189

CHAPTER SIX

ASTHE THIRD CTVILIAN GOVERNOROF GONGOI.A STATE, OCTOBERTO DECEMBE& 1983.

6.I INTRODUCTION l. GONGOI-A STATE UNDER COL. MUHAMMADUIEGA The General Murtala Mohammed Administration created Gongola State in February 1976 along with six other states. The state had Lt. Col. Muhammadu Jega (now Major General Rtd.) as its fust Military Governor. To all Gongolans, the creation marked the beginning of social, economic and political challenges leading to general development.

Carved out of the defunct North-Eastem State (comprising former Bauchi, Adamawa, Borno and Sardauna Provinces) and part of Benue-Plateau State (i.e. the former Wukari Division), Gongola State had a land mass of 102,068 sq kilometers which made it the second latgest state in the Federation. It is located within latitude 11" South and longitude 9%"West and 14" East with a projected population of 4.6 million people (1983). Gongola State shared comnon borders with Plateau and Benue sates.

Seven administrative divisions comprising Adamawa, Numan, Mubi, Wukari; Ganye, Jalingo and Sardauna made up the state at its inception. At the initial stage, the st2te capital, Yola, and all the seven adrninistrative headquarters had few or no modern infrastructutal faciiities. Mosi facilities therefore had to be developed from scratch in all parts of the sate. To this end, a Task Fotce Committee was esablished undet the chaitmanship of Alhaji Abubakar Abdullahi @aban Larai) to scout for both of6ce and residential iccommodation for the more than 5,000 civil servants deployed to the state.

Similarly, the committee had to device means of srilizilg 6axi6fly, the few movable assets inherited from the former North-Eastern State. The Task Force Committee sarted by declaring all provincial as well as divisional offices vaczrnt and re-allocated them to ministries. Equally, houses of provincial staff went to top civil servants. This exercise had its problems as Yola, a hitherto small provincial headquarter, with a small river merchandise depog was suddenly forced to accommodate a capacity population far more than it could cope with at short notice. With the acute shortage of both of6ce and residential accommodation, officers had to sleep in their cars or use school buildings while others were compelled to stay in sub-urban areas like Numan, Gombi, Mayo- Belwa and other towns quite far away from Yola. As for office accommodation, 190 BisaPb aJNE . (DR.) BAMANGA TUKU& CON

senior officers had to share offices with their subordinates' This uncomfortable situation forced the Task Force Committee to rent sub-standard houses ol erect temporary, cottugated Lon sheet structules to house civil servants as well as provide ofEce accommodation.

The problem of accommodation was further compounded by a sudden rise in the ctst of living in the new state. Prices of commodities went up, with people making brisk businesses through exorbitant hotel and rent charges in Yola mettofolis. This ptoblem forced government to embark on the construcdon of 50b senior houses by worthy contractors within the shortest "td lotio. possible time, within the state capital. In the pdvate sector, a lot of well-to-do people, both within and outside the state capital embarked on the construction tf ho..ses which were subsequently rented to government and public servants' Thus began the population and infrastructural growth of Yola under the leadetshil of Col. MuhammaduJega and his lieutenants. Apart from his civilian .o--i..ioner., Col. Babatunde Idiagbon Q-ater Maior General and Chief of Staff under the Buhari administration now late) served in the cabinet as Brigade Commander of 15" Mechanized Brigade, Yola.

The political climate in the state had been largely dictated by several factors' Thes'. f^.tors include among others the desire for quick infrastructural development, the heterogeneity of the various et}nic gtoups in the state, the literacy level of these people and indeed the genetal topography of the state' One hlstorical landmark af the early stage of its development was the 1976 local government feforms, which brought about the creetion of 17 local government Ireas. The councils were: Yola, Fufore, Mayo-Belwa, Ganye, Numan, Gul'uk, lVukari, Song, Gombi, Mubi, Michika, Zng, Jahngo, Karim I-amido,'Takum, Ba[Ld Sardauna. This noble task was undertaken by an ad-hoc committee headed by the then Commissionet fot I-ocal Government and Social Development, Alhaii Mamman Bayero.' The administrative structure of the sate remained so until the Second Republic further btoken into 40 local goverrunents (1979-1983)'O^tde/Juta when the state u/as d*itrg ,t. administmtion. Although it was sttongly argued in c.rtaii qoa.t.t. that 40 local governments could not be managed successfi'r'lly d.r. to th. states' lean resources, yet the creation went a long s/ay to satisfr the politicel yearnings of the people who considered it a positive move towards i*"1 d.rr.lop-.nt. The local govelffnents wete however short-Iived' No sooner had Maior Genetal Muhammadu Buhari (Rtd) seized power in December 1983 than the 40 local governments were reYerted to their former 17 in a nation-wide te-organization. This remained so until President Ibrahim Badimasi Babangida created four more' The Local governments are: Gashaka, Yorro, Hong and Maiha' foundation for By the timi Col. Jega was redeployed in July 1978, a solid Gongola's infrastructural development had been 1aid. The civil service was As tbe tbird Cioilian Governor of Gongola State, Octobet - December, 198i 191

strearnlined, while housing projects like Karewa and Dougirei GRAs, Bekaji Housing Estate, including additional lovz cost houses went a long way to ease the previous problem of official residence for civil servants. It is on record thatJega started the State Secretariat, opened the College of Preliminary Studies, College of Education Jalingo and Staff Training Centre Numan. It was during his tenure that private schools and hospitals were taken over by government- He also set up the School of Nutsing and Midwiferl', Yola, and started township roads in Wukari, Numan, Mubi, Yola, Gombi, Jalingo, and Ganye. Col. Jega would also be remembered for starting theJimeta rWater Treatment Plant which today has been expanded to serve both Jimeta and Yola metropolis- Col. Jega's Chief Adviser was Alhaji Hamidu Alkali who was the first Secretary to the Military Government in Gongola State. Alhaii Abubakar Girei later took over as Secretary to the Military Government when Alhaji Hamidu Alkali relinquished his office. ii. BRIGADIERMAHMUDUISTRANSITIONAIADMINISTRATION Brigadier A.R.A. Mahmudu fi,td.) took over the mande of office from Col. MuharirmaduJega (X.td.) as Military Administrator. His barely one year in office ensuted a smooth transition to civil rule in October 1979. lfithin this short period, he initiated the setting up of Gongola Bteweries and ensured the completion of Dougirei Lodge. He also built the defunct House of Assembly Complex and commissioned many basic health projects and water schemes. It was during his tenure that both the Numan and Jimeta bridges were commissioned.

Brigadiet Mahmudu had the privilege of hosting General Olusegun Obasanjo (X.td.) during his farewell tour to all the states of the Federation.o It was Brigadier A.R.A. Mahmudu who passed the baton of leadetship to Alhaji Abubakar Barde, the First Civilian Governor of Gongola State in the Second Republic at an imptessive ceremony on 1" Octobet, 1979. Thatwas the Gongola State inherited by Bamanga Tukur.

6.2 PARTY POLITICS IN GONGOLA STATE 1979-1983 Gongola State is made up of about sixty different ethnic groups, most of which are equally sized.u Amongst these, the Fu.lani ethnic group is often regarded as the "dominant" ethnic group. Because of the difficulty in obtaining information on the relative population sizes of the various ethnic groups, here we consider a "dominant" group from a sociological and economic viewpoint as one, which more than any other group in the state controls political and economic power.

!(/hen the ban on political activities was lifted in 1978, the most important political institution to be created by the 1979 Constitution was political parties. More than fifty political associations emerged, but the then military government through the Fedeml Electoral Commission €EDECO) selected four, which were accorded recognition 792 BiogruPb ,/ALH. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN namely, The National Party of Nigeria (NPlg; the Nigerian Peoples Party (f{PP); the Unity i'arty of Nigeria (UPN); and the Peoples Redempdon Party (PRP)' Of these fout were undisguised re-incarnations of the three that ruled -th.p^rti.s, th. first tlree Parties .ount y f.o- 1952-1965. Two of them wete led by the same leaders, namely, UPN and the Nbp. AII the three were ethnically and regionally based in the three former regions (North, West and East) and were dominated by the three so-called "major" .aIoi. gtoop.. The fourth party was a re-incarnation of the most radical opposition party i;the;ld Northern Region, the Nonhern Elements Progressive Union Q"lEPtf , ied by the late Mallam Aminu Kano. Latet, the NPP broke into two factions: the NPP and the Great Nigeria People Party (GNPP). The former was led by Dr' Nnamdi Azikiwe and the iatter by Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri. Both were given recognition by FEDECO.U Bamanga Tukur belonged to the NPN, an offshoot of the former NPC Q.{orthern Peoples Congress).

Gongola State, like other states created in 1976, witnessed active party politics only in the S-econd Repub[c, october 1979 to December 1983. Because of the hetetogeneity of the ethnic gioups in the state, all the five political parties were represented' However, the power tussle was mainly between the GNPP, UPN and the NPN out of which the GNPP was victorious, largely as a tesult of the interplay of ethnic and religious politics' The membetship of theie political parties was determined, to Yarying degrees, by role' ethnicity and religion. Party obiectives, Programmes or promises played very litde For example, thi membership of the UPN varied ethnically, but religiously it was predominandy Christian.

The NPN was seen by the non-Fulani and Christian groups as a replica of the former Northern Peoples congtess (fiPC) and because of the NPC's stfong attachment to the Fulani aristocracy, Islam and theNative-Au*rority, the party came to be identified with the Fulani and Islam. In general, it was seen as a party of the feudal aristocracy, bureauctats, contractors, successful businessmen and some of the well-to-do or privileged persons ftom the other ethnic groups in the state. Similady, Muslims dominated the membership of the NPN. This is however a general.ization'

Gongola State u/as Another interesting aspect of the contemporary politics of .the leadetship alignmeits iir the various political parties. As a rule, this was influenced by ethnic ani reigious considerations. Each party, for example, had to make sure that if its from the southetn part of Gongola gubernatorial iandidate was a Muslim ".rd.a-. State (the state is divided into two, north and south, by the river Benue) his running mate had to be a Christian ftom the northern part of the state and vice-versa. Similad if the gubernatorial candidate was a Fulani Muslim from the Southern part of the state, his running mate had to be a non-Fulani Christian from the Northern part of the sate. This was the practice in 1979 and in 1983, a practice of balancing ethnic and religious equation to increase a party's chances of winning. ln 1979 for example, Alhaji Abubakar Barde who is a "Fulberised"' non-Fulani Muslim (lVlumuye ethnic group) from the southern part of the state was chosen as the GNPP gubernatorial candidate and his running mate was Mr. Wilberforce B. Juta, a Christian from the Njanyi ethnic As tbe tbird Cioilian Gooernor of Gongola State, Octobet - Decembal9S3 193 group north of the Benue. V/hen Bamanga became the flagbearer of the NPN, he chose Mr. David Barau, a Christian from the nortlernzone to be his deputy.

The gubernatorial elections were very important because people wanted somebody at the top who would be sympathetic to their cause while the House of Assembly elections were regarded as an act of sending a representative from one's constituency, village or ethnic/rel.igious group to Yola who would try and bring as much development as possible. The Senatorial and House of Reptesentatives elections were considered of less importance because their impacts were hardly felt or visible in the constituencies.

E- AD ISTRATION This Administration, which lasted four years, was headed byAlhaji Abubakar Barde with Mr. \CB. Iuta as his deputy and latet as the second civilan governor of Gongola State @{ay-Sept.1983). Mr. Paul ITampana Vimtim became the 6rst speaker. Other members of the State House of Assemblywere: Mr. Godwin Puldu, Deputy Speaker and Ml S.D. Nyapuri who held the office of the Majority leader. Mr. Renold Bayero Hungushi was the Chief Adviser and the frst secretary to the government. Aftet his death, two other people served as Secretary to Government. They were: Dr. Bala J. Takaya and Dr. UsmanJalingo. The actions and achievements o[ the administration were a reflection of, and a fulfillment of, their campaign promises. During GovernorBarde's tenure, some remarkable and indelible progress was made in terms of the physical development of Gongola State.

Some of the programmes articulated and executed by the administtation include: the creation of 40 local governments to ensute grasstoots development; the abolition of Jangali (cz:ttle tax) and slashing of poll tax to N5.00 pet taxable adult. Other projects started during the period include: Yola Modern Abattoir, the re-awarding of the Secretariat contmct, the High Court Complex, the construction of more than 30 health centres and initiating the building of 100-bed hospital each at Zing and Michika. The Batde adminisration also initiated the reconstruction and tarring of Sebore-Binyeri, Mubi-Mayobani, Jebbi Lamba-Sorau, Takum-Kashimbilla as well as Garba Chede- Mutumbiyrr roads.

In the field of agriculture, the administtation purchased and distributed tractors and sarted work on a state-ou/ned cooperative bank, which later became known as the Highland Bank with an authorized capital share of N6 Million.

In the utilities secto! the provision of wzter to the tural populace was pursued with vigour. Elevated u/atet tanks vere built in Mubi, Hong, Jimeta, Fufote, Numan, Guprk, Ganye, Jalingo and Vukari. Numerous hand pump boteholes wete also drilled in the rural vi.llages to provide 'yater to enimals and humans while electriciry was supplied to many parts of the state through the Rural Electrification Board. 794 B;qrEb oJ Nl{. (DR.) BAMANGA TUXU& coN

Another priority area of the administration was in the education sectcjr. The administation sarted the Advanced Teachers' College, Hong, Islamic Teachers' College at Song and it opened up 17 new day secondary schools. The Special Education Centre atJada stated in 1982. Of the present indusries in the state, the administration awarded the contract for the building of Yola International Hotel and the commissioning of the Burnt Bricks Factory and GongolaTomato Industries at Mubi and Lau respectively.

The Batde/Juta administration seemed to have had too short a time to concretise most of the projects already initiated. \X/hen it was time to tidy up the various political gains and show a formidable front to the electorate for te-election, Party factionalisation crept ifl to deal the Batde's administration a lethal blo.x Thus when Barde stepped rJ7ilbeforce down as GNPP governor towards the end of the administration, Mr. B. Juta, his deputy took over. Batde recontested election on the platform of the NPP but could not get the mandate of the electorate. During the polls of 1983, Gongolans decided to try yet anotler party, the National Party of Nigeria, with yet anothet new leadet in the person of Alhali Bamanga M. Tukur The smooth change over of leadership between Mr. !(ilberforce Juta and Alhaji Bamanga Tukur was a clear testimony of politics without bitterness in Gongola State.

6,3 THE EMERGENCE OF ALHAJI BAMANGA M. TUKUR ON THE POLITICALSCENE. One may be wondering what philosophies of life Bamanga Tukur imbibed that has made his family life, business and politics such a phenomenal success. It is therefote, important to state here what he considers as his own philosophy of life generally which some of his colleagues and subordinates oiten refer to as the BMT RULES: There isi 1. NOKNOWLEDGEWITHOUTHUMILITY; 2 . NO COMMERCE 'J/ITHOUT CONSCIENCE; 3. NOIUEALTHWITHOUTTTORK; 4. NOAFFLUENCETTITHOUTQUESTION;AND 5. NOPOLITICSMTHOUTPRINCIPLES.

As a young man, Bamanga was always vocal. In school, he and his peets read widely about and emulated the views, politics, philosophies and principles of Nigeria's founding fathers and politicians such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Ahmadu Bello. They were somehow mobilized and sensitized in the struggle for independence from the British colonialists. Bamanga's eady shot at Politics was premised on the desire to make his own conribution towards the process of decolonization. Thus, in 1959, he contested as an independent candidate because the NPC did not want him to contest. When Bamaga wanted to contest the 1959 elections, his father told him, "I will not advise you or send you to do politics' Listen to your elders." Bamanga replied saying, "Daddy, these people are not Progressive enough." His fathet left him alone and Bamanga went ahead. The reason according to hi m was, "most As tbe tbird Cioilian Go

us 0f ,ts slrrs 0f tbe ettablisbnett were stpposed to be rcen as pro-establi ment. B* it reali4' nme of iere nof.llh vere against shrrre atPecfi of lhe sJsten. So nbenI contested against the NPC candidate as an independent candidate, I was regarded as a rebel at that tin/', Isa Nbada cLLtuned agaifisl bi| tbe Aaiott Gmtp. lne sbared lbe same positiort father; Albaji Mabnttd Nbadl nfur the pbfom of of changefron the status qto."

Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur's interestin politics therefore, dates back to tl)e Flst Republic. tn fqSg, he contested for the post of a Representative in the Nothern House of Reptesentatives as an independent candidate. Initially he was to contest the election on the platform of the NPC in Yola but was denied the oPPorturity. Consequendy, he left Yola forJada, at the last minute, to contest the election along with four others, namely: Mr. Philip Maken who contested on the platform of the Action Group (AG); Mallam Hammawa Danaba OJPC); Mr. Tuli Ayante (i'JEPQ; and Mr' Abubakar GunxnPavo G\PC).

In Nigeria, very few public officers retire with discernible achievements on the trail of thek services and .adarlroorr. The issue at sake is that material acquisition tends to be the overriding aspiration of most public officers; hence they de-emphasize public image and 6ansparint record in the putsuit of selfish interest. This trend notwithstanding, a few conicientious officers can be identiEed ftom the morass of self-seeking functionaries. Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, &e former Chief Executive of the Nigerian Ports Authority belongs to a different league having offered twenty-three years of meritorious service to the nation. For seven years, he was NPA Chief Execudve.

leave, which was In July 1982, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur proceeded on his terminal pripu rory to his retirement. One striling dimension to Alhaii Bamanga Tukur's inviable careet is that he quit *re service, his exalted position and perquisites of office voluntarily. This was not a common trait at this time in the life of the Nigerian nation, when public officials would alter their dates of birth in ordef to cling on to public office endlessly.

The soft-spoken and outgoi''g NPA Chief Executive is an epitome of those scatce qualities which Nigeria yeatns for in its arduous struggles to evolve a purposefirl socio- eionomic order where accountabilig reliability and altruism would reign supreme.

People like Alhaji B.M. Tukur ate needed in today's political framework to motivate othirs and galvanize the warring ideological vie$/points so as to evolve a ditection conducive for enduring economic and political growth. \rith these strings of excellent credentials, it is no wonder that Alhaii Bamanga Tukur went into politics immediate\ after his retirement. 196 Biwapb of AJ-}I. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY ALHAJI BAMANGA MOHAMMED TUKUR INJADA ON MONDAY1611l AUGUST 1982. Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur joined the National Party of Nigeria to contest for the seat of the Governor of Gongola State. The reason he gave for his choice of party is that having come from an NPC background, the NPN was t}re most relevant party for him. Below ate excerpts of his press briefing:

Gentbmen of lbe Press,

Yot mEt mall tbat uhen I held a Prest Conference in Lzgos ott lYedletdal 2f of fu!, 1952, I annomad tbe faet of m1 uhntary retiremetu from tbe nmices oJ tbe NPA tbdt s?anned orer ty| dtcadcs. I also indicated rflJ intefltiol lo rett rn t0 mJ horrre state Gongoh" Sina tbat date, we baw nahtained a ptqling attd stldied tihnce oaer otrjtture intentions.

For manl'1ears, arld ?ior t0 the anrroucement of m1 tohnlary retirement, ye bad met yitb wriou fulgationsJron all our the state regarding tbe diterkldtingsocio-uorcmic well beingof the citiqetts of the state arrd tbe ap?arent lzck of purposeful ba&rsbip.

Afer du conmltation with oarpeopb throryho tbe state and indted tlteJe&ration, I am resolaey' uitb tbeirmandate to seeknominaiion as thefag bearer of owgreatpa@, The National ParTl of Nigzna-

in Gorgok S taa in thefortbcoming 1 9 8 ) grbertatoial ehction.

MaJ I, tbereJore, reiqe tbit WonuniA h sllicit tbe masiae srpport and cooperatiot of all well-mearitg ?eo?h 0f this state and in partic*kr of all lhe nenbers of otrgreatpatl,

Uke Nigeia, Goryola State is nadt @ of diferent ethnic and religiots grorps. M1 expeience atd achieument at the national hul has sbonr that il it potsible to sbou that there is strength in this dit ersity.

Tbe tean spiit l bare inmhated as tbe team leader in the Nigeian Potu AtthoiE has bnn desnibed, euen 12 otr traditiotal oP?onerltr, ar,tot onb comnetdabb b also secord to noru.

It creatirrg thir s?iit, I baue bad to work witb, arld glifu, a tean tbat was nadt tp of Nigeians and foreigners oJ dffirent ethnic, profexional, religiols, philos@bical backgromfu and leadtgs.

I intend to harness this qt4afiu, ex?erierrce, nethodology and internatiotal connections in tbe rrvice of mJ state.

Tbanklo*. Albaji Ban anga Mo hamme d Trkm lada, Congola S tate. 16/8/82. As tbe tlid Cittilian Gooetaot of Gongola State, Octobel - Decen be\ 19&3 197

6.4 NOMINATION There is an old adage, which says that leaders are born not made. This has been proved time and again by those who eventually teach the pinnacle of their careers and by those \r/ho are entrusted with national responsibilities. Although life itself has ups and downq the difference with these people is that there is something smooth about the way tlrey climb to the top. Undoubtedly, there is also some dint of hard u/ork to it and a kind of eagerness to render selfless service to t}le people.

On the 23d of October 1982, Alhaii Bamanga M. Tukur was nominated to contest the 1983 gubernatorial election in Gongola State on the platform of the National Party of Nigeria QrIPI\Q. " Wh"t moti,r"ted him to seek the nomination was the feeling that Gongola State needed a new group of experienced, energetic and result-otiented leaders who could clearly identi!, the complex problems facing the sate (especially its backwardness in terms of development compared to a neighbouring state like Bauchi) and 6nd immediate solutions to them. With credentials that were nationally recognized, Aihaji Bamanga Tukur had the firm conviction that he could make an impact if he was given the opportunity to steer the ship of Gongola State. Eleven people contested . during the nomination exercise but only five were prominent. These include: Professor Iya Abubakar (a Fulani/Muslim ftom Mubi); Alhaji Bamanga Tukur (a Fulani/Muslim fromJada); Alhaji Bashiru Yahaya Hong (a Kilba/Muslim &om Hong); Professor Sa'ad Abubakar (a Fulani/Muslim from Jalingo); and Mr. Edward Aleideino (a Bwate/Christian from Numan), A[ except Mr. Edward Aleideino, were Muslims, wh.ile tlree were Fulani- It u/as speculated that Mr. Edward Aleideino was sponsored by the President, Alhaii Shehu Shagari, following a tip that only a Christian candidate could win the gubernatorial elections on the ticket of the NPN in Gongola State. In the preliminaries, three out of the five (Professor Sa'ad Abubakar, Alhaii Bashiru Hong, and Professor Iya Abubakat) lost the batde and in &e 6nal election, Alhafi Bamanga Tukur won the nomination.

RESULTS OF NPN GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES, OCTOBE& 1982

MI f.t-^rcs NUMAN AIIAMAVA MIIBI vtjx r TMInt IrqrAr T% TlEt{ rE- E hlh. &M. Tlru E08rU T+:66r01 Trr, (ro.8t-l 2r5 (15.81) | 4t5 r59l9l t,?J9 55.3% Ta MI?E!@trtfltrtt l3 086"4 I 46 0.m/,) %p1.6\ 114vo I rE fr5z,) ,ts lt6% tt EI[tEn t1r6 Tx 0"0r"/") 72("h) I | 06.tP,) I lro80Eo/d l1l205y") l TP*- ryirr,rm I ao.t4"/,1 l410.6r.l E4 EilI@I llW"A ll.slo---lno"/r 88 I ,?r. EB mrirlrltt ll l1\tv) | tr6t_4.9?h) t O6D T6 0./, T16 p.?t%) lnt-f 5i1.^ C6 ilEGilIEE 2 p.D^) t p.1yh !l!2j.4r -T!ol T.----l tB | 3.1u/" Ea E@[it!F.!rrrt 0 0/, 2 (03t^) I (0.57.) l7 (2819") 56 .t----1Lt-]%- (0.86"/") (o.cPl") -T14-l r l"l,. Bitu x"id 6 0 ronrn"/") f s e$"/d n 14% rLNh.libmAnfri 0 (cPl") 0 (v") 40.61r/r) t1lz.tyl L T16 Tor% ITIED.. s Ab.b"l- I ll. u Ti----_-l 11 1x 11- IEIEAlh. Umsrkr, f\r,-rrd* --T v,dd* !!EL* T\r,r,h&*--Tv-rd^--f w-^ * g1 650 597 500 I h". SOURCE: FEDECO, YOI-A. -r-rY 198 Bio.qnoby I AJ-f{. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

6.5 DAVIDBA.RAU: ASYMBOLOFRENAISSANCEINGONGOLA. On his nomination as the NPN gubernatorial candidate for Gongola Sate in October 1982, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur made a pledge. He promised to involve the youths in the state in his administration once elected. He also said that he would place the civil servants in a position to appreciate the need for the development of the state.

Shordy before the NPN 1983 election campaign was launched in Yola, Alhaji Bamanga called a news confetence to announce a surprise package. He told anxious newsmen that he was finflIing the pledge he had made, fust of all in the mannet in which his running mate was selected. He announced that Ml David Barau had been chosen as his ruoning mate.

Mr. David Batau should really be described as a young man because he was just 35 years then. Until his selection, he was Assistant Chief State Auditor-General in the Gongola State civil service.

He was born on the 6* of June, 1948 zt Bazzl-'tn Madzi Local Government Area of Gongola State. He had his primary education in his home town. He later went to Villanova Secondery School, Numan where he obained his school certificate in 1969. Thereafteq he attended Kaduna Polytechnic where he bagged a Diploma in Accountancy. He had had mote than 10 years experience on the iob as an accountant before his nomioation.

Thete was another angle to the nomination of Mr. David Barau as Alhali Bamanga Tukur's running mate- It was a well known fact that Gongola State was a state of diverse gtoups and interests. In arriving at any sound polit-ical decision, this peculiarity must be taken into account. Therefore, the nomination of Mr. Barau had adequately aken into consideration the NPN's zoning policy as he came from 3 different Senatorial District from that of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur. And in terms of religiorq while Alha ji Bamanga is a Muslem, his runningmate is a Christian.

The good blend is cerainly a much more constructive w2y of examining the situation in Gongola Stzte. And this must be preferred to the crude ethnic politics being played by the UPN and the GNPP in the state. Itwas the ambition of Alhaji Bamanaga Tukur and his running mate, Mr. David Barau to establish a problem-solving government and not a problem-creating govetnment tlnt their opponents sought to impose on the people of Gongola State. Alhaji Bamanga and Mr. Barau symbolized anew spirit of re-awakening in Gongola State.

6.6 EIECTIONEERINGCAMPAIGNS, JT'NE198}SEPT.1983 As the campaigns for elections were going on, NPN knew that the PPP was a spent force,leaving the struggle between the NPN and the UPN. The members of the NPN as well as Reverend Sabiya (the gubernatorial candidate for the UPNI) knew that the Reverend was handicapped in the predominandy Musl.im areas of the state. Thc mcre As tbe tbild Cioilian Gooetnor of Gongola State, October - DecernbeLl2!7 19 mention of the tide Reverend to Muslims just as the mention of Imam to Christians instinctively produced a psychological effect in the minds of the electorates against such a candidate due to religious chauvinism or fanaticism. a. CAMPAIGNSLOGANS Some of BamangaTukur's campaign slogans ran like this: 'Yoar mte far Bamanga Trktr is aote for Prlgre$ Giuelorr aote to tbe NPN a b1 so doingyoa are tharting a new coarseforprogress it Gangola S tak".

'Thefiture of Gongoh State uill be dttenzined @yrr nte. Ciae that wte to Bamanga Trkurand tbe NPN nrill leadloz into a new Heauer oJ deaelopnent".

'?ipe-borne water, elutrici!, good roads ard abmdafi edtcartonalfacilities are withillot reach once Bamanga Trfuir and tbe NPN are ruted into ofice in Gongola S tate".

'Forloa as a uoter, the issru in 1983 is: lYbo will aansfomt Gongola State into a land of innense opportmilfor all? Barde basfrittered awal his own chance to do so. Tbe UPN it an accomplice. After tbe faihre tbereJore lbe choice is narroaed down to Bamanga Ttkttr standirgon theplafom of the NPN".

"Gouernor Tatai Ali of Barcbi State and hit tean af dedicated Connistiotters and top jmctionaiu baue metic ou! duigned a progranne af neaningful dcaekpnent Ewn otr political @ponents baue te#ifed to tbeJad tbat Batchi S ate is one of tbe nost dtaeloped S tates ir thefederation, lVbatwe are talirgis that if we diditin Baubi S late, notbingwill stop trs fron peforming tbe sameJeal in Gongok. lVe posxss tbe expeiena. lVe uek to rtplace the Barde Adniristration because we nou uant to tranfarn lur state intl a bearcn of deaekpmenl"."

BAMANGA TUKUR B BE,NEVOLENT A ADMINISTRATOR M MODEST A AGRICULTUfuA,LIST N NATIONALIST G GENTLE ACCOMMODATING T TALENTED U UNDERSTANDING K KNOWLEDGEABLE U UNIFIER R RESPECTFUL 200 Biasra?b aJ AJ-t{. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR' coN

B. CAMPATGN LAUNCH: TUESDAY 5'* APRrL 83 (YOI-A) GONGOLA STATE: THE MOMENT OF DECISION. Excerpts from the speech delivered bv Alhaii Bamanga Tukur, NPN Gubernatorial Candidate, Gongoh State at the launch of the NPN 1983 Campaign in Yola on April 5' 1983 by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Athaji Shehu Aliyr Shagari. This same day, President Shehu Shagari also launched his ambitious National Housing Program in Yola as part of the Campaign strategy citing impressive list of his administration's presence in Gongola State, e.g. Federal Secretariat, Police Headquarters, Yola Airport, Mambilla Plateau Dam etc. Others present at the occasiofl were Chief Adisa Akinloye, QIIPN National Chairman); Senator Uba Ahmed, (rlPN National Secretary); and Alhaji (Dr) Umatu Dikko, (Chakman NPN Presidential Campaign Organization).

The speech: Sinn tbe latprinary in October lzstlear, we haae indeed come a lottgwal. First andforer ost,I like t0 rEort tbat ofi rtate ffirs a fipial exanph of boa patg nen who tiedfor the position t0 te?resent the pa@ unk all tbeir dffirenas and todalt are working together to enssre that an NPN gotetnment is installedin ffice cone October thiryear

It it tbir tllidantfrlnt that bar proud to be otrgreatest atset in Congola S tate.

Lzdies and Genthmen, thepo is drying. Now tbefsh i in afutih shuggleJor stniual. The CNPP otr phose back Gournor Barde rofu into power is todal witho followers. The incunbent hinself is a Chief Exeaiiw groping in the dark He is lookingfor anlther?lliticalparlJ uith whicb he canpihh hit canp,

He sorybtrefuge in the UPN ard be pas rebtfed. Now be is sttinningitr tbeNPP rotgh wa*rs. So, botb tbe part tbat brotgbt bin into pouer and binself are rcw in the same boat and tbry know tbat the weather is ury rotgbfor tben to stal flaat.

lYbat bas conpouded their problen i: tbat the peoph of Gottgola S tate baue apened tbeir diary of grieaanm against the present adnini ratiott i the $ate. Or hop ebe can one explain it? Chief Obafeni Awokwo, in bit recent political farewell uisit to Gorgola State obsemed that this state bad ttothirg to showfor it in terms of derekpnent

Tlte pwph oJ Gongola an paniafur! tpset that in 1979, the GNPP and Gouenor Afubakar BardeJed tbcn vitb mg promies and it tbree and a balf yars, ,tcither the ?an) nor tlte inatmbefi gowrror hadfllflbd atrl of thoseproaisu. lYben made, there were ittfact tto plans tofulfilltben.

Asares tof thi, Gongola State co dnot htild nea scbools in spite of a rononical iv in the number of childnn of scbool age and regardhss of pqik neking admission ifio post-pinary insfilvions Bcsidu, lbere i no pipe-bortte pater and rural ehclrif cation pmgranne is non-eistenl.

Gongola S tate is essential! a slate n ilb natural resotrcesfor massite agriaitural dcuelopnent As tbe tbird Cioilian Gooernor of Gongola State, October - December, 1983 201

Mr. Pnsidert, wbilelosrgowrnnentat lbe centre,rar? rt ingtbe ladabhprogranme of nabinglhts com@ ulf-stfficient infood and raw mateiakprodactio4 thepreserttglacrrrment ifl o rstate bere )var purs*ing o tbe r p ast-lines.

The peoph know that whatever tbere is in lbis state, it is as a ru t of lour b.ind guttre ta rPreadJosr gouernmenl's derelopnerl efons n all tbe nooks and nanties of this cotnlry. A testimonl to tbis was the fad thal1ol lancbedlonr gownment's anbiiots and bigb! commendable botsing ?rogramme igblt'ron here itt Gongola S ta*.

lYbat ue seek to do is stald orl thefvundativnlot batte laid in lbis rtate and exrc te Prvgrammes that will transform tbe liws of on peoph. And I baue no dotbt in n1 nind that o*rpeopk ,tdernzfld tbir nissior of ours. Tbry hate bun demonstrating this mderstanding $t leaaing tbeir aaiotts political parties atd declaingtheir supportfor the NPN.

Those wbo have demonslrated tbat thry bate no ca?aci/ to nb will still be very nrch arosnd rrben fl'e be7in t0 it rProue the lots of orr peoph. On con ictiott it thal potable uater an in-aliexabh igbt of nery citiqin. lYe aka belietu tbat in the presert dalt Nigeia, eaery aillage, etery banlet, not to talk of towns, mut be proaided with electici4,.

Oarstate h in cltittgnud oJ schoob ad qmlitatiu eduation. These, we sballproide n'ithott looking ba&. It addition to all these, we shall notefast to introdue a new bealth scbeme, wbih utill be secotd to fiofie-

pitb Mr Pre:ide*,fetloupafll men and women, it nal soud supefltott to tE tbat Gongoh is a:tate diaera ethnic grottps. Bst I basten to add that otr state and its peEle are rcw enbtatitrgthe idtals the NPN oand"sfor. And thati,tniA in ditersi!. Oarttiew is thdt itis 0 tnndedpolitical shategy toplqt ap the pe@h': ethnic dfferenus in order to gain a refitimefltdl efitrJ itto ofice. This is a negatiw approach. It bas neaernbed an-ltprobbm. Ratbet, it bas alway complicated malters.

On tbe otber hand, ue beliet'e that ru natler the poltical utting tbeparamomt isrue is groap interest. Also, il is ottr contentiot that agoodgoaernnent sbozld be able toprotideJor all in order to d*enphasiT.e and if possiblc to tota@ remote tbe mmplaints of relatiue depiuahott.

Therefore, lbe Nationat Pafl1 of Nigeria's pincipb of ensningboi(ontal and,ertical inuoluement of dfferentgroups in the afairs of this com@ bas ince becone apE aridea itt Gorgola State.

hue and n7 it haue In sbart, we strorg! beliere in tbe pa@ts Toning gsten. Tbose wbofrst nade a of since turned back to adopt thepoliE, lf 0il1 in diferent teminolqiu.

