Democratic Audit General Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 1

A tale Summary The prospect of a ‘hung a small minority of voters by Parliament’ has created a geographical accident – voters of two widespread impression of the in marginal seats have a more 2010 as a tightly- genuine choice of local candidates contested three-horse race. Yet, with a realistic chance of winning, electorates: even before the votes are counted, and exert much greater influence it is evident that the outcome over the overall outcome of the Why some voters are will hinge on the choices made general election. by voters in a small minority of more equal than others l Political parties reinforce political ‘marginal’ seats. The notion of inequality by directing their Stuart Wilks-Heeg the three main political parties campaigns at the most powerful running ‘national’ campaigns is, voters and neglecting safe seats. in truth, a misnomer. As the three In 2005, candidates contesting the political leaders criss-cross the three-way marginal of Falmouth country, and local candidates and and Camborne spent eight times party representatives approach more trying to win voters on the doorstep, by over local voters than their telephone or email, their efforts counterparts did in the ultra-safe are overwhelmingly directed Labour seat of Barnsley East and at the 10-15 per cent of Mexborough. seats in which the entire election will be won or l Voters also respond rationally lost. to the geographical biases in the and party In our second campaigning – turnout in 324 ultra Democratic Audit safe seats in 2005 averaged 57.4 election briefing, per cent, compared to 66.6 per cent we highlight that: in 51 ultra marginals. l At most general l The tendency for safe seats to , 50-75 become virtually ‘campaign free per cent of seats zones’ is most evident in Labour can be considered strongholds in ‘safe’ for one – the 10 seats in which combined or other of the candidate spend per elector was largest two parties lowest in 2005 were all safe Labour and are virtually seats in the North of England. certain not to change hands l There is an increasingly obvious without dramatic relationship between political swings in the vote. inequality and other forms of inequality. Almost two-thirds of l Despite voters being seats with turnouts below 50 per presented with a range cent in 2005 had ‘worklessness’ of choices on their ballot levels of 25 per cent of more. papers, the geographical l concentrations of Labour Initial data for the 2010 and Conservative support campaign confirms the render this semblance of continuation of these trends, party competition illusory with voters in key marginals 2-3 for the great majority of times more likely to receive any electors. form of contact from the political parties, and party leaders choosing l The electoral system overwhelmingly to visit marginal dramatically empowers seats on the campaign trail. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 2

A paradoxical election This briefing considers the The General Election campaign, broader implications of the electoral or perhaps more accurately the The 2010 General Election is system for the way in which opinion polls, has shifted the widely expected to produce election campaigns are run by terms of the debate dramatically. the closest result for well over parties, and experienced by voters. Following the sustained surge in a decade. Following a surge of It focuses on the four key issues of Liberal Democrat support shown support for the Liberal Democrats, how: in the polls, numerous projections the tightening of the opinion polls have highlighted the possibility l the distinction between safe and around a roughly 30/30/30 split for that the Labour Party could come marginal seats under ‘first-past- the three main parties suggests third, as measured by its share of the-post’ influences the campaign the UK may be facing the first the popular vote, but still secure strategies of the political parties; ‘hung parliament’ since 1974. Yet, more seats in the Commons than while the emergence of a genuine l individual electors’ experience any other party. Meanwhile, a three-party contest has generated of an election campaign varies handful of polls have suggested substantial media interest, both according to where they live; that it is even possible that the the campaign itself, and the likely l voters in different areas respond Liberal Democrats could have the election outcome, serve to highlight to such variations in campaigning, highest share of the votes cast, two enormous paradoxes about as measured by turnout; yet come a distant third in seats this impression of a closely-fought, in Parliament. Just how could the three-way contest: l inequalities in voter power relate electoral system produce such an to wider patterns of socio-economic ❶ The intense election campaign outcome, recently described in one inequality in Great Britain. 3 which dominates national media Sunday newspaper as ‘grotesque’? interest is, in reality, being played The causes are complex, but are out across a minority of the The limitations of first- essentially rooted in the interaction constituencies which will return past-the-post between the electoral system and MPs, and is barely discernable in the socio-geography of support for most other constituency contests. Long before the 2010 General the main three parties. Election campaign was officially Under FPTP, each elector is ❷ If -based projections announced, there was general entitled to cast a single vote for one prove correct, the closest three-way agreement that the Conservatives of the candidates standing in the election split in any election since would need to win at least 40 per constituency in which they live, 1983 risks producing a result so cent of the popular vote in order with the winning candidate elected disproportional that it will seriously to secure a small majority in the on a simple plurality of the votes undermine the House of Commons’ House of Commons. By contrast, cast. Each of the three main parties claims to democratic legitimacy. most experts predicted that a vote contests every seat in Great Britain, share of around 35 per cent for At the root of both these while further Labour could be sufficient to return paradoxes is the fundamental is provided in Wales by Plaid a Labour majority. In the run-up problem of how the electoral system Cymru, in Scotland by the Scottish to the election, few mainstream used for UK General Elections National Party and, in a substantial political commentators took issue renders votes unequal. The notion number of seats across Great with how the electoral system of the equality of the ballot is one of Britain, by the Green Party, the UK appeared to provide Labour the most fundamental and widely- Independence Party and others. accepted democratic principles.1 with such in-built advantage. To In the UK, as in all modern supporters of first-past-the-post, However, this semblance of party democracies, each elector is the structural bias in the electoral competition is largely illusory. In entitled to a single vote, regardless system is essentially part and reality, geographical concentrations of their income or status. Yet, while parcel of how the pendulum swings of Labour and Conservative support 2 UK electors notionally cast their between the two main parties. render the outcome of anywhere votes as equals, the way in which between half and two-thirds of votes are counted under ‘first-past- local constituency contests easy to 2 The electoral system has worked to the predict in advance. At most General the-post’ (FPTP) elections serves to advantage of Labour since 1997, while the produce the very opposite effect. Conservatives had been the clear beneficiaries in Elections, the great bulk of seats other periods, most notably the 1950s and 1980s. are retained by the incumbent, Prior to the ‘Lib Dem surge’, the Conservatives 1 See, for example, Inter-Parliamentary Union, could reasonably assume that the bias in the 3 Will Hutton, ‘A grotesque system that Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, system would back their way, particularly if makes for an unfair Britain’, The Observer, 25 April (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union). they could overturn Labour’s majority in 2010. 2010. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 3

