NIGERIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS 1960-2015
AJAO ISRAEL BABATUNDE (MATRIC NO.: RUN/HIR/15/6203)
2017
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NIGERIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS 1960-2015
A dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of
Master of Arts in History and International Studies
of
Redeemer’s University, Ede
AJAO Israel Babatunde
(Matric No.: RUN/HIR/15/6203)
2017
Department of History and International Studies
College of Humanities
REDEEMER’S UNIVERSITY
DECLARATION FORM FOR THE REPRODUCTION OF RESEARCH WORK
NAME IN FULL – AJAO ISRAEL BABATUNDE
TITLE OF DISSERTATION – NIGERIA-ISRAEL RELATIONS 1960-2015
DEGREE FOR WHICH RESEARCH WORK IS PRESENTED - Master of Arts in History and International Studies
DATE OF AWARD –
DECLARATION
1. I recognise that my dissertation will be made available for public reference and inter-library loan. 2. I authorise the Redeemer’s University to reproduce copies of my dissertation for the purposes of public reference, preservation and inter-library loan. 3. I understand that before any person is permitted to read, borrow or copy any part of my work, that person will be required to sign the following declaration: “I recognise that the copyright in the above mentioned dissertation rests with the author. I understand that copying the work may constitute an infringement of the author’s rights unless done with the written consent of the author or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act which expressly permits copying without the author’s consent. I further understand that no information derived from this work may be published without acknowledgement” 4. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the right of any third party. 5. I understand that in the event of my dissertation being rejected by the Examiners, this declaration would become void.
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DATE ______SIGNATURE OF CANDIDATE ______
Nigeria-Israel Relations 1960-2015
Ajao Israel Babatunde
ABSTRACT
The research details the relations between Nigeria and Israel from 1960 to 2015 from an historical context. Bilateral relations is an indispensable and strategic collaboration between two states. To achieve this objective, the study adopts the Wendt’s constructivism theory and also the historical method which are descriptive and analytical. The primary sources for the study are interviews, while secondary sources are based on bibliographic searches from government publications, books, journal articles and seminar papers to analyze the relationship between Nigeria and Israel in the period covered. Overall, this study will provide useful information for policy-makers and scholars like: diplomatic historians, political scientists, economists and international relations experts, as well as, the dissertation of students researching on Nigeria- Israel relations. The study has shown that the factors that marred Nigeria and Israel relationship in its first three decades are fading away. This created a bilateral environment where strategic engagements can be reached. The study also revealed that the two main economic agreements between the two countries are geared towards boosting their trade and commercial relations. Although, Nigeria recorded trade deficits, the technical assistance from Israel helps to improve the quality of Nigeria’s labour force. The study concludes that given the potentials of Israel’s technical advancement and economic activities, the bilateral relations holds positive prospects for diversifying and integrating the Nigerian economy especially in the area of small scale enterprises. Keywords: Bilateral diplomacy, diplomatic history, foreign policy, strategic engagement
Word Count: 228 words
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My sincere appreciation goes to my caring mentor and supervisor, Dr. Olumide Ekanade whose stream of knowledge I have drank from in the course of this academic journey and for his painstaking effort in making this thesis a success. I pray that God, the source of knowledge and infinite wisdom equip you with knowledge and wisdom needed to reach the peak of your academic career. To the Head of Department, Dr. Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi, I say a big thank to you ma for your care and support and I pray that God bless you. Also, I sincerely appreciate Dr.
Benjamin Anaemene for his thoughtful insight and advice which positively impacted this thesis.
I pray for God’s favour for you and your family. My esteem appreciation goes to Emeritus
Professor Akinjide Osuntokun for his wealth of experience and mentorship during the course of this academic journey. Thank you very much Prof. and may God continue to bless you and your family.
I sincerely appreciate all the lecturers and members of staff of the Department of History &
International Studies for you guidance, support and words of encouragement. Your impact will never be forgotten! You are all wonderful. It is my prayer that God continue to bless you and your families.
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I must also appreciate all my colleagues in the College of Postgraduate Studies and my friends whose criticisms, advice and encouragement positively impacted on this work. God bless you all.
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to God Almighty, the Source of wisdom and knowledge, and also to my dear parents, Engr. Olusola Ajao and Mrs. Nihinlola Ajao.
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CERTIFICATION
REDEEMER’S UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
NAME OF CANDIDATE: AJAO Israel Babatunde MATRIC NO.: RUN/HIR/15/6203
COLLEGE: Humanities DEPARTMENT: History and International Studies
TITLE OF DISSERTATION : Nigeria-Israel Relations 1960-2015
I certify that
1. The approved dissertation layout and other guidelines have been followed.
2. The information on the title page is consistent with the standard format approved by the
University.
3. An abstract has been included in the dissertation and is satisfactory. vii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
4. All references follow an accepted style which is used consistently.
5. The declaration form permitting the reproduction of the dissertation has been signed by
the candidate and provided for binding.
6. I certify that the above dissertation is acceptable/not acceptable in its present form.
______
Name & Date Signature
CAMPUS EDITOR
APPROVAL
I hereby confirm that this dissertation titled:
Nigeria-Israel Relations 1960-2015 was carried out and written by:
Name of Student: AJAO Israel Babatunde
Matriculation Number: RUN/HIR/15/6203 under my supervision.
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Main Advisor: Dr. Olumide Ekanade Signature & Date
Approved by:
Department of Student:
Name of HOD: Dr. Oluwatoyin Oluwaniyi Signature & Date
External Examiner: Prof. Ibikunle H. Tijani Signature & Date
Dean, CPGS: Prof G.A. Kolawole Signature & Date
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Trade between Nigeria and Israel 1990-2007
Table 2: Prominent Israeli firms operating in Nigeria
Table 3: Israeli-sponsored training programmes and technical assistance for Nigeria 1990-2007
Table 4: Transfers of major weapons by Israel to Nigeria 2006-2010
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover page i Title page ii Declaration iii Abstract iv Acknowledgement v Dedication vi
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Certification vii Approval viii List of Tables ix
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Background to the Study 1 Statement of Problem 6 Research Questions 7 Aims and Objectives 7 Significance of the Study 8 Scope of the Study 8 Research Methodology 9 Literature Review 10 Theoretical Framework 21
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF NIGERIA AND ISRAEL FOREIGN POLICY Introduction 23 Historical Development of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 23 Objectives and Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy 24 Objectives and Principles of Israel’s Foreign Policy 53
CHAPTER THREE: NIGERIA-ISRAEL POLITICAL RELATIONS Nigeria-Israel Relations: The International Circle 59 Nigeria-Israel Relations: The Arab World Circle 64 Nigeria-Israel Relations: The African Circle 65 xi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigeria-Israel Relations: The Bilateral Circle 67 The Politics Of Restoration Of Diplomatic Relations With Israel 72 Critique of Severance of Relationship with Israel and Middle East Crisis 82
Military Aid 83
CHAPTER FOUR: NIGERIA-ISRAEL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Trade 86
Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Economic Activities 91
Evaluating the Impacts of the Bilateral Relations on Trade, Aid and Investment 93
Agriculture 104
CHAPTER FIVE: NIGERIA-ISRAEL SOCIO-CULTURAL RELATIONS
Introduction 114
Religion and Tourism 114
Cultural Affiliations 118
Summary/Conclusion 120
Bibliography 123
Appendix 130
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Background to the Study
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Nigeria had kept ties with Israel since the late 1950s when important contacts were established between the two countries through their officials’ joint participation in labour and socialist movement meetings. 1 Because of this interaction, several Nigerians were encouraged by
the Israelis to visit their country. 2 This was at a time when Israel was actively cultivating
friendship with newly emergent African countries to stem the tide of her diplomatic exclusion
from the Third World. 3
Israel’s efforts were made possible by the constitutional provisions of Nigeria which had two aspects which were of relevance to foreign affairs, via the allocation of authority over external affairs to the Federal Government, and the initiation of Federal-regional competition in external matters. The Central government was granted exclusive list of powers over foreign affairs, defence and foreign trade. Similarly, the Regional government was also granted concurrent powers over higher education, promotion of tourist traffic and industrial development which provided them with a side-door into matters of foreign relations. These regions were permitted to establish independent offices in London and to develop contacts with foreign governments in pursuit of social and industrial developments of their regions. 4
In this regard, regional delegations were often sent abroad to negotiate loans and other
forms of assistance for their regions. It was on one of such trips that a Western Regional
delegation led by its Minister of Agriculture, Chief Akin Deko went to Israel in 1958 to observe
1 Olusola Ojo, Nigeria and Israel: Policy Changes and Choices, a paper delivered at National Conference on 25 years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, NIIA, 2-4, (1985), p. 1. 2 Ibid., p. 2. 3 Curtis Richard and Chileton Susan A., Israel Policy in Africa. New Jersey: Brunswick University Press, (1976), pp. 41-42 4 J.D Gray, The Foreign Policy Process in the Emerging African Nation: Nigeria (Thesis, Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, Pa, 1965) xiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
cooperative movements. 5 In addition, the negotiation resulted into creating the Nigersol
Construction Company and Nigerian Water Resources Development Corporation which were set
up in 1959 affecting the agricultural and cooperatives sectors. In respect to the negotiation, the
southern regions had established friendly relations with Israel in 1960. Their leaders were
fascinated with a number of Israeli institutions such as the MASHAV (Cooperative Agriculture
Settlement). This resulted in the introduction of agricultural settlements and training schemes in
the East and Western regions, which were designed in accordance with the Moshav-type
settlement patterns. 6
However, the Northern Nigerian political leadership did not take a similar action. Their party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) wanted close contacts with Muslim countries. In fact, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the NPC, and Premier of the Northern region exhibited implacable hostility towards Israel. The reason for this is not far-fetched from the fact that a number of northern political elites often saw themselves and their region as part of the Muslim
World, which to an extent will share close affinity with the Arab world. In fact, Ahmadu Bello in his autobiography traced his own lineage to Prophet Mohammed. In view of this, the northern leadership was generally very exposed and receptive to Arab pressure. There were even allegations of Egypt’s covert support for the establishment of NPC before 1960. 7
Northern People’s Congress then, was a senior partner to the immediate post- independence coalition government headed by Sir Ahmadu Bello’s deputy- Alhaji Tafawa
5 Olusola Ojo, op cit., p. 3. 6 Moshe Decther, To serve, To teach and To Leaner , New York: Jewish Congress, 1977, p. 89. 7 Sir Ahmadu Bello, My Life , London: Cambridge University Press (1962), p. 239. xiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Balewa, who forestall the necessity to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel. In this regard, the Federal Government was left with little option than to establish formal diplomatic ties with
Israel. Firstly, the fragility of the structure of the Nigerian federation as a result of ethnic, religious and regional fragmentation makes it politically prudent and expedient for the government to do so. Secondly, National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the subordinate to the federal coalition government through its home-base in the East had already established links with Israel and favoured a non-aligned policy for the country. This adoption of the non- aligned policy implied Nigeria’s absolute neutrality in the conflict between the Arabs and the
Israelis. 8 Tafawa Balewa used this principle to reiterate the idea that Nigeria would ‘remain on friendly terms with every nation which recognizes and respects our sovereignty and we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone.’ 9
Thirdly, the Nigerian government accorded priority to the social and economic
development of the country. It welcomed assistance from any country that was ready to partner
with her for the fulfillment of her objective. In spite of this commendable objective, it was
almost eroded by the administration’s total dependence on external sources for developmental
finance for the 1962-1968 National Development Plan. Although, the then political leaders
attested that the country’s foreign policy is guided by non-alignment, yet, bulk of the country’s
political, economic and cultural relations were still tied to her relationship with the West. Any
unnecessary antagonism with Israel would probably have denied Nigeria several goodwill in the
West. Thus, at independence, despite the pro-Arab orientation of the NPC, the overriding
8 Personal interview with Olusola Ojo. Ibadan, 17 th June, 2017 9 See, Nigeria and Israel, West Africa Magazine, London, August 18, 1956, p. 606. xv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
necessity for national unity and economic development dictated Nigeria’s ‘open-door’ diplomatic policy. However, much was not achieved in the foreign relations during this period because, Nigeria was still not in control of her relations, in other words, Nigeria was sovereign void.