In conclgsion, I assne yo\ Mn Pretident and all nl fellow pargt nen attd womett, that tbe political weather in Gongola S tale isfarorabh to *.

Ortr pledge is tbat we shatl not lzt tbe peEb of this state dowtt. The NPN is rottt all out to makt Gorgoh the nadb oJ good gouenment and tlte centre of mpruedented uonomh &uelopment

Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukut 202 BiasaPb of ALt{. (DF..) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

6.7 ELECTIONS The 1983 elections were hody contested by two patties, the NPN and the UPN, because most of the members of the governing GNPP party decamped to the Peoples Progressive Party @PP), an offshoot of the NPP, which FEDECO tefused to recognize, theteby weake ning the GNPP

For the 1983 elections, the NPN had Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, a Fulani fromJada in the soutl-rern part of the state, as gubernatorial candidate and David Bzrat, z Higi and Christian from the northern part as his running mate. The UPN had Reverend Wilson Sabiya, a Kilba and a Christian from the northern part of Gongola, as the gubernatorial candidate and Alhaji Aliy,u Njidda Samsu, a Chamba and a Muslim from the southern part, as his running mate. On the other hand, the PPP had Alhaji Abubakat Barde who hails from the southern part of the state as its gubernatorial candidate and Javan J. Ahmadu, a Njanf and a Christian from the northern part of the state as his running mate.

As the struggle for the acquisition of power between the PPP, UPN and the NPN was drawing nearer and nearer to election period, the UPN and the PPP made moves to merge and edge out the NPN as was the case in 1979. The merger however failed to materialize because neither Barde nor Sabiya was prepared to step down for the other. It is, however, not certain tlat the merger could have changed the outcome of the election. The gubernatorial election which was held on August 6 was won by the NPN even though the UPN claimed and even later ryent to court to challenge the verdict of FEDECO, but lost. The NPN had also won all the elections of the five senatoria.l seats, all the 2l seats in the House of Representatives and sixty two out of the sixty three seats in the State House of Assembly.

6.8 DECI.ARA'TIONOFRESULTSANDHANDINGOVER

I-,adies ard Gefilemen,

Haaing colhcted and anallqed all tlte res x of tbe polls canied o in tbe Ctbernatoial Election here h Gorrgola State of Nigeria, on tbc 1f dtJ of Aryrst, 198), I, UnaruA@r beirg tbe ChieJ Rrtuning Oficerfor tbe Grbernatoial Ehctior in the state, now fomal! anrounce the rumber of uohs eacb Ctbenatoial contestant oJ tbe tix politicalparties bat rueciued asfollowt: s/NO CANDIDATES PARTY VOTESKECORDED 1. Mr Futus Bagtk GAIPP 21,143 2. Mr Elkanab Cbabai NAP 9,247 t. Alb. Bananga M. Tukur A?N t00,207 4. Ah. AfubakarA. Barde AIPP 197,474 5. Alb. Saltu Abonbi PRP 12,2i4 6. Rca. lYibon S abla UPN 347,463 As tbe tbird Civilitn Gooernor of Gongola State, Ocrobet - Dccenbe\ 19?3 203

2 Albqi Bananga M. Ttbtr tbe Cfienatorial Candidatefor tbe National Parl1 of Nigeria

ha: satisfed tbe protisiors of Sectiot 1 64, Sfi-Seaion 7 oJ the Cotstitntion of the Fedtral P'rPsiln of Nigeria fo scoingmt on! tbe bighest nrnber of uotr cast dlittg tbc Ehctilr, b also scored at bast one qufier of the total ntes cast in at bast tn o-thirfu oJ tbe ntenteen localgoterrmed areas of Congoh State. Tbe second candidate, Rcr.lYikon Sablya (UPN) bas scored 250k of tbe total totes cast or more in 10 ltca/ goaernment areas. Ex-Gouenror Ab akarBardt of (NPP) snred 25o/o ormore in 5 lacalgowrtment areas.

3. I artifi that, baing canied out m1 dbies atd tbeformalities reqtired of ne fot tbe Ehaoral Act (1982) atd in afiordance titlt tbe proi:ions of Section 164, tub-*aiol 7 of the Corstitttion of tbe Federal RQfilic of Nigeria (979), Albqii Banarya M. Trktr bas bem &mocratica@ ebaed Cotentor of Congola State. And on behaf of tbe Fedcral Ehdoral Commission, Gongola State Bratch, I berefo dtchre hin ebcted. Mql I tberefore corgratulah tbe ntinnr on behalf of tbe Commission.

4. Tbanklot uerl nwb.

Alhaji Unarz Aliyt Alh{iMiltnnedA.Bappa Cbief P'etunkgofrcen Cbief EbxoralOficer, Gsber otoial Ebciiort Congola State, Gongoh S tate, Yola- Yola 1d Atgtst, 198i 1d Atgtst,198 j.

By the end of September 1983, Mr. Vilberforce B. Juta was ready to hand over the ship of Gongola State to Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur. Below ate excerpts of his handing over notes:

Fonlears bau come and gone dr,titrg whicb some palriotic tots ard datgblers of tbis olr great state were piuibged to be at lbe heln of afairs of tbe S tate, and once again tbe peoph of Gongolz S tate bare giuen tbe mandate and the Pivilrgt to Jet another ret t0 co ribtte tbeir onn qtota in Jaciktatitg dewlopmentJor tbe nasses of 0 r?eoPh.

I belieru tbat proidingthe atnoEbere andfacilitiufor the smootb transfer of pover is tbe stpreme ad of patriotiw fot the head of an out-goingglrerflfielt This is so becatn allgood fueds and aaiotts fut sacb agorernment to d be rendered webss f tbe incomitggounment is ttot n ell briefed andprEared for the responsibilij of runnirythe ffiirs of gownmmt to tbe tltinau beteft of tbe masses. It isJor tbis purpose tltat I instntcted ry fficiak to prEare &aihd Handing-Ouer Noks for the incomitg gouenmen4 which has now been done.

lYbatfllbrrt inckdt srnmaries of tltese banding oter notes $t Ministries and Parastatab, ar anll as bigbl;gbts of baric policies, objectiws, prioities and the stratgies ado?ted b botlt n1 prefuasso/s Adniristration, of rbicb I vas part and parcel as DE*4 Goaentor, and m1 Admin*tration since I took orer h Mry, 1 98 i. 204 Biosapb of AJ.}t. (DF..) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

Tbe Hadiry oaer Notes deal with the organiTation, apiration and acbieunents of tbis Adninislratiott at tttell as lbe probbms ercountered duitg the inphnentatioa oage of lhe projuts the Adninistra tiol em barfu d rp o n.

It is n1 mdmt ltEe that tbe ir+onittg Adninistralon willfrd th Noter ury belpjtl, and baye a tmootb and bihb-free take oterir tbe interesl of onpeoph-

VTLBERFORCE,B.JUTA Govetnor Gongola state of Nigeria. 22"0 September, 1983

Alhaji Bamanga Tukur attributed his success at the polls to two main reasons: He and his campaign team v/ent all over the state to mobilize people and also made a covenant'rith them. They campaigned on issues; avoiding trivial things like religion and ethnicity. Another reason is t]-,e team of committed and experienced adviseis in the persons of Mallam Hamidu Alkali, Alhaji Ahmadu Ribadu, Alhaji Umaru Magaji, Alhaji Aliyrr Mamud, Dr. Rayrnond Dokpesi and the contestanCs brothet, Dr. ltahmud Tokrr.

G MO H. INAIHA GA TUKUR. ALO SHI G MAI IKON izANT NA TIHAR G()NG()T,A ANAR DA GA v/ATAN OI(TO RA. 1983.

{rkadasbin Gwamna, C{ Jo1i, Alkalai, S bugaban Majalisat; Sarakrna, Maw girma Kuanisbinoni, Mas u girna'yr Mjalisa, Mast Girna S arakrna da Dagatai, Bigad Kuaianda Soyr Nalenla Ma'aikatan Dipknasja ru gida da ketare, yanawa lama,arjibar Gongola, Maqwn baki maqa da nata.

Kasan Sbekam gtda ke rur da jan'i1ata, Jan'i1ar Yar Kasa ta Najeila, (,lpN) ta danka nini hakin tsalawa takara a karkashin tuttarta a qaben Tama gwamta najibarGongola.

Lalh na amince da qaben dajan'iyata, taj nini da ?tci1a da-ya. Na kma datki alkapait tasbi tsale donin tabbatar da samnt nassararyam'iata a cikin dtkan Tabamigtda blar da mka gadana cikin p,an nan s |te karar.

Domin cika uannar alkawain, najo aiki haikan rikin vnnrar shekarar da ta wtce, ira kai da kauoaa, daga gai gai, daga guua kaay ryrwa karye, daga brkka Traa bttkka da ma lungt hngt l,a wamanlibar. Daga haka, na tsetsefe dakan ktsnwopin aannan kasaitatilarjihar tir. Na ksna sadt da dtbban a/umominmms a maTattnin sa u garg{ia bada ra n,nagailya kn damraa ko ,@ana ba, daga baka na sadt da dtkkan jan Gongora bada rua banbanci b)-ia kabita ko na addhi, domin twar mt da1a, itace Gangola. As tbq tbird Cioilifi Gooernor of Gongola State, October - Decernbei, 1983 205

Iir basirar da na samt daga wadamar hidinonin, ta qama matakitfarko na1fa]tinlar gagaruman matsalolfu da ruke faskantar al'*mar jibata (Gongok) Na kuna Jahind mubimjar bukatar magance wadannan natsalolin, cikir banTai, tare da rasara.

Daga haka m da yrdar Alhb rarur Asabar, glrrla sha kl ga ,yalan Aagasta, 1983, kt lantaana, alumaryiharGongola, krka Tabe ni, saboda cika alkawra da tta dalkarmaku nafdda sabon halin ralawa cikin wannan jibar. kri'ar da fuka jefa niri, km ba ni dana kz ran iryi muk batia balei da1a, k na in darkaka malsa1ir rEuwar almarztt, amma Ja tare da taimakauark,l.

Akn,ai wani K-ain maganar da kt cewa, 'lVanda (ai tasbi quwa sarua, inla taka falfai y rage taqara".

YanT* na kama/a ra saaar bautawa pannan jiba tsakani na da Allab, da kma kare martabar tsann m kinlamhrrilarTarallarNqierila. Na kmali rartmwa cewa Tanffta tsalar da adalci.

Na datlki nanrun bakil kamar matakin Jarko ne cikin bidinar shekan ba&t na laflar dz b arko kir n n lkin aann anjiha.

Saboda baka na qabi fu tabbatar na dtkar alrmanjibar Gongolz da kana dwja baki day, cewa na fahiata, kuma naj natukar amilceua da takarori da dtkkan rut1i da ke tare da mskamirl Guamna. Ina so itt kara karJaJa makt cewa, 7an gudanar da hakfulibata (Coxgok) musammart dakrna kasa ta Nriilo) baki day tare da dkakken kwoqor da Mada*akfu Sarki Allaby datra a kai na.

Zanli anfani da walan lokoci it ballana nafu dalk-dalla nanufargwamnati na, domin kaaar da shakka daga Tlkatankr Nafmko, kmarltanda ra ce te, naxoltlir da srkcfiskantarjiharmr (Gongola) ba kadan ba ne. Aama ni tare da abokan aiki na, mnra da*e da ktdd da ktma kwagon cikawa da nasara.

Na b!4 gwannati na, qata kassance ne, di ttain klfa d b dt, wadda takt mabtbtga ce ta , r4ran)arl ra'a1Ei da qast kai ga ingafia matsalin raywar almominmu, bada rua barbanci ba.

Domin cimma haka, wannan gwamnati, tm dagafarka qa'agina ta ne akatt barsasbi nai karf kttna ta kassann maifadi da cikawa, waruan ra daaki alkaaai.

Na rka, a/umarjihar Gongola, vatrnan gwamnati tana datke da nata manufa, wacce na rada ma sttna "SIYASAR RAYAKDA KASA". lYatnan mannfar ta gwamttati tta aminattaclar hanla ce, tacimmasamu raladda kaca, mai ma'ana.

Tawa gwamnatin, bata da dznar bada hanla ko amina da siyasarlin @ashinyna da mtksra da juna. Taru ike daJasaJar da ba qatalarda da slasur koma bEa, bakntana sjasar ntna kabilanci ko banbancin addini. 206 Biasra?b af N,H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUK[,n, coN

I*da Tantf bada karf ga siaran tl ta raJar da k4Ja Jhirre rarraba n inan kalalyakinjindadin raluua koina daida'i wa daida, ba tare da wanila danne wani ba. Tawa gwamttati, talo rc na siasa da take bir tdfalkit tigaba, tare dalin maraba da kowa da kowa. A matsali tta gt,rzttta, tta datki bakitt dtkan al mominmt ba tare dalin la'akai da ra'a1Einru na riasa, ko kabilar st kn addinin su ba.

S hakz babu mantfar mr ta sjasar rqadda kasa, natttfa a la sattlajihar Congola 4taajiba tai ,ravra afagen taltalin afiki wadda qata qana abin kEi ga satran jibobh tarayar nfeila baki daya

Ahna tajibar Gongola, qan balyana makl yaw abrbuwa da suke m bina; te ga sa rl ,tararar ra'a1ryir domh su tabbata.

Farko, naj inani aiki tare da ma'aikatan gnamnati ba da nwa banbanci ba, abin da nike b*ata daga ma'aikatan gwamtart ine, cikakklar bi1aj3ta. Haka ktma, tawa gwamnati qala dada karft gtin,a; 1ata bakaci maaikatanta su karatce nass cika aiki da sakandkt na gai mai albarka, ktna duk wandalaj aiki tukrru ba qaije a banqa ba, baka fuma yadznfu *kz1i aiki tuk*ru ba Taije a banTa ba, hakz ktna aadznda drka ne domir sanin cewa, duk Gwamnati da takt bin tafarkin sanm sakamako na gai, daga shirye tbiryn ta, tana bskatar na'aikata mast kwaTo da 7a:r lajn kafada da harkokin dtkgwantart nai cika aiki, ba mai ka m bih analin ba.

NEi matukar imatir cewa, a tare qamu gina sabtwarjihar Gorgok waddz drkatmt qamt li afahai da ita, dz cewa Albanad{ Ullahi.

Bryrda kai nEi fuina kokaitrlin naqain iin danga akl dala kamatala kassance a tsakanin gwamna da almar da lake m ki, kuma n fahinri aba day. Sbirc, tamt,n ,ldssarar kottacce glannatua dlgdra ne matuka akan badin kan a/ma, da daryjalancinlan adam.

Dangane da baka, 7an ballana makt cewa, kamin gwamlati tagtdanar da sbirye sbiryen aytkanta, sai tajinjina ta gano ceua sua da amfati ga kt attnarjibar Gongok. Anma kama qan btkaci cikakken gEon baynkt a duk kkoci donin tabbatar da aannan alkapain. A aanran lokacin kama ina ballana godla ta ga dtkar m anen da nka tainaka kaurai a cikit shekaru nan brdn da stka nua, domin tabbatar da gani ceaa wannanjibar ta kassance a bad.e tata kana dqa a/umna day, bafu tarhin hankali. Nalaba nast na kmali mtsulinlina a nadadin bt duka. K,anata krna y1i mr ballana godfuanru ga dtkan n1o1it nu da'1an sanda a game dn gagarumar gtdtmawar da stka ba1ar, wajen karfaJa kruancilar bankali da ksna tabbatar da raytaarjibar Congola kassame uanta ruai karf, ktma tanajiha ddla alrmma dala daladdarAllab.

YanTl kma bai in waiwali wakilanmt da srke a r aJalit n taralla dajibobi. Sune malalis*t jihahi da na wa/eiki da dattilai. Bisa ga gaskila, najinjina makl tare kana daJatar alberi bisa ga $ta@aaan btinkt da krna iir imanit da ktka nna mlit aiki tuktra domin cigaban libar Gongola a majaliun da kukasant shiga.

Tare da wannar damarta ta mantfar ma baki da1a, ta "slasar ralarda kase," nali matukar imanin tewa, qakrli malama'ar mt baki da1a, abubrawal da slke btlkata As tbe tbird Cioiliar, Gooenor of Gongola State, October - DecernberJgS3 207

Kr bani danaryit anfani da wannar lokacitt, wajen sheda na Tababban wakilat najaliur dokoki tajiha cewa bada dadewa ba 1an bada tmaininfara taro na najalisar dokoki tajihar, kamarlanda aain n kin Na1ei1a1a bati iko.

A nan, ita bElana godfua ta ga dukankrt da kuka hallarci wanan bski nai kalatanaa, kttma na taihi. Zan kanaf sonjixjina malaran makaranta manlan gobe, akanyrila da k na bakui da klkali wajenlin shii sabili da vannan lokaci na b*ki.

A wannan lokadn na qabi in nuna aminci ga narlan baki da su ka hallara a nan; waat dago wasr'r jihobi na Nleriya aasa kuma daga kassashen kelare, mtsamman domin v halarci aatnan bski. Bahi day Ina nika naf datkaka daga dtkkar godlya dz aminci Tuwa gareka da fatar Allab 1a funa da fu lafiy.

A karshe, manlan babi da'1an'twana mtianen Gongola, na Tabi kare wannanjavabitt dalake nai lair mthimmanci. Ntf na sbine in dar4ja wadanda st ka mnmnci a darEa stt, saboda baka daga lat na canja ma wanxarflin da aka sari da sma FII-IN VASAN KIYAI I-DN POI-O NA YOI,A IMETA da naida srnan wannan flin 'DANDAI:IN AI]IAJI MAH IUD NBADU", naigaj wandala kt a sahmfarko na mtbinnar ja'1an wannan jiba tam4 watda babs sbakka a lokacin ralawarsala bada kokarifle da kina cikin hidinar rayd da wamajihar da Najerja baki dEa*a.

Ktnar dailanda aka san 'DANDAI,IN TAIAV/A BAI-EIYA: a I tgos, wannatf lit da dago 1ar qa'a santa da saru 'DANDALIN MAHMUD RIBADU" a tat ne 1a'a ikain d* ,?l rre soma har ga jibkin abtbm,a na taihi da duk matryan b ktknva 'adanda

Yat ttwara maqa da mala, a warnar lokacitt da 7aru tasbi daga aattan gtin, na ro/etkt da mtt datki kudrdn ceva nu danki niarytin aiki tttklnt a tare saboda tabbatadda Tanar lafla da ci gaban rEad dajibarna A I la b1 aj a 1an an i nj i h n G o ngo h A Ila by j a qa n an i n Taray r JanhfiyrNaltria .4tnin Nagodc ma dnkm fu baki day.

6.9 FORMA-TIONOFCABINET Alhaji Bamanga's fust concern was to build a government that would keep the party united. In choosing his cabinet, there were some people he wished to placate, occupy, neutralize or keep at bay. These notwithstanding, his apptoach to his traditional enemies was more gingedy.

Types of people who will work fot the Governot i. The Constitution allowed the Governor to select the best from any part of the state wilh the sole provision of reflecdng state character. ii. He should have a system of assessing and ranking the performance of his 208 Biograpby alAJ-lI. (DF..) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

workers and thev should know from the beginning that this system existed and would be used.

I ll. He should have a record of satisfactory performance of seniot aides and assistants and they should know that they were serving at the will and the pleasure of the Governor end not of themselves or of putative interest groups. Compliance and lol,altvweredemocraticabsolutes. 1V The Governor must have his own code of conduct for the people who would work for him which, as much as possible, they must consistendy observe. This is without prejudice to the Code of Conduct section of the Party's constitution. The Governor was to use everyone who could contribute to the success of his administration in terms of physical participation. In other wotds, "all hands must be on deck". vl. The machinery of government shouid be made up of competent people who would serve in it on merit. Under no circumstances, thetefore, should the campaign team or the party take over the running of the governmenq that is the Governor must be able to distinguish between the campaign team, the party and the machinery of government and keep these poles apart. v1l. The Govemor must work out a care{irl, considerate, lust and equitable method of taking care of the various constituencies such as the youth, women, the elderly, Muslims, Christians, the business class, the elites, Fulbe, Habe, Mallum'en (Jlama) etc. vlll Secretary to Government:- This is the Chief of Staff who should be able to call Commissioners and other top aides to order. The Governor musg therefore, select someone he can work very closely with as well as trust and repose confidence in. The Secretary must also be honest, forthright as well as forthcoming. lx. The Attornev-General:- The Governor reouired someone who was knowledgeable, honest and forthright. This was someone the Governor could rely upon to give him honest advice on the legality of his (Governor's) actions. The Chief Securiw Officer:- The Chief Securiw Officer would head the Security DMsion and oversee the personal and official safety of the Governor and his family. xl. Personal Physician: - The Governor must not allow politics to creep into the choice of a personal physician. xii. tment of :- The Governor must pay particular attention to their appointrnents; he was not to rely necessarily on what the Judicial Service Commission recommended. It must be , . ,rcmbered that judges make laws and take critical and binding decisions. They arc appointed on tenure. xin. Head of Service:- This appointment wxs important but not critical, because there were checks and balances. The appointment of the Head of Service could follow the process of the civil service in terms of period and length of service, as well as appointment that could cause minimum agitation and friction in the civil service. x\'. The Governor could appoint a senior and competent person (among his As tbe tbird Citilian Gooernor of Gongola Stdte, October - December, 1983 209

Shell P€.tr,,1.\u,r t)('v. Ci). of Niq. Ltd.r PRIVATE MAIL BAG 2"I8 LAGOS. NIGERIA. I5th Noveober 1982 '

Alhaji BarBnga, 31A l,tarine Road Apapa. '

Dear Bamanqa t

Shough you left Lrglos without informing sone of us riho are your iriinas, your iecent success in the gubelnatorial nooination, has lade us to forgive you. best Congratulations andfuishes for further success - and then re itrall celebrate Et ttre Governnent House in Yolat Yours sincer€ly, --..

[,,(\re, T. WILLIE-HARRY 210 ltr,2ray,i,) 4 N,H. (DF..) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

advisers) as a liaison ()fficcr with the state legislature. He must be on very close terms and understanding as well as good working relationship with the Speaker, Depun' Spcakcr, -\Iaioritl Leader and Minority kader. He must show them that thcl mattcr and that thc Executive took note of their views, cven behind- the-sccnc vics s. x\'. Thc entirc mcmbcrship of the Legislature must also be shown that they mattcrcd not onll in making lcgislation but in the running of the government as rvell i.e thcl must bc involvcd somehow, and be made to develop a sense of fulfilmcnt. CABINET MEMBERS UNDER BAMANGA TUKUR'S ADMINISTRATION

Mr. David Barau Deputy Govcrnor Dr. Yusufu Magaji @crm. Sec. Under Barde) Commissioner Agric Alhaji Abubbakar Iya Abbas Commissioner for Education Dr Yaro Gella Commissioner for l.ocal g()vernment And Community Development Dr. Samuel Agbidc Commissioner for Health Rev. Ayuba Ndule Commissioner of Land & Survey Alhaji Mahmud Mohammed Commissioner for Justicc (Retained From Barde) Mrs. Yelwa Mbura Commissioner for Information/ Home Affairs Mr. M.S. Talmon Zonal Adminis trator Alhaji Buba Yedma Zonal Administrator Alhaji Sa'adu Gurin Zonal Administrator, Gombi Mal. Saidu Bawa Zonel Administrator Alh. Babalau Hassan Zonal Administrator /Director Ganye Mr. Ornan Nyam Zonal Administrator Alhaji Ahmadu Waziri Zonal Administrator Mr. Clement Ijai Papka Zonal Adminis trator Sa'adu Galadima Zonal Administrator Dr Raymond Dokpesi Campaign Manager 1983 & Chief of General Saff Government House

6.10 COMPREHE NSIVE PROGRAMME O THE NPN ADMINISTRATION UNDER ALHAJI BAMANGA M. TUKUK A BLUEPRINT FORACTION This programme of action was prepared and ready rn May 1983 even befote the campaigfl for the 1983 governorship race began. It was a comprehensive progremme of action of the NPN administration if AJhaji Bamanga Tukur eventually clinched the ticket of governship of Gongola State on October 1", 1983. The programme was divided into seven parts and each part into several sections. Alhali Bamanga was reputed to have had the best pfogremme of action by the NPN Govetnment between 1979 and As tbe tbid Cit iliai Gooetnor of Gongola State, Octobet - DecernbeL 1983 211

1983. Unfortunately, he could not carty out some of the programme due to the military intervention of December 31,1983.

Apart from the Governor's genetal knowledge of Gongola State, his campaign tours of the state from the party primaries to the final election must have brought him into close personal contact with all aspects of Gongola State people, cultures, attitudes, and levels of development. Thus, he had fust hand opportunity to see the state, know the people and understand the society.

The question then was what kind of society did he want to see or have in Gongola State at the end of his four-year term? That is to say, what was going to be his minimum goal or achievement in four years? And what factors were likely to stand between him and that minimum goal?

In pursuing his goals and objectives, the Governor needed to avoid being caught up in that most disabling malady, the Nixon Syndrome of giving the impression that he had been elected solely for the purpose of being re-elected. It would have been most crippting to spend the whole of the Frrst term fighting for the second term. The interests of the second term should not be ignored, of course, but it should be remembered that Gongola people like purposefirl, dynamic and courageous leadership. They wiil not forget such leadets at the polls. No one can success{irlly quatrel with success.

His goals and objectives, atleast for the fouryears, maybe related to the following: a. Physicaldevelopment-infrastructure,housing,communicationetc. b. Social development-education, health, sports etc c. Comparative development compared to other states especially to neighbouring states and ro previous administrations. d. Social relations in the cofltext of iustice, the status of women and childten, care for the deprived and the infum, sense of values of the people, instilling and creating a Gongola person with the Gongola sense of identity, values, dignity etc. e. Degree of nationalism, that is, welding the people together and giving them a sense of belonging, and a distinct personality.

The last two can perhaps be achieved through building around the family, clan (enyol) community, pmma), but not around ribe. There was therefore the need for a standard code of behaviour for the people and this could be approached by striving to improve relations among the various people, religious gtoups, and reduction of ethnic animosity between the people, minimizing other forms of inter-etlmic conflict, bridging the gulf and gap in telations between the Fulbe and non-FulbegrouPs in the state.

Here ate extracts of some relevant portions of the programme Bamanga intended to implement in Gongola State if the military had allowed him the opportuniry 212 Biasrapb aIAJ-fI. (DF..) BAMANGA TUKLJR, coN

1 . Gongola ae a Single Planning Unit In planning, the following points were borne in mind:- Consider and take into account the existing disparities between rural,/utban areas, population explosion, migration and class structure. Planning should also be built around the people and particularly around the needs of families. This is what happens in the rest of the wodd, where people know what they are doing. Thus, the maior needs and concerns of individuals and femilies ate: (, Food (ii) Water (u) Shelter (rg Standard of living (v) Cost of living (t, The education and upbringing of their chil&en and their children's children ("n) Health and well being of the family, women, children, old-aged relatives ("iii) Physical, emotional and economic security and stability of the individual and family (r*) Recreation (:<) Future security of individual and family (*) Environmental consideration- wildlife conservation, bush fues, epidemics.

2. ZONINGSYSTEMOFADMINISTRATION The zoning system was a credit to BMTs rdme and Gongola appeared to be the first state to experirhent with it before it became widely accepted and appl.ied by state goverrrnents, the federal government as well as by ministries and parastaals. To underscore the unique benefits of the zoning system, it became even entrenched in the 1995 constitution as a medium to all sections of the country.

The philosophy behind the zoning system was informed by the realization that every part of the state is at different levels of development. To remove the rural areas which were less developed from the central administnnon, Zon administrators were appointed to take care of those areas. They will know the problems, prioritize them, plan together and carry out the developments in terms of the needs of the people. A kind of sectorial development through clusters.

3, PHYSICALDEVELOPMENTANDADAPTATION PROGRAMME

I Infras tructual Services This section deals with basic amenities of life such as wateq electricity, housing, toads, hotels etc. Other super sttuctures such as human development, welfare, agricultute and industrialization ate all to a large extent dependent upon the levels of infrastructure available. Inwhat follows, we treat each of these infrastructural facilities.

'Water- 1. This is one of the most important requirements of life. A number of diseases are transmitted through water. Lack of clean and potable (drinkable) As tbe third Ck ilifi Gooenor of Gotgold Stdk, October . Decembo, 1983 213

water is, therefore, a most serlous problem that could face any community. The vast majority of the people of Gongola State did not have access to clean water. Most depend 6n wells, streams, rivers and even ponds for their daily consumption of water; in some ateas of the state people trek long distances to fetch a bucket of water. Lack of watet also means that industries which consume a lotof watercould notbe sited therc.

According to the Gongola State Water Board, only 21 towns in the state (Mubi, Michika, Maiha, Pakka, Buza, Hong Garltda,, Jtmeta/Yola, Fufote, Numan, Mayo-Belwa, Ganye, Guyrrk, Jalingo, Bali, Gembu, Takum, Wukari, Ibbi and Donga) had supply of water by the Boatd. Supply of clean water should be the right of every citizen. Policy should aim at providing facilities for clean water to all towns and villages in the state. This can be achieved by drilling wells and in5tallilg purnps to these covered wells which should then be able to give the people clean water. Boreholes would have been the best method of providing clean water to towns and villages but recendy the system has just become a source of income for politicians, bureaucrats and contractors and not of water for the people. u Housing:- Two types of policies relating to housing should be pursued simultaneously. The 6rst type is the present policy of ptoviding houses in their places of work to both senior and junior categories of saff. While continuing this policy, the long-term objective should be to encoutage owner-occupier houses by providing credit or loan facilities through staff housing scheme, housing corporation or banks. The goal shouid be to enable government workers to own theif personal houses in their home towns or wherever they intend to retire and live. These saf( for example, indigenous to Yola, who live and work in Yola, should be encouraged to build their own houses in Yola and Iive in those houses rather than in governmeot houses. in. Electricity:- Supply of electricity, apart from raising the condition of living of the people, has many other benefits. It encoutages industrialization and creates jobs and employment opportunities. It also checks rural/urban m.igration since electricity is one of the pull factors to the cities. It additionally provides efficient and cheap power and light to the communities. r /hereas most othet states of the federation have each a sizeable number of tov/ns connected direcdy to the national grid, Gongola had only four towns (Yola, Mubi, Numan and Wukari) that are connected and even these to the smaller grid. This, among other things, meant that the state was seriously and severely disadvantaged in terms of receiving a reasonably feir share of federal resources. It also tied down the resouices of the state to supplying elecricity to large towns that would have otherwise been receiving electricity from the National Electricity Power Authority 6fEPA). Thus, most tou'ns with electricity in Gongola were dependent on the Rural Electricity Board @.EB) 214 Biosa?b oJN*t. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

and, since REB could supply only minimal, it meant that the industial development of these towns and the sate was thereby severely constained.

Currendy, other than the four to' ns mentioned, which receive electricity from NEPA, only 13 other towns (Gombi, Hong, Song, Garkida, Mayo-Belwa, Zing, Jalingo, Takum, Ganye, Gembu, Michika, Uba and B zzza.) have any semblance of electricity provided by REB.

The policy of the in-coming adminismation of Alhaii Bamanga Tukur was determined to ensute that all local government and district headquarters benefit from the supply of electricity. The generation and distribution of electricity to rural communities for domestic and commercial purpose s were to be given their deserved prioriry.

As many towns as possible were to be handed over to NEPA to free the resources of the REB to concentate on other smaller towns.

Both v/ater and electricity are vital to the rapid and balanced industrializtiot of the state. The statewas to encourage the federal government to commission the Kiri Dam and build some other dams on the Mambilla Plateau to be used for generating electricity.

1V SslatElegy, - This is a potential source of abundant energy and Gongola State has plenty of supply of the raw matedal (sun) needed. A possibility of setting up a Solar Energy Agency, perhaps in partnershiP 'dth the federal government was to be seriously considered by the in-coming administration. The governor should take keen interest in the development and personnel of the Solar Enetgy Centre, with the possible assistance of the Federal University of Technology, Yola.

Roads:- Neither elecfficity, water nor any other development can be effectively carried out and maintained without effective communication and transportation systems. It would appear that Gongola State had one of the poorest and the scantiest road networks in the federation.

The broad objectives of this sector must be to Provide motorable all-season roads from the rural afeas to the urban areas of the state for easy transportation of agricultural and industrial products.

Rinp Roads and arterial intersections ot in order of orioritv) for onenin.g uo olaces and onoortunities a. Mubi- Belel- Sorau- Zumo- Malabu- Yola. b. Shelleng -Dumne- Song- Zumo- Holma- Sorau. c. Gombi -Guyaku (Ga'anda) -NewNorth-South Road. As tbe tli . Cioilian Gooetnot of Gotgola State, Octobet - Decernbel, 1983 215 d. Shelieng- Borong -Savannah -Lamurde -Karim-Lamido. e. Yola Gunn- Toungo -Gashaka -M4yo -Ndaga. f. M/Belwa Jada -Ganye- Toungo -Serti -M/Selbe -Maisamari -Nguroie - Gembu c' Serti -Bali -Jalingo -Kadm-Lamido -Yankari. h. Ganye -Garba-Chede -Mutum/Biyu Wase -Jos. vi Rail Une:- Still in the area of transportation, the governrnent was to pursue with vigour the esablishment of a rail link between Gongola and the sea port of Calabar. The idea (goal) is to link Gongola State direcdy with a major Nigerian sea port and in the process open up the Cameroon and Chad. A successful implemenation of the project wou.ld &astically reduce the cost o[ evacuating produce and distribution of manufactured goods as well as ptovide employment opportunities and redress the imbalance in the nation's physical development. The proposed railway should follow the "most convenient path" ftom a point on t}re Borno Terminal, through the entire length of Gongola State to Ogoja, terminating at Calabar. The line would pass through from Calabar and Ogoja in dre Cross River State, to Yandev, Takum, BaIi, Ganye, Jadt, Mayo Belwa, Yola, Song, Mubi, and Michika and then to Bama and Maiduguri in Borno State. The funding of this project would be explored, as it was considered vety viable. It would be possible to build it on international contractor finance, internal boffowing or as part of the federal government rail development ptogram.

