underpinning of Zhu‟s model. Secondly, this model focuses exclusively on the relational role of agents, leaving out a variety of functional roles that members of a community should play to keep it in operation. With regard to functional roles, as is seen in his definition of “one‟s proper allotment and wishes,” Zhu narrowly stipulated common moral values and moral standards which each and every member is expected to equally put into practice. It seems to me that in reaction to the rapid growth in commercial sections, which is often called, the first Chinese commercial revolution, he envisioned an ideal community best suitable for an agricultural society which puts more weight on a social and moral cohesion among members than orchestration of diverse functions. Nonetheless, through the course of this preliminary work, I have been convinced that Zhu‟s model and the practical principle of measuring can be developed into a strong alternative view to the currently discourses on reciprocity (the problem of fitting and proportional returns and compatibility with benevolence)47 and communitarianism (the problem of viable scale of a community),48 though I will go into detail on this issue in a future work.

47 Lawrence C. Becker, "Reciprocity," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1464-7. 48 Bell, Daniel, "Communitarianism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

Session Ⅴ Historical Reconciliation and Inherited Responsibility

Chairperson: Bi-Hwan Kim (Sungkyungkwan University)

"Historical Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective" Melissa Nobles (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

"Inheriting Compensation Claims and Duties: Reparations to the Descendants of 'Comfort Women'" Daniel Butt (University of Bristol)

"Comfort Women Case Reconsidered: Inherited Responsibility and Civic Responsibility" Jun-Hyeok Kwak, Eon-joo Park(Korea University)

Discussants Na-Young Lee(Chung-Ang University) Tze Loo (University of Richmond) Hee-Kang Kim (Korea University)

Melissa Nobles Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, MIT

ABSTRACT

This article provides a broad comparative overview of historical injustices and reconciliation. It seeks to provisionally identify the political conditions under which historical reconciliation is more or less likely. My analysis draws from Huntington‘s ―balance of power‖ explanation for ―transitional justice‖ decisions after democratization, and applies it to cases of historical injustices. I find, consistent with Huntington, that the most powerful decide what is possible. In our cases, what is possible may also occasionally be what is right, from a justice perspective. Here, the powerful may be domestic political actors or international tribunals and law. However, I also find, in contradiction to Huntington, that time, combined with shifts in the balance of power, can assist, and does not inevitably hinder reconciliation. Scholars argue that this shift is due primarily to the emergence and influence of international human rights laws and norms. This argument is moderately supported by the historical record.

Key Words: Historical Injustices, Reconciliation, Colonialism, War Crimes, Slavery

INTRODUCTION

Violence, cruelty, mistreatment, and exploitation are, it seems, inescapable dimensions of the human condition. Persons who enable and carry out such acts usually feel justified in doing so. Those who experience them usually reject the justifications and expect some sort of remedy. The passage of time does not often diminish either belief in the justifications or desire for remedy, even if the likelihood of success seems unlikely. Reconciliation is often an expressed desire of the victims and perpetrators alike.

Yet defining and achieving reconciliation is not easily done. In some measure, the difficulties are due to differing conceptions of the injustices and reconciliation. Judgment of what constitutes an historical injustice is often at odds, if mostly for self-serving reasons. Perpetrators often seek to minimize harms, by judging them not to be harms at all, but benefits. Victims, not surprisingly, insist that the injustice has no mitigating qualities.

Whatever the competing conceptions, the fact remains that the rectification or denial of historical injustices motivates political action. Political actors demand acknowledgement and material compensation. Alleged perpetrators offer such acknowledgement and compensation, or they do not. The achievement of reconciliation does not usually turn on the severity of the harms themselves, but on the constellation of domestic and international political forces.

This article provides a broad comparative overview of historical injustices and reconciliation. It seeks to provisionally identify the political conditions under which historical reconciliation is more or less likely. It also argues that the passage of time can facilitate and does not inevitably hinder the successful achievement of remedies. Where theorists debate the moral force of ―backward-looking‖ versus ―forward-looking‖ claims of injustice, real-world experiences suggest that ―backward-looking‖ claims are enormously resilient, and under the right political circumstances, efficacious. (Ivison 2000, 360). The article begins with a brief discussion of the nature and cases of historical injustice and the shared justifications for said injustices. I then discuss the demands for rectification and reconciliation, and identify the conditions where they are achieved and where they are not. Here, I draw directly on Huntington‘s ―balance of power‖ explanation for ―transitional justice‖ decisions after democratization, and apply it to cases of historical injustices. I find, consistent with Huntington, that the most powerful decide what is possible, which is also occasionally, what is right, from a justice perspective. Here, the powerful can be domestic political forces or international tribunals and law. However, I also find, in contradiction to Huntington, that time can assist, and not necessarily, hinder reconciliation.

THE NATURE AND CASES OF HISTORICAL INJUSTICE

Generally speaking, historical injustices may be grouped into the following categories: a) colonization and settlement, b) colonialism and empire decline, c) war crimes, and d) slavery. It is important to note that these categories are not discrete; they overlap. This is especially true of colonization/settlement and colonialism, where the former might well be considered a subset of the latter. That is, ―settlement colonies‖ were a particular kind of colonialism. I separate them, however, because I want to highlight the experiences of newly formed states, which resulted largely in the whole displacement, if not decimation, Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. of indigenous populations. Moreover, although these categories are not mutually exclusive, the categories are based on my assessment of the historical injustice‘s key precipitant or context. The experiences of indigenous peoples in the Americas (North and South), Australia, New Zealand are categorized as ―colonization and settlement.‖ Colonialism includes European colonialism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and Japanese colonialism in East Asia. War crimes refer to the crimes associated with World War I and II. Finally, I should add that the cases discussed in this article are not comprehensive. Rather, they are illustrative and are used to represent the defining features within each category.

The injustices committed during or as a result of these contexts are similar across these cases. They basically result in one or more of the following: deprivation of personal liberties and rights (political, economic, and social or human), dispossession of land and /or other material goods, violent mistreatment, and loss of life. And in nearly all of these cases, similar justifications were provided, at the time and subsequently, to justify or otherwise explain away the offenses. With the passage of time, disagreement over the historical facts and consequences of said fact continues, raising related questions: Do historical claims convincingly prove a moral and causal connection between the past and present, such that remedy is required or desirable? Is reconciliation even possible?

Colonization and Settlement: This category includes the experiences of indigenous peoples in North and South America, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa. As is well known, when European colonists arrived to these territories, their goal was land settlement. Thus, colonial settlement necessarily required massive land dispossession of indigenous peoples. In North and South America, settlement resulted in massive shrinkage of indigenous landholdings. This land alienation was achieved by treaty, sale, war, fraud, forced removal, and eventually legislation. With the passage of the Dawes Act in 1871, the U.S. government ceased to enter into treaties with Indian nations and instead legislated a land allotment scheme that mandated the division of communal land into individual allotments. This mechanism had the effect of significantly reducing indigenous landholdings. In contrast, Spanish and Portuguese colonial administrations rarely entered into treaties with indigenous peoples, largely because the Crown did not recognize Indian sovereignty. At the same time, however, the Crown recognized Indian communal landholdings. During the colonial period, Indian landholding was relatively secure. With independence in the 1830s, indigenous landholding worsened dramatically by liberal land reforms that required conversion from communal land ownership to individual. Settler landowners bought or otherwise obtained Indian lands. In South America, Indigenous peoples were largely alienated from their lands, forced to seek work on large rural estates or other extractive enterprises. In North America, they were forced to work in general labor markets or to live and work on reservations. Even more significant than the reduction of landholding was the decimation of peoples. In the U.S., for example, ―sociologist Russell Thornton has estimated Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. the Indian population . . . at about 600,000 in 1800. By the 1890s, only 250,000 Indians survived.‖ (Kiernan 2007, 363).

South Africa followed a similar trajectory. South Africa‘s mid-twentieth century apartheid system has most often been compared to racial legal segregation in the American South. However, South African experiences of land dispossession and tight regulatory control of labor and individual movement most closely resembles that of indigenous peoples in ―New World‖ settlements. Like European settlers from Britain, Spain, and Portugal, Dutch and British colonists in South Africa were in search of land. They acquired land through colonial expansion and resultant wars throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the legislature passed laws designed to directly control African labor, land ownership and residence. For example, the Native Land Act of 1913 allotted a small fraction of South African land to the African majority as ―reserves,‖ and disallowed African land ownership or lease outside of the reserves. The election of the National Party in 1948, and its establishment of the Apartheid regime should be considered an end point of centuries-long efforts to dispossess and control the African majority.

Colonial Rule and Decline: In general, colonialism, whether European or Japanese, was organized to control territory, extract resources and labor, and to ensure cultural dominance. The degree of colonial penetration and domination has been a topic of scholarly debate. Regarding the African colonial state, for example, political scientist Crawford Young has characterized these states as hegemonic, arguing that European colonists were willing and able to largely impose their will and advance their interests. Jeffrey Herbst takes an opposing view, questioning the completeness of European colonialism in Africa. Scholarly assessments of the strength of Japanese colonial rule are more certain. As historian Mark Peattie observes, ―. . . the Meiji strategies employed in the Japanese colonies comprised one of the most intensive programs for colonial development, exploitation, change ever taken by a colonial power.‖ (Peattie 1984, 44). In the case of Africa, both Young and Herbst agree on colonialism‘s violent brutality. Herbst describes violence as a ―central feature of colonial rule,‖ (Herbst 2000, 90) and Young observes that colonial hegemony ―was dearly won,‖ by European colonizers. (Young 1994, 99). The same is true of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, where Korean resistance was met with ―harsh enforcement by an openly oppressive military administration.‖ (Peattie 1984, 19)

Ottoman colonial rule represents another experience still. The Ottoman state governed one of the ―vastest empires in human history,‖ covering territory that now includes the modern states of Turkey, Hungary, Romania, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Egypt, and Algeria. (Oren 2007, 38) Governance over its Muslim majority and non-Muslim minorities was organized under the Millet system, where non- Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Muslim minorities were granted a great deal of local autonomy in matter of internal governance. However, it is important to note that all Ottoman inhabitants were considered subjects, and not citizens, of the Sultan, and lived under Islamic law. The Empire‘s territorial shrinkage (due to war, Russo-Ottoman war, 1877-78), European encroachment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries precipitated organized violence against Christian Armenians. The reasons for this animosity are complex, but appear to be rooted in a desire to ―bind Muslims to the Sultan,‖ and ―to cow the Armenians into submission.‖ (Akçam 2006, 47). In the early twentieth century, as the Empire continued to collapse, Turkish nationalism grew. Turkish nationalism excluded Armenians. By the time Turkey entered W.W.I in 1914, (in response to the Russian declaration of war), Armenians had already been the victims of state terrorism and ―Turkification.‖ The massacres and expulsions continued throughout the war, ending in 1918.

War Crimes: Historically, statesmen and theorists have regarded war as brutal, ―consistent with the laws of nature.‖ (Rudolph 2001, 656). War crimes, then, were those acts of wanton violence against enemy forces and civilians. In most instances, these acts were treated as matters of national sovereignty and handled by domestic authorities and laws. In the aftermath of W.W. II, however, international law and international human rights laws emerged, providing more expansive and detailed conceptions of war crimes and more effective mechanisms to ensure accountability. For example, international law now includes ―crimes against peace,‖ and most famously, ―crimes against humanity,‖ which includes genocide. It is important to note, however, that war crimes tribunals did not begin with World War II and the Nuremberg trials. As Gary Bass notes, ―war crimes trials are a fairly regular part of international politics.‖ (Bass 2000, 5).

The efficacy of international law and war crimes tribunals is a topic of some dispute. Scholars debate how much ideals about justice and human rights can compete with the power of realpolitik in explaining the outcomes of trials and other efforts. According to realpolitik, the interests of the most powerful states significantly shape outcomes. Those who argue for the power of the law expect that prosecutions and other legal efforts, guided by liberal principles, will succeed. Not surprisingly, the record is mixed. In his study of international war crimes tribunals, Bass judges only one of the five main liberal arguments favoring tribunals to be well founded. The one unqualified good, according to Bass, is the re-examination of the historical record. The trials help to ―establish a definitive record.‖ (Bass 2000, 287). Yet, the power of trials to set the historical record straight does not extend far beyond the courtroom. In most cases of injustices, historical narratives are continually contested, with each side marshalling competing facts to support their particular point of view.

New World Slavery: Slavery as a form of labor is one of mankind‘s oldest and most widely Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. used. The transatlantic trade slave to the Americas and Caribbean was one of the largest systems of slavery in human history, with an estimated 12 million people captured between 1500 and 1850. As importantly, the distinctiveness of New World slavery rested in the intensity and brutality of plantation life and permanence of slave status. Such status was inherited and usually life-long, corresponding closely (although not always) with racial identification. New World slavery was fundamentally, of course, a system of labor. However, insofar as states, colonial administrators, and slave owners developed racial identifications designed to protect, reinforce, and justify slave status, it was also a system of racial slavery, a fairly rare form of bondage.

There were important differences among and within slave-holding societies. For example, the Caribbean colonies produced sugar, received the most slaves, and were administered largely by absentee plantation owners and their colonial agents. The United States and Brazil were, in contrast, fully settler states, with more diversified slave-produced commodities, and significant regional variation in the use of slave labor. Scholars generally agree that slavery was an indispensable contributor to private wealth accumulation and the overall economic development of the colonies and their ruling countries, as well as to newly independent states (i.e., the United States and Brazil). In the United States, for example, ―American slaves represented more capital than any other asset in the nation, with the exception of land.‖ (Davis 2001, 6). On the eve of the U.S. Civil War in 1860, ―the value of Southern slaves was about three times the amount invested in manufacturing or railroads nationwide.‖ (Davis 2001, 6). Slavery‘s abolition in the Americas came by way of war as in the United States civil war (1865) and the Haitian revolution (1804) or by decree as in Jamaica (1837) or Brazil (1888). How much the contemporary political, social, and economic circumstances of slave descendants can be explained by slavery‘s legacy continues to be debated in these societies. Indeed, competing judgments about the potency of this legacy underlies support for or opposition to reparations and reconciliation.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INJUSTICES

Although the circumstances of historical injustice vary, the justifications for them do not. Brute force and naked self-interest are not enough. The powerful usually provide their actions a rationale that combines desert and destiny with racism. In nearly all cases, racist ideology contributed to an internally contradictory rationale. On the one hand, perpetrators of the injustices judged the victims to be deserving because of a supposed racial inferiority and/or because they posed a threat. Yet, on the other hand, subject populations were also judged capable of self-improvement. Therefore, colonizers and masters were required to subjugate in order to improve. The logic of racial inferiority presumed also the superiority of the subjugators. They judged themselves to be racially superior and engaged in a civilizing mission. In Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, for Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. example, racial theories offered competing and shifting assessments of indigenous peoples‘ capabilities and prospects for survival. On the one hand, missionaries, scientists, and state officials thought assimilation could be achieved for many, but not all. Their optimism was rooted in an Enlightenment vision of the malleability of human cultures and the certainty of human progress through progressive stages. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, state officials, scientists, and intellectuals in all four countries were increasingly taking an opposite view, seeing government and other measures as well-intentioned but futile efforts to delay, but not thwart, indigenous disappearance. Similarly, Japanese views of ―assimilation‖ presumed the superiority of Japanese culture but held out hope for the uplift of their colonial subjects, such that they too could become Japanese-like in their values, culture, and outlook. Yet, enlightenment and progress had their limits, and ―Japanization‖ would only go so far. It would and could not elevate colonial subjects from ―the limited and distinctly inferior position‖ they were destined to occupy within the empire. (Peattie 1994, 40).

American and some Latin American slaveholders judged Africans uniquely suited to serve as slaves. With emancipation, they were judged incapable of fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship, thereby justifying deliberate disenfranchisement and repression in the United States, and economic marginalization in Brazil. British colonizers viewed Africans as both incapable of self-government and content with colonial arrangements. When African nationalism emerged, colonizers convinced themselves that nationalist sentiments were not widely held. As the British saw it, they had a ―moral obligation‖ to guide the ―backward heathens of the world,‖ through their Christian values and economic acumen. (Elkins 2005, 5) Their racial superiority equipped them with the necessary skills. In yet another way, the desire of ―racial purity‖ and distrust of those deemed outsiders justified Ottoman massacre of Armenians.

Not surprisingly, these rationales of superiority, benevolence, and/or threat have made perpetrators and their descendents especially resistant to calls for reconciliation and demands for reparations. They often dismiss the wrongdoing as unimportant, deny that it happened or disagree that it should be interpreted as wholly detrimental or without cause. Acknowledgement of wrongdoing is a necessary first, but insufficient, condition for societal reconciliation. Such acknowledgement is difficult, but not impossible, to obtain, as we shall see.

