The Jonathan Presidency By Reuben Abati

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The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency By Reuben Abati

A review of the Goodluck Jonathan Presidency in Nigeria should provide significant insight into both his story and the larger Nigerian narrative. We consider this to be a necessary exercise as the country prepares for the next general elections and the Jonathan Presidency faces the certain fate of becoming lame-duck earlier than anticipated. The general impression about President Jonathan among Nigerians is that he is as his name suggests, a product of sheer luck. They say this because here is a President whose story as a politician began in 1998, and who within the space of ten years appears to have made the fastest stride from zero to “stardom” in Nigerian political history. Jonathan himself has had cause to declare that he is from a relatively unknown village called Otuoke in Bayelsa state; he claims he did not have shoes to wear to school, one of those children who ate rice only at Xmas. When his father died in February 2008, it was probably the first time that Otuoke would play host to the kind of quality crowd that showed up in the community. The beauty of the Jonathan story is to be found in its inspirational value, namely that the Nigerian dream could still take on the shape of phenomenal and transformational social mobility in spite of all the inequities in the land. With Jonathan’s emergence as the occupier of the highest office in the land, many Nigerians who had ordinarily given up on the country and the future felt imbued with renewed energy and hope. If Jonathan could do it, they too could. And it was not only the ordinary Nigerian that felt this way, the people of the South South who had always complained of being marginalized by the majority groups felt encouraged that one of their own, of Niger Delta extraction had come to power. Given the religious nature of the Nigerian people, a few commentators also added that Jonathan’s emergence as President was of divine origin and design. The cynics among us argued differently noting that since Jonathan was Vice President anyway, he was bound to be President. But no one could deny that there was something most extra-ordinary about Jonathan’s political career in a country where it helps to have a Godfather, some money, a family name, or substantial talent for criminal conduct. When his profile was published in 2007, ahead of the Presidential elections in which he stood as running mate to late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, it contained such minor details as his being the Secretary of a Food Committee in his secondary school days and Chairman of a Committee of House Prefects. Such minutiae are included in a resume when there is very little to report! He also had worked as a Customs preventive officer (whatever that means) after his secondary school education! In 1977, he gained admission to study zoology at the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, graduating in 1981. He took part in the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), serving as a school teacher at Community Secondary School, Iresi, Osun state. He later worked in the Rivers state Civil Service as a Science Inspector in the Ministry of Education, and subsequently as a lecturer in the Department of Biological sciences of the state College of Education. He got a Masters degree in Hydrobiology and Fisheries in 1982, and a Ph.D in the same discipline in 1995. By March 1993, Jonathan was appointed an Assistant Director (ecology) at the then Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) now known as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). He served in this capacity for five years, and joined politics in 1998, when he was chosen as running mate to Chief Diepreye Alamiyeseigha in the 1999 Gubernatorial elections in Bayelsa under the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). This was Jonathan’s first major appearance on the public stage. Nothing in his background, either in terms of training or exposure had prepared him for that moment. He was by Nigerian standards, an ordinary man, the regular guy who had been chosen as running mate because he would behave well and respect the Boss. Governor DSP Alamiyeseigha was indeed the Boss. Jonathan, whose strong assets include his loyalty and humility, reportedly still calls Alams “my oga” even if that oga’s tenure as

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 2 The Jonathan Presidency

Governor ended unceremoniously and in disgrace, and Jonathan is today Nigeria’s most powerful man. Of Jonathan, Alamiyesiegha wrote in a book titled Goodluck to Bayelsa (Treasure Books, 2009) edited by Neghi Ilagha as follows: “Sometimes, I wonder what life inside Creek Haven (Bayelsa Government House) would have been if Dr Jonathan were not by my side. Stories abound of repeated conflicts and crises of confidence erupting between some chief executives and their deputies in this nation. But I am glad to report that I never lost sleep over Goodluck Jonathan.” Both men sought re-election in 2003 and won. In 2005, Jonathan’s boss ran into trouble with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), another version of that story is that he stepped on President Olusegun Obasanjo’s toes; however, he was removed from office and he ended up in jail. Jonathan, in accordance with the law, replaced Alams as Governor of Bayelsa state on December 12, 2005. After completing the remainder of the Alamiyeseigha tenure, Jonathan’s ambition was to seek election on his own as Governor. But he got handpicked as running mate to late President Yar’Adua in the 2007 Presidential elections. His emergence in that position, as announced on December 17, 2006, was rather surprising. There were far more established and influential political figures in the South South and the Niger Delta. Some of his “ogas”, Alamiyesiegha’s peers from the Governorship class of 1999 had shown interest in the Presidential race and would have been glad to be chosen as Vice presidential candidate. But they were ignored by President Obasanjo who had taken it upon himself to choose his own successors. Jonathan, in comparison seemed so unenthusiastic about being Vice President; newspapers kept asking him if he really wanted the position. He reportedly confided in close associates that he preferred to stay on as Governor of Bayelsa state. On another occasion, he said he “often appeared like that at first, as if am not committed to something and once I set my mind to the thing, I always excel.” In Bayelsa indeed, Jonathan had appeared as if he was not interested in being Governor. He seemed happy to have been in his oga’s shadows. Commissioners and special assistants were said to have been more powerful than the Deputy Governor. By 2007 when he showed up as running mate to Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, he seemed to have learnt a few lessons about power. As Bayelaa Governor for two years, he had one of the most aggressive campaign strategies in the country. He cleverly promoted his administration while passing off the publicity as other people’s efforts. He had promised the people of Bayelsa in December 2005, “I will rather fail myself as Goodluck Jonathan than disappoint Bayelsans.” Ten months later, his administration had not yet been able to address the problem of militancy in the state; on one occasion, the Governor reportedly went into hiding when militants attacked the Bayelsa state Government House. But the Jonathan administration managed to build schools, more hospitals, provided more drugs for the hospitals, bought buses to aid public transportation, started work on a five-star hotel in the state capital to promote tourism, launched a 50-unit Housing scheme, built roads, paid civil servants salary arrears, gave out N60 million to 600 youths in the state under an empowerment programme, managed to control all the hawks who tried to capitalize on Alams’ humiliation to gain political capital of their own, and so on. In the main, Jonathan’s public image was that of a quiet and humble public administrator, the only chink in that armour being allegations that his wife was too over-bearing, and a reported case with the EFCC involving her. During the 2007 Presidential campaigns, Jonathan was again the perfect running mate; very happy to stay in the shadows. The first person from the South South to inch so close to the most powerful office in the land, Jonathan’s selection by the PDP was seen as an attempt by the party leadership to pacify the people of the Niger Delta who had been involved in a running battle with the authorities over the marginalization of that part of the country and the inequities attendant upon the management of Nigeria’s extractive resources. Militants in the Niger Delta had made oil exploration activities almost impossible with their organized assault on oil exploration infrastructure and personnel. Jonathan’s emergence on the big stage may have served the purpose of encouraging the people of the Niger Delta but the excitement was short-lived. Indeed in April 2007, his country home was bombed by unknown persons. The PDP won the 2007 Presidential election, it was a grossly flawed election marred by malpractices and irregularities, raising questions about the urgent need for electoral reform. On May

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 3 The Jonathan Presidency

29, 2007, Jonathan was sworn in along with President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua as Vice President and President respectively. The man from Otuoke, who only nine years earlier was a struggling public administrator had become Nigeria’s no 2. For him, it was bound to be a learning opportunity, as he received his first baptism of fire when the media insisted that he should follow the example of his new boss, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua by declaring his assets publicly. The President had declared his assets publicly in June 2007. In August, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan succumbed to public pressure and declared his assets, totalling N295, 304, 420, some N56 million more than what a Federal legislator now earns per annum for doing so little. The list included properties in Abuja and Bayelsa (N67 million), undeveloped plots of land (N60.538 m); household items (N26m), BMW car (gift) (N15 m); income yielding investments (N62.072m); cash in banks (N58.984 m); foreign accounts (nil) wife’s assets (included). Jonathan’s assets declaration pacified the media which at the time had raised serious questions about the stupendous wealth of public officials, and the need for closer monitoring of public funds and assets. Greater challenges however awaited Goodluck Jonathan in his new position as Nigeria’s Vice President.

To be continued Published The Guardian, Dec. 17, 2010

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 4 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (2) By Reuben Abati

To understand the Jonathan Presidency, we must return to its roots in the Yar’Adua era and trace developments therefrom. The Yar’Adua presidency at its inception announced a seven-point agenda, focusing on key issues of power and energy, Niger Delta, land reform, national security, wealth creation and employment, transportation, and food security and agriculture. The objective according to the then President was to reduce poverty in a country where more than 70% of the 150 million population lives below the poverty line, on less than a dollar per day, ensure peace in the troubled Niger Delta region, achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals, and fast-track the country’s development process. President Yar’Adua in a remarkable show of candour also admitted publicly that the 2007 elections which brought him and others to power was indeed flawed and that there was an urgent need for electoral reform to which his administration was committed. This raised a critical question of legitimacy but whereas Nigerians may have been suspicious of the PDP’s performance in the 2007 elections, they seemed willing to give the new administration a chance. It was the first time since 1960 that two university graduates would take charge of the reins of power at the top. This in a way underscored the importance Nigerians attach to education, but the output from the administration would end up a telling comment on Nigerian university education. President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua had a Master’s degree in Analytical Chemistry, he had worked as a college teacher, and in his early days, he had been a fire-brand Marxist, one of the radicals from the North despite the aristocracy of his pedigree. He had also served in Katsina state as Governor for eight years. He was 56. His Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, 50, had a Ph.D, had also been a college teacher, worked in a development agency, and served as Deputy Governor and Governor. The duo may not have been the best leadership materials that the country could have at the time but it was assumed in many quarters that they would understand the issues at stake and go to work in the public interest. The first signs of trouble had occurred long before Yar’Adua took office, but more trouble became evident when the administration could not put a cabinet together on time, and when it did, it was an uninspiring team, many of whose members were meeting the President for the first time. The new Federal Government also displayed much indecisiveness as it found itself in a difficult situation whereby early policy decisions were soon reversed and so much intra-governmental dissonance was advertised. The most celebrated in the latter regard was the announcement of a redenomination of the Naira policy by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which the Presidency claimed it had no knowledge of, and which it ordered Charles Soludo, then CBN Governor to reverse; his complaints that he was backed by the CBN Act notwithstanding. Senior government officials routinely contradicted each other, showing a seeming lack of direction. One of the arguments that the Obasanjo team had put forward in the lead up to the 2007 elections was that the Yar-Adua-Jonathan ticket would be in Nigeria’s interest, because it would be a government of continuity; and that the foundations that had been laid by the Obasanjo administration would yield bountiful fruits under Yar’Adua. This did not happen. One of the first things the Yar’Adua government did as it settled down was to distance itself from the Obasanjo legacy. The so- called Obasanjo boys who had expected to be rewarded for their contributions to the Yar’Adua campaign were marginalized and replaced with a Katsina mafia which surrounded the new President, that Mafia would soon assume the title of a cabal before the end of the Yar’Adua Presidency. Jonathan was an outsider to that group.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 5 The Jonathan Presidency

In due course, President Yar’Adua settled down fully in office. Some of the highlights of his administration included the launch of an amnesty programme in the Niger Delta which served the purpose of helping to reduce the national security crisis in that region, albeit poorly conceived. The President also set up a committee on the power sector with a promise that he would declare a state of emergency in that sector. The country’s power supply crisis was already almost an intractable problem with many companies relocating from Nigeria on that account. The emergency that was promised was never declared. However, in a speech he delivered on May 29, 2009, to mark Nigeria’s Democracy Day, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua offered his mid-term report and gave himself a pass mark: He said among other things that his administration had made tremendous impact in the country’s agricultural sector in two years, by constructing five agro-export conditioning centres and 10 rice processing centres. He claimed also that his government had increased irrigated land from 4,000 hectares in 1999 to 150, 00 hectares, and a N200 billion long-term concessionary loan had been instituted for large- scale farmers. He cited the Niger Delta as a region where "our agenda for the resolution of the developmental problems of the region" was being successfully implemented. In addition to a Niger Delta amnesty programme, his government had also created a Federal Ministry for the Niger Delta, saddled with the task of providing infrastructure and employment. He added: "We also have retained the Niger Delta Development Commission as a Federal Government intervention agency and ensured that its statutory allocations are paid in full…Knowing that these efforts and other developmental efforts will be ineffectual if there is no peace in the region, we are taking necessary steps to ensure greater security in the area…Our offer of amnesty to militants in the region who lay down their arms remains on the table.” The speech also referred to the Petroleum Industry Bill which the Executive had submitted to the National Assembly for consideration; which when passed into law should result in far-reaching reforms in the extractive sector which accounts for 99% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. This was to be complemented by a restructuring of the downstream sector for greater efficiency and transparency in addition to self-sufficiency in domestic petroleum refining. The administration by May 2009, had also submitted to the National Assembly seven bills on electoral reform, sequel to the establishment of the National Electoral Reform Commission led by Justice Muhammadu Uwais, and the consideration of that Commission’s report. Yar’Adua further promised Nigerians a target of 6, 000 megawatts of electricity by December 2009. He said: "I am pleased to report that we have taken concrete steps towards meeting this target and achieving 10,000 MW by early 2011." "We have also provided US$ 1.5 billion for investment in gas network infrastructure which will, among other things, ensure the adequate supply of gas to our thermal stations." His administration according to him, had also awarded contracts for the rehabilitation of 34 Federal Highways across the country at a cost of about N140 billion in addition to completing 13 major highways inherited from the previous administration.” This was the last major report President Umaru Yar’Adua presented to Nigerians before his death a year later, possibly one of his last public appearances before October 1, 2009. Positive as the report sounded, very few Nigerians were impressed. The Yar’Adua Presidency was widely considered to be rather slow and ineffective, so much that the President was given the sobriquet - “Baba Go Slow”. Many of the achievements he claimed raised more concerns. The Federal Ministry of the Niger Delta was another bureaucracy, with the appointed Minister Ufot Ekaette embarking on a wasteful familiarization tour of the region, even when he is from that same part of the country. The so-called amnesty programme by 2009 was already failing with no hope of sustainable peace in the Niger Delta.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 6 The Jonathan Presidency