while the outcome of the election Table 1: Spread of Parliamentary Seats by Marginality after the is determined almost entirely by 2005 General Election (Great Britain) any shifts in the patterns of voting in a handful of seats where party Category Size of majority No. of seats % of seats competition is most intense. Ultra safe 20% plus 281 44.7 Very safe 15-20% 92 14.6 Electoral deserts and Fairly safe 10-15% 88 14.0 Fairly marginal 5-10% 80 12.7 safe seats Ultra marginal 0-5% 87 13.9 Total 628 100 The Labour vote is heavily Source: Data derived from Pippa Norris’ British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005, release concentrated in densely-populated 1.3: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm urban areas with high majorities but low turnouts. It is largely as a regions in which particular parties ‘safe seats’, moreover, a sizeable result of the specific concentration have little or no parliamentary proportion can be described as of safe Labour seats in its representation, despite receiving ‘ultra-safe’, by virtue of MPs traditional strongholds that it would a significant proportion of the securing majorities of 20 per cent be notionally possible for Labour to votes cast. Such regions tend to or above. As table 1 shows, a total retain as many as 262 seats (40 per be dominated by large clusters of of 281 constituencies (45 per cent cent of the total) on a share of the either Labour or Conservative seats. of all seats) fell into this category vote as low as 27 per cent. While after the 2005 General Election, A glance at any colour-coded the Conservatives also benefit the great majority of which were electoral map of Britain will confirm from having a significant number the 182 ‘ultra safe’ seats in which this picture. Huge stretches of of ‘safe’ seats, albeit significantly Labour MPs were returned. As blue dominate much of the South fewer than Labour, their votes tend table 2 shows, these 182 seats and East of England, while great to accumulate in seats with high represented just over half (51.3 per swathes of red dominate the former turnouts and larger electorates. cent) of those won by the party in industrial heartlands of Northern 2005. They also comprised 29 per Meanwhile, the position of the England, parts of the Midlands, cent of all constituencies in Great Liberal Democrats is almost the South Wales and central Scotland. Britain. direct inverse of the other two main The only other obvious additions parties. With only a handful of to the colour scheme are streaks However, the possession of ‘safe’ seats to their name, and their of yellow, mostly towards the a safe seat is by no means a electoral support spread relatively periphery, notably the far South unique privilege of Labour MPs. evenly across Great Britain, a West of England, West Wales and As table 2 also shows, 84 of the small drop in Liberal Democrat the Northern reaches of Scotland. 197 Conservative MPs (43 per support could easily halve the Comparing such maps over a cent) elected to the 2005-10 party’s current Parliamentary period of several general elections Parliament occupied ‘ultra safe’ representation of 63 seats, while it would reveal remarkably little seats. Moreover, if we combine would take an enormous increase change in the geography of party the categories of ‘ultra safe’ and in the Liberal Democrat vote to control. ‘very safe’, then table 2 reveals double the party’s share of MPs. that almost two-thirds of both The figures for the ratio of votes This remarkably static electoral Labour and Conservative MPs to seats for each party in 2005 geography is underpinned by the elected in 2005 represented seats say it all: an average 26,908 votes phenomenon of the ‘safe seat’. At with majorities of at least 15 per were required to return a Labour the 2001 General Election, 506 of cent. Just 20 Liberal Democrat MP, compared to 44,335 for the the 641 MPs elected to represent MPs elected in 2005, a third of the Conservatives and 96,539 for the constituencies in Great Britain party’s total, enjoyed this notional Liberal Democrats.4 (79 per cent) were returned with ‘job security’. Conversely, 47 per majorities of 10 per cent or more. These patterns of electoral cent of Liberal Democrat victories The pattern was very similar support and their implications in 2005 were in seats which were in 2005, when 461 of the 628 for party representation in the subsequently defined as ‘ultra’ or parliamentary constituencies across Commons have a propensity to ‘fairly’ marginal, approximately England, Scotland and Wales create ‘electoral deserts’ across double the proportion of Labour (73 per cent) returned MPs with large parts of Great Britain – entire (24 per cent) and Conservative (23 majorities on this scale. 4 C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, British Electoral per cent) seats which fell into this Facts (: Total Politics, 2010), p.65. Within this broad descriptor of category. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 4

Table 2: Distribution of seats by party and by categories of marginality, post-2005 (Great Britain) Implications for party

Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat strategy No. % No. % No. % The three main political parties Ultra safe 182 51.3 84 42.6 11 17.7 have adopted distinct electoral Very safe 40 11.3 40 20.3 9 14.5 strategies in light of their particular Fairly safe 45 12.7 28 14.2 12 19.4 spread of safe and marginal Fairly marginal 47 13.2 17 8.6 16 25.8 Ultra marginal 41 11.5 28 14.2 12 22.6 seats and whether they are in Total 355 100 197 100 62 100 government or opposition. Clearly, Source: Data derived from Pippa Norris’ British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005, release for Labour as the incumbent in 1.3: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm 2001, 2005 and now in 2010, it has been rational to focus on defending as many of its marginal seats as Of course, this distinction of polling day. With the outcome of possible, while assuming that between safe and marginals seats so many local contests a virtually it will hold safe seats with little is by no means set in stone. While foregone conclusion, the result of difficulty. For the Conservative safe seats rarely become marginals the General Election as a whole will Party, the rational strategy is to overnight, individual seats may therefore hinge on the votes cast by make much the same assumption move from being fairly marginal electors in a far smaller number of in relation to its safe seats and to to being very safe, or vice versa, seats, where the outcome is far from mount as strong a campaign as over a period of several elections. certain – in particular, the ‘ultra possible to win the key marginal Shifts can occasionally be more marginals’. seats it needs to secure a majority. dramatic, such as when there are Voters in key marginal seats are Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats profound changes in the political likely to share this sense that their face a quite different challenge. landscape. When Labour won individual votes will be crucial With few obvious concentrations a ‘landslide’ victory in 1997, a in determining the outcome of of electoral support, and with less surprising numbers of previously the election. These voters will financial resource at their disposal, safe seats changed hands, and have been heavily targeted by the Liberal Democrats must go Conservative Parliamentary the political parties, not only in to greater lengths to defend representation was halved to 165 the period since the election was their existing seats, and face a seats. Labour managed to retain a announced, but also in the weeks substantial uphill battle to make remarkable number of previously and months leading up to the any additional gains. safe Conservative seats through election. Meanwhile, millions of to 2005. However, landmark electors across the great majority As a result of the distinctive elections in which voting shares of seats which are classified as strategies employed by the political shift dramatically from the previous ‘safe’ will have a radically different parties, the great majority of voters, contest are sometimes more notable experience of the election. Many even those in marginal seats, will for the proportion of seats which such constituencies will appear rarely have the opportunity of they leave in the hands of the same almost as ‘campaign free zones’, choosing between three candidates party. When Labour’s share of the particularly when contrasted to with a realistic chance of being vote fell to 28.3 per cent in 1983, a the frenetic campaigning taking elected. Aside from the two fall of almost 10 percentage points place in marginal seats. In short, dozen or so genuine ‘three-way compared to 1979, a total of 209 a general election is really a tale marginals’, and a handful of seats Labour MPs were still returned – of two electorates. To misquote in which the Welsh and Scottish only 60 fewer than at the previous George Orwell: ‘all voters are Nationalists have substantial levels election. equal, but some are more equal of support, the vast majority of marginal seats fall into one of three Even in the wake of the expenses than others’. distinct types of battlegrounds. scandal, the surge in Liberal Thus, the typical marginal will Democrat support, and a degree of involve a head-to-head contest unpredictability added by boundary between either: the Conservatives changes, the outcome of the and Labour; the Conservatives and majority of individual constituency the Liberal Democrats; or Labour contests at the 2010 General and the Liberal Democrats. Election can be predicted with relative certainty well in advance Political parties have become Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 5

increasingly sophisticated in the – as a tiny sub-section of the voters of Sheffield Brightside and way in which they target their electorate becomes defined as the Hillsborough, whose voter power efforts on key marginal seats. As ‘kingmakers’, election campaigns is calculated as being equivalent to party strategists have come to become increasingly ‘uneven’, with 0.002 of a vote.8 focus on the marginals, which tend turnouts holding up in marginal While the political parties to be geographically disparate, seats, but falling sharply in safe cannot simply target their efforts they have tended to define core ones. at 8,000 voters, there is no doubt socio-demographic categories With floating voters in key that electors in Arfon will have of ‘swing’ or ‘floating’ voters to marginals being targeted with received significantly more which they seek to enhance their growing intensity by the political attention from the political parties appeal. Based principally on parties, psephologists have than voters in Sheffield Brightside variables such as age, occupation, calculated the minimum number of during the 2010 campaign. The housing tenure and consumption voters who would need to change natural corollary of the targeting preferences, many of these their allegiance in order for the of marginal seats is that residents categories have become well election to produce a change of ultra-safe Conservative and known. The most notable are, of government. Over time, the Labour seats are the least likely to without doubt, ‘’ estimate of the number of electors be contacted by the political parties and ‘Mondeo Man’, key target who yield such remarkable power during the election campaign. As groups for Labour in 1997 as the has progressively been reduced. we noted in our 1999 Audit, if we party sought to expand its appeal At the 1997 General Election, take Bootle and Kensington as the beyond its traditional base of blue- it was estimated that around archetypal safe seats for Labour collar workers and welfare state 500,000 individual voters ‘could and the Conservatives respectively, professionals.5 Both ‘Worcester have swung a close election we can confidently surmise that, at Woman’ and ‘Mondeo Man’ were one way or the other’.6 In 2007, previous general elections: shorthand for the swing voters following the ‘General Election of ‘Middle England – the former ‘Bootle Man’ and ‘Kensington that never was’, the Electoral representing younger female Lady’ no doubt received their Reform Society estimated that the voters, typically home-owners and election addresses, courtesy of a difference between a Labour and working in white collar jobs and the free mail service, but they were not a Conservative victory could have latter their male counterparts, often solicited by direct mail, they were depended on how as few as 8,000 working in sales or similar roles. not telephoned six times during voters across 30-35 key marginals the campaign, their views were not cast their votes.7 Implications for the sought nor their fears assuaged, Much the same point is they were not invited to an intimate electorate made, using a different basis for question-and-answer session with a