Ytt. Hotels:- Gongola was perhaps the only statewithout a single modern hotel with facilities for accommodation, seminar, conference etc. The nerv goverffnenr was determined to encourage private invesrors to invest, not in the guest house qpes, but in building intetnational standard hotels. The Government Hotels Board was to go into parmership with others to build such hotels at least in Yola. A number of annual conferences and seminars slated fot Yola were canceled because accommodation was not available. v111- Town Planning and Environmental Saniation:- Thete was absolutely no reason why tolvns and villages in Gongola should be dirty- Most of the towns and vrllages were small and could easily be kept clean, neat and tidy. !(ihat was absent and what was required was an efficient menagement of these towns. Labour wes generally cheap. Widr few labourets and two or three refuse collection vehides, many of the towns could be kept clean- Ooly towns, like Yola Mub|Jdrngo and Wukeri vould require a l.itde more investmenl B. TNDUSTRIALIZATION Gongola Sate et this time wes not industrielized at all Sevetal reasons" some of which have already been mentioned accounted for this sate of underdevelopment These included govemment's nonchalancg leck of qrater and electricity and the absence of access roads to the test of the country on the one hend and to the rural areas of the state 2t6 BiograPb aIN-H. (DR.) BAM NGA TUKUR, coN on the other. Most of the roads in the state were dry season or laterite roads, which made accessibility to all parts of the state difficult. The most important activity found in almost all the LGAs of the state was the construction industry which ac cotnted fot 22o/o of industrial and commercial enterprises. Three major industrial projects in which the state had a share were the Savannah Sugar Company near Numan; the Tomato putee' Company at Lau; and the Nigerian Beverages Company on the Mambilla Plateau. Al1 these companies were however facing serious managerial and leadership problems. Moreover, some of the problems facing these companies were bel,ond the control of the state government. Indeed, a major re-apptaisal of government participation and role in these projects v/as necessafy.

Any meaningful industrial development of the state would have to be agro-based as the main resource base of the state is agriculture. The government was therefore, determined to give priority to the use of agricultural raw materials as the basis for industrial development. The establishment of an Integrated Dairy Processing Plant, the exploitation of fofest resources in the southern patt of the state and assistance to small-scale industries were to be pursued.

1. Small Scale Industries:- A deliberate policy to promote and develop small scale industries in order to increase their contribution to the growth of the state economy was also to be encouraged. Easy-to-operate and labour-intensive, rather than complex and high technology and capital intensive processes in agdcultural processes were to be the basis upon which the development of the state would be based. To this end, a Feed Mill and a Cornflakes factory were to be established using the produce of locai farmers as well as that of the Upper Benue River Basin Developmeflt Authority farms at Mayo-Ine, Dadin/Kowa and Gassol. Local businessmen as well as other rich Nigerians in other parts of the country were to be given incentives to take part in these ventures. Paper mill, biscuits, toilet soap and paper and flour mill industries could all be established under this scheme. The state's local market and the nearby Cameroon were large enough to provide ready market for these products. lt. Gongola State Properties and Investment Company: - The establishment of Gongola State Properties and Investnent Company was long overdue. All that is needed to be done wes for the government to give the comPany an initial capital gant ur *.li transfer all eisting shares held by government in all "s enterprises and the company would thereafter be on its own. It would be charged with t}le responsibility of designing, promoting, coordinating and iitrplementing the industrial and commercial development of the state. It should have an independent Board of Directors as well as be self-accounting. The company should have povers to borrow and invest in the state. It was absolutely necessary for suph a company to be independent of the ministries of 6nance, rade and industries and that interference with its business decisions by government be kept at the minimum. As tbe tbid. Cioiliar Gooenor of Gongola kaq Oct&q - Dccatbet 1983 277

C. Gongola State Coopetative Bank- The establishment of a Cooperative Bank to serve agriculture, industry and cofirmerce as a source of financing and credit facilities was also to be pursued. Banking facilities were extemely poor in Gongola State. These two financial institutions should help to mobilize savings and actively promote the development of the industrial and tutal sectors of the state economyand provide management services to the rural communities

4. AGRICULTURE(FOOp)ANDRURALDEVELOPMENT This sector was perhais the most import2.ot sector since about 80o/o of the population was ditectly dependent on agriculture in one form ot the other for their survival and as a source and means of thek existence. It should therefore be the center-piece of the development goal of the state.

A- FARMING: - Policies directed at agriculture should there fote be comprehensive and far reaching by ptoviding meaningfirl income to the people in terms of production of surplus for export either of food ot other agricultural product A farmet should obtain ft6s1 [i5 farm not ooly food" but all else that his family needs to purchase. In other words, he should get sufficient financial retums ftom his farm.

Agricultural policy should also relate to industrial policy and be able to stimulate the production of the raw matedds needed fot industdes in the sate and beyond,

The present individual fatmer should be the focus and centerpiece of the agricultural policy and whatever was necessary should be done to help him be mote productive and produce efficiendy. Given the drift from rutal to urban areas as well as the inabi.lity of small farmets to produce all the agriculnrd requirements for the teaming population, the developnient of large-scale farming was both inevitable and necessary. The government should therefore have a policy of aiding large-scale farmers to acquire land in unsettled ateas as well as help them to acquire agricultural inputs to encourage development of private, large-scale farming The government itself may not have to be direcdy involved in highly bureaucratized, wastefirl and inefficient large-scale fatming system. But it should encouage private farmers to do so by providing incentives and easy facilities.

The most meaningfrrl agricultural development strategy perhaps was the establishment of Agricultutal Development Proiects similar to the ones in Gombe, Funtua and Gusau. Such projects were usually direct, simple, and less wastefhl and were targeted at farmers. They involved the provision of inftastrucnrre inputs and accessibility to markets. The one in Gombg for example, which was, established io 1 975 at an estimated cost of N33 million, was successfirlly implemented within the time schedule. The secret of the success of the Gombe project lay in two things: the limited areas of its coverage and the good supervision it enjoyed from the World Baok Itis believed that itwould be possible to establish several of such projects in Gongola Sate perhaps with the Green Revolution and Wodd Bank financing, but direct supervision of the Votld B2nk should 21tl BiasEb afN]l. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN be discouraged. Suitable areas for the establishment of such proiects abound in Gongola, fot example, Girei, Song, Zumo, Malabu, put of Bala.lr- District (Faro and Kilange Valleys) .

The Green Revolution prograrnme of the Federal Government Presented aniample opportunity for the state to take advantage of federal resources and utilize them for its own benefits. The government should thus encourage people of the state to be fully involved in the Green Revolution programme by teceiving and investing in large-scale farming with the assistance of theprogramme.

The government was also to run and maintain small but efficient demonsffation farms or farm services and centres, all over the state for guidance and practical demonsuation to farmers. Such farm centres should also serve as models for farmers to emulate 2s we as distribution centres to farmers of resources,like fertilizer and tractor loan services'

Similady, farmers wete to be encouraged to form cooperative societies through which they could obtain loans, credits and even grants as v/ell as present and defend the interest of their membets. Easy-to-reach and easy-to-get small credit faci-lities were to be organized and given to farmers *rough the cooperative societies.

Agricultural inputs such as ferd)izer, equipment and machines, tractors, expet advice and assistancewere to be available practically and efFtciently and within easyreach of the farmer at the fatm service centres.

Part of government's plan was to ensute that fertilizers wete really made available to farmers at the right place at the right time. Therefore, government was to provide adequate storage facilities for fertilizets in each farm service centre.

A map containing information on s6i1 and soil types, soil fertility and soil erosion covering the whole state was to be done, so that the utilization of land resoutces of the state would be ai.lfd by the data obtained and land use would not be left to chance as apparendy was the case.

Seed multiplication centre to multiply high qualiry seeds of improved variety of guinea corn, maize, groundnut, millets, beans, wheat and cocoa among other crops was to be intensified and made readily available to farmers all over the state.

A progmmme of crop development for oranges, mango, guava, coffee, palm oil, cocoa, kola nuts, banana and tea was also to be intensiFred through providing seedlings of these crops to farmers at subsidized rates. This was to position Gongola State as the maior producer of some of the fruits needed in Nigeria. As tbe tbird Civilitn Gooentor of Gongola Sute, Oaobet - fkcember, 1983 219

B. IRRIGATION Gongola State has a faidy reliable, regular distdbution of tainfall during the wet season and this makes rain-fed agriculture very viable. But the state also has many rivers and streams. Thus, with plenty of fertile land, the state has a great potential for large scale irrigation projects.

The Government, along with the Upper Benue fuver Basin Development Authority, was to encourage the development of irrigation agricultue. Farmers were to be educated on irrigation techniques and practices which would provide them with things to do and money to get during the &y season. Dams were to be developed and suitable areas identified and cleated.

C. LIVESTOCK Gongola was certainly a maior livestock zone in the country. Th'e policy in this area, with active and direct participation of catde owners, should be directed to the prevention and control of animal diseases, qualitative and quantitative increase in livestock production through the development of ranches, cross breeding, supplementafy feeds, water development proiects for livestock, and increased sources of supply of animal protein.

The new administration was uniquely placed to grapple with the problem of permanendy setding once and for all, the catde orvners @ulbe Na'i) so that they too would end their misetable and difficult existence and be able to send their children to school and enjoymodetn amenities such as electricity, clean water and health facilities. l'his was to be done through encouraging and allowing the Fulbe to own, in perpetuity Iike everybody else, pieces of land in places of their choices,large enough to be ranches. These ranches should be cleatly demarcated and direcdy owned by the catde owners with their Cettificates of Occupancy. The government could help guide the catde owners in setding down dudng t1-re period of transition.

The catde owners, once setded, cou.ld then be gradually inttoduced to new metlods of animal husbandry and sedentary farming. This would be pursued through the development of grazng teserves contiguous to the ranches and strategically located throughout the sate by dre construction of dams and by cross breeding of local herds with improved breeds of catde. Th.is suggestion also called for the expansion of veterinary clinics and hospitals and equipping them to make them readily available to catde owners and ranches. Veterinary services and livestock development must be seen as potentially distinct achievement areas for the Gongola State Government. This means opening more veterinary clinics and hospitals, animal innoculation programs and placing emphasis on animal feeds.

Meanwhi.le, clear and well-demarcated grazing areas and catde tracks were to be developed and carved out. Adequate and equitable setdement arrangement would be 220 BiograPfi oJNE. (DL) BAMANGA TUKU& coN made to reduce conflict and tension between farmers and grazers, Grazers and their herds ought to be protected from incessant harassment by hostile and intolerant farmers in some areas of the state. They could also form gmzing societies to be entided to assisance and loans ftom banks, federal and the state governments.

D. FISHERIES Gongola is blessed with large rivers and perennial streams such as Benue, Gongola, Taraba, Faro, Kilange and Mayo-Danga. Thete are also generous ponds and lakes.

Policy was to be directed to the effective exploitation of the potentials of these rivers, streams and lakes through educating farmers and fishermen on modetn methods of fishing, rehabilitation and development of fishing ponds as well as setting up fish processingplants. These goals would be achieved through:- i. The procuement and distribution of fishing materials and fish feeds at subsidized rates. ii. Development of fish ponds and in. Development of fisheries extension services as part of agricultural development

Fisheries societies should also be set up by fishermen as rditered bodies to quali$.' them for assistance by the Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative Bank, other commercial banks, and the state and federal governments. 5. HUMANDEYELOPMENT This section deals with frrndamental issues concerned with human development such as education and recreation.

Education is perhaps the most important tool of human develoPment' Proper liberation, self-actualization, frrlfillment on individual as well as group basis for freedom, justice and equality and access to economic opportunities. It is, thetefote, an area that rcquires close attention as well as carefi:l consideration. It is thlough education that man can liberate himself ftom ignorance, disease, and superstitution as well as achieve control, direct and influence nature and environment. Education enables individuals to attain their heights, to fhlfill their lives and actualize their potentials. Education should be able to produce that total human being iusg responsible, selfless, and community- oriented to the service of his people- Ttrus, education is not or y or solely for manpower developmeflt but a tool for independence, self-reliance and development-

F-ducation was, for the purpose of this programme, divided into primary secondary teacher training technical and highet education e.g. (university, college of educat.ion, polytechnic) as well as non-formal, adult and continuing education

If the suggested educational progtammes by the new administration were implemented, Googola Sate was likely to produce many candidates for university admission because there were many candidates yearning for univetsity education. As tbe third Chtiliaa Gooentor of Gongola Sute, Oaober - December, 1983 221

HEALTH - This section is primarily concerned with health, social security and wages. Gongola state u/as a vast area with towns and villages scattered all over the state. ihe existing health delivery system was neither inefficient nor inadequate but was totally absent in many are2s of the state. Many diseases could have been prevented oi controlled if thete was an adequate and efficient health care delivery system. Hospitals, where available, were few, poorly staffed and ill-equipped. Maternity centeis for delivery and child welfare were few and rare in many parts of the state. Even where simple clinics and dispensaries were available, they were not propedy manned nor were drugs and other essential facilities available.

Given the fact of low capital investment in health facilities, low level of general development, absence of health education and low development of the culture of sanitary life and clean environment, the in-coming administration had to stretch itself to turn things around. There were only 12 major or General Hospitals with bed capacity of less than 2,000 in the state. With a population approaching 5,000,000 the number of hospitals and hospital beds indicated a serious distortion of health development Programme.

Health education of the people should form part of the genetal programme of functional education and even the adult and continuing education suggested earlier should include elementary principles of healthy Living, such as disposal of refuse, human waste and the conrol of communicable (infectious) diseases.

Active preventive progrunme should also be vigorously pursued particulady in the following areas: - Maternal and child health - Environmental saniation - Nutridon - Specific health education - Use of hospital and health facilities - Avoidance of native therapy - Ptoper use of alzilable resources - Control and elimination of disease-bearing insects such as mosquitoes and flies. The government also planned to increase capital investrnent in health facilities with the ultimate goal of having one major or Genetal Hospital in each of the fony local governments. Sometimes smaller efficient health centres, clinics and maternity centers, if propedy otganized and run will be more usefirl to t}re people because rhey are nearer.

The government was also to encourage the Fedetal University of Technology, yola, to set up its College of Medicine as a matter of urgency and to give all qualified students of Gongola State origin automatic admission. The state government'#as also to identi$, its taining programmes fot nurses, midwives, pharmacists, health technologists and othet ancillary medical and hospital personnel. 222 Biqlapb of AJII. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

The School of Nusing and Midwifery at Yola was to be expanded to accommodate more sftldents than its previous total of about 500. The state School of Health Technology at Mubi which was previously admitting on.ly 200 students annually was also to be expanded. The government was also to train local government and other categories of intermediate and lowefcadre of health personnel.

Doctors, nurses and other health professionals were to be well cared for through better conditions of work; better facilities and equipment provided to enable them carry out their job. The hospital should be a place vr'here love, care and consideration for the patients should be overriding. The huge human and material investments would be worth their cost if the sick are treated humanely in the hospials and clinics.

PROJECT RE\rIEW COMMITTEE Be fore embarking on the implementation of the detailed and well-researched programme of action oudined above, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur decided to set up a Project Review Committee immediately he assumed office.

In a letter No. SGS.5/37/VoL.I/3 of 20" October, 1983, the Secretaty to the Government of Gongola State, Alhaji Saidu Zakari Mohammed, conveyed to the members their appointments, as memberc of the Project Review Committee. The terms of refetence of the Committeewere; (, To consider the cost of each of the out-going capital prcjects as at the time of the award of the contract and determine its competitiveness; (ii) To highlight any irregularities in initiating and executing each ptoject; (tlt) To identi$z any ot]rer works, services or supplies to which the government committed itself, the competitiveness of such works, service or supplies and their monetary involvement; (i") To carry out a physical inspection of each proiect with the view to detetmining its quality and stage of execution and collect all relevant information relating to payments made on it; (9 To determine whether any project has been affected by the curtent economic recession, taking into considefation the date of its commencement and relevant documents telating to conditions for t}re execution of the project; ("i) To draw up priority and recommend method and principles to be adopted for the compledon of each prolect; ("ii) To consider anyother mafter that would be in the best interest of the public so as to assist the government of Gongola State in the realization of the execution of its Five-Year Development Plan 1981-1985; ("iit) The Committeewas empowered to co-opt afld orinvite any petson it considered necessaty to faciJitate the successful execution of its assignment, and to submit its findings and recommendations notlater than 31" December, 1983.

The twelve member committee had Alhaii Hamidu Alkali (OFR) as its Chairman and Mr. Ludin N. Hanis as Secreary. As tbe tlird Ciztiliar Gooernor of Gongola State, Octobet - Decernbel, 1983 223

The Committee submitted an interim report in December, 1983 in order to enable the government take action, ingood time, on some of the issues raised thetein.

AJhaji Bamanga Tukur had already prepared his budget for the 1984 fiscal yeat which was supposed to be presented to the House of Assembly on January 4, 1984. Below are r}e detarls of the budget speech.

Address by his Excellency Alhali Bamanga Tukur, Governor Gongola State on the occasion of the presentation of the 1984 budget proposals to the honourable House o[ Assembly of Gongola State on W'ednesday,28" December, 1983.

Honotrable Speaker, Honourable Members, Lzdies and Centlemetl Todal I present for tbe consideratiott oJ tbe bonourable House tbe 1984 Btdget PrEomk, in accordarce tyitb sedion 1 1 3 (i) of the Constiturton o/ tbe Federal Reptblic of Nignia, 1979. Thajott are gracious/1 to breaklotr Christmas recess to rudue me is a cbar marifestatiott 0f J0 r corrrrrlttr ent to tbe welfare of tbe peopb of Gongola S tate.

2. Sina this is thefrstBdgetndernl adrinistration, itis necestatyforme to rtate, orrce agin, tbe ofiediaes and atpirations oJ nlgoaenmentn bicb in a n slnll are- (, Restoralion ard maintenaue of essential sen,ices; €4 Pndeat managemnt of orr meagre resotrces; (iii) Oqtin n?mfudiit b1 all cotcened; (;r) L.eadenhip fo exanpb.

J h order to acbieu these oliectiws, the nacbinery oJ Gotmtzmt bas been owlat bd and yct ,zst red to ffed satittgs atd mbarce fficimc1, profuctiuiy attd accnrlntabitt Yot aft apare tltat tbe rtmber of Minislrir bas ben refundfmn Jourten to nhe, a ndrction of fue. I haoe not on$ trinmzd niristrir fut ako introfuced nat hntation it the Adminishatiott 0f lbe ttah. Seur new Deulopmettt

bmdred and six! four thowatd, rine budred ard seue@t one Naira e$26,964,971) made rp oJ one budred atdfJtl eight nillion, tbirTlfu thouand eight bndred and twen! six Naira et|58,035,826) and one bmdred and six! eigbt nillion, fine bsldred and hren\ ne tboysand one budred andJorxl fte Naira @4168,929, 145) as capital rueipt and rerurrent reunm repectiaefi, Tbe defcit was one bndred and eigltE nillion, hzen\ one jl,51o/o tbousand, six burdred a d tuerrA o e Naira ff!80,021,621) which was of the total BadgX. Mx Speaker, Honotrable Menbers, as if tbat def cit was not a stficient concern to the la:/ adrzitistrotion, a srpphmentary Budget of thirtun nillio4fue bmdred andJo! one tbonsand, nire bmdred andffilfu ruira fr{|3,541,955) c@ital ,ras prereflted to the l-tgislatue and n^r aP?mved in the dling dqs of tbe Adninistrahon. This ilneased the defcitfron otte htldred ard eighg nillio4 tutenfl one tbousatd six hundred and h))eflyi lne Naira (1t180,021,621) to ane bmdred and niul three nillion, eigbt btdred attd tbree tbotsand, fue bundred and six\ seuen Naira p1|9r,803,567) which ako inneased the pernnlage lo j8.2o.o

p*h 6. Horosrabh House ma1 to rcte tbat one bandred atd ff! nillion naira (?41 50, 000,000) of tbe recurre rewnue of one hndred atd seunry million, three bundred and ninejfue tbotsand, wo bmdred and eighy six uar er?echd as the S'tate shares Jron tbe Rderation Accoant Howewr, our actual sharefmm tbat Atolnt ix 1983 is one hundred thirxJ eight nillion, eigbt thotund two l:tndred and eigb! six Naira e{|38,080,286) tberebl giuinga sbortfall of eleuen million, rin bmdred and nineteen tbostand seyet bmdred

andforrtun Naira (Nl 1 ,9 1 9 ,7 1 4) which agait increased tbe defcit.

7. One oJ tbe side efem oJ fie defcit Bdgenrybl tbe last adninistrafion yar tbe indiscriminate award oJ cothah for atbich there uere no finfu to pay for tbem. As a res*lt, mox of the pr/uts nafted did not go bgond palnnt oJ nobili4znn fees and tbose wbich started were gmmded for nott-pqtnmt for pork exeaied Honorrabh Speaker and Hoxorrable Memberq t0 get a rhar ?i{ture of tbe stages of tbe exention of prolexs, a Capital PrEectr Reriea Connittee bas been appoitted n'ltitb will umnit its report in no distantfuure. Tbe Honotrable Hosse uill be fu@ brieJed on tbefndirgs of tbe Committee wben it yrbmitt its re?on

8. A: the Hononabh Hotse is auare, otber dtal seruiees lke ltealtb, edlcation, ualer sufered irEarable damage dte to nis@plicotion oJ and lopsidedpionry accorded it disbtrume* oJ fu t- Ercry citiryn of this State uas tben auare of tbe actte sbortage of drugs in orr Hospitals and Clirics;prenahtre closure of Post-Pimary institutions dw to ,rln-?aJment oJ food bills; waler taps renained dry ruost oJ tbe time in most tonws. Tbe total €fect of all tbere was tbe loweirgof morale of all categoies of workers and disenchattmett oJ tbe masns witb tot,erflmefil.

9. - t Honotrable Speaker and Honourabb Members are aaare in n1 lart addrer to tbi ]fo ourable Ho se on tbe S tate of tbe eclnoml or tbe 2* Not,ember, 198i,I inforned tbe Ii.tnourable Hoase uhen ruj administration took ouer ix October, 198 ), tbat I inheited total .'.'abi/ities and commitmentr t0 the t ne of reten handred and tbirtfiour million, orc hundred As tbe tbird Cioilian Go

and nine! tboasardfue hmdred and rine\t rere,l Naira N734, 190,597). On the olber band,yr nal wish to recallthatl itforned tbe thenHoue tbat tbe actual casbposiiot in the Treastrl as at )do SePtenber 1983, was on! nine bundred and thirtl four thouatd tuo hundred andfotttl one Naira (149i4,241)

10. In order lo mattage tbis sitwtion on assttmprton of nfrce, a?rEectilr of rercrue expededfor tbe peiod October to December 1983 vas made ot allocatiorts nade to Mixistri*, Departmetts and Parastatah t0 relt$citate and maintafu the existittgsen'ice.r. I mtst mention here that the allocation was uithin the 198t A??rEnlfiln Law. I an bappl to itforn tbe Honosrable Hottse that as o restit of this exercise, Hospitab and Clinics now haae drugs, water is runnixg in all taps, and Po$- Pimary hsfitutions baue resumed tbeir normal nssions. It is ako phasant to rcte thatPrinary schooh ahich were closedfor almost tualears flr,rorr- paJneflt 0J Teachers'salaiu hau restmed tbeirnorma/ business in earnest.

11. As Honosrable Members uill ruall, I addressed this Honottrable House ar tbe -ltate of tbe Ecoroml last nonth ahen I dvelt on tbe general economic sitaation of tbe S tate and lbe Nation's ot erall econonl in 1 98 ).1 regret t0 ral that the?zritiln irl 1984 ir nlt et?eded t0 be signficant! dffirent. Altboryh the world economl bas started to sbow signs af ruoueryfrom tbe economic recestion of the past three yars, netterlheless, it aill take:0r eline before tbis innease in tbe denardfor oil, wbtch is recoaer) Eathers morf,errtur?l and generales substantial tbe mait soara of reaeruefor tbe cour@. Giuen this batkgroand, we baue been caatic'us in drawing orr Bdget proposak. lt is, tbereflre, ttnrealiftic to baue a large fudget wbich is nattainable. Besides, the prenntfnandal dffinl\ wcfnd otrselau u large! dw to tbeJact tbat the past Adninishation bas resorted to defcit btdgeting duing its Jouyars in oflice. This reslhed h expenditarefar o saetcbirgretewe in a giuenlear uitb manl liabilitiet and nmmitments as earlier mentioned. Mrch ar ve nto d wisb to protti& anettities to firtber improre the socia/ and econont aell beittg of on peoph, it is n1 belief that th* sho d be vitbin the resoarce c@ati$ of tbe State. Tbe State sorras of reuenw are asfollowsi (, S tatutory Reuentefrom the Federal Couernment (i, Interlalll generated reuenue (ii, Deuekpnent loatt stoc/e

12. Tbe total anticipated reuerue tndertbese isNl87' 982,880. BieJ!, tbese are nadc 4 of- (, Stat oryReuen*e:This is off rtat tory rhore af the Federation Accoaxt ahicb is estinated atN|48,880,00 0179.15% oJ o r total reur,,/e. (i) Intenalll Genrated Reufl e: Olr tota/ internal Ruettue efort is estimated at N24, 182,800 or 1 2.86%. (i, Deulopmefi L.oar Stock: fuated \t tbe Federal Goaentmenl eacb lear Nl5, 000,000 0r7.9%. (ii, Rntrnnt and cEital Expenditure.

I ). Tbislear there is corz?hte drPartffeJron tbe ysten of bdgetitg in the preioulears- ll41t Goaerrment does not beleu ir fufeit bdgeting buanc of its side efieas. It raisufabe bopu pe in tbe ninds of the peopb b1 imningprojeas wbih cannot be inpbnefied. Since knou tbe tltdl amutnt vc expect to receiae as reaenue, we do not intnd lo btdgetfor euerytbing nore 226 Biaqnpla,o/ AJ-H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

that the amolttt of Nl87, 982,880. 81 this we are beingpractiml and realistic bexce the cbisteningoJ tbis badget ds a ''BUDCETOF REALITY".

11 Tbe estinated expelditure mderRtarrent Semices and Capital Pr/eds isN187,982,800 whith is nade rp asJolkwsi 0 PersonalEmoltments and other cbarges- Nl 85,371 ,879 (i, Proaisiorfor Capital Prolects - 2,611,001

++7 87,982,880

15. Theprouision of l{2,611,001 is to be a ow line entryforall the on- goingpr{ects wbich are to be rattked, auording to pioij as soon as tbe report of the Prolut fuaiey Conniltee is receiaed. A separate sfimission nrill be nade to the Honotrable Horse nthen the Committee report it read1.

16. IYith regardt t0 fiea ?rljectr, tbe folhwing projetu ahicb were being appnred Qt this HononrableHouse nder tbe internal loan arill take of ir l984.TbeprSux are: (, Roads - N73,452,272 (i, Horpitak N10,000,000 (ii, lX/ater N67,9)4,450 (ir) RrralElectrfrtation N9,l 80,370 Total N179,567,092

17. Horourable Speaker, Honourable Members,-1ot will agree with me lbat no matter how pell fasbiored a bdgel is, uxless it is prEerl and eficient! nanaged, it ntill cone to ruxgbt. It is for tbue reasons tbat thefolloaitg measzru are to be introduced to make tbe management o1f tbis bdget efectiae. (r) A st dJ grlxP will be appointed to bok into tbe qustion 0J gblrt aarken in all GorenmettDEartmefits andAgencix.This is buaue it has bun establisbed, afer a stud1 has been canied out, that theproisiorforpersotal emolametts bas more lban j; dafuled beueen 1979 / 80 and 1 98 (1979 / 80) prouision was N52,685,826 phih 198 ) prodtion wasNl 27,778,50). (b) Complele ban on remtitmelt bas been impond lrtil lbe qaestion of ghost yorktrs is fulfisonedo . O All Ministries, Boards and Para$atals haw been directed to Prld ce ,4 -t0- date staf lisx ,rhich lbe bdget departnettt uill examine ir relation to tbeir Eproud establishments- (rl) All Corcrnment agencies baue been directed t0 keeP ,lP-to-date records of all tbeir expenditrres so tbat at dll tiner tbe details of their expe iture are readi! auihbh for information or inspection.

18- Acceblance of ItcalPrrchate Orders bt Business Cammanitv. Since coming into ofice, ii hat cone to m1 knowledge tbat tbe btsiness commlni! is generalll reluctafi to accepl Gouernment L.acalPtrcbase Ordertfor suppl1of goods and seruices becarce As tbe tbird Cioiliat Gooenor of Gongola State, Oaober - December, 1983 227

of their expeiena of norpalnent of tbeir bilh fut tbe l"tst regine. I uouU like to take this a??ortlrliu to ass re tbe basinest conmmi\ lhat frzm Dop ltwardr eaery Local Purcbase Order vill be botorred witbin tbe stip*k*d tine,

19 Honotrable Speakc4 Honotrable Menbers,I wo d likt to seiqg this opponnij to €xPresr to ryt pmfomd gmtitttde to our traditional ntlers and commutiliesfor resPondingporitireb ry call for nlf-he/p PrEects in repaiirg otr dilapidated pinary schools all our tbe State wbib nadl tposiblefor teachingto resme. Tbis b uery commendable bemtue as leaders attd parents, we should take actil,e ParticiPatizn in the edwation of orr cbildren.

2A Sine tbe sun oJ this Adninitration, the cooperatiot lbat eists behaeex tbe Exectatiw and l-zgiskture has bur most cordial ardfrietd!. On a$ectiue of tetvice to tbe Slate is tbe same and tberefore tbe rccessilfor u to work ckse! i most nilal ard camot be orcr+mpbasi7,ed. IVe sbo d complement eacb other and not contradict one arother Tbe a ieuement of tbe Exectrtirc nut bej ge4 against the backgroud of tbe clo?eratiln it receiru Jrom tbe l-,egislanre and uic* uersa. I woriy' tberefore, like to thank all of yu, nost sincerell, for tbe co@eration whitblott haae giuen me sofar and I bave no doabt this vill continue itt tbe best itterestof otrpeoph.

21 L^ast!, bat not lbe leart, na1 I ase tbis forum to thank the ciuil nnticefor the stPPort I baae rueiaed sofar I bope the senice will re-dedicate itself to the inphmentation of tbe prograruru* and objectia* of n1 Adniri$ration. I appeal to all of tben to czoperate n/ith ruJ

Adnittislration @t exposingghost workers.

I uti:hyt a happl andprosperou Neu Year il adraflce. Tbanklo*

Alhaii Bamanga M. Tukur Execvtite Gouenor of Gorgoh Sta* 228 Itioqr,Qby af nJ-}I. (D8.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

CONCLUSION The Bamanga Tukur administration under the banner of the National Party of Nigeria Q.,IPN) lasted for only three months before it gave way to yet another miJitary interregnum. Alhaji Bamanga Tukur's three-month tenure as Governor was too short a period to assess his performance and meaningfully place him. The government sPent the three months setding dovm to acquaint itself with the challenges of governance.

Though short-lived, Bamanga's manifestoes which stood for politics of development were well received by Gongolans. During his swearing in ceremony, Gongola hosted both members of the national and international business community who had expressed commitment to develop Gongola State during Bamanga's regime. Apat from introducing the zonal system of admimstration in the state, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur will be remembered for commissioning the Bali General Hospital and the purchase of N5 milfion nairaworth of drugs for the Yola Specialist Hospital from his personal purse. The tenaming of formerJimeta Polo ground to Mahmud Ribadu Square in memory of late Alhaji Mahmud Ribadu, one time Federal Minister of Defence in Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's cabinet during the First Republic, is not only commendable but memorable. Only posteritywill judge if Alhaji Bamanga had been allowed the opporruniq'to execute his programmes and the effects his administration would have had on the lives of the peoples of Gongola State.

When asked what challenges he had faced as govetnor,? Bamanga Tukur had this to sar'; "There is so much to do, so much expectations from people and so little tesources to do this.t'

At the time he took over as Govetnor of Gongola State, the economy of the coufltry was in a shambles because revenue coming from the Fedemtion Accounthad reduced by almost half. This was because the price of oil, on which the economy depended almost wholly, had fallen to as low as nihe dollars perbatrel.

Howevet, because of Bamanga's connection with people from various parts of the wo d, he sought for assistance from donor countries like Holland, Fir and, Norwa.v, Germany and Canada all of which gave commitments to fund his capital projects. Fot example, the Norwegian Government had promised to provide water to Yola and its environs It is safe to say therefore, that but for the military coup, th€ water problem in Yola would have been solved.

MILITARYTAKE OVER OF GOVERNMENT AND DETENTION On 31" December, 1983, the Nigedan Military under the leadership of Major General Muhammadu Buhari overthrew the government of the Third Republic in a bloodless coup. This brought to an end Alhaji Shehu Shagari's 91-days second term administration. As tbe tbbd Cilriliar Gooeraor of Gotfola Sute, October - December, 1983 229

The practical reason adduced by the military for the take-over v/as the harsh and intolarable conditions in which Nigerians were living.

The new Head of State said that: tDe economl was hEelesll mismanaged lVorkers were rotpaid for ry to eighl nonths ir some cases. Corruption, isirg anenplrynent, sqmndemtania, and a general pitb feeling oJ insectti\, peruaded tbe nalion, It aas the aim of ryjwenatingtbe ailingeconoml that tbe military took oaen"

On Friday 4* January 1984, Governors Abubakar Barde, Wilberforce Juta, Alha,i Bamanga M. Tukur and Abubakar Rimi (who was in Yola to visit Alhaji Abubakar Barde) were arrested and detained in the Guest House of the Secretary to the Gongola State Government. On Sunday,January 6" 1984, the Commissioner of Police removed Alhaji Bamanga from the Guest House to a diffetent location. On Mon day 7" Jantarv 1984, the new Military Administrator of Gongola State, Major General Muhammadu D. Jega, paid a visit to Barde, Juta, and fumi. On Tuesdai, 8* Januarl' 1984, Rimi was removed and transferted to his home state, Kano.

From Yola, Bamanga was taken to Kirikiri Maximum Prison in Lagos where he met people like Adamu Ciroma, Lawal Kaita, Ambrose Ali, Alex Ekwueme and others. The,v were kept on the ground floor while on top of t}lem were hardened criminals likc murderers, armed robbers, drug addicts who were urinating all over the place. Thevwere kept without much communication with their incarcerators. Sometimes they would send people to them and they would ask them: Tell u whatloa haae done? Btmanga once answered them saying, lYly doyt treal us like cbildren? Yoa brougbt us bere antlll dre ro11/ asking *s to teljol wbat lre bau done, Is it wo g t0 clntest a demoffatit elution and win? ls it afa t? They would not answer these questions. The reason is, they were afraid and they knew well the detained politicians had done nothingwrong. They felt that if Bamanga and his colleagues were freed they might do something to bring down the governmett "l bave nercr seen stcb ar mjust, nthhss regine as tbe Bubai/ Idiagbon one. Tbg came to potper vith the mtde help of sone ndtnocratit Nigeians wbo wantedpower and access to resotras. Tbry and Babai becasse be wat so ttaite t0 huncate der offary " says Bamanga.