Nigeria established formal relations with Israel in 1960 by opening a mission in Lagos.
This fruitful cooperation between Nigeria and Israel gave her full access beyond the southern regional governments. Israeli companies enjoyed the patronage of the Federal Government more between 1960 and 1963; which was an addition to the loan of 5.2milion pounds received by
Nigeria from the Israeli Government. Although, the loans were used only by the Federal
Government and the three southern regions (third region, the Mid West region was later carved out of the old Western region in 1963). 10 At the United Nations, Nigeria maintained strict
neutrality and rarely contributed to any of the debates on the Middle East crises at the General
Assembly. On few occasions that Nigeria intervened, it was only to urge the two hostile nations
to accommodate each other. 11 However, the hostility of the Northern political elites was a major constraint on the Federal Government’s policy towards Israel. To maintain a balance, the government refused to have an embassy in Tel-Aviv. 12 Furthermore, during the first republic
from 1960-1966, Nigeria’s relationship with Israel began to degenerate as a result of the Arab-
Israeli conflict which was injected into the Nigerian domestic scene. Then, Nigerian Geo-
10 Ade Adefuye, Nigeria and Israel, International Studies Vol. 18, No. 4, October/December 1979, p.635 and Olajide Aluko, Israel and Nigeria: Continuity and Change in their Relationship. African Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1974 P. 47 11 Akinyemi A.B., Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience . Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press, 1974 p.104 12 Olusola Ojo, Nigeria and Israel: Policy Changes and Choices, a paper delivered at National Conference on 25 years of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, NIIA, 2-4, (1985), p. 6. xvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
political leaders had dissimilar religious liberties in each of their respective regions, informed by the Arab-Israeli power play. At the climax of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the late President Anwar
Sadat of Egypt had to embark on bold peace initiatives in the Middle East during the late 1970s to subside the recurring conflicts. 13
The military coup d’ etat of January 1966 and the subsequent civil war that engulfed the
country for about 30 months, between 1967and 1970 also had profound impact on Nigeria-Israel
relations. At first, everything suggested closer Nigerian-Israel ties because of the coup, the most
implacable anti-Israeli leader, Sir Ahmadu Bello had been killed in the coup, while the Federal
Government headed and dominated by the NPC had been overthrown. In its place, a military
junta headed by General Aguiyi Ironsi was believed to have established friendly ties with many
Israelis during his days as a commander of the Nigerian troops in Congo (Zaire). 14
However, before Aguiyi Ironsi could settle to tackle domestic issues, including foreign policy issues like the question of having a mission in Israel, his regime was upturned in a counter coup by General Yakubu Gowon. Nonetheless, the Ironsi administration took bold steps with far-reaching impact on the conduct of foreign policy. The ‘independence’ of each regions allowed Nigerians to sound many contradictory tunes on foreign policy which were eventually abolished. Their various regional ‘mini-embassies’ abroad were closed, and only the Federal
Government authorized agents could make any foreign policy initiative or even speak on foreign
13 Ibid. p. 2 14 Adeyemi Adefuye, Nigeria and Israel, Journal of International Studies Volume 18, No. 4, Ile-Ife Obafemi, Awolowo University Press, p. 47. xvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
policy. 15 The country rapidly moved to the brink of civil war after July 1966 coup and all
attempts to prevent the outbreak of the war failed with the secession of the Eastern Region as
Biafra in May 1967. However, the country was split into twelve states on the eve of the
declaration of Biafra with six in the North and six in the South. 16
Statement of Problem
The study is problematized within the historical context of Nigeria and Israel relations
from 1960-2015. Bilateral relations between Nigeria and Israel at the inception of Nigeria’s
independence was a complicated matter for Nigeria. Thus, the first three decades of Nigeria’s
bilateral relationship with Israel were marred with issues of religion, and the intractable Israel-
Palestinian conflict which also affected their foreign policy outlook. As F.S. Northedge
succinctly puts it:
The foreign policy of a country is a product of its environmental factors- both internal and external. 17 The study expounds further the above assertion by investigating how these issues impact
Nigeria’s relationship with Israel which ultimately led to the severance of the diplomatic ties between the two countries in 1973, despite, the fact that there was no diplomatic row arising from bilateral ties between both countries.
However, with the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, by the Ibrahim
Babangida military regime in the days of economic diplomacy provided a renewed optimism for
15 Olusola Ojo, op cit., p.7 16 Ibid p.7 17 Northedge F.S., The Foreign Policies of the Powers. London, 1986 p. 15 xviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigeria to chart a new course in her bilateral relationship with Israel. On restoring diplomatic ties with Israel, General Babangida stated below that:
We are trying to move along with the current changes in relations between various countries… we looked at what brought about the severing of relationship with Israel and Nigeria at the time we did. Things have changed so you review relations with various countries. We are convinced that what brought about severing of relationship is no longer in existence in this country so we decided to review our ties with Israel. 18 Given that the main drive of Nigeria’s foreign policy during General Babangida military regime was centered on economic diplomacy, then, the move to restore diplomatic relations with
Israel could be seen in this context. It is then pertinent to ask the question at this point that what were the diverse ways that Nigeria benefitted from Israel economically? Moreover, the Nigerian government over the last decade has prioritized diversification of Nigerian economy a vital agenda in its domestic policy, but, till date, successive governments have not been able to achieve this. With Israel’s technological and industrial capabilities which has virtually improved most of her sectors especially, agriculture, it is then expected that the result of this study will provide a framework at guiding efforts which will enhance strategic economic partnership with
Israel that will strive to achieve the domestic policy of Nigeria.
Research Questions
The following research questions underpin the study:
i. What is the foundation of Nigeria-Israel relations?
ii. What were the factors that affected Nigeria-Israel relations in the first three decades?
18 Citizen Magazine, Kaduna, vol. II no. 35 August 31-September 16, 1992 p. 21 xix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
iii. Has there been some considerable changes in Nigeria-Israel relations from 1960s till
now?
iv. Has Nigeria benefitted in her economic relations with Israel?
Objective of the Study
The aim of this study is to examine the nature and patterns of bilateral relations between
Nigeria and Israel. Specific objectives include:
i. To examine the foundation of Nigeria-Israel relations.
ii. To discuss the factors that affected Nigeria-Israel relations in the first three decades. iii. To enumerate the changes in the Nigeria-Israel relations from 1960s till now. iv. To evaluate the benefits that Nigeria has derived from her economic relations with Israel
Significance of the Study
Firstly, the study underscores the advancement of national interests through the
relationship between Nigeria and Israel on the international arena. It also reinforces the need for
Nigeria-Israel to move closer to each other. This study is timely and important for the following
reasons; firstly, it gives a historical background of the Nigeria-Israel relationship from 1960 till
2015, thereby, shedding more light on the dynamics of their relations.
