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THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY AND RELIGION IN SHAPING 'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR YEARS

BY

BABAGANA MONGUNO

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEG ON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LEGON AUGUST, 2004 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of an origin~L research

conducted by me under the supervision of Ambassador J. Q. Cleland, and that

no part of it has been submitted elsewhere for any other purpose.

Amb. 1. Q. Cleland ~.~~ (Supervisor) (Student)

Date.... 2!.J~~'±:. .. Date.. ~.f!~.o/~t University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to all the innocent Nigerians who lost their lives

as a result of ethnic and religious violence.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of preparing this work, I have incurred a lot of debt. Everyone

who contributed to the research effort in any way, no matter how small needs

to be acknowledged. However, the list would undoubtedly be too long but my

gratitude remains profound to all.

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the Director of LECIA, Professor

Kofi Kumado and all the Research Fellows of LECIA.

I am especially grateful to Ambassador J. Q Cleland whose advice, assistance and patience cannot be quantified. Without his support, this work would at best have been a mirage.

I have also benefited immensely from the support given by Dr. Charles

Quaker Dokuboh of the NIIA, Dr. Remi Oyewumi, Dr. Nowa Omoigui and

Major E. V. Onumjuru.

Finally, I am most grateful to Miss Isabella Erawoc, Miss Evelyn linkorang and Mr. Eric Amartey for typing the work and Miss Reema Baksmaty for a whole lot of support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMC American Muslim Council

AU African Union

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

FGN Federal Government of Nigeria

HRW Human Rights Watch

IGOs Inter-Governmental Organisations

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations

NIIA Nigeria Institute of International Affairs

NIPSS Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies

OAU Organisation of African Unity

OlC Organisation of IslamiC Conference

OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

UK United Kingdom

UN

USA United States of America

WHO World Health Organisation University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ii DEDICATION iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS v TABLE OF CONTENTS vii ABSTRACT ...

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background To The Problem ... 1 1.2 Statement Of The Problem 3 1.3 Objectives of the Research 4 1.4 Hypothesis ... 5 1.5 Rationale of the Research 5 1.6 Review of Existing Literature 6 1.7 Theoretical Framework 18 1.8 Definition of Key Concepts ... 19 1.9 Methods and Sources of Data Collection 21 1.10 Arrangements of Chapters ... 21 End Notes 23

CHAPTER TWO 2.0 An Overview of Nigerian Foreign Policy from Independence to the End of the Cold War... 25 2.1 The Origins of the Foreign Ministry 25 2.2 The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact 26 2.3 Nigeria's Membership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 29 2.4 Nigeria's Decision to Join the OlC ... 33 2.5 Other Significant Instances of Nigeria's Cold War Foreign Policy Decisions and their Implementation 36

2.5.1 Nigeria's Attitude Towards North Africa and the Middle East 36

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2.5.2 Foreign Policy During the Nigeria Civil War Years 39

2.5.3 The Formation of the ECOWAS 42

2.5.4 Diplomatic Appointments 44

Endnotes 46

CHAPTER THREE 3.0 An Evaluation of the Role of Ethnicity and Religion in Nigeria's Post Cold War Foreign Policy (1989 - 2003) 48 3.1 Nigeria's Influence on the War Against Terror 48 3.2 Islamic Militancy 58 3.3 The Sharia Uprisings 63 3.4 The "Miss World" Riots 64 3.5 The Anglican Church Crisis ... 66 3.6 The Innoculation Crisis 67 3.7 The Niger Delta Crisis 68 3.8 The Tiv-Jukun Riots ... 72 Endnotes 75

CHAPTER FOUR 4.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 76 4.2 Recommendations 77 Endnotes 82 Bibliography '" 83

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ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War has brought about a new dimension in international politics, whereby the thinking of state actors and non-state is no longer guided by East-West considerations. Multi-polarity has emerged with a new set of global concerns which are influencing the domestic set up of many nation- states. Most of these concerns have tended to have ethno-religious undertones, consequently inspiring internal reaction. The "domestication" of sensitive international issues very often impacts on the foreign policy decision-making process, especially in a pluralistic society with conflicting interest groups. This has been a common feature in Nigeria'S foreign policy since independence. This study examines the influence of ethnicity and religion in shaping Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The research has revealed that Nigeria's multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic characteristic is to a very large extent, influential in her foreign policy process. The numerous crises in Nigeria are predominantly triggered by ethno-religious factors which have equally impacted on Nigeria's relations with state and non­ state actors in the international community. Some contemporary global issues, particularly the war against terrorism have engendered resentment within certain segments of the Nigeria nation. Recommendations are made to reverse the destabilizing role of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's foreign policy process and improve the existing climate of suspicion and acrimony.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Foreign policy is rarely conceptualized or implemented in isolation in any country.

Influential domestic constituencies of all kinds - political, economic (business), intellectual, religious, cultural, environmental, military, among others have always tended to have a say in one way or the other.

Thus, reflecting the usually poly-national, multi-religious and non-secular character of many modem "Third World" states, ethnicity and religion play a significant role in their foreign policy decisions. The heterogeneous nature of

African "nation-states', most of which were crafted at the 1884-85 Berlin

Conference which was without regard to internal cohesion, makes this a particularly significant issue on the continent. Beyond intra-state ethnic and religious cohesion, however, there is the issue of artificial borders which have divided entire nationalities into several "modern" multinational states.

With a population of well over120 million, divided into 250 ethnic groups (some of which can also be found in neighbouring countries), the Nigerian population may be almost evenly split between Christians and Moslems, many of whom also concurre~tly practise traditional religions, although reliable figures are hard to come by, given the political sensitivities of enumeration. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Since independence, Nigeria's foreign policy has placed Africa high in its priorities. Nigeria was indeed among the early agitators in the quest to create the

QAU. In the 1970s it became intellectually fashionable to describe Nigerian foreign policy in terms of concentric drcles in which Africa was the centerpiece.

More recently, however, some observers have expressed concern that in spite of the rhetoric, Nigeria's foreign policy is increasingly gravitating towards the developed world. In other words, the centerpiece may not really be Africa, but the United States in particular and the Western world in general.

After shaking off an initial colonial hangover, Cold War era Nigerian foreign policy was dominated by an aggressive desire to assist in the total liberation of the

African continent from colonialism and Apartheid, while remaining either non aligned in the East -West ideological basis or benefiting on a case by case basis by playing the East against the Western bloc and vice versa.

Among other factors, Nigeria's religious and ethnic antecedents have conspired to impose internal and external strains in a world which often appears, perhaps unfairly, as if it is striving to "westernize" and "integrate", taking the Judaism and

Christianity as the most appropriate standard.

Nigeria's____ post-Cold War years have been characterized by increasingly aCrimonious domestic bickering among competing ethno-religious power blocs,

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consequently affecting foreign policy issues. Indeed, Nigeria's aspirations for a leading role in continental and world affairs may have been frustrated by her inability to free herself from divisive internal dynamics and controversial external alliances, even though she has made far reaching contributions towards freeing other states from such tensions.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The highly volatile ethnic and religious atmosphere which characterizes the internal affairs of the Nigerian nation may have limited the range of freedom of the central government to such a degree that foreign policy decision making is often controversial. This is particularly so, taking into account the behaviour of the state in making foreign policy commitments without consultation with the component nationalities of the country. For example, many international treaties and agreements are signed without internal consultation. Very often, these treaties are in conflict with local customs of Nigerian nationalities who were not consulted before Nigeria entered into such agreements. Many human rights, gender and child agreements and treaties are like that. This problem may have eroded the influence enjoyed by Nigeria at regional, continental and global levels.

This di~tion, therefore seeks to examine four basic issues with respect to

Nigeria's foreign policy in the post Cold War years. Although superfidally

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"normal", Nigeria's increasingly precarious relations with state and non-state actors in the Western worfd as a result of its domestic ethno-religious policies, such as Sharia law, is examined.

Nigeria's deteriorating relations with IGOs like the World Health Organisation

(WHO) on sensitive matters related to development such as immunization politics are also examined. Thirdly, the effect of ethnic tensions in the oil-rich Niger Delta region and ethnic rivalries over "resource control", on Nigeria's relations with multi-national oil and gas corporations and oil importing countries are looked into. Fourthly, the inability of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to extricate itself and reverse the ethno-religious factor in its foreign relations is considered .

1.3 OBlEcnvES OF THE RESEARCH i. To give an overview of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence till the end of the Cold War, highlighting areas where the religious and ethnic polarisation of the Nigerian society have played a role. ii. Identify the general influence of religion and ethnidty on Nigeria's post

Cold War foreign policy, dting evidence of her dwindling regional and international influence as a result of these factors, while discussing the specific roles religion and ethnidty have played in affecting Nigeria's relations with the

Western ~orfd in an age when the latter is preoccupied with fighting "religiously" motivated terror.

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iii. Proffer solutions.

1.4 HYpOTHESIS

This research will be guided by the assumption that ethno-religious divisions within the Nigerian nation-state play a significant role in foreign policy formulation and implementation.

1.5 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH

The end of the Cold War has brought new variables into the arena of international politics. Domestic issues peculiar to multinational societies have been eclipsed by the shadow cast on a bipolar world. Indeed, these concerns had always displayed a tendency to impact on the wider international community at a propitious moment. The dawn of unipolarity offered this opportunity for many a pluralistic society whose foreign policy has been influenced by conflicting internal interests. In the case of Nigeria, the ever increasing polarization of her domestic components along religious and ethnic lines has not stopped at the water's edge. The last fifteen years have witnessed an increase in the frequency of Nigeria's foreign policy dilemmas as she grappled with the attendant complications of a federal system. Equally frequent are the occasions when the central government's judgement on international matters is impaired by the desire not to upset sectional sensibilities or to "let sleeping dogs lie". Whenever the Federal Government of Nigeria has vacillated on crucial foreign policy issues

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for such reasons, there have been either costs or benefits which have impacted on her position and influence as a key regional and continental actor.

This study therefore looks into ethno religious factors and their effect on

Nigeria's relations with the international community. It attempts to provide an informed basis to resolve contentious issues and convert inherent problems into national advantages.

1.6 REVIEW OF EXImNG LITERATURE

The following works were reviewed:

1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach

2. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Unz and Seymour Martin Upset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy,

3. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in.Africa.

4. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy

5. Agyemang Attah-Poku, African Ethnidty

6. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation,

7. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Example

8. K. J. HosIti, International Politics: A Framework for AnalYSis

In an a~mpt to analyse foreign policy, Brian White has suggested that it is almost impossible to conceive or implement foreign policy free from the influence

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of domestic concerns. While agreeing with William Wallace's assertion that foreign policy is the aspect of politics which links the nation state to its international environment, White adds that foreign policy is also identifiable with the most dangerous and sensitive areas of governmental activity. However, he disagrees with the widely held argument that foreign policy can and should be shielded from the dynamics of domestic politics. According to him, the separation of foreign and domestiC politics has become increasingly difficult due to the changes in the conduct of international relations since the Second World War.

Today, affairs between states are not strictly foreign or domestic but cover a wide variety of issues, many being non security matters. However, most of these issues affect domestic interests as much as foreign policy concerns. According to him, "Typically these issues have foreign and domestic dimensions and there is often an overlap between the twO".l White's work is very informative but does not delve into the highly sensitive issues of religion and ethnicity.

Michael Clarke takes a view similar to White in discussing the foreign policy system. Foreign policy decision-making, he contends is not straightforward.

"Any study of a state's foreign policy over a given period quickly reveals that rather than a series of clear decisions, there is a continuing and confusing 'flow of action', made up of a mixture of political decisions, non-political decisions, bureau~tic procedures, continuations of previous policy, and sheer accident". 2

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Clarke tries to buttress his point by referring to Tolstoy who did not believe that

Although Clarke acknowledges the role of the "authorized decision - maker within the state, he warns that "we should realize that the idea of decision­ making does not only refer to the making of conscious choices, but also to a range of personal, organizational, institutional and environmental factors which also help account for the flow of events".4 Thus, he questions the Rational

Choice Model and the absolute influence of key decision-makers in the face of pressures and demands from within the internal environment, as well as the external environment.

In his study, Clarke has encapsulated the dynamics of foreign policy formulation within a state and the factors which are likely to influence eventual deciSions.

However, he does not discuss any specific factor in detail.

David AlienS draws our attention to the role of non-state actors in the foreign policy system. He alludes to the exertion of pressure on a target government by a foreign government via a surrogate or an intermediary in the domestic environ~~t. He emphasizes that "..... even the most powerful and relatively autonomous of states are vulnerable to 'penetration' of one sort or another from

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Clarke tries to buttress his point by referring to Tolstoy who did not believe that

Although Clarke acknowledges the role of the "authorized decision - maker within the state, he warns that "we should realize that the idea of decision­ making does not only refer to the making of conscious choices, but also to a range of personal, organizational, institutional and environmental factors which also help account for the flow of events".4 Thus, he questions the Rational

Choice Model and the absolute influence of key decision-makers in the face of pressures and demands from within the internal environment, as well as the external environment.

In his study, Clarke has encapsulated the dynamics of foreign policy formulation within a state and the factors which are likely to influence eventual decisions.

However, he does not discuss any specific factor in detail.