While in detention some well vishers and organizations visited orwrote him expressing their sol-idarity over what they considered as the unjust treatment of Alhaji Bzrntnga Tukur and some of his colleagues arrested by the General Muhammadu Buhari-led militaqi junta. One of such letters is quoted below as an exposition of the degree of synnpathy and solidarity. 230 Biorru/,/4 ,JN,H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKU R, coN

c/o r. f,. s. T. chorch' P. O. B.r Ll, Lulall. 9th febrrEry.1985. Alh. ah6D.d Baratlta frrrur l&touth, Ir.Dvll Barau D-l{-IOrt&lBetioD' Jl-t -r.18. Slr, I utrb to vdt .rA aald te th. Dch cau:aa. you bav! had.t a rcad of cmaal.ll.ar .Doau.ralaG.trt alal otlr.r Datter€. lEr tl,D I bava r glanoa at yaur anlalgrd plctu!. h ry houtar It Cvaa D ar iDaata .bp!a..io! of your phyalcel pnarnog vtt! D. It 31a. larldt D of ,au! dft.n ruD.dao, bravlt, !!al aaDcral load vi.11 ta .11. Da.. oha.8ctara .lurlE ttD:,aal.b ,our lDag! ln av€ry bodJr'r rba tia thlDtr of Jrou. I Llst fror ae4i a.utro.a tiat y.u bar. Eo c8.. to !n v.!. Drt aata ralr s fr....! b. t pDl,.d. Itr.ftd. alt |Ir. rd qq.rtloDa llt t -l. lt D.a t b. ao.al bad to b. oarlt !a.u.?, D.a to b. frDult b.a t bc at!.d,ot, D.a to b. !gIgED&. t rr.t, llalvlitrrlt goy b.d lbot you t Irai.aaa tDa.. qnsiltlaa. Itra cq,rra rt,.ur prolirt€d itatantlonr ,,f Dot D.c{ac at Grdir nudrrr, lt b.o.D.. of tbc iuoh lrdorf,at of {r}r. .b.t! Dtl,rd D.trrsl ftflt t ,o bt .sD G.it rdrr.ch oth.r D.olrl. tula ralDil ta tdr. ht b.!. L . lla qr..tldr Uba trr ealttr os! ot p.o. Goal'a itaolalo? &ia qua.tlo! ha. aa E4r Darsaod,a.l rsrl|.!! ln lda, at rtilC f!- a.r t. tb. flrtur. .rat b.ct ta th. F;t. Ubet 18 chos.n by Goal ev€r reEelnt! dcdieateal choaeD and th. arrath queL.3 cEr not ahaL lt even a lIttl!. I thir& ther€ ar! 1ot6 and lots of fsari tovrads your p€aaonallty by paople behind thc Da8k. They uant to uaa thl! era to satLsfy thc1r vlcked soulsi your protonged tlatantion Ia ! plaerurG to thsE. But Sllr D,ry I s6sure you tlt, t once vlth God. lrral! pI.alure ia ahort llvad. God ldrovs yhetr lrour tlooDJI thouahta tu.l.a to luAhters. ltre llfe of a a€rloua polllLclan j.s rargea b.tuoan the Ilttta h-& a.Dd iEpal.sonlEnt. Yout lntendod datentlon aloee not E ?tt tlra rd of yorr alnce it is only ieeth that can brj.ng 6n end to the hurn.n aodaavau!. lley I a5erEa you here that you car! bo kapt fo! dor&ay ycars Lt tha @ot you arc rlcaaeil, you l!. yorth t.n tl!.! Dort tlleD th. aataLrara. Va tl. loorl rn l'! the vllletecilo pray to cod tihE t !rou! tood h..lth D. oG.taat tlr.r. ID tbe d,etqntlon c.Dp. I t. As tbe tbird Cioilidn Gooernor of Gongola State, October - December, 1983 231

2

t{sv I Blso aay hele that plGasgr concentrate your thoughts to God alans fo! Ea is the only onc to take you aray froo your curr€nt probler. No hu!?n balngt friends or r"latlvsa can not a"nd are not reed.y to lobby for you! releaa?. If they vere reaaly, you vould not haYe been in aotantlon nor, uhan ltou have tro caae io ataH€r. The !-lEi8hty God th: t talas lrou thers brora vhen to rele,,ra your fu11stop. Sir, I roulal like to cor-cluds her€ th..t 1t 18 only d.ath th: t dravr E itcadllna aclro6s one6 vay of 1lfa. lrolt aiaya !o!e hop.. ltlerafole as lont ar you l, iTe ttrerohs sti).1 hopqrlby tho E asea th..t one day you v111 bs set free and you ut1l in turn 8Gt the natloD fr€€.

nrank you. I wlsh you sound nl8hts aDd Jovi.aL alayr rlth your co11e6uea.

Youls falthful ly,

. St€ph"n Dgaa. 232 B;osaphJ |JN,H.

R.EFERENCES 1 "Report of Comrnittee on Gongola State, Fourteen Years After", document prepated by the Minisry of Information, Youth, Sports and Culture,July 1990 under the Chairmanship of Mallam Abubakar B. Jijiwa, General Nlanageq Gongola State Broadcasting Corporation, Yola. Pl 2. IUdP4 3. IUdP.5 4. IbidP.S 5. "Ethnic Survey in Gongola State 1983" Conducted by Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Statistics Division Yola. 6. PONGRIJ.H. "Political Development in Northern Adamawa," 7809-1996: A Study in the Historical Development of Inter-group Relations", @h.D Thesis) Subrnitted to the Department of History', Ahmadu Bello Univeristy, Zaria, Sept. 1987,P 7. Ibid. Fulberisation is the process of social transformation by non-Fulani converts to Islam who after conversion abandoned their language and culture and initiated into, adopted Fulani customs as synonymous with Islamic practices. 8. "Report of Committee on Gongola State l4Years After" p. 16 9. Ibid 10. Interview with Alhaji Adamu Kawuyo Jada and Mr. Philip Maken. A.lhaji Bamanga chose the symbol of ahorse as his independent party logo '11. The Nigian Oburae4 Saturday Augu sfl'h ,1982P.3 12. Press Statement made by Alhaji Bamanga Tukur at Jada, Monday 16'h, 1982. Courtesy of Alheji Bamanga Tukur 13 Interview with Mr. David Barau (Alhaji Bamanga Tukur's Deputy Governor) in YolaS/6/84 and with Alhaji Bashiru Y Hong on2/6/84. These intetviews were conducted v/hile I was a Phd stud ent^t ABU Z^i^. Ibid 15. Interuiety aith Mx Dauid Bara4 on9 / 6 / 84 16. Intert iew y,itb Rruerend Sabja in Yola, on23 / 5 / 84 17. Intentieu ,itb Mn Datid Barar on9 / 5 / 84 18. SILDAT publications, r agos, 1983, PP 25,27 19. IbidP.3s,38 20. rbid 21. Ibid 22. Courtesy of Mr. Bafte Wilberforce]uta 23. Courtesy of Alha jiBzmanga 24. rbid 25. Courtesy of AJhaji Hamidu Alkali, (OFR), Chairman of Committee. As tbe tbird Cittilian Gooernor of Gongola State, October - December, 1983 z).)

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frl \ I a I a .tr 7at I Ei!-l oa:lLd^ Ftat DOF8zi -,2 4 I t!tru)E'-rF u>6EfiS tq(,(J I FPV ,r,FO (J ;22r-r lrr r!Ia p!t!a?fr FH> d1(J-e4O ?89 acoF{ HI!)(J5o! +F,(*'U Iq 7 iSFl.3 iH i-.

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I a '! -t I ) i ^-/ A T t r In I I R l' a *-'\ lr. I I {a J I a I I I. THE MEMORABLE SWEARING IN CEREMONY OF HIS EXCELLENCY, THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF GONGOI-A STATE, ALH. BAMANGAM. TUKUR 1ST OCTOBER, 1983. 240 BiwaPb olALH. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKTJR" CON

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CHAPTERSE\rEN

THE ULTIMATE CHOI : 1992 - ALHAII BAMANGA M. TUKUR'S ATTEMPT AT THE PRESID ENCY

7.1 INTRODUCTIO N Since President Ibrahim Babamasi Babangida came to power on 27th August, 1985, thr government had expended a lot of enetgy and resources in its much suspicious and dubious transition to civil rule programme, "that will-gradually entrench true democratic ethics" in the Third Republic. In December 1985, the Babangida Administtation set up a seventeen-member Political Bureau under the Chairmanship of Professor Sylvanus Cookey to produce a political blueprint for the country. GuideJ by Nigeria's past experience, the Bureau recommended and government accepted the retention of the presidential system and the operation of a two-party system. The aim was to discourage ethnically or regionally-based political parties and promote national uniry.

To ensure a clean break with the past, the government placed a ban on some categories of politicians tagged "old breed" who according to president Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, far from mending their ways, had developed new ideas of ',how to mismanage the economy of the counuy in a more damaging fashion; rig Nigerian elections in a brazen manner; and cause widespread disaffection among the gineral popu.lation on an unprecedented scale."

Those banned include: (D AII those politicians who held political offices frorn October 1st, i 960 toJanuary 15th, 1966 and from October 1st, 1979 to December 31st, 1983 and who were subsequendy indicted and found guilty of offences or misdeeds by any Tribunal, Assets/Special Investigation Panel, Judicial Commission or Administrative Enquiry;

('i) All persons who served as Secretaries to Federal and State Governments, Permanent Secretaries, Judges, Chairmen and Members of Federal and State Boards of Statutory Corporations and State-Owned companies or on Governing Boards of Educational Institutions as well as all other public officers who had been found guilty of misdeeds by any panel, tribunal, judicial commission or administrative enquiry between October lst, 1960 and the end of the transition period;

('t,) All Military and Police personnel who held offices during the periodJanuary 15d 1966 to the end of the uansition period and who were removed from offiie or dismissed from service or who were or would thereafter be found g"rlty of corruption or other misdeeds or indicted by various court martia.l, ribunals, Biosrdpb oJN}l. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

assets investigation panels and administtative and judicial inquiries at both federd and state levels;

(i") All persons in both the publ.ic and private sectots who had been orwould be dismissed from of6ce or-any employ.rnent during the period October 1st, 1960 to the end of the transition pedod; and

(") All those persons who may not have held any public office but who had been indicted byvarious panels, tribunals and commissions of enquiry fot corruPting public office holdets.

The idea, according to Ptesident Babangida, was to encourage the emergence of a new breed of Nigerians who would aspire to mote lofty goals of national development. lfith regards to the banoing and unbanning of politicians, Bamanga had this to say: 1l;i nlfsb, it is nmry and mfumocratic,

However, this may not after all turn out to be the case because t}te so-called "new breed Nigerians" wete like other persons around. The youth may not in fact be synonymous with honesty, especially in Nigeria, where such youths are daily exposed to the corrupting influences of the oldergroup.

The banning exercise was also criticized by man1, Nigerians who felt that it was not comprehensive enough just like the selective trials of the Second Republic political office holders. Banning atl those who held public offices, even tttose not found guilty, was tantamoult to eroding the essential pdnciple of punishment and rewatd on which societies build their means of conftolling individual behavior. For, as they argue, there is no collective guilt; individuals are guilty not a whole group. To smear a whole group with the evils of individuals is not just, fair and appropriate. For the Bible records how God wished to destroy Sodom and Gomorah for the evils of men who lived in them with their women and children but the only righteous mzn arnongst them [,ot and his two daughters] were spared.

In order to do some damage contol, the govemment esablished the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction O,IAMSER) znd the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) to educate the population on the vim:es that must be cultivated in the system to enable the country avoid the cyclical instabi.lity of the past and to pave t'ay for peaceful political succession. Tbe Uhittak Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Ba,ndaga M. Trk*\ Attern?t at tbe Presiderc! 243

7.2 LIFTING THE BAN ON PO CAL ACTIVITIES AND THE FORMATION OF POLITICALASSOCIATIONS If most of the 1979 political parties had their origin in the sundry political groupings initiated in the 1978 Constitutional Assembly, a similar thing happened during the 1988 Constituent Assembly.

On May 3rd, 1989, President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida lifted the ban on politics which his military junta had imposed on the country.

Within ten days of the lifting of the ban, no less dran fifteen political associations sprang up.

Gradually, the number grew to beat the paltry record of three political parties in 1978. To some political observers, the proliferation of so many political associations was a bad omen for the Third Republic. \X/hat is more, the diffetence among them was genera y fuzzy, suggesting the Iikelihood of mergers in the future. Few of the political formations articulated any meaning6rl ideology.

One of the eady political associations to emerge was the Nigeria National Congress (i',lNC), made up of people who preferred to call themselves Federalisls. They include: people like Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur, Umaru Sh.inkafi and Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, a multi milfionaire publisher and businessman.

The Iiberal New Movement (LNNf),later Iiberal Convention (I-.C),was also among the eady political associations that came up. It had Onwuka Kalu another multi-millionaire businessman as its principal financier. The Peoples Front of Nigeria @FN) was yet another political association that emerged, widely believed to have been hatched by Major General Shehu Musa Yar' Adua fi.td) and his proteg6s. Also among the new crop of political associations was the Peoples Solidarity Party @SP), led by Mohammed Arzika butgenerally believed to have strongsupport from the progressive group.

These four were the sttongest of the numerous associations that emerged. Othets were the: Trust Group; Labour Party; AII Nigeria Peoples Party; Brotherhood Club of Nigeria; Democratic Peoples Congress; Peoples Liberatiofl Party; Progressive Party Alliance; Nigeria People Welfare Party; Peoples Party of Nigeria; Committee of Pariots, etc.

7.3 REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS AS POLITICAL PARTIES Perhaps in a bid to reduce the number of political associations to a manageable level and to ensure that an association can metamorphose into a political party, the National Electoral Commission(NEC) engineered the most stringent registration requirements for the political parties, hoping that this measure would also ease tibal and money-based parties. The requirements were: 244 Biopplry o/ N,H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

1 All political associations seeking regisration should pay N50, 000 regisration fee; 2 Establish and furnish staff offices at local, state and nationallevels; 3 Print flags and manifestos for each office; 4 Organize and conduct campaigns and conventions in all the states and the (then) 430local governments; 5 Each association should have serially numbered membership cards with a photogtaph on each card signed by party officials.'

By those tequirements, it was estimated that a political association would require N50,000 as regisftation fee; N12.75 million to secure offices and fumish them; N108 million to organize and conduct campaigns and conventions; and N800 million to print flags and maoifestos. As for party membership cards, Professor Claude AlNiger State Chaptet at Minna Township Stadium and ended up N2.3 million richer.

Similar stories obtained in NNC, PSP and PP Nonetheless, the amount of money required to meet the registration requirements by political associations was so enormous that the only solution left was for associations to seek mergers or alliances with l_ike- minded groups. At the end of the day, a number of mergers were made but the bonds were not cemented as was later on revealed by the factionalization within the two governrrent-decreed political parties - The National Republican Convention (l,lRC) and - the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Thus, those two political parties were formed (October 1989) by the Government after realizing that it was not realistic for any Tbe Ubimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamarrgd M. Ttkn\ Atkrnpt dt tbe Presideacy 245 political association to meet the registration requirements set by NEC because of the cost involved in monetary terms. Commenting on the regisration of the two political parties on October 7th, 1989, President Ibrahim Babangida had this to say: 'Trln lsr patt ex?erielce, 0 r political prlgrar nes nrct be grafual, pupuejtl ard ffictiae. It must ain at lajng tbe basi fomdatiot for a ,tey rocil-pllitical orden lYe msst create a rcw set o1[ wlus o rctt, Jet of ?olitical attittdes orpolitical calture aimed at ubeitg in a net, social order lYe now haae cban ate afld fie12 political partie: wbicb can proride the tum-aroudfor all Nigeians, icb or poor, irrespectiue of tbeir lEaltiu or geo- pobtical locations. In this new grassrool mass partJ ?xpcinent, n4 are all eqaal 'Fonders"and 'Joineri

Fine words, fine ideas and fine intentions but the political reality was light years away from the ideals espoused by Mr. President when anaouncing the registration of the two "grassroots" political paties. Unfortunately, nothing changed. If anything, as Tony Elumelu righdy observed, the acrimony, geo- political and ethnic divide and undue politrcal influence welded by money had been on the increase. Although all were asked to become "joiners", and not owners, some money bags had bought areas of influence and positions'" in the political parties. As later events showed, the executives of the parties from the federal to the ward level came under the firm control of the money bags. In both political parties, it became increasingly difficult for principles to prevail over money. Everywhere it was money. That was why it was not possible to conduct hitch-free presidential primaries due to the importance attached to the office.

ELECTION OF PARTY OFFICIALS In July, 1990, elections were held by the two political parties to choose officials who would run the affairs of the political parties at the local government, state and national levels. During the exercises, political parties started to experience the pangs of birth. The NRC held her National Convention in Abuja on 21 July, 1990, while the SDP held its own on 28th July, 1990. The NRC was divided not only along the lines of ideology, policy or principles but on ethaic lines and on matters pertaining to t}re party and elective offices ot the spoils of office. To add to their problems, the two largest groups that merged to form the NRC - Liberal Convention (I-C) and Nigerian National Congress (lrlNQ never really fused. At the various levels, each group had cootinued to hold its own meeting, plotting its strategies on hov/ to deal with the other group. Apart from divisions based on old alliances, the NRC was also divided along three sharp lines. The Northern conservatives led by Isa Kaita, Abdumhaman Okene, Adamu Ciroma, Lawal Kal;ta, Bamanga Tukur and Aminu Wali; the Eastern Minority AJliance (initially called the Moderates) led by Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyaflvu and Gabriel Igbinedion; and the Western conservadves led by Dr. Ahmed Kusamotu and Chief Femi Fani Kayode. The raging batde was over the chairmanship position as whichever gtoup loses, it is eliminated from the presidential race going by conventional political wisdom.

As a result, Chief Emmanuel Ivuanyanwu who had always expressed his desire to contest for the presidency of the federation had to storm out of one their crucial 246 BiwaPb oJAI-H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKU& CON meetings where he, Adamu Ciroma, Bamanga Tukur, Ahmed Umaru, Ibrahim Gusau, Lawal Kaita and Dr. Kusamotu were the kingpins. From the beginning of the Third Republic, chief Iwuanyanwu had been criss-crossing the nation, selling his czndidature. He towered so much atove the other ambitious southerners for the ptesidential ticket that he was cleady synonymous with the South's choice for President' But many northerners were not comPletely at home with Iwuanyanwu. In order to dampen and neutralize his presidential ambition, the nonherners planned to give Iwuanyanwu the kind of shocklr Bashorun M.K.O Abiola received during the NPN days when he was pointedly told by Umaru Dikko that the presidencywas not for sale'

Conscquently, the northern group decided to sPonsor a southern minority, Chief Tom Ikimi, flr the Chairmannship of the party. Chief Ikimi was said to have the right stature, education, (a 1973 gmduatetf Architecture from A.B.IJ Zaira) and upbringing needed for the posi. This master stroke turned the fteshly found southern unity into dust as Chief Ikimi finally scaled as NRC's National Chaitman. 7.5 THE SIDENTIALAS All in all, over 6fty people indicated their willingress to contest for the post of the president of the country.

Every citizen is basically qualified to be pfesident even without some kind of training and experience for the highest office. The number was incredibly large and wottisome' Few rn:ay be serious, maiority were "iokers", while some were downright "spoilers and fraudstars" who wete only out to reap financial capital by making overtures to their friends and international finance agencies. Below is a list of some of the aspirants in the SDPandNRC:

S.D.P. N.RC. Major General Shehu M. Yar'Adua fi'tQ Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi Chief M.K.O. Abiola x Alhaji Adamu Cirpma Senator Mahmud Waziri Alhali B. M.Tukur Mr. Ogunsanwo Gbolabo* Chief E.Iwuanyanwu Dr. Dele Cole AIhaji I-emaJibril Amb. Baba Gana Kingibe Alhaji lnuwa Wada Chief Frederick Fasheun Dr.J.O.J. Okezie Mr. Chinedum Ezebuiro+ Mr. Olusegun Ogundinmu Prof Adebayo Adedeji* Mr. OIa Akaiule Chief Olabiyi Duro jaiye Alhaji Yusufu Maitama Sule Mr. Adeboyega Esan Alhaji Ibrahim Dan Musa Chief Lai Balogun Alhaji Aliko Mohammed Mr. I-ekan Balogun Alhali SalehJambo Mr. Oladejo Okediii Alhaji Umaru Wali Mr. Franl Okosunx Alhaji A. Mohammed* Kola Salami Alhaji Shehu Musa* The Ubimate Cboke: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Trahar's Attempt at tbe Presidetcl 247

BabaAdi Chief Edwin Unwudiwe* Chief Olu Falae Dl Datti Ibrahim Mrs. SerahJubril Prof.Jerry Gana Dt Abel Ubeku Mr. Samuel Salifu*

+ Yetto declare as of 2/2/92 Sotxce.The N etysutatcb, 2-1 / 2 / 92.P. 36

Some of these contestants had for along time had eyes on the nation's most coveted seat and had been planning for years towards cl.inching the ticket. Alhaji Adamu Ciroma is one of such persons. Alhaji Adamu Cioma (Dalktan Fr&a) was born in Potiskum, now in Yobe State, on 7th February 1934. A History graduate of the 1960s, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma had occupied important and sensitive positions in various governments of the country. He was a former Centtal Bank Governor; Editor of the New Nigerian Newspapers; and two times minister (Finance and later Agriculture) under the Shigari Administration. He was also the Minister of Agriculture under tl-re General Sani Abacha administration. In 1978, Adamu Ciroma was one of the sir candidates along with Alhaji Shehu Shagzi (Ttrakin So,&rlr); Alhaii Yusuf Maitama Sule (Dan Masanin Kano); Professor lya Abtbakar (Galadinu Mfi); Chtef Joseph Tarka; and Dr. Olusola Saraki that scaled through the screening exercise of their party, the National Party of Nigeria Q.{PIrl), to contest for the post of President. When t}re determination of the party's flag bearer was stalemated, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma and Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule (strong contenders to Alhaji Shehu Shagad's candidature) were prevailed upon to step do\r/n to pave v/ay for Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the second round of the NPN mini primaries in Kaduna.

Alhaji Adamu Ciroma was one of those eadier banned by Ptesident Babangida from contesting for any elective post in the Third Republic. In December, 1991, these categories of banned politicians were unbanned- Consequendy, in a letter dated 31 January written to his friends, Aihaji Adamu Ciroma intimated them of his plans, sayiog, 'giuen ryt backgromd and general experience il blth ?lblic and pitate nctors, I feel tbat I an adeqmte! eqlipped to nek tbe higb ffia of thepretidentof Nigeia".

On 9th February, 1992, Dr. Bode Olowoporoku, a prominent politician from Ondo State, sent out another set of lettets on behalf of :dte AlbEi Adant Cirona Ca@aign Organi7ation, making public the intention of Alhaji Ciroma to run for office of President. Befote then, Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, Mamfan Sokoto, said to be a close friend of Adamu Ciroma, was among the first crop of candidates to declare his interest in the presidency. Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi was born inJanuary,1937 in Kauta Namoda, Sokoto 248 Biosrqb af AJ-}{- (DB.) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

State. A 1974 Iaw graduate from the Universiry of Lagos, Alhaji Umaru Shinkafl was a formet Nigerian Security Organisation Q'{SO) boss; a former Oyo State Commissioner of Police and former Minister of lnternal Affairs under the Murtala / Obasanio regime'

Since 1985, he had set his eyes on the Presidency. For good measure, it was alleged that he, "tutned his 25 Ribadu Road residence in Lagos into a campaign office, recruited skeletal staff of about seven persons and had been shutding between Lagos and Sokoto and consulting influential Northern Elders". The same source furthet claimed that Shinkafi's effort was further bolstered by the "support" from a long-standing friend, Athaji Adamu Ciroma. On Friday 21" of November 1991, he formally made public his interest in the Presidency saying, "lo da1 witb abidinglfaitb in tbe Alnigltry God and tbe people of Nigeia and bEe for lbe faktre of n1 coutt@, I fuckre n1 ifiention to seek nomittation fot the Pruidencl of tbe Federat Re?tlblic 0f Nigeia on the platforn oJ the Natiorral Re? blicdn Conuention (I'{RC)".

To Alhaji Shinkafi, his presidential bid would be smooth sailing, especially with the clampdown on old "politicians". Unknown to him, things would change in quick succission, especially the unbanning of the banned politicians, thereby opening the floodgate for those with political ambitions. No sooner had old politicians been unbanned than a new set of presidential aspirants ioined the hustings, including his friend, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma (Dallatun Fika). Ciroma's entry into the Presidential race brought some problems for the Northern Elders over who to suPPort between Alhaii Umatu Shinkafi and Ahaii Adamu Ciroma, thereby creating the fust visible crack on the political wall of the defunct Northern Region. Those who had all along supported Shinkafiwere suddenly split into two camps. Consequendy, a group of Northern Elders, headed by Alhaji Isa Kaita @azirin Katsina and 6rct Education Minister in the former Northern Region) met three times to re solve the issue but it was inconclusive. Other prominent members of the Northern Elders Committee were: Alhaii Shehu Shagari' Lawal Kaita, and Bamanga M Tukur, Suleiman Takuma, Shettima Ali Monguno. Yusuf Maitama Su.le, Abdurahman Okene, Nuhu Bamali, Sule Katagum, Ibrahim Gusau, Majot General Hassan Usman Katsina, Professor Ishaya Audu and Senator Uba Ahmed. According to one source, majority members of this group setded for Adamu Ciromawho they described as probably the best of all the candidates. Their decision and choice was informed by what appeared to have been the general thinking within the NRC that the President should come ftom the North East Region' Consequendy, there was a plan by the group to persuade Shinkafi to step down for Adamu Ciroma. In a similar way Ciroma was eadier prevailed upon to steP down for a Sokoto man, Shehu Shagari, in 1978.

This arrangement could not work because Aihaji Shinkafi repeatedly said he would not relent in his efforts to clinch the presidential ticket, especially that he and his supporters saw Ciroma's entry as "morally wrong to change his mind". Butin politics and especially Nigerian politics, the game is dictated more byinterest than morality. Tbe Utimdte Choice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Takur's Atten pt dt tbe Presideu! 249

7.6 TRY I T TH PRESIDENTIALRACE

MOTIVATION TO YIE FOR THE PRESIDENCY: 'Ml inspiration was ri?2,?le- I belieued tbatae hdue a c0 nttJ and we needed a leaderrhry tbat will ?ra?el it to greater heights, not on! fot Nigeia and Nigeians butfar tbe entire lVest Afican regiox oJ tbe continent- S a lfound it aery necessaryifor ts, as A;ficans ta came or.tt to lfi oarpeopleJron lhe position af want and whetherit, is watt of education, resaurces to improtte tbe qaalitix a;f tbe lirx of ourpeople. lYith a detennined and uitionary kader:hip abich bas commitmext to tbon pinciples, and well nakliTedJollawershrp, a lotaf progress can be nade.

I also looked at n1 sojoarn and m1 expeience at tbe Pofts Astboiry, plas tlte tbings I aanted to do as Gournor oJ Gongola State bh vas denied tbe opportani! to do tben. IJelt that I should be able to g* tbe chance now to do tbem al the national /eael.

It was alleged that because of the stalemated situation over the choice between Alhaji Shinkafi and Alhaji Ciromz, Alhaji Bamanga M Tukur was "solicited for and encouraged" by suppotters of AJhaji Umaru Shinkafi to join the race. The idea was that Alhaji Bamanga Tukur comes from the same North East Region as Adamu Ciroma. He is a political hearry weight, being a one time Governor of Gongola State. He is also endowed v/ith huge resources. !7ith these credentials, if he joined the race, he wouid further polarise and whitde down Ciroma's support base thereby giving Shinkafi an advantage.

Even though this may be given as a reason for Alhaji Bamanga's entry into the Presidential race, there is no doubt that Alhaji Bamanga Tukur's personality, record of administative excellence in government and business also qualified him to provide credible leadership for Nigeria.

Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur hails from Adamawa State which falls in the North-East Region. He has some non comparable qualities and traits in him. He is hard working, committed and has a humane nature that welcomes and fosters credible relationship with men of various backgrounds, religious and ethnic. Added to these, he had a complete understanding of the economic predicament of the country coupled with his adequate knowledge of intetnational politics, trade and commerce.

It is also pertinent to note that a geo-political assessment of leadership in Nigeria will certair y highlight how Adamawa Province had made appreciable steps tov/ards cJinching the Presidency of the country and was denied by events. By this misfortune, the state remained disadvantaged in terms of development. The te-occurence of this phenomenon could be seen in this perspective: Alhaji Mahmud Ribadu - Defence Minister 1960; Professor Iya Abubakat - Minister of Defence 1979; Alhaji Ali Baba - Minister of Internal Affairs; Dr Mahmud Tukut - Minister of Industry, 1984; Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur - Minister of Industries, 1993; Alhaji Muhammadu Gambo Jimeta- 250 Biosra?b oJNn. (DL) BAMANGA TUXU& coN

Ministet of Agriculture, 1994. The event in the detetmination of miliary leadership in 1966, 197 5, 197 6, 1983, md, 1985 - Gongola sons had played prominent roles in these coups, yet they were only rewarded with the appeatance of power not power itself. A few of them include the following: Geneml G.S.JaIo (Chiefs of Defence Staff); Air Marshall Ibrahim Alfa and Air Vice Marshall A D. Bello (Chief of Air Staff); Admiral Murtala Nyako (Chief of Naval Staff); Majot Genemls H.A. Hananiya, Paul Tatfa, I.B.M. Haruna, Abdullalhi Shelleng; Ait Commodore Dan Suleiman and Inspector Generals of Police- Alhaji Adamu Suleiman and Alhaji Muhammadu Gambo Jimeta. Alhaji Bamanga's outing in 7992 wzs thus one bold and courageous effort by an indigene of Adamawa to provide Adamawa State's turn of leadership for Nigeria. The good omen was provided by the Northern Elders' endotsement that the North East Region should produce the ptesident. It was also a pointer to the uniqueness of Alhaji Bamanga, Tukur's involvement in the 1992 presidential race.

7.7 THE ULTIMA CHOICE 92: ALIIAII BAMANGA M. TUKUR'S 1992 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN On 2nd Mr.c},:,, 1992, Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukut, (.Wakilin Ganye) launched his campaign, "Ultimate CHOICE '92", at the Ribadu Square, Yola, for the nation's highest office, thus heralding his entry into the already crowded but distingished club of ptesidential aspirants.

It was, by no means a smooth start. As soon as his campaign took off, some of his detractors and former political associates in the National Party of Nigeria (l.lPlrl) began to spread campaigns of calumny against him. Theit grouse with Bamanga had its roots in the Second Republic. This group allegedly campaigned for Alhaji Bamanga to become the Governor of former Gongola State in 1983 but after assuming poweq he abandoned them in terms of appointinents to political offices and the award of contracts. Instead, Bamanga rewarded some people (even non-indigenes) who neither worked for the party nor campaigned for him.

Here are excerpts of what the group considered as the "sins" of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur It is on record tbat tylten Bamanga Ttkn became Cournor ir 198) he told nenbers of the National Pa@ of Nigeria who had worked tireless!.for bis tictory tbat tbty were mercenaies who had no motiae for workingfor bin. He said tbat tbg ca@aigledfor hin becalse of the nonry be gate then d*ing tbe election peiod. Tberefore, afier h* inatgtration ceremonl as Gouernor, Bamangt Tukar adtised tbe fenale nenbers of the cdm?aign team togl and many, so ar toget tomebodl to take care oJ tben. This is becaue be had no more ase for tbem. To tlte maried yomeb he adtised tben to hold on to tbeir husbands and while to the male members of tbe campaign tean, be a&ti:ed tben to go and searchJor work. This rcnainll ponray the pruidential aspirant as a beartbss ard ungratef*l nan. He not o$ bebaued selfsb! @ derying the par| members tbe o??ortunil)t to ben@t fron tbeir barfuyork and rherelry apprEiaring the betefts to on! hinulf and bisfani!, be also dttied tbe pa@ members the opport*nig of f flling thensebes @ belping to i@bment the pa@'s programmes. No matter the amount of mone,1 Bamanga Ttkur mlst haae spent for his gouernorsbb **?orgrr, it was certai l indtcentfor bim to heat his supponert with some indfferenn afier his uictory. The da1 of ruknning har Tbe Ultimate Cboice: 1992 - Albdji Banarrga M. T ka/\ Attempt at tbe Presid.ency 251

not corle ad thir iJ tbe reason w@ nost political obsen ers see Bananga Ttkrtr's canpaign Jor Presideng, as doomed from /be start Bamalga Tt4ks/s bad pzblic inage uitb tbe politica@ aairc citi1,erc oJ tbe S tate is ako e dent in tlte appoi nent of the ofinrs of bis canpaign *an. As be cannot secure the lryalry ard co-operation oJ t ous pd4 tbe National Rq lhan Conycltiox, he z,ent as Jar t0 ap?lint Psblir$ ackttouledged Social Denorntit Pa@ slpporters - Mobanned Fufore and Timaytls Mathiar-t bis Manager atd Director of ca@aign respectiue!. It is in the ligltt of tbe aborc and otber acls which baae portraled Bamanga Tlklr as an angratefi, mreliabh ard selfsb pfili fgare that we aduise Bamanga Ta kur to reconsidtr his bidfor tbeprxidenry, Tltere are hyo alterxatit es dmilable t0 hinflr consideration, It ir ? blic knowledge that nne of hisJrierds and astociates like Adamt Ciroma and Unant Shinkaf are nioas presidtntial aEirants.lVe aduite bin to pitcb camp with om of these more riable cadidates. Tbis aill enabh bim to exeniu his influence and acbieae same af his politica/ goals uhicb thosld not be as lofu as bis *archfor the ?resid.enryl, Or be sho*ld prbli!, apologise to the peopb of Adanawa and Taraba Statesfor the sbaneJtl atd callous manner be treated them as Couertorof the dtfittct Gorgok State. Onlf throsgb tbis action will be be abh to secne some nnblana of sapportfron hh bone base abich is wcetsaryfor bis stccess.

Ary deriartor fron tbe hto altentatiaes aboue yill lzad to a ditastmw and bmiliating defeat for Bamarga Ttktn Pnple will cenain! accept l:is ,r7ol0 but their ru?pot aill be balfbeaned and $pocritical. It h tbe aoice oJ the pe@b tbat tbis writer is repro&tcing. Pltase bear it

Generally, with exceptions so rare, democmtic politicians are usually insecure and intimidated men. They advance politically only as they placate, or otherwise manage to manipulate the demanding, threatening elements in their constituencies. This is especially typical of the behavior of Nigerian politicians and electorates alike; once they are with you while you are contesting for afly elective post and when you eventually win, everybody would claim that they eiected you or aided you to your new, elevated position. They will now come round looking for appointments or plum contracts. But as Mr. Gideon Zamani, one time Hon Speaker of the Kaduna State House of Assembly under the three-month administtation of Alhaji Lawal Kaita righdy observed, "tbe hatb ir tbdt 1ou cannot girc cotlracts, distribute monry or dP?oint nefitr to a// tbon wbo ebctedyl or aidedlour . ascendance to pawer. Tbis makes most acauations against sacnssfulpoliticians tolgeruine".

As in the case of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, he was only three months in office which could be considered as a period of setding down. Al1 *ris did not discourage Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur; he very well knew what snares u/ere being spread around his path, from personal animosity and possibly from popular delusion. He put to hazard his ease, his security and his otherinterests in pursuitof the objective before him, the presidencr,.