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Secondly, it sheds more light on the patterns of Nigeria’s external relations with Israel. In addition, the study is vital because it attempts to show the importance of bilateral diplomacy which is key to the socio-economic progress of a developing country like, Nigeria. Finally, this study will provide useful information for policy-makers and scholars like: diplomatic historians, political scientists, economists and international relations experts, as well as, the dissertation of students researching on Nigeria-Israel relations.
Scope and of the Study
The study focuses on the conduct of Nigeria-Israel relations through the following breakdown; an examination of Nigeria-Israel relations in the last five decades, effects of the
Civil War on Nigeria-Israel relations, and the consequences of the Middle East crisis on their relations. It will also identify the political, economic, technical, and socio-cultural relations between the two states, as well as, the impacts of foreign policy on their relations.
Research Methodology
The study adopts historical method and it is therefore descriptive and analytical.. It utilized primary sources which includes; oral information in the form of interview and secondary sources which includes books, article journals, conference communiques and seminar papers.
Necessary and relevant facts pertaining to Nigeria-Israel relations were extracted and scrutinized to exhibit the historical requirements of the basic objectives of the study.
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Literature Review
Concept of Foreign Policy
Up till date, the definition of foreign policy still remains subjective, hence, to this end, the study will pick a plethora of scholars who at one time had attempted to define the concept based on their individual perspectives. Modelski defines foreign policy as the system of activities evolved by communities which is aimed at changing the behaviour of other states, and to adjust their activities to the international environment. 19 Similarly, Frankel also defines foreign policy
as consisting of decisions and actions that involve to an extent some appreciable level of
relationship between a state and another. 20
19 Cited in Obi E., Nigeria’s foreign Policy and International Relations Theories. Vector Publishers, Onitsha. 2006 20 Cited in Obi E, Nigeria's Foreign Policy and International Relations Theories. Vector Publishers, Onitsha. 2006 xxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
A country's foreign policy consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests, and to achieve its goals within the international relations milieu.
It is the aggregate of a country’s national interest which results from the interaction of internal and external forces, as perceived by the foreign policy decision-makers. The strategies employed are aimed for the interaction between different countries.
For an effective relations between two countries, their foreign policy must be well defined, well thought, and must have a direction. Hence, Adeniran infers that foreign policy can best be understood through an explanation of what it actually is. 21 Foreign policy, according to him consists of three elements; the first, is the overall orientation and policy intentions of a particular country towards another. The second element is that a country must have an objective for seeking relations or dealings with other countries. The third element of foreign policy is that there must be means for achieving a particular goal or objectives.
However, in recent times, due to the deepening level of globalization and transnational
activities, relations and interactions have been known to exist between state and non-state players
on the international political arena. These relations in their own way have influenced several
foreign policies between nation states. The foreign policy of any nation is the external projection
of some of the domestic policies of that country that may have relevance in such arena. Both
domestic and foreign policies of a country are interrelated, or perhaps intertwined. Thus, foreign
policy can be appropriately defined as: A country’s response to the world outside or beyond its
21 Cited in Wogu IAP, Sholarin MA, Chidozie FC, A critical Evaluation of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy at 53. Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 5: 137-147. 2013
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own frontiers or boundaries. And in this regard, the response may be friendly or aggressive, causal or intense, simple or complex, but it is cannot be excluded. It comprises many elements:
Diplomatic, Military, Trade, Economics, Social, Cultural, Educational, Sport etc., and it varies in form and focus according to pending circumstances in a state. 22
Sometimes, countries may at different times be allies or enemies or valued allies, for a
relatively long or short period of time. For example, Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with Côte
d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia, during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), because, they
associated and traded with Biafra –The Breakaway Eastern Region of Nigerian. But, the
relationship was restored at the end of the war. The major point here, is that whatever form
foreign policy takes; responses to the outside world will always be there. In effect, every country
must have a foreign policy in order to live and survive as an independent entity in a complex
world.
Essentially, therefore, countries all over the world design and implement foreign policies
in order to guide their external relations, as well as protect, promote and defend their vital
national interests. This may be in the areas of defending territorial integrity, promotion of
economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests, and whatever a country might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore, naturally expected that Nigeria’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or inaction in international relations. According to Yaqub, a county’s foreign policy should be dynamic enough to respond to the challenges that might be
22 Chibundu VN, Foreign Policy with Particular Reference to Nigeria (1960-2002). Ibadan: Spectrum books Ltd 2003 xxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
taking place in the world which are outside its territorial confines. 23 Indeed, the dictum in international relations is summed up in this statement, “ there is no permanent friend, but permanent interest”24 .
Section 19 of 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic had gone further to set the foreign policy objectives of the Nigerian state thus:
The foreign policy shall be:
• Promotion and protection of national interest;
• Promotion of African integration and support of African unity;
• Promotion of international cooperation for consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination in all its manifestation;
• Respect for international law and treaty. Obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication and
• Promotion of a just world economic order.
Following the policies cited above in the 1999 constitution, Yusuf and Akinboye asserts that “the protection of our national interest has remained the permanent focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy, but the strategies for such protection vary from one regime/government to
23 Yaqub N, The millennium development goals and the sustainability of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the 21st century. Vintage publishers, Ibadan. 2004 24 Ibid xxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
another”. From this statement, the implication is that various governments from Nigeria’s independence till date have preserved similar goals and objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy, but in different ways. Thus, the foreign policies under Goodluck Jonathan's administration were deduced from the above and they include:
• Improved cooperation with other military forces all over the world to bring about peace globally.
• Improved bilateral and multilateral trade agreement.
• Cooperation and assistance in curbing health challenges all over the world.
• Promoting the welfare of Nigerian's abroad to ensure they are treated with respect and dignity in all circumstances.
Diplomacy
The modern world has witnessed changes in the global distribution of power and the nature of power itself. Such changes include the risk of conflict in its various manifestations, which sometimes affect every member of the populace. The nature of the anarchical international xxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
system also creates a setting in which different self-interested states and non-state players pursue their respective goals and purposes.
This reason for such diplomatic strategy is not far-fetched from the fact that, since the
17th century, states have been seen as the principal and sometimes the only effective international players 25 . So, the arrival of large numbers of these new, post-colonial states with no
essential experience of the actual rules unlike the older states system is an important
contemporary factor for developing diplomacy; because, bonding among these states is essential
to their function in the decentralized system of the global world. In an attempt to explain this
better, Hans Morgenthau describes an important factor in diplomacy which is key to national
power, that is, preservation of international peace. 26 He also asserts that diplomacy which ends in
war has failed in its primary objective of promoting the national interest through peaceful means.
However, looking at the factors that gave rise to diplomacy in the First World War in
(1914-1918), it is quite evident that it brought about bankruptcy to all the powers involved in it,
and its subsequent economic issues which provided a diplomatic space that encouraged
negotiation among the involved countries. Therefore, the development of diplomacy occurred
most significantly at periods when wars were ineffective means to pursue national interests.
Diplomacy thus, became its principal substitute. Long Strang, a former British Diplomat,
25 Langhorne, R. & Hamilton, K., The Practice of Diplomacy: its Evolution Theory and Administration. London: Routledge. 1995 p. 3 26 Morgenthau, H., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5 th edition. New York: Knopt. 1973 pp.540-548.
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remarked: “in a world where war is everybody’s tragedy and everybody’s nightmare, diplomacy is everybody’s business” 27 .
After 1815, when prevention of warfare became a principal objective of diplomacy, it resulted in the development of the peace conference in the early 19th century and the subsequent creation of both the League of Nations, and the United Nations in the 20th century. 28 Therefore, the profile of diplomacy rise basically because the pursuit of sustainable peace and security continued to bother the minds of all stakeholders: international organizations, governments,
NGOs, and many others.
Apparently, the major functions of diplomacy have been to establish, communicate, negotiate and bargain for tolerable agreements and other arrangements between sovereign centres of decision making in the international system 29 . Conclusively, diplomacy works towards achieving conflict resolution and therefore it is used for two or more conflicting parties when they are ready for conflict resolution, negotiation and agreements. It can equally be used by officials in a form of media to communicate with state and non-state actors to build confidence and advance negotiation and to mobilize public support for agreements. Diplomacy can be pursued through various routines and special media activities like press conferences, interviews as well as visits of Heads of states and mediators of rival countries. For instance, the televised ultimatum of President Kennedy of the United States sent to the USSR about the 1962 Cuban
27 Langhorne, R. & Hamilton, K., The Practice of Diplomacy: its Evolution, Theory and Administration. London: Routledge. 1995 p. 1. 28 Ibid. p. 2 29 Couloumbis, T. A. & Wolfe, J. H., Power and Justice. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall,Inc. 1978 p.118 xxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Missile crisis, Nixon's visit to China in 1992 and Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem 30 were examples of television diplomacy, designed to achieve breakthroughs in crisis and conflict.
Again, in resolving issues, people to people contact diplomacy is also another form of diplomacy that is best suitable. As Mohammed Khatami, an elected Iranian President on May
1997 asserted that, people-to-people contacts diplomacy was guided by the assumption that a major hindrance to the re-establishment of normal relations between the two countries that have been hostile to each other can be resolved 31 . Thus, there is the need to reconcile the two people by means of friendly exchanges between their governments. Khatami proposed the above assertion as a way of solving the Iranian and the US crisis, caused by the Iranian invasion of the
U.S embassy in Iran, violating their archive as well as keeping their diplomats in hostage. As a result, the U.S broke their diplomatic relations with them in 1980. Sports competition as one and a means of improving people-to-people relation was used to settle their misunderstanding.