David AlienS draws our attention to the role of non-state actors in the foreign policy system. He alludes to the exertion of pressure on a target government by a foreign government via a surrogate or an intermediary in the domestic environ~~t. He emphasizes that ...... even the most powerful and relatively autonomous of states are vulnerable to 'penetration' of one sort or another from

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outside." Although Allen's contention is profound, he overlooked the fact that non-state actors within a state can equally exert tremendous pressure on foreign governments to influence the policies of their states. Allen goes on to identify the role of religion in determining foreign policy but does not discuss the ethnic factor which quite often accompanies the religious factor; especially in pluralistic societies.

Michael Smith's comparison of Foreign Policy Systems focuses on the 'openness' or 'closeness' of regimes and the problems that confront both democratic and authoritarian regimes in shaping their foreign policies. 6 He condudes that open regimes that are sensitive to the political aspirations of the society have fewer foreign policy problems than closed regimes, which are characterized by societal chaos and a threatened political order. His analysis is however too general and not entirely accurate. While Yahya Jammeh's regime is autocratic and the socio­ political climate in the Gambia is exceptionally peaceful, the country's foreign policy has not been without problems. On the other hand, the socie-political restlessness which characterized the Abacha regime did not strangulate its foreign policy process. As a result, Nigeria had quite a number of friends in the international community.

In his ~se study of politics in developing countries, Larry Diamond7 alludes to the role of Nigeria's autonomous interest groups and aSSOCiations. According to

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outside." Although Allen's contention is profound, he overlooked the fact that non-state actors within a state can equally exert tremendous pressure on foreign governments to influence the policies of their states. Allen goes on to identify the role of religion in determining foreign policy but does not discuss the ethniC factor which quite often accompanies the religious factor; especially in pluralistic societies.

Michael Smith's comparison of Foreign Policy Systems focuses on the 'openness' or 'closeness' of regimes and the problems that confront both democratic and authoritarian regimes in shaping their foreign policies. 6 He condudes that open regimes that are sensitive to the political aspirations of the society have fewer foreign policy problems than dosed regimes, which are characterized by societal chaos and a threatened political order. His analysis is however too general and not entirely accurate. While Yahya Jammeh's regime is autocratic and the socio­ political dimate in the Gambia is exceptionally peaceful, the country's foreign policy has not been without problems. On the other hand, the socia-political restlessness which characterized the Abacha regime did not strangulate its foreign policy process. As a result, Nigeria had quite a number of friends in the international community.

In his ~se study of politics in developing countries, Larry Diamond7 alludes to the role of Nigeria's autonomous interest groups and associations. According to

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him, 'these autonomous interest groups and associations had established

suffldently broad constituendes and deep roots so that they could not have been

eliminated without a level of violent repression that no Nigerian military regime -

even that of Buhari and Idiagbon - has dared attempt". He goes on to re-echo

the dassic pluralist argument that autonomous intermediate groups "provide the

basis for the limitation of state power and make the society less likely to be

dominated by a centralized power apparatus". Diamond also condudes that

Nigeria's volatile ethnic and religious diversity has made it difficult to

institutionalize authoritarian rule because of the indination of such groups to

consider any regime as illegitimate from their point of view.

Looking at Diamond's assertions on the face value, one cannot but agree with

him. However, the same situation has equally been applied to democratic governments in Nigeria albeit in much subtler ways. It could also be argued that depending on the degree of ruthlessness or guile, authoritarian regimes can

prevail over interest groups in Nigeria. Indeed, this was the case with Abacha

and Babangida administrations.

In the same study, Diamond views Nigeria's relations with the international

environment as "primarily through the nexus of oil production". Although, this

has ~~_ the case to a reasonable extent, he does not consider the role of other

equally influential domestic factors such as ethnidty and religion in moulding

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Nigeria's relations within the international environment; especially their link with the oil factor. Even though he admits the potential threat of these two elements, it is only in relation to Nigeria's internal situation. According to him, "one cannot ignore the growing inddence of religious mobilization, extremism and violence in

Nigeria, which could become a growing outlet for popular frustration and cynical elite exploitation if a pluralistic democracy cannot be made to work. In a country that is roughly half Muslim and half Christian, with a bloody ethnic dvil war in its past, such religious conflict must raise profound alarm".8 Indeed recent developments, especially in the post-Cold War years have shown the ethno~; •. t j ..-:r.o' -';, :..... religious factor goes beyond Nigeria'S I>oon_. ,~,,~) }~, \: ~~/ ~,,;; Nigeria's position in the West African sub-region has been collectively discussed by FranciS M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and I.

William Zartman. 10 According to them, 'West Africa is structured, in large part, by Nigeria's position in the sub-region. Nigeria has been perceived by some of its neighbours as a threat, while simultaneously it has played the role of regional organizer. Political instability in Nigeria, following the cancelled elections of 1993 and the potential for serious internal conflict may lead to a change in the country's regional role. As has been the case in Central Africa and the hom of

Africa, a regional structure may fall into chaos if the core state itself is besieged

with int~al problems. This threat will remain for West Africa until the

governance issue in Nigeria is settled". The authors' concerns are based on

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realities which continue to pervade the Nigerian domestic environment while concurrently threatening to erode her sphere of influence in the immediate external environment. However, the authors did not focus on sources of political instability and their role in the larger regional situation.

Martin Needlerll raises some issues regarding national interests which he contends "must have primacy in determining foreign poliCY". He stresses the need to sort out authentic national interests from the spurious and warns about the self righteousness of pressure groups. He also points out the need to harmonise conflicts among the different national interests, each of then genuine.

Needler's assessment of foreign policy in a democratic society suggests other factors competing with the national temperament in the formulation of foreign policy. "It cannot be assumed that the distinctive features of national character will embody themselves automatically in a state's foreign policy. Policy is made and executed, after all, by a specially selected elite not necessarily typical of the society as a whole, and it is shaped not only by the wishes of the national

population, but also by the externally imposed necessities of the situation. It is thus not possible to simply deduce a nation's foreign policy from the leading features of the national temperament". 12

AlthOUgh_~eedler's appraisal ought to be the norm in any pluralist society, events

in recent history have shown that it is not always workable. In more

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industrialized and older democrades like the United States and the United

Kingdom, there is a stronger possibility that the specially selected elite can hold sway to a reasonable extent, operating under the protective shield of the overall national interest. In developing democrades, however, the role of that spedally selected elite is limited in large measure and quite often subordinated by the desire to placate sharply differing domestic interests. This is often the case with

Nigeria.

In his very well researched study on African Ethnidty, Agyemang Attah-Poku contends that ethnicity is a universal phenomenon which embraces most societies on earth. Although it has played an advantageous role in the past by enabling different ethnic entities to form a united front against foreign invaders, ethnidty in recent times has been the greatest source of disunity and destruction in Africa. 13 In the first three parts of his study, he discusses the major ethnic groupings on the continent, their relationship and cultural differences. In the last three parts, he discusses the role of ethnidty in Africa in the past, major paradigms and discusses some of the ethnic strifes and skinnishes. He ends his study by offering long lasting solutions to both hidden and open conflicts. This highly instructive work did not however make any attempt to discuss ways in which ethnicity has influenced any nation in the fonnulation and implementation of its fo~gn policy.

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Donald Rotchild 15 acknowledges existence of widespread conflicts between states and ethnic groups but insists that such occurrences can be avoided or at least managed. In a broad study, he contends that while ethnicity is usually accompanied by untold destruction, it also has the potential of a creatiVe force which can bestow material and psychological needs in a pluralistic society.

Rothchild dwells extensively on the push and pull factors between the state and its grappling ethnic groups. He concurs with the statemate that "provided that an overarching sense of shared future exists among diverse ethniC and other interests, state and ethnic leaders may be able to live with a certain amount of uncertainty and even join forces to solve common problems".

Rothchild offers various alternatives in the quest to eliminate the diviSive aspects of ethnidty. One of such is decentralisation and federalism. Citing recent examples such as those in Senegal, Zambia, Ghana, Niger and Mozambique, he illustrates the possibilities for broad partidpation and influence in local politics and administration. He buttresses his point by referring to the fact that federalism "has won acceptance in Nigeria and in certain cirdes in Ethiopia and

South Africa".IS

His study, however, is limited only to internal dynamics with regard to the ethnic factor. A~. analysis of the role of the various ethnic components in influendng the overall national interest in the international environment is lacking in this work.

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Ade Adefuye16 discusses Nigeria's wlture and foreign policy from the First

Republic to the Babangida administration. He examines the effects of wlture on

foreign policy formulation and implementation and points out that the diversity of culture no doubt influenced Nigeria's domestic as well as foreign policy. His study focussed mainly on sensitive issues of the Cold War years such as the anti­ apartheid movement which Nigeria championed. Other areas diSQIssed include

Nigeria's commitment to the OAU and Frontline states. Although the study is based on the effects of Nigeria's cultural heterogeneity on her external polities, it does not dwell extensively on areas of domestic friction and their implications on foreign policy, especially in the post Cold War years. However, this undoubtedly informative work draws the condusion that "since foreign policy reflects the domestic reality, culture has invariably been an important element in Nigeria's conduct of external relations".

R. A. Akindele and Segun Johnson's analysis of public involvement and shaping of Nigeria's foreign policy takes a look at the practicality of all embracing conferences in the foreign policy process. 17 The All Nigeria Peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986 are used as case studies although on a broad level. Specific areas of controversy such as religion and ettmicity are not mentioned with regard to foreig~_ policy, although the authors acknowledge that "many citizens are less interested and involved in external affairs than in the politics of domestic

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problems. This should however, not be used to justify excluding them from involvement and partiCipation in the shaping and making of foreign poliCY".

K. J. Holsti,17 in a very illuminating study of international politics, discusses the relationship of public opinion to a government's external objectives and diplomatic behaviour. He opines that it is difficult to generalize on this subject because "the characteristics of political systems in the world today vary so immensely - from primitive, patriarchal or religious oligarchies to modern industrial democracies and totalitarian dictatorship". 18 He disputes the hypothesis that alludes to foreign policy goals and diplomatic behaviour as necessarily a response to domestic opinions. He also rejects the notion that public feelings are neglected or considered unimportant in the foreign policy business. He however points out the fact that many government offidals have

"claimed frankly that their decision could not be influenced by fickle public attitudes.19 In the same vein, he states that there are instances where "offidals yielded to public pressures despite their own preferred policies".20

Hoisti focuses primarily on societies where the public has free access to

information from abroad and there is a great awareness of the external

environment. He states further that even in highly literate societies the majority

of the people continue to show lack of interest and apathy in international

affairs. He condudes that more research needs to be carried out in this area,

especially in non-Western countries. There is, therefore, a need to fill some of

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problems. This should however, not be used to justify excluding them from

involvement and participation in the shaping and making of foreign policy".

K. J. Holsti,17 in a very illuminating study of international politics, discusses the relationship of public opinion to a government's external objectives and diplomatic behaviour. He opines that it is difficult to generalize on this subject because "the characteristics of political systems in the world today vary so immensely - from primitive, patriarchal or religious oligarchies to modern

industrial democraCies and totalitarian dictatorship". 18 He disputes the

hypothesis that alludes to foreign policy goals and diplomatic behaviour as

necessarily a response to domestic opinions. He also rejects the notion that

public feelings are neglected or considered unimportant in the foreign policy

business. He however points out the fact that many government officials have

"claimed frankly that their decision could not be influenced by fickle public attitudes.19 In the same vein, he states that there are instances where "offidals yielded to public pressures despite their own preferred policies".20

Holsti focuses primarily on sodeties where the public has free access to

information from abroad and there is a great awareness of the external

environment. He states further that even in highly literate societies the majority

of the people continue to show lack of interest and apathy in international affairs. He condudes that more research needs to be carried out in this area , especially in non-Western countries. There is, therefore, a need to fill some of

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these gaps in Holsti's study with regard to non-Western countries such as Nigeria especially in more recent years.

27 The assessment of contemporary international politics by Samuel P. Huntington .

"The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", Huntington dwells extensively on the new shifts of interests among nations. With the end of the

Cold War, he concludes that several structural changes have emerged. In part one of his work, his findings are that for the first time in history, global politics is both multi-polar and multi-civilizational while non Western states are no longer influenced by westemisation.

Part two of his book looks at the shifting balance of power among civilizations.

The influence of the West is declining while Asian civilizations are expanding.

Islam, he contends, is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours. 28

Part three deals with cultural affinities between states and the attempts being made by countries to group themselves around the lead or core states of their dvilization.

In part four, he assesses the increasing conflict between the West and other civilizatioo.s, especially Islam. He also focuses on local conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and their consequences.

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these gaps in Holsti's study with regard to non-Western countries such as Nigeria especially in more recent years.

.:21·),'.1>: ::,:' The assessment of contemporary international politics by Samuel P. Huntington ' ...:.-

"The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order', Huntington dwells extensively on the new shifts of interests among nations. With the end of the

Cold War, he concludes that several structural changes have emerged. In part one of his work, his findings are that for the first time in history, global politics is both multi-polar and multi-civilizational while non Western states are no longer influenced by westernisation.

Part two of his book looks at the shifting balance of power among civilizations.

The influence of the West is declining while Asian Civilizations are expanding.

Islam, he contends, is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours. 28

Part three deals with cultural affinities between states and the attempts being

made by countries to group themselves around the lead or core states of their

civilization.

In part four, he assesses the increasing conflict between the West and other

civilizatio[ls, especially Islam. He also focuses on local conflicts between Muslims

and non-Muslims and their consequences.