Both the Presidency and the National Assembly had played so much needless politics with electoral reform and the report of the Uwais Commission, that the seven bills submitted to the National Assembly made complete short-shrift of the core recommendations of the Commission on the independence of the Electoral Commission, its funding, and the system of elections. More than 140 billion had been spent on roads, but across the country the state of public infrastructure remained deplorable. Till date the disbursement of the N20 billion agric fund is a subject of official mystery. For two years, the government could not address the crisis of electricity supply in the country, and whereas there was so much to be done in terms of development projects, every December, Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) ended up returning money to the treasury simply because they had not done anything in the course of the year. In 2008, there was the celebrated scandal of such monies being shared by Federal Ministry of Health officials in collusion with members of the Senate! There were also many untidy developments: the removal of Nuhu Ribadu as Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the attendant politicking which gave the impression that the Yar’Adua administration was not so committed after all to the fight against corruption. There were also allegations of a re-Northernization of the Federal Government, particularly of key government departments. But the bigger source of concern was the failing health of President Yar’Adua. This had been a major issue during the Presidential campaigns of 2007, with persons who knew him reporting that the only reason Katsina state under his watch as Governor did not spend so much money was because the Governor was on sick bed most of the time. Nevertheless, he won the election and became President because he was the man that former President Olusegun Obasanjo wanted and whom he swore would succeed him. It did not take long before Nigerians knew the truth: they were saddled with a sick President. There were reports of Federal Executive Council meetings being cancelled because the President was indisposed. He also travelled abroad frequently for medical treatment, first to Germany and later Saudi Arabia. He was Chairman of ECOWAS, but he missed many of its meetings, and also important UN engagements. The Nigerian press was largely sympathetic however. Yar’Adua’s illness provided a perfect alibi for the slowness of his administration at a great cost to Nigeria. The poser then was: if he had a Deputy who was healthy, why could he not delegate most of his functions, and allow the country to move on while he sought medical help? In Nigeria, processes and traditions that work elsewhere are rarely respected. Since 1999, there has been at both Federal and state levels, a crisis of relationships between substantive political figures and their Deputies (Governor/Deputy Governor, President/Vice President). When Governors travelled, they often did so with their entire cabinets including the Deputy Governor, leaving the state in the care of either the Head of Service or the Speaker of the Assembly, or whoever would not pose a threat to the Governor. Before the end of their tenure in 2007, President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar were sworn enemies. The 1999 Constitution assigns no specific role to Deputy Governors or the Vice President, placing the occupiers of such positions at the mercy of their bosses. The oft-stated consensus among Nigerians is that these are “spare tyre” positions. Ambitious Deputies readily found themselves in the line of fire; various stakeholders have learnt to defer only to the man in power, who also does not usually leave anyone in doubt about the scope of his authority. President Yar’Adua may have been ill, but he was assertive. He left no one in doubt that it was his Presidency and that he was in charge of it. There was never at any time any public display of disaffection between him and his Deputy but Dr Goodluck Jonathan wielded no extraordinary influence. Members of the Katsina Mafia inside the Presidency were reportedly far more powerful. Aides of the Vice President complained about how their boss’s office was cash-strapped. The Vice President did not even live in the official residence of the Vice president. He was quartered in a Presidential Guest House. It was not until January 2010 that the Federal Executive Council hurriedly and most conveniently approved a sum of N7 billion for the design and construction of a befitting residence for the Vice President.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 7 The Jonathan Presidency

Adamu Aliero, then Minister of the Federal Capital Territory said: “The vice president is staying in a guest house meant for visiting heads of state. It is not right. It is not befitting for the vice president…It is unbecoming for the vice president to stay in a guest house…” This was nearly three years after Jonathan became Vice President! Members of the Ijaw Monitoring Group (IMG) had in fact complained before then that not enough security was being provided for the Vice President. The BBC has described Jonathan as a “low-key deputy to a low-key President” and that if his Vice Presidency was distinguished at all, it was only in terms of the role he played in the negotiations with Niger Delta militants, his own kinsmen. Jonathan, as in Bayelsa, again played the role of a loyal Deputy: he was not a threat to his boss. But his age of innocence ended in November 2009 with developments that thrust him closer to the big job, and serious lessons for Nigeria.

To be continued Published, The Guardian, Dec. 19, 2010 ______

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 8 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (3) By Reuben Abati

The month of November 2009 marked a turning point for Dr Goodluck Jonathan’s political career and a wakeup call for all Nigerians with regard to the powers of Presidents as well as constitutional provisions guiding the conduct of Presidents and the relationship between them and their Deputies. Emergent developments further proved to be a major test of character for Dr. Jonathan, and for virtually every power centre in the country including the military, civil society, parliament, the media, political parties, and ethnic nationalities. On November 23, 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua left the country for Saudi Arabia. The original official explanation for his absence, which would later turn out to be terminal, was that he had gone on lesser hajj or umrah, which is a common practice among Nigerian Muslim leaders even if this advertisement of private morality has no connection whatsoever with their public conduct. The President had made a few of such trips since 2007; concerns about his ill-health had also been a recurrent issue in his presidency. Indeed, before his Saudi Arabia trip, the President had reportedly complained about chest pain and fever shortly after returning from a Friday Juma’at service in Abuja. Within 48 hours, word went round quickly that the President had died in Saudi Arabia, with many Nigerians demanding the whereabouts of their President and the exact status of his health. On November 26, 2009, the Presidency was forced to issue a statement on the President’s condition. In a statement sent from the King Faisal Hospital, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Dr Salisu Banye, then Chief Physician to the President reported that “at about 3.00 pm on Friday, November 20 th after he returned from the Abuja Central Mosque where he performed the Juma’at prayers, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua complained of left sided severe chest pain. Preliminary medical examination suggested acute pericarditis (an inflammatory condition of the coverings of the heart)…It was then decided that he should take confirmatory tests at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where he had his last medical check up in August. The medical review and tests undertaken at the hospital have confirmed the initial diagnosis that the President is indeed suffering from acute pericarditis.” He added that the President was responding “remarkably well.” Mr. Olusegun Adeniyi, Special Adviser (Media) to the President, further added that the President was indeed responding well to treatment and that the country would be regularly updated on his progress. That however did not happen. Instead what followed was high-wire politicking with the country’s affairs and future. President Yar’Adua would remain in Saudi Arabia till February 24, 2010 about 93 days. Once the nature of his illness was announced, the entire country became more or less a hall of medical experts as it soon became public knowledge that acute pericarditis could take up to six weeks to treat. The experts on the subject however pointed out that given President Yar’Adua’s medical history complicated by problems with his heart and kidneys, it could turn to be a terminal ailment for him. One expert opinion stated that even if he survived, he would be in a vegetative state. Where the President is likely to be away from his office for a period of time for health or vacation reasons, he is required by the Constitution to write formally to the National Assembly to that effect, and with this the Vice President is empowered to act on his behalf. Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution is explicit enough: “whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a written declaration that he is proceeding on vacation or that he is otherwise unable to discharge the functions of his office, until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary such functions shall be discharged by the Vice president as Acting President.” President Yar’Adua refused to comply with this Constitutional provision, thereby leaving the entire country in a lurch. What should have been an ordinary procedure, and an action taken in accordance with the Oath of office which the President took on assumption of office ended up polarising the Presidency and the rest of the country, with palpable threats to national stability. By November 30, a group of eminent Nigerians under the umbrella of G53, had called on the President to resign from office and allow the

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 9 The Jonathan Presidency country to move ahead. This view was soon echoed by other stakeholders in the Nigerian project who felt that the country had suffered enough from having a sick President. Apart from the slowness of the administration, the country itself was beginning to look sick in the eyes of the international community. In September, the president had travelled to Saudi Arabia to attend the opening of a university of science and technology and visit the King (in Nigeria, university teachers were on strike at the time!). He also could not attend a UN Summit of world leaders in New York, United States. In November, a scheduled state visit to Brazil had to be cancelled. Yar’Adua was Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); that body had to postpone its 37th summit twice because its incumbent Chairman was ill. The effect on governance at home was worse as a pro-Yar’Adua group led by his wife Turai Yar’Adua, and others suddenly took over the reins of power and began to exercise power by proxy. This group, the cabal as it became known, was said to have insisted that the Yar’Adua Presidency needed to be protected in the interest of the North. They wanted the state of confusion in the country to persist because to allow Goodluck Jonathan to hold power as Acting President, would amount to robbing the North of its claim to power. There were clear indications however that the cabal was interested in its own agenda, and was not acting in anyone’s interest. Indeed, there were voices of reason from the North who insisted that the laws of the land should be respected; former Governor of Kaduna State and leader of the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) in fact called for the activation of Section 143 of the Constitution; that is impeachment proceedings against the absentee and invisible President. General Aliyu Gusau (veteran National Security Adviser) and other Northern leaders would also later step forward to help Jonathan maintain stability. Other Northerners who defended the rule of law included Mallam Yahaya Mahmud and Uba Sani. This was a season however, when the irresponsibility of a segment of the Nigerian political elite was well-advertised. Michael Aondoakaa, Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice at the time had argued shamelessly that the President of the country could exercise power from anywhere in the world, whereas there is no such thing in the country’s Constitution. Pundits drew attention to models from other parts of the world, but the Yar’Adua cabalists stood their ground. Rather than the law of the land being respected, what was soon became an issue was Goodluck Jonathan’s continued stay in office. There were allegations that he was being pressurized to resign his position as Vice President, to prevent the South South from benefiting from Yar’Adua’s ill-health. The game plan as revealed was for the Senate President, David Mark, to take over as Acting President and then organize elections within three months. This caused some tension in the polity. The Ijaw Monitoring Group, the Ijaw National Congress, and the Joint Revolutionary Council, a wing of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), also representing the Reformed Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, and The Martyrs Brigade issued a statement that if Jonathan was forced to resign instead of the Yar’Adua group respecting the Constitution, there would be anarchy in the land. The seed for the later division over the politics of zoning within the PDP had been sown; the country on account of one man’s illness was already tottering on the brink. The Nigerian Rally Movement (NRM), an NGO also rose in Jonathan’s defence. The Lawyers of Conscience also later issued an ultimatum asking Yar’Adua to resign. Apparently to douse the tension, Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, through his Special Adviser Media (Ima Niboro) described reports of his alleged plan to resign as “false and mischievous”. The general public was advised to discountenance such “drivel.” But it would soon be clear to all and sundry that Vice President Jonathan (as he then was) was having a running battle with those who did not want him in power. In February 2010, close to three months after the President’s absence, Jonathan’s Ima Niboro would again issue a statement in response to allegations that his boss, anxious to become Acting President had lobbied and bribed state Governors and Federal lawmakers with $2 billion and another N300 million. Niboro wrote about “a campaign of calumny” against Jonathan. The real calumny however lay in the resistance of Jonathan’s authority by Yar’Adua’s Ministers. In spite of the regime of uncertainty in

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 10 The Jonathan Presidency the country, Jonathan whose strength of character and loyalty were the high points of this troubled season tried as much as possible to hold the reins of power. On November 27, he told the country that he had spoken with his boss a day earlier and that he was hale and hearty. “He is okay”, he said. During Sallah, he played host to Muslim leaders. In a 2009 Christmas message he thanked Nigerians for their prayers for Yar’Adua’s recovery which he said was “having a good effect”, asking them not to relent. There were so many calls for prayers for the ailing President during this period: the Arewa Consultative Forum, Vincent Ogbulafor, then PDP Chairman, and all kinds of persons. Jonathan did his best to hold the government together, but he was grossly handicapped. The Ministers treated him casually. The Constitution requires the cabinet in the event of the President’s incapacitation to so declare and thus activate Section 144 of the Constitution. But the Ministers were reluctant to act in the national interest. In September 2009, former Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Baba Gana Kingibe was reportedly relieved of his position for conducting himself as a possible replacement for Yar’Adua. When the ailing President returned to the country, Kingibe was sacked. And so every Minister played safe. Jonathan presided over the Wednesday Federal Executive Council meetings, but the Ministers usually arrived late. The Vice President signed memos, and the approval of contracts. But he lacked real authority. In December after five FEC meetings, he tried to assert himself by stopping the Ministers from going on Xmas holiday. He also presided over the 49 th NEC meeting of the PDP, where he boasted that if elections were conducted 100 times the PDP would win, drawing the ire of the opposition. But the same Vice President could not sign the 2010 Appropriation Bill because he had no powers to do so, he also could not swear in the country’s new Chief Justice (CJN), Justice Aloysius Katsina- Alu. The country was saved an imminent embarrassment by the Oath Act of 2004, which allows a departing CJN to swear in his successor. The amnesty programme in the Niger Delta was stalled and the 2009 National Honours’ Award could not hold. On Christmas day, one Nigerian Umar Abdumuttallab tried to bomb a US-bound plane; it was Jonathan’s call to stand up for Nigeria. Exasperated by the drift, The Save Nigeria Group (SNG) led by Professor Wole Soyinka, Pastor Tunde Bakare, Femi Falana, Uba Sani, Ayo Obe, Ndubuisi Kanu, Yinka and Joe Odumakin staged rallies in Abuja and Lagos, protesting the lack of respect for the laws of the land. The Nigerian Liberty Forum wrote to the King of Saudi Arabia asking him to produce Yar’Adua. The Jubilee Group gave Yar’Adua a seven-day ultimatum!. But where was the Federal Executive Council and the National Assembly whose responsibility it was to act as guardians of the national interest?