DEMANDS FOR JUSTICE

The search for reconciliation today strongly suggests that these historical injustices were inadequately addressed or remedied at the time. That perception is largely correct, but it does not fully explain the outcomes. Subject populations, at the time, actively resisted Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. subjugation and violent mistreatment. It is not only, then, that the victims‘ demands or expectations for remedy were not met, but also that the interests of the more powerful perpetrators were protected. This finding is consistent with Samuel Huntington‘s argument about the fate of authoritarian rulers during transitions to democracy. (Huntington 1991). According to Huntington, most authoritarian leaders are not punished because political transitions are often brokered processes between incoming and outgoing political elites. Outgoing elites are able to protect their interests, which include some form of amnesty. The power of outgoing elites severely constrains the options of incoming elites, who most often want to punish authoritarian leaders. The balance of power is the determining variable in Huntington‘s argument. It is also, I think, the determinant in many cases of historical injustices, where the powerful go unpunished and the historical injustices go without rectification , at least during the time immediately following the injustices. In the section that follows, I briefly provide evidence of how powerful interests were protected, in the near term.

Colonization and Settlement: That settler interests were protected and advanced is starkly clear. Settlers largely replaced indigenous populations, due to the population decimation and dispossession of land. Indigenous resistance to settler encroachments was continuous. However, indigenous peoples were forced to negotiate politically for their continued survival under severely constrained conditions. Settlers constructed and controlled the systems of government and economy. State officials built nation-states, at the expense of substantial indigenous political, economic, and social autonomy. Indigenous peoples fought to preserve and regain some measure of autonomy to shape their collective futures. In fact, the historical trajectory of government-indigenous interactions in these countries has followed a quite similar course, occurring in five stages over time, from independence to mutual relations, dependency, marginality, and political resurgence. The main point, here, is that historical injustices have not ever been sufficiently addressed, at least to the satisfaction of indigenous peoples, which explains the continued salience of these issues.

South Africa is significantly different from these experiences and fits more appropriately within the democratization literature. In this case, the African majority, in the form of the African National Congress (ANC), replaced the white minority government through democratic elections. Yet, even here, white minority interests in avoiding punishment for crimes under apartheid were well protected. As is well known, the transition from apartheid to democracy in the early 1990s was negotiated between the incoming African National Congress party and the outgoing National Party (NP). The ANC wanted to prosecute former NP party officials and the NP desired amnesty. The trade-off was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), where truthful testimony before the TRC replaced criminal prosecution. The rationale of the TRC has been that truth leads to

Colonial Rule and Empire Decline: The precipitous decline of European colonial rule in Africa and Asia after World War II was due to a number of domestic and international forces. Among the most important were the emergence of nationalist movements in the colonies and the new post-War international order, which prompted European states to value a united continent more than their colonial possessions or territories. Colonial rule ended in certain cases by colonial war, as in the French and Portuguese empires or by negotiation as in the British. Japanese colonial rule collapsed as a result of their defeat in WWII.

On the view of many, nominal independence did not necessarily mean decolonization. Theories of ―neo-colonialism‖ or ―dependency‖ have long maintained that ―Third World nations have become dependent on the international economic system dominated by the Western capitalist powers and Japan for markets, technology, financing. . .‖ (Smith 1975, xiii) While these theories are now largely marginalized within academic and policy communities, they are still useful for understanding current-day demands for reparations and reconciliation. Proponents argue that colonial powers unjustly benefited and profited from colonialism and should be made to compensate. However one judges the merit of theories of ―neo-colonialism‖ or dependency, it is reasonable to expect that outgoing colonial powers sought to protect their economic and political interests, as best they could. And in those cases, short of war and utter defeat by opposing forces, they were often able to successfully do so. Many of the economic and political relationships with former colonial powers remain in tact.

More persuasive, perhaps, than general claims about the ability of colonial powers to protect and project their interests are the specific instances where violent massacres, perpetrated by colonial powers, went unpunished, at the time. For example, historians have documented how both Belgium and British colonial authorities in the Congo and Kenya respectively successfully evaded punishment. The Belgian Congo, known as the ―Congo Free State‖ under King Leopold II, was ruled as his personal domain, with absolute control, for twenty-three years (1885- 1908). His rule was extraordinarily brutal and hugely profitable, based on forced labor in rubber tree extraction. His rule was also notorious, leading to ―hundreds of mass meetings . .in the Britain, the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand demanding ‗Congo reform.‖ (Hochschild 2005, 39). However, King Leopold was not ever directly punished for these excesses. Instead, in 1908, rule was transferred to the Belgium government, and he died the following year.

In colonial Kenya, British authorities presented the 1952 ―Mau Mau‖ rebellion against British settlers as excessive, wanton violence by Africans against defenseless white Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. settlers. Yet, the Kikuyu people were essentially fighting to regain the lands from which they had been gradually alienated through colonial laws and market forces. The British‘s response to the rebellion was a brutal crackdown, in which nearly the entire Kikuyu population of 1.5 million people were detained by the British, and many hundreds were tortured and killed. (Elkins 2005, xv). Yet, upon independence, Kenya‘s first President Jomo Kenyatta, one of the leaders of the Mau Mau rebellion, made it clear ―that there would be no prosecution of Kikuyu loyalists, British colonial officials, or settlers.‖ (Elkins 2005, 360). His actions may be partly explained by the balance of domestic forces upon independence. Kenyatta desired to secure his and his party‘s rule. He wanted neither to antagonize the British government nor white settlers, which prosecutions would have most certainly done. Undoubtedly, he hoped to secure and maintain favorable political and economic relations with the former colonizer. Moreover, British settlers fared well. As Elkins writes: ― The newly independent Kenyan government bought their land at market rates, using nearly £12.5 million in loans from the British government to finance the buyout. In total, nearly twenty thousand European settlers left Kenya.‖ (Elkins 2005, 362)

Silence about the Armenian genocide accompanied the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the end of WWI, and the establishment of Turkey. In the war‘s immediate aftermath, the British occupied Istanbul, and tried unsuccessfully to arrest and prosecute Turkish officials responsible for the massacres. Their efforts were severely hampered by Turkish officials who ―destroyed the evidence of their killing, burning incriminating documents as well as their victims‘ bodies.‖ (Oren 2007, 39). Domestic developments in Turkey also undermined any serious attempts to address the Armenian genocide. Turkish nationalists were most interested in uniting Turkey and securing its borders against attack. The Turkish Parliament, in turn, was not interested in addressing the murders, as the British wished. Instead, the Parliament ―was mired in debates over who had suffered more acutely in the war, Christians or Muslims.‖ (Oren 2007, 39). The point is that Turkish unionists judged the unification of Turkey most important. General Mustapha Kemal (aka ―Ataturk‖) judged the massacres to be ―the work of a small and unauthorized clique – a ‗shameful act,‘ but one for which the Turkish nation bore no collective responsibility.‖ (Oren 2007, 39) ―At the Lausanne Conference in 1923, which established Turkey‘s permanent borders, the Armenian massacres were not even mentioned; nor were the Armenians allowed to take part.‖(Oren 2007, 39) In the nearly ninety-five years since, Turkish officials have steadfastly denied the genocide. The point here, however, is that no one was prosecuted at the time, although the massacres were known by the British and Americans to have been committed.

War Crimes: Punishment for war crimes depends largely on war‘s winners and losers. No matter how much victors attempt to proceed fairly in a trial, basing it on liberal ideals of justice and due process, there is always the perception of ―victor‘s justice.‖ This charge of ―victor‘s justice,‖ conveys a fundamental, if incomplete, truth about the prosecution of war Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. crimes. The truth is that losers are usually more vigorously, consistently, and widely prosecuted for war crimes than are victors. Nonetheless, the Nuremberg trials were designed to uphold justice, not victor‘s justice. As is well known, the Nuremberg Trials, conducted by the four-state (US, Britain, France, USSR) International Military Tribunal tried twenty-two Nazi officials, immediately following the war. Of the twenty-two, ―three were acquitted, seven were sentenced to prison,‖ and twelve were sentenced to death. (Elster 2004, 54). Moreover, ―other trials were conducted separately by the four powers in their occupational zones. American military tribunals convicted 1,814 German war criminals (450 received death sentences), British tribunals 1,085 (240 death sentences), French 2,107 (104 death sentences).‖ (Elster 2004, 54) The Germans also conducted their own trials and implemented processes to purge Nazis (known as denazification). Both the German trials and especially denazification had been largely judged as failures, mostly because there was no great interest in Germany to prosecute fellow Germans, and because the German judiciary had not been successfully purged of Nazi-Era judges.

The International Tribunal of the Far East in Tokyo, analogous to Nuremberg, was established to prosecute Japanese war criminals. However, unlike the Nuremberg trials, these trials have been more sharply criticized and consistently characterized as ―victor‘s justice.‖ This is because in addition to the Tribunal comprised of seven allied nations, ―each of the Allies created its own military tribunal to judge individual atrocities committed against their personnel.‖ (Elster 2004, 56)

It is important to note, of course, that not all war crimes were addressed by the trials. Prosecution began immediately following the War. The Allied Forces then swiftly turned their attention to reconstruction efforts. The impeding international realignment and Cold War meant that former adversaries had to be rehabilitated and made members of the Western alliance against the communist bloc. However, it the inability of trials to address all of the war‘s injustices that motivates efforts, continuing today, to seek remedy and reconciliation. For example, the crimes of Japanese soldiers against Korean women (so- called ―comfort women‖) have never been properly adjudicated. The Japanese government has neither apologized for nor materially compensated these women for their exploitation. Similarly, Japanese political elites, especially conservative members have not unambiguously acknowledged (let alone, apologized for ) the brutality of Japan‘s war conduct in China, for example. The negative consequences for Japan‘s external relations with its East Asian neighbors have been well documented. For our purposes, what is most important is that the multi-faceted dimensions of war conduct, war crimes, and their punishment were not completely settled with trials.

Slavery: As earlier mentioned, the abolition of slavery in the Americas and Caribbean came, in most cases, by war or decree. Either way, slaves gained little more than their freedom Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. upon slavery‘s end. It is true that the U.S. Civil War decimated the southern Confederate states that seceded from the Union. Approximately 400,000 Southerners were killed or injured, billions of dollars of slavery related investments were lost, railroads destroyed, millions of acres of cropland destroyed, and for slave-owners, slaves emancipated. President Lincoln‘s ―Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction,‖ issued in December 1863, ―offered full pardon and the restoration of all rights ‗except as to slaves‘ to persons who both pledged an oath of loyalty to the Union and acceptance of the abolition of slavery. (Foner 1988, 35) President Johnson, who succeeded Lincoln after his assassination in 1865, devised his own policy, which ―conferred amnesty and pardon, including restoration of all property rights except for slaves,‖ to recipients who pledged loyalty to the Union and support for abolition. (Foner 1988, 183). Johnson also required that ―major Confederate officials and owners of taxable property valued at more than $20,000‖ apply individually to the President for pardons.

What is most important, for our purposes, is that President Johnson did not require the readmitted Southern states to extend the franchise to black citizens nor did he support any kind of material compensation for ex-slaves. 1 Similarly in Brazil, ex-slaves were largely left to their own devices after slavery‘s abolition by decree in 1888. Many left their plantations but soon returned to work as field laborers. Others worked independently as artisans, sought work in urban factories and shops, or worked as domestic servants. They were not compensated at all for the years of forced labor. Even in Haiti, the only country in the Hemisphere where slavery was abolished by a slave revolution, the former French planters were compensated. In exchange for French recognition of Haitian sovereignty (King Charles X threatened to re-conquer the island and restore slavery in 1825), the Haitian government was forced to pay France ―an indemnity of 150 million francs‖ and to reduce its import and export taxes by half. (Farmer 2004).

The key point is that in all cases, at the time of slavery‘s abolition, slaves received nothing in the way of material compensation for their labor, and were given very little, either materially or politically, to begin their lives as free persons. In contrast, former slave owners, even those who were soundly defeated in war, as in the U.S. and Haiti, were sometimes compensated for their losses, and were quickly able to reconstitute their political and economic power.

TIME, POLITICS, AND HISTORICAL INJUSTICES

1 More specifically, in 1865, Union General Sherman declared a “field order,” which declared the Georgia Sea Islands and a strip of South Carolina as rice settlements. Each family of freed slaves was to be given 40 acres and a mule. President Johnson nullified the Field Order and ordered that the land be returned to pardoned Confederate landowners. In 1867, Republican representative Thaddeus Stevens proposed a slave reparations bill that did not pass. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

Huntington‘s argument also contained a temporal component. He maintained ―Justice comes quickly, or not at all‖ in democratizing societies (Huntington 1991, 228). However, as I have argued elsewhere, Huntington‘s argument does not well predict outcomes once the time horizon is lengthened. (Nobles 2010). Justice may, in fact, come slowly as democratic elites return to issues of state crimes once democratic governance is consolidated. In the case of historical injustices, I find that time might also engender similar effects. Although it might appear counter-intuitive, the passage of time does not necessarily mean that historical injustices will not ever be addressed or remedied. The balance of power may well shift in favor of aggrieved groups and their demands for remedy. Scholars have mostly argued for the positive effects of international human rights in producing this favorable shift. In the section that follows, I provide an admittedly preliminary evaluation of how much international forces effect the efforts to rectify past injustices, by examining the cases where which international laws and norms appear to be most influential and where domestic forces appear to be.

Many scholars attribute considerable influence to the moral dimensions of international human rights in leading to measures of remedy and reconciliation in and between countries. In his study of historical injustices and restitution, Elazar Barkan asserts that domestic efforts are examples of ―the new emphasis on morality,‖ where ―moral issues came to dominate public issues and displayed the willingness of nations to embrace their own guilt.‖ (Barkan 2000, xvii). In Barkan‘s view, the ―unfolding of guilt around the globe‖ has led to varied strategies of restitution for historical injustices ranging from W.W.II crimes to colonialism and national settlement. (Barkan 2000,xviii). Barkan suggests that an ―international morality‖ embodied in human rights laws and norms is a primary determinant for the seemingly global phenomenon of reconciliation.

John Torpey views worldwide demands for reparations (including symbolic gestures and material restitution) as products of international norms in general and the success of Holocaust claims in particular. According to Torpey, the Holocaust now serves a global ―standard‖ and ―model‖ for reparations claims. Indeed, he writes that ―a satisfactory interpretation of the twentieth century would have to include an understanding of the upsurge of attention to human rights and the burgeoning global preoccupation with coming to terms with past injustices that have flowed from the Jewish catastrophe.‖ (Torpey 2001, 358) Finally, Mark Gibney and Erik Roxstrom focus on state apologies to populations of other countries, for example, President Clinton‘s 1999 to the Guatemalan people for U.S. support of repressive right-wing governments. On their view, state apologies serve as instruments in the ―transnational enforcement of human rights.‖ (Gibney and Roxstrom 2001, 924).. It is important to note, however, that both Barkan and Torpey also imply the

Similarly, in studies of reconciliation between former WW II antagonists, both Yinan He and Jennifer Lind argue for the role of symbolic and ideational forces. He argues that ―deep reconciliation,‖ defined by ― a high degree of peacefulness between former adversaries,‖ is produced by the ―harmonization of national memories.‖ (He 2009, 13). The ―harmonization‖ is achieved by ―joint history research and restitution measures,‖ including ―apology and forgiveness, legal accountability, and material compensation.‖ (He 2009, 37). Similarly, Jennifer Lind finds that denials of past wrongdoing can have especially deleterious effects on relations between former adversaries. (Lind 2009, 550) These arguments for the power of ideas and symbolic gestures would seem to challenge, or at the least, qualify standard realist accounts of reconciliation. As He explains, ―realist theory treats historical ideas as a reflection or justification of structurally defined national interest.‖ (He 2009, 4). Realism is generally skeptical about cooperation or reconciliation because within an anarchic international system, states necessarily engage in self-help. States most often cooperate when it is in their self-interest to do so. On this view, then, reconciliation may be in a state‘s self-interest. The question, then, is how to achieve it. He and Lind both argue that non-denial of past injustices, if not contrition for them, can produce positive outcomes.

Other scholars argue less for the power of narrow self-interest, and more for the general ways in which international law has changed the larger environment in which states operate. It is the idea that international politics is now shaped, in significant ways, by the ideas and practices of human rights. A state‘s reputation in the world‘s state system is judged, in part, by how closely its conduct conforms to the human rights standards it endorses through international treaties and conventions. (Keck and Sikkink 1998). (On one level, this too may be construed as self-interest, insofar as it may be in a state‘s self-interest to protect and improve its international reputation.) Political changes in the international arena provide a more propitious environment for the successful resolution of historical injustice claims and reconciliation.

The utility of international human rights law to political actors is clearer in certain cases of historical injustices than in others. For example, advocates of reparations for slavery and colonialism in Africa argue that slavery and colonialism constitute a form of racial discrimination that violates Article I of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Violation of this convention is not bound by time, these advocates argue, therefore the historical experiences of slavery and colonialism must be included. The aggrieved nations press their claims not in bi-lateral or even multi-national negotiations with former colonizers, but rather under the auspices of Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. international organizations, such as the U.N. Given the weakness of the UN and its inherent inability to alter the behavior of states, it is not surprising that reparations or even an apology has not been forthcoming. In this case, the increased influence of international human rights laws and norms has led to discussion of reparations for slavery and colonialism in international forums. Yet, these institutions are weak, making successful resolution, without full engagement of the relevant states, impossible.