It can be argued, quite legitimately, calculation, by the New Economics party leader. Such privileged status 9 that the targeting of categories Foundation’s ‘Voter Power Index’. was reserved for the ‘swing voters’. The Index, created by Nic Marks, of swing voters in key marginals If parties behave rationally assesses how much weight an constitutes entirely rational in targeting certain seats, then individual vote has, based on behaviour for political parties. Yet, the response of electors may be the total electorate for each while this amalgam of political argued to be equally rational. Since constituency, the marginality of sociology and marketing fascinates casting a ballot in an ultra-safe the seat and the probability of it political strategists and pundits, seat is highly unlikely to make changing hands. The index reveals rather limited consideration is any impact on the outcome of the that the most powerful voters in ever given to the implications contest, voters have significantly 2010 are those in Arfon, a tight for the electorate. Yet, important less motivation to turn out to vote marginal in North West Wales consequences stem from political compared to their counterparts in with 43,000 voters, who have the parties targeting their resources an ultra-marginal, where a single notional equivalent of 1.3 votes in an increasingly strategic way ballot could realistically make the each. At the other end of the scale, different between one candidate 5 In 2001, the Conservatives sought to target ranked 650th, are the 66,000 ‘Pebbledash People’ – middle-aged, white collar losing and another winning. As workers living in suburban areas. At the 2010 election, ‘’ has emerged as the key 6 S. Weir and D. Beetham, Political Power and 8 New Economics Foundation, Spoiled Ballot: target demographic – held to represent male Democratic Control in Britain (London: Routledge, why less than three per cent have a fair share of professional voters who live in new-build housing 1999) p.63. power in Britain (London: NEF). See also: http:// close to motorway junctions and whose work 7 , The Election that www.voterpower.org.uk/ requires that they travel extensively by car. Never Was (London: ERS). 9 S. Weir and D. Beetham, ibid, p.66. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 6

a consequence, turnout rises Figure 1: Turnout and proportion of seats changing hands at the significantly as seats become 2005 General Election, by marginality of seat (marginality based more marginal, with low turnouts on 2001 results) concentrated overwhelmingly among the ultra safe seats. As Turnout % Seats changing hands % figure 1 shows, this creates a very 70 clear pattern. Following the 2001 60 General Election, 324 seats were classified as ultra-safe. At the 50 2005 election, the average turnout in these seats was 57.4 per cent 40 and just 2.2 per cent of the seats changed hands. Both turnout and 30 the proportion of seats changing hands rose as seats became more 20 marginal, with the result that over

20 times as many seats changed 10 hands among the 51 ultra- marginals, compared to ultra-safe 0 seats, while turnout was almost 10 Ultra safe Very safe Fairly safe Fairly Ultra (n=324) (n=83) (n=99) marginal marginal percentage points higher in ultra (n=99) (n=51) marginal, compared to ultra safe, Source: Data derived from Pippa Norris’ British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005, release seats. 1.3: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm The response of the electorate to the parties’ strategic focus on Table 3: Natural Labour voters? Worcester Woman versus Bootle marginal seats therefore tends to Man reinforce the progressive targeting Worcester Woman Bootle Man of election campaigning. Since Likelihood of voting Labour (2005) 39% 30% safe seats are very unlikely to Likelihood of not voting (2005) 41% 60% change hands, with voters more Voter power – score and ranking (2010) 0.455 0.003 likely to stay at home rather (Rank: 129/650) (Rank: 644/650) Likelihood of being workless (2005) 13% 32% than vote against the incumbent, Sources: Derived from British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005; ONS Electoral Statistics parties may feel there are few (2005); New Economics Foundation (2010); NOMIS (2010). incentives to campaign. At the same time, the targeting of policy traditional strongholds. There is cent), it did so in a contest with and campaigning towards median also some evidence to suggest a 64 per cent turnout, based on and swing voters creates obvious that levels of electoral registration an electorate with a notional 92 ironies. For instance, it can be have fallen quite sharply in areas per cent registration rate. The argued that, by 2005, ‘Worcester which have conventionally been net result, as is shown in table 3, 10 Woman’ had become a more considered ‘safe Labour’. At the was that the likelihood of ‘Bootle reliable Labour voter than ‘Bootle 2005 General Election, Bootle Man’ voting Labour was only 30 Man’; Labour’s total vote in Bootle returned the largest Labour vote per cent, compared to a 60 per in 2005 was numerically smaller in the country – 75 per cent of the cent probability that he would not votes cast. Yet, only an estimated than in Worcester: 19,000 compared be voting at all. Conversely, the 84 per cent of eligible Bootle voters to 30,000. probability of ‘Worcester Woman’ were registered in 2005, while the being a Labour voter in 2005 was How did Worcester come to turnout among those registered was 39 per cent, roughly equal to the have more Labour voters than just 48 per cent. Bootle? The core reason is that 41 per cent probability of her being traditional Labour voters in By contrast, while Labour a non-voter. Given that around Bootle have disengaged from the secured a much lower share of one-third of working age voters electoral process. Turnouts have the vote in Worcester (42 per in Bootle were without work in dropped dramatically since Labour 2005, compared to 13 per cent in 10 The Electoral Commission (2010) Completeness succeeded in winning office in and Accuracy of Electoral Registers in Great Britain Worcester, these contrasts are all 1997 – most obviously in Labour’s (London: The Electoral Commission). the more remarkable. Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 7