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The final part of the work (part five) stresses the importance of Western

civilization, particularly America accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi­

civilizational character of global poIitics.29

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is based on the pluralist theory which contends that "the state is not

a unitary actor. It is composed of competing individuals, interest groups, and

bureaucrades. To the pluralist, the state cannot therefore be viewed as a unitary

actor because to do so misses the multiplidty of actors comprising the entity

termed 'the State' 11,.21 This line of thought is in congruence with the basic

pluralist notion that non-state actors have an important role to play in

international politics. Although the realist assumption insists that factors such as

ethnidty, religion and race are inescapable human phenomena, the state is a

rational actor which has the ultimate dedsion at its disposal in spite of the

fragmented nature of its entities.

The pluralist theory has always been appropriate in the Nigerian context.

Although for most of its post independence years, the country has been

subjected to military dictatorship, it has, by virtue of its diversity had to operate

within ~.~ confines of representational governance. It has been suggested that

"representative government would therefore be a microcosm of the larger

18 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

The final part of the work (part five) stresses the importance of Western civilization, particularly America accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi­ civilizational character of global poIitics.29

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is based on the pluralist theory which contends that "the state is not a unitary actor. It is composed of competing individuals, interest groups, and bureaucracies. To the pluralist, the state cannot therefore be viewed as a unitary actor because to do so misses the multiplidty of actors comprising the entity termed 'the State' ,n.21 This line of thought is in congruence with the basic pluralist notion that non-state actors have an important role to play in international politics. Although the realist assumption insists that factors such as ethnicity, religion and race are inescapable human phenomena, the state is a rational actor which has the ultimate decision at its disposal in spite of the fragmented nature of its entities.

The pluralist theory has always been appropriate in the Nigerian context.

Although for most of its post independence years, the country has been subjected to military dictatorship, it has, by virtue of its diversity had to operate within ~~ confines of representational governance. It has been suggested that

"representative government would therefore be a microcosm of the larger

18 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

society, containing memberS drawn from all groups and sections in society, in tenns of social dass, gender, religion, ethnidty, age and so forth, and in numbers that are proportioned to their strength in society at large".22 This means that "only people who are drawn from a particular group can genuinely articulate its interests". It is also suggested that people are merely conditioned by their backgrounds and are incapable of or unwilling to understand the views of people different from themselves" 23 This dissertation would therefore be guided by the pluralist theory.

1.8 DEFINmON OF KEY CONCEPTS

i) Ethnidty: The tenn 'ethnidty' is generally applied to cultural,

linguistic and SOCial types. According to Andrew Heywood, 'ethnicity'

unlike 'race', does not refer to genetic differences amongst humankind

which supposedly distinguish people from one another on biological

grounds like skin, hair colour, physique, physiognomy and the like.24

Nevertheless, both ethnic and racial cleavages have had equal

significance in international affairs. Ethnicity has also been defined as a

subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and

aspirations, it refers to people who are linked by a consciousness of a

spedal identity, who jointly seek to maximise their corporate political,

_~_. economic, and sodal interests. As a sense of peoplehood, it has its

foundation in combined remembrances of past experience and in

19 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

society, containing members drawn from all groups and sections in society, in tenns of social dass, gender, religion, ethnidty, age and so forth, and in numbers that are proportioned to their strength in society at large".22 This means that "only people who are drawn from a particular group can genuinely articulate its interests". It is also suggested that people are merely conditioned by their backgrounds and are incapable of or unwilling to understand the views of people different from themselves" 23 This dissertation would therefore be guided by the pluralist theory.

1.8 DEFINmON OF KEY CONCEPTS

i) Ethnicity: The tenn 'ethnidty' is generally applied to cultural,

linguistic and SOCial types. According to Andrew Heywood, 'ethnicity'

unlike 'race', does not refer to genetic differences amongst humankind

which supposedly distinguish people from one another on biological

grounds like skin, hair colour, physique, physiognomy and the Iike.24

Nevertheless, both ethnic and racial cleavages have had equal

Significance in international affairs. Ethnicity has also been defined as a

subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and

aspirations, it refers to people who are linked by a consciousness of a

spedal identity, who jointly seek to maximise their corporate political,

____ economic, and social interests. As a sense of peoplehood, it has its

foundation in combined remembrances of past experience and in

19 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

common inspirations, values, nonns and expectations. The validity of

these beliefs is less significant to an overarching sense of affinity than

25 is the people's ability to symbolize their doseness to each other.

Ethnidty, as used in this dissertation means the different cultural,

linguistic and social groups that are found within nation states such as

Nigeria. ii) Religion: Religion is defined as the belief in a superhuman controlling

power, espedally in a personal God or gods entitled to obedience or

worship. 26 In this study, the word 'religion' will embrace both

monotheism and polytheism (the worship of a single deity and multiple

deities). It will also cover animist and traditional fonns of worship as

found in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. iii) Pluralism: The tenn "Pluralism" is used to designate theories that

strongly emphasize the importance of human association other than

the state. In political sdence and Law, pluralist work stresses the role

played in political life by assodations, organizations and groups that

were relatively independent of the state and one another. Pluralists

contend that diversity is not only a fact but also desirable.

20 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

1.9 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

There has not been existing literature on this study because it is very recent.

This has made it necessary to source for relevant data from informed individuals who participated actively in Nigeria's foreign policy process in the aftermath of the Cold War. Other sources include library research and interviews with individuals who worked in relevant governmental and non-governmental institutions in Nigeria. Further materials were acquired from the NIIA, ECOWAS,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abuja, NIPSS, and AU and the UN.

The secondary sources of data are obtained through scholarfy works on Ethnicity and Religion in International Politics, including books, journals and other forms of documentation .

1.10 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

Chapter One consists of the research design. This includes the background to the problem, hypothesiS, rationale, literature review, theoretical framework, definition of key concepts, sources of data and arrangement of chapters.

Chapter Two provides an overview of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence until the end of the Cold War.

21 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

1.9 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

There has not been existing literature on this study because it is very recent.

This has made it necessary to source for relevant data from infonned individuals who participated actively in Nigeria's foreign policy process in the aftennath of the Cold War. Other sources indude library research and interviews with individuals who worked in relevant governmental and non-governmental institutions in Nigeria. Further materials were acquired from the NIIA, ECOWAS,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abuja, NIPSS, and AU and the UN.

The secondary sources of data are obtained through scholarly works on Ethnicity and Religion in International Politics, induding books, journals and other fonns of documentation.

1.10 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

Chapter One consists of the research design. This includes the background to the problem, hypothesiS, rationale, literature review, theoretical framework, definition of key concepts, sources of data and arrangement of chapters.

Chapter Two provides an overview of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence until the end of the Cold War.

21 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Chapter Three examines the role of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (1989 - 2003) and proffer solutions.

Chapter Four consists of the condusion and recommendations.

22 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Chapter Three examines the role of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (1989 - 2003) and proffer solutions.

Chapter Four conSists of the condusion and recommendations.

22 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Chapter Three examines the role of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (1989 - 2003) and proffer solutions.

Chapter Four consists of the condusion and recommendations.

22 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

End Notes

1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach, New York: Edward Elgar publisher, 1989, p. 5-6.

2. Ibid, p. 27

3. Ibid

4. Ibid, p. 28

5. Ibid, p. 61

6. Ibid, p. 193 -194

7. Lany Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Upset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, New York: lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990, p. 386.

8. Ibid, p. 404

9. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa., New York: Brookings Institutions Publishers, p1996, p. 143.

10. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy, Colorado: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1996, p. 12

11. Ibid, p. 22 - 23.

12. Agyemang Attah-Poku, African Ethnicity, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1998, p.45.

13. Adam przeworki, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.33.

14. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997.

15. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign POlicy' The NiOerian Example 1992, p. 179.

1~. R: A. Akindele and Segun Johnson, "Public Involvement and Particioation in the Shapjng of N~ena's F~iOn policy· RefJectjons on the All-Nigeria peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986 " A JOint Essay In "The Structure and Process ... NITA and Vantage Publishers Limited, 1989.

17. K. J. Hoslti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, New York: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1995, p. 260.

18. Ibid,

19. Ibid, p. 261.

23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

End Notes

1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach, New York: Edward Elgar publisher, 1989, p. 5-6.

2. Ibid, p. 27

3. Ibid

4. Ibid, p. 28

5. Ibid, p. 61

6. Ibid, p. 193 -194

7. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Upset (eds), Politics in Developing CountrieS: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, New York: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990, p. 386.

8. Ibid, p. 404

9. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa., New York: Brookings Institutions Publishers, p1996, p. 143.

10. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy, Colorado: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1996, p. 12

11. Ibid, p. 22 - 23.

12. Agyernang Attah-Poku, African Ethnicity, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1998, p.45.

13. Adam Przeworki, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.33.

14. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997.

15. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign poljcy· The Nigerian Example 1992, p. 179.

1~. R: A. Akindele and Segun Johnson, "Public Involvement and Participation in the Shaping of NI~ena's FO~ign Policy· RefJectjons on the All-Nigeria peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986 " A JOInt Essay In "The Structure and Process ... NIIA and Vantage Publishers Limited, 1989.

17. K. J. Hoslti, Intemational Politics: A Framework for Analysis, New York: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1995, p. 260.

18. Ibid,

19. Ibid, p. 261.

23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

End Notes

1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach, New York: Edward Elgar Publisher, 1989, p. 5-6.

2. Ibid, p. 27

3. Ibid

4. Ibid, p. 28

5. Ibid, p. 61

6. Ibid, p. 193 -194

7. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Upset (eds), Politics in Developing CountrieS: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, New York: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990, p. 386.

8. Ibid, p. 404

9. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management In Africa., New York: Brookings Institutions Publishers, p1996, p. 143.

10. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy, Colorado: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1996, p. 12

11. Ibid, p. 22 - 23.

12. Agyemang Attah-Poku, African Ethnicity, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1998, p.45.

13. Adam Przeworki, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.33.

14. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives fOr Cooperation, New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997.

15. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign poliCY' The Nigerian Example 1992, p. 179.

1~. R: A. Akindele and Segun Johnson, "Public Involvement and Participation in the Shaping of NI~ena's FO~jgn pOlicy' Reflections on the All-Nigeria peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986 " A JOInt Essay In "The Structure and Process ... NITA and Vantage Publishers Limited, 1989.

17. K. J. Hoslti, Intemational Politics: A Framework for Analysis, New York: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1995, p. 260.

18. Ibid,

19. Ibid, p. 261.

23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

End Notes

1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach, New York: Edward Elgar publisher, 1989, p. 5-6.

2. Ibid, p. 27

3. Ibid

4. Ibid, p. 28

5. Ibid, p. 61

6. Ibid, p. 193 -194 7. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, New York: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990, p. 386.

8. Ibid, p. 404

9. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa., New York: Brookings Institutions Publishers, p1996, p. 143.

10. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy, Colorado: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1996, p. 12

11. Ibid, p. 22 - 23.

12. Agyemang Attah-Poku, African Ethnicity, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1998, p.45.

13. Adam przeworki, Democracy and the Market; Cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1991, p.33.

14. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997.

15. Ade Adefuye, Culture and foreign policy' The Nigerian Example 1992, p. 179.

16. R. A. Akindele and Segun Johnson, "Public Involvement and Participation in the Shaping of Nigeria'S Foreign Policv' RefJectjons on the All-Nigeria peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986" A Joint ES$ay in "The Structure and Process ... NIIA and Vantage Publishers Limited, 1989.

17. K. J. Hoslti, Intemational Politics: A Framework for Analysis, New York: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1995, p. 260.

18. Ibid,

19. Ibid, p. 261.

23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

20. Ibid, 261

21. Paul R. Viotti and Marie V. Kauppi, InternatiOnal RelatiOns Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism... New Jersey: Macmillan, 1993, p. 228.

22. Andrew Heywood, PolitiCal Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction, New Yorie: St. Martins, 1994, p. 182.

23. Ibid, p. 183.

24. Ibid, p. 183

25. Ibid, 343

26. Donald Rothchild, op. cit., p. 24.

27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCivl7izatiOns and the Remaking of World Order, London: The Free Press and Design, 1997, p. 20 -21.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

24 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

What is today known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria (the governmental department charged primarily with the conception/formulation and implementation of foreign policy) was known as the External Affairs Department prior to Nigeria's attainment of independence on 1st October 1960. This department was within the Chief Secretary's Office in compliance with colonial guidelines. In 1957, this department was relocated to the Prime Minister's Office and it performed routine administrative and protocol duties. On Independence day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was established. The Prime Minister, became the first

Foreign Minister from 1st October 1960 to 17 July 1961. His first task was to set up Nigeria's missions abroad and intensify the recruitment of staff. The ministry was however saddled with the misfortune of lacking qualified personnel and specialists ( an affliction common to almost all institutions in newly independent

African states). Balewa's successor, Jaja Wachukwu therefore had to carry out a reorganisation of the ministry in great detail.

The milit9!Y intervention of 15th January 1966 paved the way for a Federal

Military Government headed by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. This

25 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLIcy FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

What is today known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria (the governmental department charged primarily with the conception/formulation and implementation of foreign policy) was known as the External Affairs Department prior to Nigeria's attainment of independence on 1st October 1960. This department was within the Chief Secretary's Office in compliance with colonial guidelines. In 1957, this department was relocated to the Prime Minister's Office and it performed routine administrative and protocol duties. On Independence day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was established. The Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became the first

Foreign Minister from 1st October 1960 to 17 July 1961. His first task was to set up Nigeria's missions abroad and intensify the recruitment of staff. The ministry was however saddled with the misfortune of lacking qualified personnel and specialists ( an affliction common to almost all institutions in newly independent

African states). Balewa's successor, Jaja Wachukwu therefore had to carry out a reorganisation of the ministry in great detail.