He also knew that obloquy is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all rue glory and remembered that calumny and abuse were essential parts of triumph. While some of his adversaries retired, bleeding and broken from the wounds of such political skirmishes, Alhaji Bamanga was immuned to them. His gteat ego and vigorous health had made him thick-skinned, physically as well as mentally. One other quality of Aihaji Bamanga M. Tukur which distinguished him from his other political opponents \r/as that 252 lt/ta!',11,/)1 ol AJ-}I. (DF..) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN he was a liberal politician and a statesman with vigorious reform influence, practical and effective as against the Utopian theories of many apolitician.

The totality of his work in life also shows an astonishing profusion of talent and banality, tealism and romanticism, patriotism, awareness of the motal, social, political, economic and intellectual issues of former Gongola State, Adamawa State, Nigeria and the international communiry Alhaii Bamanga Tukur also has a delinite philosophy of life. He believes that whatever one sets out to do, one should do it with all one's God- given strength and conviction in accordance with the highest dictates of one's conscience and damn whatever anybodyelse says. According to him: Tbere is alwEs one thilg in lfe. S ome people want to sneaqtou btt lf 1ol stand or )orlr zwrl andlou are being igbt, fear nobodl buarse the hvth n/ill srrfoce. It ir ewnij; it isjeakay; tbatJ1 canfi\t c re. No matler wbat-yot do to tben, once thry are enuiols, tbry can neuer see anltbinggood ittlol. Tbq want to dulrEyt. Thqt cattrrnt TbA aafit t0 be li/ee-10r. Thry cannot Tberefore thg resolue to giueyt all kinds of namu. Btt sinn nost of tbeir acbielements attd suasses in life depend on 1ot, tltq alwayt baae to mme back lo1ot. All tbat om needt lo do itt t cb a sit tation is to ignon all thry hau dom and continte uith the goodness whicb thry are enaio* becatselou are a betlerjwlge of ytrselJ- [ yt knowlot are chan, f 1ot knowlol an fortbight, bardworking and uccessf , u|y sbo dlot cbange? Their criticitn was meafi lo cbargelotfor tbe belterif tbq aregiringconshtctiae nitidsn. If on lhe other band lbry reson tu blacknailirglot, it is not buatselot are doing somelbing ininical to somebodl else's inhrest dzlibenteS. IJ 1ot knovloa are not doing ar1 oJ ncb, alry bxber? Don't deuiatefronlorr ca se. Contit e rlrith tbatgoodnus buaan 1or are tbe betl jtdge oJ ytrself. If yr are doirg something wong aldlot knoa, wlry do it? B* lf 1u krow and beliew tbat wbatlou are doing is corred,forget about whahuer arlbodl tbinks abo lol-go ahead, dor't look back

For most politicians, long-term preparation and srategizing has been a necessity in .ULTIMATE ^cfi izir,g one's political ambitions. Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur's CHOICE"was charged with this responsibility. At the head of the National Campaign Team was Alha)i Lawal Kaita, a one-time civilian Governot of Kaduna State in the Second Republic. He was the Chairman of The National CAMPAIGN TEAM, 'ULIIMATE CHOICE '92", with its headquaters in Lagos. Bamanga Tukur was the only aspirant of Northern origin with the headquarters of his campaign office in Lagos. The rest had theirs in Kaduna. Other members of the National Campaign Team were: Alhaii Bamanga Tukuq Mr. David Barau, Director Field Organization; Mr Thomas Nathaniel; Alhali Isa Mubi; Dr. Garba Nadama, Saidu U. Kumo (Garkuwan Gombe) Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu, Dr.Suleiman Kumo, Alhaji Lawal Kaita, etc. This team toured the length and breadth of the countrJ', selling their candidate to the electorate.

Thete were also coordinators and directors at the national, zonal, state and local governrnent levels. The country was divided into two zones - North and South. Dr Ral,rnond Dokpesi, a long-standing Personal Assistant to Alhali Bamanga M. Tukur Tbe Uhimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanp M . Tuhur's AtternPt at tbe Presidencl 253

doubled as the National Co-ordinator of "Ultimate Choice 92,, at tl-re Headquarters ifl Lagos and the Zonal - Co-ordinator in charge of the Southern Zone. There were also directors of various departments in the headquarters in Lagos. Mr. T.M. yunusa was the Director, Logistics while Mr. Ugo was in charge of Finance. The Northern Zore was headed by Alhafi S iduUmar, (Garkuwan Comhe),whowas also the Depuw National Co- ordinator. He was assisted by Dr. M.M. Shata who was the Director of Organization in the zone.

Each state had a State Co-ordinator, l-ocal Government co-ordinators and watd mobilizers, five for each ward. Below is a list of some State Co-ordinators for the Northern Zone.

STATE STATECO.O RDINATORS 1. Adamawa Alhaj.iAhmed Song/ Mr. Thomas Nathaniel 2. Bauchi Alhaji Kari Bajogal Alh. Saidu Umar Kumo ' 3. Benue MrAper Wambo 4. Bomo A[iaji Yamani Abba Gana 5. Jigawa Alhaji Hamma Suleiman 6. Kaduna Alhaii Ibrahim Dankulla 7. Kano Alh. Danladi Nasidi/Alh. I-awal Kaita 8. Katsina Alhaji Hassan Mashi 9. Kebbi Alhaji Usman Sani 10. Kogi Mr. Richard 1 1. Kwara Alhaji Suleiman Rasheed 72. Plateau Mr. Davou D.B. Zang 13. Sokoto Alh.Jebbi Maradun/Dr. Garba Nadama 74. Tanba Dr. Ando Shaki 15. Yobe Alh. Hassan Yusuf 16. Abuja Mt Kyauta Yepwi

There were also women co-ordinators in each state with Hajiya Amina Kwol as the women leader for the northern zonc.

Adamawa State, the home state of Alhaji Bamanga Tukut was co-ordinated by Alhaji Aliyu Mahmud, @{adawakin Adamawa), Alhaji Ahmed Song and Mr Thomas Nathaniel while Alha)i Muhammadu Fufote and Chief Timawus Mathias wete Manager and Ditector of Campaign respectively. The Think tank was drawn from academia, business and the civil society. They include: Dr. Mahmud Tukur, Alh. Lawal Kaita, Dr. pat Utomi, Dr. Emeka Enejere, Dr. Raymond Dokpesi, Mr. Lawrence Agbu and Mallam T.M. Yunusa. 254 Biasrapl4' r,f AJ-}{. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

7.8 THE 1992PRES IDENTIAIPRIMARIES Those whom the two political parties found fit and propet for the Presidency and thus cleated fot Saturda.v August 1 staggered Primaries were:

S/NO SDP NRC I Prol'essor Jerry Gana Alhaii Bamanga Tukur 2 Dr Abel ljbeku Alha i Adamu Ciroma 3 Major General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua Alhaii Umaru Shinkafi 4 Dr. Olusola Saraki Chief Emmanuel I\\'uanyan\r'u 5 Chief Olu Falae Alhaii Lema Jibril 6 Senator Mahmud Waziri Chief Melford Okilo 7 Chief Lai Balogun Mallam Saleh Jambo 8 Chief Olabiyi Duroiaiye Alhaji Shehu Musa 9 ChiefArthur Nzeribe l0 Dr Datti Ahmed 1l Dr. Dele Cole t2 Alhaji Lateef Jakande

The Presidential primaries wete to be staggered. The idea was designed to ensure that a truly detribalized Nigerian, a Nigerian who knew every part of the coufltry eventuallv emerged as its leader. Fot the purpose of the exercise, the National Electoral Commission divided rhe country inro six zones.

Zone A: Satutday 1 August, Katsina, Abia, Borno. Kwara and Delta States. Zone B: Satutday 8 August, Anambra, Edo,Jigawa, Ogufl .'r rd Sokoto States. Zone C; sttutdzy 1 5 August, Alora Ibom, Oyq Kano, Niger and Tataba States. Zone D: Saturday 22 August, Adamawa, Cross fuver, Kogi, Lagos and Plateau States Zone E: Saturday 296, August, Bauchi, Enugu, Kebbi, Ondo and Kwara States Zone F: Saturday 5" Septembeq Benue,Imo, Kaduna, Osun,Yobe and FCT

Io otder to eflsure hitch ftee primades, NEC had Put in place a set of guidelines to forestall a repeat of the December 14, 1991 gubernatodal election which flezrly brought the nationclose to the edge of the precipice. The guidelines include: F The members of the party executive at all levels ward, local government, state and national must at no time show or declare support fot any particular aspirant as this is against the spirit of fair play and natural iustice. \{4-rere NEC has evidence that a particular person is receiving such support, he ot she will be disqualifi ed outrightly; F The venue of the primary in each watd must be cleady identified and widely publicized throughout that \vard; F The venue of the collation of votes at the loczl government leve1 must be the local government sectetariat of each parq/l ) The state secretariat of each party will serve as the venue for the final collation of votes cast thfoughout the state; F For each ward, there must be an authenticated Party membership list containillg the names of all members who are entitled to vote in the primaries. Where such Tlre Ubimatc Cbqice: 1992 . Albaji Bamzaga ll. Tthds Attempt at tbe 255

a list is not available, primaries will not hold in that ward; The result of voting at each ward and of the collation at each perty's local government and stzte secretariat must be declarcd on the spor Any result not declared on the spot will be nullified by the Commission; and

Authenticated copies of the results at all levels must be given to NEC poll watchers as well as the police. Any result which copy is not given on the spot will also be declared null and void.

By the constitutions of the political parties, the actual conduct of the primaries was the intemal affairs of the parties. However, NEC would actively monitor and supervise the conduct of the primaries as it did duting the repeat governorship primaries of December 1991. But iudging from the experience of tl-re gubernatorial primaries, many people advised NEC to take over the conduct and supervision of the presidential primades. Ttris category of people argued that even in the United States of America where democracy is a way of life and whose btand of democtacy Nigeria was trfng to copy, party officials are not entrusted with the conduct of primaries. There is an independent electoral body set up by the government charged with &at responsibility.

AUGUST 1. 192 PRESIDENTIALPRIMARIES On Satuday August 1, 1992, the fust round of the ptesidential primaries kicked off in Katsina, Kwara, Abia, Borno and Delt2 states. It uzas an exetcise for the aspirants to test their sttength and determination in otder to sepatate the paper tigers ftom credible aspbants who had been working assiduously to sell themselves and their programmes to members of their party. The result of the primaries however genetated a lot of controversy between the aspirants, paty members and the Nigerian public (see able below). While some people upheld and pmised the tesulg other people were not only suprised but shocked. Instandy, they criticized and denounced the results and called on NEC to cancel them. For example, Dr kmaJibril, a prominent indigene of Kasina, was cock-sure of electoral victory in his home state, Katsina. He was beaten to third position after Alhali Bamanga M. Tukur and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi. Understandably, "as the son of the soil," he *zs peeved. He headed straight to the NRC headquarters in Abuja to protest the results of the election, alleging widespread malptactices. He alleged that figures announced for some councils exceeded the party membership. According to Dr. IrmaJibdl, 'There is open co@licifi b1 tbe Police. Tbg euen stopped countingit some areas and ntrotefditioufgtres ar res ts nbicb means secuil agmx bate allowed rbemselus to be tsed agahst ttst'- 256 BksEb o:f AJ-}{. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

TABLE 1: AUGUST 1 PRESIDENTIALPRIMARIES RESULTS

KATSINA STATE SDP KATSINASTATE NRC Yar Adua 657,488 Tukur 81,311 Falae 11,439 Shinkafi 82,249 Saraki 6,943 Jibril s4,746 Waziri 6,150 Ciroma 50,824 Jakande 3,758 Musa 12,577 Balogun t,109 Iwuanyanwu 7,100 Ahmed 2,394 Okilo 5,489 Ubeku 982 Jambo t,679 Gana 701 Cole 614 Total Votes Cast 301,985 Nzeribe 45 Duroiaiye 52 Total Votes Cast 699,800

ABIASTATE NRC ABIA STATE SDP Balogun 3,247 Iwuanvanwu 210,931 '19,530 Ahmed 273 Tukur YarAdua 18,452 Shinkafi 41,867 Ubeku 3,496 Ciroma 20,748 Falae 11,398 Okito 17,210 Waziri 4,081 Musa 15,076 Saraki 13,511 Jibril 5,826 Nzeribe 396,575 Jambo 1,008 Gana 225,502 Total Votes 398,197 Jakande 403 Cole 432 Durojaiye , sq, Total votes Casts 479,908 KWARASTATE SDP KWARA STATE NRC Sanrki 271,807 RESTILTWAS CANCELLED Falae 40,525 Yar Adua 40,471 Jakande 16,576 Wazin 8,059 Balogun 4,078 A}med 3,310 Nzeribe 021 Ubeku 476 Cole 120 Tbe Ubimote Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Tuhur's Anempt at tbe Presidetcl 257

Duroiaiye t73 Gana t5 Total Votes 385,553 Casts BORNO BORNO STATE NRC STATE SDP Yat Adua 258, r68 Ciroma | 15,16r Saraki 46,534 Shinkafi 66,381 Falae 18,809 Tukur 61,13 I Wazir i 16,474 Jibnl 24,224 Balogun a 7sl Musa 21,449 Ahmed 5,445 Iwuanyanwu 7,O37 Gana 14,574 Jambo 4,901 Nzeribe 4,370 Total Votes Cast ljbeku 466 Durojaiye 417 Cole 4196 DEI JTA DELTA STAIE NRC STATE SDP RESULTS RESULTS CANCELLED CANCELLED

SOURCES:

Nigeian TibuqTresday 4. August. 2 PP 1 -2 Tbe Grurdian,Wednesday August 5. 1992 P. 2 Tbe Nigeriar Tibrze, ti7ednesday 5. August 1905 I*.

Other complaints about the voting exercise in Katsina State were: many people voted twice, jumping of numbers while counting the votes egl - 10 - 15 - 20 -,() etc. and voting by the under-aged. In Borno State, there were complaints that the returning officers of both parties cancelled election resuls in 8 wards for the NRC and 24 wards for the SDP due to irregularities. In Kwara State, it was alleged that there was no accreditation of voters, no counting of votes and collation exercise whjle the results were prepafed in advance. Similat complaints were made uzith regards to the conduct of the presidential primaries in Delta and Abia states. In Delta State, it was alleged that election did not take place at all because an insttuction was given ftom some quarterc tha;tTloh of the votes should be given to a particular aspirant wh.ile the remaining 2570 was to be shared by the otlers. In Abia State, an aspirant physically took over one of the parties' secretadat in collusion with the security of6cials. He dictated the 6gues to be allocated to all his co- contestants to the extent that he had to plead vr'ith electoral officials to reduce the figures allocated to him.

Because of the number of complaints about the conduct of the August 1" primaries, many people, including some of the aspirerrts, called for the cancellation of the results. Chief Olu Falae, Dr. Olusola Saraki and Chief I-ayi Balogun wete among those thar 6rst called for tl-re cancellation of the results "because there \yas no voting done in all the 6ve states where elections were supposed to have taken place". On Tuesday 4" August 1 992, 9 of the 12 SDP Presidential Aspitants namely: Chief Olu Falae, Major Geoera.l Shehu Yar Adua @.tQ, Senator Mahmud Waziri, Chief Olabiye Duro jaiye, Alhaji I-ateef 258 Biogapb of AJl{- (DR-) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

Kayode Jakande, Dr. Patrick Dele Cole, Dr. Datti Ibrahim, ProfessorJery Gana, and Dr. Olusola Saraki, met in Senator Mahmud's office in Lagos (Victoria Island, Solomon Stteet).In a joint communique they advised NEC to: i. Take over tlre conduct and supervision of the primaries to restore greater confidence in the electorate; ii. Conduct the primaries thtoughout the country the same day; in. Display photographs of aspirants in wards and post security men to the areas before any election is held; and iv Cancel the result of the August 1 primaries.

In addition, the aspirants proffered suggestions to the patty hierarchy that a fresh list of accreditation of party members be made to be supervised by !7ard Chairmen, agents of aspirants, NEC and security offlcials in ordet to reduce rigging in futute elections. The party EXCO was also indicted fot supporting certain aspitants.

Their counterparts in NRC held a closed door meethg with the national leadership of the paty in Abuja on Wednesday 5" August, 1'992 ard they pledged to conduct themselves amicably and would support whoever finally emerged as the party's presidential candidate.r The aspirants also sanctioned disqualification (suspension or expulsion) as punishment for any aspirant found quilty of inducing irregularities. That same day, the Chairman of the party announced the cancelation of NRC results for Delta and K$/ara states) for alleged large-scale fraud pelpetrated by the states' party officials. Similady, SDP tesults for Delta State were also cancelled for the same reasons.

The widespread complaints about the general results of the August 1 primaries wete a bad omen for the subsquent presidential primaries and the entire transition programme. For example, the number of votes cast in the August 1 pdmaries (in Katsina, Abia and Kwala states were far mote than the votes cast in the National Assembly and Governorship elections (December 1991) in those states in which all eligibie adults voted (see Table 2 below).

TABLE 2 : AUGUST PRESIDENTIAL PR]MARIES AND OTHER ELECTIONS RESULTS

STATE PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNOR. SENATOR- HOUSE OF PRIMARIES SHIP IAL REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION ELECTIONS ELECTIONS DEC. 1991 Katsina sDP 6858s0 )11 qqq 243,767 226,21t NRC -301,923 290,613 258,27t 274,447 Kwara sDP -3,855,613 326,739 240,7t6 270,071 Abia sDP 479,972 116,408 163,067 150,493 NRC -399,197 308,078 177,267 191,992 Tbe Utimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M, Takur's Attefipt dt tbe Presid.encl 259

7.9 BMT'S EI ECTORAL PERFORMAN CE Despite all the criticisms about the conduct of t}re August I primaries, co-ordinaton for Major General Yar'Adua, Adamu Ciroma and Alhaji Shehu Musa accepted the elections as fair. Since the primaries were an exercise for the aspirants to test their strength and popularity, it is worthy to note that from the analysis of the performances of the aspirants, Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur made an impressive outing by topping the list in the NRC. The credit for this goes to his well-sttuctured and articulated campaign team, " Ultinate Cboice 92", Alhaji Bamanga Tukur's zeal, hatd"vork and determination. In fact, one of his Campaign Directors remarked that Alhaji Bamarga M. Tukur worked tirelessly like a "buffalo to ensure that he succeeded at the-polls."

Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur's campaign offices nationwide were always filled with friends, relations, or inJaws all in voluntary service for his success at the close of the day. There was always a skeletal team of staff that worked throughout the night. Everpvhete, the mood was one of hyper-active optimism of sweeping away cobwebs in the party to ensule success at the polls. With such an effective campaign machinery behind him manned by hardworking and dedicated-staff, Alhaii Bamanga M. Tukur entered t}e presidential race with a positive mood. What is more, Alhaii Bamanga Tukur himself accepted and appreciated the best in people as the ultimate reality of their lives. This explains why he was at his best at the hustings, enjoying the rcal and stimulating emotions of the big rallies and the hectic ravels all over the country, selling his Four- Point Agenda:

Fru andJair enterpise; Food and waterJor all; Iiee edacation and hcabb; and F l enplEnent and sodalserui!.

In his speeches during his campaign tours, he always stood for both the old and the young; fteshness and modetnity. He was receptive to suggestions and above all, his combativeness and determination made up for his weak points. Alhaii Bamanga M Tukuris also a humorous persofl. Humor is both a litmus te st and a $/eapon for winning peoples' support during rallies. As a leader hungry for populat approval, he had trained himself in the techniques of the medium of humorous oratory as professionally as he had trained himself to become a future President. For example, whete his opponents lectured or patronized, he communed with the audience, flattering its intelligence and delighting viewers like a TV star. He never missed a rick, ever ready with a point scoting answers and always .,vith facts or statistics to flatten h-is oPPonents. It is no wonder that he came out leading in the August 1 Presidential primaries. The electoral petformance of Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur during the August 1 primaries was a vindication of his political opponents' vilification. He beat all his other contenders by scoring the highest number of votes. This showed that the accusations by his opponents were outrighdy false, and incendiaryin thek temper. 260 BkgraPb o.f AJ-I,. (DR ) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

Their whole concept was a concoction perfected by fraud. If Aihaii Bamanga Tukur had been guiity of any of the things he had been accused of, it was because he had been too good even to h.is oPPonents, too generous and too much of aJulius Caeser.

with this impressive first outing, Alhaji Bamanga M Tukur was seen to be a threat to the other aspirants. This reason, plus the intervention of other factors like the biased attitude of the NRC National Executive towards some aspirants, and the support some of the aspirants got from the government might have all combined to account for Alhaji Bamanga's trailing *rird place in the subsequent presidential primanes.

THESE BER1992PRESID PRIMARIES. Ina Alha M Tukur I-A on the Seotembet1992, Fellow repfilicans, n1 names are Bamanga MobammedTtkun Tenlears ago, I had catse to seeklotr nandate tofoster nnil, harmonl, peaa and deuelopncntfor tbe progress of our fufunct Gongok State- tbe not kng due to Military Yot reponded positiue! @t electing nelotr gorenor, bul sihutiot did kt interuefltion. God bas spared otr liaes t0 ,vitners)et anotber delekPnerlt Proess oJ gouernance in tbe naking. I an tberefore coming back agaitt to seeklon mandzte to conpbte tbe nfulflhdlob 17' thit timefor the whole cotn@. Tomorroa, Sattdal tbe 2d Sep*nbq 19924ou are calkd ?ot t0 corrte r the NRC. an forward to exerciselour denocratic igbt to cboou tbe Jhg bearerfor 0 great ?art), I uote me the of nobb tberyfore @peakng t0 )o,, t0 chme lt/t enmdsse and for for realilation lotr pe objechw for nakirg our com@ religioull harmonious, ecotomical! proEerou as intended to do before in our defna Gongola S tate. I an seeking tbis position becaue it ffirs hope for otr people, otr coln@ andfor tbe whole continent. Tberefore, it is wonh tbe unifce. I haae the necessary expeience, expertin and exposurefor tbelob. I porked as a citil seruant afid neated a record of achieuenent. ln commerce a politics, I baue nade n1 nark @ contesting and ainning at ebcrton, it I haae becone c@tain of ind*stry. Tbese are not small achieuments. On t0? of tbat, I anJotr son and dtsert'e1our su??lrt and efico&ragement. I bl?eJltt )ill aotefor ne when tbe tine cones. I will not dissapointya. I will sare! perforn.

Because of the protests and complaints that greated the August 1 pdmaries, the time- table for the subsequent primaries in the remaining zones was re-scheduled to allow room fot the electotal boards of the tvo political parties and NEC to examine and investigate the aliegations and fine - tune the guidelines in order to reduce electoral fraud and rigging befote conducting further elections including a repeat of some of the cancelled primaries. The primaries resumed on 12* September 1992 . This was followed by two otherprimaries on the 19th and 26'n of Septembet,7992.

An interesting development in the rescheduled primaries was the fact that votes that were scored were generally realistic. Aspirants scoted votes that u/ere telatively lower than what theyhad scored in the botched August i primaries - a development that defied logical explanation. For instance, it was one of the mysteries of the presidential primaries that while Yar' Adua recorded 657,488 votes in his home state, Katsina, on August l, he managed to secure 250,502 votes when the exercise was repeated on Tbe Uhimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Tubrt's Attempt dt tbe PresidencA 261

September 19. Did as many as 406,986 of his supporters stay av/ay from the rescheduled polls? or why did 296,318 supporters of chief Arthur Nzeribe rurn rheir back on him on September 12, leaving him with only 99,682 votes when they gave him 396,575 votes on August 1"? These notwithstanding, despite all the safety measures employed by NEC and the electoral bodies of the two political parties, the same complaints ier*faced ,ft.. the conduct of each election, especially by the aspirants. In the NRC camp, Alhaji umaru Shinkafi continued to stand his ground that Alhaji Adamu choma was not only rigging the primaries in order to maintain his leading position but that he also had thl backing of the party hierarchy. In a full page paid advert in one of the national dailies stgned by one Abubakar C. Abdullahi, Umaru Shinkafi's Director of public Affairs, "choice 92 National Headquarters", chief rom Ikimi and other national officers of the party were accused of supporting Ciroma. Alhaji kmaJibril withdrew his candidature from the race due to what he described as "unpatriotic and undemocratic" primaries. This was also contained in a paid adven in th e NigerianTibueof Friday 9th october 1, 1992. In the same vein, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma complained to NEC of the injustice done to him and his home state, Yobe. He accused, Alhaji Buba Galadima and one Alhaji Kaloma AIi, both of whom he described as "high rankingmembers of Choice 92", botir of them Shinkafi's faithfirl for preventing NEC to hold NRC primaries in yobe on 19th September, 1992. " . Al\aii Bamanga M Tukur also had similat complaints, especially against the party Exco's bias towards a particu.lar aspitant but he did not make it a public affair. Similar complaints were also made by the SDp presidential aspirants. In a paid advett in t\e Nigrian Tibune of 6th October, 1992, captioned, ..SDF Aspirants riject Yar'Adua", signed by Senator Mahmud Waziri for 9 SDp aspirants, the party executive was accused of attempts to impose Yar'Adua as the presidential candidati.

These developments u/ere not healthy as the countJy journeyed towards the Third Republic. Many prominent Nigerians including some members of the Armed Forces Ruling council (AFRC) felt that some drasric measures had to be put in place to arrest the situation before the political transition programme was derailed. As a tesult, on Tuesday, 6th October 1992 (after the 2 ptimaries in September), the Armed Fotces Ruling Council (AFRC), met and agreed to halt the primaries "until all allegations of malpractice were investigated and verified by NEC". This decision, according to tl-re AFRC, was informed by the Council's commitment to the institution aJtzaion of a durable political system and process that would guarantee the survival of the Third Republic. Many Nigerians welcomed this move and urged the Federal Goverflment to intervene to stop the rigging and monetization of the ptesidential primaries.

As for the NRC, the situation was one of serious concern especially the September primaries. With no clear winner as of this time, the party met eadier and emerged from the meeting even more divided. According to the provisional Frgures of the primaries (1"' October 1992) which is not realistic, i. Alhaji Adamu Ciroma scored1,494,4O2votes ii. Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi 1,439,820 votes in, Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur scored 992,066 votes 262 Bihgapbl of AJl{- (DR..) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

None of them mustered the required one - third of the votes to decisively head off a run-off election which had been fixed fot 1Oth October 1992 instead of 3rd Octoberto one aliow the party to sort out its Problems. The aspirants could not agree on either or two people to step down for the other. 'n

In addition to this, even as the NRC ticket may appear to be a straight fight between Alhaji Shinkafi and Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, the game was still dotted with aspirants wh

RESULTS OF 12'" SEPTEMBER 1992 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES FINAL RESULTS (a) SDPSOCIALDEMOCRATICPARTY

Aspirant (),aun Ondo lmo Jisa$ alPlateau Edo Kogi C/R Kebbi [eraba T0lal Position 11.221 14.{08 so,4eo F5.4r4 65,951 58.r43 12.{60 64,687 h4303 ,, .6-1{ O. Falae 1.1,099 259*177 6,02! r6,292 F2,48-r 9..r03 26,170 rfim 5J23 ErJ6J 473,422 2t 9?0 996ti2 ro E4,o9o 5281 33t9 38-1t 5 14 lr 2s6 | 7-101I t' Saraki 7,5,t I r 5,85-l 3.091 r,66s Fs,lr9 22,659 {6,136 12,529 9,168 fl.6o r 156J72 l.Gane 0 625 2IJ5I 12 Fo,9s9 1,510 21,191 E98 r,loo P.4se 71.97t Iakande | 2,t 88 15,211 0 l,9io E,oo9 314 tt2 138 r r:o Eo 11.734 tl aziri t96 56 t2 1448 F,149 125 2254 t.902 ryz F.eo8 21.671 Balogun I g0-1 55-12 681 zto6 2116 1089 859 3r29 irs lro3s t7605 Ubeku l6{ t79 0 211 [869 {,t53 1230 155,1 ,r0 1t166 12912 Durojriye l5 0 z 262 ltC 3 63 0 A ioto lo'' Datti 0 t0t t) 56 Es4 237 2,469 72 b7 P6 3152 ll'n Coln 87 125 146 t 262 m 2 814 21 B4 1.608 l2'n

(b) NRC NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

tsDiranl krsun loodo Edo koci c/R fi{ebbi fa.rt" ifot"t Positioa he. 2 F{,s04 l6,2es h7,8ol ltl5,zc, E6,6sl llog,tzt hl,2m 116,%6 ho6.6r? ll" inkafi 58 1 119 7 r4-8fl5 110.695 Ess,r26 E" 'l ll Ersl k,646 b3J39 ll6,9E7 [zcror F" I";".dT.66o I.r?8s i,1.449 0.656 5.1.16 i.4J0 rt,096 ,91I Eor,l:o I ibdr b,{?4 P,?le Fr4e P,s I,l Fis2ol:: b,eo? F,6lo br,874 F' h.l34 E.eo8 1t 11 J78 l1 9.6.t t imbo F9 Fle [lJ57 F26 Ei6s B l6rj Xr lls? I l6 17 I r4t E{s r05 FhI F fsor hm h Eu b 141 E,zrz ls" i E [J7r P P F F lg F b ll,612 [0" ; b0 16r h lt2 hr P46 trl F Fzr hr* Tbe tlLirna,e Cboice: 1992 - Albdii Bamanga M . TuhLr" AtternPt at.bePt5idenc-y 263

ADAMA\VA STATE LRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES R-ESULT (NRC ) 26TH SEPTEMBER 1992

NAME tt T-----r----- I 3192 3722 7t44 50,00 1264 2164 1623 1200 24i2 3061

s. A. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aduloil B.T[lur 1992 954 I 21t2 I {956 I to6a 2219 1457 5a6t 2067 )47t l3 le 12 lo to 2q I 0 l05 0 0 0 0 -o fo o 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0

L.Jibrtl Io I I lto oTo . T------l 0 0 0 M- OLilo Ira I 0 lo 0 0 0 -o--=l o lo i f5-----. 0 lo lo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 lo fo---l 2l .Tr o 5 U- Shitrk li 640 253 1547, 2953 t62 553 llll v2 196 507 Sh.ll-rr M/G.li NAME r-r 1255 lt.l7 1216 3a76 2213 2262 AIRC

o ]o o 0 h l. lr5l5 l41U 21@ 2520 fr- lr9$ It 67 I o o lrr a a a r l. o 1 0 I o o Jibril 2 zo I! I t a a c 0 I ! 5 l o 0 0 D 0 20 0 a a U. shirLtl 90t l6cr Il60 ,lE0 9:ll 1203

SOURCE NA TIONEZ CONCORD NEtrtrSPlPER, WEDNESDAY AUGUSTsTH.1992PP7-2. -

THENECREPORT on october 6th, 1992, the AFRC ordered NEC to investigate the allegations of ftaud in tre September 1992 pdmaries. In the course of her investigatiotrr, NEC interviewed Resident Electoral Commissionerq presidential aspirants, security agents, top officials of the two political parties and received written reports from thim. The National Electoral commission president submitted its report (1 8 pages) to the on 1 4th october 1992. The report was an open admission of failure of the primaries and the open ballot system recornmended by NEC. It was also a compendium of electotal fraud. The National Electotal commission identified 13 electoral sins committed during the September 1 992 primaries. They include: i- Use of money to buy votes or to achieve undue advantage; ii. Threats and intimidation of voters by agents of the aspirants and security officials; in. Favoritism on the part of the party exco; iv. Use of state govefffnent machinery by some governorc in favour of some aspirants; v. Falsification of membership lists, figures and allocation of votes where elections did not hold; vi. Non-serialization of acctediation slips; 264 Biogrqb hJNE. (DR-) BAMANGA TUrU& coN vu. Late arrival of pre-accreditation materials and over-allocation of pre- accreditation cards; vin Non-conduct of primary elections as scheduled and arbitrary cancellation of results by electoral officers to favour certain candidetes; ix. Mutilation of results; x. Issuance of fake accrediation slips; xi Voting by undet-aged persons; xii Voting by non-accredited persons; xin Voting by non-party members.

Thc maaagcn of the transition programme namely, NEC itself, MAMSER and Security Officials, made up for the remaining sins for the failures and lapses recorded during &e Septi9rnbet 1 992 Primaries. i Undue inlluence and use of MoneY Dr. Umatu Dikko, The National Patty of Nigeria's (NPfr) campaign chief in the 1983 elections had this io say just before the miliary struck in December 1983.'A pofitieian's din is t0 obtain totes.'lfubatuwr mottq be nakes goes back to tbe peopb becaue he vattts lhdr wh. "Meattittgfrtt ,,note1t is the bottom lne of pofities" )8.NEC's findings on the allegation of the use of moiey indlcated that it was-of genetal nature without any-concrete evidence. Some of the aspirants admitted using money to buy votes or acctediation slips' No aspirant patticulat aspir:ant as guilty except Chief l-ateef Jakande-who said that -.ntio.rJd.ny and "yar'Adua finanied Chairmanship eleitions of so-. Local Government Council's" also that he "gave N12 Million to oyo State SDP Chairman". Alhaii Baba Gana Kingibe and how..N2 million cheque was given to him by one aspirantrr _another -.ntio.,id on "ordered N4 million to othet memben of the EXCO to pass a vote of no confidence him"'r. Babagana Kingibe also accepted that "you cannot win elections without money".