Elections and Act was that local candidate spending The price of votes: 2000 that national party spending had limited impact on electoral targeting campaign was capped. While national party outcomes. A cursory glance at the spending at the 2001 General aggregate figures might appear spending Election fell dramatically compared to confirm that this view was Election campaigns do not to 1997, this was largely due to the shared by the political parties. In come cheap, least of all heavily state of party finances rather than 2005, the collective sums spent by targeted ones. With the onset of the introduction of the cap – none Conservative, Labour and Liberal the media age, the parties began of the three main parties came Democrat candidates at the local to increase their spending on close to the imposed expenditure level amounted, in real terms, to election campaigns from 1964, limits. In 2005, national campaign about one-third of the combined but it was really after 1987 that spending began to rise again and, outlays of their predecessors in the sea change in the scale, focus by historical standards, recent 1945. and organisation of campaign general election campaigns have However, to draw conclusions operations occurred. The result remained expensive affairs despite from these aggregated national was that the political parties the caps on spending. In real terms, figures would entirely misrepresent became engaged in what is often the 1997, 2001 and 2005 General shifts in party strategy over recent described as a ‘spending arms Elections rank respectively as decades. As Ron Johnston and race’, culminating in the record the first, fourth and second most Charles Pattie have demonstrated, national spending levels at the expensive in the post-war period. local candidate spending has 1997 General Election – when the A key shift over the past six shifted as the parties have become three main parties spent in excess decades has been the eclipsing increasingly sophisticated in how of £80 million between them, in of local candidate spending by they target individual local seats, today’s prices.11 national campaign spending. resulting in growing variations General election campaign In 1945, spending by individual in local candidate expenditure.13 spending consists of two notionally candidates still constituted around Moreover, Johnston and Patttie have distinct elements, which are often 90 per cent of total election shown that local candidate spending difficult to separate in practice. expenditure. In real terms, the total is far from irrelevant in an era of First, there is the money spent by sum of candidate expenditure in media-led national campaigning. By local candidates at a constituency general elections has remained targeting expenditure at marginal level. This expenditure is based on relatively stable since 1945. seats which they are seeking to limits, originally introduced However, after 1959, the balance defend or to gain, political parties under the Corrupt and Illegal began to shift, quite dramatically, are able to increase their share of Practices Act 1883 as part of towards national spending directed the vote at a relatively low cost and, a wider set of reforms aimed by the political parties rather therefore, are acting in a highly at eliminating corruption and than by local candidates and their rational and strategic manner.14 malpractice from British elections. agents. During the period 1970- Candidate spending during the The system has been retained ever 83, the balance between the sum period of the election campaign is since and currently entitles each of national expenditure incurred far from the only means through candidate at a general election by parties and the total of local which parties seek to target their to spend up to £7,150 plus 5p per expenditure incurred by candidates resources at marginal seats. Indeed, Parliamentary elector in a borough/ remained broadly equal. But, much of what is defined as national burgh constituency or 7p per from 1987 onwards, national party campaign spending is, in fact, Parliamentary elector in a county spending began to grow sharply. directed at marginal seats. When constituency. By 1997, the ratio between local party leaders and other senior candidate spend and national party The second category of party figures criss-cross the country spend was 1:10, the exact reverse of campaign expenditure is the money during the election campaign, their the division of spending in 1945.12 spent by the parties nationally. This expenditure has grown As national campaign spending 13 R.J. Johnston and C.L. Pattie, ‘Where’s the difference? Decomposing the impact of local exponentially in the post-war grew and general elections election campaigns in Great Britain’, Electoral period and it was only after the became increasingly dominated Studies, 16 (2), 1997, pp.165-174. passage of the Political Parties, by national media coverage, the 14 R.J. Johnston and C.L. Pattie, ‘How much does consensus among most academics a vote cost? Incumbency and the impact of 11 S. Wilks-Heeg, Purity of Elections in the UK: campaign spending at English general elections’, Causes for Concern (York: Joseph Rowntree Reform 12 For further discussion, see Wilks-Heeg (2008), Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 18 Trust, 2008). op cit. (2), 2008 , pp. 129-152 Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 8

routes are carefully planned to take masterminded by its current Vice- just 8p per elector. More than in as many target seats as possible. Chair, Lord (Michael) Ashcroft.18 half of the total was spent by the In addition, the sites chosen for Labour incumbent, who opted to As such, candidate expenditure ‘national’ expenditure on billboard spend a mere 25 per cent of the by no means represents a measure posters will be carefully selected permitted maximum. Meanwhile, of the totality of a party’s focus according to each party’s strategic the candidates contesting the on an individual seat. However, focus on specific marginal seats, seat for the Conservatives and it provides an invaluable proxy as will the voters who receive the Liberal Democrats could have measure of the intensity of local telephone calls from ‘national’ mounted little more than tokenistic campaigning, which we can call centres set up by the political use to identify variations in the campaigns, spending less than parties. As we noted in our second extent to which voters in different £1000 each, respectively amounting full Audit of UK democracy, constituencies are being targeted to six and eight per cent of the published in 1999, the intensity by the political parties. In turn, we expenditure limit. with which national campaigns are likely to find that the patterns As an ultra safe Labour seat, are focused on a handful of local associated with local candidate Labour took 61 per cent of the vote contests, circumventing local spending are reinforced by other in Barnsley East in 2005, just over expenditure limits, pointed to forms of evidence, ranging from the twice the vote share of the other potentially serious issues of legality extent to which voters receive any two main parties combined. Yet, – these have not been resolved by form of contact from the political the introduction of caps on national the bulk of the electorate appeared parties to the constituencies which expenditure at general elections.15 to have been deeply under- party leaders chose to visit during whelmed by what must have been There is also growing evidence an election campaign. What, then, a lacklustre campaign; 51 per cent that the national parties have do these patterns of local campaign of voters did not vote at all. In ultra sought to direct resources to local spending reveal? safe seats, low levels of campaign parties in target seats in order spending and low voter turnout are to build the capacity for them to Poor odds on a one two sides of the same coin. mount a ‘long campaign’ between election periods. Secondary horse race By contrast, candidates in marginals spend significantly analysis of data compiled by As of 28th April 2010, bookmakers more campaigning to win the Johnston and Pattie from the Ladbrookes were offering odds of seat. Excluding constituencies Electoral Commission’s register 1/500 on Labour winning in a host in the more remote parts of of donations to political parties of individual constituency contests Scotland and Wales which have highlights the same pattern of from Barnsley East to Glasgow electorates of 55,000 or below, geographical targeting of donations North East. A successful £40 bet 16 the constituency with the highest to local party units. The practice on a Labour victory in one of candidate spend per elector at is most evident among donors to these seats would therefore result the 2005 General Election was local Conservative and Liberal in a yield of 8p. In other words, Falmouth and Camborne in Democrat parties. In the year Ladbrookes have come to the view Cornwall. In this tightly contested before the 2005 General Election, that electoral contests in the likes three-way marginal, won by the 71 per cent of donations to local of Barnsley East constitute a ‘one Conservative Associations and 63 horse race’. Liberal Democrats with a 34.9 per cent of local Liberal Democrat per cent share of the vote, the parties were directed to marginal The political parties have candidates from each of the three seats, compared to 38 per cent for reached much the same main parties spent at least 95 per Constituency Labour Parties.17 It conclusion. The parties spent less cent of the maximum permitted, is the Conservative Party, above campaigning in Barnsley East with UKIP also contesting the seat all, which has gone furthest and Mexborough at the 2005 and spending two-thirds of the in channelling money to local General Election than anywhere limit. The combined spending of parties, based on an approach in Britain. The constituency’s all nine candidates at the election electors had £5,128 spent on them was £46,361, equivalent to 65p per 15 S. Weir and D. Beetham, op cit, p.90. by the four candidates contesting elector. The electorate responded 16 R. L. Johnston and C.J. Pattie, ‘Funding local the seat in 2005, equivalent to parties in England and Wales: donations and accordingly, resulting in a 67.1 per constituency campaigns’ British Journal of Politics 18 Lord Ashcroft has attracted considerable cent turnout, significantly above the and International Relations, 9 (3), 2007, pp.365- controversy as a major donor to the Conservative average of 61 per cent in 2005. 395. Party via Bearwood Corporate Services, and has 17 S. Wilks-Heeg, op cit. non-domicile status for tax purposes. Clearly, these two constituencies Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 9