The milit9.!Y intervention of 15th January 1966 paved the way for a Federal

Military Government headed by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. This

25 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POUa FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

What is today known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria (the governmental department charged primarily with the conception/formulation and implementation of foreign policy) was known as the External Affairs Department prior to Nigeria's attainment of independence on 1st October 1960. This department was within the Chief Secretary's Office in compliance with colonial guidelines. In 1957, this department was relocated to the Prime Minister's Office and it performed routine administrative and protocol duties. On Independence day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was established. The Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became the first

Foreign Minister from 1st October 1960 to 17 July 1961. His first task was to set up Nigeria's missions abroad and intensify the recruitment of staff. The ministry was however saddled with the misfortune of laCking qualified personnel and specialists ( an affliction common to almost all institutions in newly independent

African states). Balewa's successor, Jaja Wachukwu therefore had to carry out a reorganisation of the ministry in great detail.

The milit9ry intervention of 15th January 1966 paved the way for a Federal

Military Government headed by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. This

25 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

government was itseff toppled after only six months. The new Head of State,

Lieutenant Colonel was faced with severe domestic crisis whiCh threatened to split the country along ethnic lines. The crisis had a direct effect on

Nigeria's external relations. With the advent of military rule, the Ministry of

FOreign Affairs was transformed into the Ministry of External Affairs and within a short period it nudged the FGN into playing a more significant role in international politics, especially within the continent of Africa. Indeed, this aspect has been acknowledged by Ray Ofoegbu as one of the positive contributions of military rule in Nigeria, a by-product of the professional preparations of the

Nigerian military leadership. According to him, ''The preparations induded extensive training in Ghana and Britain; and international peace-keeping roles in

Zaire, India/Pakistan and Tanzania. 1

2.2 THE ANGLO-NIGERIAN DEFENCE PACf

One of the first controversial foreign policy decisions in which the Nigerian government got itself entangled was the making and termination of the Anglo­

Nigerian Defence Pact. Barely a month after independence (November 1960), the Nigerian Parliament ratified a defence pact between Nigeria and her erstwhile colonial master, Britain. This was cemented in spite of the vociferous objection by the politically sensitive Nigerian public. However, on 21st January

1962, the, pact was abrogated by the Prime Minister himself in an unexpected announcement. This abrogation generated the same degree of controversy which

26 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

government was itself toppled after only six months. The new Head of State,

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon was faced with severe domestic crisis which threatened to split the country along ethnic lines. The crisis had a direct effect on

Nigeria's external relations. With the advent of military rule, the Ministry of

FOreign Affairs was transformed into the Ministry of External Affairs and within a short period it nudged the FGN into playing a more significant role in international politics, especially within the continent of Africa. Indeed, this aspect has been acknowledged by Ray Ofoegbu as one of the positive contributions of military rule in Nigeria, a by-product of the professional preparations of the

Nigerian military leadership. According to him, ''The preparations included extensive training in Ghana and Britain; and international peace-keeping roles in

Zaire, India/Pakistan and Tanzania. 1

2.2 THE ANGLO-NIGERIAN DEFENCE PACT

One of the first controversial foreign policy decisions in which the Nigerian government got itself entangled was the making and termination of the Anglo­

Nigerian Defence Pact. Barely a month after independence (November 1960), the Nigerian Parliament ratified a defence pact between Nigeria and her erstwhile colonial master, Britain. This was cemented in spite of the vociferous objection by the politically sensitive Nigerian public. However, on 21st January

1962, the.. pact was abrogated by the Prime Minister himself in an unexpected announcement. This abrogation generated the same degree of controversy which

26 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

government was itself toppled after only six months. The new Head of State,

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon was faced with severe domestic crisis which threatened to split the country along ethnic lines. The crisis had a direct effect on

Nigeria'S external relations. With the advent of military rule, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs was transformed into the Ministry of External Affairs and within a short periocl it nudged the FGN into playing a more significant role in international politics, especially within the continent of Africa. Indeed, this aspect has been acknowledged by Ray Ofoegbu as one of the positive contributions of military rule in Nigeria, a by-procluct of the professional preparations of the

Nigerian military leadership. According to him, 'The preparations included extensive training in Ghana and Britain; and international peace-keeping roles in

Zaire, India/Pakistan and Tanzania.1

2.2 THE ANGLO-NIGERIAN DEFENCE PACT

One of the first controversial foreign policy decisions in which the Nigerian government got itself entangled was the making and termination of the Anglo­

Nigerian Defence Pact. Barely a month after independence (November 1960), the Nigerian Parliament ratified a defence pact between Nigeria and her erstwhile colonial master, Britain. This was cemented in spite of the vociferous objection by the politically sensitive Nigerian public. However, on 21st January

1962, th~.pact was abrogated by the Prime Minister himself in an unexpected announcement. This abrogation generated the same degree of controversy which

26 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

greeted the signing of the pact. It is worthy of note that there was no consultation at any level which resulted in the termination of the pact. There was no cabinet meeting, neither was there a parliamentary debate which led to the dissolution. This, in itself has ever since been a source of bewilderment. The pact has also provided fodder for the perennial controversy over the primacy or relative significance of the domestic over the external factors in foreign policy decision making in Africa. 2

The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact is one of many foreign policy decisions taken by African states which have resulted in differing opinions. While to some observers, African leaders have hijacked and personalised foreign policy decision making, another school of thought holds the opinion that these leaders are actually left without any real freedom of action by the twin hazards of overwhelming international economic and political forces on the one hand and domestic interest groups with a commensurate amount of influence on the other.

A third category views such leaders as "merely playing the role of arbiters among foreign and domestic groups". 3

The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact has the greater significance of revealing the true nature of the internal dynamics of the Nigerian nation and how it brings itself to bear on the foreign policy decision-making process. There was a widespread conviction that Britain virtually arm-twisted her former colony into signing the pact after losing out in the 1956 Suez criSis. Driven by the desire to

27 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

greeted the signing of the pact. It is worthy of note that there was no consultation at any level which resulted in the termination of the pact. There was no cabinet meeting, neither was there a parliamentary debate which led to the dissolution. This, in itself has ever since been a source of bewilderment. The pact has also provided fodder for the perennial controversy over the primacy or relative significance of the domestic over the external factors in foreign policy decision making in Africa.2

The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact is one of many foreign policy decisions taken by African states which have resulted in differing opinions. While to some observers, African leaders have hijacked and personalised foreign policy decision making, another school of thought holds the opinion that these leaders are actually left without any real freedom of action by the twin hazards of overwhelming international economic and political forces on the one hand and domestic interest groups with a commensurate amount of influence on the other.

A third category views such leaders as "merely playing the role of arbiters among foreign and domestic groups". 3

The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact has the greater significance of revealing the true nature of the internal dynamics of the Nigerian nation and how it brings

itself to bear on the foreign policy decision-making process. There was a

widespread conviction that Britain virtually arm-twisted her former colony into

signing the pact after lOSing out in the 1956 Suez crisis. Driven by the desire to

27 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

establish a military base in the Northern Nigerian city of Kano as an alternatiVe to those in cairo, Tripoli and Khartoum, British Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys exerted pressure on the Nigerian leader and eventually dinched' the deal for

Whitehall.

The polarising nature of the pact was manifested by the inherent mutual suspidon between the North and the South. The Northern leaders who endorsed it shared the belief that it was an insurance against a combined effort by the

East and West to wrest power from the North and pose a threat to their existence. Another reason why the Northern Region embraced the pact was because it would serve as a necessary stop-gap measure until the newly opened

Nigerian Military Training Co"ege could serve as an instrument for counterbalancing the disproportionate percentage of Southern entrants into the officer corps of the Army. 4 Apart from the Northerners who dung on to the pact, there were several Southerners from the mainly Eastern National Coundl of

Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) party who supported the pact as a means of forming a common front with the mainly Northern NPC as a counterweight to the predominantly Western Action Group (AG). Domestic interests were equally involved in the abrogation of the pact. The suspicion between the AG, NCNC and

NPC which represented the three major Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa) was convenient for the existence of the pact. As soon as it became apparent to the North that an AG-NCNC' alliance was just a mirage, the need to hold on to it became less important.

28 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

establish a military base in the Northern Nigerian ety of Kano as an alternative to those in cairo, Tripoli and Khartoum, British Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys exerted pressure on the Nigerian leader and eventually dinched' the deal for

Whitehall.

The polarising nature of the pact was manifested by the inherent mutual suspidon between the North and the South. The Northern leaders who endorsed it shared the belief that it was an insurance against a combined effort by the

East and West to wrest power from the North and pose a threat to their existence. Another reason why the Northern Region embraced the pact was because it would serve as a necessary stop-gap measure until the newly opened

Nigerian Military Training College could serve as an instrument for counterbalancing the disproportionate percentage of Southern entrants into the officer corps of the Army. 4 Apart from the Northerners who dung on to the pact, there were several Southerners from the mainly Eastern National Coonel of

Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) party who supported the pact as a means of forming a common front with the mainly Northern NPC as a counterweight to the predominantly Western Action Group (AG). Domestic interests were equally involved in the abrogation of the pact. The suspicion between the AG, NCNC and

NPC which represented the three major Nigerian ethnic groups (yoruba, Igbo and Hausa) was convenient for the existence of the pact. As soon as it became apparent to the North that an AG-NCNC alliance was just a mirage, the need to hold on to it became less important.

28 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Having considered the internal factors, it would be appropriate to discuss the external influences. The recurring crescendo in international politics of that era was the Cold War which hardly inspired a dimate of growth for newly independent African states. The pro western Balewa government was visibly seeking avenues to prevent a communist infiltration and the pact offered a safeguard. A major source of pressure for the ratification of the pact was the increasing tensions between Nigeria and Ghana. On the attainment of a republican status, Ghana under the leadership of President Kwame Nkrumah was perceived by Nigeria to be aligned to the Eastern Bloc; a perception which made lagos uncomfortable. Apart from overtly supporting subversive activities in

Nigeria (the AG plot to oust the Balewa administration), Nkrumah was also accused by the Nigeria Government of supporting efforts to detach the British camerouns from Nigeria. A final straw was the Osagyefo's determination to impose political union as a step to the unification of Africa. For the Balewa government, all these were suffident reason to take precautionary measures against potential Ghanaian aggression, hence the signing of the Defence Pact.

2.3 NIGERIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

Nigeria's dedsion not only to join but remain a member of the Inter­

Governmental organization known as OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting

29 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Having considered the internal factors, it would be appropriate to discuss the external influences. The recurring crescendo in international politics of that era was the Cold War which hardly inspired a dim ate of growth for newly independent African states. The pro western Balewa government was visibly seeking avenues to prevent a communist infiltration and the pact offered a safeguard. A major source of pressure for the ratification of the pact was the increasing tensions between Nigeria and Ghana. On the attainment of a republican status, Ghana under the leadership of President Kwame Nkrumah was perceived by Nigeria to be aligned to the Eastern Bloc; a perception which made

Lagos uncomfortable. Apart from overtly supporting subversive activities in

Nigeria (the AG plot to oust the Balewa administration), Nkrumah was also accused by the Nigeria Government of supporting efforts to detach the British camerouns from Nigeria. A final straw was the Osagyefo's detennination to impose political union as a step to the unification of Africa. For the Balewa government, all these were suffident reason to take precautionary measures against potential Ghanaian aggression, hence the signing of the Defence Pact.

2.3 NIGERIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)

Nigeria's decision not only to join but remain a member of the Inter­

Governmental organization known as OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting

29 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

Countries) is generally accepted as a rational choice that was fuelled by nationalistic considerations. However, it has been suggested that prior to Nigeria joining this body as its eleventh member in 1971, there were indeed domestic interests at play despite the overall national interest. According to P.e. Asiodu, a one-time Federal Permanent Secretary, Ministry of petroleum Resources in the

Gowon government, 'The then Federal Executive Coundl was sharply divided over the issue". 5 While one faction rationalized its objection to membership on the grounds that it was not in the country's best interest to get involved in

Middle East politics, the other insisted that such an occurrence was most unlikely. It has been hinted in various Nigerian cirdes that there was an underlying suspicion of motives even within the central government. This was buttressed by the fact that in the past, the Islamic North had attempted to court the fraternity of some Middle East countries. A case in mind was the invitation extended to Saudi Arabia's King Faisal to visit the Northern Region by its

Premier, Ahmadu Bello. This had aroused widespread criticism, especially in the

Christian South whose press considered the invitation of monarchs and Heads of

State as the sole prerogative of the Prime Minister and not a Regional Premier.

Nigerian policy within OPEC itself, has revolved around Saudi Arabia which is the largest exporter of oil and consequently the most important member because of her extensive reserves and enormous crude output. This automatically gave

Riyadh I~erage in the oil industry as a price leader. Naturally, other members

(Nigeria indusive) always took into account Saudi oil polides. A very crudal

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factor was the Saudi influence on Nigeria as a result of Islamic ties between the former and latter. According to Soremekun, ''The SaudiS themselves are very conscious of these links and on a rather testy occasion during the 1978 oil glut,

Sheikh Yamani, due largely to this cultural factor, was compelled to remark that

"Nigeria's plight is very close to my heart".6

Shehu Shagari's tenure as Nigeria'S President during the Second Republic (1979-

1983) was characterized by the unending debate over Nigeria'S continuing membership of OPEC. Both protagonists and antagonists straddled the perilous

Nigerian ethno-religious divide and based their cases mainly on the state of the national economy.

