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A Tale of Two Electorates

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A Tale of Two Electorates Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 | May 2010 1 A tale Summary The prospecT of a ‘hung a small minority of voters by Parliament’ has created a geographical accident – voters of two widespread impression of the in marginal seats have a more 2010 General Election as a tightly- genuine choice of local candidates contested three-horse race. Yet, with a realistic chance of winning, electorates: even before the votes are counted, and exert much greater influence it is evident that the outcome over the overall outcome of the Why some voters are will hinge on the choices made general election. by voters in a small minority of more equal than others l Political parties reinforce political ‘marginal’ seats. The notion of inequality by directing their Stuart Wilks-Heeg the three main political parties campaigns at the most powerful running ‘national’ campaigns is, voters and neglecting safe seats. in truth, a misnomer. As the three In 2005, candidates contesting the political leaders criss-cross the three-way marginal of Falmouth country, and local candidates and and Camborne spent eight times party representatives approach more trying to win voters on the doorstep, by over local voters than their telephone or email, their efforts counterparts did in the ultra-safe are overwhelmingly directed Labour seat of Barnsley East and at the 10-15 per cent of Mexborough. seats in which the entire election will be won or l Voters also respond rationally lost. to the geographical biases in the electoral system and party In our second campaigning – turnout in 324 ultra Democratic Audit safe seats in 2005 averaged 57.4 election briefing, per cent, compared to 66.6 per cent we highlight that: in 51 ultra marginals. l At most general l The tendency for safe seats to elections, 50-75 become virtually ‘campaign free per cent of seats zones’ is most evident in Labour can be considered strongholds in Northern England ‘safe’ for one – the 10 seats in which combined or other of the candidate spend per elector was largest two parties lowest in 2005 were all safe Labour and are virtually seats in the North of England. certain not to change hands l There is an increasingly obvious without dramatic relationship between political swings in the vote. inequality and other forms of inequality. Almost two-thirds of l Despite voters being seats with turnouts below 50 per presented with a range cent in 2005 had ‘worklessness’ of choices on their ballot levels of 25 per cent of more. papers, the geographical l concentrations of Labour Initial data for the 2010 and Conservative support campaign confirms the render this semblance of continuation of these trends, party competition illusory with voters in key marginals 2-3 for the great majority of times more likely to receive any electors. form of contact from the political parties, and party leaders choosing l The electoral system overwhelmingly to visit marginal dramatically empowers seats on the campaign trail. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 | May 2010 2 A paradoxical election This briefing considers the The General Election campaign, broader implications of the electoral or perhaps more accurately the The 2010 general elecTion is system for the way in which opinion polls, has shifted the widely expected to produce election campaigns are run by terms of the debate dramatically. the closest result for well over parties, and experienced by voters. Following the sustained surge in a decade. Following a surge of It focuses on the four key issues of Liberal Democrat support shown support for the Liberal Democrats, how: in the polls, numerous projections the tightening of the opinion polls have highlighted the possibility l the distinction between safe and around a roughly 30/30/30 split for that the Labour Party could come marginal seats under ‘first-past- the three main parties suggests third, as measured by its share of the-post’ influences the campaign the UK may be facing the first the popular vote, but still secure strategies of the political parties; ‘hung parliament’ since 1974. Yet, more seats in the Commons than while the emergence of a genuine l individual electors’ experience any other party. Meanwhile, a three-party contest has generated of an election campaign varies handful of polls have suggested substantial media interest, both according to where they live; that it is even possible that the the campaign itself, and the likely l voters in different areas respond Liberal Democrats could have the election outcome, serve to highlight to such variations in campaigning, highest share of the votes cast, two enormous paradoxes about as measured by turnout; yet come a distant third in seats this impression of a closely-fought, in Parliament. Just how could the three-way contest: l inequalities in voter power relate electoral system produce such an to wider patterns of socio-economic ❶ The intense election campaign outcome, recently described in one inequality in Great Britain. 3 which dominates national media Sunday newspaper as ‘grotesque’? interest is, in reality, being played The causes are complex, but are out across a minority of the The limitations of first- essentially rooted in the interaction constituencies which will return past-the-post between the electoral system and MPs, and is barely discernable in the socio-geography of support for most other constituency contests. long before The 2010 General the main three parties. Election campaign was officially Under FPTP, each elector is ❷ If opinion poll-based projections announced, there was general entitled to cast a single vote for one prove correct, the closest three-way agreement that the Conservatives of the candidates standing in the election split in any election since would need to win at least 40 per constituency in which they live, 1983 risks producing a result so cent of the popular vote in order with the winning candidate elected disproportional that it will seriously to secure a small majority in the on a simple plurality of the votes undermine the House of Commons’ House of Commons. By contrast, cast. Each of the three main parties claims to democratic legitimacy. most experts predicted that a vote contests every seat in Great Britain, share of around 35 per cent for At the root of both these while further electoral competition Labour could be sufficient to return paradoxes is the fundamental is provided in Wales by Plaid a Labour majority. In the run-up problem of how the electoral system Cymru, in Scotland by the Scottish to the election, few mainstream used for UK General Elections National Party and, in a substantial political commentators took issue renders votes unequal. The notion number of seats across Great with how the electoral system of the equality of the ballot is one of Britain, by the Green Party, the UK appeared to provide Labour the most fundamental and widely- Independence Party and others. accepted democratic principles.1 with such in-built advantage. To In the UK, as in all modern supporters of first-past-the-post, However, this semblance of party democracies, each elector is the structural bias in the electoral competition is largely illusory. In entitled to a single vote, regardless system is essentially part and reality, geographical concentrations of their income or status. Yet, while parcel of how the pendulum swings of Labour and Conservative support 2 UK electors notionally cast their between the two main parties. render the outcome of anywhere votes as equals, the way in which between half and two-thirds of votes are counted under ‘first-past- local constituency contests easy to 2 The electoral system has worked to the predict in advance. At most General the-post’ (FPTP) elections serves to advantage of Labour since 1997, while the produce the very opposite effect. Conservatives had been the clear beneficiaries in Elections, the great bulk of seats other periods, most notably the 1950s and 1980s. are retained by the incumbent, Prior to the ‘Lib Dem surge’, the Conservatives 1 See, for example, Inter-Parliamentary Union, could reasonably assume that the bias in the 3 Will Hutton, ‘A grotesque voting system that Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, system would swing back their way, particularly if makes for an unfair Britain’, The Observer, 25 April (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union). they could overturn Labour’s majority in 2010. 2010. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 | May 2010 3 while the outcome of the election Table 1: Spread of Parliamentary Seats by Marginality after the is determined almost entirely by 2005 General Election (Great Britain) any shifts in the patterns of voting in a handful of seats where party Category Size of majority No. of seats % of seats competition is most intense. Ultra safe 20% plus 281 44.7 Very safe 15-20% 92 14.6 Electoral deserts and Fairly safe 10-15% 88 14.0 Fairly marginal 5-10% 80 12.7 safe seats Ultra marginal 0-5% 87 13.9 Total 628 100 The labour voTe is heavily Source: Data derived from Pippa Norris’ British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005, release concentrated in densely-populated 1.3: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm urban areas with high majorities but low turnouts. It is largely as a regions in which particular parties ‘safe seats’, moreover, a sizeable result of the specific concentration have little or no parliamentary proportion can be described as of safe Labour seats in its representation, despite receiving ‘ultra-safe’, by virtue of MPs traditional strongholds that it would a significant proportion of the securing majorities of 20 per cent be notionally possible for Labour to votes cast. Such regions tend to or above.
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