Furthermore, the role of diplomacy in the global world has also been boosted by modern technology. For instance, global television in particular has become a central source of information about world affairs. It was due to the live CNN global television coverage of
President Bush's speech that prevented the Russian coup attempt on August 1991. 32 The aim of
this type of diplomacy is to cultivate favorable image abroad. According to Malone, it also aims
at affecting foreign people's thinking and ultimately that of their governments.
30 Johnson, C. & Langhorne, R. (Eds.), Problem and Issues in Contemporary Diplomacy. Vol III. London: Sage Publication Limited., 2004 p. 97.
31 Ibid 32 Ibid xxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
In addition to the role of diplomacy by content, public diplomacy describes activities directed towards the field of information, education, and culture amongst others with a sole objective to influence a foreign government by firstly influencing her citizens. 33 Mass media
especially international broadcasting in particular is one of the channels used in public
diplomacy. Others include cultural and scientific exchange of students, scholars, intellectuals,
artists, participation in festivals and exhibitions, building and maintaining cultural centre,
learning of foreign languages and establishing local friendly leagues and trade associations.
Diplomacy also facilitates communication between the political leaders of the states and
other entities in the world politics. Without communication, there are no international societies.
It is meant to minimize friction. Writing in the 1400s in one of the first treaties on diplomacy,
Emalao Barnaro asserted that “the first duty of an ambassador is “... to do, say, advise and think
whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state” 34 . With this,
diplomacy also fulfils the functions of symbolizing the existence of the society of states.
Diplomats that engage in diplomacy are the visible expression of existence of rules to which
states and other entities in international system pay some allegiance.
Nigeria-Israel Relationship
This section is dedicated to scholarly reviews on Nigeria-Israel relationship and some
factors that shape their relationship. According to Bolaji Akinyemi (1970), Nigeria maintained
cordial relationship with Israel before and after independence which flourished their bilateral
33 Fredrick, H. H., Global Community and International Relation. Belimot: A Wadsworth. 1993 p. 229. 34 Craig, Gordon, A. & George, A. L. (Eds.)., Force and State Craft: Diplomatic Problem of Our Time.3 rd edition. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995 xxx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
relations. The relationship between the two states dates back to pre-colonial era when Chief
Akinterunde Deko, the then Minister of agriculture and natural resources accompanied by some
Nigerian delegates from the Western Nigeria government visited Israel in 1958 for economic and technical assistance purposes 35 .
Olajide Aluko (1971) in his article Israel & Nigeria: Continuity and Change states that, at
Nigeria’s independence on October 1, 1960, the relationship between the two states were
formalized by the Nigerian government’s recognition of the political presence of Israel in her
country, and at the same time, Israel was also permitted to establish an Embassy in Lagos in
1960. Within 1960-1966, Nigeria-Israel relations prospered through the establishment of
different joint ventures such as: Nigersol Construction Company and Nigeria Water Resources
Corporation Limited. There were Israeli commercial companies operating in Nigeria without
necessarily going into partnership for Nigerians’ interest. One of such companies was Soleh
Boneh, which by early 1970 had constructed many important roads such as: the first-class
highway between Ijebu-Ode and Idi-Ayunre, some thirty (30) miles and Ondo to Ife, which is
about 42 miles. Also, there were some considerable changes in Nigeria-Israel relationship;
firstly, there were no longer restrictions on Israeli movement in some parts of the country;
secondly, Israeli aid was accepted throughout Nigeria; thirdly, Nigeria maintained neutrality
towards Israel due to the Middle East crisis 36 . It was noticed that, while the Federal government
35 Akinyemi Bolaji, “Nigeria-Israel Relations in 1960-1970. “ Journal on Middle East Politics, Volume 10, No. 2 , University of Tel Aviv Press, p. 352-353. 36 Aluko Olajide, Nigeria-Israel Relations: Continuity or Change, African Review Journal Volume 12, No. 1, University of Daavessalam, Tanzania, (1974), pp. 44-45. xxxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
of Nigeria allowed Israel to establish Embassy in Lagos, she did not open an office in Tel Aviv,
Israel.
Terhemba N.A and Adegboyega K.M., (2007) examined the domestic structure that influenced the evolution of Nigeria-Israeli relation from 1960 up to year 2007. This work is useful to this study because it delineates important areas that brought the two countries together at first. However, Terhemba and Adegboyega’s work failed to address the areas of non-state players which shape to a large extent, the relations between Nigeria and Israel. 37
According to Abdul Gaffaru (1976) Israel and Nigeria relations suffered setbacks because of the Federal government’s foreign policy goals and objectives. There was also setback in their relations because, Nigeria assumed leadership role in Africa through her political leaders in 1972 at a time when there was a dire need for a unified African organization that will address the pressing economic issues among Third World nations. Nigeria’s position on the Arab-Israeli conflict increasingly tends to be pro-Arab, this was the case at the 1972 and 1973 Organization of African Unity Summits, and at the September 1973 Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers where
General Yakubu Gowon cemented the severance of ties with Israel due pressures from the Arabs sponsored by the late Muammar Ghadaffi’s overtures to force African states to take active action against Israel. 38
According to Olusola Ojo (1985), there were of course, other considerations. Gowon was the Chairman of the OAU at the time. The OAU was an important regional instrument which
37 Terhemba N.A., and Adegboyega K.M., “The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigerian/Israeli Relations,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No.3&4, Fall & Winter 2007. 38 Gaffaru Abdul, “Israel-Nigeria Relations: The Middle East Politics and Influence”, New Nigerian Newspaper , Kaduna, May 26: 26 xxxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigeria hoped to use in realizing many of her foreign policy objectives in Africa, and she had consciously began to strengthen the prestige of the Organization since the end of the Arab/Israeli war of 1973. There were fears that all her plans would collapse if she takes a side in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. It is to be noted that before Nigeria severed ties, ten other African states had also broken ties with Israel, except Ethiopia which in the past had shared both strategic and close historical/cultural ties with Israel, it also eventually broke her relations with Israel on 23 rd
October 1973 making slim General Gowon’s reluctance . 39 The breakoff of Ethiopia’s relations with Israel in 1973 certainly marked the lowest ebb of Nigeria-Israel relations. Unlike in some other African countries, Israel did not even retain an ‘interest officer’ in Lagos thereafter. Along the line, Nigeria often joined other African countries to pass condemnatory resolutions against
Israel at international fora, including the 10 th November 1975 UN ‘Zionism-Racism’
resolution 40 .
According to Nwakama, (1987) informal relations between the two countries continued unimpeded, and in some cases recorded significant improvement in Nigeria. Israel’s construction and engineering companies continued to enjoy active federal and state governments’ patronage.
The list of housing projects, hospital, hotel, educational and industrial facilities, public buildings and public works projects completed by Soleh Boneh between 1975 and 1982 were quite impressive 41 .
39 Ojo Olusola, “Nigeria-Israel: Policy Changes and Challenges, “ being a paper presented at National Conference on the 25 th Years of Nigeria’s Foreign policy orgnised by NIIA, Lagos, 2-3 December 1985, p. 19. 40 Ibid., p. 20. 41 Nwakama Edwin, “Analysis of Internal Relationship Between Israel-Nigeria”, Punch Newspaper, November 6, 1987, p. 14. xxxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Chazan Naomi (1983) states that Nigerians continued to engage several Israeli institutions at different levels with visits to the Afro-Asian Institute of the Histradut in Tel Aviv, the Mount Carmel Centre in Haifa and the Settlement Studies Centre in Rehovot. The Jerusalem based Inter-Faith Committee and the Tantur Institute of Advanced Ecumenical Studies near
Bethlehem has hosted Nigerian clerics. Informal pilgrimages to the Holy land continued in
Nigeria since 1980, and it has always been subsidized by the federal government to encourage sufficient attendance. 42
Theoretical Framework
In the present century, there is fundamental paradigm shift in Nigeria’s perception on the future of world politics. Many theories are relevant to the study of relations among nation-states such as system theory, liberal theory, realist theory, interdependence and under-development model of analysis. But there is one model (or) paradigm that is suitable for this subject thereafter, and that is ‘constructivist theory’. What is constructivist theory all about and why is it germane to this discourse? This is what this section of the study intends to examine.
The chief proponent of this theory, Alexander Wendt attempts to provide an alternative explanation to structural realist and neoliberalist institutionalist theories about the relations of state in the international arena as it focuses mainly on the role of identities, norms, ideas and social relations of states. 43 Constructivism comes with a new perspective on what is happening in it. Constructivists authors concentrate on the social structures and on the way and how they are
42 Chazan Naomi, “Israel and African in 1980s”, The Dilemma of Complicity and Ambiguity”. Paper presented at the International Conference on Africa and Great Powers, University of Ife-Ife, Nigeria, 1-4 June, 1983, p. 7.
43 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xxxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
being created by the actors and how they influence the actors in return. The constructivist researchers concentrate also on the “discursive power”, power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideologies and language. Constructivists analyze the power defining identity from which then the interests of actors are derived and which inspires in the form of social structures. All in all, this is a completely different approach to understanding states’ relations among the comity of nations. 44
In relation to the study, this theory helps to understand the social structure of Nigeria at independence in which the three regional governments had different dispositions to relations with Israel owing to their ethno-religious orientations. This influenced the half-hearted relationship between Nigeria and Israel at the beginning of their relations in 1960. Also, constructivism explains the identity of the actors vis-à-vis their interests. In the case of this study, Nigerian actors at independence projected their disparate identities and interests in their dispositions towards Israel. Part of which was expressed in the hostile disposition of the
Northern premier, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello to the State of Israel. In the case of the Western and
Eastern regions, given their liberal views, they were more receptive to State of Israel.