The NRC asptants, quite unlike their SDP counterparts, did not appearworried by the use of money in the botched primaries. According to the report, Alha,i Adamu ciroma had even advised NEC not to waste its time inquiring into the soutce of money of some of the aspirants saying, "If you inquire into the sowce of money you cannot get In spiie o? Ciroma's advice, the Federal Government otdered the Federal ^rr1*he..i''. Inielligence and investigation Bueau @IIB), Sate Secudty Services (SSS) and the Natioial Intelligence Agency Q"IIA) to identifr sources of funds spent in the presidential race by each aipimnt and the extent of money spent by indi-vidual aspirants. to so-e obse*..., th. go*..r-.nt only wanted to clear itself of doubts by the public of government's sinceri!, of the ransition programmg by proving its case-against the lest it be seen as if government is iust whipping uP sentiments against the ".pirr.r,. ,.iirrrr,.. These notwithstandi.g -o."y *r, used but thc problem is that giving of mlney is such a private and secret exchange that it is difficult or impossible to-qrov. e' ,a'l aspirants told N-EC that they spent money revelling, payin-g campaign Ylf,. pfug"q posters, paying agents, co-ordinators and furnishing party offices which NEC described ;. ,s "l.gitn"at I[ aspirants and NEC officials also agreed that running a presidential campaign was a cosdy affair. Tbe Utimate Cboice: 1992 - Alhaji Bamanga M, Tqku's Attempt at tbe Presideaclr 265

The aspirants also pointed out that the pervasive poverty accentuated by SAp and the persistent low level of enlightenment at the grassroots created an environment where financial inducements for votes easily thrived. In some places, the aspirants were asked to bring moneyif they expected votes. Those who claimed they had no money got low votes in such areas, while those who had money opened their vaults and got highe; votes. o' The National Electoral Commission had no figures to prove s,rch aspirants *rong since, as mentioned eadier, giving of money is such a private and secret eichange that ii difficult or impossible to prove. The Structural Adjustment programme (SAp) arguably, the notorious babv of the Babangida administration, delivered to Nigeria i" f qS6, inflicted excruciating pains on the Nigerian populace. In April 1992, six years after the birth of SAP, Babangida had this to say, "IianH1, I haw ktpt on askingnlt economists wlry is it tbat tbe economl of tbit counttl bas not collapud tplll now. tvhat is it tbat is keepiryit tp? s ure/1, it is not otr tbeoi*. It is nor atythingae bate read. I still hatte utfotnd an atsaer Tbe Nigeian econonl bas defed a// uononic tbeoies and I tbink we should be grateJrl tbat tte bau a sociej (and nonoil) snb as tbis" Assauked by the poverty of SAP and ravaged by unkind inflation that had violendy shaken the foundation of the Nigerian economy, the Nigerian poor electorates in 1992 became enslaved to the apron strings of the nata. They were ready to mortgage their votes for today's amah, sak, ice, maize, gani, soap and cooking oil at the-risl of tomorro.y's sarvation. Their conscience became that of money and not wisdom. This was how moneyimposed itself ovet the conscience of the poor electorates. No wonder, 'money-bags ruled the polls through massive naira extr^yzglnz from their inexhaustible vaults and dictated the votes they wanted. Who do you blame? The aspitants or the poor voters? One thing is clear, taking over of political power using the battel of the gun or using money are all undemocratic processes of winning pofucal POv/ef.

i.i Partv aqents. Co-ordinators and the rigginp of Elections The NEC report on the role of agents and co-ordinators said that: 'r[hese ntegoiu of ?erslflnel c,rrtit ted one of the najor probhns dritg tbe pimaies. It is alleged tbat the co-onlinators were a giter lot of mongt @t tbe aspirantsfor mobiliqation of nters infnoriof tbe as?irafltJ. In tarn, tbese co-ordirators, in order to exhact mnre money fron tbe arpirants misid nanl oJ then ta think tbat tbry bare all sons of $opon uhih in realig, ibg tto not b)ae. Therefore, inmediate! afer euery electio4 these co-ordinarors and ageds wilt be crlirgfo and nakingall sorts of allegations in order to coruince tbe aspirafis tbat be actta$ won bul was denied uictory becatse of tbisir tbat reas,rl. Some oJ tbem were dotbh agents workingfor 2, 3 or 4 aspirants. In thefnat anafisis, tbq workedfor tbe bighest bidder. Tbe Nationa/Ebxoral Commissior blaned these agentsforfeeding their enplEers (he aspirants) aitb sordid tahs o/ elecnral napractices tojastfl their hire.,a)

They were also the people who perpetrated the rigging galore that characterized almost all the primaries. The principle behind the rigging of votes is essentially to get the highest number of votes. Every profession has its ouin merit. In politics the medt is numbers. Politics is after all a game of numbers. The question of the "best candidate" was flever the most dependable instrument that was used in the primaries to get the highest number of votes. The mode of operation was simple: One example is, a casual 266 Biosral,Ja af AJ-}i. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN looking agent would file past the electorates and whisper: "Ladies and Gendemen so - and so has a programme for you. Vote fot him; use this card and go to Maitama Street, Balogun Street, etc, after voting". After the voting exercise, the electoratrs would rePott at the mentioned venue to "redeem the cards" authenticated by the party agents. Such cards wele then exchanged for cash, rice, cooking oil, etc, already deposited with some party stdwars. Some agents were even more daring. They openly distributed money at polliog stations. Where for example, they found queues behind their favoured aspirant was low, they threw money into the aL thereby causing voters to leave the queue to scramble for naira. That done, voters wi.[ now quickly change queues in favour of the candidate whose agent "rained" naira. These and more other sophisticated tricks and devices wete employed by the agents and perfected after every election to ensure that they secured high votes for their aspirants. This was how the agents and co-ordinators contributed to the "killing" of the primaries.

(t") Favourism bv the Partv Exeeutives The aspirants of the NRC appeared to be more eager to discuss about the biased role of their party executive than the use of money.. Allegauons by some NRC aspirants according to the NEC report was that "four kev National officers of the party used their positions not onlv to support one aspirant, Alhali Adamu Ciroma, but to foist him bv whatever means on the parw as its candidate". They were the National Chairman and his Deputy, The National Secretary and The National Treasurer. The National Financial Secretary and two Ex-officio members were said to be supporting Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, while The National Publicity Secretary was alleged to be a Bamanga Tukur- man. This gives a ratio of 4:3:l for Alhaii Adamu Ciroma, Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi and Alha]i Bamanga Tukur respectively. By this ratio, one might be right to observe that the performances of the three aspirants at the polls were a reflection of this arrangement. Alhaii Bamanga Tukur could be said to have been unlucky to have only one member of the EXCO oa his side probably because he was the last person among the three to join the race and, of course, "the youngest and the least experienced" in the presidential race considering that Alhaji Ciroma had been in the race in the Second Republic and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi was said to have been preparing for the presidential seat since 1985. Thus, after an impressive outing during the August 1" primaries, things changed for Bamanga in subsequent primaries The reason was obvious: Bamanga's leading position in the August 1" primaries posed a serious threat to the other aspirants. One of the effective ways of curtailing Bamanga's creditable performance was through the use of the partyrs executive. In fact, the arrangement was broadened to include the officials of the party's electoral agency. According to the same report, the four men supporting Ciroma also hijacked the functions of the Republic Electoral Agency (RECA) and rendeted the agency ineffective. Mr. Gabriel Ogar, RECA Chairman, had been vested with the authority to conduct the primaries, deploy electoral officials, collate, analyse and announce results". However, the National EXCO took over t]-rose functions. For example, Mrs. Patience Ugodo who served as Chairman, RECA, Kaduna State, told NEC that she was given specific insttuctions by Chief Tom Ikimi and Chris Aighije, former NRC National Treasurer, "to go to Kaduna and return Adamu Ciroma" . While Tbe Utimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Tl,k*r's Anmtpt at tbe Ptesidercl 267

in Kaduna, she received series of telephone calls from Chief Tom Ikimi and his associates offering het key political posts if she agreed to play ball. OneJoe Nwodo was said to have telephoned her husband emphasizing that she was working against the government because "Ciroma is the GovernmenCs candidate". Unknown to her, they had already prepared results which favoured Ciroma which they asked her to sign. When she refused to sign the prepared result, she was beaten up. But for her refusal, Ciroma would have been returned witl more than 1,000,000 votes.

Many NRC aspitants gave even more damaging testimonies against the party's national Ieadership. Dr. kmaJibril, who had earliet withdrawn from the race, alleging massive electoral fraud, told NEC that the party leaders rvere " bugling tbe acteditatiot exercise and giaing slips to fauotred candidates.... I am not on! uindicated, but it is no,u clear to all doabrttg Tbonasu that tbe Septenber pinary is a mere aote allocation and bucb oJ gangsteisn" As for Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, he alleged '?rdadice agaitst ne St nl pa@ Cbairman. I feel persoral injury about thi. lYe had signed an agreeruett tbatpar! leader will remain ne ral. But lkini, witb lbe conniaaue of the Vice President, made anangementJorAdamt Cirona atd lbis split the ?arlJ dovn tbe liny''. Similad Alhaji Saleh Jambo charged, that "those sent ro conduct the election were friends of the Executive and theywere given definite instructions on what to do". Alhaji Adamu Ciroma took a different stand. He claimed that he was not aware that party officials were " facilitating" his cause. Besides, he said "each party official has a right to have a preferred candidate". Alhaii Adamu Ciroma also defended himself against the allegations by Mrs Patience Ugodo. He in turn accused Ugodo of working for Shinkafi say.rng, 'Mrs Patience Ugodo is a collaborator oJ Rcu. Hldc Onuaguluchi ir Enrgu Stale. Each NationalOficervasgiwn the o??ort ni| to rrorriilate inditidtlak to work in tbe clectoral panels. So arious was Alhqli BubaGakdina to nakt this kd1 an electoral ofiar that h€put her at caning Jron Yobe State. Sina tbe pinary ebction, sbe has buome r0 ricb as to fut ftll-page, adrertisenerts in manl national wwsp@ers (sajng) tl:at tbe elecrtons ir Kadua State were iged against ber fatoured candidate, Alh@i Unant Shinkaf, who sbe iruxplicab! calb 'Marafa' (Sbinkaf's Traditiottal Tith). Sbe confetsed tbat the schemed her wa1 into tbe electoral panel Rn Onmg.tlacbi isAlhEi Shirkaf'spaintnan inEnugu State." .

AIso in his testimony to NEC, Alhaji Abubakar Galadima, National Financial Secretary of the NRC, speakingon behalf of seven other National Officers insisted that Ikimi and three other NRC party chiefs were indeed backing Ciroma. According to btm, 'Ikini and bis groq had directed pa@ oficials at state, local goaernment areas and aard htels to etsure tbe ictory of Cirona".Iktrri:ttas also said to be arx,are that a southerner had no hope in the NRC for presidential nomination. He then reached an understanding with CLoma, his friend, to emerge as the party's candidate and Ikimi would resign to become Ciroma's running mate. But Ikimi only told NEC of the meticulous steps the National Executive had taken to ensure that everything went well, especially in the printing of accreditation slips, sanitization of party guidelines and stiff penalties for electoml fraud.". Like the NRC Chiefs, the SDP National Executive also showed NEC they were a divided house. The party's National Chairman was alleged to have used his position to garner support in the National Executive for Shehu Yar'Adua. Virtually all the party's 268 Biorrupln ol AJ-H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

presidential aspirants with whom discussions were held stated this position to NEC. They pointed to NEC that 'Kingibe was a personal axistant to Yar'Adu in 1976, when Yar'Adru was ChieJ of Staff, Saprene Headqaaners. krgibe, the Protesting asp'irantu ,,lted, ,rar said wat made tater hehed fut Yar'Adaa inn beconing at Ambassadon The arpirafis Kngibe Director oJ OrganiTation of the Peopbs Front, (PF), a political organiTatiotforned andfnanad b1 the aspirants alhged, Yay'Adm. lVben tbe tao paniu aere formed @ gorcnment, Ktgibe, further buane SDP Chairmat tbronglt tbe assistance of Ya/Adru. Giaen these long-establisbed close ties betuun Kngibe andYar'Adaa, aspirants told NEC, tbere was no ua1 Kngibe coald baue stpenised a aspirants had aiso alleged free andfair cofiest it whicb Ya/Adtta uas a contestant".The SDP that thi Social Democratic Party Electoral Board (SODEB) was biased in favour of Yar'Adua.

iv Use of State govetnment machinery by some governots in favour of some asoitants. Many aspirants in the two political parties complained to NEC that some governors used their state machinery to engineet victory for their favoured candidates' The National Electotal Comm.ission said:

Based on ils intetttien s with aspiratts, ofinrs oJ the partiu and atber sources, tbe Commissiot belierns that there is yfficiett reason to belieue tbat some goaernors sided n,itb miou aspirants ad probabfy sedgouerrment mathinery to ca@aignfor lheirfauotred candidalas. In tl, e SDP, accusing fingers were pointed at Govetnors of Yobe, Borno, Taraba, Edo and Oyo States where the Governors *ere rePorted to have participated actively to ensure victory for Yar'Adua In the NRC, Governots of Kebbi, Rivers, Ctoss Rivers and Sokoto States were alleged to have campaigned actively for Shinkafi while their counterParts in Kogi' I-agos, Enugu, Bauchi and Adamawa states were said to have favoured Ciroma. In Enugu State, tle govetnor was alleged to have deliberately imposed a curfew to prevent mass tutn out to lreat. roo- fot ,.llocation of votes in favor of Ciroma. Another governor in one of the Eastern states also reportedly vowed that over his dead body would Chief Arthur Nzeribe win the ptimaries in his state. Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu was perhaps more forthdght in hightighting the use of the state machinery by govetnots during the primaries. He told NEC:

I think the nait problen aas the Goaernors. Tbqt na in Abtja and stppoied a candidate. lve and tbgt-?ronised thgt will not. h Nrcrs, Abia, Enagt and Cross Riuers, tho inflrunn oJ 'gouernorsPntuned was aery cbar In some states, gotertors threatened their commissioners, directors-general and -so on. In gneral, tbe gottentors sttpported ,ne ol tuT dtpir,rrts throagb oxt the natiot' h manl plaas, thq snbiitted reports; thq corrapted NE,C and secail age s to sign the res x that uere held Tbry t0 sign. Sone of tbe gouernors not on! ued tbeir forged stgnatgrei oJ aspiraflts wbere s*cb Pn?lefailed struclues, i.e, commissioners and so ox' Preui\sJ tarrrpaiga str ct res, thry ako nade ue oJ tbeir new 52. It *", also observed that some of the rifts and problems experienced during the presidential primaries were extensions of the power-play that dominated the October 1991 go.,ernorship primaries and the Decemb er 74, 1997 governorship elections. A glaring example of this was in Adamawa Sate, the home sate of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, Tl2e Ultirnate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M Tuhu's Attempt dt tbe Presidenc-y 269

the Governor, AJhaji Saleh Michika used the stzte machinery to make sure that Alhaji ..son Adamu Ciroma won the primaries instead of rhe of thi soil,,,Alhaji Bamanga lt. Tukur. In an attempt to execute this plan, Mr Thomas Nathaniel, a forrner ch^irml of the State Civil Service commission who was the campaign Director of Aihaii Bamanga Tukut was alleged to have assaulted Alhaji Abdurahaman Adamu, the Statjs rvorks Commissioner of at the NRC State Secretariat where the resurts of the NRC primaries were being compiled. Mr. Thomas Nathaniel was eventually artested and charged to court for assault. When the Area Court Mallam yahaya Abubakar, Judge,-Bamanga refused to grant bail to Thomas Nathaniel, a crowd of Tukurk ,..ppor,".., who laid. siege at the court premises since 9:00am, barricaded the-judge's .r, ,.ri fo.."i him back to his chambers where he was held hostage. He *r. only allowed out at 4:00pm when he consented to give a rulingon the appliiation for bail.

Alhaji Saleh Michika even went a little further than the primaries affair. when in 1993 more disfficts were created by his administration, he used t}'is avenue to deliver another blow, though indirect, at Alhaji Bamanga Tukur. Before the creation of more districts, Alhaji Dahiru Tukur (eldest brother to Bamanga Tukur) was the district head of Nassarawo District atJada where their father had ruled as wakilin chamba fot manv years. v4-ren Nassarawo District was split into three districts, new district heads were to be elected for the new districts. In the case of Nassarawo District, Alhaji Saleh Michika directed the chairman of Jada Local Government to transfer Dahiru Tukur to one of the newly created districts, Mayo- Kallaye, which is a rural area and appointed (rather than an election by ward heads as in other districts) a new district Headti Nassarawo at Jada, thereby personalizing the whole affair.

Vice-President

The second target of Shinkafi's anger was what NEC described in its report as "a highly placed government official". Shinkafi had identified his target as the "vice - presidelnt,i. HetoldNEC:

"Euen tbe vice President,fron wbon I expectj*ttice, was against me. The vice preside intentned witb got'ernors and askrd them to denl me s@pon. Cbief lkini, pitb tbe connittarce of the vice- President, made arrangementsfor Adamt ciroma". "Do you see the vice president as in the same position as'the Governors?" NEC asked Shinkafi. In his reply, Shinkafi said, ,,Ha (tbe vice Pre:ide*) is diferefi buaun be is representing the Federal Goiernmert, salirg thtat tbe fficialgor',ernmenr cadidate it cirona. Eaen a commissionero/ potice told ne that he war i told thar Ciroma is the Federal Goternment candidate ". vi TheN onal Electoral Commission Even though NEC did not include itself as one of the problems identified for the non- successfi:l conduct of the primaries, NEC cannot be exonerated from the blames. Some public commentators in fact laid most of the blames on the doorsteps of NEC. Theit teasonwas that NEC had been advised from many qualters not to: i. Stagger the primaries but to conduct it in one day; and 270 BiEraPb ,/AI-H. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR' CON ii. Supervise the conduct of the primades rathet than leaving it to the Party executives. The National Electoral Commission refused. Accotding to Bamanga Tukur, it was desigtett nfail ab-initio buatse no ffiri aas made ta discuss and recolcile tbe candidates ahich was rcrnal mder tbat ultingas was done in tbe FirstBtpublic to allow a candidate to energe.lYbere sacb eforr uas contempla*d, it was stbturted @t sorte special interest grottp tbrorylt inaisibh bands.'Io ilros. groops, the transition programme was now at a cross roads because NEC refused to listen to wise counsel. According to them, NEC said that virtually all the 23 aspirants were guilty and some people had been calling for their heads as if they had committed any sin. But one might ask: If a teacher had a class of 23 students and all of them failed his test, could he be exonetated for the failute of his students? It is either, he had set difficult questions not related to the syllabus or the syllabus was bad or the teacher was bad. Certainly, the students could not be blamed 100%o for their failure. In the same vein, if all the 23 aspirants failed the presidential tests, it meant that NEC deliberately set a framework that was impossible to execute or NEC deliberately failed the 23 aspirants, having certified the results at all the wards and the local govetnment levels. It was even suspected that NEC was being used consciously or unconsciously to derail the Ttansition Progtamme. For these groups, NEC was flot competent as it was constituted to hold any election that would be free, fait and respected in Nigeria. The credibility of NEC officials was also tainted as they could not be exonerated 100%o of the blame. For example, Alhaji Suleiman Takuma, Director of Organization of Adamu Ciroma for President accused NEC of disenftanchising Yobe State (the home of Ciroma) by cancelling the NRC result there, and no convincing reason was given. He went on to say, l%e in tbis organiqation haae sorue reseraations asfar as the impani*liy 0f NEC is nnerned. InJact, we belieue NEC is part of tbefrad.

In writing its fina1 report to the AFRC, NEC was 'told not to make specific recommendations but to Present only facts. The summaryof the reportis as follows:

1 NEC restated its eadier stand that the primaries be held in one day after the outright cancellation of the August 1 primaries; 2. NEC restated an eadier stand of selective disqualification of those found to have fouled the system; 3. NEC indicted the national executive committees of the two parties, saying they were not impartial. The report was especially harsh on the NRC national leadership. It gave graphic details of the division within the party's executive committee and; ,l The NEC report also indicted a highly placed government official for his role in the botched primaries. The Ultimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bananga M. Tukar's AttemPt dt tbe Presidency 271

7.I1 DISSOLUTION OF PARTY EXECUTIVES AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CARETAI(ER COMMITTEES On Wednesday 14th, October 1992, the Narional Electoral Commission (lrlEC) submitted its report to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). After a ten-hour meeting spanning two days (Ihursday 15d and Friday 16d October) to consider the NEC report, the AFRC fually handedits judgement on Friday 16'h C)ctober, 1992.

BriefingState House correspondents after the meedng, the President declared that: The exeaiius of tbe hyl pdrties al ,tationol, state and /ocal gotemmenl leyels are dissobed innediatell. Caretaker rommittees will be appointed ta run tbe ffiirs oJ the ?alitial pdnies and will, in association ailb NEC, prepare and mndut a comtenlion of tbe hto Panierfor tbe pr/r?ase oJ electingnew parry exerutircs at local, stale, and national leaels.to

Even though NEC painted all those who contested the primaries with the tar of electoral fraud, the AFRC still allowed the presidential aspirants another chance to contest. The AFRC based its apparent magnanamity on the fact that the transition period was a learning process. But Dr. Raymond Dokpesi, National Campaign Co- ordinator of Alhaii Bamanga Tukur, observed that "the retention of all the aspirants in the race created the impression that innocent people can still be sanctioned alongside guilty ones".

On Tuesday 20'" October 1992, The National Electoral Commission released the names of caretaker committee members of the two political parties at the national and state levels. It announced Alhaja Lateefat Okunnu, former Deputv Governor of Lagos State as the National Chairman Caretaker Committee tbr the NRC; and AVM Ishava Shekari for the SDP. The names of the Cha.irmen at the state level were as follows:

SATE SDP NRC Abia Professor Uzouku Dr. NN Nwosu Adamawa Alhaji Muhammadu Bulama Alhaji Hamid Tukur Akwa Ibom Mr. Austine Ekong Mr. JJ Opot Aambra Mrs. Marvam I. Clark Mr. Vincent Aniago Bauchi Alhaj i lbrahim Musa Alh. AG Abubakar Bcnue Mr. Ebenezer Obeya Dr. Dan Mou Borno Alh. M. Alin: Mohammed Dr. JA Magaji C/River Mr. G Ewa Mr. Bassy lgre Delta Professor Iloba Mr. Emmanuel Ofule Edo Engr. Garba Urefb Dr. Alex ldehen Enugu Mrs. Adelene Idike Mr. AC Owoh Imo Mr. E. Emenako Mr. Ken ldozie Jigawa Alhaji Usman Sambo Alh. M. Mashafaru 272 Bk{apla oJ AL}t. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

Kaduna Alhaji Abubakar Ladan Mr. Patrick Yakowa Kano Alhali Baffa Usumanu Alh. Saidu Zakari Katsina Alh. Tukur Ahmed Alh. M. Magaji Jibia Kebbi Alh. Mohammed Augie Alh. S.M. Jega Kwara Alh. Nasiru Oniyangi Mr. Gabriel Majebi Lagos Mr Adisa Hamidu Mr AA Taire Niger Alh. Mohammed Abba Mr. O.E Kolo Ogun Mrs. B.A.M. Awosanya Mr. Oyeniyi Abiodun Ondo Mr- t-.K- Omosebi Mr. IO Dada Osun Chief Bola Akinvele Mr- Joseph Folonunsho oyo Mr- Olusegun Oladitan Mr. A Adetola Plateau Mr. Ibrahim Shehu Mr. A.N. Kum Rivers Prof. E.O . Bannigo Dr. Kingsley David West Sokoto Alh. Ahmadu Gusau Ath. M.M. Fadsa Taraba Mr. Obadiah Ando Alh. lM Mafrndi Yobe Alhaji Ibrahim Talba Alh. Ibrahim Kura Abuia Dr. Z. Aboki Dr. Sanusi Abubakar

Sotrce: Tbe Nigeian Tibane,'[lhursda,v. 22- October 7992

12 DISQUALIFICATION AND BANNING OF TrtE 23 PRESIDENTIAI ASPIRANTS

When The Nationd Electoral Commission submitted is report to the AFRC on Wednesday 14" Octotrer 1992, one of the first knotty questions that faced the military chiefs when their meeting tregan on Thursday afternoon, 15th October 1992 to consider the NEC report, was whete to draw the line between the guilq' and flot guilty. What sanctions to apply - general or specific:

It will be recalled that during the governorship primaries of 1992, NEC nullified results of governotship primaries in nine sates and banned twelve contestants from participating in the transition programme. Some people hailed this drastic step by N [iC because drastic ailments usually require drastic cures. On the other hand, NEC had been accused of double stan&rds and favouritism in the disq',,lifisation exercise as it was riddled with glaring inconsistencies. For example, why were resuls for Delta State NRC not cancelled when it was obvious that t}Ie vote s cast were far more than what was in the partyrs register? V/hy didn't N EC leave the courts to iron out, as in similar cases? Also, by disqualifying the governorship contestants, a precedent had been set. As sud! the tendency was that the government will also disqualify presidential aspirants if the elections were bogged in the mud.

In his broadcast to the nation on Tuesday 17" November 1992, the President announced the cancellation of the results of the primaries, disq,,ali6.4 alt tjr,e 23 aspirants and banned them from participating in politics and elections during the remaining part of the transitiofl programmc for contravening Presidential Primary Tbe Ultimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Tukur's Atternpt at tbe Presidenq) 273

Election Decree No.37 of 1992 with particular referenccto Sections 21,22 and 2i.The AFRC was said to be convinced that all the aspirants, individualty or serially, and the party executives, violated the provision of this Decree wlich had, graw coueqtrcnces of mdtrninng for*talling ditt^rting and prdsditirig the realiv ion of tbe Transitiol programme uitltin tbe stip ated tine. Tbe pretidenry sltorld not befor sale and Ntgeia cannot be bougit at tbe expenu of Nigeia a Nigeian:. Tbe admixistration it determined to pretted tbis and cilkfor the co-operatior of Nigeians to sbu and riect tbose wbo want to bt1 then and load it oaertbem.

Here, historians should pass their judgement when the murky water is clear to reveal the real intention of government action towards the transition to civil rule.

The President also extended the transition period fromJanwaty 2, to August 27",1993. Many people reacted to the President's Tuesday nation-wide broadcast. The leaders of the two political parties endorsed the suspension of the primaries. Alhaji Balarabe Musa, a one time civilian Governor of Kaduna State, condemned the elections and the banning of all the 23 aspirants. According to him, " this act bas robbed the cornrry of ,edible pruidertial candidans. Tbose banred are tbe besr neam of leaders Nigeia bas and thi co*ntry na1 not get belter cardidates again. Altboryb tbere are some elements amongst tbem wbo were rut iuen L good as iate gouerrors, some of then sbo d baue beer allowed lo re-enter tbe race again buauw of tbeir qua/i4,. " He mennoned specifically, Adamu Ciroma and Lateef Jakandib..ru.. oi .h.i. records,and capabilities, saying'pr tbe sakt of qrcliq of the politiciars,for the sake oJ banding oaer to tbe peoph wbo are capabh, thqt $ould hate alkwed Ciroma and Jakande,l He, howeverl blamed the politicians for allowing the mi-titary boys to make a football match out of them, adding "it ir our clfldt/ct tbatjlst madt the arml to do what tbel did."

chief Adekunle Ajasin, also a one-time Governor of ondo State seemed to agree with Balarabe Musa's position, sayrrtg "the blanket bu or tbe 2) aspirantr aa, no )uch. The de.naytic was a lro1sy barningprocess; benn tbgl shozld baue been giien tbe opportuni! n defend themselus"- otthis part, senator chuba okadigbo observed that 'lhe bii was enotionai, has no nationafomdation ard kcks equilt'. Government according to him should have used t]re disq,alification criteda as contained in the various electoral laws and the constitution. In a similarvein, the Senate President, Dr. Iorchia Ayu, expressed fears tlat the ban and the ext€nsion of_ the transition ptogramme were no guarantee for absolute political stability, addi-ng that there would likely be multiplicity of crises and another possible cancellation leading to another extension. In Arthur Nzeribe's opinion, the extension was a lateral ,,tbe andlogical result of the politicd atrocities of the political class, adding tha t nilitary rnuld hjatfied n renain itpowermtilpoliticians realiqed tbat the road to poliicalpower sbo tnit be clsrt*red n itb dead bodies of political opporc t or littered uitb brndles oJ naira or iaprEieties,'.n . Bamanga ,I,Jobo@ Tukur also commented sa yrng andcntan* tbot. tye ,orltd ni si rhe reason orratioule bebind it lYe uere rnerealbd arrd told tt)h arrd tbit is olr indiuidual sins- lye werelwt told tbat so mtcb monel war r?ent lYe are ,rrorlq bagt wbo came along t0 biack?oliticr. Bst that iaslrst a ntse. Not all the preidential D arpirana are equl! ieb and n{ormi! cornpl to uanant tbe b)n. " 274 tsi(Btupta 0f AJ-rI. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

7.13 NEWSETOFPRESIDENTIAI PIRANTS After the cancellation of the primades and the disqualification of the 23 presidential aspirants, NEC was asked to make recommendations to the AFRC for future elections. On Tuesday 3'o November, 1992, NEC submined its recommendations to the President. In his speech after'receiving the recommendations, the President declated that "his administration would not hand over the mande of leadership to a fraudendy u'. elected President" NEC recommended a modified Open Secret Ballot System popular\ christened "Option A4" to be adopted for futute elections. This system modified the accreditation and voting procedure. Henceforth, accreditation of voters would come between 8:00AM aod 10:00AM on voting day. Between 10AM and 10:30, Presiding Officers would explain the procedure to the voters. Thereafter, all accredited voters would line up in one queue, regardless of party affrliation. Then one would move, get a voting card and move away to thumb print the symbol of the candidate of one's choice, drop the thump printed catd and wait for the votes to be counted.

With the disqualification of the 23 aspirants, both the SDP and the NRC were not sure of which aspirant to pick from the new entrants. Different factions of the coalitions in both parties were talking to each other to get a consensus candidate in the intetest of the parties. During the deliberations by the members of the AFRC on the NEC Report, the members among other things discussed the possibility of drafting two Prominent Nigerians into the presidential race. They argued in favour of Chief Moshood Abiola, Chairman, Concord Newsp@ers and Alhali Maitama Sule, Nigeria's one time Permanent Representative at the United Nations forthe SDP and NRC respectively.

This might have perhaps been the reason that informed and prompted Chief Moshood Abiola to join the race as a "government-sponsored candidate". The disqualification of the first batch of 23 presidential aspirants opened the flood-gate for new entrants in the field. Before the end of October 1992, there were no less than 248 nev/ entrants in the presidential race out of which the SDP had 138. Many leading members of both patties were woried about the large number of candidates going for nomination under the new Option A4. This number incteased to 288 (155 for SDP; and 133 for NRC) byJanuary 1993. Thus for the first time in Nigeria, 288 people were in the contest for the presidential race. The government blamed the large turn-out on the adoption of Option A4 which allowed each ward in the country to Present at least a candidate for the Presidential race. Critics of the arrangement stipulated that an aspirant must submit himself for endorsement at the ward level on February 6, "1993. All members of the party at the ward level would vote for asPirants of their choice. An aspirant who won would face the Local Government Congress on Febru zry 29'^ 1993.Then the ',vinners at the local government level would Frght itout at the State Congress onMarch6,1993.

The winner would contest for each party's ticket at the National Convention of the two political parties from March 27th to M 1993. ^rch29" Membets of the National Assembly and other critics of the Option A4 described the Tbe Uhimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Tuhur's Attenpt at tbe Presidenet 275 process as "cumbersome" and "unworkable". They see it as a ploy to cause further confusion to enable President Babangida to stay beyond August 1993. Albert Legogie, Deputy Senate President, re-echoed the view of his colleagres that Option A.4 had made the "Presidential race an all-comers affair". He;aid, "the system v/as capable of injecting the good, the bad and the ugly" into the race which was not a good omefl for the countty.

With 288 aspirants, the presidential race for the leadership of the Third RepubLic was already a crowded field. Unless the aspirants subsumed their personal interests for party and national interests and allow consensus candidates to emerge, the political parties which had all along been patch-works of contending alliances may be totn asunder. The result may be disastrous for the emerging Thitd Republic. Below is the list of some of the new aspirants.

SDP NRC Chief MKO Abiola Alhaji Bashir Tofa Amb. Babagana Kingibe Alhaj i Yusuf Maitama Sule Professor Bolaj i Akinyemi Alhaji Ismaila Mamman Professor Adebayo Adedeji Alhaji Aminu Wali Professor Ango Abdulla hi Dr. Joseph Wayas Chief Odumegu Ojukwu Hon. Edwin Ume Ezeoke Mr. Chinedum Zcbtiro Mr. Ayo Ogunlade Chief Lulu Briggs Dr. Walter Ofonagoro Mr. Lanre Adesina Alhaj i Tareb Abba Gana Mr. Segun Adegoke Chief Diete Spiff Mr. Demas Nwoko Professor M. Adamu

Other problems that may be encountered witll the choice of a consensus candidate in both parties were those of ethnicity, religion and region from which the presidential candidate would eventually emerge. This had been a matter of unsetded controversy between the aspitants and the Nigerian public which started over the choice of chairmanship candidates of the two political parties in 1991. Those living in the Southern parts of the country felt that the North had been dominating the leadership of the county for a long time. Now it was the turn of the South to produce a president. For example, when in September 1992 it was becoming clear that in both the Social Democratic Party @DP) and the National Republican Convention (lrlRC), two northetners and Muslims (Shehu Musa Yar'Adua and Adamu Ciroma respectively) would emerge as the presidential flag bearers, Tbe Nigeian Tibune of Wednesday 7" October, 1992, had this to say: Tbe problen ,itb disaniA ir this comtryt is the uork oJ a ckqae of u@atriotic ehmefis ix tbe noib who are selfsb that thry mnnot aford to lite atd let others liae. Tbis nortben diqn bas illicit! obtained concessions of fnancial assistance controlbd @ the Organi4ztior of Isknic ConJerence. Tbe control oJ tbe cenhe is tlterefore a mtst because it is doing tbat thq co d contit*e to sbon, Nigeia ar a dz facto Mr in stak ubih k the frst stE in the grand design to dzlwr the cotntry as 276 Bio+rapb ,JNE. (DP..) BAMANGA TUKUR" coN

tbe Islamic k?sblic of Nigeia. The Jear of ksing Cbairmansbip and otber Perqt;rites 0rpatrznagu wbicb tbg obtained, b1 unlastsapercexiot of so*berners is rbe ditirg;forn which bas cksed tbeir eles to tbe realities of toda1. None oftbem will be accepted as cioilian president by soatberners (enphasi nine).

In a related development, when all the 23 Presidential aspirants were banned, the same nevspaper, Tbe Tibne of 10th November,7992 carried a story on its front page caPtioned, 'Yontba lo pick a Pruidertial ca idate". The write up narrated how traditional rulers in all Yoruba-speaking areas of the country had commenced a powerfi.rl lobby to solidif, the unity of Yoruba to produce a single presidential candidate when the tace picked up again. A powerfirl lobby group was constituted, made up of paramount rulers of all Yotuba states and opinion leaders.The Alaft of Oyo, Oba Lamidi Adeyemi, was to be in the fore front of this arrangement. Alternatively, if President Ibrahim Babangida failed to hand over power in January, a Yoruba man should be canvassed as Vice President. Thus, Chief Ernest Shonekan's eventual choice to head the Interim National Government (ING), might have been part of theYorubagrand plan.