To be continued on Sunday Published The Guardian, Dec.24, 2010 ______

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 11 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (4) By Reuben Abati

The framers of the Nigerian Constitution had contemplated such a situation in which Nigeria found itself with President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua’s illness and hence Sections 143-146 of the 1999 Constitution address issues of vacation, indisposition, incapacitation and impeachment with regard to that office. But in applying the law in Nigeria, the main issue has continuously been one of leadership responsibility, and the failure of those who should protect the common good. The handling of Yar’Adua’s illness was a classic case of impunity. With President Yar’Adua having failed to transmit a letter to the National Assembly to cover his absence as required in Section i45 of the Constitution, and with it becoming public knowledge that the President was terminally ill (NEXT newspaper would soon publish a scoop announcing that Yar’Adua was brain dead), there were several options. Section 144 empowers members of the executive council of the Federation, through a two-thirds majority to declare the President or Vice president “incapable of discharging the functions of his office.” A medical panel is then set up to verify the report and the National Assembly is required to take consequential action. which would be officially gazetted, and from the date of the publication of the gazette, the President will cease to hold office. But the Executive Council of the Federation, defined by the Constitution as the “body of Ministers of the Government of the Federation” refused to so act. There was so much inane talk among them about loyalty, although this in retrospect seems understandable. Offices of Ministers are as established by the President (Section 147 (1)) which means that Ministers are his appointees. In the tough terrain of culture and tradition that is part of the governance culture in Africa, it would have amounted to betrayal for such persons to bite the same fingers that invited them to “come and eat”. Given conflicting reports about the President’s ill-health, the Ministers also deemed it necessary to play safe. By the 39 th day of President Yar’Adua’s absence, the government had been effectively taken over by his wife, Turai and a small cabal of pro-Yar’Adua loyalists. There were organized trips to Saudi Arabia, with select Governors and Ministers (including Governors Isa Yuguda and Bukola Saraki) returning from Saudi Arabia and claiming to have seen the President. The Ministers were on the leash of the emergent cabal. Indeed, this was a learning period for Nigerians seeing how a First lady and a team of sycophants could hold 150 million Nigerians to ransom. The cabal proved to be deviously inventive. Section 148 of the Constitution says the Vice President can only act at the discretion of the president. Through the auspices of the cabal, two cases were instituted in court to stop Jonathan from pretending to act on behalf of his boss. In the first case in which ruling was obtained within two days, Justice Daniel Abutu of the Federal High Court, Abuja ruled that Jonathan was not in any position to act as President. Aondoakaa, then Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and a key Yar’Adua fire-fighter, told the National Assembly to respect the court ruling. In the meantime, there was public pressure on the Executive Council of the Federation to invoke Section 144. But Abutu’s ruling was explicit and declaratory. He said: “the only condition that could warrant his (Goodluck Jonathan) change of status from Vice President to Acting President is willful compliance by President Yar’Adua to activate the provisions of Section 145 of the 1999 Constitution via transmitting a written declaration to the National Assembly endorsing power shift.” The learned Judge added that “he could not and would not invoke the doctrine of necessity as being urged by the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA) to declare that the VP was entitled to perform the functions of the President in an acting capacity in view of the omission or failure by President Yar’Adua to transfer powers.” Still, the Executive Council of the Federation refused to act. On February 3, 2010, Professor Dora Akunyili later broke ranks and wrote a five-page memo to the Council asking that a resolution should be passed by its members to make Jonathan acting President. “If we fail to act now,” she said, “history will not forgive us.” Akunyili had upstaged her colleagues and it became unfashionable for anyone

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 12 The Jonathan Presidency of them to continue to hide behind a finger. This resulted in a face- off between Aondoakaa and Akunyili, with an exchange of abusive letters, and the latter demanding an apology from fire-spitting Aondoakaa who had impugned her integrity. There was in every respect, at this period, a wanton display of opportunism. But the Akunyili memo had the effect of emboldening a few of the Ministers who had also thought that the country needed to be saved. The EXCOF became divided with the emergence of a group known as G-10. More on this later. The National Assembly is empowered to exercise oversight functions. Specifically under Sections 143 -146, it is its remit to ensure that the Presidency is not violated. But the lawmakers dilly-dallied, and refused to initiate impeachment proceedings as advised. On December 15, 2009 or thereabouts, Senator Victor Ndoma Egba tabled a motion, as a matter of urgent national importance, asking the Senate to discuss the matter of President Yar’Adua’s ill-health. His request was shot down personally by the Senate President, David Mark, who dismissed the motion as premature and asked instead for the declaration of a nine-day prayer session for Yar’Adua. The House of Representatives also refused to inquire into the matter. The Nigerian civil society was however unrelenting in its insistence that the country is more important than any individual. In addition to aforementioned groups in civil society, the Concerned Nigerian Group led by former Senate President, Anyim Pius Anyim, and the Eminent Elders Group led by General Yakubu Gowon, sent a letter to the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Vice President asking that the National Assembly should pass a resolution to empower the Vice President to act as Acting President and to save the country from anarchy. The international community was also justifiably worried about the state of confusion in Nigeria, as recent revelations by WikiLeaks on Nigeria during the period would seem to confirm. The tension was so much that one newspaper reported that Vice President Goodluck Jonathan had stopped eating food prepared by cooks in the Presidency. It was alleged that there were either plans to eliminate him or stage a military coup. The January 15, 2010 Armed Forces Remembrance Day also created some challenges. It was initially not clear whether Dr Jonathan would lay the wreath at the parade since he had no powers to act as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He eventually attended the ceremony, persuaded by those who advised him to act Presidential, but he went to the event wearing a bullet proof vest, and the soldiers on parade were not allowed to carry live ammunition. Meanwhile, the National Assembly seemed to have had no option but to respond to pressure. The pro-Yar’Adua cabal and Turai Yar’Adua had become more desperate. Earlier, there were reports that the ailing President signed the 2010 Appropriation Bill which was taken to him on sick bed in Saudi Arabia around December 30, 2009, to give the impression that he was indeed recovering. Principal Secretary to the President, David Edevbie was said to have taken the Bill to Jeddah and back. On January 11, 2010, President Yar’Adua also made what was considered a public appearance when he spoke for three minutes by telephone on BBC telling Nigerians in Hausa and English: “At the moment I am undergoing treatment and I’m getting better from the treatment. I hope that very soon there will be tremendous progress which will allow me to get back home…. I wish at this stage to thank all Nigerians for their prayers for my good health and for their prayers for the nation.” He then wished the Super Eagles who were taking part in the African Cup of Nations in Angola success. His voice was weak. The interview conducted by Mansur Liman of BBC Hausa Service was relayed by local radio stations. But Nigerians were inconsolable. They demanded a television interview. They wondered why the President of Nigeria would prefer to speak to his own people through the BBC, from a foreign hospital! They insisted that the interview was contrived the same way the President’s signature was forged with regard to the signing of the N352 billion 2010 Appropriation Bill. On January 12, The Save Nigeria Group took to the streets in protest in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory. A week earlier, the Nigeria Bar Association and other lawyers including Bamidele Aturu and Femi Falana had also gone to court asking President Yar’Adua to resign. NBA President Oluwarotimi Akeredolu also asked Yar’Adua to act as a patriot and put the country first. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s active rumour mill turned hyper-active with all kinds of stories about the President’s condition and

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 13 The Jonathan Presidency how the treasury was being looted. On January 12, 2010, the National Assembly passed a resolution giving Yar’Adua a 14-day ultimatum to transmit a letter of medical leave to the Senate. The National Assembly also constituted a team to go to Saudi Arabia to ascertain the true state of the President’s health. The national leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) also sent a delegation. The Secretary of the Government of the Federation, Alhaji Mahmud Yayale Ahmed was summoned by the Senate. He was not of much help other than pointing out that the required letter had in fact been written by the President and that the National Assembly should summon the Special Adviser to the President on National Assembly Matters, Senator Mohammed Abba-Aji to explain why the letter was not delivered. For almost a week, the presidency played games with the issue of this letter. Abba-Aji promised to produce the letter, then the SGF changed his story, both men passed the buck. It was a sordid advertisement of the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian system. On January 21, a group of Senators formed the National Interest Group. Its members included Senators Smart Adeyemi, Abubakar Gada, and Bala Mohammed (as Chairman) who took it upon themselves to mobilize their colleagues in the National Assembly to act in the best interest of Nigeria. The National Assembly was polarized into two camps. But by January 27, the Senate began fresh discussions of President Yar’Adua’s ill-health. On February 9, the same National Assembly passed a resolution empowering Vice President Goodluck Jonathan to assume office as Acting President. The Assembly based its action on the BBC interview by President Yar’Adua, submitting that under the doctrine of necessity, the interview and its transcription could be taken as written application for leave by the President. This of course was not true and questions were raised about the legality of the National Assembly’s action by Professor Omo Omoruyi, the NBA, Anselm Eyo of the Citizens Forum for Constitutional Reform, Inuwa Bakari, Supo Shonibare, Balarabe Musa, Mike Ibanga and other concerned citizens. One Farouk Aliyu Adamu and Ataguba Aboje also went to court in protest. But the country had drifted for so long, that the people were willing to accept any solution to the logjam. Even the House of Representatives which had resisted the transfer of power to Jonathan separately endorsed the resolution. The Integrity Group, a body in the House, led by Farouk Lawan had insisted, like Alhaji Tanko Yakassai, a Northern leader, that the balance of power in the country will be affected if Jonathan was allowed to act as President. Nonetheless, the National Assembly on February 18, further passed a resolution amending Section 144 of the 1999 Constitution placing a time limit of two weeks for the President to be absent from office without transmitting a letter to the National Assembly. In such circumstance, the Vice President automatically assumes office in an acting capacity, thus robbing the President of any claim to discretionary powers in the matter. Yar’Adua and his loyalists had shown that a country could be held to ransom through the manipulation of gaps in the law. In passing the resolution, the National Assembly reportedly consulted many groups and stakeholders including the Bukola Saraki-led Governors’ Forum which had become more influential in the country than hitherto. Jonathan immediately accepted the verdict. He was the first Niger Deltan to be Nigeria’s Vice President and the first person from that part of the country also to act as President, more than 50 years after the Willinks Commission report on the right of minorities within the Nigerian Federation. Nigerians, particularly civil society heaved a sigh of relief even as the laws of the land had been compromised. To give its action the cover of legality, the National Assembly issued a letter addressed to the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, referenced NASS/C5/R/05/III/92 and dated February 10, 2010, which stated inter alia that Vice President Jonathan will henceforth act as president and cease to do so when the President transmits to the National Assembly “in writing that he had returned from his medical vacation”. Alex Izinyon, in an informed opinion, wrote that the resolution had the force of law. (The Guardian, Feb 16, 2010 at page 78. ) This was the formal commencement of the Goodluck Jonathan Presidency. In 78 days, so much had happened in Nigeria in terms of respect for the rule of law and the conduct of public officials. All through, Goodluck Jonathan conducted himself after the fashion of a gentleman. It is most unusual for a man in his position not to hanker after power, but he did not, and no one could accuse him directly of seeking to depose his boss. His humility and reticence worked in his favour as Yar’Adua’s

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 14 The Jonathan Presidency loyalists depleted his store of goodwill with the public; subsequently, Turai and her collaborators did more damage to the Yar’Adua persona. Niger Delta youths were understandably excited that their kinsman was now President, but the more interesting fact of the Jonathan Presidency was how a once reticent political figure suddenly became an assertive man of power. The story of Jonathan’s Presidency provides very strong lessons in the power of power itself and its multifaceted impact.

To be continued on Friday. Published The Guardian, Dec. 26, 2010

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 15 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (5) By Reuben Abati

The major challenge that Acting President Goodluck Jonathan faced on his assumption of office on February 9, 2010, was indeed how to assert himself and consolidate his hold on power. He showed quite a surprising dexterity in this direction, confirming the clichéd view that you never really know the true character of a man until you give him power. In his maiden address, he had observed: “The circumstances in which I find myself assuming office today as acting President of our country are uncommon, sober and reflective”. Indeed. It was the first time Nigeria would be saddled with a sick President who also chose to go AWOL (Absent Without Official Leave), thus creating a constitutional crisis. Jonathan added that “the events of the recent past have put to the test, our collective resolve as a democratic nation. I am delighted to note that our nation has demonstrated resilience and unity of purpose. Today affords us time to reconnect with ourselves and overcome any suspicion, hurts and doubts.” He promised that he would move the nation forward in a more determined manner, and that his administration would be committed to the goals of Vision 20-2020 - the plan to make Nigeria one of the 20 leading economies in the world by the year 2020. He also talked about creating employment for the youths, tackling corruption, Niger Delta insurgency, the crisis in the power sector, and much later, about electoral reform and its urgency. Goodluck Jonathan’s emergence as Acting President helped to dispel the air of uncertainty that had overtaken the country, and reassure the international community that Nigeria was back on track. The United States, Britain and the countries of the EU wasted no time in supporting the emergence of Jonathan as Acting President: the drift in Nigeria had caused so much anxiety about the stability of the West African sub-region and the implications for global security and human rights. But the more interesting part of this moment in Nigerian history was its exposure of the lower depths of the Nigerian character. The drama began with the first meeting that Jonathan chaired as Acting President. Two weeks earlier, he had in an attempt to assert himself locked out Ministers who came late to the meeting of the Executive Council of the Federation. But on the said day of his first meeting, most of the Ministers were seated by 8.30 am. The meeting was scheduled to begin at 10 am. At previous meetings during the 78 days of uncertainty, Dr Jonathan had reportedly sat in the Vice President’s chair, but on this occasion, he went straight to occupy the President’s seat, pointedly ignoring the Director of Protocol who tried to direct him to his usual seat as Vice President, and who had failed to usher him in as is appropriately required. He also personally ordered the Ministers to sing the National Anthem. He also ordered two Ministers to offer prayers. The same day, the Acting President redeployed three Ministers: Mr Michael Aondoakaa Attorney General and Justice Minister became Special Duties Minister, Prince Kayode Adetokunbo, Labour Minister became the new AGF/Justice Minister and Alhaji Ibrahim Kazaure, Minister Special Duties was moved to the Labour Ministry. It looked like a minor cabinet reshuffle but it was a strong power statement. It was actually a demotion of Aondoakaa who had been most vocal in justifying Yar’Adua’s prolonged absence and disregard for the laws of the land. Immediately after Aondoakaa’s redeployment, a truck load of policemen was sent to the Ministry of Justice to search his office! Many Nigerians wanted Aondoakaa sacked from the cabinet; there were also strident calls for a complete dissolution of the Yar’Adua cabinet. It turned out that in reshuffling the cabinet, Dr Jonathan did not even consult the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and Vincent Ogbulafor, Chairman of the PDP, who had also been supportive of the Yar’Adua cabal would so complain. He would later be consumed by the emerging power tussle. But clearly Jonathan had served notice that he truly intended to take charge of power.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 16 The Jonathan Presidency