Furthermore, by 1992, economic diplomacy was the main drive of Nigeria’s foreign policy and the restoration of diplomatic ties was within that context.
Thus, within the context of the constructivist theoretical framework, the identity of
Nigeria’s relationship with the State of Israel in the first republic was centered on religion and
the intractable Israel-Palestinian conflict and by 1992, Nigeria’s interests in her diplomatic
relations with the State of Israel was centered on economic diplomacy.
44 Segbers K., Dyllick-Brenzinger, Hoffman K., Hauersberger C., Global Politics: How to use and apply Theories of International Relations. Arbeitspapiere Des Osteuropa-Instituts Der Freien Universitat Berlin. Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik. 2006 pp.71-73 xxxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON NIGERIA AND ISRAEL’S FOREIGN POLICIES
Introduction
Foreign policy is any prearranged action by a government to tackle issues on security,
environment, defense, cultural, international political relations and international economic
relations. It is the activity of a state with other states, non-governmental organizations,
international organizations. Thus, Frankel defines foreign policy as a range of actions, as well as,
a set of principles influencing these actions, taken with reference to external situations and
factors… the summation of thoughts, actions and principles on external affairs taken by decision-
xxxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
makers with the intention of achieving long-range goals and short term objectives. 45 Foreign policy consist two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them. According to Pham, the interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft. In its ingredients, the foreign policy of all nation- states: great or small, is the same. 46 In a nutshell, the shaping of a foreign policy is a dynamic process involving the interaction between a country’s internal and external environments.
According to Northedge, the foreign policy of a country is a product of environmental factors- both internal and external to it. 47
Historical Development of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
Nigeria’s entry as a sovereign state into the international system began with its attainment of independence in 1960 and her ensuing admission as the 99 th member of the United Nations on the 7 th October 1960. However, there had been a general shift in the policy from different
regimes since 1960 as the influence of personality on Nigeria’s relation with other countries
cannot be overemphasized because, different leaders operate within concentric circle of national
interest. According to Akintola, Nigeria, from her independence has maintained a relatively
consistent foreign policy because the country has experienced varied forms of government. Right
from independence, Africa has formed the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy with emphasis
on the emancipation, development, and unity of Africans both within and outside the continent. 48
45 Frankel J., International Relations (2 nd ed.), London: Oxford University Press. 1978 p.77 46 Pham, Peter J., Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: An Enquiry into Sources and Prospects. http://www.ipri.pt/eventos/pdf/PeterPham_paper.pdf (Retrieved 24/09/2017) 47 Northedge, F.S., The Foreign Policies of World Powers (ed.), London 1968 p. 5 48 Akintola Bukola, “Nigeria and the World: A Review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (1960- 2007)”. The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal, 3(4), December. 2007 xxxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
With focus on the historical development of Nigeria’s foreign policy, this segment shall illuminate on the principles and objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy.
Objectives and Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
It is pertinent to stress that Nigeria’s relation among the comity of nations is driven by objectives and principles. These often vary in terms of scope, the intensity with which they are pursued and availability of resources for their achievement. Foreign policy objectives and principles serve as a guide through which nation-state relates with the international system. In formulating foreign policy objectives, every nation-state makes strategic distinction between interest which are critical to its very existence and those that are not. Foreign policy objectives are a set of broad plan and goal values that a country intends to achieve as it relates with other members of the world. Foreign policy objectives concern the goal-values that a state aspire to attain in its external relations, these objectives are also referred to as the State’s internal interest.
The Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives and principles according to S. Lamido, comprise of the following: the protection of the sovereign and territorial integrity of Nigeria; the promotion of economic and social well-being of Nigeria; The enhancement of Nigeria’s image and status in the world at large; the promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of our country and Africa; the promotion of international cooperation, conducive to the consideration of world peace and security; mutual respect and friendship among all peoples among the States; redressing the imbalance in the international power structures that has tended to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of developing countries;
xxxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
promotion of world peace based on the principles of freedom, manual respect and equality of all persons of the world. 49
Akindele presents the broad objectives as: promotion and protection of National interest;
promotion of the total liberation of Africa and support of Africa Unity; promotion of
international cooperation for mutual respect among all nations and elimination of racial
discrimination in all its manifestations; respect for international law and treaty obligations as
well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration and adjudication; and promotion of a just world economic order. 50
Olusanya and Akindele (1986) identified the following five major principles as
influencing and guiding the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy, these are: Non-Alignment (not
successful as she got attached to the West); the legal equality of all States; non-interference in
the domestic affairs of other States; Multilateral Diplomacy; and Afrocentrism.
These objectives and principles have since the country’s attainment of independence in 1960
been broadly and concisely spelt out by successive administrations. These fundamental
objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy have remained in charge since independence and have
been pursued by successive administrations with varying degrees of emphasis and focus. This
simply means that the objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy have remained consistent but with
different degrees of implementation by successive regimes.
The first principle of the Nigeria foreign policy; respect for territorial integrity of
sovereign states is informed by the idea that Nigeria’s ability to defend its own sovereignty is
49 Sule Lamido; “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” in Akindele, R. A. and Atte B. (eds’), Selected Readings in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations, NIIA Enlightenment Course 1(2) 2002. 50 Olusanya and Akindele (eds), 1986, Nigeria’s External Relations:… p. 63. xxxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
strengthened when states respect each other’s territorial integrity. Respect for territorial integrity assumes added importance in Africa where arbitrary and artificial boundaries created are subjected to dispute. Balewa had opined that such boundaries should be respected and, in the interest of peace, must remain the recognized boundaries until the people concerned decided to their will to merge into one larger unit. We shall discourage any attempt to influence such communities by force…since such interference could only result in unrest and …harm to the future of this great continent. 51
Also, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states complements the first. Non-interference is different from non-intervention. Interference itself literally means an unwelcome participation of an external or a second party in the national affairs of a sovereign state. However, intervention is an acceptable development in international politics to help a State restore peace or to save a nation from an internal crisis that is becoming externalized or a huge humanitarian concern. 52 However, Nigeria upholds this principle of non-interference as it relates to its African States, but it has intervened at critical moments on many occasions. Among such instances where the unilateral and subsequent multilateral intervention in the Liberian crisis from
1990 to the restoration of democratic rule in 2005, the engagement of the Sierra Leone warlords from 1994 to the eventual stabilization of the hitherto fragile democracy in that country in 1999.
Furthermore, the principle of Afrocentrism implies that in all issues of Nigeria’s foreign relations, those involving Africa would always take precedence. This Afro-centric position makes Nigeria to initiate policy choices and antagonizes Nigeria to subordinate any extra African
51 Balewa, A., “Our Great Day has arrived”. Text of Independence Day Addressed to the Nation on Oct 1 st , 1960. Retrieved at; http://www.iiste.org/journals/ on 24/08/2017. 52 Pogoson A. “The United Nations and the Politics of Humanitarian” African Journal of International Affairs and Development., 11(1)., p. 112. 2006 xl This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
powers for the attainment of her national interest (Pan Africanism). This position demonstrates her absolute resolve for OAU, AU, OPEC which she has frequently used as a diplomatic strategy to drive African interest in the United Nations (UN). Nigeria has relatively and consistently antagonized African enemies and support Africa through the initiation of policy choices and options to drive home African demands as was the case of the struggle and dismantle of apartheid in South Africa before 1994. 53
In addition, the principle of legal equality of all states makes Nigeria to believe that a
well ordered and peaceful community at the global and continental levels needs mutual and
reciprocal respect for the views and interests of all peoples and as such she continues to re-assure
the world that she has no intention of embarking on aggressive military policies against smaller
and weaker nations despite her relative advantage in size, population and resources. Nigeria
believes in playing a leadership role within the context of Africa but not an imperial type. 54
Non-alignment is also a major principle guiding Nigeria’s foreign policy. As a new
independent nation, this was the primary norm guiding her foreign policy. Non-alignment as a
principle is the idea by a group of states not to take sides during the Cold War, with either of the
feuding ideological powers. It is distinct from neutrality, it implies an active participation in
international affairs, but such participation would not go beyond mediation and reconciliation
levels in the face of East-West conflict. 55
The principle of multilateralism calls for Nigeria’s membership of foremost international
organizations at the sub-regional, regional and global levels and the need to initiate new ones.
53 Nwibor Lucky B., Nigeria Foreign Policy from 1960-2003 “Implications for Present and Future Leaders”. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science . Vol. 9(8)., p. 54 2014 54 Ibid 55 Ibid xli This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
This is predicated on the fact that membership of such organizations affords her the opportunities for multilateral negotiations and collaborations with other states to moderate international political issues as they can use such fora to articulate and aggregate their views and collectively give legitimacy to their foreign policy goals. Nigeria has since her independence, influenced international organizations such as the United nations to voice her opinion on issues pertaining to
Africa and has sought international cooperation in achieving her stated aim. An example is her successful campaign against the apartheid rule in South Africa.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Tafawa Balewa Administration (1960-1966)
Freshly from colonial rule and savoring the excitement of a newly independent nation,
Nigeria committed herself to some certain foreign policy declarations which have remained
unchanged, and perhaps, thrusted her governance till date. After independence, Nigeria’s foreign
policy was predominantly pro-British and guided by British interests until the first military coup.