In other cases of colonialism, aggrieved nations have confronted the former colonizer directly and met with limited success. For example, the Herero people of Namibia charge that German colonizers committed genocide in their efforts to repress Herero opposition to colonial rule and land dispossession between 1904-1906. An estimated 75 percent of their pre-war population were killed or died as a consequence of their suppression. (Harring 2002, 401-02). In a 2004 ceremony marking the 1904-06 massacres, Wolfgang Massing, Germany‘s ambassador to Namibia told those Herero gathered that ―he wished to ‗express how deeply we regret this unfortunate past. ‗He called the massacres the ‗darkest chapter in our colonial history.‘‖(Donnelly 2004, A10.) The ambassador‘s statement was ―Germany‘s strongest ever expression of contrition for the killings.‖ (Donnelly 2004, A10). However, the German government has refused to offer compensation, arguing that because Germany is today Namibia‘s largest foreign aid donor, it is paying its debt. The Herero people see it differently, and in 2004, ―filed a lawsuit in the United States on the behalf of the tribe, demanding $4 billion in reparations from the German government and German companies.‖ (Donnelly 2004, A10) Here, it seems that demands repeatedly directed at the colonizer may have a higher likelihood of success. Germany has publicly acknowledged the massacres and continues to offer aid, which the German government interprets as a compensatory measure, although it refuses to label such aid as ―reparations.‖ The Herero do not consider general developmental aid to the Namibian government an adequate response to their particular historical suffering. They demand that they be compensated directly; hence, their lawsuit against the German government and companies. At the time of this article‘s publication, US courts have not yet decided on their lawsuit. In any event, it is difficult to discern how much Germany‘s international reputation or German domestic politics accounts for the government‘s 2004 decision to issue such a strong expression of regret.

The cases of Britain‘s response to revelations about the Mau Mau rebellion and Turkey‘s response to the Armenian genocide argue very strongly against international norms or laws in advancing reconciliation. As Neal Acherson notes, ―the British public is not really aware of what went on,‖ even now, fifty years later, but that this ignorance is not due to an unavailability of information. (Ascherson 2005) The Mau Mau rebellion was first widely reported in the 1950s, then re-examined again in the 1980s, and most recently in 2005, with the publication of two books (previously mentioned in this article.) ―But,‖ as Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Acherson observes, ―British ignorance about Mau Mau is of a peculiar, resilient kind,‖ apparently rooted in the ―British need to believe that their Empire was run and eventually dismantled with restraint and humanity. . .‖ (Ascherson 2005). The point here is that greater knowledge about Mau Mau has not lead in Britain to any official public expression of contrition. Similarly, no Kenyan government since independence has either demanded compensation from the British or officially memorialized the Mau Mau rebellion within Kenya. Here, domestic determinants in both Britain and Kenya appear to better explain why reconciliation in the form of a formal government apology and reparations have not occurred. International morality, international pressure or international reputation do not seem to be significant factors at all.

Similarly, the Turkish response to the Armenian genocide is also a case where international factors are at play, but are not as influential as we would expect. As already discussed, the Turkish government has strenuously resisted demands for an apology to Armenia or public acknowledgement of Turkish responsibility for the genocide. Today, Turkish authorities use article 301 of Turkey‘s penal code to interpret discussion of the genocide as an insult to ―Turkishness, ‖ and have arrested several authors as a result. European governments have reacted strongly and negatively to Turkey‘s stance. For example, in October 2006, the French Assembly passed a law that makes denial of the genocide a crime, presumably to counteract and highlight the perceived wrong of Turkish historical and moral denial. (The French senate and president must still approve the law). The Armenian Diaspora in the United States, for example, has repeatedly attempted to get the U.S. Congress to pass legislation acknowledging the genocide, as a way of indirectly pressuring Turkey. In 2007, their efforts almost succeeded, with over 200 co-sponsors of a bill. However, Congress eventually withdrew the bill ―after Turkish authorities threatened to retaliate by cutting off American military supply lines to Iraq.‖ (Campbell 2009, 966). Europe‘s response is especially significant because Turkey is being considered for admission into the European Union. The EU has made it clear that Turkey‘s successful entry rests, in part, on open acknowledgment. EU entry would seem to provide a powerful, external incentive for state-sponsored efforts of historical reinterpretation. But, so far, they have not. Here, domestic politics within Turkey, namely, nationalist parties and nationalist popular sentiment, overpower international demands for acknowledgement or international human rights norms.

As earlier discussed, some, but not all, crimes of WW II were punished after the war. Some, but not all victims, were compensated. The successful case of Germany‘s apology and reparations to surviving Jews and the state of Israel for the Holocaust is well known. In addition to the trials (both international and domestic), German Chancellor Adenauer officially apologized before the German Bundestag. In 1952 the Federal Republic of Germany signed agreements with the State of Israel and the Conference on Jewish Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Material Claims against Germany (the ―Claims Conference‖) to pay DM3.4 billion (approximately US$820 million) over a period of 12 to 14 years. (Pross 1998, 30). Of this amount, DM3 billion went to Israel, in the form of German goods and fuel. The Israeli government and the Claims Conference agreed that the remaining DM450 million would be transferred—―partly in the form of goods, partly in foreign currency and partly in Israeli currency‖—to the Claims Conference. (Segev 1993, 234). Finally, the German government, in its treaty (or protocols) with the Claims Conference, agreed to enact federal restitution legislation that allowed individuals to pursue claims of persecution and harm.2 Here, both international and domestic pressures account for Germany‘s payments.

The outcomes have been far less positive for victims of Japanese war crimes, who have looked for remedy both in courts of law and the international court of public opinion. As is widely noted, the Japanese have been far more reluctant to acknowledge crimes and apologize for them. The well-documented divisions within Japanese political leadership between ―hard-line‖ nationalists bent on glorifying Japan‘s past aggression, and ―soft-line‖ nationalists who express regrets about that past, partly explain the ambiguity of Japanese responses. Legal strategies pursued by victims have failed. Although a Japanese district court ruled in a historic 1998 decision that the Japanese government compensate three former Korean ―comfort women,‖ the decision was short-lived.(Watts 1998, 15).The following year, a regional high court overturned the favorable ruling, leading the women to appeal to Japan‘s Supreme Court for assistance in securing compensation. In March 2003, the Japanese Supreme Court upheld the regional court‘s decision, thereby extinguishing any possibility of compensation from the Japanese government. (Green 2003,15). In light of these legal losses, victims have turned to the international community, casting their plight in terms of international women‘s rights and drawing support from the vast international human rights networks. This experience points up the difficulties of citizens groups (as opposed to governments) in directly approaching a perpetrator state. They have not, unlike the Herero of Namibia, pursued their claims in American courts.

In the cases of colonization and settlement within established democracies, the evidence convincingly suggests that domestic factors matter more than international human rights norms or other international factors. It is true that international law and norms buttress domestic indigenous mobilization. Indigenous groups in Australia and Canada, for example,

2 These laws, known as the Federal Restitution Law (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, or BEG), were finally adopted on June 29, 1956. They allow for compensation for persecution “on the grounds of political opposition, race, religion, or worldview,” and for “fact situations indicating harm,” including harm to life, to body and health, to freedom, to possessions, to property, to career advancement, to economic advancement, and harm through payment of special taxes, fines, and costs.” Pross, Paying for the Past, p. 50.

As I have argued elsewhere, indigenous groups and other aggrieved groups demand apologies and material reparations from national governments in order to change the meanings of national membership. (Nobles 2008). Such demands are typically rooted in centuries-long activism and mobilization. They succeed – that is, governments apologize and/or offer material reparations- when political elites support minority group rights for ideological reasons, and are more sympathetic and responsive to demands based in historical injustice. Conversely, they fail when political elites oppose minority group rights on ideological grounds (instead favoring individual rights), and do not think that the past provides a suitable justification for future policies. The motivations of elected politicians are, my research shows, mostly partisan and ideological, and also, to a certain extent, moral and emotional (guilt-driven). The electoral incentive for politicians, in regard to these groups, is not strong because indigenous issues are of negligible electoral salience, especially in national elections. This is not true for African-American issues, which partly explains why reparations have not been seriously pursued. And, now with the election of President Barack Obama, reparations seem more, not less remote. Candidate Obama, on several occasions, stated his opposition to race-targeted reparations, favoring instead universal policies. As President, Obama has made clear his commitment to government‘s role in advancing the common good, through substantial public expenditures in education, urban revitalization, and health-care. With these policies, African-Americans will certainly benefit, but they will not be the only beneficiaries.

CONCLUSION

The passage of time can create more favorable, and in any case different, circumstances than those prevailing at the time of injustice. The most important change of circumstance is the balance of power. Scholars argue that international human rights have shifted that balance in favor of historical injustices. It is certainly true that these issues are now much more visible in both international and national forums than in the past. This visibility may be attributed to a general change in global worldviews. However, the efficacy of these laws and norms in actually producing results, without the assistance of other incentives or levers of power, is quite limited. For example, the UN‘s 2001 Conference on Racism raised the issue of European reparations to Africa for the slave trade and colonialism, but it stopped there. Similarly, the government of Turkey has been largely

However, when domestic courts are open to international human rights arguments, the results are more favorable. For example, reparations claims against private corporations have recently had a high rate of success, although this was not only the case. Lawsuits seeking compensation for Holocaust-related crimes have long failed. As legal scholar Michael Bazyler observes, the estimated twelve lawsuits against private entities for Holocaust-related World War II crimes filed by victims between 1945 and 1995 were summarily dismissed. However, since 1995 nearly all such lawsuits have been successful, totaling settlement payouts of over U.S. $8 billion. Similarly, Armenian insurance claimants, using these recent Holocaust cases as a model, successfully settled with the New York Life Insurance Company for U.S. $20 million in January 2004. On the other hand, numerous lawsuits against Japanese corporations for their use of slave labor during World War II have failed. Bazyler attributes the recent successes of lawsuits to several factors. The most important is the use of U.S. courts and American legal methods of discovery and class action suits to pursue transnational litigation against multinational corporations, many of which do substantial business in the United States. As important, over the past twenty years U.S. courts have grown receptive to human rights law to such an extent that they will today hear such case ―even if (1) the acts complained of did not occur in the United States and (2) the plaintiff is not American.‖ (Bazyler 2002, 13). The successful trajectory of lawsuits shows clearly the positive interaction of human rights law and time. It also shows, however, that this successful trajectory is ultimately dependent on the receptiveness of a country‘s domestic courts. In the end, it is reasonable to conclude that scholars have been imprecise, rather than plainly wrong, in their assertions about the force of international human rights laws and norms.

Favorable shifts in the balance of power such that remedy and reconciliation become possible rests ultimately, in my view, on changes within domestic politics. Time and international human rights are important in certain instances. As we have seen, indigenous populations in the U.S., Canada, Australian, and New Zealand have, since the beginning of European settlement, pursued political and social rights in order to protect and advance their interests. International human rights law and norms are now parts of their arguments. However, tangible legislative changes and symbolic measures (e.g. apologies) are the results of deliberate decisions taken by domestic actors. Aggrieved groups must mobilize and make demands. Political elites must be responsive to this mobilization. In these cases, the responsiveness of political elites depends on their political ideology, emotion, and moral reflection. For example, Australia‘s former Prime Minister John Howard steadfastly refused either to apologize to or to support targeted laws and public policies for Aboriginal Australians. He opposed these measures because they violated his Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. ideological commitment to individual, and not group, rights and to formal equality. Moreover, he did not think that an apology for past treatment of Aboriginal peoples was required, although he judged such treatment to have been bad. The 2008 election of a Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, has effectively resulted in a complete reversal. One of the first acts of the Rudd government was to deliver an official apology. Additionally, the government is reviewing its Aboriginal policies. Here, the important shift was an democratic election. From these examples, it is clear remedy and reconciliation are more likely (but not guaranteed) in democracies, precisely because democratic institutions allow for citizen participation and leadership accountability.

Democratic governance is an important, and likely fundamental, factor. Even in Turkey, government resistance to openly acknowledging the Armenian massacres has not completely squelched discussion within civil society. Beginning in 1999, Turkish and Armenian historians along with other specialists have openly and repeatedly met in the years since to discuss the issue.(Suny 2009) The government largely opposes their efforts to understand the historical record, in all of its complexities. The point here is that members of civil society have taken up the task. It is possible that their findings will eventually become part of the larger public discourse, challenging the official story, and effecting future elections. This proposed migration of a revised historical narrative, from university seminar rooms to public forums to electoral politics is highly contingent in Turkey, and elsewhere, where historical reconciliation is being considered. One thing is certain, however. Politics in the twentieth-first century will be significantly shaped by the wrongdoing of earlier centuries.

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Daniel Butt Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Bristol

“Are we not touched by the same breath of air which was among that which came before? Is there not an echo of those who have been silenced in the voices to which we lend our ears today? Have not the women, whom we court, sisters whom they do not recognize anymore? If so, then there is a secret protocol between the generations of the past and that of our own. For we have been expected upon this earth. For it has been given us to know, just like every generation before us, a weak messianic power, on which the past has a claim. This claim is not to be settled lightly.” Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History (1940)

INTRODUCTION

This article assesses the claim that present day individuals can be said to have inherited either rights or duties of compensation as a result of the “comfort women” system perpetrated by the Japanese army during World War II. I argue both that the Japanese people as a whole possess compensatory duties to victims of the comfort women system in the present day, and that the class of “victims” can be meaningfully expanded to include not only the comfort women themselves, but also their descendants, who can plausibly be said to have inherited rights to compensation from their mothers. The argument is theoretical rather than historical. I make no empirical claim concerning the number of women subjected to coercive sexual enslavement during World War II, but I do take it for granted that some women, of diverse nationalities, but certainly including women from Korea, China, and Japan, were so treated. My claims relate to them and to their descendants, regardless of number and largely regardless of nationality. I do assume that the treatment that the women in question suffered was a serious injustice. These are contentious issues in Japan, where both the number of women and the extent to which the system rested upon the use of force are matters of considerable political debate, as evidenced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2007 claim that there was no evidence that the system had been coercive.1 The historical evidence against this position is, to my mind, utterly conclusive, but I do not show this to be

1 Abe claimed, “"There has been debate over the question of whether there was coercion.. But the fact is, there was no evidence to prove there was coercion as initially suggested.” See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6411471.stm [accessed 07/02/2010].

One comment before the main argument commences. I argue in this article that Japan has been guilty, ever since the end of World War II, of serious injustice in relation to the victims of the comfort women system. It should perhaps be noted that such serious injustice as a result of the non-rectification of historic injustice is hardly a novel phenomenon – the consequence of my theoretical approach to past wrongdoing is that this kind of moral culpability in the present day is widespread, implicating a great number of modern, industrialized democracies. However, this is not to deny some instances of non- fulfillment are more egregious than others. In my view, the actions of successive Japanese governments on this issue have been particularly shameful – there has been a sustained and recurrent pattern on the part of many political actors of not only openly denying present day responsibilities, but deliberately disputing the historical facts of the case, acting from what I take to be narrowly self-interested, nationalistic motives. Such actions are obviously deeply damaging to the victims of injustice. In what follows, I argue that a failure to rectify an act of injustice itself constitutes an act of injustice. This is true, on my account, even when the original act of injustice is largely ignored and forgotten, but it becomes obviously true when those who possess rectificatory duties not only fail to accede to repeated demands that they fulfill their duties, but literally add insult to injury by questioning whether the original act of injustice even took place. It should be noted, however, that Japan is not the only wealthy industrial democracy which struggles to face up to the reality of its historical actions. As I write this paper, it is being reported that the UK government is currently denying claims for compensation to four Kenyans who claim that they suffered physical and sexual abuse during the Kenyan “emergency” of 1952 to 1960, on the grounds that the law of state succession means that the current Kenyan government is now responsible for actions taken

2 On this, see Yoshiaki Yoshimi , Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II (New York: Columbia University Press: 2002). 3 For more on the political controversy over reparations, see Roy L. Brooks,, When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy over Apologies for Human Injustice (New York: New York University Press. 1999) and Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historic Injustices (New York: Norton, 2000). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. by the colonial administration when Kenya was part of the British Empire.4 Serious attempts to rectify historic injustice are still the exception rather than the norm, but that does not let anyone off the hook. It is no consolation to the victims of terrible wrongdoing that other victims of injustice have also had their historic suffering ignored.