Previously, he had presided over meetings of the Executive Council, merely approving memos and limited expenditures, receiving dignitaries, and having to manage the Abdumuttallab incident in December, but now he was in charge. On February 10, he received a special envoy from the Government of Kuwait who brought a special message from the Emir of Kuwait. Fresh vitality had returned to the Nigerian Presidency, and at the time, there were talks that Nigeria should begin to move beyond President Umaru Yar’Adua. In the meantime, Acting President Goodluck Jonathan still occupied his old office as Vice President, in deference to the clause in his appointment that he could only act as President until President Yar’Adua returned, and the latter had informed the National Assembly accordingly. There was however a lot of pressure from the public as many Nigerians tried to set an agenda for the Acting President. They wanted the Jonathan acting Presidency to tackle the issues of power supply, the renewed conflict in the Niger Delta, or better still, energize the Yar’Adua seven-point agenda, and focus especially on electoral reform. There was also a lot of praise-singing in the form of general commentaries on how Goodluck Jonathan was such a lucky man who without putting himself up for any election in his individual capacity, had found his way to the highest office in the land. Persons expressed the view that it is advisable to name one’s child, Goodluck, apparently forgetting that some other public officials named Lucky had been so unlucky in public office. In the face of the growing sycophancy over his name and emergence as Acting President, Dr Jonathan immediately announced that nobody should place congratulatory adverts in the media, or pay solidarity visits to Aso Villa, because “the country is at a critical juncture where we must begin to focus on the daunting challenges that confront us.” Still, this did not stop state governors, the leadership of the National Assembly and the leadership of the ruling People’s Democratic Party from visiting him. The Acting Presidne3t also personally invited to Aso Villa, a group of eminent personalities, mainly former Nigerian leaders, including General Yakubu Gowon, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Dr Alex Ekwueme and Chief Ernest Shonekan. This was also a again, a clever power consolidation move: the former leaders identifying with Jonathan were more or less endorsing him. The same Jonathan that everyone treated shabbily hitherto had suddenly become significantly relevant. But of this group, one person whose sudden claim to influence riled the Nigerian public was former President Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo had tried to benefit unfairly from the situation in the country by publicly disowning President Umaru Yar’Adua, more or less asking him to throw in the towel if he could no longer continue. The Nigerian public is often so forgetful, and needs to be constantly reminded of historical details (many Nigerian schools no longer teach history!), but this time around, the people did not disappoint. They did not forget that it was in fact Obasanjo who imposed a sick president on Nigeria. Soon after his assumption of office in 2007, Yar’Adua’s mother, his wife and sister had gone to Ota to thank Obasanjo for making him President: one of those funny signs of the underdevelopment of Nigeria’s democracy! Given the crisis that enveloped the nation, Obasanjo tried to explain that he was told Yar’Adua was fit enough medically to be president and that he had no reason o doubt the medical report. The truth is that Obasanjo was poorly treated by the Yar’Adua administration. As soon as Yar’Adua settled down in office, the first thing he did was to castrate the Obasanjo group or whatever remained of it in power. With time, Obasanjo kept a low profile. But with Jonathan now Acting President, Obasanjo suddenly became more visible, and began to show up again in the corridors of power rather frequently. There were protests that Jonathan should not turn his Acting Presidency into an extension of the Obasanjo Presidency. Obasanjo had also handpicked Jonathan as running mate to Yar’Adua in the 2007 Presidential election! The Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) in fact considered it necessary to issue a statement advising Obasanjo not to meddle in Jonathan’s affairs! In its words: “CNPP is worried that Chief Obasanjo, if allowed to meddle in the Jonathan presidency, might halt genuine electoral reform, the Niger Delta post-amnesty programme and revamping of infrastructure that collapsed under Obasanjo. Now that we are out of the woods, or so it seems, we reason that what Nigerians do not need at this time is (sic) the leprous

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 17 The Jonathan Presidency fingers of Chief Obasanjo to pollute the subsisting fragile peace of the graveyard. He should therefore be barred from Aguda Lodge so that our acting President can take his decisions independently.” But Jonathan’s big problem was not his association with Obasanjo. He tried to focus on the assignment. Two days after assuming office, he swore in 17 new permanent secretaries whom he advised, instructively to “eschew corruption.” The following week, the 37 th summit of ECOWAS which had been postponed twice due to Yar’Adua’s ill-health was finally held and Jonathan was elected ECOWAS Chairman. He made a strong speech deploring “undemocratic change of government in the West African sub-region” – given his own circumstances, this was not exactly an innocent statement as there were fears in Nigeria of a possible military take-over. He also arranged a meeting of the principal staff of the Presidency in an attempt to unify the team. Within a week, he met with the steering committee of the Federal Government National Integrated Power Projects (NIPPs). Jonathan was obviously under heavy pressure. Many Nigerians wanted the Executive Council under his watch to take a firm decision in line with the Constitution, on President Yar’Adua’s continued absence, by declaring him incapacitated, and for the National Assembly to commence impeachment proceedings. As public clamour in this regard intensified, the leadership of the ruling PDP decided to travel to Saudi Arabia to see the President. The Governor’s Forum also sent a team. In response to public outcry, the Federal cabinet also decided to send a six-man delegation to Saudi Arabia to thank the Saudi King for keeping the Nigerian President and looking after him at the expense of the people of Saudi Arabia (many Nigerians thought this was an assault on Nigeria’s sovereignty), and to use the opportunity to see the President. The delegation never got a chance to see the President. On February 24, the power game suddenly changed when President Umaru Yar’Adua was smuggled into the country, back from Saudi Arabia, under the cover of darkness. It was the boldest move so far by Mrs Turai Yar’Adua and other members of the Yar’Adua cabal, and their crudest act of desperation. Although there were reports that the Acting President was informed at the last minute of the President’s return, he was kept completely in the dark. Security men were deployed to the airport to receive the President without the Acting President’s knowledge or approval. Patrick Obahiagbon of the House of Representatives argued like others, that this was in breach of section 213(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The intention was to raise doubts about the legitimacy of Jonathan’s acting Presidency; what followed was a season of intrigue. Yar’Adua was taken away from the airport in an ambulance but no one saw him or could ascertain the state of his health. The following morning, the spokesman to the President, Olusegun Adeniyi issued a statement in which he said: “After being discharged by the team of medical experts overseeing his treatment in Saudi Arabia, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua returned to the Presidential villa…early this morning. While the President completes his recuperation, Vice President Jonathan will continue to oversee the affairs of state”. The reference to the Acting President as Vice President was noteworthy. President Yar’Adua returned to the country, two weeks after Jonathan was empowered to take over power, a day after the Acting President had sent a list of nominations to the National Assembly with regard to appointments of Chairman and members of the Code of Conduct Bureau. He had also just sent a draft bill of the 2010 budget for the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) for accelerated passage by the Senate. Yar’Adua’s return practically threw the country into another round of uncertainty. The extent of this became clear when the February 24Wednesday meeting of the Federal Cabinet could not hold. It was meeting time as usual, but the Council Chambers had been taken over by President Yar’Adua’s bodyguards. Jonathan’s body guards were chased away. The Ministers arrived but they waited for over hour, waiting for either Yar’Adua who had just arrived to chair the meeting or Jonathan, the Acting (Vice?) President. Around 11 am, Yar’Adua’s BGs (as they are called) were withdrawn, and there was a fresh announcement that Dr Jonathan would preside over the meeting. He did not. Instead, he sent the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) to announce that the meeting had been “postponed till further notice.” Yar’Adua’s return had halted Jonathan’s attempt to assert himself as Acting President, but it also marked the beginning of an intense power struggle between the

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 18 The Jonathan Presidency

Yar’Adua cabal and the pro-Jonathan, civil society backed group, again a demonstration of elite recklessness. What exactly were the issues at stake beyond power for its own sake? And how did the Jonathan group, as well as civil society respond to the obvious attempt by the Yar’Adua cabal to place narrow personal interests above the common good?

To be continued. Published, The Guardian, January 2, 2011

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 19 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (6) By Reuben Abati

The various forces that had resisted Dr Goodluck Jonathan’s emergence as Acting President showed their hands fully with the return of President Umaru Yar’Adua. This included to start with, the protest by the Northern political establishment, prompted obviously by the Yar’Adua cabal, that allowing a Jonathan Acting Presidency could result in Presidential power being taken away from the North whereas the North needed to complete its eight-year turn under, as it turned out, a controversial zoning/rotational principle. This marked the beginning of a long, drawn out debate over Jonathan’s eligibility for Presidential office. Ordinarily this should not have been an issue. President Yar’Adua had returned to the country and under the terms of the “doctrine of necessity” that brought Jonathan to power, Yar’Adua only needed to notify the National Assembly of his return and then continue in office. But no one saw Yar’Adua in public. No letter to the National Assembly came from his office either. Jonathan could only in any case, hold office till May 29, 2011, that is till the end of the Yar’Adua four-year tenure. But those within the political class who thought that after being allowed to spend more than a year in office as Acting President, Jonathan could be tempted to seek election as President in the 2011 general election immediately began a campaign to stop him, incumbency is after all, a dreadful factor in Nigerian politics. They argued that the status quo in terms of power sharing should not be altered: with the South West having spent eight years (1999- 2007) in the presidency; the North should also be allowed to complete eight years, in other words, Jonathan whatever happened, should not nurse the idea of ever becoming President in 2011. Every step that was taken by the cabal and the Northern power mongers was informed by this resolve. A propos, there were attempts to choose a Vice president for the Acting President, notably by the self-styled Yar’Adua “political family.” The story then was that the “cabalists” were in the process of recommending as Vice President someone from the sick President’s Political zone, and two prominent names were Isa Yuguda (Governor of Bauchi State) and Saidu Dakingari (Governor of Kebbi state), both President Yar’Adua’s sons in-law, which says something about the character of the Nigerian political elite and the personalisation of power. Other names included Adamu Aliero, the then Federal Capital Territory Minister. But it was not just the North and the Yar’Adua cabal laying claim to power and seeking to check the Acting President, the Governors’ Forum also insisted that whenever a Vice President was chosen he must come from the ranks of Governors. This personalization of power, or what Mathew Hassan Kukah calls “themyownisation of power” (Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria, Spectrum, 1999 ) is the bane of Nigeria’s development process, and it came to the fore most poignantly during the dark season of instability occasioned by Nigeria having a terminally ill president. For public figures trapped in this bind, nothing matters except personal ambition and so it was. While Jonathan faced resistance on the national stage, there was also some resistance to his ascendancy in the South South region, his main political constituency. By emerging as Acting President, Jonathan had become a major political player in the South South and therefore a big threat to the political ambitions of existing power-brokers in the region. Of what use is a President without a political base? This is a major consideration in Nigerian politics as Obasanjo learnt with bitterness in the run up to the 2003 elections, forcing him and his political strategists to construct a political base in the South West, which due to its artificiality has now almost completely collapsed. One major supporter of Jonathan in the South South was Chief Edwin Clark, the leader of the Niger Delta Leaders, Elders and Stakeholders Forum, but some of the Governors were said to be against him. Two of the five serving Governors in the Niger Delta reportedly funded the legal protests against Jonathan’s declaration as Acting President and also held meetings with the Yar’Adua political family. It was revealed then that a South South Governor gave 21 Senators $100, 000 each to encourage them

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 20 The Jonathan Presidency to scuttle the motion proposing Jonathan as Acting President. Clearly, there were political stakeholders in the South South who preferred to stay with the Yar’Adua political camp. One key referent was the issue of loyalty and the politicians hedged their bets carefully. By the end of February, the newspapers were already reporting that there was no love lost between Jonathan and Timipre Sylva, Governor of Bayelsa state. The rallying point for all the anti-Jonathan forces was the sudden return of President Umaru Yar’Adua. And there was a deliberate attempt to shut out the acting President. He was not allowed to see his boss. The First lady, Turai Yar’Adua also refused to see him or offer him any information about the President’s condition. Apparently to deceive the Acting President, a week before his boss was smuggled into the country, the President’s Chief Physician< Dr Salisu A. Banye, had written a letter to the Acting President, dated February 17, telling him: “This is to inform His Excellency that the President has been receiving treatment for his pericarditis with a remarkable improvement since our arrival on 23 rd November 2009. He has however been confirmed by a team of medical specialists to have developed episodes of chest infections that necessitated his isolation and intensive therapy. He is now recuperating and will be discharged from the hospital as soon as advised by the medical team. He has specifically instructed me to convey his gratitude and best wishes to you and the entire people of Nigeria.” This letter was written at about the same time that the Executive Council of the Federation was under pressure to invoke Section 144 of the Constitution and accordingly begin the process of declaring the President incapacitated and unfit to rule. Other medical experts immediately took on Dr Banye and argued that there was no way President Yar’Adua could be said to be recuperating. In some other climes, a thorough investigation of that entire drama would have been conducted and people like Dr Salisu Banye would have been summoned to give evidence and the Medical and Dental Council would have asked him pointed questions about how he seemingly mixed medical practice and politics, creating a funny alchemy that more or less raised public doubt about the medical profession. Where is Dr Banye these days, by the way? Is he still writing medical reports? The lie was soon exposed albeit the Yar’Adua cabal was more pre-occupied with sustaining it. For more than two months, this group led by Turai Yar’Adua and a few loyal Ministers (their number reduced as soon as Jonathan became Acting President!) took the Nigerian public on a roller coaster ride of deception. They organized a pro-Yar’Adua propaganda machinery meant to convince the public that the man was alive. Pro-Yar’Adua rallies were held in Abuja. Newspaper advertorials were published reminding the public of the great achievements of Yar’Adua. There were also reports of selective sightings of the President. On one occasion, there was a story in the papers that he was planning to attend Friday service at the Abuja Central Mosque. Nobody saw him, although the presidential convoy was driven around the city. Then, there was another story about Yar’Adua being sighted in the gardens of Aso Villa playing with his grandchildren! Some characters reportedly saw him and they confirmed this to be true, including a cousin who drank tea with him! And there were rumours that the President would soon show up in public. Many of the Governors and traditional rulers who helped the Yar’Adua cabal to sustain that charade are today also patronizing Dr Jonathan. But nothing demonstrates the hypocrisy of the Nigerian elite more than the ugly involvement of religious clerics in that Yar’Adua saga. In April 2010, after four months of a needless hide and seek between the Nigerian people and their sick President, Nigerians were told that Muslim and Christian clerics had visited and seen Yar’Adua in Aso Villa! The Muslim clerics, including Dr Ibrahim Datti Ahmad, and the Chief Imam of Abuja, Alhaji Ustaz Mohammed told Nigerians that they not only saw Yar’Adua, they also shook hands with him, and prayed with him. The four Christian clerics were the then Catholic Archbishop of Abuja and Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) President John Onaiyekan, founder of the Living Faith Church (Winners’ Chapel), Bishop David Oyedepo, former Aso Villa Chaplain, Professor Yesufu Obaje, and Throne Room Trust Ministry Pastor Emmanuel Kure. The Muslim clerics said they met a Yar’Adua that was recuperating. The Christian clerics declined comments. The public was outraged. Professor Itse Sagay, the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) and the Afenifere

