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Master's Degree Programme – Second Cycle (D.M. 270/2004) in Comparative International Relations at Ca' Foscari Universi

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Master's Degree Programme – Second Cycle (D.M. 270/2004) in Comparative International Relations at Ca' Foscari Universi 1 Master’s Degree programme – Second Cycle (D.M. 270/2004) In Comparative International Relations At Ca’ Foscari University of Venice Final Thesis THE TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN NORTH KOREA Supervisor Ch. Prof. Rosa Caroli Asst. Prof. Vincenza D’urso Graduand Paolo Pedrini Matriculation Number 827084 Academic Year 2015/2016 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduzione in lingua italiana INTRODUCTION 1. CHAPTER ONE 1.1. Introduction 1.2. North Korea’s mobile communication history in a nutshell 1.3. Why Orascom? 1.3.1. A silent divorce? 1.4. Domestic cellphone: Get involved! 1.5. Rate plans and top-up cards 1.6. Handsets and gizmos 1.7. What about foreigners? 1.8. Conclusions 2. CHAPTER TWO 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Black market breakdown 2.3. Deal with it! 2.4. Salaries in North Korea? 2.5. Smuggling into North Korea 2.6. The Jangmadang and grasshopper merchants 2.7. Making connection 2.7.1. Brokers 2.7.2. Calling the South 2.7.3. The surveillance 2.7.4. What happen if you get caught? 2.8. Conclusions 3 INTRODUZIONE IN LINGUA ITALIANA: Quando sfogliamo le notizie di cronaca, ci capita ciclicamente di leggere articoli sulla Corea del Nord: le follie legate al giovane dittatore Kim, i campi di prigionia, le minacce dei missili atomici e via dicendo. Ciò che invece non giunge attraverso i media è una chiara figura in grado di descrivere come realmente vivono i Nord Coreani, i vari strati che compongono la loro società, il loro stile di vita e le diverse attività che caratterizzano la loro quotidianità. Non è facile cercare di penetrare con i nostri occhi nel paese più inaccessibile e sconosciuto del mondo. E’ un po’ come cercare di descrivere una casa scrutando dal buco della serratura, senza però poterci entrare. Qualcosa si riesce a vedere, ma è difficile poter capire nel complesso che cosa ci sia veramente al suo interno. Tuttavia al giorno d’oggi fonti affidabili dalle quali trarre informazioni attendibili sono alla portata di click. Quei confini tanto sorvegliati celano molti segreti ancora, rendendo lo studio e la scoperta sempre più interessante e coinvolgente. La mia ricerca ha come obbiettivo quello di presentare e descrivere un elemento penetrato in Corea del Nord solo negli ultimi anni: la telecomunicazione mobile. La tesi esordisce analizzando la storia dell’introduzione del servizio di telefonia mobile ufficiale e i rapporti internazionali che hanno dato la possibilità a quest’ultimo di svilupparsi nel paese. Cercherà inoltre di dare una spiegazione alla scelta del regime di aver come provider del suo nuovo network una società Egiziana, e i motivi che spinsero quest’ultima a proporre il grande investimento al paese più imprevedibile del mondo. Egitto e Corea del Nord sono due paesi che hanno condiviso amicizie reciproche nel tempo, ma come vedremo questo non sarà di alcun aiuto al CEO della compagnia egiziana, che si imbatterà in non pochi problemi che ne mineranno i rapporti d’affari. In seguito analizzeremo come il network 4 realmente funzioni e quali sono le caratteristiche uniche che lo differenziano da quello degli altri paesi del mondo. Malgrado nelle moderne società digitare su uno smartphone caratterizzi la vita di tutti i giorni, scopriremo come nel paese dei Kim la possibilità di accedere a tale servizio sia un privilegio che solo pochi possono permettersi. Analizzeremo in che modo i Nord Coreani possono usufruire di tale benessere e di come effettivamente il possesso di un telefonino possa modificarne la posizione sociale. Nonostante la grande crescita e la vasta popolarità che la comunicazione mobile ha riscontrato nello stato Nord Coreano sin dalla sua introduzione, il possesso di un telefonino (o addirittura di uno smartphone) non conferisce tutte le libertà e capacità che un utente comune dovrebbe aspettarsi. Il regime di Kim mantiene la presa stretta sul suo popolo, sorvegliando le comunicazioni telefoniche allo scopo di identificare il circolo di informazioni sospette. Come si potrebbe supporre, i Nord Coreani tramite le linee telefoniche locali non hanno alcuna possibilità di comunicare con il mondo esterno e di ricevere informazioni da altre fonti che non siano quelle di regime. Un telefonino rimane così un semplice mezzo per comunicare solamente con amici o famigliari che vivono all’interno del confine. Viene utilizzato anche dai mercanti per scambiarsi in breve tempo indicazioni sul cambiamento dei prezzi nei mercati delle città. La comunicazione mobile, nonostante sia solamente nazionale, ha portato notevoli miglioramenti negli ultimi anni all’economia del paese. E’ probabile che sia proprio questo l’obbiettivo del regime di Kim: migliorare sviluppo e il welfare nel suo stato e allo stesso tempo costruire un ulteriore livello di sorveglianza, evitando però di svestirlo del titolo di “paese eremita”. Infatti, sono poche le figure che hanno la fortuna di aver accesso