INHERITANCE AND HISTORIC INJUSTICE

It is commonplace to assert that a great deal of human history has been characterized by grievous wrongdoing. Every civilization has its own skeletons in the closet – past instances where, for a range of reasons, historic persons acted in a manner that we hold in the present to be seriously unjust. The question of whether these historic actions give rise to rights and duties in the present is deeply contested. This is not the business of judging the moral character of historic individuals or societies. If we were to try to attribute moral praise or blame to historic persons, we would presumably try to make a at least partially contextual judgment, which took into account, without necessarily accepting, the moral standards of the time, and looked at the information available to and pressures upon decision-makers. But in judging an historic action unjust, we are more straightforwardly holding that it involved the wrongful, and typically harmful, treatment of others – whatever the justification advanced at the time, and regardless of the motives of its perpetrators. As Bernard Williams writes, “an assessment in terms of justice can, more obviously than others, be conducted without involving the unhelpful question of whether anyone was to blame”.5 Perhaps the most straightforward way to think of past injustice in contemporary terms is to speak of rights violations. Many historical persons were treated in ways in which they should not have been treated, in manners which wrongfully set back their interests. A wide range of experience is covered by the idea of a set-back to interests. We may think of trespass, illegitimate seizure of property, and denial of expressive liberties. We may also think of murder, torture, enslavement, and rape.

What follows from an acceptance that our people was historically responsible for terrible wrongdoing? One response is forward-looking – it takes consideration of the historic record as a basis for an assessment of current day practices, asking whether lessons from the past have been learned. Alternatively, one may take a backward-looking approach. Rather than seeing the historical record as an instructive text to guide future conduct, one looks to the lasting effects of past wrongdoing, and asks to what extent it gives rise to rights and duties in the present day. Should an acknowledgement of past injustice be merely accompanied by a stated commitment to avoid the mistakes of history and try to act better in

4 Afua Hirsch, “UK 'using obscure legal principle' to dismiss torture claims in colonial Kenya”, The Guardian 25/02/2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/25/kenya- colonial-torture-mau-mau [accessed 07/02/2010]. 5 Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London, Fontana, 1985), p. 166. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. the future? Or is there any meaningful sense in which it is possible to seek to rectify historic injustice? It may be thought that it is the second approach which takes past wrongdoing more seriously. If I burn down your house, justice requires that I apologise and seek to make amends for my actions – paying, presumably, for your house and its contents, and for associated losses which you have suffered, including both opportunities which you have missed, and suffering you have endured, as a result of my actions. To suggest that all that is necessary is to forebear from setting other persons’ houses alight in the future is clearly to miss the point of both my status as wrongdoer, and your status as victim of wrongdoing. This is relatively straightforward so long as the identity of both victim and offender is clear. But as soon as time passes, so that we are dealing with different generations of persons, who were not even alive at the time of the original act of injustice, things become less clear. If neither those responsible for nor harmed by an act of injustice are still alive, why should we worry about the past? Does it not make more sense to focus our attention on the future? Jeremy Waldron argues that a concern for rectifying historic injustice can be trumped by “an honest and committed resolve to justice for the future, a resolve to address present circumstances in a way that respects the claims and needs of everyone.” This type of resolve “has priority over reparation which might carry us in a direction contrary to that which is indicated by a prospective theory of justice”.6 Should we not, in short, let bygones be bygones?

It is unsurprising that it is at this point that inheritance comes into the picture. The idea of inheritance links generations together in a morally relevant sense. The paradigm case of inheritance is a bequest of property. A member of one generation transfers their property rights to a member of the next. If we hold that this transfer is legitimate, it seems we have reason to resist the idea that justice should be forward-looking. The claim of the advocate of the justifiability of the inheritance of property is that the actions of prior generations make a difference to what people are entitled to in the here and now. Thus, for historical entitlement theorists such as Robert Nozick, historical principles of justice “hold that past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things”.7 If we are willing to grant the principle that entitlements can be transferred across generations, and so resist egalitarian demands for a generational redistribution of resources, it looks as if we are committed to at least a backward-looking element to our theory of distributive justice, which determines the fair allocation of benefits and burdens in our society. This opens the door to certain types of claim for the rectification of historic injustice – most notably those relating to the misappropriation of property. If group A’s ancestors stole a given item of property from group B’s ancestors, and still have it in their possession, group B would seem to have at least a prima facie claim to the restitution of the object in question. The idea here

6 Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding historic injustice”, Ethics 103 (1992), 4-28 at p. 27. 7 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 155.

Things become more complicated when we try to expand the notion of inheritance beyond such relatively straightforward cases of the inheritance of particular objects. This can be clearly seen when we look at the issue of compensation for wrongs committed in previous generations. It is possible to maintain that both compensatory rights and duties have been inherited. Both suggestions, however, are problematic and contested. First, why should we allow the idea that parents’ moral responsibilities are sufficiently akin to property that they can be handed down, seemingly involuntarily, to the next generation? Whilst some communitarians may feel comfortable with this idea, to many of an individualistic bent, this seems dangerously close to visiting the sins of the parents upon the children. One suggestion dispenses with the idea that contemporary generations are responsible for

8 Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparations and Historical Injustice (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 109. 9 Waldron, “Superseding historic injustice”, .pp. 18-19. 10 See Daniel Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), chapter 5; and A. John Simmons, “Historical rights and fair shares”, Law and Philosophy 14 (1995), 149-184. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. injustice, and instead maintains that they can come to have rectificatory duties when they are benefiting, however unwillingly, from the unjust actions of their ancestors.11 Such an approach may be helpful when we are considering ideas of colonial exploitation, but seem of less use when we deal with the wartime actions of a power that went on to suffer catastrophic military defeat. Second, is it really right to hold that a given individual’s right to compensation is sufficiently similar to a property right in an object that it can be bequeathed to another, in the same way one might leave a work of art or a sum of money in one’s will? Janna Thompson has argued that it is not:

…an approach to reparation that appeals to inheritance also puts limits on what kinds of injustice can be the subject of claims. Claims have to be confined to demands for restoration of, or compensation for, expropriated possessions. Descendants can claim nothing in reparation for the murder, torture, abduction or maltreatment of their forebears, for the disrespect shown to them as persons, however large these injustices may loom in their thoughts about the past.12

Compensation is intended to make up for a loss that a given individual has suffered. When that individual dies, should we not maintain that the entitlement to compensation dies with her? It might be claimed – though, as will be seen, even this is contested – that descendants might be deemed entitled to compensation if they can demonstrate that they themselves have been harmed by historic injustice, but in the absence of actual harm, many do not see why they should be said to have inherited a claim to compensation.

In what follows, I seek to address both categories of objections. I argue that there is a sense in which present day generations may be said to have inherited collective responsibility for historic wrongdoing, and maintain that this can give rise to extensive rectificatory duties in the present. I also argue that if we understand the nature of the non- rectification of historic injustice correctly, it is indeed the case that the idea of inheritance can explain how present day parties have rights to compensation – not through having inherited a right to compensation per se, but by having been harmed by a failure to pay compensation to their ancestors.

INHERITING DUTIES OF COMPENSATION

The direct victims of the comfort women system were entitled to compensation at the end of World War II. The most obvious class of victims is the women themselves. It is

11 See Daniel Butt, "On benefiting from injustice", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007), 129- 152, and Rectifying International Injustice, Chapter 4. 12 Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past, p. 108. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. clear that they were the victims of horrendous wrongdoing. Those responsible for this wrongdoing possessed straightforward rectificatory duties to them, including both apologies and compensation. As stated previously, it is my view that neither form of rectificatory duty has been fulfilled. The question of the form of apology which has been made is complicated – certainly, different Japanese administrations have apologized and expressed regret in various forms, although such expressions have often been deemed insufficient by the victims of the comfort women system. The content of the apology, however, cannot be divorced from the question of compensation, and here things are more straightforward. The Japanese government has resisted calls to pay full compensation directly to survivors. Instead, limited payments have come from the Asian Women’s Fund, stemming from donations from private citizens. The victims do not deem this response adequate. The particular features of this case demonstrate how important both elements of rectificatory justice can be. It is sometimes suggested that compensation following wrongdoing removes the need for apology. This suggestion is problematic for a number of reasons. There are certainly instances where the payment of compensation effectively amounts to an apology. Sometimes, the mere fact that a perpetrator has admitted a need to make recompense is itself indication of an acceptance of wrongdoing. Suppose I steal a book from a shop. Five years later, I am wracked with guilt, and send a cheque to the shopkeeper for the purchase price of the book, plus interest. My regret for my wrongful act is, in this case, clear. Other cases, however, are less straightforward. One problem here is that there is frequently more than one way of characterizing an act of injustice. One function which an express apology fulfils is that it makes it clear exactly for what the offender is apologizing. This is crucial in the comfort women case. There are two ways of characterizing the injustice done to the victims, one of which is highly insulting to them. The first is to maintain that they were the victims of institutionally endorsed sexual enslavement, involving multiple instances of rape. The second is to hold that the injustice consisted of a lack of remuneration, and suggest that it was the absence of payment for sexual services, rather than repeated subjection to sexual violence, which was problematic. A simple compensation payment with no express description of the character of the wrong which is supposedly being addressed is at best ambiguous between the two.13 The point of this is clear – what was owed to the victims of the comfort women system by those morally responsible for their suffering is only partially described by a focus on material compensation. The loss which a victim of injustice suffers is generally not confined to material loss. This is true even in cases where property deprivation is at the heart of the act of injustice in question, such as in cases of theft. A victim of such an act certainly does lose material property, and may suffer associated material losses through her inability to make use of her property, but she may also be harmed in any number of different ways, finding the experience itself traumatic, suffering

13 See Claudia Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). I owe this reference to Rahul Kumar. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. an ongoing loss in her sense of personal security, and so on. Compensation responds to the harm suffered by a victim of injustice by seeking to increase her well-being, ideally increasing it to a point equivalent to where it would be had the injustice not taken place. When this is not possible, justice requires that the victim’s well-being be brought as close to this point as possible. If this harm is to be repaired, the context of a compensation payment is of great importance. Two points follow from this. The first is that compensation alone may not suffice to do all that can be done to rectify injustice – an overt apology may also be necessary to improve the victim’s well being. The second is that the identity of the compensator may matter if injustice is to be rectified.

It is instructive here to look at Onora O’Neill’s account of rights to compensation. She seeks to differentiate between “restitution” and “compensation”. For O’Neill, restitution “is a matter of restoring matters to those that obtained before wrong was done. It is a response not so much to offenders and victims as to the ruptured moral relationship between them.”14 Thus, the identity of the agent seeking to effect restitution is key. She writes, “Restitution cannot be vicarious. That which has been lost, or its symbolic equivalent, must be restored by those who did wrong, or by their heirs or representatives.”15 For O’Neill, compensation should be understood differently. It looks not to the ruptured moral relationship between offender and victim, nor indeed to offenders at all, but to victims exclusively. Thus, “compensation, unlike restitution and punishment, can be vicarious… Victims may be compensated if somebody offers them some equivalent for the loss suffered. Compensation can be done vicariously, in that it need not be provided by wrongdoers or their heirs or representatives.”16 But it must be noted that some forms of compensation are only realizable when the compensation is not vicarious: when it comes not from a third party, but from a particular agent, typically with some connection with the act of wrongdoing.17 Victims of wrongdoing may very well want to receive compensation from those responsible for the wrongdoing specifically. It might be that the only thing that will fully compensate a victim (or that will bring her as close as possible to compensation) is the voluntary payment of compensation by the wrongdoer. In such a case, the compensation, if genuine and uncoerced, serves not only as a payment but also as a form of apology, and this apology can in itself improve the wellbeing of the victim. In other cases, it might be that the only thing that will fully compensate a victim is the involuntary payment of compensation

14 Onora O’Neill, “Rights to compensation”, Social Philosophy and Policy 5 (1987), 72-87 at p. 74. 15 O’Neill, “Rights to compensation”, p. 74. 16 O’Neill, “Rights to compensation”, p. 75. 17 It need not necessarily be the case that the agent who is able to compensate the victim have any connection with the accident at all. Imagine I suffer from recurrent pain as a result of an attack. It may be that all the money in the world would not compensate me, in that I would still prefer my previous, pain-free state, but that my wellbeing could be increased to a point equal to my previous state if my childhood sweetheart agreed to marry me. In such an instance, she, and only she, would be in a position to compensate me. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. by an offender – in such cases, the victim possess a desire to see the offender punished. It may be that the monetary value of the compensation to the victim is largely incidental – what is important is the material loss suffered by the offender. What is clear is that, in the comfort women case, the payment of compensation from third parties has failed to satisfy the victims. What the victims demand is a full apology and compensation from specific agents who bear a particular type of relation to the perpetrators of injustice.

The question of who bore moral responsibility for the comfort women system is clearly a difficult one. Answering the question would involve detailed consideration of the historical record. We would need to know something of decision-making processes within the Japanese administration – who gave which orders, who knew and acquiesced, who was genuinely ignorant of what was going on. We would need to think carefully about questions relating to the moral responsibilities of members of the military and of civilians who find themselves involved in serious moral wrongdoing. We would need an account of the conditions necessary for collective guilt amongst the people as a whole, and would need to think about ways in which individuals who dissent from particular policies and regimes are able to exculpate themselves in relation to wrongdoing. These are important questions that need to be addressed in relation to questions of criminal justice: they were central, for example, to the deliberations at Nuremberg. But they need not be addressed for our current purposes. All that is necessary for the argument in hand is that we hold the Japanese people to be remedially responsible for the actions of their leaders in the Second World War. This is not to say that the Japanese people as a whole was guilty of moral wrongdoing – nor, indeed, need it make a claim about the moral guilt of any individual Japanese citizen. The claim is simply that the Japanese people possessed a collective duty following the end of World War II to seek to put right the wrongful wartime actions of their government. David Miller uses Tony Honoré’s concept of “outcome responsibility” to describe such a claim: When we say that an agent is outcome responsible for the consequences of her action, we are attributing these consequences to her in such a way that, other things being equal, the resulting benefits and burdens should fall to her. If the consequences include harm to others, then outcome responsibility may, depending on the case, entail liability to compensate for that harm.18 I do not have space here to argue this point further – suffice it to say that although the point is contentious, many will agree that the Japanese people possessed such a collective duty at the end of the War. My real question is that of what happens to this duty as time passes. Is it possible for this duty to be inherited by subsequent generations?

I have argued elsewhere that in cases of this type, this is indeed possible.19 My claim

18 David Miller, “Holding nations responsible”, Ethics 114 (2004), 240-68, pp. 244-245. 19 Daniel Butt, "Nations, overlapping generations and historic injustice", American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2006), 357-6; Butt, Rectifying International Injustice, Chapter 6. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. rests upon three contentions: 1) It is possible, in at least some cases, to hold peoples responsible for the actions of their leaders. 2) Peoples are comprised of overlapping, rather than successive, generations. 3) The failure to rectify an act of injustice itself constitutes an act of injustice.

The key point here is that the entity which is responsible for redressing the wrongs of the comfort women people – the Japanese people – is not the same kind of entity as an individual person. It is, instead, a certain type of collective, a type which has been described by Peter French as a “conglomerate collectivity”:

A conglomerate collectivity is an organization of individuals such that its identity is not exhausted by the conjunction of the identities of the parties in the organization. The existence of a conglomerate is compatible with a varying membership. A change in the specific persons associated in a conglomerate does not entail a corresponding change in the identity of the conglomerate.20

It is indeed wrong to visit the sins of the parent onto the child, because they are quite distinct persons. This is not quite the case for a people, however, which slowly changes its identity over time. This fact, along with the truth that a failure to rectify injustice itself constitutes an act of injustice, allows a people to be collectively responsible for a failure to rectify wrongdoing across a long period of time. The ongoing responsibility binds new members into collective wrongdoing, and gives rise to new claims for compensation from those denied what they are due.

To see how these claims work in practice, let us return to the comfort women case. Japan was occupied by the Allied powers between 1945 and 1952, and lacked sovereignty. Let us assume that Japan would not have been able to pay compensation in this period, even had it wished to do so. Does this mean that the obligation to pay compensation lapsed? It is hard to see how this could be. Clearly, “the Japanese people” was not precisely the same entity in 1952 as in 1945. Some existing members of the collective died, other new members were born. However, the majority of the Japanese people in 1952 were alive in 1945. This is all that is needed to make a compelling case for ongoing rectificatory duties. We need not make any argument relating to the ongoing nature of the Japanese state throughout this period. If we accept that the Japanese possessed a collective rectificatory duty in 1945, then in 1952 we have a situation whereby the vast majority of members of the 1945 collective are still alive, and form the vast majority of the 1952 collective. The change in the exact

20 Peter French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 13. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. composition of the Japanese people does not negate the rectificatory duty – if it did, then the passage of a single day, with its concomitant births and deaths, would be sufficient for rectificatory duties to lapse. The key point here is that nations are comprised of overlapping, rather than successive, generations. This point is often missed when considering issues of intergenerational justice, where models are sometimes used which assume that one generation simply replaces another. If that really were the case, then it would be much harder to maintain that collective rectificatory duties can persist across time. As things stand, however, we can hold that the Japanese people is guilty of ongoing wrongdoing in both 2010 and 1952. If a survivor of the comfort women system was due compensation in 1952, her claim is not invalidated by the possibility that no one responsible for taking any of the decisions which led to her wartime suffering is now alive. She was not only a victim of injustice during World War II, but has been a victim of ongoing injustice ever since. Each day that the Japanese people’s rectificatory duties towards her have not been fulfilled, the injustice has been exacerbated. So it is that even if none of the original wrongdoers are still extant, present day individuals are implicated in ongoing wrongdoing. The Japanese government should have paid compensation as soon as it was practical to do so following World War II. Every day when this did not take place, a fresh injustice was committed. It is this injustice, the ongoing failure to compensate – or, to put it another way – the failure to compensate for failing to compensate for failing to compensate – which has rolled across the generations. It is in this sense that contemporary Japan has inherited rectificatory duties to the victims of the comfort women system.