Table 4: Division of parliamentary constituencies in Great Britain by levels of candidate spending (total candidate spending per elector), 2005 General Election

Range of spend per elector Proportion of mean Number of seats Turnout % seats changing % seats not won % adults classified spend (%) hands by Lab/Con as workless 48p or more 150 plus 41 63.4 32.0 42.0 16.1 40-47p 125-149 101 63.9 21.0 25.0 14.5 24-39p 75-124 329 61.5 6.7 9.8 15.6 17-23p 51-74 119 58.2 0 0 18.0 16p or less 50 or less 37 54.3 0 0 21.8 Sources: Derived from British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005; Electoral Commission (2005); NOMIS (2010). mark two extremes ends of the competition. None of 156 seats 1.5 times the national average, one spectrum. Yet it is nonetheless changed hands, and every one of third of seats changed hands, with striking that, in monetary terms, the these seats returned an MP from 42 per cent of the seats being won voters of Falmouth and Camborne one of the two main parties (two- by candidates representing parties in 2005 appeared to be worth eight thirds were represented by Labour other than Labour or Conservative. times as much to the political after 2005, and one-third by the Of course, many of these patterns parties than the voters of Barnsley Conservatives). It is also significant are mutually reinforcing. Marginal East and Mexborough. Moreover, that rates of worklessness, as seats are obviously more likely the basic dichotomy between safe measured by the proportion of to change hands and, as a result, seats with minimal campaigning the working-age population in and low turnouts, and marginal receipt of a key social benefit, were parties spend more attempting to seats with vibrant campaigning and noticeably higher in these areas win or retain them than they do in higher turnouts, goes far beyond of low candidate spend in 2005, other seats. Moreover, many of the these two cases. particularly in the 37 seats with the seats in the top spending bracket lowest levels of spending. are three-way marginals, which Table 4 lists five categories of inevitably drives up candidate parliamentary contest based around Table 4 underscores how dynamic spending. However, the key point multiples of the average candidate party competition occurs in just is what these contrasts between spend per elector for seats in a handful of seats. Only in seats high and low spend areas tell us England, Scotland and Wales. where candidate spend per elector about the differential experience of The contrasts between the areas was 40p or above did turnout electors in different constituencies. of high and low spend are highly typically rise above the national apparent. At the 2005 General average of 61 per cent in 2005. Tables 5 and 6 provide summary Election, the average combined In the 41 seats where candidate data for the bottom 10 and top candidate spend per elector across spending per elector was at least 10 constituency contests in 2005, 628 parliamentary seats in GB was 32p. However, in 37 seats where Table 5: Bottom 10 constituency contests in 2005, ranked by candidate spending per elector was candidate spend per elector (Great Britain) 16p or below, i.e. half the national Name of constituency (2005) Cand. spend No. of registered Worklesness Turnout Winner average or less, average turnout per elector (£) electors (%) (%) 2005 was 54.3 per cent. Conversely, in 41 Barnsley East and 0.08 66,941 25.8 49.3 Lab Mexborough constituencies, combined spending Bolsover 0.10 67,568 20.6 57.3 Lab by candidates amounted to 48p or Houghton and Washington 0.10 67,089 21.7 51.7 Lab more per elector, i.e. one and a half East times the national average, with Eccles 0.11 69,006 21.3 50.2 Lab turnout averaging 63.4 per cent. Rother Valley 0.11 67,973 18.3 58.1 Lab Significantly, table 4 identifies St. Helens North 0.11 69,834 20.7 56.2 Lab 156 seats (25% of the total) in Halton 0.12 64,379 23.4 53.1 Lab which candidate spend per elector Doncaster Central 0.13 65,731 22.2 52.3 Lab was at 23p or below and in which North Durham 0.13 67,506 20.8 55.3 Lab no meaningful electoral contest Scunthorpe 0.13 62,669 20.2 52.1 Lab appeared to take place. Not only are candidate spend and turnouts Avearge/total 0.11 668,696 21.5 53.6 --- typically low in these areas, there Sources: Derived from British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005; ONS Electoral Statistics is also no real evidence of electoral (2005); Electoral Commission (2005); NOMIS (2010). Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 10