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 21 The Jonathan Presidency

Renewal Group, among others, immediately protested that this was yet another illustration of the use of religion to achieve political ends. Again, this is one of the predictable features of Nigeria’s underdevelopment; religious leaders like traditional leaders are often invited by political figures to endorse nonsense and they are ever so willing. Nigerians were not only disappointed, they felt insulted, but ironically this has not stopped them from trooping to the same churches and mosques to listen to the same clerics who are yet to make a clean break with that ugly past by telling Nigerians exactly what they saw. In the midst of all of this, Acting President Goodluck Jonathan managed to hold on to the reins of government. The “allied forces” against him were not only playing politics, they were also engaged in psychological warfare; they were determined to break his spirit. Even the general public was skeptical: Jonathan’s image was that of a weak, self-effacing man who suddenly found himself at the centre of history by just being lucky. Everyone had a small piece of advice for him including roadside mechanics. But whatever the people thought about his inner strength, they were all resolved in one regard: that the laws of the country should be upheld and that the Yar’Adua cabal had taken the country for a ride for too long. It was around this period that Balarabe Musa, former Governor of old Kaduna state and a Northern progressive issued a statement insisting that Yar’Adua should be impeached, and that it was time the Yar’Adua shadow stopped hovering over Jonathan. Indeed, President Yar’Adua had become a shadow. Jonathan was unflappable. He still chaired the meetings of the Executive Council of the Federation, signed bills into law, and received dignitaries. In his inaugural speech as Acting President, he had referred to the “goodwill and understanding” of the international community. As Acting President, he enjoyed the support of this critical constituency, particularly the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU. In March, Jonathan set up a Presidential Advisory Council chaired by former Defence Minister, Lt Gen. T.Y. Danjuma. It had been his call to manage the violence in Jos in March 2010, with 400 people dead. He fired Yar’Adua’s National Security Adviser, Sarki Mukhtar and appointed General Aliyu Gusau to take charge. Smart move. Jonathan was playing a game of chess with his opponents, and with the likes of Obasanjo, Danjuma, and Aliyu Gusau behind him, in addition to the international community, and the Presidential Advisory Council, he was about to checkmate the enemy. But the high point in that game came when Acting President Goodluck Jonathan was invited to the United States by President Barack Obama in April 2010, to attend the Nuclear Disarmament Summit along with other world leaders. This was a turning point for the Jonathan Presidency.

To be continued. Published The Guardian, January 7, 2011

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 22 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (7) By Reuben Abati

The trip to the United States on April 10, 2010 was the first time President Goodluck Jonathan would travel outside the country since his assumption of office as Acting President in February 2010. He was scheduled to attend the Global Nuclear Disarmament Summit from 12-14 April, but for Jonathan, this turned out to be more than a four-day working visit. It was a demonstration of American support for his Presidency; a sub-text that would soon be clear in the course of the visit. Nonetheless, there was some opposition to the trip at home, coming notably from Mallam Ghali Na’Abba, former Speaker of the House of Representatives (1999-2003) who insisted that the visit was “ill-timed” given the mounting problems at home. In his words: “Honestly I believe the acting president shouldn’t have left this country at this critical time…He should take time to think of how to administer this country in a situation whereby a sick and substantive president is side by side with him, a situation whereby there is no vice president and a situation where there are so many weighty things waiting to be attended to within the country… “I thought going out to attend a meeting which I understand is on nuclear weapons, for our president is ill- timed and I must advise the acting president to sit down and face the most important domestic problems before him”. “We have an entrenched situation whereby certain people got hold of power through manipulation. When you look at various layers of power, particularly within the political parties, you will agree with me that we are facing a very dangerous situation as far as this democracy is concerned because you will find out that the majority of these people have never been elected anywhere and they are entrenched and they are moving people from position to position just by manipulating the party’s constitution”. As Na’Abba observed, there were indeed very serious problems at home. The Yar’Adua shadow was threatening the stability of the Acting Presidency with Yar’Adua’s loyalists claiming stridently that there was only one presidency and no such thing as a Jonathan Presidency. Civil society groups continued to insist that President Umaru Yar’Adua should appear in public and that it was unconscionable for the First Lady and a few persons to hold him hostage. Even the President’s mother and sister were said to have been turned back by the First Lady when they went to Aso Villa to see him. A few days earlier, the Acting President still in an attempt to hold on to power and assert himself had dissolved the cabinet and appointed new Ministers. A total of 38 Ministers were appointed, including 13 returnees, and new ones. Goldman Sachs executive Olusegun Aganga was appointed Minister of Finance, Diezani Allison-Madueke was made Petroleum Minister and the Acting President said he would personally take charge of the Power Ministry. The Acting President also changed the Group Managing Director of the NPPC, replacing Muhammed Barkindo with Shehu Ladan. He told the nation that his government “will hit the ground running”. He further boasted: “I have confidence in this team, which I believe reflects the federal government’s commitment to take bold steps in solving the nation’s problems.” He also appointed new Special Advisers. Further appointments to the cabinet will be made in August 2010. But with what Jonathan had done, there were already concerns about the character of the emergent cabinet in form of protests about the seeming Niger Delta-nisation of the Presidency. This is a familiar scenario in Nigerian politics. Every man of power who gets into high position surrounds himself with his own kinsmen. What seemed like the influx of Niger Delta figures into key governmental positions had been preceded by the take over of the presidency by Yar’Adua’s Katsina crowd, and before then by Obasanjo’s amala group . That Nigerian leaders feel more secure only when surrounded by their own kinsmen is one of the sad realities of Nigerian life and society, but their implied sense of security is of course mythical. At the time Jonathan prepared to leave for the United States, there were also troubles within the ruling Peoples Democratic Party. A desperate jostling for power post-Yar’Adua had begun. It was around this period for example that former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar returned to the PDP. There had also been a report in The Nigerian Tribune, titled

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 23 The Jonathan Presidency

“2011- Count me out- Acting President” but it was either this report was false or the sources were misquoted, for as Jonathan settled fully into office, he would openly declare his interest in the 2011 Presidency, and work desperately towards realizing that ambition, resulting in sharp divisions within the ruling party. In September 2010, Dr Jonathan would initially dither about attending a summit of the UN General Assembly due to urgent issues at home, but in April there was no way he could have accepted Na’Abba’s advice. The United States trip strengthened his hands. The Americans granted Jonathan the kind of audience and reception that Yar’Adua was not so privileged to enjoy. He met with President Barack Obama for about 15 minutes. The picture of Jonathan sitting close to the American President at that critical moment when so many forces were arraigned against him at home placed him at a great advantage. He also held meetings with the US Vice president, Joe Biden, the President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, the US Congressional Black Caucus and the Nigerian community in Diaspora. A week earlier, a Nigeria-US Bi-National Commission was launched by the US State Department, described by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as “a new vehicle for co- operation”. America’s foreign policy process is driven by specific strategic national interests. President Clinton had used the meeting with Acting President Jonathan to stress Nigeria’s “regional importance.” He advised Jonathan to use the remainder of the Yar’Adua presidency to make “a difference in governance”, follow through on “countering corruption”, and realise his public promise on “electoral reform.” There was also some talk about global security. Jonathan was accompanied on the trip by Governors Adams Oshiomhole of Edo State, Ikedi Ohakim of Imo, Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers, Godswill Akpabio of Akwa Ibom and Aliyu Shinkafi of Zamfara state. Other members of his delegation included Foreign Affairs Minister Odein Ajumogobia and Petroleum Minister Diezani Allison-Madueke. He met in Washington DC with Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, former Chairman of the EFCC who had been in exile and was having a running battle with the Yar’Adua administration. There were indications that Ribadu might play a major role in the Jonathan government as an adviser, a few weeks earlier the Jonathan Acting Presidency had withdrawn criminal charges against him over allegations that he failed to declare his assets while in office. Naturally, Dr Jonathan promised the Americans heaven and earth on nuclear security, electoral reform, the anti-corruption campaign and so on while asking for continued American support. Jonathan also appeared on CNN in an interview with Christiane Amanpour; he was also interviewed by the BBC in the course of which he disclosed that he was yet to see President Yar’Adua! He told Amanpour: “The most pressing issue for Nigeria now in terms of basic infrastructure is power.” He had a luncheon with the Corporate Council on Africa (CCA. He also addressed the Council on Foreign Relations where he intoned: “I promise Nigerians and the rest of the world that the 2011 elections in Nigeria will be credible”. He added: “This is our time. Either we continue with more of the same or our change begins.” He also promised to inject new blood into INEC by June 2010. On his return, the Presidency declared that the trip was successful and announced plans to establish a Diaspora Commission “to harmonise the contributions of Nigerians living abroad and ensure proper documentation of their input in the affairs of the nation as key stakeholders.” Jonathan’s trip to the United States was mutually beneficial to both countries. In 2009, President Yar’Adua had cancelled a proposed trip to the UN General Assembly including meetings with UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon and President Barack Obama. Due to Yar’Adua’s ill-health, Nigeria was beginning to lose its pride of place on the international stage. In December 2009, following the Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab incident, the United States listed Nigeria, “a country of interest.” The US had also been critical of Yar’Adua’s failure to hand over to his Deputy as required by law. Besides, 26 oil blocks belonging to US oil companies, Chevron and Shell had expired, and there was at that moment, a hot romance between the Nigerian Government and the Chinese who appeared interested in higher stakes in Nigeria’s extractive industry. The Americans obviously got Jonathan to make the right promises. At a personal level and given the situation at home, the trip was a major triumph for Jonathan and a setback for the Yar’Adua cabal at home. If he was battling a psychological crisis

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 24 The Jonathan Presidency arising from self-doubt, he returned from the United States more confident, and this probably accounted for his breathless junket around the world subsequently. Those who wanted to keep Jonathan “in his place” were unrelenting, the success of the US trip notwithstanding. Rumours about President Yar’Adua’s condition continued unabated as ghost- sighting became a national pastime. The progressive community continued to protest that Jonathan must not take orders from an invisible President. But Jonathan had cleverly positioned himself in power and he was beginning to enjoy it. After the US trip, he really began to enjoy the office (see Reuben Abati, “Hurry up, Jonathan”, The Guardian, May 15, 2010 and “President Jonathan: One Month Later, When?, Crossroads, The Guardian on Sunday , June 6, 2010). His confidence level was rising, and this much was evident when he addressed the audience at the “one man one vote” campaign launched by Governor Adams Oshiomhole, at the Ogbemudia Stadium, in Benin City, Edo state. In that speech, he defined the greatest challenge of our time as good governance and the threat posed by electoral fraud. The Jonathan Presidency was on such a roll that by the end of April, many Nigerians had concluded that even if President Yar’Adua got well, Jonathan should be allowed to continue in office. That prayer was answered when on May 5, it was announced that President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua had passed on. There was no dancing in the streets as was the case when Military dictator, General Sani Abacha died in June 1998, but Nigerians were relieved. Yar’Adua was the fifth Nigerian Head of State to die in office, (after Tafawa Balewa, J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, Murtala Muhammed, and Sani Abacha) and presumably the second to do so from natural causes. Yar’Adua was buried the same day around 5.50 pm at the Dan Marna Cemetery in Katsina. The occasion was almost marred by violent protest by angry Katsina youths at the gates of the Katsina Township Stadium. In attendance were state Governors (Ibrahim Shema, Katsina, Rotimi Amaechi, Rivers, Adams Oshiomhole, Edo, Theodore Orji, Abia, Liyel Imoke, Cross River, Sullivan Chime, Enugu, and Peter Obi, Anambra); prominent political leaders (Muhammadu Buhari, Atiku Abubakar, Bola Tinubu, Bisi Akande, Vincent Ogbulafor, Anyim Pius Anyim, Ibrahim Mantu, Achike Udenwa), senior military officers (led by Air Marshall Paul Dike, Chief of Defence Staff), the Prime Minister of Niger (Muhammadu Danda), a Federal Government Delegation (led by Speaker of the House of Representatives, Dimeji Bankole, including the SGF, Yayale Ahmed and Works and Housing Minister, Sanusi Daggash); the Emir of Katsina, Abdulmumini Usman. Nigerians may have been relieved that Yar’Adua died but they did not nurse any animosity against him, instead the people they held responsible for the crisis that Yar’Adua’s ill-health occasioned were his wife, Turai, and the members of the so-called Yar’Adua cabal. Yar’Adua in death was regarded more as a victim rather than a villain. Questions may have been raised about his sincerity (agreeing to be president when he knew that he was terminally ill, claiming that his health was “in the hands of God” whereas he studied and taught the sciences and should have known better) but the reaction to his death was largely sympathetic. The crisis of his ill-health had proven to be an eye-opener for Nigerians on the questions of human character, the politics of power and the limits of the extant constitutional order. Husband of two women (Turai and Hauwa) and father of nine children, Yar’Adua would be remembered for his spirited efforts in seeking an end to the violence in the Niger Delta, his honesty about electoral processes, and his determination to make a difference, stalled by bouts of ill-health. Goodluck Jonathan was conspicuously missing at the Yar’Adua burial. No concrete official explanation was given other than speculations about religious reasons and national security. Jonathan will later visit the Yar’Adua family after his full assumption of office as President and Commander in Chief as the Constitution stipulates under the circumstances. In the meantime, the Presidency issued a statement through Senior Special Assistant to the Acting President, Ima Niboro saying “Nigeria has lost the jewel on its crown, and even the heavens mourn with our nation tonight.” Well, so much clichéd talk about jewel and mourning Heavens! The Presidency declared a seven-day national mourning period. Jonathan was sworn in on May 6, at exactly 9.47 am, by the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Aloysius Katsina-Alu at the Presidential Villa, Abuja; the ceremony was presided over by the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Yayale Ahmed. This made Jonathan, Nigeria’s 13 th Head of State since

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 25 The Jonathan Presidency

1960; the second university graduate to occupy that office and the first Ijaw/Niger Deltan to do so. Two days later, Jonathan paid a condolence visit to the Yar’Aduas in Katsina. His Presidency had finally begun without shadows and ghosts. But how would he fare? And what did he bring to the table?