Thus, while claiming non-alignment as one of her policy principles, Nigeria was basically pro-
British and pro-West. Thus, when Tafawa Balewa courageously stated that his administration
will not allow infiltration of communism into Nigeria, he most likely was referring to Britain’s
tele-guiding of Nigeria’s new leadership which denounced the Soviet Union’s communist
ideology and all its interests.
During 1960-1966, Nigeria’s foreign policy was conservative, reactionary, and pro-
Western administered by an uncertain and unformed administration which aligned to every
aspect of the West’s diplomatic relations. Moreover, “Tafawa Balewa couldn’t take any major
xlii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
foreign policy decisions without first consulting the British government.” 56 One notable feature of the period was that the pro-African and pro-Commonwealth Nigeria was consistently in tune with the British slant. According to Egbo, “all sectors of the economy were not only controlled by the West, but were entirely dependent on their capitalist orientation for the country’s consumptive patterns and developmental efforts.” 57
However, the first major test of the conceived roles of Balewa administration’s in
Nigeria-Africa policy was evident during the Congo crises in 1960. Balewa, declared that
Nigeria’s active support for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Congo, was to “see that there is law and order, that is all our interest.” on the crises 58 The ideological undertone in the
Congo crises was as a result of groups’ division along French and Belgian lines. On Congo crises, the UN disproved the African Prime Minister, thus, protecting their colonial or neo- colonial interest in Congo. 59 In view of this, Balewa ignored the basic problem of neo- colonialism in the Congo which inferred his support for the United Nations’ colonial status quo for the sake of “law and order” negating his role in the emancipation of African countries from colonialism.
The second test was on Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia). Balewa took a conservative stance in the harsh apartheid rule and unilateral declaration of independence of Ian Smith.
Nigeria did not honour the Organization of African Unity’s decision that member states should
56 Idang, G.J., Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960-1966. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. 1973 p.14. 57 Egbo, Steve, Nigeria and the World: A Treatise on Foreign Policy. Enugu: John Jacobs Classic Publishers Ltd. 2003 p. 56. 58 Balewa, A.T., Nigeria Speaks. Ikeja: Longman. 1964 59 Ohaegbulam, F.U., Nigeria and the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo , Tampa: University of Florida Press, 1982 p. 102. xliii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
break diplomatic relations with Britain for tactically supporting Smith, instead, Balewa preferred peaceful discourses with OAU and Britain to settle the rift. 60
Nevertheless, the Balewa administration however, maintained its conceived roles in some
instances, he was among the African leaders who sought continental unity, through his effort the
OAU was formed on May 5, 1963. The OAU incidentally, reflected Nigeria’s perception of a
more pragmatic approach to African Unity. Secondly, Balewa spearheaded the expulsion of
South Africa from the Commonwealth and Olympic Games to increase pressure on the apartheid
regime to amend its policy.
Thus, there were lots of inconsistencies and contradictions in Balewa’s foreign policy
evident his actions cited above during that period. But, in spite of his administration’s close ties
with the West, he refused to support Apartheid relations in South Africa. Also, during Balewa
administration, Nigeria took bold steps to severe relations with France over their testing of an
atomic bomb in the Sahara Desert in 1961, just three months after Nigeria’s independence. 61 In this regard, Nigeria also refused to attend the maiden conference of the Non-aligned Movement in Belgrade during that period. In spite of the above positive achievements, the inconsistencies and contradictions in Balewa’s foreign policy were still evident in some other instances, evasion on the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc until December 1961, and acceptance of the Anglo-Nigeria Defence Pact until its abrogation by students. In addition, the refusal of Nigeria to train armed militia to assist Angolan national fighters in their war against the Portuguese colonialists, despite Nigeria’s avowed resolve to rid the continent of
60 Adigbo. R. E.,”Nigeria’s National Role Conception: The Case of Namibia”. A Ph.D Thesis in the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. 2005 pp. 173-175. 61 Philips, C. S., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy , Evanston: Northwest University Press. 1964 p.86. xliv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
colonialism was another evidence of Nigeria’s foreign policy contradictions in Balewa’s administration. 62
Generally, the Balewa policy concern was primarily on decolonization of Africa and this brought him to terms with several liberation struggles; one of the focal roles of Nigeria being in support of any movement that head towards the total liberation of the continent. However, his approach was consistently cautious and legalistic, appealing for regard of international law in matters that required revolutionary approach. He seemed unwilling to hurt or provoke western powers and appeared to be a great patron of Britain. Indeed, he was anti-communist and several of his policies in this regard were far way off from non-aligned principle of Nigerian foreign policy. Balewa’s foreign policy has not therefore been regarded as dynamic, innovative or satisfactorily Africanist as it was perceived as unstable marred with contradictions.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Agunyi Ironsi, January – July 1966.
The Agunyi Ironsi regime was terminated on July 29 th , 1966, six months after it assumed
power and the regime witnessed continuation of the country’s belief in cordial relationship with
other States, non-interference and caution in intervention in African crises. Ironsi assured the
country’s allies both in Africa and the world that his foreign policy would retain the principle of
non-alignment and good neighbourliness. 63 The domestic problems including the backlash of the
unification decree which was feared to be establishing Igbo hegemony in a unitary state, made
Ironsi’s regime have a very little time to carry out any African policy or occupy any role it
defined. However, the Ironsi regime made a vital decision which had profound impact on Nigeria
62 Soyoye Akinyode, “ A Historical Analysis of Nigeria-China Labour Relations, 2000-2014.” A Masters Dissertation, 2015 p. 18 63 Adeyemo, F.O., Dynamic of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1993-1998. Lagos: Franc-Soba Nig. Ltd. 2002 p. 114. xlv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
foreign policy which saw the closure the regional offices overseas as well as disengagement of regional governments from sending economic missions overseas. 64
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under General Yakubu Gowon, 1966-1975
The regime lasted exactly nine years in power from July 29, 1966 till July 29, 1975 and the Gowon era witnessed a momentous foreign policy. The regime came into being as a result of the bloody military coup for the second time after gaining independence.
The regime conduct and general diplomatic practice reflected the established orientation
about its presumed leadership role based on its size and potentials. This drastic change in foreign
relations was partly informed by the Nigerian civil war in which the government solicited for
military aid their traditional allies Britain and the United States, both declined making the
government turned to the former Soviet Union for military assistance. This direction by the
regime marked the beginning of Nigeria’s central role in African affairs. In his comment, Dr.
Okon Arikpo, the ten Minister of External Affairs, said that “Nigeria foreign policy was
constructed in concentric circles with Africa in the centre.” 65 Africa-centeredness of the regime was translated into reality when: Nigeria committed herself to regional integration efforts, envisaged under ECOWAS. Thus, Nigeria accepted the task of large financial commitments to
ECOWAS regularly and contributing up to one-third of its annual budget; Nigeria gave financial
64 Kia Bariledum, Nwigbo Tambari S., & Ojie Peter A., Foreign Policy Strategy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1960-2012: The Missing Link. Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Vol. 4(1) 2016 p. 24 65 Ibid xlvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
and moral assistance to the liberation movements in Southern Africa; paid dues to the liberation committee of the OAU campaign against the Anglo African states for the creation of ECOWAS; the regime negotiated with the European Economic Community (EEC) as Nigeria’s new trading partner; solidified friendship with the former Soviet Union and recognized the People’s Republic of China; Nigeria also spearheaded the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) in their struggle to negotiate as one body with the EEC for improved trade relations. 66 In addition, to assist the liberation movements, the regime supported the OAU’s decision to break diplomatic relations with Israel for fighting an African nation, Egypt. 67 Nigeria’s economic boom of the
post-civil war years contributed significantly to the country’s ability to develop a dynamic
diplomatic practice under Gowon.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Muritala Muhammed, 1975-1976
Muritala’s regime was as a result of the overthrow of the nine year old regime of General
Yakubu Gowon on July 29, 1975. General Murtala had already gained enough experience for
external relations due to the experiences he got while serving in the Gowon’s regime as the
Federal Commissioner for Communication. He was fiercely nationalistic and determined to
actualize his objective which was giving Nigeria a lead role in African politics. He had earlier
gained some knowledge on foreign affairs and world politics through his membership and active
participation in the conferences and seminars of the Nigerian society of International Affairs. 68
66 Ibid. p. 25 67 Olusanya, G.O. & Akindele, R.A., Nigeria’s External Relations : The First 25 years. (eds.) Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press. 1986 p. 57. 68 Fawole, W.A., Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule 1966-1999 , Ile-Ife, OAU Press. 2003 p.88. xlvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigeria under Murtala Mohammed witnessed a well-defined, articulate, coherent and explicit policy for Africa that was not smeared with fear or deference to any bloc or country. It was the beginning of the boost in Nigeria’s declared Afro-centric posturing, an era that saw the country’s casual interest in events happening in and around Africa. This era was known to be the golden age of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The country was favourably positioned for a dynamic role in African affairs, not only because of the new leadership zealous commitment to Africa and the boom in oil-based economy after the civil-war, but rather because of a succession of prominent African issues which permitted the country to take the leading role. The sign of the foreign policy dynamism became noticeable from the onset of the regime when it announced the indefinite postponement of the long awaited and scheduled visit of the British Monarch, Queen
Elizabeth II, to Nigeria. The queen was scheduled to pay a visit to Nigeria in October 1975 and elaborate preparations were made, including the construction of the Tafawa Balewa Square in
Lagos. The postponement was actually diplomacy for its outright cancellation, Britain perhaps never forgave the regime for this diplomatic insult on their monarch and Britain was implicated six months later for the failed coup d’etat that resulted in General Muhammed’s death. The regime also did not spare Africa on the Black world of its new style and orientation as it also unilaterally postponed the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture
(FESTAC) until 1977, on account that Gowon’s leadership objectives were too grandiose and unrealistic that they had to be scaled down. By these actions, the regime sought to demonstrate a clean break from the style of the preceding government. 69
69 Soyoye Akinyode, “ A Historical Analysis of Nigeria-China Labour Relations, 2000-2014.” A Masters Dissertation, 2015 p. 23 xlviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
In 1975 when the Murtala regime came into power, Nigeria’s overall standing in Africa was quite impressive. It had 17.2% of Africa’s total population 70 , and 22% of Sub-Sahara
Africa’s, with the implication that one in every four black African was a Nigeria 71 .