INHERITING RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION

Let us suppose, then, that we grant the argument of the preceding section. It follows that the ongoing refusal of the Japanese government to pay compensation to comfort women constitutes a serious act of injustice. Women who survived their wartime ordeals have been grievously wronged not only by their original treatment, but also by the subsequent actions of the Japanese government. Those women who still survive remain entitled to apology and compensation. I have suggested that, technically, it may be that this apology and compensation is for the ongoing refusal to rectify rather than for the original wrongdoing, but the entitlement remains nonetheless. It is clear, however, that many of the direct victims of the comfort women system are no longer alive. Many, of course, were killed at the time as a direct result of their wartime treatment, others have died in the intervening years. Does this mean that Japan’s rectificatory duties have been superseded by the passage of time? In this section, I consider a range of arguments that maintain that this is not the case. It is true that in cases where the original victim is dead, the ideal response to historic wrongdoing is no longer available. This should always be a matter of profound regret, and is especially so in cases where there was opportunity to seek to make redress, but this opportunity was not taken. The passing of this opportunity, however, does not bring to an end all possibility of at Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. least partial rectification.

In what follows, I consider three possible ways in which it might be thought that justice requires that compensation be paid to the families of comfort women. I have sympathy with all three, but will outline the first, and then briefly the second, in order to show how they rest upon theoretically controversial foundations. My aim, therefore, is to build a case for the third. In what follows, then, I consider three ways in which rectification may still be possible. These are: 1) When other persons have been harmed by the act of injustice itself. 2) When it is possible to benefit the dead. 3) When other persons have been harmed by the failure to pay compensation.

This is not an exclusive list of possibilities. There is, for example, a plausible case to be made as to how rectificatory duties can be owed to collectives, such as nations, when members of the collectives are harmed by those outside the collective, and when it is no longer possible to compensate the direct victims themselves. If one adopts such an approach, one may well be able to construct a case for the payment of compensation to the range of countries whose members were forced into sexual slavery. My primary focus in this section, however, is with claims which can be exercised by individual members of the families of comfort women specifically. As such, my argument need not rely upon controversial claims involving the relation of the individual to the group. More practically, it also allows for the possibility of rights to compensatory claims by the families of Japanese victims of the comfort women system, as well as those of other countries.

1) Harm by the original act of injustice The most straightforward case that can be made for compensation for family members rests upon the claim that the relatives have themselves been harmed by the original act of wrongdoing. On such an account, they were also victims of the original act of injustice. There are obviously many ways in which an individual could have been harmed, either materially or psychologically, by the fact that their mother or grandmother was a victim of the comfort women system. However, there are significant practical and theoretical barriers to advancing claims of this kind, especially insofar as we are primarily concerned with the descendants of comfort women, many of whom were not even born at the time of the original injustice. This is not to maintain that such harm is impossible. Most would agree that it is possible for someone to be harmed by an action which was committed prior to the birth of the person in question. Suppose that I bury a bomb in the centre of a town, equipped with a timer such that it is due to go off in one hundred years time. This comes to pass, and a number of people are injured. There is no obvious problem in maintaining that my actions have harmed those injured by the bomb, even if I am long since dead, and the victims are relatively young. The obvious counterfactual state here is one Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. where I did not plant or set the bomb. In terms of our normal way of speaking, at least, it seems that the victims of the bomb-blast have been harmed by my actions. Things become more complicated, however, when the unjust actions in question make a difference to who exactly comes into existence in future generations. This is commonly referred to in the literature as the “non-identity problem”.21 The existence of a given individual seems to hang on their having been conceived at a particular time, when a specific spermatozoon came into contact with a specific egg. Events which make significant differences to how individuals lives go almost certainly mean that the children they subsequently conceive will have a different personal identity to those they would have conceived had the event not taken place. If, then, a current day individual owes her very existence to a historic injustice, how can she claimed that she been harmed by the event in question and is owed compensation? Whether this is a good argument is (at least) an open question – I have argued elsewhere that this approach misunderstands the role of counterfactual reasoning in calculations of compensation, and that the morally relevant counterfactual in cases of historic injustice is the (highly unlikely) possible world where the injustice did not take place but nonetheless the same individuals were conceived.22 But regardless, there are still a range of problems associated with the idea that present day parties will be able to demonstrate that they are worse off than they would have been had the comfort women system never existed. Demonstrating some kind of tangible loss which can plausibly be said to reflect the direct effects of the original act of injustice will doubtless be difficult to impossible in (at least) a large number of cases..

2) Benefiting the dead The second approach is not accurately described as an inheritance account, but it does involve present day parties compensating the descendants of victims of historic injustice. The idea here is not that the descendants are themselves entitled to compensation, but that we benefit the dead victims themselves by conferring benefits upon their descendants, on the grounds that this is what the victims themselves would have wanted. This is the account put forward by Michael Ridge, who rests his argument on three claims: 1) Duties of reparation require us to benefit the victims of our injustices. 2) We can benefit the dead by promoting the satisfaction of their desires. 3) Most people strongly desire that their descendants flourish.23

It is clear that this approach is directly applicable to the comfort women case. In my view, it constitutes a powerful argument in favour of payments to descendants. It is true, of course, that we cannot say for certain that conferring benefits upon their families is what the victims of the comfort women system would want, were we able to ask them. But it seems

21 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 351-355. 22 Butt, Rectifying International Injustice, pp. 102-117. 23 Michael Ridge, “Giving the dead their due”, Ethics 14 (2003), 38-59. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. overwhelmingly likely that this would indeed be the case in the vast majority of cases. However, as Ridge acknowledges in his article, the argument is controversial. Some will flatly deny that it is possible to benefit the dead – since they are, after all, dead, and no longer exist. The plausibility of the Ridge position, then, hangs on an acceptance that individuals possess what Loren Lomasky has called “lifetime transcending interests”.24 The argument is compelling if one accepts the possibility and desirability of benefiting the dead, but in the next section I will put forward an argument which does not rest on such a controversial metaphysical claim. One important point should be made in relation to the comfort women case, however. Ridge argues that there is effectively a statute of limitations built into his account:

…the force of reparative duties to the dead diminishes over time because our ability to benefit them by benefiting their descendants diminishes over time. While people care a great deal about their direct descendants, they generally care less about descendants three and four generations down the line. Indeed, after a certain number of generations people usually do not care much more about their descendants than they do about people in general.25

It does seem right to say that as time passes, it becomes harder to benefit the dead. It may be that in international cases the generational drop-off is less pronounced, as in many cases people with national sentiment can be said to be benefited if one benefits their nation, rather than necessarily their descendants specifically. But the broad point stands. This is significant, since it means that there is a sense in which the perpetrators of injustice can escape the obligations generated by this model by refusing to pay compensation for a sufficiently long period of time. This should not, however, be seen as some kind of “get-out clause”. Rather, it is a source of significant moral danger for those responsible for an ongoing failure to rectify injustice. As time goes on, so it will become harder to rectify their wrongdoing. There is a window of opportunity to benefit the deceased victims of injustice, which does, on this account, post-date their death, but which is not infinite. Unless action is taken within this window, the injustice will become unrectifiable. It may well be argued that there is a particular form of moral wrongdoing in play here. It is one thing to act wrongly, it is another to act wrongly in a way which can never be rectified, such that the restoration of the moral equilibrium between offender and victim is irreparably damaged. If we accept the Ridge account, the Japanese people has only a limited amount of time in which they can meaningfully act. Rectification is not impossible, on this account, after the death of the direct victims of injustice, but it will become so relatively soon.

24 Loren E. Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 25 Ridge, “Giving the dead their due”, p. 52. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. 3) Harm by failure to pay compensation Finally, we turn to the argument that descendants of injustice have been harmed by a failure to pay compensation to the victims of injustice. On this approach, we need not contend that the original act of injustice itself harmed the descendants of the victims. But what of the subsequent failure to pay compensation? Might it not be the case that these descendants would be appreciably better off in the present if compensation had indeed been paid in a timely manner? As both other writers and I have argued elsewhere, a focus on the fact that a failure to pay compensation itself constitutes an act of injustice seemingly gives us a way out of some of the problems posed by the first argument relating to harm caused by the original act of injustice itself.26 If, for example, we hold that compensation should have been paid after the birth of descendants, then the non-identity problem is not a problem. It might be thought, however, that we are still firmly in the field of complex counterfactual speculation. Who knows what would have happened if compensation had promptly been paid? Is there any reason to think that this would have been passed on to descendants? Surely it is more likely to think that in many cases it would have been spent? There appears to be no fact of the matter here – it is not a given that victims would have chosen to retain their compensation rather than spend it, or that they would have left it to their descendants rather than to others. Janna Thompson makes this point in outlining Jeremy Waldron’s discussion of indeterminacy in relation to rectifying historic injustice. She suggests that for descendants to have a right to claim property that was taken from their ancestors, “they have to be in a position to demand what they would have received from their forebears if the injustice had not been done.” The problem is that there is no way of knowing what, if anything, this might be:

Where human choice is involved, there is no fact of the matter. Even our best guesses about what people will do are often confounded. If victims of injustice had not been dispossessed, they might have disposed of their possessions in some other way. They might have gambled them away, made a bad investment, given them to someone else, or used them for their own projects. Even immediate descendants of victims have no right to assume that the property of their forebears would have been passed on to them if the injustice had not been done. The further the injustice recedes in time, the more choices that could have been made by intervening generations, the less credible this assumption.27

26 See Bernard R. Boxill, "A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations", The Journal of Ethics 7:11, 63-91; Butt, “Nations, Overlapping Generations and Historic Injustice”; Andrew I. Cohen, “Compensation for Historic Injustices: Completing the Boxill and Sher Argument”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2008), 81-102; George Sher, “Transgenerational Compensation” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005), 181-200. 27 Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past, pp. 111-112. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. It seems, then, as if at least very significant doubt can be thrown on the claim that the descendants of comfort women have been harmed by the failure to compensate their forebears. It might be thought that we need some kind of account of how we should discount the real probability that they would not, in fact, have inherited any compensation at all. In my view, such a response would be wholly mistaken. The reason for this is that it fails to apprehend the significance of the claim that a failure to rectify an act of injustice itself constitutes an act of injustice. When this is combined with an appreciation of the key role played by inheritance in the harm caused by failure to pay compensation argument, it is possible to build a robust account of the rights to compensation to descendants, which need take no account whatsoever of the fact that had compensation been timely, it may well be highly probable in a range of cases that the descendants of victims would not have received compensation.

It was previously argued that a failure to rectify injustice is itself an act of injustice. This has significant consequences for the entitlements of descendants of victims of injustice. Imagine the following: person A seriously wrongs person B, injuring her so that her quality of life is permanently impaired. It is straightforward to maintain that A owes B significant compensation. In theory, this should seek to repair the damage that A has inflicted upon B. So, imagine that there is a pill that B can take, which will totally eliminate the effects of A’s actions. This pill is very expensive, and B cannot afford it. A, however, is wealthy, and could easily pay for the pill. A clearly has a duty to pay for the pill on B’s behalf. This duty obtains as soon as A inflicts injury upon B, and is the minimum which A owes to B – there may also be further duties owing from the upset B experiences as a result of her experience. What happens if A does not immediately pay for the pill? The injustice is straightforwardly exacerbated – for every day that B suffers avoidable pain which could be eliminated were A to fulfill her rectificatory duties, the injustice visited upon B becomes worse and worse. This means that, as time passes and A fails to act in relation to B, her wrongdoing gets worse and worse. A no longer owes B simply the amount of money which would pay for the pill – this is what was owed at the time of the injustice, but with every day that passes, B suffers pain and discomfort which itself stands in need of compensation. This compensation will not be directly related to B’s pain in the same way as the pill is related to B’s pain. There is no way that compensation can cancel out the pain which B has suffered in the sense of meaning that B is not a victim of unjust pain suffering – this has occurred, and is a fact of history. Rather, the purpose of compensation here is to provide a counter-balance to this pain. Ideally, it should leave B indifferent to her state where she experienced no pain, and that whereby she both had the pain but also has some different benefit.28 So, if A agrees to pay for the pill five

28 This should not be expressed in terms of B being indifferent between not being wronged and between being a compensated victim of injustice. It is perfectly reasonable for B to maintain that she would have preferred not to have been a victim of injustice even if the compensation she has received leaves her better off in an all-things-considered sense than she would have been had the Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. years after the original act of injustice, there is still the matter of the pain which B has experienced for the preceding five years. Let us imagine that £10,000 represents a fair amount of compensation for these five years of pain. Suppose, however, that A refuses to pay the money. B develops an unrelated terminal illness. On her deathbed, she calls for A, and begs A to pay her the money that she owes her, so that she can leave it in her will to her daughter, C. A refuses, and B dies uncompensated. What should we say about the rights of C in this case? It seems clear to me that C is entitled to the £10,000. There are two ways that this argument might be made. The first is to say that she has inherited an entitlement to the £10,000. The second is to say that she has been harmed by her failure to inherit the £10,000. These may on the surface appear to be rather different arguments. I, along with others, have previously argued that it is important to distinguish between cases where compensation is claimed, on the basis of harm suffered, and where a claim is made for the restitution of property to which one is entitled. 29 In broad terms, the inheritance claim is more straightforward than the harm claim, since it does not need to engage with any counterfactual reasoning – the claim is simply that one party has property in their possession which rightfully belongs to another. The difficulty in such cases comes from establishing that the victim has a right to compensation which should be treated as akin to a property entitlement. In this type of case, however, it seems that either approach leads to a similar conclusion. The two are intimately related, since a failure to pay compensation to which another is entitled is itself a harmful act of injustice which gives rise to compensatory obligations. Imagine the following scenario. D lies on her deathbed. She has written a will, that states that at the moment of her death, all her possessions will be transferred to E. Seconds before she dies, F sets off a bomb which instantaneously destroys all of these possessions. There is no time for anything else to happen. D dies, and E receives no inheritance, as there are now no possessions left to inherit. It seems as if we can characterize E’s loss in one of two ways. We might say that F’s actions generated an entitlement for D to some of F’s property, up to the value of the property which F has destroyed. On D’s death, this entitlement passed by inheritance from D to E. Or we might say more straightforwardly that F harmed E, as E is clearly worse off following F’s actions. Ten seconds after D’s death, it is clear that E is now worse off then she would have been had F not acted as she did, and that F owes E a sum equivalent to the value of the property which F destroyed. Insofar as she does not compensate E in this way, F is guilty of an ongoing injustice. From the moment of D’s death, for as long as E does not receive compensation she is herself a victim of injustice.

injustice not occurred. 29 Butt, Rectifying International Injustice; Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice”. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. It is key here that we identify the precise sense in which E is a victim. The ongoing character of the refusal to pay compensation is essential. It means that we should hold that E is harmed by F’s ongoing failure to act morally, rather than by the one-off failure to do so at the time of E’s inheritance of D’s estate. Suppose that a given descendant of a victim of injustice is a gambler, who regularly loses all the money available to him. Suppose that we hold that he is due compensation for the fact that his parent was not compensated for the injustice which she suffered. He can plausibly claim to be the victim of injustice, since had the compensation been made to his parent just before her death, he would have inherited the compensation in question. Suppose that ten years pass. Throughout this period, he persistently requests that the compensation be paid to him, but this request is refused. After ten years, can he plausibly maintain that he a victim of injustice? Let us suppose that we accept that if the compensation had been paid, it would almost certainly no longer be in his possession – he would have lost it gambling. (Perhaps he saves up all the money he has in a given year, and places it on the number 13 on a roulette wheel on each birthday. Every time he has done this for the last ten years, he has lost.) So it is highly probable that had the money been paid, he would be no better off than his current position. It looks as if the harm account suggests that there is no case for compensation, whereas the inheritance account holds that he is nonetheless entitled to his entitlement. But this is to mischaracterize the harm account. He is not simply the victim of injustice for the one-off failure to pay compensation ten years ago – he is also the victim of injustice for the ongoing refusal to pay compensation ever since this point. Imagine that ten seconds before he places his first annual gamble, he requests that his compensation be paid. The request is denied. He gambles, and then ten seconds later again demands his payment. Is there any reason to think that the act of gambling the money in his possession means he is no longer entitled to compensation? There surely is not. If this is the case, it is not clear why ten years, rather than ten seconds, should make any difference to this claim.