The Igbo race and the Northern Elders Committee were not left out in the cold in the power game of inter-ethnic and inter-regional 5u,,ggle for the presidency. In a paid rdvettla the Dai! Chanpion of Fiday,April, 16th, 1993, (a day before the election of the chairmen of the parties in Abuja), the Igbos had this message for the Yorubas:

'rSouthetn Ptesidencv: WillYoruba's Plav Ball?" In 1992, hro ilhnizrt Igbo nns, including CbieJ Artht NTeribe of tbe Social Democratit Pa@ ran the presidential pinaiu, thq got 79ro aotesJrom the Yorubar afld tbb Yoruba states. Chief Oh Falae, no hss at illwtrio* son oJ tbe Yoruba, ako ran lhe Presidntial pinaies. Igbos ntedfor bin

inpressiae!1. He didfm better in Igbo states lban bis Igbo cornterpans did in Yontba states. h 1 99j, another illastriots Yon ba so4 Cbief M.KO. Abiola, coxtested tbepresidertialpinaies and did wry uell, witb inpressiae supportJron the lgbo national dtlegates. Now Igbos watt the Cbairnansbip of tbe Social Denocratic Panl whicb thry dueme in order to ,taintain the balance of power among the three nEor ethnic grorQs. The qn*tion is: will the Yonbas sapport tbe lgbo aEiration? Bcci?rlciA is tbe rume of tbe game. Sratch n1 back; I will sn'atcblorr back lYitbout tbit redprodj, tbe Soatltern tolidai4 is a nirage and the Plssibiliry 0f a So bern Presidert, a dream. Tbit is tbe chalbge beJore tbe Yorubas todal

Itqliue SDP. L,ong litte tbe kderal Rcpu blic of Nigeia S ignd @-LlJal and concened lgbo members of tbe SDP

Such write ups, couched in such languages, depicted danger signals as the flation rnarched towards the Third Repullc. This pardal)y or wholly transitioo exlained why the programme finallv derailed with the .r.r..[".io., of the june 12th., D;a election; why the ill-fated Shonekan_led Interim survive Nr;;;;;*rrment (ING) did not and pave way for tle reruin of .fr. fUifi,rry i, N"*ii., , rr:. The annulment of the June 12 presidential Election l.d ," ;;;;;;;.0""?0, various groups and Tbe Ufuimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bamanga M. Tukur's Anempt at tbe Presidenc! 277

sections of the country. Some of the groups, especially from the Western part of the country, were calling for the disintegration of the country while other groups like the Northern Consultative Forum (l.lCF) made up of men of sincerity of purpose and patriotism like Bamanga Tukur, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Adamu Ciroma and Abubakar fumi called for the continued corporate existence of Nigeria.

The Interim National Government which was midwifed in the wake of an unmitigated political impasse after the annulment of theJune 12, 1993 Presidential election may turn out to be a blessing for Nigeria. This was the opinion of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur. According to him, Nigerians should realize that Chief Ernest Shonekan did not canvass for the post. It is the will of God that be uill lead Nigeia ard so he sbodd be giuer the chance. He urged Nigerians to give him support to pave way for peaa, mderstanding and mttml co- eistence.In the opinion of Bamanga,lNG is on! a stop ga?. It irjr/sr tbe deiire ta continu ntling b lhry did not know hoa to go abo it Tbere was also tbefear of massiu retolt becarse lhry anrulled

a popthr eledion won @ Akok. lt was cbanginggoal posls @ permaion. Thq ako utedgot'ernment finded organiqations like MAMSER and tbe nedia to danpex public opinior throryb tbeir pfilications and prEaganda to s ??on Goaernment positions. Tbe media went against all tbat hEpercd; ehtions were notjoii morry was xed, etc, and wbatCotemment bas done is rigbt

As a way out Bamanga Tukur suggested: l%e tbe political dass aanted peaa. If we bad reacted, tbere wat bigh probabili\ tbat tbere wo d be troubh and, tbe Military vo ld ute il to efiact a decree to ?eryel ate tbeir stal in .power @ sajng politiciats aere not readlfor ehctions. lVefelt witb an inteim gouernr ent, we m d talk ta peoph like S borckan pbo is a ciilian, so that ye cotlld start arother democraticprocess.

Commenting on the proposed fresh presidential election in February, 1994, Alha)i Bamanga Tukur cautioned and pleaded with his recalcitrant colleagues to consider the

implications of suchzction. Let u alliupositiue! to tbe challenges of the mommt @ slritingard acting decisiue! to defise tbe grcatest landnine abicb the ?re-mat re boldkg oJ frub Pruidential election portnds. IYhatever tbe oatcome o1f stch an election, he argued, tbe resalt is not like! ta be nationa/l2 accep*d giuer tbe pruetrt atmospbere of nsrt4al dithz4:r ir tbe land. Altboryb tbere had been gradml cooling of of the negatirc passiott aisingfron the annt menl oJ tbe Jane 12 Pruidtntial election, "tbe releJ aforded fot tbe Intein Natioml Counment (NC), is not)et srfrcienl t0 ?roride cond cite atmospbere reqtindfor a conchdu Presidential election in February 1 994. He sqguted the sbiftingoJ tbe ehxion date to Decembeti 1994 to giue fnefor tbe National Eledoral Commission ard the nao political partia t0 re-shlldtre, re-organiry a re-@praise tbe conslitrtiols afid naflfertos of tbe hro Pzlitical Pdrties, seorefundingand dstal idntiq. )'7 e Biqmpl1 oJ AJ-t,. {D*) BAMANGA TUKU& coN

CONCLUSION The transition to civil rule programme, accotding to its architects, was fashioned out to give Nigeria "a viable political order". In 1989 the two grassroots political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention Q"IRC), were formed and draped in the paint of democrats and republicans. The SDP and NRC were created by military fiat but the programme seems to be littered with traps and full of double standards evidenced in the constant changes in the transition time table.

The presidential primaries kicked off on August 1 on a shaky note. Subsequent pdmaries which held on 12, 19 and 26 September wete no better. There were cries and protests by most aspirants of the two political parties over the results of the primaries. The Fedetal Military Government ordered NEC to investigate the allegations of electotal ftaud by most of the aspitants during the conduct of the primaries. Consequendy, the government decided to cancel the tesults of the primaries, disqualified all the 23 aspirants and dissolved the executives of the two political parties. To many people, this move was belated. Govetnment should have made decisive moves eadier to check the malpractices at every sage of the election by imposing stringent measures on erring aspirants.

Similady, the punishment meted out by the govemment to the aspirants 'was also not comprehensive enough. Only those found guilty should have been punished. lfhatever fault the aspirants had committed, to be just told that all their efforts had come to nought is unfair. As Chief Gani Fawehemi righdy observed, it was also not 'fair to tell Nigeians to organi(e al tbe aard leuel and rutional huel on! to be told that thq co d no lorger operate pho and tbgt were disbanded. All these engenfured Eatlry and rynicisn it tbe ninds of tnlers aere beginnitg to ask NEC abetber roters werejobless peoph or hattett't tbq beard of aoters'fafige?"- Even the new entrants also failed because of the framework upon which NEC asked them to work. Officials of MAMSE& security agents, party agents and the electorate had also contributed to the failure of the primaries. The point beingmade here is that the failure of the primaries was an indictment of the whole society, a stain on the conscience of the nation and a jeopatdy to Nigeda's democracy. This calls for a te-awakening and 'a new orientation. What this implies is that leadership in the form of individuals (e.g the presidential aspirants) and collective leadership (the electorates) had failed one rr/ay or the other. It was obvious that if tlis trend was allowed to persist, the nation must be ready for the worst. lX/hat then is to be done? 1. Govetnment should ake quick and ptompt action against those who engage in electoral fraud in the future tlrough outright disqualificadon, 2. For all Nigerians, there was a call for vigi.lance, impartiality and honesty. Nigerians really want democracy and believe in same. All must be prepared to fight all those that are hell-bent on wining at all costs. Collectively, we can win the war against them. 3. There was also the need to play "politics without bitterness." This would encourage harmony especially among the aspirants, which in turn would influence them to view political struggles in an objective manner rather than see Tbe Ultimate Cboice: 1992 - Albaji Bdmangd M. Tuk r'sAttempt at tbe Presidencl 279

it as a do-or-die affair. Politicians should aspire for the coveted seat working in the spirit of moderation, toletance and co-operation.

4 We should also try to insist that in all areas of social life andin politics, (especially for those aspiring to lead Nigeria) honesty and high moral standards sf,oUa U. the guiding principles. Trust, combined with strict responsibility and spirit of genuine comradeship, should be the people's gu.iding principles. In this way, the nation could eliminate those who want to seize power using undemoctatic means such as through the barrel of the gun or ill-gonen money. 280 Biograpl0 at Al-}I. (DR ) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

REFERENCES

1 The African Cuardian, October,8th 1987, P 13 ., rbid 5 The Holy Bible - The book of Genesis. Chapter I Only Lot and his two daughters were spared. 4 TheAfican Corcorl. Vol.2. No. 36. December 5th, 1988, p.16 5 rbid 6 For more lists of the Political Associations, see The Africatt Concord of December, 5th. 1988 and Newsvatch ofJuly,ITth, 1988. P. 16 7. rbid 8. ThisWeek, No 136,-August,7", 1989. P 8 9. ThisWeek, No. 180.July, 23, 1990. P 16 10 "The Gathering Storm" - As next Saturday's fluly 21 1990) NRC National Congress approaches, the likely showdown sends danget signais to the Third Republic" Tony Elumelu 11. rbid. 12. rbid. 13. rbidP.24 14. The Citi7,en,Yol.3 No.40, October,3 -17,1992,P 77 15. Ibid?.35 16. The Afican Concord,Yol.60 ,27 March,l992 P.36 17. Ibid p.35 18. The CitiTetr October 5-11 , 1992-P. 16 1.9. AJrican Concord,2l st March,1992 P 35 20. rbidP.39 27. Ibid. It was also alleged that Alhaji Shinkafi was lobbying multimillionaire Publisher, Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, to accePt the post of Vice-President 22. Interview with Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur, Lagos 20/0/95 also Interview with Hon. Gideon Zamani, Kaduna 11/11/95 and z3- Interview with Alhaji Saidu Umar, (G arktaat Gonbl Ktdlr:,zl / 72/95 24. The G*ardian,Newspaper Tuesday 4th August, 1992, P2 25. Ibid P2 26. Tbe TibuneNewspaper of Wednes day, 5 / I / 1992,P.7 27. The NewNigia4 August, 1992,PP. 1-2 28. TheNigeianTibare. Wednesday. 5th August, 1995, P. 1 29. The Naz Nigeian, Thwsday 6/8/92, P.1. Those absent ate: Chief Arthur Nzeribe, Dt Abel Ubeku, and Chief Layi Balogun. 30 The National Concord, Fidary, Tth August, 1992,P 1. Those in attendance were: Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur, Umaru Shinkafi, Adamu Ciroma, Shehu Musa, Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, Chief Milford Okilo, Dr. kmaJibril and Alhaji Sale Jambo. 31. The New Nigerian, T4 October,7992. P.3 32. The Nigian Tibare, 6th October, 1992.P.72.The other aspirants were: Dr. Datti Ahmed, Chief Layi Balogun, Professor Jerry Gana, Chief Arthur Nzeribe, Dr. Olusola Saraki, Alhaji Lateef Jakande and Chief Olabiyi Durojeiye. .-) )_ The New Nigeiar,Thursday, 8th Oc tober. 1992,P,7 Tbc tfiri r4E Cboid: 1992 . Albci Barnaa1a M. T&dt Ancrngc d rtc Prcsidedq 281

34. The Citizen, Vol. 3 No. zto. 15-1l-October,1992.PP -17 35. rbid 36. The Nenwaxb,Decembet 7d\ 1992 compiled by To rrylyare ct alp.14 37. The Ncpnaxb of 26 / 10 / 1992,P. 15 38. rbid 39. The Ncusrutcb of Decembeq 7. P. I 5 /10. Ibid 41. TEIJ. No. 15. Apd 13. 1992 P24. This was duting an intern*t with Abga Tiaeslot:rr,alirst 42. TEIINo.36, Septemb€r,7th. 1992P.20. Report complied by Nosa Igiebor etal 43. Tlae Naawateb of December, 7th, 1 992,p.77 44. rbid 45. Ibid 46. TEIJ., Newswatch of 26th October, 7992. P.75 sheftftber told NEC tbat Ikiai elained tobe a, &iend to her husband which informed his choosing her to go to Kaduna. 47. Ibid. One Uche, a Persond Assistant to Chris Adighiie was said to have started the beating while Idi Faroul, an NRC National Officer was asking why she wanted to deny her self and her husband big iobs if Ciroma won. 48 The Nen'n atch of December, 7th, 7992 P. 77 rhe Neu Nigerian of Friday 96 October, 1992, P. I ^nd 49. The Nen swatcbYol No, 17, October266.1992P.15.

50. The Ncust'atcb of December 7th, 1 992, P. I 8 51 Tlhe Nepwatcbof October, 26th, 1992, P 15. 52. rbid. 1 53. The New Nigerian Wednesday, 1 4 Ociober, 1 992 and ora.l interviews 54. Interview with Alhaji Ahmed Akawu, former Chairman ,JadaLGA ori2/ I / 95 55. The Ncpspatcb of 7th December. 1 992 P 20 56. Tbe Nigerian Tibttte - 9 / 11 /92.P.7 57. The Nep Nigeriat Friday 9th Octob e\ 1992,P 1 58. T"he Nertsttatcb.26 October, 1992, P. 17 59. NezN{ezbz Newspaper, Thurs&y 19 Novembeq 1992. Pl 60. Tibne of Fid*y 20th November, 1 992 P I 61. 62. TEIINo. 5, February, 1st, 1993, P. 11 63. Tifurc,of 2lstOctober. 1992 - PP 1-2 64 7EI I No.5 February 1st,1993, P 15 65 The Neusaateb,26th October, 1992, P. 16. 66. Newnaxh,Yd, 5 - February 1, 1993. P. 9 67 rbid. 68. Ibid 69. Tntune7 /10/7992,p.6 70 TnbueT /10/7992,p.6 77 Interview with Alhaji Bamanga Tukur 72. Guardian 13/ 10 / 1993.p.2 t5- Ibid

283

CHAPTEREIGHT

THE MINISTER INSTEAD

INTRODUCTION On November 17'n, 1993, General Sani Abacha finally outmanoeuvred the Interim National Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan which he collaborated to install after the collapse of President Ibrahim Babangida's nightmarish tegime with the annulment of theJune 1993 Presidential Elections. According to General Sani Abacha, his tegime was a child of necessih'. Thereafter, Abacha sought to buy legitimacy by bringing on boatd the biggest of all the political names from the various sections of the country under a government of national reconciliation and unity.

8.2 APPOINTMENTOFBAMANGATUKURASMINISTER: One etening, I receiaed a lelEbone callfron someone ulitg lbe Head oJ S la*, Gereral S ani Abacha, wanted to haae a pord n itb ne, tbot sor e ftc i0 mefi were comifig to pick me to see tbe President. I ramplied. I went there and met Solamon l ttr, AbfuakarNmi and one Col. Abnadl of tbe Military In*lligern Unit I was asbered ir lo su Ceneral Sani Abacba. General Sari Abacha said, I calledlot buarse I am lbinking of forxting a Cotrnment and I wartlot to be part of it as a Mirrister I told bim, excw me sir,lou knoa we baaejtttfrished the eledioreeingpalitia in n hicb I contestedfor tbe post of tbe pruident of tbis comtry.I baae been a Gouerror, so itis better I belp wben I am outside. He larghed a said, look,lor hat'e gore all oyer the courrh) hl?itg t0 be elecled as tbe leader oJ lbis camtry, if there is no clt/ntry t0goterfi, ,ubere arelot headingto?

I calledloa buaw this cornhJ is ifl d gleat?robbm. Yos rememberwben Govon took oun Tbere aar a lotof prablen.The coanhl was abo t t0 break a?art Coaon had to call onpeoph like Awolowo, Dx Okti Ankpo, Chief J.S. Tarka, Amiru Karo etc to come and hep hin.It is a sinilar siltatiol. So I am callinglol to come and belp me to sate tbe contryfron collapse.

After a day or two, Bamanga's name appeared among the list of ministets and v/as given the portfolio of Mioister of Industry.

The cabinet was dominated by the big wigs who had slugged it out in the political turf for the same seat which Gen Abacha occupied. The new ministers included such names as: Alhaji BamangaTukur, Ambassadot Babagana Kingibe, ProfessorJerry Gana, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi and Ebenezer Babatope. Others wete: Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, Lateef Jakande and Dr. Olu Onagoruwa. People who were known for their consistency for scorning military rule joined the fray. It was a very cutious set up which on the face of it tended to potray Abacha as the enthusiastic liberal who was ready to go far and wide with his rivals in earlier political contests. This notwithstanding, a close look at names Iike Tukur, Kingibe,Jakande and the rest shows these were people of merit, experience, competence, political ingenuity and tested ski.lls needed to salvage the nation's embatded polity and economy at that difficult period of its political historl'. 284 Biogr@l, ofALH. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

) & I Fa ? r \ t-l - ( \ 71 I --. J lJo

l I itz \- ) F. t& Z? L- ze L, t a (, i.i ) i! Y l( rI] )& [. X,r< I Fdi'1 --t t. 7

Alhaji Bamanga M. Tukur was sworn in as the Minister of Industry on Saturday 27, November 1993. There is no doubt that the industrial sector needed a dedicateJ and experienced person in business as its chief executive. He is a well known industrialist, up the lggving rungs of the indusrial laddet on a meritorious note. A)haji Bamanga Tuklt was the right person to bring the counry out of the economic logja- o..r.io.rJd by the annulment of theJunel2 Elections. As of that time, the Nigeri"n ..o.ro*y *", in a shambles. Itneeded succout and an appetizing flavour for that matter with patriotic courage, determined zeal and expertise as a successfirl business man and industrialist, Alhaji Bamangawould effectively tackle the economic vicissitudes of Nigeria. Just before his appointrnent as Ministet of Industry, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur in the rurbulent political weather of the country headed for the United States of America eady in November to canvass for investment in Nigeria by United States businessmen. Addresshg United States businessmen in New York in the company of Alhaji Isyaku Ibrahim (a fellow Nigerian businessman), Mr. Carington and Mr. Vaidan Jordati a member of President Biil Clinton's kitchen cabinet, Bamanga took advantage of the good trading climate provided to invest in Nigeria. He also pleaded for panince and understanding in the nation's march towards a democratic order bicause such understanding is the bedrock of good uonomic image for a deretoping nation like Nigeia. The saruiaal0f tbe corPorate existerce of Nigeia ard her ecoroml were more importifi rban anlthingelse, and muh more important than tbe transient anbition of nortals (or the hadersltip of tbe nuntry).rn addition, he urged the United States to pull Nigeria out of its economii piedicament and urged Nigerians to make similar calls until salvation was achieved.

8.3 INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF NIGERIA The objective of government's industrial policy was to achieve an accelerated pace of industrial development. In this regard, the industrial sector would become thi prime mover of the economy.

The elements of this objective include: (a) Providing greater emplolment opportunides; (b) Increased export of manufactured goods; (c) Dispersal of industries; (d) Improving the technological skills and capability available in the country; (e) Increased local contentof industrial output; (f) Atracting foreign capital; and (g) Increased private sector participation in the manufacturing sector.

S trategix and Poliry Meastres In pursuit of the cenual objective of accelerated industrial development, government would take a numberof steps or strategies and policy measures, involving (r) Encouraging increased private sector participation in the industrial sector, Privatizing and commercializing holdings in certain existing industrial enterprises; &) Playing a catalystic tole in establishing new core industries; 286 Biognpb, oJNE. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

G) Ptoviding and imptoving ifl frastructural facilities; (d) Improving the regulatory environment; G) Improving the investrnent climate prevailing in the country; (0 Establishing a clear set of industrial priorities; and G) Harmonizing industrial policies zt federal, state and local governmment levels. In realization of these st2ted obiectives of governmenCs industrial goals, the following tecommendations were made to Sani Abacha after three months of taking office. These wete to pave way for multi-sectotal development in tlre countfy.

Employment generation The major policy role through which-government planned to enhance employnnent generation was the promotion of small scale industries."Small scale" industries were defiaed as those with total investment of between one hundred thousand Naira (i*100, 000) and two million Naira (N2m) inclusive of wotking capital. Micto Cottage Industries were defined as those whose total investment cost did not exceed one hundred thousand Naira i+100.000) including work.ing capital but exclusive of land. Government therefore was to accord high ptiority to the small and medium scale enterprise (SMES) proiects whose main objectives were to develop in Nigeria, a ' broader base of enffepreneurial culture, a core of trained manpower and an effective institutional structure capable of providing technical services and ctedit facilities to viable small and medium scale enterprises. rWith different organizations working at different levels, government consideted it necessary to set up a co-ordinating umbrella orgarizaion called "Small Scale Industries Corporation" charged with the following responsibilities, among othets:

(a) Promotion of small-scale industries; (b) Development of policies and programmes for small scale industries; G) Provision of extension servicesi (d) Meeting the training needs of small scale industries; G) Provision of technical and management assistance; and (0 Provisionof facilities for credit delivery.

A key government strategy for the development of this class of industries was helping more actively to meet financing needs for small-scale industries. Hitherto, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry IrJBC! had been the major medium for providing funds for small scale indusfties. The Federal Government was to evolve a broader-based mechanism of credit delivery, allowing small scale industrialists greater access to ctedit facilities. To this end, government planned to involve the following financial institutions: (a) Five (5) commercial banks, (b) Three (3) merchant banks, (c) The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industy (I.,IBCI), (d) The Nigerian Agricultural Co-operative Bank (i.{ACB) and (e) Statc Development Finance Corporations. Tlre Minister Instead 287

Government was also determined to encourage the growth of small-scale industries through: @ The establishment of industrial estates with appropriate institutional facilities. Hencefotth the Federal Government will assist States with matching grants in the Establishment of indusrial estates for the promotion of small-scale industries. The Administration of such estates, however, would be left to the states. &) In addition, existing programmes such as the Enrepreneuriai Development Working for Yourself Programme, (VFYP) and the Train-the-Trainers Scheme would still be further intensified and improved upon as drey were avenues for developing the crop of entrepreneurs needed in the countqr. G) The Small Scale Industries Corporation will accord high ptioriry to industries engaged in the manufactute of basic needs including: food processing and agro- industries, household equipment manufacturing industries, building material industries, industries for manufacturing of low-cost transporr equipment, pharmaceutical industries etc. Meaningful industrial development will necessitate the widespread acquisition of technical know-hour by Nigerians Every effoft would be made to acquire the level of industrial technology that would establish a self-reliant economy. Government was to actively suppon industrial research and development efforts and promote agencies engaged in industrial research and manpowet training. These were the strategies canvassed by Ramanga Tukw.

The Industrial Development Centres QDCs) represented an important instrument for improving the natioo's technological capacity. The IDCs were created to ensure that small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), not ordinarily in a positior to employ highly skilled manpower, such as managers, engineets and technical staff, but were assisted to solve their operational problems Specifically, the functions of IDCs were to provide: (") 'Iechnical advice and assistance regarding the selection of the proper manufacturing process for the product in view; selection of the dght machinery; equipment and taw materials for the purpose. O) Assistance in tie installation and operation of machinery. G) On-the- job training of artisans in the handling of machines and simple tools (d) Assistance in the repairs of machinery and tools and tooling facilities of IDC's workshops. G) Advice and assistance to resolve operational problems encountered by SMES. (0 Advice and assistance to small sc.ale industrialists t.r improve the desigt and quality of their ptoducts. G) Training of proprietors and supervisory staff of SIIEs in modern nranagement methods and practices suited tu their erterprises. 0r) Marketing counselling regardir,g pricing, packaging, sales stategy, advertising and marketing methods for the promotion of sales of their products. (, Feasibility reports for inter,dir.g sn^all scale industrics. 288 Biosnpl4 af AJ-H' @R.) BAMANGA TUKTUR, coN

Increasing the local content of Nigerian Industrial outPut was a central obiective of government industdal policy. Finding suitable local raw matetials and promoting their use by industrywas one element of the strategy by which govetnment planned to realize this objective.

The Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC) had the mandate to allocate resources to research and development of identified raw material substitutes oi alternatives, while government would actively encourage new industries with greater linkages to the rest of the economy, Existing industries would be encouraged to pursue further backwatd integration. Assistance in the commetci z-hzatton of research results represented another strategy which government planned to adopt in order to raise the local content of manufacturing output.

Accelerating the pace of industrial development would require enormous capital investrnents While government welcomed domestic private capital investments, it also recognized that such investments may not be available in the required volume. Government therefore encouraged foreign capital into the manufacturing sector.

The main component of government stategy tbr anracting foreign capital was the liberalisation of access to foreign exchange tbr individuals and companies provtded through the foreign exchange market (FEIr!, easier capital and dividend repatriation through less cumbersome procedures was a by-product of changes in the regulations. Another element of government strategy consisted of amendments to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977 (I{EPD). These amendments were designed to open up more ereas for foreign investment- Thus, in the amended decree, only one list of scheduled enterptises instead of three was retained. The list conained businesses exclusively reserved for Nigedans. Foteigners and Nigerians alike were by &e amendment to own up to 100% equity, seperately or in parmership, h any unscheduled enterprises. Foreigners vrere welcome to hvest in the scheduled enterprises with a minimum capitalization of twenty million naira Q*20, 000,000.00).

Government was determined to continue to cultivate and improve bilateral trade links with other countries as a means of encouraging foreign capital investment in the Nigerian economy.

The first main strategy by which government sought to achieve incteased private sector participation in manufacturing was the privatization and commercialization of public sector investments. In this connection, government had completely divested itself of holdings in the companies. In addition, while some companies were to be fully commercialized, others especially those considered strategic for that moment, wete to be partially privatized/commetcialised. Ibe Miaister Insteail 289

8.4 STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MINIS OF USTRY As at October 1992, the Ministry of Industry had eight departments. Since then, a re- structuring of the Federal civil Service had taken place which re-constituted the Federal Ministry of Science and rechnology. The Technology arm of that ministry which was earlier merged with the M.inistry of Industry as a depattrnent was there fore transferred back, hence the ministy became known as the Federal Minisry of Industry. Io anothet development, the Industrial Development Coordinating Department was eventually not given the status of a departrnent as provided under the decree establishing it. Rathei, it was reduced to the status of a division and placed under the of6ce of thl director- genetal. Consequently, the ministry had six frrll-fledged departments and a secretariat for the Industrial Development Co-ordination Committee. The components were as follows:- (, PersonnelManagementDepartrnent (ii) Finance and Supplies Department (iii) Planning, Research and Statistics Department (iv) Federal Industtial Investment Promotion Department (") Small and Medium Industries Department (", IndustriallnspectorateDeparunent ("ii) IndustrialDevelopmentCoordinationCommitteesecretariat

After they were swotn into office, Bamanga went to see the preside nt and sid, Sit;lott gau me tbe Mini$1t of Indulry probabll buarse oJ n1 experierce in tbe Nigria, ports. I need ihru m-lrrlbs to ?re?are arrd come back toyog to lelllou sincere! whatl think tbeMitistry of indtstrl sboltd do.

After three months, Bamanga's brief was ready. He requested an audience of atleastone hour with Mr. President to discuss his plans with him before seeking for any approval. When that'u/as granted, he told him , Si4 noalot hare made me to be in cbarge of ,r.iit, ,ngor, ?yQec uebicle amnb!, and feniliTer tbese are major clm?orlefltr tbat tolclt or peoph,s liuu. Bamanga theo gave him the detailed overview below:- 1. SUGAR: lYe barc tbe corylhrcna of iters Niger ald Bente. We can grow all the sugar ue reqtire wbich can be r p?krrlented b tbe out grower scbeme. lye nud to giu tbem ning to work atd deaelop tbe lard, parcbate and maintenara oJ eqtipment eh. 2. CEMENT: IYc bate all the nateials we reqtire, ue do rot need to import ary tbing all we ,tud to do ir t0 Pdate atd seruice tbe equipmefi. 3. PAPER: lVe can redace the inport oJ ?a?er b reactiaatiflg the paper mills tbat are not fr.tndioning or rutfittctioting tofu ll capaciry like Jebba, Osogbo and lwEitt. 4. VEHICLE ASSEMBLY: lYe baue to start nanrJactting tbe local contnt-agglassu, phalshJ etc. IYe hau tbe mateials tbat we can redrce 500/o of what we are roa impoilg. 5. FERTILIZER: lVe need arotherJeniliqerfactory in Ktdma sila there i, o ,r7orr1 there. It pill sene Kano ard tbeNortbEast Zone. 290 BiogaPt, of AJl{.

After going through all these, the Head of State said, he was happy and promised to give the necessary financial assistance to Bamanga Tukur. Next was to souce for funds. At that time, the African DeveloPment Bank (ADB) refused to give money to countries under military regimes.

Bamanga used his connection to make ADB to give him a loan which he used to revamp the Savannah and Bacita sugar companies.

8.5 AC OFALT{AII BAMANGATUKU R AS MINISTER OFINDUSTRY The new industrial policy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was launched in 1989. The flext step was the setting up of the National Council on Industdal Development (|.JCID) and the adoption of the principle of the Strategic Management of Industrial Development (SMID), otherwise known as dre Industrial Masterplan. Between 1990 nd 7992, the NCID successfully instituted the first phase of the SMID and the consulant Guidelines, which marked the end of Phase I had been accepted by the Federal Government. From Decembeg 1993 when Bamanga assumed duty as Honourable Minister of Industry QIMI), the issue of Phase II of the NCID was revisited. The SMID approach was predicated on a private sector NCID - led industrialization process. Through the SMID, Bamanga launched the Phase 11 of the SMID approach on March 21, 1994. This became necessary because the coflcept of SMID and Industrial Master Plan was not bourd by the complexities of political succession but the long term interest of t}re country. Under Phase I of the SMID, 9 Strategic Consultative Groups (SCG) were set up as the platform for interaction, consultation and cooperation between the public and private sectors. The list is as follows:- Foundries and Forges; Pharmaceuticals; Non-metallic Building Materials; kather and Irather Products; Cement; Rubber and Plastics; Metal Fabrication; Textiles and wearing apparel; and Food Processing. Under Phase II, Bamanga approved the increase of the SCG from the above mentioned 9 to 12 by sub-dividing the food processing SCGinto 4, namely: Sugar, Sugar Confectioneries and Bever2ges, Grains and Cereals, Livestr>ck and allied products, and; Vege tllrlc oil.

This bccame necessary because NICD felt Bamanga,had, ready agreed with them that proccssing is vast and of prime importance to the lives of Nigerians but may not be Tbe Ministet lrlttedd 291

increased from time to time as resources for supporting the increase were not available. Under Bamanga's tenure, the ministry explored avenues to increase, substantialll', the private sector leadership in all activities of NCID if the government would only play the tole of the catalyst and give some financial help where necessary to lessen the burden of implementing their decisions.

In its quest to artract foreign investors into the economy as well as protect the nation's investments abroad, the ministry, under Bamanga as Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on IPPA, had co-ordinated negotiations on bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement between Nigeia and other countries. So fat, Nigeria had entered into investment promotion and production agreement with France, Britain and the Nethetlands while approval had been received to sign those of Switzerland and Romania. Negotiations with Italy and Spain had been concluded and forwarded to the Federal Executive Council for approval. Furthermore, negotiations were at advanced stages with other counties like the U.S.A., Germany, South Korea and Bulgaria. Dtaft agreements had been exchanged with Sweden, Namibia, Benin Republic, Zimbabwe and the Russian Federation.

The 76 meeting of the National Council on Indusry was held in Katsina, Katsina State between 28" and 29'n July, 1994 at which rwenty six states and the Federat Capital Territory were represented. The meeting afforded Alhaji Bamanga the oppomrnity to rub minds with his state counterparts on issues of importance to industrial development. The meeting painstakingly deliberated on the memorandum submitted from members covering a broad spectrum of topical issues that affected the sector. The meeting took time to review the progress recorded in implementing previous decisions and further deliberated on .issues which could enhance accelerated growth of the industrial sector of the economy. Prominent among the decisions of the Council were the settingup of a committee to harmonize the functions of existing as well as proposed small-scale industry financing institutions with a view to re-organizing them to be more effective, making a case for a grant to the states for the development of industrial layouts, and directing states to conduct comprehensive censuses of cottage, small, medium and large-scale industries in their respective states and L.G.As. A six-man committee of the council was set up to come up with necessary proposals for a fund scheme to assistretired civil servants who mightwish to set up their own businesses.

The relationship with internaional orgarizations of relevance to industrial development was also encouraged and strengtheried under *re tenure of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur as Minister of Industry. These are United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Industrial Department Organizatton (IJNIDO), the Economic Commission for Africa @CA), and the United Nations Development programme GINDP). Others are: The Commonu,ealth, The European Economic Communitv etc. The UNDP coordinates the activities of all other United Nations Agencies in any particular country. Consequendy, in relating to UNIDq the ministy goes through the UNDP. On its own, the UNDP had embarked on a five-year Development Programme 292 Biagrapla af ALIi. (DB..) BAMANGA TUKUR' coN known as the 4th Country Programme fot Nigeria. Nigeria is a member state of UNIDO and during its 5" General Conference held in Yaounde/Cametoon in December, 1993, Nigeria was re-elected into the other two policy making organs, viz: The Indusrial Development Board and the Programme and Budget Committee. It was at the conference, shordy aftet Alhaji Bamanga assumed office, that he got the commitment of the new UNIDO Director-General to visit Nigeria to have an on-the spot assessment of country's industtial needs with a view to providing the required technical assistance.

In addition, the PRS Deparmrent of the Ministry in 1994 completed the production of the edition of the Irdntrial Direcnrywhich contains the list of industries operating in the country and their distribution by state. The following information is provided on each industrial establishment: 0 Name and address of establishment; G) I-oca.l Government Area of location; (nl) Numberofemployees; 09 Yearofestablishment; (") Product; and ("D Authorized capial.

Furthermore, the ministry, in collaboration with the Federal Office of Statistics and the state statistical agencies, had started preparations for the listing of all industrial establ.ishments in the country, employing 5 persons and above. The information collected would be usedin the production of the 4* edition of the Industrial Ditectory.

In recognition of the need for accurate and timely industdal data for planning purposes, the Ministty with the assistance of UNDP/UNIDO procured and installed some computers for sorting, ptocessing and retrieving industrial data in the Ministry's sectoral Data Bank. Additional assistance, most especially in the area of staff training was sought from UNDP/UNIDO and the request was covered under the UNDP 4th Country Ptogramme.

1. SMATIANDMEDIUMINDUSTRIES The functions of the departrnent included policy formulation, co-ordination and implementation of all aspects of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), promotion and financing. To carry out these assignments, the department had two main divisions whose functions entarled t}c follorving; (r) Implementation of the \WoddBank Loan Scheme; and Implementation on the Studies Component (iD fimpretec Nigeria Project. (iii) EnrepreneurshipDevelopmentProgramme. (i") Establishment of the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria. Ihe Ministet Instead 293

(") Orgaruzatton andmanagemeflt of the SME Information Centre. (", Establishmentof the proposed SME Ctedit Guarantee Scheme. ("iD Implementation of programmes for upgrading of the informal sector viz: modernization of mechanics with basic infrastructure support and incentives. (".) Provision of common services programme forSME development. (i*) NBClresrucruringactivities.

SME studies aimed at undertaking indepth investigation and analysis of selected SMEs sub-sector were conducted with a view to making available to government a rich, dependable and up-to-date repository of information for poliry formulation and implementation. In addition, the studies were designed to provide SMEs information on various industrial activities for investment, decision- making, data on raw materials, technology and areas of potential surveys. Specifically, the studies were to be undertaken on the following:- TASKA: Review of the Entrepreneurship Development programme in Nigeria. TASKB: Study of developing linkages between SMEs and large-scale enterprises *rough sub-contracting TASKC: Sub-sectoralEconomicSurvey. TASK Cn: Preparation o[ SME profrles in different industries. TASKD: Survey of SME-related technologies development in Nigerian research institutions and their adaptation. TASKE: The review of previous plans and proposals on strategies for implementation of commercially viable industrial states for SMEs in Nigeria.