The Military Government of Generals Buhari and Idiagbon were equally concerned with the weak state of the economy and the decline in oil prices. The regime by its nature was not susceptible to domestic influences. However,

Buhari's antecedents in the oil ministry and his faith gave his administration added sympathy in its dealings with Riyadh when Nigeria was granted an unprecedented increase in its quota by OPEC. The ethnic and religious dimensions may be accidental in much the same way as they could have been deliberate. It is indeed interesting to note the faith and ethnic origins of Nigeria's most prominent oil ministers, who indude the following:

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factor was the Saudi influence on Nigeria as a result of Islamic ties between the former and latter. According to Soremekun, ''The Saudis themselves are very conscious of these links and on a rather testy occasion during the 1978 oil glut,

Sheikh Yamani, due largely to this cultural factor, was compelled to remark that

"Nigeria's plight is very close to my heart".6

Shehu Shagari's tenure as Nigeria'S President during the Second Republic (1979-

1983) was characterized by the unending debate over Nigeria'S continuing

membership of OPEC. Both protagonists and antagonists straddled the perilous

Nigerian ethno-religious divide and based their cases mainly on the state of the

national economy.

The Military Government of Generals Buhari and Idiagbon were equally

concemed with the weak state of the economy and the decline in oil prices. The

regime by its nature was not susceptible to domestic influences. However,

Buhari's antecedents in the oil ministry and his faith gave his administration

added sympathy in its dealings with Riyadh when Nigeria was granted an

unprecedented increase in its quota by OPEC. The ethnic and religious

dimensions may be accidental in much the same way as they could have been

deliberate. It is indeed interesting to note the faith and ethnic origins of Nigeria's

most prominent oil ministers, who indude the following:

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• Shettima Ali Monguno - A Northern Moslem

• Major General Muhammadu Buhari - A Northern Moslem .

• Dr Rilwanu Lukman - A Northern Moslem

• Professor Jubril Aminu - A Northern Moslem

A scrutiny of the names listed above could imply an attempt by a particular group to dominate the oil portfolio. However, it could also be a calculated effort at acquiring a firmer foothold with the most influential OPEC member. This

"theocratiC flavour", although noticeable became much more pronounced under the Babangida administration.7 It was during this administration that Dr Lukman became visible as one of the leading advocates for Nigeria to join the

Organization of Islamic Conference (0lC). It was also during this period that he was suddenly appointed Nigeria's oil minister amidst a doud of speculation and fingers pointing towards Riyadh, in the heartland of the Islamic world. The significant point about Lukman's tenure is the fact that for the first time in its existence, OPEC had endorsed the appointment of one person (Lukman) as its president eight consecutive times. While a religious connotation can be suggested, it can also be implied that the perpetuation of Lukman as OPEC's

President was designed to keep Nigeria from "straying away" from the organisation.

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2.4 NIGERIA'S DECISION TO JOIN THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COIC)

The Government of President has been singled out by most observers as the architect of Nigeria's association with the Organization of

Islamic Conference. This is probably due to the fact that it was during the

Babangida years that the OIC issue reached a crescendo. The reality however is that the seeds of this association were sown long before the General became

Nigeria's President. Tracing the roots of the Nigeria-OIC affair, Cohen opines that the act of arson carried out on the sacred AI Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by

Israeli government agents embittered the Moslem wond thus leading to a decision to organise a summit of IslamiC Heads of State in September 1969 in

Rabat. 8 The summit resolved to foster doser cooperation among Islamic countries. Prior to the establishment of the OIC in 1971, Moslem groups in

Nigeria had formed ties with similar bodies in other countries, especially in the

Middle East. Prominent among such was the close relations between Premier

Ahmadu Bello's government in Northern Nigeria and Islamic governments in the

Middle East and North Africa. This led to Bello being "charged with the responsibility of looking into the possibility of the creation of a permanent forum at which Islamic governments could interact on a regular basis,19 Shortly after, a report, to which Bello contributed, was submitted to the Sixth Session of the

Muslim ~~ond Congress held in 1966. It is therefore not surprising that when the trumpet was sounded for the 1969 Rabat Summit, a delegation of Nigerian

Moslems led by the late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi answered the call and

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pledged support for the formation of the OIC on behalf of Nigeria's Moslem population. The reaction to this development in Nigeria was a series of offidal and unofficial question marks. "In what capadty did the delegation attend the

Conference? Was it an offidal delegation? Did it have any support from the

Nigerian Government?l1 The complexities of the day which included Nigeria's secularity, and the conduct of a dvil war founded on ethno-religious grounds, compelled General Gowon to distance his government from the delegation in a statement to King Hassan of Morocco. Consequently, the delegates were refused accreditation although they were accorded an observer status. Gowon's announcement that Nigeria had no intention of becoming a full fledged member of the orc was endorsed by General Murtala Muhammed's regime (even though

Muhammed himself was a devout Moslem). This trend reduced in subsequent governments (Obasanjo and Shagari governments).

The Buhari/ldiagbon Government was also pushed into the orc saga during its short life span. Fresh efforts were made for Nigeria to graduate from observer to full member status by highly influential Moslem lobby groups which had strong business bonds with their counterparts in the predominantly Moslem Arab World.

The lobby from Arab countries was equally intense and laced with oblique assurances of finandal support. It is very poSSible, though not verified, that

Buhari's reputation as a very devout Moslem could have rekindled the embers of agitation for complete membership. According to Olukoshi, the Buhari government refused to take any hasty dedsion based on the advice of External

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Affairs Minister Ibrahim Gambari who cited the 1979 Constitution which is specific on the maintenance of secularity. Furthermore the potential threat to national unity was also a factor to contend with.12

The emergence of General Babangida as President (another Moslem leader) signalled a fresh onslaught by OIC enthusiasts. The president referred the matter to Foreign Minister Bolaji Akinyemi who offered advice identical to his predecessors. The President, who was under pressure to call the bluff of the

West which was imposing "inconsiderate" financial conditions on Nigeria, decided to reject Akinyemi's counsel and endorsed the attendance of an offidal delegation to the Fez ministerial meeting of January 1986. Nigeria'S formal application was accepted during the morning session of 9th January 1986. The backlash that ensued as soon as the membership became public knowledge was near fatal. There was an instant Christian-Moslem stand off which the government tried to defuse by explaining the situation off with the excuse that the organisation itself was more political than religious and Nigeria stood to gain tremendously from the financial fallouts. However, this offidal line did not command general sympathy and the government reverted the country to its original observer status. 13

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Affairs Minister Ibrahim Gambari who cited the 1979 Constitution which is

specifIC on the maintenance of secularity. Furthennore the potential threat to

national unity was also a factor to contend with.12

The emergence of General Babangida as President (another Moslem leader) signalled a fresh onslaught by OIC enthusiasts. The president referred the matter to Foreign Minister Bolaji Akinyemi who offered advice identical to his

predecessors. The President, who was under pressure to call the bluff of the

West which was imposing "inconsiderate" financial conditions on Nigeria, decided to reject Akinyemi's counsel and endorsed the attendance of an offidal delegation to the Fez ministerial meeting of January 1986. Nigeria's formal application was accepted during the morning session of 9th January 1986. The backlash that ensued as soon as the membership became public knowledge was near fatal. There was an instant Christian-Moslem stand off which the government tried to defuse by explaining the situation off with the excuse that the organisation itself was more political than religious and Nigeria stood to gain tremendously from the financial fallouts. However, this offidal line did not command general sympathy and the government reverted the country to its original observer status. 13

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Affairs Minister Ibrahim Gambari who cited the 1979 Constitution which is specific on the maintenance of secularity. Furthermore the potential threat to national unity was also a factor to contend with.12

The emergence of General Babangida as President (another Moslem leader) signalled a fresh onslaught by OIC enthusiasts. The president referred the matter to Foreign Minister Bolaji Akinyemi who offered advice identical to his predecessors. The President, who was under pressure to call the bluff of the west which was imposing "inconsiderate" finanCial conditions on Nigeria, decided to reject Akinyemi's counsel and endorsed the attendance of an offidal delegation to the Fez ministerial meeting of January 1986. Nigeria'S formal application was accepted during the morning session of 9th January 1986. The backlash that ensued as soon as the membership became public knowledge was near fatal. There was an instant Christian-Moslem stand off which the government tried to defuse by explaining the situation off with the excuse that the organisation itself was more political than religious and Nigeria stood to gain tremendously from the financial fallouts. However, this offidal line did not command general sympathy and the government reverted the country to its original observer status. 13

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2.5 OTHER SIGNIFICANT INSTANCES OF NIGERIA'S COLD WAR ERA FOREIGN POLIcy DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

2.5.1 Nigeria's Attitude Towards North Africa and the Middle East;

As discussed earlier, Nigeria'S interactions with North African states presented serious challenges to the various governments of the post independence era. As a result of the polarized nature of Nigerian society, and the substantial autonomy enjoyed by the regional governments, it was almost impossible for the central government to maintain normal relations not only with the Arab countries of

North Africa but also those in the Middle East, particularly Israel. Adefuye observes that the Northern Region's contact with North Africa might not have attracted critidsm if the Sardauna's14 emphasis had been on trade rather than religion which he allowed to dictate his attitude to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The increasing ferocity with which the Sardauna condemned Zionist aggression and the passion with which he embraced the Islamic countries led to sharp criticisms in the Southern press of Nigeria. The fact that he was the Vice President of the

World Islamic league did not help matters. His visits to the Middle East and

Pakistan urging various leaders to organise an All Muslim States' summit was considered as the role of the Prime Minister and not a Regional Premier. Indeed, this caused the Prime Minister some discomfort because the Sardauna was the leader of_~is own political party.

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Relations with Israel were subjected to the same degree of internal squabbling amongst the three regions. Even before independence, both the Eastern and

Western regional governments had entered into trade agreements with Israel.

When the Federal Government signed a loan agreement with Israel, the Nigeria

People's Congress (NPC) called on the Federal Government to end all negotiations with and withdraw recognition of Israel. When the Federal

Government refused to do that, the Northern government dissociated itself and refused to have anything to do with the loan agreement. 15 Shortly after, the

Sardauna announced that Israel would not be allowed to take part in any development programme in Northern Nigeria.

Other incidents which increased friction between Federal and Regional

Governments included the 1962 signing of two trade agreements with and

Israel. The Northern Regional government called on the Federal Parliament not to ratify the agreement with Israel but the FGN ratified it without sending it to

Parliament. These domestic rifts produced reactions from some countries. In

1962, exports from Nigeria which were considered to be produced by companies either owned completely by or in partnership with Israeli concerns were banned by the Jordanian government. Again, a similar problem arose when a Nigerian contingent to the Commonwealth Education Conference in India stopped in Cairo to change planes. The Egyptian Government invited both the Federal and

Northern government Ministers of Education to stay in Cairo as guests of the

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government but did not extend the same courtesies to the Western and Eastern

Ministers. The Arab-Israeli crises brought out the partisan qualities of Nigerian politics even at the diplomatic level where attitudes were supposed to reflect the national interest. The pro-Israel stance of both Premier Akintola of the Western­

Region and Premier Okpara of the Eastern Region were commensurate with the anti Israel stance of Premier Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Region. While the two Southern Premiers professed love and commitment to Israel, their Northern counterpart declared that Israel did not even exist. It was only by sheer will power that the Federal Government refrained from being drawn into taking sides with any of the regional governments. According to Adefuye, it was in apparent deference to northern Moslem sentiments that Nigeria did not open an embassy in Tel Aviv even though Israel had one in Lagos. It is interesting to note that throughout the period between 1960-1965, Nigeria's partidpation in the Arab­

Israeli debates at the United Nations was very minimal and marked by caution.

Nigeria's contribution to the debate during that period was a two minute speech urging both sides to compromise. Even the voting pattern was marked by sensitivity towards the attitude of the internal interest groups. The Arab-Israeli issue was put to vote seventeen times. Nigeria voted six times in favour of pro _

Arab resolutions, four times for resolutions which favoured neither side and abstainei:f" on seven occasions. Indeed the Federal Government was placed in a very delicate situation by virtue of the fact that it was a coalition government

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made up of two parties which had opposing policies on the Middle East as a result of their cultural peculiarities of the peoples they represented. While the leader of the NPC, (the party of the Prime Minister) was Ahmadu Bello, a great grandson of Usman Danfodio who considered it a religious obligation to support the Arab cause, the NCNC showed sympathy for the Israeli cause although it pressed for a non-aligned policy. In order to enhance national unity and stability,

Sir Abubakar's Federal Government had to demonstrate its neutrality by steering a middle course. This made the FGN vulnerable to accusations of weakness and lack of decision. When the coalition broke down later, the NCNC chieftains went to town and condemned the NPC attitude towards Israel as rooted in religious bigotry.