as ranked by candidate spend campaign resources back towards the broader pattern presented in per elector. Each group of 10 some of its previously safe seats. this briefing. constituencies were home to Based on media reporting and around 600,000 voters in 2005, The 2010 campaign party websites, we recorded 156 yet the political contrasts between place-specific visits by party leaders them could hardly be greater. All To what extent has the 2010 or other senior party figures to of the 10 constituencies with the election campaign followed the individual constituencies during lowest spend were won by Labour pattern established by other the period from 7-28 April 2010. in 2005, with turnouts averaging recent general elections? Data Of these, around two-thirds were 53.6 per cent. In the 10 seats with on candidate expenditure at the made by the three party leaders, all the highest spend, there is an 2010 General Election will not of whom visited at least 30 distinct almost even balance between the be available until some time after three main political parties, and the election. However, to provide localities each during this 21-day average turnout was 63.2 per cent. at least an interim answer to this period. While precise verification is question, Democratic Audit has difficult, several of these individual It is notable that, while levels gathered data from two other visits were clearly chosen of worklessness average 21.5 per sources as the campaign has because of the clustering of two cent in the seats with the lowest unfolded. or more adjacent marginal seats spend, this is not substantially constituencies – as is highlighted in First, we have been monitoring higher than in the areas with table 7 overleaf. high candidate spending. This national and local media reports surprising and perhaps counter- of the constituencies visited by Around one-third of these intuitive finding is part of an party leaders and other senior party localities have been visited by emerging trend. In several seats figures since the election campaign more than one senior party figure, where candidate spending is started. Second, we have conducted with approximately 35 of them high, Labour dominance has a small-scale internet survey of receiving high-profile visits from been challenged by the Welsh 200 voters across a geographical senior representatives of at least or Scottish Nationalists, by a spread of 160 constituencies in two different parties. The most rise in support for the Liberal Great Britain to gauge the extent visited location on the campaign Democrats, or both. While such and forms of contact which voters trail in the period to 28 April was cases remain relatively isolated in a diverse range of constituencies Brighton, home to two Labour- among safe Labour seats, they do have had from political parties – held seats which are key targets create a situation in which Labour both during the campaign, and in for the Liberal Democrats and the is forced to respond in some the three months prior to it. Our full Conservatives respectively. While localities by mounting a more analysis of the data from these two marginal and target seats within vigorous campaign. As the Liberal sources will be reported after the relatively easy reach of London Democrats and others begin to election campaign has concluded. also feature significantly among make in-roads on seats in Labour However, it is possible to report the places visited by two or more heartlands, Labour will therefore some striking initial findings from senior party figures, the localities be increasingly forced to divert our research, all of which underline which party leaders have travelled

Table 6: Top 10 constituency contests in 2005, ranked by candidate spend per elector (Great Britain, excluding remote seats with electorates of less than 55,000)

Name of constituency Cand. spend per No. of registered Worklesness (%) Turnout (%) Winner 2005 elector (£) electors Falmouth and Camborne 0.65 71,509 17.3 67.1 LD Cardiff Central 0.60 61,001 13.4 59.2 LD Clwyd West 0.60 55,642 18.7 64 Con Preseli Pembrokeshire 0.57 55,502 17.5 69.5 Con Sedgefield 0.57 66,666 21.0 62.2 Lab Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey 0.56 69,636 14.2 63.6 LD Southport 0.55 67,977 16.5 60.6 LD Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire 0.55 56,245 17.6 67.3 Lab Islington South and Finsbury 0.53 57,748 19.6 53.6 Lab South Thanet 0.53 63,436 18.3 65 Lab AVE/TOTAL 0.57 625,362 17.4 63.2 ---

Sources: Derived from British Parliamentary Constituency Database 1992-2005; ONS Electoral Statistics (2005); Electoral Commission (2005); NOMIS (2010). Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 11

Table 7: Frequent destinations on the campaign trail

Place No. of visits Marginal/target seat Incumbent Target seat for Brighton 3 x Labour; 1 x Conservative; Brighton Pavillion Labour Lib Dem (88) 1 x Lib Dem Brighton Kempton Labour Conservative (45) Hove Labour Conservative (10) Cardiff 2 x Lib Dem; 1 x Labour; Cardiff North Labour Conservative (22) 1 x Conservative Cardiff Central Lib Dem Labour (72) Swindon 1 x Conservative; 1 x Labour Swindon North Labour Conservative (60) Swindon South Labour Conservative (45) Southampton 2 x Lib Dem, 1 x Conservative Southampton Test Labour Lib Dem (57) Romsey and Southampton North Lib Dem (notional) Conservative (4) Reading 2 x Labour; 1 x Conservative Reading East Conservative Labour (16) Reading West Labour Conservative (107) Oxford 1 x Labour; 1 x Lib Dem Oxford East Labour Lib Dem (4) to have a remarkable geographical Table 8: Reported contact from the political parties during the spread. has visited first two weeks of the 2010 General Election campaign, and in the several Conservative target seats three months before the election campaign, by type of seat/contest in the North of England, including Type of seat/contest No. respondents Average contacts Average contacts Bolton North East and Bury North, (campaign) (pre-campaign) while has made visits LD-held marginals or LD top 50 target 14 10.4 6.4 to Liberal Democrat target seats Three-way marginals 14 10.4 5.8 as geographically dispersed as Safe Lib Dem 4 7.3 4.5 , Cornwall, Glasgow and Conservative targets (1-200) 33 6.9 2.8 Safe Labour 66 4.5 2.6 Newcastle. Conservative held-marginal 8 3.6 3.8 Our internet survey was Safe Conservative 48 2.4 0.9 designed to capture the extent of variation in the contacts which figures cited in table 8 demonstrate measured by voter power, voter voters receive from political that voter report far higher levels of turnout, or campaign spending parties in different types of safe contact from the political parties in per elector) suggest a correlation and marginal seat. The web-based marginal seats, particularly those with wider forms of socio-economic questionnaire was circulated via a targeted by the Liberal Democrats, inequality? range of personal and professional than they do in safe Labour and networks to voters across England, As a partial answer to this Conservative seats. This pattern Scotland and Wales. The survey question, figure 2, overleaf, maps in clearly apparent in both the was not designed to achieve a the relationship between voter periods before and after the election turnout and worklessness across socially and demographically campaign officially began. representative sample, but rather to all parliamentary constituencies gather data from a geographically in Great Britain in 2005. As the dispersed range of constituencies. The rise of political data show, there is a very clear Completed questionnaires were inequality relationship between the two gathered from a total of 202 variables. Turnouts of 70 per cent Through this briefing the issue respondents during the mid-point and above are heavily concentrated of the relationship between of the campaign from 20 to 22 in areas with lower levels of electoral competition and social April 2010, of which 187 were fully worklessness, and there is a very deprivation has been alluded to. complete. Responses were gathered clear tendency for turnout to fall It has been noted that safe Labour from constituencies in all English as worklessness rises. The great seats, in which turnouts are low, regions and from Scotland and majority of seats in which turnout campaign spending limited and Wales, although there was some was below 50 per cent in 2005 had party competition virtually absent, bias towards five English regions: levels of worklessness running at have levels of social deprivation, the North West, Greater London, 25 per cent or above. as measured by worklessness, the South East, Eastern and tend to be significantly above These findings should not and the Humber. average. To what extent does the surprise us; there is widespread While the data obtained should evidence presented in this briefing evidence that virtually all forms clearly be seen as indicative, the about political inequality (whether of civic and political engagement Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 12