Economically, it had 16.3% of Africa’s total GDP and 2.3% of Sub-Sahara Africa’s 72 . Added to this demographic superiority and a booming economy was a large standing army of 270,000 men, which constituted 66.9% of the entire armed forces of Sub-Sahara Africa 73 .Its annual defence expenditure of $977 million in 1975 was 42.7% of the total defence appropriation for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa 74 . In other words, when looking within the ECOWAS context,
Nigeria at that time commanded such an intimidating posture within the sub-region. In terms of
armed forces, its position was unmistakably unbeatable, with 81.8% of total military expenditure.
These curious combinations of vital statistics and the occurrence of significant African issues of
the era made the foreign policy of that period such an intense and activist foreign policy pursuit.
The radicalism of General Murtala’s administration is portrayed in his open declaration
that Nigeria would make Africa the cornerstone of its external relations. The declaration was
backed up with swift recognition of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
faction in the Angolan struggle for self-determination. This unilateral action was in response to
intelligence reports that apartheid South-African troops were already deep inside Angola fighting
on the side of Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), one of the three guerilla
factions supported by the American government which also engaged in the struggle for control of
70 Olusanya, G.O., Akindele, R.A & Ate, B., Economic Development and Foreign Policy in Nigeria. (eds.) Lagos: NIIA. 1998 p.42. 71 Ibid , p.53. 72 Ibid , p. 60. 73 Salihu, H., Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2. Ibadan, Vantage Publishers .2006 p.76. 74 Ibid, p.78. xlix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
the newly independent country. The swift action strategy of Murtala received widespread endorsement from Nigerians who witnessed Nigeria’s progress, as they expected it to be since independence. 75
The short-lived leadership of Murtala Mohammed did not in any way derail Nigeria’s foreign policy as his successor, General Olusegun Obasanjo followed the same trend. He was dedicated to the African spirit and was bold to take actions independent of Western influence.
Obasanjo, to his credit, did a lot in terms of pushing Nigeria to the front-burner in international affairs as he extended Nigeria’s foreign relations to the Soviet bloc to cultivate friendships that have lasted till date. Although, the domestic policies did not yield much visible developmental progress, Nigeria’s foreign policy under Murtala/Obasanjo regimes are still the best so far, as they both received wide acceptability and respect in the global community.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under General Olusegun Obasanjo, 1976-1979
General Olusegun Obasanjo came to power after the assassination of General Murtala
Muhammed in a bloody coup attempt on 13 th February, 1979. Since the two of them were friends and shared the same vision about Nigeria’s role in Africa and the rest of the world, General
Obasanjo simply continued where Muhammed had left. In short, it was a continuation of the policy direction and orientation that was begun in 1975.
Anglo-Nigeria relations under this period suffered a severe and permanent setback throughout the regime of Obasanjo. 76 Relations with the United States of America also suffered
75 Fawole, W.A., Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999. Ile-Ife: OAU press. 2003 pp.90-91. 76 Salihu, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy ,. p.87. l This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
some severe reverse under Gerald Ford and only improved under President Jimmy Carter. But even then, the attitude towards Angola also changed too. Commitment to the MPLA government in Luanda did not waiver since the country had invested considerable material resources and huge ego in its sustenance and to prove to the World that Africans would no longer serve as imperialist stooges. 77
A statement credited to Obasanjo was of important effect when he made it clear that the country would not hesitate to use all means at its disposal to accomplish her vital foreign policy objectives. This was demonstrated by dramatic step of nationalizing the assets of British
Petroleum here in Nigeria which was announced on July 31 st , 1979 on the issue of Zimbabwe’s
independence. Nigeria under this regime used the platforms of various international
organizations to conduct its anti-apartheid campaigns to isolate South/Africa from the comity of
nations because of Apartheid system in that State. While Nigeria under the regime campaigned
to get South Africa expelled from the Commonwealth as early as 1961, the apartheid regime had
nonetheless continued to enjoy tacit international approval and cooperation until the mid-
1970s. 78
The intensification of the Obasanjo regime’s anti-apartheid policies began to constrain
the apartheid state. The widespread riots of 1976, which resulted in the Soweto massacre and
detention of thousands of protesting Black youths, Nigeria made to turn the global searchlight on
the racist country. The Nigerian authorities literally brought hundreds of the Soweto kids and
scores of other South Africa Black youths into Nigeria and placed them in the country’s
educational institutions on scholarship. It was a significant contribution to the anti-apartheid
77 Soyoye, A Historical Perspective of Nigeria-China Labour Relations 2000-2014, p. 25 78 Ibid li This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
struggle in South Africa. As a result of Nigeria’s influence and virulent campaigns, the South
Africa apartheid regime became increasingly isolated and detested as any regime that had any serious dealings with it incurred the anger and displeasure of Nigeria.
Nigeria also used its influence to bring pressure on western governments, including the
US and Britain, to lend support to the movement for decolonization of Southern African countries and facilitated the process that brought Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF to power in
1980. 79 Nigeria had a very big universal image in the 1970s because of the focused and effective
African policy, and its loud voice matched by actions in the world.
Also, this period witnessed Nigeria’s leading role in conflict mediation and resolution in
different parts of the continent. It attempted to mediate the conflict between Ethiopia and
Somalia but recorded no success because the leaders of both countries were already armed to the
teeth and convinced that the crisis was better resolved on the battlefield. There was also an
attempt to mediate in the Chadian crisis and Nigeria hosted the negotiation and singularly
conducted a peace-keeping operation at the instance of the Chadian factions contending for
power and control of the country. Nigeria acted on the issue of the Chadian crisis due to France’s
request of Nigeria’s assistance in the search for peace, stability and reconciliation in Chad. 80
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Shehu Shagari, 1979-1983
Apart from making the usual remarks about maintaining the Afrocentric foreign policy of
Nigeria, there was not much to be said about the foreign policy of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. He tried to keep up with the already established policy of his predecessor but could not because of series of problems that faced him and which he was incompetent to withstand. It is to his credit,
79 Salihu, Essay on Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 55. 80 Fawole, Nigeria’s External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military, Rule,1966-1999, p.54. lii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
though, that he spearheaded Africa’s commitment to peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes like the Somalia/Ethiopia; Morocco/ Polisario Movement over Western Sahara; and the Hissene
Habre/ Guokonni Weddeye crises in Chad. 81 However, there was no major issue that the regime tackled and the leaden approach to issues made it impossible for Nigeria to maintain her formal position on the continent as it had already started doing. Rather, the government is known to have caused bad blood and hostility towards Nigeria by some neighbouring states in the African continent with the expulsion of illegal aliens especially from Ghana.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Muhammadu Buhari, 1984-1985
The foreign policy under this regime was mainly to restore the damaged economy of
Nigeria. The foreign policy priority of that period was to have more peace in Africa starting with
her neighbours.
In order to have a lucid picture of Nigeria’s foreign policy under this regime, it is
imperative to illuminate on the situation of the country as at the time Buhari took over power. He
came into power at the period when the country’s economy was in a bad state, the regime
therefore lacked the financial muscle that had been so critical to the success of the Murtala and
Obasanjo’s regime. The Shagari’s administration had mismanaged the national treasury to the
extent that it had to enforce domestic belt-tightening measures called the Economic Stabilization
Act from April 1982 and later had to seek an IMF loan facility of about $2.2 billion to bail out.
The economy had been wrecked by mismanagement, corrupt practices of public officials and
greed on their part. The Buhari’s regime arrested and detained many politicians who had
81 Egbo, Steve, Nigeria and the World, p.77. liii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
misappropriate and embezzled public funds, in which many of them bagged long jail sentences after conviction.
The first major preoccupation of the foreign policy was geared towards revamping the ailing economy. It also inherited the proposal to seek an IMF loan, which according to the institution would result in some forms of economic relief to the financial problems of the country as at the time stated. Negotiation between the IMF and the Buhari government could not progress as smoothly as anticipated because of disagreement over the conditionality that the lending institution attached to the loan facility. The economic condition of the country at that time made the regime rejected all IMF’s proposal and the regime turned to the other innovative measures to obtain some measure of relief for the depressed economy. And since she was unable to pay for her imports and her dwindling fortunes from oil sales, Nigeria decided to engage in counter- trade. Nigeria under General Buhari concluded arrangements with some notable countries like
Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands for the supply of Nigeria’s crude oil in exchange for much needed consumer goods and machinery. This bartering of oil for essential needs pitted the regime against Britain. Britain was particularly piqued because it perceived that its export trade with Nigeria might suffer inevitable reverses if Nigeria continued to exchange oil for its import from other countries. 82
The foreign policy of this period really impaired Nigeria’s immediate neighbors because of the “Quadripartite policy” of border closure, sudden change of national currency and expulsion of illegal aliens from Nigeria. These three policies were embarked upon in an attempt
82 Fawole, Nigeria’s External Relations, p. 132. liv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
to address the problematic economy that Buhari inherited from his predecessors. 83 The closure of the land borders with immediate neighbours was purely for national security and economy reasons. The closure was necessitated by the need to prevent the escape of ousted politicians who had illegally siphoned huge sums from the national treasury through the porous land borders.