2.5.2 Foreign Policy During The Nigerian Civil War Years:

The remote and immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War are attributable to various factors but most significant among them was the preponderance of ethnic and religious sentiments in the body politic of the entire Federation. These factors, as we have already discussed, were not limited to the national boundaries but were also projected onto the international scene and had considerable influence on the way Nigeria related to many key actors in the international environment during the war. Much credit has been given to the

Biafran propaganda machinery in the conduct of the war. It has even been suggested that the skilful use of propaganda by the Biafrans actually prolonged a

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war they would have lost in a matter of months. The Biafran strategy was to present their case to the international community in such a way that they would evoke profound sympathy for their cause. In doing so, they called on the rest of humanity to come to their rescue because they faced imminent extermination as a people. They referred to the pogroms of May and October 1966 and lamented that as a result of persecution, they had been herded into a comer with no outlet except the Atlantic Ocean. Pictures of children afflicted with the killer disease

Kwashiorkor were splashed on the front pages of international newspapers and magazines. The Igbos were relentless in stressing the futility of a union in an inherently heterogeneous society. They insisted that they were hounded out of what they considered their motherland by the Hausa-Fulanis who were determined to dominate the rest of the federation and destroy whoever opposed them. The Igbos asserted that anybody who hoped to bind the various ethnic groups into one country was living in a fool's paradise. Lord Frederick Lugard, the architect of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of

Nigeria in 1914 had indeed made a fatal mistake they suggested. In fact, the propaganda warned that the aim of the North was to complete the Jihad of 1804 by extending its frontiers to the Atlantic Ocean. Reaction to the propaganda was instant. Biafra was recognized by four African countries, namely: Gabon,

Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Zambia. It is believed that the urge to support fellow cathOlics __~nd the attitude of the French Government might have influenced the decision by Gabon and Ivory Coast to recognize Biafra. 16 In the case of Zambia,

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it was widely believed that President Kenneth Kaunda who is a devout catholic was overcome by the plight of his fellow catholic Biafrans. Kirke-Greene makes reference to General De Gaulle of France who was quoted as asking why the

Igbos who are generally Christians and live in the South in a certain way have

17 their language dependent on another ethnic faction of the Federation.

President Nyerere of Tanzania was perhaps the staunchest supporter of Biafra and he made several passionate appeals to the OAU for recognition. Also of

Significance was Biafra's appeal to Italy portraying the conflict as an ethno­ religious motivated crisis.

Religious chords were pulled by both parties with predictable results. Biafra's comparison of her situation to the sorrows of Jews during the Second World War was enough reason for Israel to support her against the predominantly Moslem

North which had antagonized her during the era of Ahmadu Bello. While the FGN tried desperately to water down insinuations of a religiously inspired war, its case was not made any better by the fact that there was a large number of Moslems on the Federal side whose army was commanded by the Hausa-Fulani Prince of

Katsina Emirate, Brigadier Hassan Usman Katsina. Added to this was the ease with which the FGN secured the support of the Government of Egypt whose

Airforce pilots and Jets carried out bombing missions against Biafra.

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2.S.3 The Formation of The ECOWAS:

The reasons which led to the formation of the ECOWAS in 1975 are multiple, but the fundamental concerns raised by the founding fathers include a strong desire for regional integration as well as the establishment of a common market.

However, in the case of Nigeria there were other pressing issues which impacted on her. These induded the bitter lessons learnt from the Civil War which raised the issue of good neighbourliness. If Nigeria had been surrounded by hostile neighbours she would probably have lost the war (Adefuye). The fact that these countries were not used as staging posts for enemy forces was comforting but that did not eliminate the possibility of France influencing her surrogates against

Nigeria in future. It was therefore expedient for Nigeria to encourage the formation of such a regional body in order to enhance her security. IS

Another reason (often overlooked) is the need to re-establish ethnic ties amongst

African peoples who were separated from each other as a result of the partition of the continent by the colonial powers. People of the same ethnic stock were strangers across borders. In the case of Nigeria, the Kanem Bornu Empire which was in present day Northern Nigeria, included parts of Chad Republic before the partition ~~ the 19th Century. Today, there are members of the Kanuri and

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Shuwa ethnic groups in both countries just as there are Fulanis, Ekoi and about five other ethnic groups in both Nigeria and Cameroun.

In the 1970s, General Gowon appointed H.E. Bello Malabu (President Ahmadou

Ahidjo's former village chief) as Nigeria'S Ambassador to Cameroun. Indeed

Nigeria-Cameroun relations were at their best during his tenure and Nigeria did not consider Cameroun a Francophone country in the Spirit.19

Other cases of ethnic groups shared commonly are the Hausas and Kanuris in

Niger Republic, the Yorubas in Nigeria and Benin. About 95% of the population of Porto Novo (now Cotonou) are Yorubas. The Fulanis also stretch across the borders of Nigeria and Niger Republic. An interesting point is the aversion of some ethnic groups for international borders because it stifles their economic growth. An example is the proclivity of the fishing communities in Bakassi to have two villages with one name on either side of the Nigerian and Camerounian borders so that when they can shift their village when the water recedes and return when the rains arrive. The problem of large ethnic groups sitting across borders is a universal one and could often have grave consequences as is the case with the Turks in Iraq and Turkey, Germans in Austria, Russian immigrants in Eur~! Mexicans in the United States, and Ewes in Ghana and Togo. Nigeria _

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has been able to manage this issue as a result of the sensitivities of the various

nationalities. 20

2.5.4 Diplomatjc APJ)Ointmentsj

The Nigerian Constitution is specific on the importance of equal representation in

public service. This has been enshrined in the Constitution in the interest of

peace and stability. This applies to diplomatic appointments. The practice has

been for the Senate to confirm diplomatic appointments with the various states.

It is also the practice to appoint seasoned diplomats to countries considered to

be of great importance to the nation's interest. In the case of Nigeria, it has been

observed that most heads of government have tended to favour people from

their ethnic or religious background in making ambassadorial appointments to

some key Missions such as London, Washington, and the UN. This is probably

because the President (or Head of State as the case may be) feels such a person

could best represent certain domestic interests abroad. Some examples include

the posting of Alhaji Sule Kolo, a northerner to London during Gowon's tenure;

the posting of Gambari, a Muslim to the UN during the Babangida years; Hassan

Wakili, a Northern Muslim to Washington during the Abacha years, Alhaji

Abubakar Alhaji , a Muslim Northerner to London during the Babangida years; Joseph <:rba, a Northerner to the UN during the Babangida year; Maitama Sule, a Northern Moslem to the UN during Shagari's tenure and a host of similar

postings. Indeed, the practice has also been to post Moslems to countries such

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as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan while Christians are accredited to Israel and the Vatican. The same pattern is applied to the postings of Defence Advisers and

Attaches.

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END NOTES

1. Ray Ofoegbu, 'The Structure and Process of FOreian Policy Fonnulation and Implementation : A Study of the Ministry of Extemal Affairs" An Essay in 'The Structure and Processes NITA and Vantage Publishers Umited Ibadan , 1989, p. 78

2. Olatunde JB Ojo, 'The Making and Tennination of th~ Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact". NIIA and Vantage Publishers limited Ibadan, 1989, p 255.

3. Ibid

4. Ibid, P 257.

5. Kayode Soremekun, Nigeria's Membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Essay written in 'The structures and processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria, 1960-1990", Ed Gabriel 0 Olusanya and RA Akindele, NIIA and Vantage Publishers Intemationalltd, Ibadan, 1990,p 296.

6. Ibid, P 299.

7. Ibid, P 301.

8. C, Cohen, DemocraCY(Athens: University of Georgia Press,1971),p6.

9. Adebayo Olukoshi, The Long Road to Fez : An examination of Nigeria's Decision to Become a Full Member of The Organization of Islamic Conference, NIIA and Vantage Publishers International ltd, Ibadan, 1990, p 488. 10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.p494.

12. Newswatch, 17 February 1986,p.17

13. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign Policy: the Nigerian Example, NIIA Press lagos, 1992. p 43.

14. Ibid, pp 44-45.

15. Ibid, P--. 45.

16. Ibid, P 57.

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17. AHM Kirke-Greene, Crises and Conflict in Nigeria, Volume II, p 329.

18. Ibid, 109

19. Ibid, 112

20. Ibid, 321

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0 AN evALUATION OF THE ROLE OF ETHNIcrry AND RELIGION IN NIGERIA'S POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN pOLICY (1989 - 2003)

The Post-Cold War era is still relatively very short in terms of international politics. This spans a period of about fifteen years (1989 - 2004) and although quite a lot has occurred to make significant impact on regional and global issues, they are not necessarily conclusive. This Chapter will discuss the various ways in which religious and ethniC considerations in Nigeria have affected her attitude towards other state and non-state actors and vice versa. It is nevertheless pertinent to mention that very little has been written on this subject considering the period in question and the peculiarities associated with it, for instance, its highly sensitive nature which does not allow for ease of research. However, there are several iSSUes which have been open to public glare and easy to keep track of by virtue of their ability to evoke much public interest and dialogue.

These include the war against terrorism, the Sharia Saga, the Niger Delta, liv-

Jukun, Plateau and other crises, the "Miss World" controversy and the Nigerian

Innoculation Episode. These will be the areas of focus in this chapter and will be analysed in respect of their significance not only domestically but also internationally .

3.1 NIGERIA'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

The war -against terrorism means different things to different state and people and groups depending on their perceptions and interests. The Federal Republic

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of Nigeria has not made any conscious foreign policy decisions or aligned herself to any state or group of states. She has maintained her normal commitment to the United Nations just like almost all other countries with a similar background and heritage as Nigeria's. However, the very peculiar internal dynamics of the country have drawn her unwittingly under the international spotlight. This is not necessarily with the endorsement or acquiescence of the Federal Government

(which has consciously refused to give tact approval to domestic interest groups especially on potentially divisive issues). Regardless of the central government's determination to remain on the straight and narrow path, it has shown the occasional irritation at attempts to divert her from pursuing her primary objective of satisfying the sensibilities of a pluralistic and, very often, erratic society.

Africa has become noticeably more important to the West, particularly the United

States of America, since the war against terrorism was launched. This is traceable to the campaign following the 11th September, 2001 attack on prominent institutions of the USA such as the Pentagon by Islamic fundamentalists allegedly sponsored by the terrorist organization AI-Qaeda.

Although several reasons can be attributed to this sudden interest in Africa, there remain two major reasons which cannot easily be brushed aside. First, is the growing need for the USA and her allies to look for alternative sources of oil, away ~ their traditional sources in the highly unstable and volatile Arab world characterized by unrelenting terrorist attacks. Many viewers, both in the USA

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and outside, are becoming very unoomfortable at the prospects of a successful revolution in any of the Arab countries specifically the ousting of a monarchy such as the one in Saudi Arabia. Should this happen, there will be a greater likelihood of a domino effect on other monarchies such as those in Jordan,

Oman, among others which have been accused of doing very little to promote democratic values at home as well as vigorously pursuing the Palestinian cause.

The group most likely to harness massive public support in an effort to remove any monarchy would almost certainly be a religiously motivated group led by derics or fundamentalist non-state actors. Such a group's strength would be in the appeal of the religious fervour of the 21st century which has engulfed almost every country with a large Moslem population. There is a general nervousness in the liberal democracies of the West that an uprising reminiscent of the Iranian

Revolution of 1979 is a real possibility.l

A greater apprehension in the West. is the realization that the outcome of a successful revolution would not only install a regime in opposition to Western democrades, (particularly the United States) but also all their interests

(specifically the State of Israel). Any such changes in the present status quo of the Arab world would mark the beginning of very significant changes in the international system. Traditional beneficiaries of the oil resources of the Islamic world ~~Uld be cut off and new dients would emerge.

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Apart from the United States, other countries which would have earned the label of being active collaborators with the Western world would also suffer a setback.

Equally to be disadvantaged would be those countries which demonstrated a lack of interest in the Arab cause even though they have a lot in common by way of religion and culture with the Arabs. Depending on the amount of support offered, either by way of supporting pro-Arab resolutions at the UN or overtly demonstrating anti-Israeli sentiments, even weak nations would be held responsible. This is not really a wild speculation considering the recent acts of terrorism unleashed in Spain, East Africa and other countries such as Indonesia which has the largest Muslim population in the world.

Although the USA has never had the indination to have enduring interests in the well being of any nation (except perhaps Israel for obvious reasons) it has to consider alternative sources of oil. This means cultivating the friendship of such oil producers. Naturally, the African continent would become the target.

Nigeria, being a large producer of crude oil would be a likely focus of US attention in this regard.

Jonathan Stevenson's Observations on developments after the US intervention in

Afghanistan are indeed very relevant. He states that "Two years after the

Afghanist~.n intervention, Africa has renewed strategiC resonance. This time,

circumstances may be more propitious for sustained Western interestn •2 He

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contends that having coercively effected a regime change in Iraq, the United

States appears to have conceded greater short and possibly medium-tenn instability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region for the sake of longer­ term security. This places a higher premium on Washington cultivating non­

OPEC oil supplies to ensure its energy security, for which it is counting on sub­

Saharan Africa. 3 Although Nigeria is an OPEC supplier, it will remain a potenti~ ~\ alternative to the Arab suppliers, hence the United State's concern ~;~r tfi. . e" ~...... '..•. ' .. i~ unstable situation in Nigeria's Niger-Delta area. ~.J,,):j ~~iii/><: "~,..-.;u,-·~

Should there be a successful Islamic revolution sWleping across the entire Arab world, what guarantee does Nigeria have of not becoming a victim of Arab hostility and be aCQJsed of being "one of those traitor nations who refused to actively support our Palestinian brothers the way they supported the liberation movements of Southern Africa". It must be pointed out here that the majority of

Nigerians are not literate in the Western sense but are extremely up-ta-date with international events. Their level of awareness of global issues is amazing and this has always equipped the poor uneducated masses with adequate knowledge of current events.

