THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY or GERMANY By DREW MJDDLETON THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY, INC. Publishers INDIANAPOLIS NEW YORK PREFACE THE intention of this book is to demonstrate that Germany is the most important single problem of American foreign pol- icy and that the fate of the world may rest on the direction which Germany takes. There are no easy answers to the internal problem in Ger- many or the struggle for Germany's future. One of the major detriments to clear political thinking in our time is the habit, which we have caught from the totalitarian, of thinking in terms of black and white. This book will not tell you whether Germany is "democratic" or "Fascist" or "Communist." Nor will it tell you conclusively the direction Germany will take in the future. It will, I hope, demonstrate the penalties of failure and the rewards of success in Germany. Ultimately, whether we succeed or fail in Germany depends on the peo- ple of the United States. What I have tried to do is tell how the struggle for Ger- many has been fought thus far and how I believe it will go in the future. My personal connection with Germany began on a Sep- tember afternoon in 1944 when, just after we had crossed a narrow bridge, a shell burst in the field adjoining the road. "Here we are in Germany," said the sergeant, "and they don't seem glad to see us!" From 1939 to 1945 as a war correspondent first for the As- sociated Press and then for the New Yorl^ Times I was at the receiving chef of Cermari nationalism. In France, Belgium, Hollanc), J^cuch North Africa and finally in Germany, I saw enough of war as the Germans fight it to inspire a deep loathing of any political system which converts men into the beasts I found them to be. But, as a Christian, I have never believed that an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is the solution of our problems. I was in Germany from May of 1945 until March of 1946. In May of that year I had the good fortune to be sent to the Soviet Union to study and report on another authoritarian system. Inevitably some of my impressions of Russia have found their place in this book. In April of 1948 I returned to Germany. I have worked there ever since as Chief Correspondent in Germany for the New York Times. But the views in this book are my own. Most of this book is based on my own findings in Germany and my work at three meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at Moscow and London in 1947 an^ at Par^ "* 1949. Where it has been necessary I have drawn figures from the official publications of the Office of Military Government (U. S.) such as Report 175 of the Information Services Divi- sion. I am indebted to various officials of both American and British Military Government and to numerous members of the the city government of Berlin and Parliamentary Council for the assistance they gave me in locating relevant material and revealing their own personal wishes. The struggle for Germany is emotional as well as mental. Many of the men, German, American, British and French, whom I interviewed in Germany, felt strongly on the subjects we discussed and in a number of cases held views diamct- rically opposed to mine. Yet I met with the greatest courtesy from everyone, from General Clay to Willy Agatz, the Com- munist leader in the Ruhr. Again, this book offers no solution. Basically it is an in- quiry into how far we have gone in our struggle for Germany and what lies before us. If in the end it offers a few sugges- tions to those who will continue the struggle, I will be satis- fied. DREW MlDDLETON Berlin August 24, 1949 THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY CHAPTER ONE O SOONER HAD THE CURTAIN fallen upon the final convulsions of a dying Germany in May of 1945 than it rose again upon the first act of a longer but equally important drama, the rebirth of Germany. No one knows what form the new Germany will take. But we know there will be a new Germany and that the question of whether it faces east or west is of vital importance to the world. States, like men, are conditioned by environment. Under- standing of the German problem is impossible without un- derstanding of the Germany of 1945-1949. Much of the non- sense talked about a German comeback is due to the fact that too many people think of the Germany of 1945 in the terms of the Germany of 1918. They have underestimated or dis- counted not only the physical destruction wrought upon Ger- many by five years of war but the cumulative effects of enor- mous casualties in two world conflicts, the psychological ef- fects upon the German people of war in Germany, on the ground and in the air sustained bombing, complete and ut- ter defeat four years after Germany had reached a pinnacle of power it had never before attained and, finally, occupation and partition. Germany will come back. But when the effects of war and defeat twice in a third of a century are weighed against the industry, virility and courage of the Germans, it is extremely ii 12 THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY doubtful that Germany will come back all the way. I do not think Germany will ever again achieve the pre-eminence in Europe and the power for evil she won in 1914 and 1939. This will be due first to her own exhaustion from two wars and second to a less parochial reason: the rise to a disputed world leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union, empires that dwarf Germany. Germany's future potential for evil or good will be as a makeweight in the contest between these powers, not as a decisive factor in itself. Returning to Germany and the German problem, let us refresh and perhaps appall ourselves with a view of Germany as she was in May of 1945 as ^ curtain rose on the latest act in the long life of the German tribes. For unless we have a clear view of the Germany in the hour of defeat, we cannot understand the Germany of today and tomorrow. Here was destruction and chaos in a degree never before known in the world. An intricate, highly organized society had been disrupted. The invasion of Germany from west and east, heralded in the west by prolonged and intensive bomb- ing, had brought about not only the complete defeat of the German armies but the ruin of a state. This we have forgot- ten. The Germans have not forgotten it, for there are few Germans living today who are not reminded of it every day of their lives. The destruction and disruption in which the Germans found themselves then are the primary reasons why the Germany of today differs so greatly from the Germany of 1922. There are those who, viewing the first faint stirrings of German nationalism in 1948, were quick to say, "We'll have it all over again. History repeats itself." How can history repeat itself under conditions so different? For whereas in 1918 the Western Allies had occupied only THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY 13 a narrow strip of territory in western Germany, and the physical structure and the forms of local government en- dured, albeit under great strain, all of Germany was occupied in 1945, the physical plant upon which the state was based was destroyed, damaged or at a standstill, and the processes of normal economic and political life had ceased to function. Germany no longer existed as a state. The Germany of that day was silent and broken. Allied planes flew low over the Ruhr. In the sunshine lay the huge plants that had fed the armies of the Kaiser and Adolf Hitler with guns and ammunition. Nothing moved on the ground. Locomotives and cars lay on their sides rusting in the sun. Great gaps had been rent in the factories so that from the air one could discern the torn and twisted machinery that lay within. Other plants had been burned out. Strangely, many of the tall factory chimneys remained. A wisp of smoke ap- peared from one or two. It was the only sign of life in that dead landscape. And when the airplane turned from its steady buzzing over the factories and flew over the areas where the workers had been housed, there were more acres of destruction. All that summer and for many months thereafter various Allied commissions poked and pried through the rubble of the German cities or pored over the reports kept by the Ger- mans on the extent of bomb damage. Meanwhile the casual traveler journeying through a land hammered by an almost incredible weight of bombs was impressed not only by the destruction done to industry, which was great, but by the manner in which bombing had disrupted communications, dispersed the population and deadened the resistance of a brave people. There is an argument that bombing, long-range strategic 14 THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY bombing on the pattern of the United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force in the second World War, cannot be a decisive weapon and that German industrial production rose steadily until 1944. This may be true if the result of strategic bombing is measured only by its effect on actual industrial production.