It might be thought that the length of time of non-possession here does, in fact, make a morally relevant difference. As noted previously, in “Superseding Historic Injustice”, Jeremy Waldron suggests that non-possession of property does make a difference to one’s entitlement to property. It is important to appreciate, however, that this argument does not apply to this case, especially if the issue is understood in terms of the harm, rather than the inheritance, account. This is not an example of a case whereby an individual has an item of property which, for example, she loses and does not see for a number of years, but which another finds, and makes a central part of her life. Rather, the failure to pay compensation is an active and ongoing wrongful harm, which continually fails to advance the interests of the victim. We are not speaking here of compensation for historic injustice. Rather, we are discussing compensation for the ongoing, rolling refusal to pay compensation for historic injustice. The ongoing agency of the party refusing to rectify means that the clock is continually reset. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

We can now put the arguments of this section together. The direct victims of the comfort women were entitled to compensation for the suffering which they endured in the course of World War II. The failure of the Japanese government to pay compensation to these individuals was an ongoing injustice, which itself gave rise to compensatory duties. They were due this compensation right through their lives, including the point just before their deaths. The failure of the Japanese government to pay compensation at this point directly and wrongfully harmed their heirs. This means that the heirs became victims of injustice, and the Japanese government acquired compensatory duties to them. Insofar as this compensation has not been paid, Japan is responsible for serious ongoing injustice.

One final point. The argument presented here rests upon one party inheriting resources from another. It was suggested earlier that if one denies the justifiability of inheritance, it might be thought that the argument loses much or all of its force. Imagine, for example, that one is an egalitarian, and believes that each individual should be entitled to some kind of equal share of resources at the start of their life. This would seemingly suggest that inheritance itself is unjust, insofar as it leads to inegalitarian starting shares in the next generation. Such an egalitarian might argue for a compulsory, 100% inheritance tax of all estates, and subsequent egalitarian distribution to all. It is indeed the case that such an approach would invalidate the claim of a descendant of a victim of injustice. But it should be clear that a claim can only be blocked on these grounds if it is indeed the case that an egalitarian generational redistribution of resources is taking place. Furthermore, in the case of international compensation claims, we would need to see a cosmopolitan, global egalitarian generational redistribution of resources. The real world is very far indeed from realizing such an ideal. It is not morally permissible for those possessing rectificatory duties to others to deny that they possess such duties by reference to a forward-looking account of distributive justice unless they are themselves committed to seeking to realize such a forward-looking redistribution. This is not to say that concerns of distributive justice cannot lead us to put rectificatory claims to one side. The question is whether the prima facie rectificatory claim causes a conflict with the background account of distributive justice. If one permits the justifiability of inheritance, it seems that it will not do so. If one is genuinely opposed to inheritance, then things are more complicated. We need to consider a range of issues relating to the relation between ideal and non-ideal theory. The key question, however, is whether the putative rectificatory duty will make things better or worse off from the perspective of distributive justice. It can readily be conceded that things are complicated if we believe that fulfilling rectificatory duties will have negative effects from the perspective of distributive justice. So, for example, imagine that we are egalitarians, and are confronted with a situation whereby a group with less than average property holdings possess rectificatory duties to compensate a very wealthy group. There is a genuine, complicated conflict here. But things are much more straightforward if the roles are Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. reversed, and a wealthy group finds itself with compensatory duties to a less well-off group. What is clearly unjustifiable is if the wealthy seek to avoid fulfilling their rectificatory duties and hang on to their wealth by appealing to principles of distributive justice which would not allow them their wealth in the first place. The Japanese government condones the practice of inheritance domestically. It does not seek to promote global egalitarianism. It is also extremely wealthy. It is not clear how the claims of descendants of comfort women can be denied by reference to an argument relating to tension between distributive and rectificatory justice and the unjustifiability of inheritance. We live in a world where history matters when it comes to the distribution of benefits and burdens. The country of our birth and the identity of our parents makes a massive difference to our life prospects. Insofar as the real world is backward looking, so the events of the past are significant to determining who should have what in the present day. It is the significance of history to present day individuals’ life chances that makes it so important that we scrutinize whether we are properly fulfilling our rectificatory duties to others. Japan, on my argument, is failing to do so in a very serious fashion.

This paper is a draft. Do not quote without permission.

Jun-Hyeok Kwak Associate Professor Political Science, Korea University E-mail: [email protected]

Eon-joo Park EAI Center for Values & Ethics Fellow Political Science, Korea University E-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

This paper presents civic responsibility with reciprocal non-domination as a viable suggestion for the „comfort women‟ issue in South Korea. The „comfort women‟ case has been a polemic issue in the context of inherited responsibility. The Japanese government, which takes account of the state as the agent responsible for wartime atrocities, tends either to deny the existence of any collective responsibility or to limit the extent of such responsibility to the provision of financial compensation and other superficial measures. In contrast, South Korea, which demands an official apology and the acknowledgement of historical wrongdoings, is dependent upon the argument that nations should be accountable for the historical injustices committed by their previous generations. However, this claim still encounters a difficulty, namely, that an excessive focus on nationalism might humiliate the victims and prevent a thick reconciliation with Japan. On the basis of these observations, we will carry out following the two tasks: Firstly, by applying the predominant theories of inherited responsibility to the comfort women case, we are going to show that these theories are insufficient in terms of the „agent‟ taking inherited responsibility and the „scope‟ of its recompense. Secondly, by elaborating reciprocal non-domination as a regulative principle through which all citizens acknowledge the need for preventing themselves from committing similar injustices in the future, we will argue that civic responsibility would be more applicable to the comfort women case especially in the context of inherited responsibility.

Keywords: inherited responsibility, „comfort women‟, civic responsibility, reciprocal non-domination, national responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

This year marks the eighteenth anniversary of the first Wednesday Demonstration in Seoul.1 Over 900 times, the former „comfort women‟ and other Korean citizens assembled in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to demand a sincere and official apology from the Japanese government. However, the door of the Embassy is still firmly closed to the voices of the surviving victims and the citizen-led protests. The Korean government similarly disregards the aforesaid demands, citing the importance of maintaining a peaceful diplomatic relationship with Japan. A phrase used on the website of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Korean Council hereafter) succinctly expresses the feelings of the survivors: “Our tears have not dried up yet.” However, the conception that responsibility for injustice can be, and is, inherited appears to confirm that the Wednesday Protests and other efforts to elicit remorse and apology from the Japanese government were never in vain. In fact, the idea of inherited responsibility constantly inspires actions for resolving the case of the „comfort women.‟ There are two main reasons for resolving the „comfort women‟ issue on the basis of inherited responsibility. First of all, with the passage of time, fewer and fewer perpetrators and victims are left. Without the theoretical basis of responsibility being passed down to the next generation, historical injustices, such as the „comfort women‟ case, will be buried and forgotten without ever healing the wounds of victims. Secondly, the principle of inherited responsibility is expected to guarantee that no similar inhumane deeds will ever be committed again. By recognizing the graveness of the injustices perpetrated in the past and the difficulty of healing the wounds, we can share the idea that we must try to do our best not to become either perpetrators or victims of the same injustice. Despite the importance of inherited responsibility, the „comfort women‟ issue is still stuck in the middle of contentions without a viable solution. In other words, there is no room for a solution of the „comfort women‟ case among the existing arguments. The first reason is that the agents responsible for these misdeeds are not properly defined. On the one hand, when we consider the state as an actor for inherited responsibility, two limitations are

1 Wednesday Demonstrations are held every Wednesday in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to demand that the Japanese government should assume responsibility for the „comfort women‟ issue. The first demonstration was held on January 8th, 1992, when Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi visited South Korea. Former comfort women are always in the center of the demonstrations, but many other people who want to bring justice also support them. The 900th Wednesday Demonstration, held on January 13th, 2010, made the following demands: Firstly, the Japanese government must officially apologize to the surviving „comfort women‟ and compensate them for their sufferings; secondly, the Japanese government must enact a law aimed at preventing any repetition of the military sexual slavery system; thirdly, the South Korean government must take diplomatic actions to solve the problem; fourthly, both the Japanese and the South Korean government should remember the historical injustices resulting from war and colonialism by investigating the historical crimes and seeking a peaceful reconciliation; and fifthly, worldwide efforts must be made to eliminate sexual discrimination and violation against women. For additional information on the Wednesday Demonstrations, see http://www.womenandwar.net . Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. to be seen.2 Firstly, the concept of the state does not clarify fully the continuation of responsibility from the past to the present and to the future, because there is no shared and continued identity between the state responsible for historical injustices and the current Japanese government. Secondly, there is a possibility to leave the issue of responsibility in charge of a limited number of political officials or representatives, with the exclusion of citizens‟ participation. The Japanese government actually adopts that position on the issue of state responsibility. For instance, Japanese political leaders have reiterated that their duty was already wholly fulfilled due to the international treaties concluded after the end of the Pacific War, such as the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, this focus on international treaties limits the ability of ordinary Japanese citizens to participate freely in the deliberation on the „comfort women‟ issue. Since the government is considered the sole agent in charge of the „comfort women‟ issue and all reparations were supposedly already carried out by the government, citizens are not expected to regard this question imperatively as their own problem. On the other hand, the theory of national responsibility which considers the nation as an actor seems more effective than that of state responsibility.3 First and foremost, because the nation as such continues regardless of the passage of time, it certainly can explain that historical responsibility does not disappear over time. Moreover, not only government officials but also ordinary citizens can be active agents in taking care of historical injustices. However, since a nation is not a tangible reality but an “imagined community” (a term coined by Benedict Anderson) which is short of legal and political substance, it may cause problems such as how to share the responsibility among citizens and how to remedy the injustices in practice. Worse still, appealing to the nation inevitably accentuates „national shame‟ or „purity‟. Hence the compensation of victims becomes a less important issue than recovering national pride. In South Korea, the fact that the „comfort women‟ problem is depicted as a national shame causes the survivors to feel moral guilt, which in effect paradoxically reinforces the violation of their human rights. Furthermore, the nationalists who put an emphasis especially on the emotional condemnation of Japan considerably impede a sincere or „thick‟ reconciliation.

2 State responsibility is generally based on the concept of the state as an institutional entity which can hold formal and legal affairs. The main reason for holding the state responsible is that it has an ability to make decisions and take actions, such as signing a treaty, conducting diplomacy, and fulfilling a promise (Levy 2008; Pierik 2008; Thompson 2002; Erskine 2001). 3 National responsibility is considered one of the most elaborate theories in inherited responsibility, because the nation can take responsibility regardless of the passage of time. In this case, common national identity is viewed as a source of continuity (Miller 1995; Tamir 1993). Based on the continuity between the past generations and the next ones, inherited responsibility is explained as a accountability to share (Miller 2007; Butt 2008), active association with the past coming from national pride (Abdel-Nour 2003) and the affection of descendants for their ancestors (Wheeler 1997). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. The second reason why the „comfort women‟ issue cannot be dealt with by the existing arguments on inherited responsibility is that the scope problem is still unresolved. Simply put, the scope problem indicates to which extent one should be responsible for historical injustices. As seen in the assertion that the problem of providing compensation for war crimes was already solved by the South Korean-Japanese Treaty in 1965, the Japanese government tends to confine the scope of its responsibility to legal and material responsibility, without a moral acknowledgement of the fault. As a result, the Japanese government fails to notice that the real demand of the former „comfort women‟ is the restoration of their dignity through the sincere admission of Japan‟s wrongdoing. In contrast, South Korea demands the acknowledgement of historic injustice, an official apology and the revision of controversial Japanese textbooks. Even if they consider not only legal/material responsibility but also the restoration of the dignity, honor and human rights of the „comfort women‟, and promise not to repeat the same injustice, it is also true that the “politics of apologies” constantly stimulates Japan and that feeling remorse or apologizing is difficult if the injustice in question was perpetrated long time ago, not by the present generation but by others. Based on these observations, this paper will present „civic responsibility‟ based on reciprocal non-domination as a viable suggestion for both the “agent problem” and the “scope problem” in the „comfort women‟ issue. To accomplish this aim, we intend to accomplish the following aims. Firstly, we are to review the theories of inherited responsibility, concluding that these are not sufficiently applicable to the „comfort women‟ issue. Two considerations will be proposed in accordance with the „agent‟ holding inherited responsibility and the „scope‟ of its recompense. The former consists of the issue about holding either the state or the nation responsible, while the latter examines various attempts to alleviate the victims‟ suffering from historic injustice. Secondly, we are to propose civic responsibility based on reciprocal non-domination to better the „comfort women‟ case in the context of inherited responsibility(Kwak 2005; Kwak 2008). Civic responsibility will present a proper ground for sharing collective responsibility without disregarding historical responsibility as individual choice. Moreover, as reciprocal non-domination aims at reconciliation beyond compensation, it will be operated as a future-centered regulative principle which prompts both victims and wrongdoers to have a non-ethnocentric deliberative stance in which all citizens are aware of why and how we should prevent ourselves from committing similar injustices in the future.

INHERITED RESPONSIBILITY: AN OVERVIEW

The term „comfort women‟ refers to those Korean and other foreign women who were coerced or duped to do sexual services for the Japanese military during the Second

THE AGENT PROBLEM: STATE OR NATION

4 The term „comfort women‟ is a hotly contended issue. Despite the criticism focused on the male- dominated and euphemistic characteristics of the term, we decided to use it, albeit with quotation marks, in this paper. For one thing, the term „comfort women‟ is better known to the public. Secondly, this term can reflect a specific phase of colonial rule when the Japanese government sought to press foreign women into sexual labor, and at the same time it tried to concede its involvement. While we fully understand the feminist motivation to use „sexual slave‟ instead of the „comfort women‟, we decided to avoid the former term, because this expression is somewhat frightening and might cause humiliation or embarrassment to the survivors. For more information on the terminological debate about the „comfort women,‟ see Yoon 2008, Jung 2007, and Kang 2006. 5 It was the feminist groups who first raised the „comfort women‟ issue. Starting by criticizing Japanese sex tourism, movements for demanding a serious investigation on the „comfort women‟ system and reparation for the survivors have been advanced since the 1990s. The Korean Council was also established at that time to support the movement for solving the „comfort women‟ issue (Jung 1995, 182-3). 6 The first official inquiry regarding the „comfort women‟ issue in the Japanese Diet was initiated by a Socialist deputy, Motooka Shoji during a House of Councilors Budget Committee session held on June 6th, 1990, that is, a month after South Korean President Roh Tae-woo had visited Japan. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute.

The statement that Cabinet Minister Morihito Hosokawa made during a plenary session of the upper house of the Japanese Diet well represents the consistent and unchanging view of the Japanese government. That is, the problem of compensating the former „comfort women‟ was completely and finally solved by the 1965 „Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation‟ in the „Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.‟7 Thus any additional action for reparation is only a humanitarian effort motivated by compassion for the former „comfort women‟ who underwent tremendous suffering, rather than an obligation. In this sense, the Japanese government tends to regard the state as the proper agent for taking responsibility for the „comfort women‟ issue, whereby only the state as an officially composed political entity can carry out domestic and foreign policies regardless of the people living in its territory. Such an institutional approach usually purports to prove the state‟s capabilities of reasoning, decision-making and taking actions. If this approach proves the state‟s ability to make decisions as a single agent and take actions in a concerted fashion, it would be the most appropriate one especially in the question of who is in charge of the responsibility for historical wrongdoings because the issue of compensation can be decided and performed easily as well as promptly. Moreover, without a substantial entity, it might be difficult to distribute responsibility among members of a community (Pierik 2008, 474-81; Levy 2008, 486-91; Erskine 2001, 74-76). In this context, it might be said that the Japanese way to solve the „comfort women‟ issue is very simple and effective, and indeed it looked so when the 1965 South Korean-Japanese treaty was signed. However, state responsibility cannot be a proper framework for solving the „comfort women‟ problem, for two reasons. First, due to the lack of shared and continued identity between the empire of Japan and the post-war government of Japan, state responsibility cannot guarantee that the responsibility for historical injustices done by the Japanese military until the end of World War II in 1945 is passed over to the current generation.8 Although the state of Japan persists over time despite regime changes, the rationale of state responsibility is insufficient to persuade members in a state about their role as responsible citizens to take care of their predecessors‟ faults. Actually, in the absence of continuation between a former generation and the current one, it is not an easy task to understand that considering the past and trying to heal the wounds is necessary and important. This weak motive inevitably gives rise to a negative or indifferent attitude toward historical injustices. Worse still, state-centered responsibility inspires an idea that responsibility for historical