alla rete internazionale ed internet. Tra queste persone troviamo non solo le élite diplomatiche di regime e pochi professori universitari, ma anche quei viaggiatori che scelgono come meta turistica proprio la Corea del Nord. 5 Storicamente, viaggiare a Pyongyang significava dover lasciare alle autorità doganali qualsiasi tipo di dispositivo tecnologico che potesse comunicare o scattare foto furtivamente. Visitare la Corea del Nord era come intraprendere una sorta di viaggio nello spazio tempo per giungere in un luogo lontano distaccato dal mondo reale, senza alcun possibile contatto con l’esterno. Per quelli che non possono immaginare di trascorrere un singolo giorno senza la connettività globale, ecco che le autorità coreane offrono loro un servizio ad hoc. Nonostante sia estremamente costoso, al giorno d’oggi chiunque può portare con sé il proprio smarphone, laptop o tablet e farne completo uso collegandosi ai principali social network direttamente dal cuore di Pyongyang (cosa che non si può fare a Pechino). La rete predisposta per gli utenti stranieri tuttavia, è completamente scollegata da quella locale, rendendo impossibile qualunque tentativo di comunicazione tra i turisti e la popolazione autoctona. Il governo Nord Coreano tratta gli utenti del suo network in base alla loro provenienza e alla loro estrazione sociale, mostrandoci la sua vera natura caratterizzata da alti livelli di censura e tenace controllo. Ad ognuno la propria propaganda. Ma c’è un lato nascosto della comunicazione mobile in Corea del Nord, ben più interessante ed eccitante. Coinvolge una piccolissima parte della popolazione che riesce ad allacciarsi alla linea internazionale potendo così connettersi con il mondo esterno. Il modo in cui riescono a fare ciò è molto semplice ma allo stesso tempo costoso e pericoloso: usando un telefonino in grado di connettersi con le antenne telefoniche cinesi posizionate al di là del confine settentrionale. Nella seconda parte dell’elaborato analizzeremo proprio questo fenomeno partendo dalle sue origini storiche. Verso la fine degli anni 90, quando la ormai fallita unione sovietica non appoggiava più il regime di Kim Il Sung, il sistema comunista di 6 distribuzione nazionale collassava, creando un lungo periodo di grande carestia in tutto il paese. Questi oscuri anni sono conosciuti come “La Ardua Marcia”, una fase che sconvolse il paese radicalmente seminando morte e malcontento tra la popolazione, sopratutto quella più povera. La morsa letale della fame, spinse i nord coreani in disperata situazione a cercare fonti di sopravvivenza al di là di quelle di regime. Si formarono le prime attività private e piccoli mercanti cominciarono a vendere la loro merce nelle strade di città e villaggi. Sono gli anni in cui nacque e si sviluppò il mercato nero e il contrabbando attraverso il “poroso” confine settentrionale. Questi difficili anni modificarono la società coreana nel profondo arrivando addirittura a ribaltare il ruolo delle donne nella famiglia. Trafficanti cinesi e coreani entrarono in contatto tra di loro tessendo una rete segreta di scambi che portarono all’interno del confine coreano merce che fino ad allora rimase sconosciuta. Quelli che prima importavano cibo per far fronte al periodo di carestia, ben presto cominciarono a introdurre prodotti di vario genere. La merce che penetrava il confine era severamente proibita dal regime: indumenti di fabbricazione estera, DVD contenenti film e serie televisive Sud Coreane, radio, piccoli lettori CD e telefonini con SIM card cinesi. Proprio con questi nuovi dispositivi illegali i nord coreani cominciarono ad aprire gli occhi alla realtà. Le persone che vivono nei pressi del confine settentrionale poterono collegare il loro telefonino alle antenne cinesi. Questi nuovi dispositivi non solo facilitarono e migliorarono il contrabbando e il mercato illegale, ma consentirono ai nord coreani di avere per la prima volta la libertà di comunicare privatamente con persone al di fuori del paese, senza dover utilizzare le linee monitorate del regime. Al giorno d’oggi i dispositivi che permettono questa incredibile libertà vengono chiamati dai nord coreani “telefonini cinesi”. I pochi fortunati che riescono ad ottenere tale dispositivo contattano i famigliari che vivono al sud, scoprendo tutto ad un tratto la dura verità 7 che fino ad allora il regime aveva nascosto. In ultima istanza analizzeremo un altro fenomeno sviluppatosi tra la corea del nord e quella del sud: il sistema dei “broker”. Questo fenomeno consiste in una rete di intermediari che facilitano il contatto e il trasferimento di denaro tra due individui situati rispettivamente nelle due coree. Nacque come espediente usato dai rifugiati nord coreani che vivono in altre parti del globo per inviare denaro alle loro famiglie. Scopriremo chi sono questi “broker” e come riescono a creare contatto tra due paesi così nemici. Per aiutarci a fare ciò, ascolteremo la storia di un coraggioso disertore che riuscì tramite questi intermediari a trarre in salvo anche i suoi due figli. Solo con la testimonianza diretta di persone che hanno vissuto questa esperienza si riesce a percepire veramente la pericolosità della fuga e la brutalità del regime nord coreano.
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