To be continued. Published The Guardian, January 9, 2011 ______-

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 26 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (8) By Reuben Abati

In his inaugural speech on May 6, 2010, President Goodluck Jonathan had formally outlined the major concerns of his administration, in addition to paying tribute to the departed President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua. He addressed Nigerians as “my dear brothers and sisters.” In a matter of months, the new President will also start addressing Nigerians as “my friends”. Commenting on the former President, he said: “President Yar’Adua’s contribution to political development and good governance would never be forgotten. He will therefore always occupy a pride of place in the political history of our dear Nation. He was a man of great personal integrity, deep devotion to God and outstanding humility. In all his public service, he displayed uncommon commitment to the peace, progress and unity of our country. He has left for us a profound legacy that provides a firm foundation for Nigeria’s future. His exit has therefore created a huge vacuum in his personal contributions to the political growth and development of our nation. I have lost not just a boss but a good friend and brother.” Well put. But the business of governance must continue and Jonathan had a job to do, so in the sixth paragraph of his speech he declared that “In this regard our total commitment to Good Governance, Electoral Reform and the fight against Corruption would be pursued with greater vigour. As I had stated time and again, we must enshrine the best standards in our democratic practice. One of the true tests would be to ensure that all votes count and are counted in the upcoming General Elections. Similarly the effort at ensuring the sustenance of peace and development in the Niger Delta as well as the security of life and property around the entire country would be of top most priority in the remaining period of this administration.” The seventh paragraph was further instructive: “I want to reassure all Nigerians that the pledges which we had made to improve the socio-economic situation which we face through improved access to electricity, water, education, health facilities and other social amenities would continue to be given the needed emphasis. The welfare of our teeming workers and the unemployed youths would also be accorded a new impetus.” He had more or less struck the same chords since his assumption of office as Acting President. There wasn’t therefore much that was new in the agenda that the new President set for himself; besides this was merely a continuation of the same programmes indicated in the Yar’Adua seven-point agenda. Jonathan’s emergence as full president and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces brought a definite end to the reign of uncertainty in the country and greater stability to governmental affairs. However, he faced a serious, multi-pronged dilemma: consolidating his hold on power, proving that he was bringing to the new assignment more than mere good luck, and securing a place for his Presidency in history through performance. Like Andrew Johnson, Harry Truman, Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson, all Americans, it was now his burden to complete the remainder of the term of a President that had died in office, but it was also an opportunity for him to prove his mettle in the art of public governance and either win plaudits or reproach. Given the peculiar nature of the Nigerian arrangement, Jonathan had more than this to worry about: he had to worry almost immediately about entrenched interests that did not want him to use the platform of the Presidency to seek a stay in office beyond May 29, 2011, the effective end-date of the Yar’Adua Presidency. Immediately after the seven-day mourning period, President Goodluck Jonathan resumed work at the Presidential Villa, Abuja. His first assignment in the President’s office was a meeting with a Gambian delegation led by that country’s Vice President, Mrs Isatou NJie-Saidy. He also inspected the facilities in the president’s office. Renovation work by Julius Berger (the ubiquitous Nigerian government contractor) had already started at the official residence of the President, and there were reports of the Yar’Aduas moving out. Some of the members of the Yar’Adua cabal had suddenly gone underground since the death of the former President. The Special Adviser to the late President on Media and Communication, Segun Adeniyi, offered to move on to enable him pursue a Fellowship programme at the Harvard University in the United States.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 27 The Jonathan Presidency

There were further indications that the appointments of Yar’Adua’s aides will be reviewed. Both the President and the Vice president usually have a retinue of aides performing similar functions, although they all work within the same Presidency; it was therefore natural for Jonathan’s aides to take the front seat as their boss moved up. Still, there were a few Yar’Adua aides who hanged around hoping to be retained and quite a number of them managed to stay on: a credit to the new President. As is to be expected, there was renewed intense lobbying for political appointments. The President had about 39 major appointments to make including Vice President (1), INEC Chairman (1), INEC Commissioners (10), Executive Vice Chairman, Nigeria Communications Commission (NCC) (1), Supreme Court Justices (2) and members of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) – (24). The President was further reminded in those early days that the position of the Comptroller-General of Immigration would be vacant in July. In April, shortly after his return from the United States, Acting President Jonathan, as he then was, had directed the then INEC Chairman, Professor Maurice Iwu to proceed on terminal leave in line with the expiration of his five- year tenure. Iwu and his assistants may have expected an extension of tenure for another term of five years, but while in the United States, Dr Jonathan had given a hint that he intended to reform the electoral system and that those in the electoral commission whose tenure may expire would definitely be relieved of their positions. He kept that promise. Iwu’s exit however brought much elation to various stakeholders who held the then INEC Chairman personally responsible for the failure of the 2007 General elections, and the temerity with which the offence was repeated in all the court-ordered rerun and by elections since 2007 and particularly the February 2010 Gubernatorial elections in Anambra state indicating that the commission under Iwu’s watch was incapable of improvement and efficiency. Iwu’s interpretation of his performance was remarkably different, and he was consistent in insisting that he was not the villain, rather the blame should be heaped on Nigeria’s political class and even the people. His protestations were ignored; he was accused of partisanship and insincerity, not a few asked for his prosecution! He would not be the first Nigerian electoral commission chairman to be so vilified although he was considered the worst of the villains. Thankless as the job of the INEC Chairman seemed to be, there was intense lobbying for it and speculations about the new Chairman. The Nigerian President wields enormous powers and is in a position to dispense almost limitless patronage. In a country where principles count for little and loyalties are ephemeral, Dr Jonathan soon found himself surrounded by professional fortune-hunters, seeking further cut from the proverbial national cake. Grovelling in the corridors of power is a major Nigerian pastime, and in due course, Dr Jonathan would prove to be adept in exploiting this weakness to serve his own purposes as everyone before him in that position had done. But he met a strong opposition in the Northern power bloc which was determined to restrict him to a period in office not later than May 29, 2011. Fending off this opposition would eventually become a major source of irritation and distraction for the remainder of his administration, and perhaps the explanation for the over-arching obsession with power politics and politicking during the period. The political interest of the North with regard to the presidency of Nigeria had been an issue during the crisis of former President Umaru Yar’Adua’s ill-health, but the need to stop the South South and Jonathan in particular from appropriating what the political North considered to be its right, became more intense after Jonathan’s return from the United States. The President himself may have unwittingly triggered the renewed offensive against him. In his CNN interview, Christiane Amanpour had asked him seven questions on his likely Presidential ambition, and as Jonathan evaded the questions, the interviewer kept pinning him down to it, until he made the following confession: “there are options for me if I want to contest election. I can re-contest as vice president to anybody. I can contest as a president, because the laws allow me. But that is not my own priority now. My priority now is to see how, within this little period left, what impact can we show.” Jonathan may have been a bit diplomatic but among his South South kith and kin, his emergence as President with full authority was seen as “the turn” of the minorities to lead Nigeria for the first time since independence in 1960.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 28 The Jonathan Presidency

The moment Jonathan became President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the largest militant group in the Niger Delta insisting on “resource control” granted the Federal Government “some weeks” of amnesty to allow President Jonathan to begin to address the second phase of the amnesty and rehabilitation of militants programme initiated by the Yar’Adua administration. Yar’Adua’s ill-health had stalled the amnesty process in the Niger Delta and not enough had been done previously to secure the support of the state Governors in the region. Since Jonathan is of that region’s extraction, it was widely thought that his administration would be able to bring some stability that would be of advantage to the extractive industry. This region of the country which produces the crude oil that is the mainstay of the country has never held Presidential power. The Ijaws in particular, being the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, and the most widely spread in the coastal region, consider it their right to also hold power at the centre. The people of the Niger Delta and Jonathan’a aides began to drop hints that Jonathan may contest the 2011 elections, since there are no laws technically forbidding him from doing so. One of Jonathan’s first outings as President, within the first week, was a visit to the Niger Delta where he promised “improved coordination” of the amnesty programme! In the course of that visit, a former Niger Delta militant, Victor Ebokawe, also known as Boyloaf, one of those characters that became prominent by piggybacking on the Niger Delta crisis, gave an interview to BBC Network Africa. “Nothing is going to stop him”, he said. “He cannot tell us that he will not run…The presidency of Nigeria is not the birthright of a particular region..Jonathan is a man who is ready to rule Nigeria as one Nigeria.” The Northern political establishment may have had its own ambitions for 2011 in relation to Yar’Adua’s death, but its members were further riled by the body language of the fedora-hat wearing, walking stick wielding Niger Delta militants who had taken over the Presidency of Nigeria - in the North’s reckoning, by default. To worsen matters, within days of Jonathan’s ascendancy, there were suggestions that his tenure in office should not end in May 2011, but May 2015, because after all the Yar’Adua-Jonathan ticket was due to expire after an eight-year period. This kind of talk is common in Nigeria where the voter is regarded as unimportant by politicians and political decisions are driven strictly by self-interest. Indeed a founding member of the PDP from Rivers state, Prince Emma Anyanwu in response to objections from the North to auto-suggestions of a Jonathan candidacy in the 2011 general elections ruffled more feathers when he issued a statement in Abuja saying, inter alia : “since the joint ticket is presumed to be for an eight-year tenure by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) which gave it to them and since Jonathan cannot come back to serve as Vice president after ascending to the position of President due to the death of Yar’Adua, it is just and lawful for him to complete the remaining five years of the joint ticket.” There were reports around the same period of plans to extend Jonathan’s tenure by six months or two years due to “inadequate time to complete the ongoing fundamental reforms in the polity.” Whatever that meant. Such suggestions proved to be problematic and divisive. What were the responses to these emergent currents particularly from the conservative Northern establishment? And how robust and impactful were those responses and their implications for Nigeria’s future?

To be continued Published, The Guardiazn, January 14, 2011

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 29 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (9) By Reuben Abati

The position of the so-called political North in relation to power politics is one of the recurrent sore points in Nigerian society and history. Nigerians of other ethnic extraction for many years, including the Yoruba and the Igbos are suspicious of what is regarded as Northern domination of the political space, resulting in protests about perceived marginalization of other groups within the polity. With extant historical fact indicating that the North was favoured by the British colonialists in the processes leading to independence in 1960, and in the original composition of the Nigerian military, with a state like Sokoto describing itself as a state of people who are “born to rule”, and with the Nigerian power structure dominated for more than 30 years by Northern political figures, every move by the North to gain political control at the centre simply sets off strong ethnic sentiments in other parts of the country. The 1966-70 civil war was among other things, a response by the Igbo nation to the excesses of the political North. Between 1993 and 1999, the opposition to the North’s continued stay in power was also part of the sub-text of the pro-democracy struggle by aggrieved Yoruba and other progressive forces in the country. The North lays claim to having a much larger population and geographical space than other parts of Nigeria. It controlled more than 50% of the seats in the House of Representatives in the First Republic and in every other Republic since then, has maintained a simple majority over other Nigerian ethnic nationalities in the Federal parliament. Up till 1999, the North had always won all Presidential elections and formed Government at the centre. Between 1966 and 1999, it also produced all the military Heads of State except two – Aguiyi-Ironsi (6 months, 15 days) and Obasanjo (3 years). Even the Obasanjo first era could be considered a period of northern rule as he completely subordinated that administration to the whims and caprices of the north. As at 1999, the north had produced nine Heads of State/Governments. Most official positions that are considered strategic had been held since 1960 mostly by Northerners. Strategic national institutions have also mostly been located in the Northern part of the country: the Defence Academy, Ajaokuta Steel Mill, Defence Industry, the Federal Capital Territory etc. Major national positions were also held by the North. The first time a Southerner held the position of Minister of Internal Affairs, after 1960, for example was in 1993, when Alex Ibru was appointed to that position. Before independence, J. M. Johnson held that position from 1957 -59 under the colonial authorities, but before Ibru in 1993, there had been 17 Ministers of Internal Affairs all from the North! Other positions dominated by Northerners included Minister of Defence, Minister of Mines of Power, Managing Director of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), Chief Passport Officer of the Federation, Head of Immigration, Chief of Staff (Army), Registrar, Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board, Executive Secretary, Nigeria Universities Commission. A few positions including the Head of the Nigerian Navy, Minister of Justice/Attorney General of the Federation and Chairman of the National Electoral Commission were reserved for Southerners. Major General David Ejoor, one of the three Southerners who occupied the position of Chief of Army Staff before 1994 once pointed out that “since the fall of Ironsi, the North has maintained absolute control of the Army.” In all of these, the minorities who had been agitating for recognition and equity since 1958 were completely underserved and marginalized, despite the fact that the Niger Delta which produces the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, that is crude oil, after the collapse of the agricultural sector, is a minority region. Perhaps Northern domination would not have been possible if the other groups, particularly the other two major ethnic groups: the Igbo and the Yoruba had not been equally guilty. Other Nigerians have had cause to complain about the arrogance and clannishness of the mainstream Yoruba elite. There were also complaints about how Igbos dominated the Nigerian Railway Corporation (out of 431 members of staff, 270 were Igbos), when an Igbo, Dr Ikejiani served as