7 Morihito Hosokawa at the 128th plenary session of the upper house of the Japanese Diet (September 24th, 1993). 8 Miller asserts that the proper agency to assume responsibility should be the nation. He cites, among others, the following limitations on state responsibility: the difficulties encountered while specifying how individual people can share responsibility and the possible coincidence with national responsibility, such as the case of stateless nations (Miller 2007, 112). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. injustice does not exist if the victims and/or perpetrators have already passed away. For instance, political leaders in Japan frequently adumbrate that demands for a sincere official apology and compensation to the survivors of the „comfort women‟ system will fade away as the survivors die of old age or illness (Lee Hahm 2001, 128). But it is inappropriate to argue that the descendants who enjoy the benefits the colonial rulers brought about can disclaim any responsibility for the harms the colonial rulers brought to the survivors who still suffer from the past injustices. The „comfort women‟ issue gives rise to such grave physical and emotional harms which affect both the victims and their families, and those harms have been continually passed down up to now. Therefore we need another theoretical framework through which we can understand and accept that the responsibility for historical injustices is inherited. The second limitation of state responsibility is that the collective agency of taking responsibility is likely to be restricted to a relatively small numbers of persons, such as diplomats and other government officials. We do not question the appropriateness of the representatives‟ main role in inherited responsibility when public opinion is well formulated through a democratic deliberation process. What we do consider is the case that a state in question does not lay sufficient emphasis on democratic deliberation, or does not have any kind of the process of deliberation at all. In this case, the responsibility of historic injustices cannot be kept in terms of self-determination or mutual respect.9 Namely, there is no sincere expression of respect when there is only a decision made by political officials without a popular consensus. In the same vein, the insistence of the Japanese government on that all reparation problems of the „comfort women‟ issue were fully resolved due by the earlier international treaties prevents a broader and deeper discussion of the issue among citizens. After all, the 1951 San Francisco Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers and the 1965 South Korean-Japanese Treaty had certain inherent flaws with regard to legal reparation.10 Nevertheless, state-centered responsibility without necessitating the proper

9 According to Caney, treating states as responsible agents is highly unfair to individuals who are disadvantaged because of the actions of a non-democratic state (Caney 2003, 302). Nobles also points out that demands for an apology have the greatest chance of success in democratic countries where people have “open channels of participation”. As opposed to legal measures, apologies are publicized by providing room for deliberation, and they present collective, rather than individual, guilt (Nobles 2008, 9-12 & 29-30). 10 The two Koreas were not parties of the San Francisco Treaty, since Korea, as a Japanese colony, had not participated in WWII as an independent actor. In the South Korean-Japanese Treaty, the „comfort women‟ issue was not dealt with. Worse still, the compensation provided by Japan was not used for assisting individual victims but appropriated by the South Korean government for its own economic development projects (Hicks, 1994, 170-1). In the Japanese Diet, Councilor Motooka Shoji also highlighted that the treaties had not included compensation for the former „comfort women,‟ since women‟s rights were not given adequate emphasis at that time (Motooka Shoji in the 145th Budget Committee session of the House of Representatives on September 8th, 1999). However, the Japanese government continues to reiterate that its duties were already fulfilled by its adherence to the treaties. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. participation of citizens cannot meet the demands for reconsidering the treaties.11 If we cannot expect a change in the attitude of the Japanese government, it is the ordinary citizens who can change the government. Yet those who fail to acknowledge their obligation to remedy their ancestors‟ misdeeds or regard the problem of „comfort women‟ as a minor issue cannot be expected to pressure the government to initiate feasible solutions and reconciliation. The limitations of the theories of state responsibility can be complemented if nations rather than states are considered as the proper bearers of inherited responsibilities. The continuity of a nation over times can be a powerful rationale to explain why the next generation is responsible for past injustice perpetrated by the previous generations. As Miller highlights, the national commonality between the old and new generations can encompass various fields, such as bequeathed territories, institutions, physical and cultural capitals (Miller 2007, 151-9). And the very existence of visible benefits gained from historical injustices in the past constitutes a sufficient reason to oblige every individual in the nation to redress what a victimized party has lost. In this sense, nations are understood as “intergenerational communities in which the present generation acknowledges responsibility both to respect the memory of past generations and to enrich the lives of future ones” (Miller 2007, 154). If it is acknowledged that the continuity of national commonality resides not only in material and substantial gains but in common identity and cultural ties, the „comfort women‟ case, in which the descendants of the perpetrators do not obtain any advantages but only harms and scars from the past, can be investigated in terms of inherited responsibility. In a word, the „comfort women‟ case can be taken more sophisticatedly if nations are to be held responsible for historic responsibility. The narrowness of state responsibility in its appropriate bearers can be overcome through national responsibility. While political elites or officials play a pivotal role in state- centered responsibility, citizens can also become active agents to take care of historic responsibility. Primarily because the members of a nation feel solidarity based on their common identity, it might be easy to expect more active and voluntary participation in consideration of their duty to demand reparation or redress past injustices. In South Korea, interest in the „comfort women‟ issue is much higher than in Japan. This phenomenon is not

11 Shin agrees that it is impossible to bring a lawsuit at an individual level without a new interpretation of international law. What is impressive in his argument is that he gives a pivotal role to the United States to empower a new interpretation of international law (Shin 2009, 24). According to Schmidt, there is a precedent of correction and revision of international law. For instance, in 1988, 43 years after the end of the Pacific War, the United States issued an official apology and provided compensation for the Japanese-Americans who were forcibly interned in wartime relocation camps (Schmidt 2000, 50). Moreover, in 1981 Germany also provided France with additional compensation for the cases of forced conscription. Considering that Japanese citizens are also allowed to make individual claims for compensation for the damages resulting from a nuclear disaster, there is no reason to reject the idea of individually compensating the former Korean „comfort women‟. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. irrelevant to the idea of national responsibility. Not only government officials and NGO activists but also ordinary citizens are aware of the „comfort women‟ issue. Moreover, many controversial aspects of Japanese-Korean relations, such as the territorial dispute about the Dok-do Islands and the history textbook debate, often stimulate strong solidarity among Koreans, and sometimes elicit intense emotional reactions. Thus it is little wonder that South Korea rejects and does not understand the logic of the Japanese government that accepts only legal responsibility and state-to-state material compensation. However, it is highly doubtful if the „comfort women‟ case will ever be successfully resolved according to the principle of national responsibility. Firstly, nations are, to use Benedict Anderson‟s term, political entities concocted through imaginative experiences which are short of legal substance, and thus it might prove difficult to decide how to share the responsibility among people and how to remedy the harms specifically. Solidarity spurred by national commonality may provide us with a rationale for inherited responsibility, but what then makes historic responsibility feasible is largely determined by actual politics rather than imaginative ties. Nevertheless, Miller believes that since nationality functions as an impetus to produce powerful civic trust between citizens, it can guarantee one‟s more contribution to collective responsibility for historic injustices done by the previous generations (Miller 1995, 72-73; Miller 2000, 31-33; Miller 2007, 135-161). By the same token, it would be argued that national responsibility should be preferred for the „comfort women‟ case because this helps maintain a trans-generational commonality in large and anonymous states. No matter how strong national sentiment is, it is doubtful whether the nation can really produce collective responsibility to take care of historical injustice. On the one hand, even though the former „comfort women‟ are fellow citizens, how can it be guaranteed automatically that all South Korean citizens acknowledge responsibility to try to remedy them? Can we say that it is one‟s „responsibility‟ to condemn Japan as evil and emotionally emphasize oneness as Korean? On the other hand, it needs more explanation on the Japanese side, because Miller asserts that emotional affection based on “proximity” cannot spread into global level, and it is enough to consider a minimal level to live at least as human (Miller 2007, 23-50). In this vein, reparation for the former „comfort women‟ case can be seriously constrained, because for those Japanese who have no proximity with the former „comfort women‟ it appears sufficient to achieve as a minimum that the survivors can live just as any human being. If Japan supposes that the provision of a proper amount of money can help one to reach a minimal condition as a human being, we cannot refute this compensation according to Miller‟s idea. In addition, defining the minimal level of human subsistence needs more discussion in the „comfort women‟ case. Secondly, appealing to the nation might give priority to the restitution of national pride over the restitution of the victims‟ dignity. Worse still, this process can impose more burden and scar to victims than before. In South Korea the former „comfort women‟ have become a scapegoat by the name of nationalism for a long time. There is a tendency in Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Korean society that the „comfort women‟ discourse is connected with national pride or national shame. The „comfort women‟ phenomenon is seen as Korean national shame, and great emphasis is being laid on regaining national pride or purity. However, this approach caused serious difficulties to the survivors, because they were subjected to immense humiliation as women and made to feel guilt. In other words, their human rights were violated twice. Since the gender of women has been depicted as the property of the nation in the „comfort women‟ discourse, the demand of apology is interpreted as a process of restoring national pride and chastity that was lost. In this sense, the long silence of the former „comfort women‟ is quite understandable. The victims, who have been always regarded as passive objects, felt to have been humiliated as women (Yang 1998a, 163 & 165-172). This ugly face of nationalism is readily found in testimonies of the former „comfort women‟. Indeed, they feel intense guilt and humiliation for having been „comfort women‟.12 Recently, the Korean Council sued some internet users who persistently insulted the former „comfort women‟. Most of the abusive words were focused on national humiliation: “Korean women in the colonial period volunteered to be a sexual slave out of loyalty to the Japanese empire” or “Are you proud of having graduated from the comfort station?”.13 All these stories illustrate that the former „comfort women‟ were viewed not as individual human beings but as the property of the nation. In short, inherited responsibility based on either the state or the nation cannot be a proper ground for solving the „comfort women‟ issue. For this reason, we need a new paradigmatic change, not only for the „comfort women‟ issue but also for achieving reconciliation between Japan and South Korea.

THE SCOPE PROBLEM: PUNISHING OR FORGETTING

The issue of reparation for historical injustices is not a simple question. Various studies suggest a wide range of ways to resolve past injustices, such as material payment, medical treatment, affirmative action, official apology, rewriting controversial textbooks, and so on. In the „comfort women‟ issue, several solutions have been proposed, but none of them is likely to lead to a successful and satisfactory outcome.

12 For instance, the following statements were common responses: “I have a daughter who is still single even though she has already reached marriageable age. I think no one wants to marry my daughter because I was a „comfort woman‟.” (Ito 1994, 115) “I had to conceal my past even from my husband during my whole life.” (Ito 1994, 122) “I do not want to be investigated any more. Today is much better because you [an investigator] are a woman like me. But I could not tell my past in the comfort station when the investigator was a man. I was so embarrassed that my face turned red.” (Ministry of Gender Equality 2002, 136) “Please do not include my name in the book. I could not endure if my grandchildren got to know my story.” (Ministry of Gender Equality 2002, 181) 13 Hankyoreh January 13th, 2009. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. With respect to reparation for historic injustices, there are two dominant positions. The first position emphasizes that one party has to pay back whatever was lost or harmed, without considering the prospective provision for restoring bilateral relations in the future. No matter how straightforward it may appear, such a simple way of restitution has practical weaknesses. On the one hand, in some cases it is impossible to restore what was damaged. We can readily find several reasons in many cases, such as the absence of either the expropriator, or the victim, or the object taken (Vernon 2003, 551).14 Actually, all these three reasons can be found in the „comfort women‟ issue. In addition, no visible and material property can be restored or returned in the „comfort women‟ case, because what the former „comfort women‟ lost was not land or property but their human dignity and human rights. 15 We need, therefore, to locate the problem of historic injustices in a more sophisticated logic through which one may use a compensatory system even in the absence of perpetrators, victims, and objects taken. In many cases, we are drawn to formulate a coherent principle to cover the issue of historical redress even though there is no tangible substance to rectify. At the juncture, the issue of historical redress can be estimated chiefly through a counterfactual conjecture that if the injustice had not taken place what would have happened.16 On the other hand, unilateral retribution without the subsequent restoration of relations might not achieve reconciliation between the two parties but create a deadlock. Particularly if the parties involved hold diametrically opposing views and memories on the matter of past wrongdoing, it might reproduce and aggravate the conflict. The „comfort women‟ issue can be an example in that sense. Whenever deliberating about the issue, we can easily find that both Japan and South Korea stick their position to ethnocentrism, especially regarding themselves as a victim of history.17 Japanese citizens perceive that they were victimized by the United States and the Soviet Union, whereas Koreans regard themselves as victims of Japanese colonialism (Shin et al. 2007, 1). It is not difficult to find

14 Similarly, when considering retrocession, it is difficult to specify the continuity between a present claimant of land ownership and a real owner in the past (Kukathas 2003, 170). 15 Even if there was a concrete object to return, difficulties in restitution may be encountered if the object in question later disappeared due to some natural disaster or became unreturnable (Vernon 2003, 552). 16 Some problems still remain, however. Firstly, we might not be able to measure the exact counterfactual situation. Secondly, it is doubtful whether a compensation decided by counterfactual approach would really heal the wounds of the victims (Waldron 1992, 7). 17 Yinan He highlights how conflicting memories on history play a main role in impeding genuine reconciliation. The creation of national myths, such as myths of self-glorification, self- whitewashing and other-maligning, and their distribution through mass education, commemoration and resolution arrangements will worsen the atmosphere of reconciliation. In this context, joint history research is needed so as to achieve real reconciliation (He, 2009: 25-45). In Japan, there are attempts to glorify Japanese history, “including myths of victimization” and “bestowing moral superiority,” and to whitewash it by efforts to “deny or rationalize” the past injustices. In contrast, South Korea is engaged in other-maligning mythmaking through which Japan becomes “inferior, evil, or culpable” (He, 2009: 27-28). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Japanese textbooks which emphasize how Japan suffered and continues to suffer as a result of the Pacific War (Soh, 1996, 1240; Schmidt 2000, 6-7, 61).18 Specifically, Japan stresses that wartime Japanese atrocities should not be singled out for worldwide criticism, because such atrocities, including the operation of comfort stations, were inevitable during the war. This victimized feeling in Japan becomes intensified whenever Japan‟s neighboring countries criticize Japan and demand an official apology. From Japan‟s perspective, it is especially hard to accept such demands from the United States, because the latter is also reluctant to acknowledge its misdeeds, such as the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Shin 2009, 8-20). Thus, it requires a deliberative stance for forward-looking reconciliation in which both parties can overcome the feeling of victimhood and exclusive nationalism. The second approach to deal with reparation for historical injustices is focused only on the establishment or reestablishment of current and future bilateral relations without resolving the historical injustices themselves. This tactic of forgetting historic wrongdoings might be actually used as a method to deny all responsibility for historical wrongdoings (Kukathas 2003, 172; Miller 2007, 139). Denying one‟s historic responsibility will, of course, result in new conflicts between the two parties. For instance, in July 1995 the Japanese government decided to establish a foundation named „Asian Women‟s Fund‟ to support the former „comfort women‟. The foundation and its plan, however, was harshly criticized by South Korea on the grounds that it was not a „public‟ fund but only a „private‟ one that granted „atonement money‟ to the former „comfort women‟ (Schmidt 2000, 68 & 173). The establishment of the „Asian Women‟s Fund‟ was regarded, particularly in South Korea, as a sign of the Japanese government‟s unwillingness to acknowledge its responsibility. Denying its direct involvement in the operation of the comfort stations, the Japanese government is apparently of the opinion that privately provided consolation money is sufficient (Han 1995).19 Such an attitude, which is focused only on the restoration of bilateral relations in the future, actually aggravates anti-Japanese sentiments, because Koreans do not regard the creation of the fund as a sincere attempt at thick reconciliation.20

18 Through the falsification of truth, the Japanese government has attempted to modify and conceal some aspects of the „comfort women‟ system, such as the number of women conscripted and their age, in history textbooks (Schmidt 2000, 62-63). In 1996 and 1997, respectively, the assemblies of Okayama and Ibaraki prefectures went so far as to present petitions for the elimination of the „comfort women‟ issue from history textbooks. As a result, in 2000 four publishing companies completely omitted the „comfort women‟ issue, while two others expressed the aspects of violence and coercion ambiguously or indirectly (Yang 2002b, 634). 19 At the 154th Budget Committee session of the upper house of the Diet, Yasuo Fukuda indeed asserted that the „Asian Women‟s Fund‟ should be a private fund, since the issue of state responsibility was already settled (July 15th, 2002). 20 Councilor Motooka Shoji also hit the nail on the head at the 145th Budget Committee session of the upper house of the Diet (September 8th, 1999) by saying that the fund should be established after thoroughly considering about the other party‟s ideas, and conditions, and demonstrating the Japanese side‟s sincere willingness to apologize. We can say that the „Asian Women‟s Fund‟ failed Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. Another problem inherent in the restoration of bilateral relations without taking past wrongdoings into consideration is that it cannot suggest any principle which can prevent the repetition of similar inhumane actions in the future. There is a „supersession‟ theory developed by Jeremy Waldron in which the resources of the world are distributed in a way that is fair to all of its existing inhabitants. Emphasizing that any behavior counted as injustice may become justice under new and different circumstances, the supersession theory claims that it is more important and urgent to resolve the present injustices than the historical ones (Waldron 1992, 13 & 24-7). It is agreeable that the present in which we live is precious, and that we still face a wide range of injustices, inequalities, and unfairness. However, a past injustice hardly, if ever, becomes justice. In Waldron‟s example of a situation where supersession can be applied, there were two actors, P and Q. P forcibly seized the well of Q. While P‟s act „was‟ definitely injustice when both P and Q had their own wells, if the well of P later dries up because of a severe drought, P‟s action is no longer considered an injustice (Waldron 1992, 25). In this example, it appears reasonable to argue that in the light of the severe drought, sharing the well is actually justice. The action of P, however, cannot become justice, because originally it was not aimed at sharing but a hostile seizure. What the passage of time provides is not a change from injustice to justice but a point in which we have to show justice by helping those who in need. In case of an exclusive focus on the present injustices, the past injustices are likely to be forgotten, and lose their intrinsic significance. If we do not point out that the seizure of a well owned by another person is unjust and wrong, anybody can feel that seizing the well of others, particularly in need of water, is not illegal and unjust. Similarly, if we say, as the „Asian Women‟s Fund‟ suggests, that the most urgent need of the former „comfort women‟ is financial support, because their poverty is the current injustice that we have to confront, we patently fail to take a lesson from history. So far we have reviewed the problematic aspects of the existing reparation theories. Shortly put, a new principle is needed to resolve the „comfort women‟ problem, through which non-ethnocentric deliberation may be realized; restoring the victim‟s position will be achieved even though there is nothing to give back; one‟s responsibility for historical wrongdoings will not be neglected; and the repetition of similar injustices will be prevented.

CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY WITH RECIPROCAL NON-DOMINATION

South Korean NGOs played a pivotal role in drawing national and international attention to the „comfort women‟ issue. The NGOs called upon the Japanese government to investigate the truth, admit the crimes perpetrated by the Japanese authorities, make an

on both counts. South Korea consistently denounced the fund from the very beginning, and the administration of former President Kim Dae-Jung established its own supporting system for the former „comfort women‟ in 1998. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. official apology, provide compensation and rehabilitation for the victims, punish the perpetrators, establish a memorial and a museum, and lay sufficient emphasis on this issue in the history education to be received by future Japanese generations. The first movement for the „comfort women‟ in the 1980s was motivated by feminist objections against Japanese sex tourism, for Korean feminists regarded the „comfort women‟ issue as the root of Japanese sex tourism, that is, not a past injustice but a still existing problem (Jung 2004, 108-130). Especially since the 1990s, the movements for the „comfort women,‟ with the Korean Council at the center, have gained momentum, and not only South Korean and Japanese civil associations but also international organizations, such as the UN, the International Court of Justice, and the International Labor Organization (ILO), have become involved in the issue. The campaigns which the NGOs launched on behalf of the „comfort women‟ were undeniably of a great significance. At the citizens‟ level, more and more people in South Korea pay attention to, and get involved in, the „comfort women‟ issue through the Wednesday Demonstrations, donations, and volunteer activities. At the national level, the South Korean National Assembly enacted a law on providing support to the former „comfort women‟ as early as 1993. At the international level, the UN Commission on Human Rights published Radhika Coomaraswamy‟s report on “Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences” in 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2003. The same commission also presented Gay McDougall‟s report, “Systemic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict,” in 1998. The International Court of Justice published its final report in 1994 under the title of “Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal,” while ILO asserted that the „comfort women‟ system violated international laws. The attention paid to the „comfort women‟ issue in international society is also demonstrated by the related parliamentary resolutions passed in various countries, such as the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, and the EU. However, NGOs have also experienced internal conflicts caused by ideological disagreements, since some groups adopted an ethnocentric position (Jung 1994, 120-30 & 254-58). To facilitate the further actions of the NGOs and overcome the limitations of the existing solutions for the „comfort women‟ issue, we suggest „civic responsibility‟ based on reciprocal non-domination.

CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY AS A FRAMEWORK

As indicated above, inherited responsibility is a controversial issue from the agent problem to the scope problem. Most of all, it requires a rationale to make clear why individuals who directly did not participate in committing historical injustice are still responsible for it. According to liberals, a political agent is “potentially free from the guilt of the fathers,” and thus responsibility can be imposed only by personal choice or with consensus (Abdel-Nour, 2003: 695). Abdel-Nour claims that only individually imagined Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. national pride or shame through individual capability and willingness to reflect of or refine the history can be an imperative standard to decide whether the next generation can be responsible for their ancestors‟ fault (Abdel-Nour 2003, 701-703). This argument, however, is problematic since it attributes responsibility wholly to individual choice. In other words, according to this argument, perpetrators or their children can arbitrarily choose whether to take responsible or not, whereas the victims or their descendants do not have any opportunity to escape from the sufferings and wounds caused by historical injustice. In this context, we need a mechanism to prevent perpetrators from making the matter of responsibility an individual choice which might lead to the complete denial of any responsibility. In contrast, there is an argument that inherited responsibility should be collectively taken, because human beings are socially interdependent and spiritually embedded in the common interests of a political community (Crawford 2007; May 1987; Zimmerman 1985; Feinberg 1970). This argument is also problematic in the sense that individuals can be subordinated to collective goods or objects. In addition, it is doubtful whether mere membership can bring about sincere feeling to take responsibility for the past injustices which are not directly related to the present generation. At this juncture, inherited responsibility requires a framework of civic responsibility through which citizens voluntarily take responsibility collectively without suppressing their individual autonomy and dignity. In order to overcome making responsibility either as individual choice or as automatic and natural product from belongingness to a certain community, civic responsibility is embodied at three levels. That is, reciprocal recognition at the individual level, civic contestability at the state level, and civic decorum at the international level (Kwak 2008). Firstly, a responsible citizen can recognize another community member‟s need even if their interests are in conflict. This anthropocentric recognition of the other is possible if reciprocal understanding at the individual level is based not on self-interest or altruistic devotion but on self-love which can be extended to a humanitarian consideration. Apart from acceptance, indifference and approval which are employed by approaches taking self- interest and individual choice significantly, civic responsibility can be implemented in specific conditions rooted in reciprocal recognition. To put it concretely, acceptance does not approve differences, indifference individual preferences, and approval a will to coexist. Yet tolerance in civic responsibility accommodates differences with a clear preference and necessitates a will to coexist despite differences. According to the individual level of civic responsibility, taking responsibility for the „comfort women‟ issue is never reduced to an individual choice. Particularly on the victimized side, demands for reparation for the former „comfort women‟ will be acknowledged. This activity, based as it is on mutual recognition, is coming from self-love which understands the difference of historical context and environment between the present generation and the survivors, and at the same time reflects a will to coexist. In addition, citizens of the victimized party may also try to prevent the occurrence of any violence against local women which might be similar to the „comfort Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. women‟ system. Secondly, at the state level, we need to establish an institution to maintain reciprocity at the individual level and at the same time guarantee civic contestability to check this institution. For this, liberty as non-domination should be identified not with a goal but with a condition for life.21 In other words, a person with private interests can make a voluntary contribution to the community only if liberty as non-domination is solidly founded. Civic contestability also needs to set liberty as non-domination as a suitable precondition for guaranteeing the actualization of common good during conflicts as well. In other words, selfish preferences can be compounded not through rational deliberation but through active political participation with democratic contestability and competitive democracy. In sum, liberty as non-domination is an institution aimed at preserving reciprocity among citizens, and every citizen may try to check and monitor the arbitrary use of political power. The second element of civic responsibility can encourage citizens to check and monitor the deliberation of the „comfort women‟ issue in order to prevent the violation of liberty as non- domination. As has been noted before, the „comfort women‟ debate in South Korea frequently becomes a manifestation of extreme nationalism which doubly hurts the former „comfort women,‟ because it is focused on the restoration of national pride, rather than the healing of the victims‟ wounds. However, civic responsibility will guide all movements and discourses on the „comfort women‟ issue to be preceded according to the principle of liberty as non-domination. Third, civic decorum is required to apply civic responsibility not only at the domestic level but also at the international level. For this purpose, we need a „politics of persuasion‟ to connect domestic politics and international politics (Kwak 2009b). The contents of the politics of persuasion can be divided into two parts. Firstly, taking inherited responsibility should be acknowledged by citizens as a way of consolidating democratic legitimacy. In a democratic society, inherited responsibility can be justified only if citizens are successfully persuaded by political and moral arguments. Thus it is necessary for political leaders to explain to citizens why they must deal with their ancestors‟ fault even though they personally did not commit any injustice. By the same token, political elites generally play a role in persuading citizens to take care of historical injustice, but ordinary people who are capable of persuading others can also inspire citizens. By imagining what happened if the past injustice could not be dealt with considerably, those who can persuade others will urgently encourage other citizens to take inherited responsibility. Secondly, civic responsibility focuses on ethical responsibility through democratic deliberation or a

21 The concept of liberty as nondomination has been developed by the so-called neo-Rooman theorists, such as Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, Maurizio Viroli, and Jean-Fabian Spitz. Using Machiavelli‟s notion of libertà, they articulate liberty as, for example, “I am free to the degree that no human being has the arbitrary power to interfere with me even if I lack the will or the wisdom required for achieving self-mastery.” See Philip Pettit, “Freedom as Antipower” (1996, 578). For critical assessments to this line of thought, see Jun-Hyeok kwak (2004, 219-239). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. collective decision-making procedure. In this process, inherited responsibility will be regarded not as a universal and eternal law but as a product of democratic deliberation. Furthermore, the stories of historic responsibility also can shape citizens‟ general opinions, because they boost up the political probability in which accidental cooperation and emotional judgment can be allowed. Inherited responsibility itself is a subject of public deliberation, and so it is conceived neither as prima facie nor as a natural right granted by superhuman power. Consequently, civic responsibility with the politics of persuasion can be an alternative to theories of inherited responsibility especially at the international level. With civic responsibility, the „comfort women‟ issue is viewed as a question of inherited responsibility in good shape. This is because not only political elites but also citizens actively do participate in deliberation on the issue, and reach a consensus about how to resolve the „comfort women‟ issue in detail. Those who can imagine the grave results which may occur if the „comfort women‟ issue is not be settled properly will sincerely persuade other citizens to prevent the reoccurrence of any similar injustice. In this sense, it can be argued that civic responsibility is shaped not through membership but through intersubjective interaction between citizens, and therefore responsible citizens who experience civic and political equity in a democratic country willingly take their responsibility for the historical wrongdoings committed by other members of the same community. In fact, anyone who wishes to identify himself or herself with the achievements of his or her fellow citizens or to find his or her dignity in them will take the inherited responsibility for the misdeeds of the previous generations.

RECIPROCAL NON-DOMINATION AS A REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE

As has been noted before, the core of civic responsibility is democratic deliberation among citizens. The emphasis of democratic deliberation in terms of historic responsibility is not at all new. For example, arguing in favor of a reconciliatory approach, Thompson emphasizes „discourse‟ through which different interpretations on historical injustice can be coordinated, and as a result, victims and perpetrators may develop a satisfactory relationship (Thompson, 2002, 49 & 52). However, there is one more point which we need to consider, that is, how an effective discursive stance can be created and properly operated. As Thompson points out, reconciliation is impossible if victims are either intransigently determined not to reconcile with the perpetrators or compelled to show forgiveness under the pressure of the wrongdoers (Thompson 2002, 49). To overcome these barriers, one needs to develop a regulative principle in advance to empower victims to resist the perpetrator‟s pressure. At this juncture, we suggest „reciprocal non-domination‟ as a regulative principle which guarantees equal power to both parties with the aim of facilitating discussion between them.22

22 Although reciprocal non-domination is a foundational value in democratic deliberation, it does Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. We expect that reciprocal non-domination as a regulative principle in democratic deliberation serve three roles (Kwak, 2009a). First, reciprocal non-domination functions as a condition to form a discursive stance between countries in conflicts about historical injustice. When a deliberative stance is guided, the focus is not free action but the conditions under which more open and democratic debates can be guaranteed. If action is focused, it is not in principle allowed to interfere with an individual‟s private sphere by way of legal sanction or public interference unless his or her free action is interfered with. If condition is focused, however, such a legal sanction or public interference becomes legitimate when the individual in question is in a situation that prevents her from making a decision on his own free will. In this context, reciprocal non-domination may become a coherent ground which protects the individual from being subjected to the arbitrary will of others, legitimizes legal and institutional interference, but at the same time draws the limits of such interference. For instance, in the case that a victim was enforced to forgive a historical injustice due to the pressure of a perpetrator, we can address the case as the problem of inequality between the powerful and the weak through the principle of reciprocal non-domination. Secondly, reciprocal non-domination also should be presented as a coordinating principle for conflicts during deliberation. In other words, reciprocal non-domination not only creates a deliberative stance but also enforces the participants to follow the outcome of discussion. It is true that if we can simply reject the decisions resulting from deliberation on the grounds that the two parties inevitably have dissimilar and contrary opinions, the deliberation stance itself becomes meaningless and useless. However, if the result of deliberation also can be regulated by that principle, participants can have reciprocal non- domination as a minimal condition as well as an investigation standard during deliberation. For instance, if the Japanese government refuses the result that she must acknowledge the historical malpractices and apologize to the former „comfort women‟, the other participants in the deliberation process can recognize that the Japanese decision violates reciprocal non- domination. Accordingly, it is possible to expect solidarity of all weaker parties or activate deliberation at international level, even though the other participants are weaker than the Japanese government. In this sense, reciprocal non-domination, not as the first principle but as a rule to action, can form, maintain, and modify a deliberative stance. Finally, reciprocal non-domination should contain the process of internalizing liberty as non-domination as a normative principle. The minimal standard to reach an agreement through deliberation is reciprocity which entails the identification of one‟s status with a

not play the same role that first principles, such as utility or liberty, play in theories such as utilitarianism or libertarianism. There theories derive all of their other principles from their first principles. By contrast, nondomination is not a first principle from which the rest of justice is derived, but rather a regulative principle that serves two different roles. First, it guides thinking in the ongoing process in which citizens as well as theorists consider what justice requires in the case of particular laws in specific contexts. Second, it shows that need for other principle to fill out the content of a democratic deliberation. See Kwak(2005). Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. counterpart‟s status. However, reciprocity cannot be achieved without an empirical ground or certainty about the coming future. Thus we can internalize reciprocity by the help of reciprocal non-domination which preserves liberty and creates a balance between two conflicting parties of unequal power. In the „comfort women‟ issue, the internalization of liberty as non-domination can bring about the reciprocity between victims and perpetrators. The victimized party typically regards himself or herself only as a „victim‟, „sufferer,‟ and the „injured‟. In contrast, the perpetrating party usually tries to minimize his crimes in order not to be punished or forced to pay compensation. For example, South Koreans only demand what they have lost, without taking care of what they can do in the future or what they actually did in the past. Several former prostitutes in South Korea have accused the former political leadership for encouraging them to become sexual slaves for U.S soldiers. Those who blame the Korean government emphasize that they consider it a „deep hypocrisy‟ that successive Korean governments keep calling for reparations from Japan while refusing to take a look at South Korea‟s own history.23 Similarly, Japanese citizens usually do not consider the possibility that in the future they might find themselves under similar circumstances as Japan‟s former victims. If the Japanese government could presume that Japanese citizens might also become victims of the same kinds of injustices as the ones perpetrated during World War II, it would be far easier for it to reach an agreement that would be satisfactory not only to the present victimized party but also to the Japanese themselves.

CONCLUSION

In mid-2007, the Honda Resolution, calling upon Japan to acknowledge and accept its official responsibility for the wartime mistreatment of „comfort women,‟ was passed unanimously in the U.S. House of Representatives. After that, the Dutch parliament also unanimously passed a resolution on the apology and compensation to be provided for „comfort women.‟ The Canadian House of Commons (lower house) adopted a resolution demanding acknowledgement of the misdeeds committed by the Japanese armed forces, an official and honest apology to the victims, proper education of the next generations about war crimes, and reinsertion of the omitted parts on military sexual slavery into Japanese history textbooks. The EU also adopted a resolution about the „comfort women‟ issue with demands similar to the ones mentioned above. It is undoubtedly a positive development that the „comfort women‟ issue attracts increasing international attention. However, we still need to find a way to resolve the „comfort women‟ issue, not so much by external encouragement and pressure but through the active participation of the parties involved. Some might say that it already occurred several times that the parties involved held talks with the aim of reaching reconciliation. On the one hand, national leaders and

23 Herald Tribune. 8th.Jan.2009. Copyright ⓒ 2009 by the Asiatic Research Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this working paper may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Institute. government officials take a principal role in demanding justice or seeking reconciliation. On the other hand, ordinary citizens also seek reconciliation or try to achieve peaceful coexistence with the other side. However, neither the former nor the latter approach considered responsible citizens as an actor in inherited responsibility. Even if we acknowledge the role of national leaders in reshaping historical reconciliation through inherited responsibility, it would be even more important to realize that civic responsibility should be a basis to persuade fellow citizens to participate actively in assuming inherited responsibility. Furthermore, responsible citizens of a perpetrating country should call upon their government to apologize to victims and compensate them, while responsible citizens in a victimized country should not only consider the fate of the victims but also reflect on their own history and contemplate whether there were similar injustices committed in their own land. If it was civic responsibility to make citizens participate in a deliberative stance voluntarily to resolve historical wrongdoings, it is reciprocal non-domination that is conducive to regulate differences in opinion and power status between a victimized and a perpetrating party. Moreover, deliberation coordinated by reciprocal non-domination will become a future-oriented conflict-regulating mechanism through which a present conflict is not only resolved but citizens who are not directly related to this conflict also willingly join the deliberation process in order to prevent history from repeating itself. By understanding the other side as such and at the same time assuming that we also might find ourselves in the position of either the victim or the wrongdoer, we can bring about a salutary covenant for the future. We believe that civic responsibility based on reciprocal non-domination will restore not only a distorted relationship between victims and wrongdoers but also humanity itself.

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