After an elaborate and exhaustive selection process which spanned September, 1992 to March 1993, si-r (6) consulting firms were selected to carry out the studies. The active implementation of the studies started in November, 1993, and was expected to come to an end by September 1994.

Already, over sixty (60) countelpart staff had been mobilized to work side-by-side with the consulting firms for skills acquisition. The report and findings of the studies were expected to guide the plans for SME grorlth and development in rhe shorq medium and long terms. As at September 1994, the survey of the selected six (6) industrial sectors had reached over sixty per cent completion while the consultants had commenced data assessing seminars and workshops for target groups, representatives of the private sector, development banks, policy makers at different strata of gover.r-e.rt, .tc. So-e of the findings of the studies, for example, the establishment of a model industrial estate in Abuja, had been found feasible and if given available resource would be pursued vigorouslyin the 1995 fiscal year.

The need for a National Credit Guarantee Scheme was conceived by the resolution reached at the National consultation on Strategies for Financing SMEs in Nigeria held in Abuja in 7992. ln pursuance of the resolution passed by the National Council on 294 R;qrapb ol AJ-II. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

Industries (',lC! at Sokoto inJuly 1992, a twelve-member Technical Team of experts wastonstituted to prepare the feasibility report, implementation, and strategies for the scheme. The Technical Committee on National Credit Guarantee Scheme met from September, 1992 to September 1993, submitted its report to the Ministry in October 1993. The ministry considered the report and submitted amemorandum on the scheme to the Federal Executive Council for consideration and approval. In view of the strategic importance of the scheme to the grou'th of SMEs in Nigeria, particula y as a facility fot credit delivery, the scheme had been admitted into the National Rolling Plan for 1995-1997 , akhough its funding would be sub ject to availability of funds. 2. EMPRETECNIGERIA- Entrepreneurship for Technology, otherwise called EMPRETEC, is a branch of the United Nations Entrepreneurship Development Programme (EDP). National Empretec mounted one training proglamme in 7994 x Bauchi, bringing the total number of entreprefleurs trained nation-wide to 395. As part of its counterPart contribution, the sum of N7 million was made available to the programme by the ministry in 1994 to setde liabilities inherited from the UNDP The centres for this training which began operation at their temporary sites were to move to their permanent sites within the shortest time possible. The Federal Ministry of Industry started the construction of 16 three-in-one workshops and administrative blocks in 1987/88. As at 1994,14 of the workshops had been completed while the remaining had reached more than 9070 completion stage. In addition, the construction of the workshop 2t Ikorodu and Abuja had reached advanced stages of completion. I{hile some of the completed workshops had been equipped in some of the approved trades, arrangements were going on for the procurement of machines/equipment in the remaining trade s in some of the centers. The installation of machines/equipment was also going on at the four zonal centres. As for the administrative blocks,9 of the 10 had been completed and 7 of them were already in use. The construction of administrative blocks at the Industrial Development Centres at Yola, Ilorin and Abuja was still in progress.

The ministry also procured and installed some equipment at 12 of the satellite centres of Jos, Makurdi, Ilorin, Maiduguri, Minna, Sokoto, Abeokuta, Akure, Port-Harcourt, Uyo, Benin and Kano. As at 1994, the workshop equipment for the zonal centers had been procured and contract for their installation awarded. The amount of US $3.6 million was relocated ftom SME ptoject for the purpose of procuring the se machines/equipment for the zonal centres.

()ne of the policy instruments for the promotion of SMEs aimed at enhancing industrial dispersal was the establishment of industrial layouts by each state of the federation with appropriate infrastructural facilities. The ministry continued to support this noble cause by giving grants to states. To assist the nevly created nirre states in 1990, the ministty got approval from the Federal Ministry of Finance for the setting aside of Ni20 Million for the purpose of establishing special industrial lavouts. These special layouts were to be located in nine new state capitals and nine other specially designated Ihe Minister lr,stedd 295

utban centres. In rhis connection, the ministry released layout desig,ns for the project as well as guidelines fot its implementation to the beneficiaries.

3. BUSINESS APPROVALS. The Industrial Development coordination committee was established by Dectee in 1988 and inaugurated in January, 1989, as a stop-gap agency for all pre-investment business-telated approvals. It has, therefore, the statutory ...po.r.ibility to grant business permits and expatriate quota approvals, pioneer status certidcates,- and technical/management fees agreements.

FromJanuary 1994 to Augqst 1994, a total of 148 applications for business permits were considered out of which '122 were approved. Anticipated total investrnint from the investments was Nl,445,050,000.00 (t+1.,145 Billion). It was estimated that employment oppottuflities u/ould be generated from the new investrnents.

Out of the 116 applications in respect of approved status-in-principle received and considered during the period, 106 were approved. A total foreign investment of N836.6841 millionwas expected to be brought in as a result of the approvals.

Below is the Sectoral Regional Analysis of the Approvals Granted. Sectoral Analysis ofApprovals January, 1994 to August, 1994 S/NO SECTORS TOTAL LOCAL FOREIGN EMPLOYMENT NT]MBER EQUITY(N) EQUITY(N) GENERATION APPROVED I Agro/Allied 27 538.125m 190.625m 4342

2 Chemical 29 28628m 213.182m 4,664 3 Enginee.ing 66 15093m 32357m 8.504 TOTAI, 122 717613 727377 7510 4. THE MOTTVE INDUSTRY The automotive industry was the main focus of Alhaji Bamanga's 1994 aonual ministerial briefirg. The history of the automotive industry in Nigeria dates back to about thirty years ago jike when private companies UAC, I-eventis, SCOA, BEIrAC and RT. Briscoe estabLished auio assembly plants. Government's initial involvement in the industry came about under the second National Development Plan (1970 74) with the establishment of tw.o-passenger car assembly plants in Kaduna and I-agos. This was followed by the establishment of four commercial ruck assembly plants in Bauchi, Enugu, Ibadan and Kano under the Third National Development Plan (1975-80). The assembly plants were:

s/No NAME OT ASSf,MBLY PLANT INSTALLED CURRENT CAPACTTY (PA) CAPACITY I]TILIZATION 1 PEUGEOT AUTOMOBILE, NIGERIA 60,000 Cars t0% LIMITED (PAIo Ikduna 2 VOLKSWAGEN OF NIGERTA (VWON) 12,000 5% L489s 3 ANAMBRA MOTOR MANI]FACTURING 7.500 Units ofTrucks in 8% COMPANY LIMITED (AI\IAMM CO) Enugu one shift I 5,000 Utrits in hvo shifts 296 Bi,:srE|ry af N]1. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

4 STEYR NIGERIA LIMITED. Bauchi 2,000 (Agricultual 02% Tractors 8,000 (Trucks) 5 NATIONAL TRUCKS MANT,'FACTURING 7,000 (Trucks Nil LIMITED. Kano 3,000 (Apdc. Tractors) 6 LEYLAND NIG LIMITED. Ibadan Under Receivership 0% Under Receivership

The Federal Government had 35"k share holding in each of the above mentioned vehicfe assembly plants. The main reasons for the involvement of the government in this industry within the period were to expand the industrial sector of the economy and to assist the country's balance of payments by reducing imports of vehicles, spare patts and related components, thereby te directing the overall economic development of the nation.

The Fedetal Government was conscious of the very high cost of the products of the assembly plants which arose mainly due to the weak value of the Naira and other problems. Consequendv, some policy packages that would bring down these costs were introduced in 1994. Some of these were the tariff diffetentials of an zverage o{ 40o,/o between the firlly built up (FB[I) vehicles and the locally assembled ones, approvals fot these assembly plants to import completely knocked down (CKD) and spare parts duty free, use of bills for collection/open account to import CKDs and components and approval to enjoy zero duty concession on imported raw materials and comporiefrts. Furthetmore, in otder to expand the market share of the local assembly plants, government directed the three tiers of government and their agencies to patronize the products of these plants as a matter of policy. Bamanga had directed the National Automobile Council to liaise with the Federal Ministry of Justice to gazette the circular to give it the fotce of law. The auto industry was also being reated as a priority sub- sector of the ecoflomy. The foreign exchange requirements of the assembly plants would also subsequently receive adequate attention of the allocating committee.

TheJoint Venture Agreements flVA) establishing the assembly plants wete supposed to be reviewed after ten (10) years of their coming into effect but this was not the case.

During Bamanga's tenure, officials of the ministry were directed to critically teview the agreement taking into consideration the need for backward integration particularly in the area of local content development. In this regard, Article 1002 on Local Content Integration of Joint Venture Agreement (VA), which had not been fully adhered to by the technical partners would be enforced. In re-negotiating the agreements, recent techlological developments in the countfy wefe to be taken into account so as to ensufe full utilization of such facilities.

Btmanga took positive action to put in place clear poJicv gridelines to re,ditect the development of the auto industry in the nearest future. These guidelines were documented in the National Automative Policy which was launched on the 23'd August, Tbe Ministd In.tedd 297

1994, in Kaduna. Decree 84 of 1994 established the National Automotive Council ()rlAC) as a parasaal of the ministry was to enforce tlese guidelines.

The future of the automotive industry is very bright given the fact that the country possessed most of the resources that could be developed into inputs for manufacturing vehicles. For example, iron ore, columbite, tin and gold were available. The government appreciated the fact that lack of basic industrial infrastructue had done a lot to slow the development of the industry in the past. Consequently, the provision of these infrastructural facilities received the priority attention of the authorities. At the same time steps were being taken to develop other support facilities. other factors favourable to the future development of the auto industry included the counuy's central location on the African condnent, its large territory and population, universities, technical institutions as well as research and development centres which were being manned b.v competent professionals- Government was developing all the facilities that would feed the auto industry with the required inputs for its production. The Nigerian Iron Ore Mining Company Limited, Itakpe, had a beneficiation plant which would supply Ajaokuta with high grade iton ore. There was plan to expand and upgtade this plant. The Itakpe-Ajaokuta railway line was also nearing completion. The Ajaokuta integrated Iron & Steel Complex which consisted of a blast fumace, jobbing foundry, flaisheet plant, machine and machining floors and specialized steel making facilitiei was about 9070 completed. Its commissioning in the near future would be a great advantage to the auto industrl'. The beneficiation plant of the Delta Steel Company, Aladja, had an integrated plant with direct reduction for ore contents of higher quality than the one coming from Itkape. The company also possessed a jobbing foundry to complement the Ajoakua complex. Alhaji Bamanga's commissioning of the foun&y plant of the Nigerian Machine Tools Limited, Osogbo, was another positive development in the industry. The complex had heavy and small parts machine shops, heat tteatment plant, a raining centre and a tool room. It was significant that pAN had already placed orJers for vital spare parts for the machine tools. The planned fi.rll development of the Nigerian Petochemical Industry was also meant to improve the techno-structural facilities conducive to the development of the Nigerian auto industry. There was also concetted effort to fully develop companies which specialize in the local production of patts and components with the active support of the assembly plants, the Automotive Local Content Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (ALCMAIT| and the government.

There is no doubting the fact that if these efforts by government were complemented with reciprocal gestuies ftom the organized private sector and the technical partnerc, Nigeria would have been within the threshold of experiencing prorp.rotr. industry with its multiplier effecs in the near future. ^ ^oto

5. CHEMICALSUBSECTOR two fertilizer ]he companies, the National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria QllAFCOlrI) Iimited, Onne, and the Federal Superphosphate Fertilizet Company (FSFEQ Limited, Kaduna, have been making positive impact towards the attainment of the national goal 298 Birsrapb aJNE. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN of self-sufficiency in fertilizet production. .NAFCON produces Urea, NPK and DAP, which are suitable for various ecological zones of the country. Since that plant was commissioned in 1988, it has been meeting the entire urea needs of the country and about 307o of its nitrogenous fertilizer needs.

By 1994, the company had produced a total of 4,789,055 metric tonnes of fettthzer since its inception in 1988. In 1993, NAFCON and the local producers supplied about 60%o of the total national fetilizer require ment while importers supplied the short fall.

Furthermore, in ordet to reduce dependence on imported fertilizet and thereby increase local production, consttuction work on NAFCON Phase II Expansion project began during Bamanga's tenure as ministet. The proiect was sited adjacent to NAFCON 1, so as to optimise the benefits of economies of scale from the availability of trained manpowet material and infrastructure already in place at Onne. The contract for the construction of the NAFCON II proiect had been awatded to a consortium led by M.uC Kellog The project was to cost US $586 million dollats. The funding was originally on 50:50 loan/equiry ratio.

Following the restructuring of the company exly in 1994 by Bamanga Tukur, the company had a single Board of Directors and ooe Managing Dilector for the entire company. This arrangement effectively put paid to the old structutes of separate board and management for the existing NAFCON I and NAFCON II.

Efforts ur'ere gearcd tos'ards the implementation of NAFCON III Expansion Project, which is to be sited in Abuia. A specific site for the proiect had been identified in Gwagwaiada Area of the FCT. However, as at 2010, negotiations were still going on with the World Bank and other foteign financiers for the sourcing of funds to execute the proiect. ln September 1994, Shell Gass Plant at Alakiri, 14km from NAFCON complex, was set up to feed the fertilizer company with gas which constitutes 80% of the fertilizer company's raw materials.

Alhaii Bamanga observed that a strategic and core comp,rny as NAFCON needed to receive optimum co'operation and less problems ftom Shell Gas Plaot. He also realized that the security of t}tc country's food supply was threatened as fatmers may not get enough fertilizer at the requLed time for their crops. Consequendy, Alhaii Bamanga embarked on a faca finding visit to NAFCON and Shell Gas Plant at Alakiri. At the end of it, Shell was asked to cxpand its gas production capacity by tedoubling its efforts in order to ensure steady supply of gas to NAFCON. me llinister Instead 299

6. THECEMENTSUB-SECTOR Cement constitutes a very vital component of the economic development of any nation. Since the commissioniog of the 6rst cement plant n 1957, a ioal of seven cemefltplants have been established at various locations nation-wide as follows:

s^io COMPANY INSTALLED t,OCATTON CAPACITY I Ashaka Cement Comp"ny el,c. 850,000 Bauchi State

2 Bendel Cement Company Limited 450,000 Edo State 3 Benue Cement Company Plc 900,000 Benue st te 4 Calabar Cement Company Limited 400,000 Cross River State 5 Cement Compani of Northem Nigeria Limited 500,000 Sokoto State ' 6 Nigeria Cement Company Limited 600,000 Enugu State

7 West Africao Portland Cement Plc. 1,200,000 Ogun State

The Federal Government had shares in alr the companies with the exception of the Bendel Cement Company Limited. All t}re cement companies have bein slated for partiai privatization as a step towards improving their performance and only Bendel Cement Company Limited, Calabar Cement Company Limited and Nigerian Cement company Limited are yet to be privatized. The cement plants had a tJal production capacity of about 5,320,000 tones per annum, that was about 47yo capacitl,utilization. Contributing to this unfortunate sate-of-affairs werc technical, human, dnancial and material problems which the industry had to contend with. such problems include oh-solete machines and equipmeng erratic power and fuel supply, inadequate funds, difficulty in procurement of foreign exchange, low parity of thi naira, higtrproduction cost, high cost of labour due to new salary and wages of staff, lack of sp"r. p".t., poo, communication and difficulty in evacuating finished products as a resuli of inadequacy of ransport facilities. These factors contributed to the scarcity and high price of cemeni in Nigeria.

In realization of the problems facing the cement industry in Nigeria and also in recognition of the contribution of the industty to the national ..oro-y, the Federal Government through the Ministet of Industry, Bamanga, took measures aimed at addressing the problems facing the industry. The measures included:- i. Reduction o[ import duties on machinery spare parts end raw materials by t]re cement industry. ii. Abolition of tax on excess profit to enable the cement companies plough back such profit into further production as well as purchase the much niedeld spare Parts. iii. Provision of technical assistance by UNIDO for the refurbishing and modernization of plants e.g. Benue Cement Company @Ce plc and Clment Company of Nortl-retn Nrgeria (CCNN), are curently benefiting from these arrangements. iv writing off of interests on loans owned to the Government by the companies in 300 Biognpll of AJ-II. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

order to assist them to restructure their financial bases. Intensification of su:dies on g)?sum deposits as a means of reducing foreign input into local cement production. 1'1. Encouraging foreign investors to establish new plants on build, operate and transfer (BOT) system; and vii Making special foreigrr exchange allocation to the cement industry.

Government had also put in place a plan to extend gas pipelines to all the areas in which cement companies are located as it was expected that utilization of gas, in addition to electricity, would facilitate cheaper cement production. The need to link all cement companies with railway lines had been sttessed and the matter was being addressed in collaboration with the appropriate goverlxnent agency. Further to the above, the Ministry of Industry, having identified the need to increase the volume of local cement production, had given support to the setting up of new cement plants by Kogi and Adamawa state governments. In the same vein, Ashaka Cement Company was also being supported in its bid to expand its installed capacity. Other cement companies were equally assured of similar support in their re-activation plans. The Ministry was also encouraging private entrepreneurs through various incentives to establish mini plants in the country.

In order to encourage reseatch into cement technologl,, the ministry, under Alhaii Bamanga, also considered setting up a Cement Technology Institute in the countrv and the establishment of a new cement companyin Gu1'uk, Adamawa State.

7. THENATIONALSUGARSUB-SECTORPOLICY The National Sugar Sub-sector Policy adopted in January 1993 provided for the establishment of a National Sugar Development Council Q.JSDC) to promote the development and growth of the local sugar industty. The National Sugar Development Council was accordingly established ifl 1993 as a Parastatal of the Ministty of Industry. The NSDC had the tesponsibility for co-ordination and monitoring of activities for the development of the local sugar industry. In 1993, the groundwork for the effective take off of the council was laid and by 1994, it had taken off. The council identi{ied four (4) suitable areas for siting of mini sugar plants. It also planned to assist existing sugar plants, namely: Savannah Sugar Company, Numan; Lafiagi Sugar Company; Bacita Sugar Company; Save Sugar Company in the areas not covered by ADB loans. It also planned to embark on the development, rehablitation and refurbishment of factories as well as the provision of workshop and additional equipment for farm and harvest operations.

8. AGRO-ALLIEDSUBSECTOR:PULPANDPAPERMILLS The Nigerian Paper Mill atJebba was designed to produce 65,000 tonnes of pulp and paper per annum. The company produced the following grades of industrial paper: kraft paper, sack paper, kraft liner and flutting media. Before Bamanga's appointment as Minister of Industr\,, the operatiofls of the existing paper mills atJebba and C)ku-Iboku Tb" Mini\t"r In\tedd 301

were characterised by frequent shut downs. As a result, their producrion fell below 20% of installed capacity. During Bamanga's tenure both mills resumed normal production.

9. ENGINEERING SUB. SECTOR The Nigeria Machine Tools Limited Q.{MT), Osogbq which was established in 1980, as an integrated machine tools industrl,, could not be completed on schedule due to wodd- wide inflationary rend, management problems occasioned by the technical partners (HMI of India), as well as inadequate and irregular funding. The Frst phase, which was the 3,000 metric tonnes capacity foundry had been completed by Alhaji Bamanga Tukur and commissioned on 29" April, 1994 by the Chief of General Staff (CGS), I-t. General Oladipo Diya MSS, FSS, (mni). To ensure that the foundry was commercially-oriented and efficiendy managed, the ministry instiruted a task force to identi!, and select a core investor who would participate in NMT as Joint Venture Partners. After the commissioning of the foundry, work on the Healy Parts Machine Shop commenced in eatnest and reached advanced stage; most of the machines atrived and were installed. Meanwhile, the power generating house, the tool room and the heat treatinent plant wete refurbished.

Also, the foundry commenced commercial ptoduction; when firlly on stream, tl s company was expected to meet t}te needs of manufacruring industries generally and particulady those of firms operating in the automotive industry,. Already PAN had placed orders for critical parts woth over N40 million. Giving the linkage effects of the NMT, several other companies approached the company for the fabrication of their vital spate parts.

The foundry workshop and related facilities were the first of their kind in the whole of Africa sou& of the Sahata. The foundtywas designed to produce a total of 3,500 metric tonnes of iron steel and non ferous castings annually. The immediate benefits of this facility to the nation was that different moulds for spare parts castings could be produced for the cement, auto-assembly, petrochemical and refinery industries, thereby generating handsome revenue for the company and conserving scarce foreign exchange for the country. The workshop was aiso capable of producing some vehicle components that were hitherto imported by the localvehicle assemblyplants.

10. RE-ORIENTATION OF WORKERS' ATTTTUDE TO '{rORK One of Bamanga's areas of achievement as a minister was his ability to re-orient the attitude of workets in the ministry to move away from their bureaucratic orientation. He told them,l-.ook,1otr are not uehicle mantfactnreff;)ot are not prldmrs of stgar or nment, wfo do )ou ask tbese ?e,?h to cone to tbe Ministry to seelot all tbe time? Tbe Mini:try is on! srperuiing tbese Jactlies. All ,ve ,reed to do is to tee their btdget, see their areas oJ nud eEecial!1 wbere tbeir rennue cdnnol clter their clsl, yhere inaestmelt is tuded, ta/ee it to Council, gx finds and ynd it to then dinct! ratber than nmingto tbc Ministry.

He also discouaged unnecessary traffic to his office unless for very genuine and important rcasons. 302 Biograpb d Alf,t. @R.) BAMANGA 'rUKUR, coN

On their part, the workers accused Bamanga of coming from the private sector, scattering cirril service rules, bureaucracy and so on to which he reacted: I an on! doingwhat I affd to d0. I knlw it is flot eag ta tbange people's attihtdes, to drop tbeir old habits especia@ as citil nruantu or bttreatcrats a nlulf coningJrom tbe pittate nctor. lY/e bad dffirent oientations andperceptions oJ bow cetain tbings sboald be done. But wben people sap tbat I harte no ifierest otber than to ree tbat thikgr g0 snootb!, sonepeople cooperaled.

DROPPIN GOFTHEllISE T OF ABACHA'S MINISTERS When polical activities were allowed to re-start by the ruling military junta, Adamu Ciroma and Bamanga Tukur went to General Sani Abacha and told him that it was immoral for them to be in government and at the same time play politics. Consequendy' they requested that they be relieved of their posts so as to enable *lem to participate in politics. Abacha pleaded with them to give him more time. In the end, he dissolved the entire cabinet. He reasoned that if he allov/ed them to go individually, it would create an impression that things were bad. Adamu Ciroma and Bamanga Tukur had a good working relationship as members of General Abacha's cabinet' team, l%e pashed the ecoroml fon ard and Abatba liked it. As a nark af Abacha's likingfor oar wben we leJt, he neuerhe/d arg cabinetmeetings agaitt.

On Wednesday 8" February, 1995, Abacha dissolved his first set of ministers. The reason Abacha gave was mainly to allow them time to face the challenges of politics which most of them were yearning for in the possibility of a post-Abacha political dispensation. He thanked them for their services to the country, emphasizing their patriotism, vision and commitment. According to Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya, the ministers "stood firm and did all within their best to ensute that the ship of the nation did not sink". This act was a departure from the Babangida years when ministers were dismissed or a whole cabinet was sacked without the courtesy of exprcssing national gratitude.

To many Nigerians, *ris set of ministers was the best Nigeria ever had, even though a number of them were said to have underperformed or conducted themselves in some undignified ways; they were desperate to get resources to ptosecute their future programmes. The National Democratic Coalition G\IADECO), speaking through its representative, Chief Ralph Obiora said tbe cabinet satk e?itani

Among the ministers themselves, the responses had been a mixed tune of anxiety and lack of concern. For example, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur was said to be cruising the Lagos highway on Friday 10" February (2 days after their sack) with all t}e facilities of his old office. Alex Ibru had already done a valedictory note saYing Posterity would bear him Tbe Ministet Instedd 303 out and was out of the country setling Abacha's budget while Jerrv L scni continued to go to his office. A few others like the Transport Minister, Chief Ebenezcr Babatope, were non plussed while Jakande was cited as arguing the case for his elaborate housing programme which he would have.r,anted to supewise to completion.

VISION2OlO On November 77'n 7996, the Head of State and Commander-in-Chie f o[ the Federal Repub)ic of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, inaugurated the 172-Member Committee on Vision 2010. Chief Ernest Shonekan, erstwhile Head of State was nominated as Chairman of the committee. As far back as 1993, Chief Ernest Shonekan first started the idea of the National Economic Summit. After three years of dicey experimentwith an idea that seemed to be nebulous in purpose, the summit became a hot bed of fertile ideas which gave birth to Vision 2010 in September, 1996.

The team was described by an analvst to be "exhaustive and comprehensive", reflecting a collection of Nigeria's corporate society. It was a mixed bag of twelvc prominent traditional rulers, eleven female members, captains of industrl', technocrats, educationists, the mi.litary, the media and other opinion leaders in the country's socio- economic community. Some politicians like ,\Ihaii Bamanga M. Tukur, Latee f Jakande and Umaru Shinkafi were not Iclt out.

The vision as enunciated b,v the Head of State v/as meant to be an economic development programme through which go\.ernment would systematicallv expect to improve the quality of life of Nigerians within fourteen yeats. It was also intended to "provide strategic insight into thc direction in which the nation needs to move as well as a proper focus on the formation of programmes and policies which will lead us to the realization of the future of our dreams."

The terms of refetence of the committee as oudined by Gen. Sani Abacha were: (") To define for our country, its corect bearing and sense of economic, political, social and cultural direction. In doing so, to specifically examine all aspects of our national life which should be developed and fortitied; G) To set appropriate goals and targets and time frame for achiernng our economic, political, social and cultural objectives and to propose the strategic and institutional arrangements required to attain the set goals and targets; (, To forge a plan which will ensure that Nigeria is, en route, by the yeat 2010, to becoming a developed nation in terms of economic prosperiry political stabiliq' and social harmony. In particular, to focus attention on creating the right atmosphere and environment for: (ri) Accelerated agticultural production to ensure food sufficiencl' and the ptovision of maior raw materials. (u1) A full fledged industrialization programme based largely on local raw materials input fot enhancement of dre cxportation of manutactured goods; 304 Bnsmpta oJ N-11. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

The Vision 2010 had thirteen sub-comrnittees. Average membership of these sub- committees was fifteen. There were also seventeen dove-tailing economic groups with average of twelve members each. The committee submitted its reportwithin the one year deadline, 30" September, 1997. The implemeotation of the report began sffaight away with the constitution of the National Council on Nigeria Vision Q'{CN\) headed by Abacha himself.

According to the Visioners' Report, Nigeria would be something of an El Dorado by the year 2010. Nigeria would have ffansformed into a United, ittdulriots caing attd God- feaing d.enonatic socieA czm,flitted t0 naking the basic needs of life ffirdable for euery one and treating a haditg ecoroml.

There is no gainsaying the fact that Nigetians had cause to be skeptical or even cynical about the Vision 2010. This is because over the yearc, Nigerian leaders had increasingly demonstrated the knack and defmess in putting together on paper plans, workshops, symposia, committees or task forces. These had oniy been mere "paper tigers". Implementation and the much needed crucial political will had not been one of the country's national hallmarks . For instance, according to Prof. Tam David West, a one time Minister of Pe troletm, since irdependenn, Nigeia bu hadforr ill-inpknented oretenfaibd deaelopnents plans, thru linpilg economic summits and ramerots sinilar eforts at detelopments nratugier.

Samuel Aluko, a Professor of Economics and Chairman, National Economic Intelligence Committee in an eleven-page memo tided: "Brief comments on Vision 2010 report" criticized the report as only representing the view of the elite. He said that tbe nost inponant stakeholdcrs are neither Nigeiats, the owr abelning najoil of abon did not participate ir thefotmtlzrton oJ the tision nor are aware of wbat tbe trision doctamefi contains. It is lr?risiflg that floyhere in tbe tision that eacb segment of the piaate sedor is inuited to prepare a stbmit ta tbe tition Cowcil itt oan plan oJ attainingits orn fision 2010.

One Joseph Ode also opined that the Viioners made no reuol ionary distouri* aboti tbe cot/rrtrlts Part and Prescribed no rerulfiiotary nl*iolt either. The document is a colhction oJ aety Janiliar and sinple remedies tbatreqdre otil cbangu in attit*de, taku andpolilcal will. For example, if we lake tbeftdings and recommendaliotts on ecorcm1, the uitiot enrisaged tbat fo 2010 tbirys aodd be mnch bettn For iutance, Nigeria uill achiete an awrage of 10 per cent anul gror domesrtr prodtct (GDP)groatb ard a singb digitinJlation rate throtgb tbeperiod oJ 2010. The report bowwer, acknoabdget thefad tbat tbe goal appears too ambitiots becatse betwun 1976 and 1996 the arerage amul gmatb rate aas onll 1.6 pcrcent Similar observations have been made on other aspects of the report e.g. Education, Energy, Cormption, Leadership, etc. Commenting on \TISION 2010, Alhali Bamanga has this to say: # ri all enbracing it is tbe nost nedibb and atditable progranme I haye erer seen in tbis coutry. If it aas adhered tq b1 nory we wo d not be ubere ye are todaJ. Tbose rbo bate rcgatite rieus abod t,ision 2010 are nrtain! biased. This is buatse it was tbe most comprehensiu programme Nigeia eterprepared that aas attuled @ nanl natiots oJ tbe world 7he Minister lastedd 305

CONCLUSION Alhaii Bamanga Tukur's office as Minister of Industry was a miniature Nigeria. People from all parts of the countrv came to see him and he insisted on seeing every one that came, listened to their problems. Other people in public office would do otherwise. They would screen off themselves from people. In fact, this is a rare quality in Bamanga. As for the stalf of his ministry,, he tried to insti.ll confidence in them in handling an,v issue and whenever the occasion permitted, he always insisted on eating with his staff.

No doubt, this attitude did contribute a lot to his successful and smooth l4-month tenure as Minister of Industry. Of particulat refetence in this regard were his special advisers: Alhaji Ahmed Song and Alh. Tukur Modibbo; his Personal Assistant, Dr. Emeka Enejere and, of course, his Secreary, Mrs. Funmi.layo Sanusi.

In assessing one's ach.ievement in any given set up, a number of Parameters may be considered. They include, the amount of time spent on the job, the availabiliry of and utilization of resources, the required personnel, the degree of co-operation received from the workers and one's relationship with them and the degree of free hand one was given to execute the duties assigned.

Alhaji Bamanga Tukur's tenure as the Minister of Industry spanned over a period of 14 months. During this period, he was able to conceive and establish some new proiects, completed and commissioned some abandoned pro,ects, re-trained some staff and motivated others. For example, the completion and commissioning of abandoned projects such as the Iwopin Paper Mili and Foundry W'otkshop at Osogbo in which huge finances had been invested v/as a very important achievement. Commenting on his tenure as Minister, Bamangahad this to say: lVell, I leate bittory tojtdge. I re-oiented some of the wor/eot. Tbefactoies were workittg, I ako nade ure tbat tbe companies *tder the Ministry got tbeirfreedon to o?elate tuitb little itterferencefron tbe Minis@ as was tbe case before I cane. Thgt were workingprEer!; their huel of profuctior bad all increased. 30(r Biqqr,tpb ol N]1. (DR.) BAMANGA TUKUR, coN

REFERENCES

1 IleNaz.r28* November, 1 993, p12-13 2 New Nigeian,Saturday 25* Decemb er,19993p.4 3 rbid 4 N igeiar IndrstrialPo/iq,,apubkcaion of the Minisffy of Industry. 5 NationalComcilof Indastry Report oJ tbe/o nutingof tbeNational Cor r cil o.f h daslryt and Technolog1t, Katsina, 25" and 26" Jdy, 1994. 6 Sam I. Ayininuol a: The Role of Financial Srctors in Nigeia's lndutialiqation Pronss, paper presented at the 1994 Africa Industrializaion Day Celebration, Abuia, Thutsday 17trh N ov.1994. l M.C. Okonkwo, Tbe.ltate 0f tbe Piyate Sedorin Nigeian lndrstialiqation: Tbe,lmal/ ,f cale Indlsties. A wa1 foruard ta indtnialiTation; paper presented during the occasion of Africa Industrialization Day Celebration, Abuia 17" Nov. 1994. 8 G.O. Akeiobi, Nigeian IndastialPoliqt, Piuate Sector ParticiPatilr, Abuia 17'nNov. 1994 9 Key note address by the Honourable Minister of Industry,, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, at a meeting with Chief Executives of Parastatals, Companies and Agencies under his Ministry, AbujaJalnry,2T ,1995. 10 A Welcome address by the Acting Coordinator Industrial Development Centre, Mr. S.G. Ahiaba, during the visit of the Minister of Industries toJos 25* August, 1994. 11 Address by Alhaji Bamanga Tukur on the occasion of the commissioning of PHASE I of the Iwopin Pulp and Paper mill, Ogun State, Thursda,v 8'n Dec. 1994. 12 Speech at the official visit of the Hon. Minsiter of Industry to NAFCON Jznuary 4-51994by the Managing Director Dr. N.O. Ejiga. 13. Speech delivered by the Honourable Secretary of Industry and Technology, Alh. Aminu Sale on the occassion of signing of the Engineering Procurement and Construction Agreement (EPC) between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Messrs M.\V Kellogof Houston, USA 20" August, 1993. 14. Speech by Suleiman Abdullahi, Managing Director, Savannah Sugar Company Ltd; Numan on the occasion of the visit of the Minsiter o[ Industries to the company 8'n Febr wary,1994. 15. Welcome address by the Chairman, Board of Directors of Nigeria Machine Tools Ltd. Osogbo, on the official visit of the Minister of Industries 23'o February, 1994. t6. Welcome Address bv Mr.Jacques Manlev, Managing Director, PAN Nig I-td on the occasion of the Minister of Industries visit to the factorl' '1" Sept. 1994. 17. Address by Alhaji Bamanga Tukur at the official opening ceremonl' of the new Lagos office of Ashaka cem. Plc, Februan, 14'n, 1994. 'l'he 18. N en s 2O't' Feb. 199 5, pp. 12-13 19. Ibid.p. 13 20. Ibid, p 14 Tbe Ministi Instedd 307

21. This Du,N)Y.27",1997 22. Vanguard,Fi.dziyDec6" 1996, p. 11 23. Today, May25, p. 9-11 24. Newswatch,Dei.l5'h 1997, p. 8-11 25. YB. Usman - Nigeian realities ard lptilrlr t0 the yar 2010: A.D. A discussant's clntriblation t0 tbe ?resertartor of tbe paprr "The place of Nigerian Global economy by the year 2010, by Chief Ernest Shonekan at the 37* Annual General Meeting of NACCIMA," Ptemier Hotel,Ibadan Thursday 19"June, 1997. 26 Ibrahim A. Ayagj, Eduarton and Vision 2010, New Nigeian, Tuesdzy, lvJy, 22, 1997.