It is also interesting to note that issues which do not have a religious or ethnic underton~ do not inspire any interest among this class of Nigerians who inCidentally form that sector of society which resorts to violent spontaneous

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actions once their interests are not protected. This has been exemplified by the events of the 19605 - 19805 which were highlighted by the struggle for the liberation of all black peoples (of which Nigeria was a key actor). Indeed, the struggle to liberate fellow blacks, oppressed by foreigners, should ordinarily be the concern of all shades and grades of society, but that has not been the case with Nigeria. The decolonisation, liberation and anti-apartheid agenda were actually pursued by the Federal Government, intellectuals and students who were fired up and motivated by Cold War era personalities such as Che Guevera,

Amilcar cabral, Nelson Mandela and Malcolm X. Indeed, Kwame Nkrumah's portrait was to be found hanging in students' union hostels, and university cafeteria alongside the portraits of Martin Luther King and other cult figures.

Ordinarily one would assume that not only the educated minority but also the uneducated majority would embrace cause of the black man. However, in

Nigeria, the latter group has not shown any real concern towards such matters.

It could be argued that the uneducated masses of Nigeria demonstrated a detachment from the plight of their oppressed kith and kin in Southern Africa because they did not share a similar experience at any pOint in their history.

However, one is indined to accept the argument that the problem in Southern

Africa did not fire up the Nigerian masses because their sensibilities (which are primaril'l..ethnic or spiritual) were not affected. The argument for Nigerians as not having experienced such atrocities as apartheid does not really convince one.

53 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

It has already been stated that the Nigerian masses have always been

conversant with international events, therefore they could have formed an

opinion on this matter just as they did on the Arab-Israeli crisis.

The lack of interest in wider issues can be best summarised by the explanation

that in African states generally, the symbols and myths of nationalism, and the

euphoria of independence proved too superficial to develop and sustain

3 alternative modes of allegiance and a community of purpose at the state Ievel.

Essentially, values are formed along individualistic or group lines and not with

the overall national interest in mind, unless of course it is a governmental

matter.

Another explanation for the apparent lethargy of the greater masses could be the

'turning of the tide' after attainment of independence in many a developing

nation. The dawn of independence has often been an anti-dimax and the

beginning of downward spiral. The lack of real preparation for nationhood is

revealed by an obvious lack of 'connectivity' between the educated dasses and

the mass of the people. Thus, the masses crawl back to their 'holes' and

'thickets' to contemplate narrow concerns while the educated 'elite' huddle in

newly acquired Government Reserve Areas (GRAs) to strategise on how to

remain there forever, at the expense of the tax payer. National consciousness,

accordin~_ to Fanon, instead of being the all-embradng crystallization of the

innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the mobilization of

54 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what might have been ... the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state. These are the cracks in the edifice which show the process of retrogression that is so harmful and prejudicial to national effort and national unity. 5

Although the Balewa government tried to pursue a middle course, the almost autonomous regional governments meddled into foreign policy issues (which should be the exdusive territory of the FGN). Their actions had strong religious or ethnic undertones which did not help the First Republic. Indeed, this supports the opinion that "How people view the wond is greatly conditioned by one or more cultural paradigms to which they have been exposed".6 Although it has been argued that ethnidty or ethnic consciousness is a contemporary phenomenon in Nigerian politics,' it goes bad< to the colonial era. It was largely absent in pre-colonial times but has nevertheless become pervasive in today's world where it is hardly possible for any ethnic (or even religious) group to isolate itself. This raises the call for a concerted effort by the different groups living in "united" countries to forge greater cooperation and understanding. The various touchy issues of the Cold War era have not disappeared completely in

Nigeria's post-Cold War era. (;:(.. ~ .. t

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Significantly, ethnic and religious tensions continue to impact on foreign policy matters. The OIC saga only served as a "kick starter" for a trail of demands and counter demands by Nigerian Christians and Moslems who tend to forget that in the not too distant past they were all pagans, at best animists; therefore the need to accommodate each other becomes imperative. The chain of ethnic and

st religious violence which began in the Cold War era has continued into the 21 century with disturbing results. Nigeria's role in the international community is not helped by these acts of fratricide which can be attributed to avoidable reasons.

Huntington, reflecting on the post Cold War World, observes that today, the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: who are we?8 He also asserts that people define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities and others.9 This only helps to inform us that differences will continue to exist, and societies will become increasingly heterogeneous whether in America or Africa. If this is the case, there is a need to put aside partisan interest and allow the national interests to become the main focus of the people.

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The Nigerian situation is made even more complicated by the over eagerness of the FGN and indeed various domestic interest groups to align with countries like

Saudi Arabia for varying reasons such as oil or religious affiliations as discussed in previous chapters. Although Nigeria is a secular country and should not really have religious polides that tend to alienate other faiths, it has in the past taken dedsions (probably innocuously) which have attracted criticism and placed the stability of the nation on the brink. The behaviour of the state in making foreign policy commitments without internal consultation has always been a sore point.

Very often, these treaties are in conflict with the local customs of Nigerian nationalities not consulted before "NigeriaN entered into such agreements. Many

"human rights", gender, child agreements and treaties are like that. However, it is often those agreements with religious/ethnic dimensions that rekindle the smouldering embers of hatred and become serious national issues.

One of such pol ides was the decision to join the OIC (Chapter Two). Another issue has been government sponsorship of delegations for the annual Islamic

Pilgrimage (the Hajj). It was as a result of growing disaffection that the FGN approved government sponsored delegations for the Christian Pilgrimage to

Jerusalem. The inability of the FGN to separate state from church/mosque as is the case in many advanced democrades has been a source of internal friction because ~.. has always had an input on Nigeria's relations with other nations. This

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will be elaborated further in discussing individual cases such as the Sharia Law,

Anglican Church crises and the innoculation issue.

3.2 ISLAMIC MILITANCY

Another reason why Africa is becoming important to the United States and her allies is the spread of Islamic militancy which is in itself related to the

proliferation of terrorist activities. Some scholars and writers on International

Politics have attributed the Origins of this phenomenon to the end of the Cold

War which made some regimes is sub-Saharan African weaker as a result of the

absence of a sponsor state. Indeed, it has been said that American effort to

remedy the problem were stifled by the United States' ill-fated intervention in

Somalia from 1992 - 1994. It has also been pointed out that the September 11

attacks were regarded by some as potentially dangerous for Africa because of the demonstrated capadty of radical Islamic groups like the Taliban to hijack failed or failing states and the indination of transnational Islamic terrorist

organizations like AI-Qaeda to become their literal and ideological tenants,

dictated more proactive Western efforts to prevent such outcomes by rescuing

and helping to develop such states, many of which are in Africa· 10

A much ~hoed view on contemporary issues is the fact that Africa is the most

impoverished and unstable continent and therefore a very fertile ground for

58 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ~/"~:~:O~', \~ I;: " ) 7.~ ~";'; ;>- '~?i?/;·I sewing discontent and preparing it as a potential staging arena for transnational

Islamic terrorist operations. Added to this, most actors in the international arena have always had great economiC/colonial interest in the continent. This gives them every reason to desire a foothold on the continent.

Although the poverty and instability theory should be taken seriously, there is also another reality to be contended with. There is an inherent wave of ill-feeling in the Islamic worid towards the democrades of the West (especially the United

States), which are viewed not only as insensitive but also hypocritical. The nexus of their argument is the unfair handling of the Palestinian issue by the US. In a congratulatory letter to President George Bush, the American Muslim Council

(AMC) pointed out the cause of Muslims' problem with the US as follows:

"The Problem is that in much of the Middle East, the US is perceived as particularly close to and protective of some of the least democratic countries in the world. .. the US should not allow authoritarian regimes to justify their repression ofall opposition movements as a defence against 'fundamentalism' or 'extremism' because it is precisely dictatorship and authoritarianism that fuels extremism and radiaJl change". 11

The AMC went on to make spedfic recommendations which included Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, an end to illegal settlements, a shared

Jerusalem and a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

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The anti-American passion is therefore a universal emotion in the Muslim world.

John Esposito in an article comments that anti-Americanism is driven not by blind hatred or religious zealotry of extremists, but also by a frustration and anger with US policy among the mainstream in the Muslim world, particularly the soft­ glove treatment of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon and hiS heavy-handed policies in the west Bank and Gaza: 12

The aversion to US policies is especially visible in states like Nigeria with a large concentration of Muslims. Nigerian Muslims (predominantly in the North) have always aligned with the Arab world. This is to be seen in such matters as the annual Hajj Pilgrimage, Lesser Hajj Pilgrimage, inter-marriage, cultural ties, business ties among others. Indeed, approximately 60% of the Hausa language is derived from the Arabic language and approximately 90% of Hausa names are

Arabic names unlike Yoruba names which are mostly indigenous names despite the fact that a large number of Yorubas are Muslims. It is against this cultural and religious background that the Muslim North is extremely sensitive and quick to erupt into violence whenever a touchy affair with religious implications arises.

This is reflected in the numerous religious crises of the post-Cold War era, inspired by international events such as the First Gulf War (1991) and its sequel

(2003).

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There have, however, been occasions in the past when the interests of various groups have been at variance with the mindset of the FGN. Joseph Garba's recollection of relations between Africa and the Arab world in the mid seventies is quite revealing. Black African nations, having thrown in their lot with Egypt after the October 1973 war with Israel, insisted on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and eventually broke off diplomatic relations with the state of

Israel. A grateful Egypt promised to repay this show of solidarity with generous donations which never came while oil prices kept rising. Eventually, it became obvious to the black African nations that no largesse would be received.

Relations became very cold despite attempts at mending fences. In a speech at the Foreign Ministers Summit in cairo in 1977, the Nigerian Foreign Minister expressed displeasure at the Arab lack of reciprocity and stated Black Africa's relations with the Arabs is not even remotely a beggar - benefactor relationship.

"The Egyptian Government showed its dear displeasure with my statement... I was one of the few heads of delegation who didn't have a private audience with

President Anwar Sadat".13 This revelation shows a clear contrast between the government mood and the feelings of a particular interest.

It is interesting that there is also a prevailing current of Muslim nationalism and defiance in Nigeria's North fuelled by the invasion of Iraq (2003). On several occasions!. .. the Government and its representatives have been embarrassed by

the restiveness of Muslim militants. The state visit to Nigeria by President Bush in

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There have, however, been occasions in the past when the interests of various groups have been at variance with the mindset of the FGN. Joseph Garba's recollection of relations between Africa and the Arab world in the mid seventies is quite revealing. Black African nations, having thrown in their lot with Egypt after the October 1973 war with Israel, insisted on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and eventually broke off diplomatic relations with the state of

Israel. A grateful Egypt promised to repay this show of solidarity with generous donations which never came while oil prices kept rising. Eventually, it became obvious to the black African nations that no largesse would be received.

Relations became very cold despite attempts at mending fences. In a speech at the Foreign Ministers Summit in cairo in 1977, the Nigerian Foreign Minister expressed displeasure at the Arab lack of reciprocity and stated Black Africa's relations with the Arabs is not even remotely a beggar - benefactor relationship.

"The Egyptian Government showed its dear displeasure with my statement... I was one of the few heads of delegation who didn't have a private audience with

President Anwar Sadat". 13 This revelation shows a clear contrast between the government mood and the feelings of a particular interest.

It is interesting that there is also a prevailing current of Muslim nationalism and defiance in Nigeria's North fuelled by the invasion of Iraq (2003). On several occasions!. .. the Government and its representatives have been embarrassed by the restiveness of Muslim militants. The state visit to Nigeria by President Bush in

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2003 was, marked by vociferous protests in Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara and other mainly Muslim states. The wave of revolt has also been attributed by some observers to the desire to control and use national resources for domestic

benefit.14 Besides, there is a widespread belief in the north em states that their candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari lost the Presidential election to

incumbent President Obasanjo because of "manipulations" by the United States

which is not eager to see the emergence of a Muslim hardliner. There was,

therefore a resentment towards the 'Chief Architect' of their candidate's loss

which was translated into an Anti-Bush/USA protest. is

The spread of Islamic militancy in Nigeria has been a source of distress not only

within the country but also in the Westem world. The recent siege in Yobe State

of Nigeria has jolted intemational observers into realizing the potential for armed

insurgency. The relatively calm state was thrown into confusion when a group of

youths calling themselves "The Talibans" decided to occupy an entire village and

overpower the local police. It was only when the army was ordered to handle the

situation that normalcy retumed. Although the United States did not make an

official statement regarding the inddent, it was evident that the very fact that an

indigenous group could fashion itself after the Talibans of Afghanistan did not

strike a pleasant cord with the US State Department. Although the crisis was

contained--after a few days, it has sent a very disturbing signal to the West to

reconsider its relations with Nigeria.

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3.3 THE SHARIA UPRISINGS

Sharia law in Nigeria is not a recent occurrence. It has been in existence since

independence although it was not applied in a manner that evoked apprehension

in citizens of other faiths. The late Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu

Bello approved only certain aspects of the Penal Code because of the nature of

the Northern Region. Sharia was not a major source of concern then because

religious fanatism and intolerance were not then a part of the Nigerian social

order. The sudden surge of religious fundamentalism is responsible for the

resistance of non-Muslims to the imposition of Sharia law. In the last five years,

there have been no less than five very serious religious incidents in Nigeria and

several other clashes of considerable impact. The Kaduna riots of 2000 which

occurred twice resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives. The Jos riots of 2000

were equally destructive while the Jos riots of 2004 compelled the President to

sack the Plateau State Governor.

The advocates of Sharia law in Nigeria are committed to fulfilling their goal and

insist that they are entitled to practice their religion according to the Quran.

