Democracy and Elections

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Democracy and Elections 10 Democracy and Elections Key Terms Boundaries Commission (p. 406) A body that recommends changes to election boundaries. By-election (p. 422) A district-level election held between general elections. Campaign Finance regulations (p. 409) Laws that govern political fundraising and/or spending. Disclosure (p. 411) Revealing otherwise private information, such as campaign expenses. Election Platform (p. 414) A list of political pledges announced before or during an election campaign. Gerrymandering (p. 406) The purposeful manipulation of electoral districts to maximize one party’s chances of winning. GOTV (p. 420) Efforts to mobilize supporters to vote, such as telephone reminders. Government Subsidy (p. 410) Public funds used to support an individual, group, or cause. Incumbent (p. 421) An elected official who currently represents an electoral district. Leader’s tour (p. 414) A visit of various electoral districts by the party leader and an entourage of staffers and journalists. Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) System (p. 404) An electoral system that combines geographic and partisan representation by providing extra seats to parties whose share of seats is lower than their share of the popular vote. Party Nomination (p. 420) An internal contest to decide who should represent a party locally in an upcoming election. Inside Canadian Politics © Oxford University Press Canada, 2016 Permanent Campaign (p. 413) The practice of electioneering outside of an election period, especially by leveraging government resources. Plebiscite (p. 422) A citizen vote held to inform a decision by a representative body. Political Contribution (p. 410) Donations to a political candidate, group, or cause. Recall (p. 423) Legislated process by which electors of a given district may petition for a by-election. Redistribution (p. 405) The formal process used to periodically adjust electoral boundaries. Referendum (p. 422) A citizen vote whose outcome is binding on legislators. Safe seat (p. 401) An electoral district in which the incumbent party is highly likely to be re-elected. Seats triage (p. 421) The identification of swing ridings where campaign resources should be concentrated. Single-member Plurality ( SMP) (p. 394) An electoral system whereby the winner of a district needs just one vote more than the number amassed by the runner-up. Spending Limits (p. 411) Legal restrictions on how much money can be spent in a campaign. Swing district (401) A riding or constituency where the election outcome is uncertain. Suffrage (p. 388) The right to vote in an election. Third Parties (p. 410) The Elections Canada term for interest groups. Voter’s Paradox (p. 401) The situation facing a voter whose single ballot is unlikely to influence the outcome of the election, making the costs of voting greater than the potential benefits. Voter Turnout (p. 417) The proportion of eligible electors who cast ballots in an election. Writ of Election (p. 413) A legal document dissolving a legislature and marking the official start of an election campaign. Review Questions Multiple Choice Questions 1. What year did Non-aboriginal women gain the right to vote in Canada? a) 1918 b) 1920 c) 1922 d) 1960 Inside Canadian Politics © Oxford University Press Canada, 2016 2. Which of the following best describes a “candidate’s representative,” or a person who observes the counting of the ballots? a) Polling agent b) Returning officer c) Scrutineer d) Electoral officer 3. Which of the following statements is NOT true regarding the Mixed Member Proportional system? a) It is practiced in New Zealand. b) It is only based on a proportional electoral system. c) It is based on both proportional and plurality electoral systems. d) Its district size includes both single and multi-members. 4. Which of the following provinces attempted to reform the electoral system to a Mixed Member Proportional system in 2007? a) Quebec b) Manitoba c) New Brunswick d) Ontario 5. What is the rule which states that no province shall have fewer seats than it did in 1985 known as? a) The Senate floor rule b) The Grandfather floor rule c) The Constitutional rule d) The representation rule 6. Canada’s political culture tilts more toward equality, while the American political culture tilts more toward freedom. True or False? a) True b) False 7. What is the limit that corporations and unions can donate to political parties? a) $1500 b) $1000 c) Unlimited d) They are not permitted to donate to political parties. 8. What is the minimum number of campaigning days for an official campaign at the federal level? a) 30 b) 36 c) 50 d) 100 Inside Canadian Politics © Oxford University Press Canada, 2016 9. According to the chapter, which of the following groups are most likely to vote in Canadian elections? a) Young people b) People with lower income c) New Canadians d) Senior citizens 10. Which of the following referendums was rejected? a) The 1980 referendum on Sovereignty Association in Quebec b) The 1995 referendum on sovereignty in Quebec c) British Columbia’s referendum on Single Transferable Vote ( STV) d) All of the above Discussion Questions 1. Why is voter turnout in Canadian Elections generally low? 2. How do political parties generate revenue? Further Resources Websites Fair Elections Act http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2014_12/page-1.html This website provides a complete breakdown of all the provisions and amendments of the Fair Elections Act. Democracy Watch http://democracywatch.ca/about/ A national non-profit organization, Democracy Watch discusses and publishes material and information on government accountability, including information on a more transparent election, as well as information on the Fair Elections Act. Elections Canada ( Chief Electoral Officer) http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=abo&dir=ceo&document=index&lang=e This Elections Canada website focusses on the Chief Electoral Officer. Fair Voting BC http://fairvotingbc.com/ Inside Canadian Politics © Oxford University Press Canada, 2016 Since British Columbia had a referendum to change their electoral system; it is only fitting to manage a website that deals with more democratic reform options in British Columbia. Fair Vote Canada http://campaign2015.fairvote.ca/ This website offers a new perspective on changing the way we vote in Canada at the federal level. Electology http://electology.org/ Although this is not specifically based on a Canadian context, it does provide universal information on online voting and other electoral reform options. Electoral Systems http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/bp334-e.htm This is an excellent article from the Parliament of Canada that talks about the strengths and weaknesses of electoral systems. The Electoral System of Canada - http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=ces&document=index&lang=e This website provides a basic explanation of the electoral system practiced in Canada (FPTP), information on representation, pillars of democracy, transparency, accountability, and many other components of electoral democracy. Articles/Books I. Stewart, I ( 2009). Just One Vote: From Jim Walding’s Nomination to Constitutional Defeat (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2009). This book was mentioned in this chapter and examines the significance of “just one vote,” and the evolution and mechanisms associated with party nominations. L. Young and H. Jansen, eds, Money, Politics and Democracy: Canada’s Party Finance Reforms (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011). A well-researched book on the politics of public funding and political parties, Money, Politics and Democracy deals with party financing reforms and its correlation with democratic values in Canada. Inside Canadian Politics © Oxford University Press Canada, 2016 RSS Feeds RSS posts ( Fair Voting BC ) http://fairvotingbc.com/feed/ Answers to Review Questions Multiple Choice Questions 1. a (p. 390) 2. c (p. 391) 3. b (p. 399) 4. d (p. 404) 5. b (p. 405) 6. a (p. 409) 7. d (p. 410) 8. b (p. 413) 9. d (p. 419) 10. d (p. 424) Inside Canadian Politics © Oxford University Press Canada, 2016 .
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