Figure 2: Relationship between turnout and worklessness, seats, at least some of which may GB Parliamentary constituencies, 2005 well amount to ‘proxy’ politics, supported by the ‘cheque book’ Turnout % activism of large scale donors. By 90 contrast, in areas where either of the two major parties enjoys large 80 majorities, local parties are often 70 found to be withering on the vine – a phenomenon whose symptoms 60 become most obvious at election time. The broadcasting of live 50 television debates between party 40 leaders in 2010 does not alter the fundamental fact that the election 30 will be won or lost in marginal seats. The evidence we have been 20 able to gather about the geography 10 of the 2010 campaign clearly reinforces the patterns of inequality 0 which were apparent in 2005. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 There has been remarkable Worklessness % reluctance, not just among the main rise with socio-economic status.19 two political parties, to debate the However, growing evidence of Conclusion role of the electoral system as a a relationship between political Whether the 2010 General Election factor prompting low turnouts, or to inequality and other forms of produces the sort of outcome which discuss the wider implications of all inequality should very much is widely seen as democratically the political parties targeting their concern us. After the early 1990s, abhorrent remains to be seen, but efforts at a minority of seats. But Labour’s core electoral focus on the there can be little doubt that the this is no longer just a question of aspirations of middle-class voters debate about electoral reform in the political participation. That many of in marginal seats, together with the UK has reached a pivotal moment. the seats in which local democratic wider electoral dynamics described As that debate gathers pace, it is activism and engagement (whether in this paper, were significant crucial not to lose sight of some measured by campaigning, factors prompting increasing of the wider political and social spending or voter turnout) are numbers of voters in the most implications of the UK’s current lowest also suffer the highest levels deprived areas to disengage. The electoral system. of social deprivation is perhaps the greatest indictment of all against purchase which the poorest groups Evidence that turnouts and in society exercise over government our current electoral system. campaigning are depressed in Reversing the downward spiral of policy has almost inevitably safe seats, especially safe Labour declined as a consequence. The political and social inequality will seats, is undeniable – particularly be a key challenge facing the new absence of meaningful electoral when contrasts are drawn with the contests across a host of safe UK government. Policy-makers will marginals. There is also widespread fail to rise to the challenge if they Labour seats in 2010 will only serve evidence, and growing concern, to reinforce these trends. neglect the impact of the electoral regarding the manner in which system as a driver of both political political parties, often supported and socio-economic inequality. by individual or corporate donors, have sought to direct financial resources to the marginal seats in which the outcome of general elections is effectively determined. The net result is an increasingly 19 S. Wilks-Heeg and S. Clayton, Whose Town is polarised democratic geography. it Anyway? The State of Local Democracy in Two Vibrant local political activism is Northern Towns (York: Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 2006). generally restricted to a handful of Democratic Audit General Election Briefing, No. 2 |May 2010 13

About the author About Democratic Audit Acknowledgements

Dr. Stuart Wilks-Heeg is Executive Democratic Audit is an The author would like to convey particular thanks to Steve Ackers for his assistance with data Director of Democratic Audit and independent research organisation analysis, Pete Campbell for helping to design the Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at that carries out research into web-based survey questionnaire, and Dave Ellis the University of Liverpool. He is the quality of democracy in the for monitoring the movements of party leaders and other senior party representatives during the author of Purity of Elections in UK. The Audit’s methodology for the campaign. Thanks also to Stuart Weir, David the UK: Causes for Concern (York: auditing and assessing democracy Beetham and Dave Ellis for their comments on a draft of this briefing. Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, has won international acclaim. Design by Tony Garrett 2008). It is widely copied across the world, having been employed in at Any queries about this briefing may least 21 nations by governments, be directed to Stuart Wilks-Heeg: international bodies such as the [email protected] UNDP and the Open Society Institute, universities and research institutes. Democratic Audit has published three major successive democratic audits of the UK, using the methodology, and many path-breaking reports on specific aspects of the UK’s political life from a clearly defined democratic perspective. Democratic Audit is a not-for- profit company, grant funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Registered in England and Wales; company no. 6145962.

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