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 30 The Jonathan Presidency

Chairman of the Corporation. With Raymond Njoku as Minister of Transport, the story was the same in the Nigerian Ports Authority as at 1963. These details and more are contained in a document titled “A New Deal for Western Nigeria” being a broadcast by Premier of the Western Region, Chief S L. Akintola on March 11, 1964, including a statement by Yoruba leaders of the NCNC. The three major ethnic groups (Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) have always related with each other therefore on the basis of mutual distrust, and this perhaps explains the disunity in the land, but another dimension of this political division can be traced to the vexed issue of class alienation. When the professional political elite of whatever ethnic colouration hanker after power, they do so ostensibly on behalf of the group/nationality, but mainly what is being protected is the interest of a few individuals or mafia or a cabal. Northern domination of political power in Nigeria up till 1999 curiously did not result in economic progress or educational success for the majority of Northerners, rather its by-product has been wider alienation and impoverishment in Northern Nigeria. Hence, when certain persons claim to be defending the interest of the North, the question to ask is: which North? Whose North? Nonetheless, by 1993, the annulment of the June 12 Presidential election won by a Yoruba, Chief MKO Abiola, by a Northern-dominated military establishment ignited protests across the country which united progressive elements among both minorities and majorities. The sustained objection was not only against military rule, but also Northern domination of the political space. Nigerians began to talk more boldly about the need for power rotation and the zoning of presidential power, in accordance with the principle of Federal Character in the Constitution, and to grant marginalized groups within the polity and other ethnic nationalities a sense of belonging. The emergence of two Yoruba candidates in the 1999 Presidential election was in acknowledgement of this demand. For eight years, with Obasanjo in the saddle, the North considered itself out of power, even if many Northerners played prominent roles in that administration. Power calculations in Nigeria tend to focus more on the ethnicity of the holder of Presidential authority. In fairness to Obasanjo, within eight years, his administration drew a new map of power and influence, although certain elements in the North felt that he owed his position to their support. With Yar’Adua’s emergence as President in 2007, the North found itself back in the saddle and its irredentists saw their region being in power till 2015. Yar’Adua’s ill-health and eventual death threatened that calculation, and hence the desperation to stop Jonathan from becoming President of Nigeria in 2011. A Jonathan Presidency in 2011 could lead to an eight-year tenure ending in 2019, which would then mean that the north would have been out of power at the presidential level, for a total of 171/2 years between 1999 and 2019. The South South seeing Jonathan’s emergence as a necessary demystification of the domination of political power by majority ethnic groups in Nigeria rose, almost in unison in his support. But in 2010, this did not stop both the Yar’Adua cabal and northern irredentists from adopting all kinds of strategies to stop Jonathan from even contemplating the idea of an Ijaw man, a minority, hoping to be president of Nigeria! First, both the Yar’Adua cabal and the political North, having failed to stop Jonathan from becoming President, insisted on choosing Jonathan’s Vice President for him. The idea was to appoint as Vice President, a man who would be a good candidate of the North in the 2011 Presidential election while Jonathan serves either as Vice President or waits till the Northern power brokers who had always decided who became Nigerian president made up their minds. Some of the names that were touted at the time included the following: Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Alhaji Yayale Ahmed; former Kaduna Governor Ahmed Makarfi; Sokoto Deputy Governor Mukhtar Shagari; Jigawa Governor Sule Lamido; Ambassador to South Africa Gen. Buba Marwa; Niger State Governor Aliyu Babangida, Bauchi state Governor, Isa Yuguda, Gombe State Governor, Danjuma Goje, and Katsina Governor, Ibrahim Shema. The Northern Senators Forum (NSF) later endorsed former Kaduna State Governor and Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance Ahmed Makarfi for the post. Other proposed candidates included Senators Ibrahim Idah (Kastina), and Umaru Argungu (Kebbi state), and the then National Security Adviser, Gen. Mohammed Aliyu Gusau. The Governors Forum which had increasingly emerged as a

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 31 The Jonathan Presidency key power broker insisted that the Vice President must come from among its ranks. There were also indications that the 19 Northern states had resolved that the Vice President must come from the North. The leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was soon compelled to issue a statement stating that the VP would come from the North but that the Northern PDP should allow the President to make his own choice. The second strategy adopted by the political North was to inflate sentiments about zoning and rotation of political power. There were arguments that it was the turn of the North to produce Nigeria’s President from 2007 to 2015. Members of the public and the opposition dismissed this as an internal arrangement within the PDP while PDP members could not make up their minds whether this was a ”gentleman’s agreement”, or a clause in the party’s Constitution. Indeed, article 7.2 of the party’s constitution deals with zoning and rotation of power, but then there is nothing in the 1999 Constitution forbidding any Nigerian from seeking elective office. It was interesting seeing the political North whose domination of political power had prompted debates on rotational Presidency for more than 30 years, now claiming to be a victim. The subject of zoning is of course an old one in Nigerian politics ( see Anthony A. Akinola, Rotational Presidency, Spectrum Books, 1996) but in 2010, those who argued in favour of the north included Alhaji Tanko Yakassai, Mallam Adamu Ciroma and Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Education, Farouk Lawan. The matter soon ended in court with an Abuja High Court ruling that zoning/rotation is provided for in the PDP Constitution. The court was however silent on the superiority of the Constitution, that is the grundnorm with regard to fundamental individual rights. The third step that was taken by the Northern political establishment was a meeting of the 19 Northern Governors in July 2010, where 10 of them voted for zoning, eight against it, and one abstention, although the Northern Governors Forum also further resolved that President Jonathan had the constitutional right to seek the party’s nomination in accordance with section 131 of the extant Constitution. Clearly, this was subtle blackmail, and another advertisement of desperation. A fourth step was later taken and this was in the form of a resolution under the auspices of the Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLF), managed by Mallam Adamu Ciroma at which other Presidential aspirants from the North: General Ibrahim Babangida, Bukola Saraki, and Aliyu Gusau decided to adopt their colleague, former Vice President, Abubakar Atiku as consensus candidate of the Northern PDP. The decision was purportedly taken by a committee of nine “wise men”. In his acceptance speech, Alhaji Abubakar Atiku said: “I commend the Consensus Committee for this endorsement and for their sacrifice, their patriotism, their commitment and their integrity. They have made an important contribution to the unity and stability of this country.” The truth is that the so-called consensus only further pitted the North against the South and highlighted the ethnic undercurrents of Nigerian politics. It reinforced the politics of Godfatherism and the pretension of minority groups seeking to dictate political choices to the rest of the community. (see Reuben Abati, “Atiku, consensus politics and the North”, The Guardian, November 26, 2010 ) In the face of all these, President Goodluck Jonathan remained unperturbed. His supporters and other concerned stakeholders including the media took on the zoning debate, with emphasis on the next Nigerian President being a person of merit and quality and not a champion of narrow, ethnic and class interests. President Jonathan appointed as his Vice President, not any of the names that the cabal sought to impose on him, but the then Kaduna State Governor, Namadi Sambo, a Northerner, an architect and businessman, a reticent, self-effacing, conveniently obscure personality, who would not pose any threat just in case Jonathan made up his mind to run for President – a clever choice Thus, Jonathan chose his own Northerner. On June 8, he appointed Attahiru Jega, Professor of Political Science and Vice Chancellor of Bayero University, Kano, Chairman of the Independent national Electoral Commission- the first Northerner to occupy that position. If anything went wrong with the 2011 general elections, for the first time, a Northerner would have to take the blame! The same day, Jonathan got the National Council of State, comprising former Presidents and Heads of State, to decorate him with the highest honour in the land, the Grand Commander of the Federal Republic (GCFR), a kind of endorsement even if most self-serving. ( see Reuben Abati, “How

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 32 The Jonathan Presidency

Jonathan Got His GCFR”, The Guardian, June 11, 2010). On June 28, President Goodluck Jonathan launched a Facebook page through which he enjoined “Nigerians to give me the privilege of relating with them without the trappings of office.” This made Jonathan Nigeria’s first digital President, but it was also a subtle campaign strategy . (see Goodluck Jonathan, My Friends and 1 : Conversations on policy and governance via facebook. Lagos: GDP Associates Ltd., 2010). By August, there were speculations that President Jonathan enjoyed the support of the United States seeking stability in the Niger Delta as a means of securing US strategic interests in the country. US Secretary of State and other key US officials visited Nigeria. In August, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Odein Ajumogobia was also a guest of the US Secretary of State. In September 2010, Dr Jonathan formally declared his interest in the 2011 presidential election, citing his achievements in office. How did that play out? And what are the achievements he talked about?

To be continued Published, The Guardian, January 16, 2011 ______

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 33 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (10) By Reuben Abati

On Saturday, September 18, 2010, President Goodluck Jonathan formally declared his interest in the 2011 Presidential race on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party. The event which was held at the Eagle Square, Abuja, was attended by a cross section of Nigerians including politicians, students, teachers, Niger Delta youths, market women, “Naija Artistes for Jonathan” - actors (Stephanie Okereke, Kanayo O. Kanayo, Francis Duru etc.), comedians (Ali Baba..), and musicians (Onyeka Onwenu, Weird MC, Sammy Okposo, D’Banj etc.); 52 out of the 62 registered political parties in the country were also represented, 30 of the 36 state Governors were in attendance. Obviously, the intention was to project Goodluck Jonathan as a popular President. His declaration was a bold move to remind the pro-zoning Northern establishment that the Presidency is good also for a minority citizen, and a loud comment on the character of Nigerian politicians as many of them spoke enthusiastically at the occasion. Former PDP Board of Trustees Chairman, Chief Anthony Anenih told the audience: “We did it in 2003 and 2007.” What did the PDP do in 2003 and 2007? Anenih is popularly known among his critics as “Mr-Fix-It” and so when he refers to what the PDP did in 2003 and 2007, the cynics would only think of how the PFDP fixed the elections. However, Anenih immediately clarified his statement: “I have never seen anything like this before. I encourage Nigerians who are sitting on the fence to join the train because it is moving.” The crowd was large indeed, and there were many Nigerians willing to join the “train,” particularly state Governors who became emergency musicians. The Rivers state Governor, Rotimi Amaechi sang in pidgin English: “no yawa for the matter”. Cross River Governor, Liyel Imoke said: “Na di Jonathan ticket go unite Nigeria. South South 100 per cent, Nigeria, 100 per cent.” Delta Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan told the people to “register and vote for Jonathan”. Theodore Orji, the Governor of Abia state sang: “Jonathan is a winner man”. Oyo state Governor, Adebayo Alao-Akala led a chorus: “If you know you are happy and you know, say JEGA” (JEGA- Jonathan Ebele Goodluck Azikiwe). One of the early strategies that the Jonathan camp adopted was to exhume the President’s Igbo names and advertise them as a way of broadening his appeal in the Southern part of the country. Names are not mere labels among Africans; they are very strong signifiers which attract specific emotions depending on the circumstances. Azikiwe is the name of the foremost Nigerian statesman and politician -Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe who at the height of his political career was an adopted role model even for unborn generations. But the more interesting development was the presence of Northern Governors: With the exception of Bukola Saraki, Modu Sheriff (ANPP-Borno) and Ibrahim Shekarau (ANPP-Kano), all the pro-zoning Northern Governors attended the Jonathan event. In July, the Northern Governors had voted 10 for zoning, eight against and one abstention. There had been fears however that even the Governors who agreed that Jonathan was free to run would prefer to work for the Northern interest. Their presence, with the Chief Servant, Chairman of the Northern Governors Forum, Babangida Aliyu addressing the rally was an early indication that Jonathan could well divide the votes in the North eventually. The Nassarawa Governor, Aliyu Akwe-Doma told the rally: “we are for good luck, not bad luck.” Murtala Nyako (Adamawa) said “Goodluck to all of us.” Danjuma Goje (Gombe) said “support Jonathan, support progress”. The Niger State Governor talked about his people’s willingness to “negotiate”. Benue Governor Gabriel Suswam said “the people of Benue state have mandated me to endorse Jonathan 100 per cent.” In July, Suswam and Doma had opposed the idea of zoning. Goje, Lamido, and Babangida Aliyu supported the zoning of the Presidency to the North at the time; by September, however, they were very conspicuous at Jonathan’s declaration. The North obviously was either divided or confused. But if the Governors seemed ambivalent, the Arewa Consultative Forum was inconsolable.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 34 The Jonathan Presidency

It condemned the Jonathan declaration and accused the President of using the EFCC to blackmail all state Governors to support him by force. Indeed, seven of the 10 Governors who insisted on the presidency being zoned to the North in July had been visited by the EFCC by September 2! ( see Reuben Abati, EFCC: The “Onslaught” Against Ten Governors, The Guardian, September 5, 2010) . Six youth groups from the North also threatened mayhem. Similarly, the “consensus candidate” of the PDP presidential candidates of the North, Alhaji Abubakar Atiku seemed determined to run a robust campaign ahead of the PDP Presidential primaries. The focus on winning the PDP presidential nomination would prove to be a major source of distraction for the Jonathan Presidency, not a few Nigerians were convinced that the 2011 elections became more of a priority to President Jonathan than the daily grind of governance. With the Atiku group, and the ACF trying to stop Jonathan, the campaign soon became abusive on both sides. In the primaries of the ruling PDP held in January 2011, there were three candidates: Jonathan, Atiku and Sarah Jibril, but the run up to that occasion witnessed a lot of mudslinging between the Jonathan and the Atiku forces. Atiku talked about experience, Jonathan talked about his achievements. The Atiku group claimed that the other camp had perfected a rigging manual, the Jonathan group warned Nigerians about the desperation of the other group. Even serving Ministers who ordinarily should focus on their assignments got into the fray as the Ministry of Finance felt obliged to tell Atiku that he knew nothing about the economy. The quality of debate in Nigerian politics often leaves much to be desired. The pre-2011 general elections campaigns were driven mainly by ego, opportunism and febrile ethnic sentiments. For the most part, President Jonathan and his team concentrated on his achievements, with promises of greater things to come. The first seven paragraphs of the Jonathan declaration speech focused, for example, on one, how the administration had taken on the challenges of “national security with patriotism and care.” The President was apparently referring to the Farouk Abudmutallab incident of December 2009, sectarian violence in Jos, the Boko Haram uprising in parts of the North, and the spate of kidnappings across the country. By October 2010, however, just how serious the country’s security challenge was would be further advertised when bombs exploded in Abuja on the occasion of the country’s golden jubilee anniversary celebrations. In December 2010, in the last week of the year, there were more bomb explosions around the country, underscoring how limited the antidote of “patriotism and care” could be in the face of such challenges. Two, the President said “all our refineries are working, saving us huge amounts of funds spent on importation of petroleum products.” In December 2010, public attention would be drawn to how for the first time in almost a decade, there was no fuel scarcity in the country during the yuletide season. Nonetheless, the country continued to spend heavily on petroleum importation. Three, he also talked about power sector reform and the involvement of the private sector in power generation and distribution, noting that “power generation has significantly improved.” The truth is that by December 2010, the country still generated less than 3, 000 MW of electricity, although in August, the Presidential Power Sector Reform Task Force had launched a power sector reform road map including plans to sell 16 PHCN subsidiaries to private sector investors. In January 2011, the Government would announce the test running of three power plants in Sapele, Alaoje and Olorunsogo. The President also referred to the Local Content Bill and the Petroleum Industry Bill as part of on-going reforms in the extractive industry. He added that “normalcy” had begun to return to the Niger Delta. The reality on this score is that kidnappings, bombings and violence in that region have continued unabated. He also cited achievements in form of “monumental projects”: road infrastructure, water projects (a road map for water supply will be launched in January 2011), investments in the educational system “to return quality and competitiveness to them.” (this is doubtful); and self-sufficiency in food production. He then declared: “I set the stage for free and fair elections by constituting an electoral commission comprising of Nigerians with impeccable credentials for firmness and incorruptibility. I charged our anti corruption agencies to speed up the war against corruption and respect no sacred cows in the process. In the management of the economy, I