Despite the apprehensions of non-Muslims who feel there are some hidden

motives, the protagonists of Sharia have argued it would not affect non-Muslims

living in ~.eir community. The most notorious case was the Amina lawai episode.

Amina had been charged with adultery after giving birth out of Wedlock. The

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penalty, according to Sharia Law is death by stoning. The zamfara State

Government remained firm and warned it would not be bullied into rescinding.

The series of court cases drew mass publicity and generated so much controversy. The Human Rights Watch (HWR), Amnesty International, Churches,

Women's Organisations among others, launched into a frenzied attack on the

Zamfara State Governor (the chief architect of Sharia in the State). The matter lingered on until the State Government decided to pardon her. Other cases had also sparked off protests. The celebrated amputation of a cattle rustler in

Zamfara State a few years ago is still fresh in memory.

The West has expressed concern about the escalation of religiously motivated violence. It has been observed, however, that while the US supports the Saud

Family of Saudi Arabia, it is hesitant on the imposition of Sharia Law in Nigeria because Nigerian Muslims might be "more Muslims than the Arabs". Indeed, this feeling had been expressed in the 1970s in Nigeria by various religious leaders induding Muslims. Alhaji A. D. Ajijola, a Muslim lawyer stated that "we would be fool-hardy to continue to apply laws which were developed in the 8th Century without modification. The Muslims in Nigeria cannot claim to be better Muslims than the Muslims in the Middle East ... "is

3.4 THE "MISS WORLD" RIOTS

The Niged~n nation witnessed a new dimension in the cultUre of dvil unrest in

2002 when the "Miss World" Beauty Pageant was scheduled to take place in

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Nigeria. The decision to host the contest in Nigeria triggered a series of protests in the conservative Northern states where calls were made to all 'believers' to resist the show which they said was highly immoral. They insisted that the very thought of showing women in swimming suits, almost naked on television was abhorrent and threatened to take drastic actions if the government did not cancel it. In the midst of the protests, a Nigerian lady journalist of "This Day"

Newspaper wrote an artide attempting to counter the argument of those in opposition to the contest. Her artide made reference to the Prophet Muhammad in a saladous manner and this incensed the Muslim community who issued a

'Fatwah' calling for the head of the journalist who was eventually smuggled out of the country. This was followed by widespread rioting, destruction of the

Newspaper's premises and looting of innocent people's stores, shops, among others.

The eruption of unexpected violence resulted in the decision to change the venue of the contest from Abuja to London. The partidpating countries expressed fear for the safety of their contestants who had already declared their intention not to go to a highly volatile country. Domestically, there was a lot of anxiety because the reigning "Miss World" was a Nigerian. In the South

(especially the Ijaw Community from which the "Miss World" originated) they felt insulted ~use they had been deprived of the opportunity to celebrate their star. Being a minority group, the Ijaws needed a platform to acquire

65 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh

by the Bible. Nigeria's Anglican Church was not alone in opposing the gay bishop's ordination. Several other Anglican churches especially in East Africa also threatened to break away from the church just like Nigeria had threatened to do.

Although the International Declaration of Human Rights says one is free to have sexual preferences, the reaction of African leaders was contemptuous. President

Yoweri Museveni of Uganda retorted that when the Declaration was being made, no African was there. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe announced that homosexuals should be shot. As far as the African leaders were concerned, the

Declaration of Human Rights which approves the freedom of sexual orientation should not be taken seriously.

The fallout of the Anglican Church dispute placed Nigeria's Anglican Church in the black book of the various international pro gay groups. On a broader and much higher level, the inddent has not affected Nigeria adversely. This is probably because the majority of people in the United States and other countries do not approve of homosexual marriages. The awareness that the present White

House is opposed to homosexuality is a good sign for the anti-gay lobby.

3.6 THE INNOCULATION CRISIS

An announcement by the Kano State Government of Nigeria to the effect that it had rej~ innoculation of babies because it did not approve of the World

Health Organisation (WHO) vaccines, threw the international community into a

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both the colonial offidals and their Nigerian successors have kept the issue in the forefront of national life. Its potential to inflict serious damage on the Nigerian polity was a problem to colonial offidals even in the first decade of the 16 amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 .

The elusive nature of ethnic cohesion in Nigeria has impacted on her desire to play a major role on the African continent. It is when some individual African countries are stable, free and united that energies and resources can be more effectively geared towards a larger African Union.17 With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalisation, the need is even greater for individual countries to relate on a higher level than the continental level. However, certain constraints make it difficult for countries like Nigeria to prosper on the global level. Inherent domestic animosities have added up to make Nigeria a danger zone to foreigners. The conditions for investment are extremely poor and the ease with which ethnically-motivated acts of uncontrolled violence erupt have made Nigeria a truly dreaded country even though it has the human and material capacity to overcome this drawback.

Ethnic crises have plagued Nigeria since independence. They have included the

TIV riots of 1960 and 1964, the massacre of the Igbos in Northern Nigeria in

1966 and~the civil war, among so many other inddents. Post-Cold War ethnic conflicts indude the Zagon-Kataf riots of 1992 between the Hausa-Fulani and

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minority Katafs in Kaduna state; the TIV-Jukun riots of Benue state, the Hausa­

Siyawa riots of Bauchi state, the Hausa-Birom riots of Plateau State and the

Ogoni protests of the 1990s. Of all these ethnic dashes, the Niger Delta crisis

seems to be the most deep rooted and problematic.

The Niger Delta situation has a very strong ethnic colouration both locally and on the national level. Locally, ethnic groups in the region (Ijaw, Urhobo, Isoko,

Itsekiri, Kalabari, Ogoni, Andoni among others) are in arms against each other for crumbs. Nationally, they confront the problem of being minOrities within the

Nigerian framework. The dominant ethnic groups that control the Federal

Government consider the Niger Delta a goose that lays the golden eggs for their benefit and use the military and police resources to keep the 'goodieS to themselves. The oil companies are not monitored and controlled in such a way that would ensure corporate responsibility. This has resulted in environmental degradation to the detriment of the local minority ethnic groups who do not wield power at the centre to enforce their will. Hence, they adopt whatever unconventional or illegal means available to address the issue.

The Niger Delta's vast oil resources makes it a very crucial and viable region within both the Nigerian and international context. This is one of the reasons behind th~tshow of concern by the U.S with regards to the crisis. Although the

US is in favour of protecting the multinationals, it is equally in opposition to the

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government-backed campaign against the minorities who themselves engage in wanton destruction of Federal Government pipelines in unabating acts of sabotage. The U.S has not fully overcome its shock at the Odi massacre of 1999 in which the entire village of Odi in the Niger Delta area was decimated by

Federal troops. Despite FG claims that the village had been taken over by insurgents and all the dvilian population had either been driven out or was killed, the Western press insisted it was an act of genocide. It is even more intriguing that the ethnic violence in the Delta has not been suffidently countered by the

Federal Government either by way of dialogue or by military action. Rather, there has been a negative effect on the image of the FGN in terms of human rights. This is reminiscent of previous administrations, which also used iron fist in suppressing the Niger Delta violence. The British Commonwealth had sanctioned

Nigeria and suspended her from the Commonwealth in 1995, when General

Abacha imposed the death sentence on the activist, Ken Saro Wiwa. It promised

Nigeria that on the very day of the inauguration of the civilian government,

Nigeria would be readmitted. The day after the inauguration, the Commonwealth

Secretary General was able to announce that Nigeria is not only back fully in the

Commonwealth, Nigeria's standing internationally at the United Nations, the

Organization of African Unity and all other international organizations had been fully restored. 17

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The international dimension of the Niger Delta issue indudes the reaction of

IGOS and NGOS who are advocates of environmental protection. Green Peace has made several attempts at making the oil companies and the FG to adopt a more pro-environment attitude.

3.8 THE TIV-lUKUN RIOTS

The llv-Jukun crisis of 2001 was also a very prominent reference point in

Nigeria's trail of violence in the post-Cold War era. The general attitude of the FG to ethnic disputes is reminiscent of the Lugardian approach, whereby the colonial troops were dispatched to suppress areas of dvil disobedience with unrestrained force. This has been the general approach by successive Nigerian governments.

The result of such a policy has not been altogether effective, as it can be seen in the Niger Delta Situation. If anything, there has been a wave of opposition from international actors who are averse to such methods, regardless of the drcumstances that incur the wrath of the government.

The llv-Jukun crisis of 2001 was set against a background of deep-seated suspidon between the belligerents who do not approve of government mediation. The military detachment that was sent to the area was rounded up by a local militia, killed and decapitated. The reprisals from the FGN were complete in terms of force. The entire village of Zaki Biam was destroyed. The reaction of

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the international community was very anti-FGN and sanctions followed not too long after the inddent.

In terms of external relations, Nigeria's image suffered another heavy blow after the killings in Zaki Biam became public knowledge. Just hours after the inddents, various countries condemned the action of the Federal Govemment and demanded that the 'culprits' be brought to book. The government's refusal to do so did not go down well with some countries such as the US which decided to place sanctions on Nigeria. Several human rights organizations also condemned the action. Up till now, there is a lobby of Nigerians from the Tiv ethnic group who have made several appeals to the United States government and other influential world bodies to address the matter which they consider to be an act of genocide.

In evaluating some of the major inddents of ethnic and religious violence in

Nigeria, one is able to identify two pattems in respect of the attitude of the intemational community. On the one hand, Western democraCies, led by the U.S have vowed to wage a war against terrorism but they are visibly duplicitous in their campaign. Acts of terrorism that are not religious in nature are not viewed

in the same light as acts of terrorism with a tinge of religious motivation. Where

the FG h~~ damped down on acts of terror against the state such as burning

pipelines together with defenceless dtizens or murdering government agents,

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the U.S and other Western states do not endorse commensurate reprisals. This is in sharp contrast to acts of terror by religious groups. The laki-Siam episode can be considered by many observers to be an act of terror on the same level as the abduction and beheading of innocent civilians in Iraq. However, because it is not an act of 'terror' in the Western sense, it should not attract grave consequences.

The same school of thought feels that the U.S in particular, acts hypocritically when it does not condemn harsh repression of such acts as those carried out by the Talibans of Yobe state and other religious crises. This has cast doubts in the mind of the FG in its evaluation of the U.S policy on ethnic and religious crisis.

A case in point is the muffled protest of the U.S when the Odi massacre took place. The government reaction to the U.S. response was not very favourable as it appeared that the U.S was constant in its application of double standards.

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Just as it is not possible to decree people to love one another, it is not possible

to abolish ethnidty or "tribalism" by an Act of the National Assembly, Congress or

Parliament among others.

Ethnicity is a function of the mind and depends on how parochial or open the

mind is. The FGN, while acknowledging the reality of ethnic diversity in Nigeria,

should place the national interests above all others in formulating foreign policy.

External polides should be designed with a view to protecting internal

nationalities. The FGN should also simultaneously evolve a programme, which will diffuse ethnic suspicions and thereby improve the climate of ethnic hatred in the country. The National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) is a good idea for achieving this but it should be complemented by other similar schemes. One way of doing this could be to induce ethnic groups to contribute to the development of other ethnic groups, communities. If Youth Corpers who are not indigenes of the Niger Delta area contributed to the development of infrastructure, with government support, the locals would most likely cultivate greater love for them.

This should be applicable to all the communities. A good example is the efforts at

community development in which the Ghana Armed Forces is presently engaged,

under which the army constructs roads, and provides water and medical services

to rural communities. As a result of this sustained effort, all the acrimony which

the militarY generated during the era of dictatorship has to a large extent been

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removed. If there is greater love among the different nationalities, self-serving

tendendes will not affect issues such as foreign policy

The FGN should adopt a strategy whereby potentially difficult foreign policy

issues are dedded by conventional and visibly rational means. One way of

achieving this is to take decisions under the umbrella of the UN. The issue of

invading Iraq was resolved by most states which made it a UN matter.

The use of public debate can also serve a good purpose. The FGN could present

a sensitive issue to the public and allow things to take their own course. Just by

feeling the pulse of the public, the government can take a responsible decision

and avoid confusion. This was not the case with the OlC matter. If an issue

cannot be readily decided upon, the FGN could just claim to be studying the

matter until events overtake it.

It is strongly suggested that the FGN holds a National Conference on Foreign

Policy in order to address the complex issues arising from ethno-religious

tenSions which have continued to pose a major obstacle to Nigerian's overall

interests.

FGN Sh~~d address the problems of various nationalities that have a case. The

Niger Delta crises remains unsolved because the various governments of the

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Federation have not treated it condusively. If the FGN gets involved directly and

cuts off the so-called community leaders who are exploiting the people, there would be real development and the people's attitude would change.

There is also a serious need to improve the quality of education of the Nigerian people and make them aware of the fact that everything does not start and end in their villages or local churches and mosques. The higher the level of education, the less liable or vulnerable the people become to the manipulative tendendes of their leaders. At least, Ghana and the Gambia share a very similar background with Nigeria and yet their sodeties are not bedevilled with ethnic and religious concerns. The FGN should study the admirable qualities of some countries with a view of inculcating it at home.

Anally, the best antidote for the virus of ethnic and religious influences in all the important areas of foreign policy formulation and implementation is good governance. The benefits of good governance cannot be overstated. The governed will have no cause to ding on to pedestrian sentiments, if they are covered by the "insurance policy" of equal treatment.

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Endnotes

1. Bluwey, Gilbert Keith, UndelSlanding Intemational Relations, Accra: Yamens Press, 2003, p.17.

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