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 35 The Jonathan Presidency advocated a more transparent banking industry, price stability, low inflation, and aggregate increase in productivity as a way to drive us to a more prosperous economy. In international relations, I advanced the respectability accorded our country by effective engagement in global fora.” Indeed the stage had been set for the 2011 elections with the appointment of a new electoral commission, but the new INEC was full of complaints and excuses about funding and timing, raising anxieties about its preparedness for the task ahead. The initial time-table for the elections had to be changed, and the Constitution had to be amended to accommodate the new schedule as Nigerians found themselves at the last minute without a credible voters’ register or strong electoral institutions. In the banking sector, a number of bank chiefs were indicted for corrupt practices and made to face the wrath of the law. Without doubt, the Jonathan Presidency had helped to re-establish Nigeria’s international presence. Dr Jonathan also brought fresh energy and vitality to the office after months of anxieties about Presidential illness. With the launch of his Facebook page, he also became Nigeria’s first true computer-age President. By December 2010, over 340, 000 persons had visited the Jonathan page, with an average of about 1, 000 – 2000 responses per day, and it was here again that the President talked about more achievements in office: the re-opening of three textile mills in Kaduna (ironically, the same government lifted the ban on importation of textiles in November 2010); four airlines now offering direct flights to the United States (except that only one is Nigerian). President Jonathan had also shown a readiness to allow a level playing political field, with his refusal to help impose the PDP will in all the court ordered re-run and by-elections, particularly in Edo, Osun, Ekiti and Delta states and the gubernatorial election in Anambra state. When the PDP lost the Governorship in Ekiti state, Governor Gbenga Daniel (PDP-Ogun) protested openly that this was “bad” for the Jonathan campaign. Ordinarily, an incumbent President in Nigeria would be expected to impose his party at all levels on the electorate using the machinery of the state. In his speech, Jonathan had highlighted his “dream for Nigeria”, the substance of which he described as “a new era of transformation of our country.” He concluded: “Goodluck has come to transform Nigeria and I will never let you down.” By January 2011, reactions to the Jonathan Presidency were mixed, a combination of the shortness of time, and over-arching obsession with politics, and the administration’s failure to “hit the ground running” as promised, presented the Jonathan Presidency at best, as a developing story with enormous potentials. The real test of Jonathan’s popularity was perhaps the PDP Presidential primaries held on January 13, 2011. What transpired? And what lessons if any, have Nigerians learnt as they prepare for their fourth general elections since the exit of the military in 1999?

To be concluded on Sunday Published, The Guardian, January 21, 2011 ______

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 36 The Jonathan Presidency

The Jonathan Presidency (11) By Reuben Abati

The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) held its convention and presidential party primaries on Thursday January 13 at the Eagle Square, Abuja. The three candidates at the primaries were incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, former Vice president Abubakar Atiku, and Mrs Sarah Jibril. In the run up to this, there had been much mudslinging and exchange of bile between the two leading candidates, Jonathan and Atiku, with both candidates investing heavily in media advertisement. In its campaigns on the eve of the primaries, the Jonathan group (One Nigeria Coalition) stole the Atiku line as follows: “Dr Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan’s Experience says it all! – university teacher, skilled technocrat, deputy governor, acting Governor, Vice president, Acting President, President, ECOWAS Chairman.” On television, the group ran a campaign wishing every Nigerian: Goodluck! In counter adverts, the Atikus asked: “Who is the better prepared?- Jonathan: Even his alleged bribes rejected, Never contested election; Inexperienced, uninspiring, Cannot honour agreements; Atiku- The comeback kid, Fought third term, Demystifies incumbencies, Experienced, reliable, sincere.” In other advertorials, it was alleged that Jonathan and co had perfected plans to rig the PDP Presidential primaries and the 2011 elections. The rhetoric of political campaigns in Nigeria is usually self-serving and acrimonious. Sarah Jibril, seeking the ticket for the third time, ran a low budget, self-effacing campaign and was the least combative candidate. The PDP presidential primaries was necessarily a contest of many forces seeking a showdown: North vs South South, Jonathan vs Atiku, Obasanjo vs Atiku, Northern Political Leaders Forum/Arewa Consultative Forum vs Ijaw National Congress. Fears had been expressed that the bombs that exploded on October 1 and December 31, in Abuja and in Jos (December 24) may have been linked to Jonathan’s rejection of the PDP zoning formula and the determination of his opponents to make the country ungovernable and thereby discredit him. Much earlier the Jonathan Presidency also accused his political opponents of seeking to commit “treason” with an unveiled threat that the administration would be ruthless in dealing with such persons. The PDP Presidential primaries in effect, turned out to be more or less a military exercise, with massive security arrangements. It is yet another sign of the underdevelopment of the Nigerian state and its democracy that every major election has to be held under heavy security presence in order to hold back the constant threat of anarchy. In 2007, the April general elections were no better than a military operation as soldiers took over the entire nation to ensure peace. For its Presidential primaries, the PDP took advantage of its control of power at the centre, and practically shut down the Federal Civil Service for two days! Five security checkpoints were located in areas leading to the Eagle Square manned by the Police, Vehicle Inspection Officers, the military, the Federal Road Safety Corps and the Civil Defence Corps; people were forced to trek for about two kilometers to get to the venue, and at each point, they were subjected to bomb scan, security scan and body search! Nigerian public officials and political leaders consider it a proof of their importance to arrive late at public functions, and to start every programme behind schedule without being required to offer any apologies. Thus characteristically, the PDP convention which was scheduled to start at 10 am, did not start until 5.34 pm. Sarah Jibril arrived at the venue at 11.58 am, Atiku at 4.15 pm, Vice President Namadi Sambo, at 5. 13 pm, and Goodluck Jonathan at 5. 30 pm! The primaries, aired live on television, by Africa Independent Television (AIT), and the public-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), appeared peaceful, and transparent, as the entire process was conducted in full public glare. It ended the following morning around 6 am, with the results read by Professor Tunde Adeniran, Chairman of the PDP Electoral Committee. Out of a total of 3,603 votes cast, 61 ballots were voided, Jonathan won 2, 736 votes, Atiku 805 and Sarah Jibril, one vote, making Jonathan the presidential flagbearer of the PDP in the 2011 general elections with Namadi Sambo, the Vice President as his running mate.

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 37 The Jonathan Presidency

This was the first election that President Jonathan would run and win as the principal candidate. His emergence as the Presidential candidate of the ruling party was a major moment for the country’s minorities who since the Willinks Commission (1958/59) had been agitating for equity within the Nigerian Federation. But more significantly, Jonathan’s victory exposed the failure of the so-called northern consensus on the zoning of the presidency to the North. Jonathan polled majority votes in all the country’s six Senatorial zones, as follows- North Central: Jonathan (380), Atiku (165), Jibril (1); North West: Jonathan (422), Atiku (365), Jibril (0), South West: Jonathan (482), Atiku (22), Jibril (0); North East: Jonathan (331), Atiku (154), Jibril (0), South East: Jonathan (423), Atiku (23), South South: Jonathan (625), Atiku (9), JIbril (0). He won convincingly across the country except in three states in the North West – Sokoto (932-84), Kano (21 – 98), Zamfara (7 – 70) and Niger (16 -84) which he lost to Atiku. He however beat Atiku in his home state of Adamawa and even in Yobe, the home state of Mallam Adamu Ciroma, one of the loudest pro-zoning campaigners, and by a wide margin in Katsina (147 – 11), President Yar’Adua’s state. His victory further advertised the power of incumbency and the increased influence of the 27 PDP Governors. Alhaji Atiku who had condemned the Jonathan administration in his campaign speech, rejected the results, his agents refused to sign the results sheet. There were threats of court action, but a few days later Atiku shut down his campaign office and announced that he would remain in the PDP. The most courageous of the candidates however was Sarah Jibril: she had no power of incumbency to exploit, and no money to distribute among delegates but she displayed character and determination. In her speech, she had appealed to women delegates to support one of their own, and all men to support Mama Sarah Jibril. But this gender pitch earned her just one vote. This was a sad comment on the place of women in public life in Nigeria, the status of women and the chauvinism of Nigeria’s democracy. Mama Sarah Jibril, seeking the Presidential ticket a third time, has however earned a place in history: whenever a woman emerges as Vice president or president of Nigeria in the future, she will be remembered for her pioneering efforts in that direction. In his acceptance speech, Dr Goodluck Jonathan remarked that there was “no victor no vanquished”, and began promptly to reach out to the Northern political establishment through a programme labeled CAR- “Consolidation, Appeasement and Reconciliation”. Nonetheless, there were protests against his candidacy in parts of the north – notably Kaduna and Bauchi. The Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLF) also met to plan their next course of action. Meanwhile, a group of northern leaders, the G-20, led by Chief Solomon Lar and South East Governors congratulated Jonathan and Sambo. The resilience of a section of the North insisting on its right to power would remain a sub-text of the Jonathan ascendancy, with implications for post-election politics, and an early indication that the President’s victory may well be pyrrhic. By January 20, most of the party primaries had been concluded, with candidates of the various political parties already known, although the INEC election time table allowed the primaries to be held on or before January 31, 2011. The key Presidential candidates that had emerged included Goodluck Jonathan (PDP), Muhammadu Buhari (CPC), Nuhu Ribadu (ACN), Pat Utomi (Social Democratic Mega Party) Dele Momodu (National Conscience Party), Ibrahim Shekarau (ANPP), John Dara (National Transformation Party), Peter Nwangwu (African Democratic Congress) and Ambrose Ewuru (Hope Democratic Party). On Saturday, January 15, 2010, INEC launched a two-week voters’ registration exercise; the excitement which Nigerians showed during the party primaries and with which they embraced the voters registration showed a deep passion for democracy and particular interest in the 2011 general elections. But as the processes leading to the elections began, was there any indication that the 2011 elections would be an improvement on previous elections, or confidence that it would be credible? The general feeling sadly, was that the elections were doomed to fail, and that Nigeria’s transition towards democratic rule was yet to yield desirable outcomes eleven years after. The pre-election phase was characterised by the usual crisis of institutional failure and the country’s poor state of preparedness. Across Africa, there has been a demonstration of the weakness of democratic structures and extant capacity deficits as has been seen in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi,

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 38 The Jonathan Presidency and Guinea. In Nigeria, the change of guards at the electoral commission only further exposed the weakness of the institution as the new Chairman and his team revealed that the system needed to be built afresh, beginning with the procurement of equipment, the training of staff, the preparation of a voters’ register. By July 2010, the INEC Chairman had complained about lack of funds and in September, about the need to change the election timetable. From this point onwards, the entire process had to be rushed, including Constitutional Amendments that had been left unattended to by the legislature, in order to meet the hand over deadline date of May 29, 2011. It was only on January 10, 2011 that the amended 1999 Constitution was signed into law by President Jonathan, prompting legal action by Olapade Agoro, presidential aspirant, National Action Council, who requested that the INEC time-table and the primaries should be declared null and void. The voters’ registration (Jan 15 -29) exercise, marred by irregularities, violence and outright failure in the first week, exposed just how unprepared both Nigeria and INEC were, further raising anxieties about the elections considering the importance of a voters’ register and the integrity of processes to electoral outcomes. A budget of $75 billion was earmarked for the voters’ registration exercise but by the end of the first week, the INEC Chairman was reportedly complaining about lack of funds, even if one of the three contractors had not supplied all the Direct Data Capturing Machines (laptop, fingerprint scanner, web camera, and battery) which malfunctioned in many places. In many states, angry youths who could not be registered attacked the youth corps members who had been recruited to serve as ad hoc officials. Three persons were shot in Ebonyi state, two persons were killed in Jos, scores were injured in Bayelsa, thugs went on rampage in Osun. The politicians had obviously not learnt their lessons. The party primaries across board were marred by violence, the absence of internal democracy in all the parties, with powerful Godfathers in many states imposing their wives, daughters, sons-in-law, and cronies without creating a level playing field for open competition. In Osun, Ekiti, Lagos, Anambra and Edo states, ACN members protested alleged imposition of candidates; in Ogun, Zamfara, Abia, and Delta states, aggrieved PDP members held parallel primaries thus deepening intra-party confusion and division, in Akwa Ibom, the Governorship primaries had to be canceled and a rerun ordered by the party headquarters. Dele Alake, ACN Senatorial aspirant in Ekiti, Central offered an apt description of the entire process when in withdrawing from the race he wrote: “I did not envisage that an intra-party primary would degenerate into malpractices, fraud, violence and brigandage… I have come to the painful conclusion that it will be an uphill task for decent people with a sense of propriety to be part of such process… I do not and will not be part of a scheme that will hoodwink the public because I want to serve them….” ( The Nation, Jan. 13, 2011. ) In an interesting development, the Chairman of the ACN, Chief Bisi Akande, retorted that “Nobody should accuse the ACN of imposition because that is our style. Anyone that is not comfortable with that should go and contest in another political party.” The security agencies were unable to check the spread of violence during the party primaries and after. The high level of desperation at the intra-party level could only suggest a further heightening of tension during inter-party competition and hence an urgent justification for more pro- active security responses. The monetisation of politics also remained a problem. There were allegations of votes buying, and in the absence of a machinery for tracking campaign finance, the stage was well set for the corrupt manipulation of electoral outcomes. As at January 2011, there was no real emphasis on ideas and programmes, other than the ambition of political office seekers. With the conclusion of the primaries, many politicians defected overnight to rival parties which could offer them the party tickets for the 2011 polls. The mismanagement of the pre-election phase had obviously sown the seeds for future litigations and sundry crises with regard to the abuse of human rights and the rule of law, the ineffectiveness of government services, legitimacy of outcomes, and the failure of law enforcement agencies. The role of the media was also suspect; for example Alhaji Rashidi Ladoja, the Gubernatorial candidate of the Accord Party in Oyo State, protested that his campaign material was rejected by the Broadcasting Corporation of Oyo State (BCOS). Also, the Jonathan campaign team used the NTA owned by the

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 39 The Jonathan Presidency public, to promote the President’s candidacy while media organs owned by politicians toed the party line shamelessly. The first phase of Nigeria’s 2011 general elections was at best a selection process, the preparations were shoddy, the dominant PDP had no strong opposition to challenge it; there was a lot of excitement among the people but no optimism for the kind of real change sought by an increasingly vibrant civil society. Will Jonathan keep his promise to ensure free and fair polls and make the people’s votes count?

Concluded Published, The Guardian, January 23, 2011 ______

Dr. Reuben Abati, Lagos, Nigeria 40