Generally, the borders were shut in line with the regime’s determination “to look inwards and reorder our internal priorities internally; to check indiscipline; to consolidate the value of our currency; to check smuggling and put our trade relationship on a very positive path with our neighbours. 84
While the effect of the border closure was still affecting the neighbors, the regime took
another domestic measure that had it effects beyond the country’s border. This was the sudden
change in the design and color of the Nigerian currency, Naira. The government was so
convinced that there was no way it could put in place effective measures to overhaul the ailing
economy with the vast quantity of naira illegally circulating in the neighboring States. The naira
was so severely devalued by smugglers and currency traffickers that only a change in the color
and design of the currency could allow the government’s economic measures to yield fruits. This
sudden currency change caught both Nigerians and foreigners unawares. The devastating effect
was further compounded because of the border closure which did not permit illicit holders of
vast quantities of the currency outside Nigeria to repatriate them to Nigeria to be changed. The
millions of naira in circulation outside Nigeria thus became worthless paper, a situation that
caused several hardships in the neighboring countries whose economies had thrived on the illicit
83 Ibid, p. 134 84 Gambari, I., Foreign Policy decision; Nigeria after the Second Republic, New Jersey: Humanities Press International. 1989 p.69. lv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
naira trafficking and smuggling. 85 The Buhari regime was not yet done with issuing of hostile
policy to the neighbours when in 1985 decided the expulsion of illegal aliens from the country.
These aliens were actually nationals of ECOWAS States, principally from Ghana, Togo, Benin
and Niger Republic, who were staying in Nigeria without legal permits without renewing them
and others came illegally and had not regularized their stay. The mass expulsion of ECOWAS
nationals called into question the sincerity of Nigeria’s claim to leadership of the sub-region.
And to some ECOWAS States that were affected by this, Nigeria was being unjust and unfair.
Another major incident that affected Anglo-Nigerian relations was the attempted
abduction of Nigeria’s former Transport Minister, Alhaji Umaru Dikko in London. The news
broke on July 5, 1984 that Umaru Dikko was abducted from his home in Porch ester Terrace,
dragged and put in crate marked for delivery to the Federal Ministry of External Affairs, Lagos.
The British Police later got to know about this and the drugged Dikko was freed. Two Nigerian
officials and two Israeli citizens were implicated in the botched kidnap. The Nigerian
government denied any involvement with the case because it was an act of terrorism and
violation of international law. The Nigerian government lunched a verbal attack on Britain for
providing sanctuary for Nigerian dissidents who were planning to topple the Buhari’s
government. Britain in response seized the Nigerian Air Force cargo plane and detained it.
Britain followed that up by announcing the expulsion from Britain two Nigerian diplomats.
Buhari was ready to let heaven loose just to prevent Nigeria being humiliated by Britain. 86
85 Fawole, Nigeria’s External Relations, pp. 136-137 86 Soyoye, A Historical Perspective of Nigeria-China Labour Relations 2000-2014, p. 31 lvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Ibrahim Babangida, 1985-1993
General Ibrahim Babangida saw foreign policy as an “issue-based pursuit reflecting a package of objectives and goals tied to the nation’s security and the well-being of Nigerians generally”. 87 This he did by bringing the best personnel on board viz: Bolaji Akinyemi, Ike
Nwachukwu, Rilwanu Lukman, and gave them the essential latitude to implement their strategies towards achieving the said goals. Thus, the many foreign policy issues such as the Technical Aid
Corps (TAC) programme, the Concert of Medium Powers initiative and Economic Diplomacy as foreign policy thrusts, and which were well-received, had the inputs of many eggheads that
Babangida brought into his cabinet. It was also under his leadership of ECOWAS (1986-1988), that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Citizens actually took off. This could be said to be the shining point of his leadership in terms of Nigeria’s Africa policy, as he not only reversed Buhari’s ill-conceived closure of borders to punish smaller neighbouring countries, he virtually took over ECOWAS, making Nigeria the arrowhead of the sub-regional organization.
As clearly expounded by Shagaya: “Nigeria not only provided the bulk of the material and logistic support for ECOMOG operations but also the bulk of the personnel. Apart from the first
Commander who was a Ghanaian, all subsequent Commanders were from the Nigerian military.
That today Liberia is a united country owes much to the foresight and sacrifice of Nigeria … the
Babangida regime gave ECOWAS institutional relevance by not only donating land for the
87 Adeniran, Tunde, “Foreign Policy, External Image and International Relations” in Sam Oyovbaire (ed.) Governance and Politics in Nigeria: The IBB and OBJ Years. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. 2008 lvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
building of the ECOWAS Secretariat but contributed 4.5 million dollars towards its construction.”88
Babangida also went beyond the continental level by taking bold steps such as restoring
relations with Israel that had been severed since October 1973 over the Arab-Israel conflict.
Thus, in all, Babangida’s regime was credited with some achievements such as: the revival of
Nigeria’s active commitment to ECOWAS by lifting boundary closures and restoring free
movement within ECOWAS countries; Nigeria’s active intervention in inter-African affairs and
conflicts, especially in West Africa, in the border wars between Mali and Burkina Faso and in
the strained relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia; the establishment and funding of
Nigeria’s Technical Aids Corps (TAC) which provides highly trained Nigerian personnel at little
or no costs to needy African States and Caribbean States; the formation of the Lagos Forum of
Medium Powers; and the use of Nigeria’s foreign policy to support and promote Nigeria’s
domestic economic policy. 89 Besides, it was during this era that Nigeria got the most representation in the international scene through the United Nations. It was during this period that Obasanjo was selected as one of the three pioneer members of the International Eminent
Personalities mandated to arbitrate in the South African political debacle by the Commonwealth.
In 1989, Nigeria’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Joe Garba, was made
President of the General Assembly in its 44th session; and also in 1990, Emeka Anyaoku was elected as the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations.
88 Shagaya, John N., Governance in Nigeria-The IBB Era: An Insider’s View. Jos: Viewpoint Communications Ltd. 2003 p. 86 89 Ofoegbu, Ray,“The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation: A Study of the Ministry of External Affairs” in. Olusanya and. Akindele (eds.) The Structure and Processes of Foreign Polic Lagos: NIIA. 1990 p.213. lviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Regardless all the above successes, Babangida’s regime is not taken to be the best time for Nigeria’s foreign policy because “rhetoric, emptiness, inaction, policy somersault and indecision were to mark the second half of his tenure.” 90 . As is already well known, Nigeria became a pariah nation after Babangida annulled what is arguably the freest and fairest election ever held in Nigeria.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under General Sani Abacha, 1993-1998
General Sani Abacha took over leadership in Nigeria at the peak of the annulment of June
12 elections. At this time, the world was gradually tilting towards liberal democracy, and given the opposition to such obvious palace coup on the Interim National Government of Chief Ernest
Shonekan, Nigeria was generally hostile to most countries. The country became a pariah among the comity of nations. Thus, foreign policy during this period was “reactive and isolationist.” 91
Unlike his military predecessors in power and governance who articulated concrete proposals concerning Nigeria’s relation with the rest of the world outside its borders, General Sani Abacha cannot be said to have articulated any clear policy. What invariably passed for the country’s foreign policy during this tenure was no more than a series of tragic domestic policies and actions that later turned into diplomatic controversies. These issues include the ruthless crackdown on pro-democracy agitation, gross abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the arrest and detention of Moshood Abiola in June 1994, March 1995 coup hoax, the November
90 Egbo, Nigeria and the World: p.95. 91 Akintola, Bukola, “Nigeria and the World: A Review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy (1960-2007)”. The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal, 3(4), 2007 p.462 lix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
1995 hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa, and other eight Ogoni activists, and the controversial coup plot of December 1997.
For him, there was a need to fashion out a new foreign policy thrust for the country as the traditional position had become more or less in his estimation. Thus, he constituted a 50-member committee of every other interest group apart from career diplomats, intellectuals and experts in the field of international relations and foreign policy. This deliberate action showed his hand early enough that he did not want anything except to direct what should happen without recourse to what had been the tradition. Moreover, the regime was so audacious in disregard of diplomatic norms and showed marked disdain for elegance in relations with the diplomatic corps of other countries that left them stunned. The gross State-sponsored violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Nigerians resulted in heightened global interest in Nigeria at a time that human right issues had taken a center stage in global consciousness. So also did such reckless act of political assassination of prominent citizens, serial bomb explosions masterminded by state security operatives. What can be called a conscious policy, was the issue of Nigeria’s participation in ECOMOG operations in Liberia and later Sierra Leone. And even at that, it was more of a question of coincidence that may clearly premeditated and articulate policy.
Under his regime, he saw the world from his own peculiar conceptual lenses, and expected absolute obedience to his authority and was willing to kill to ensure compliance.
Besides, it was also clear that he was never really moved by international contempt, as he promptly sought new friends from Iraq, Iran, North Korea etc., when the Commonwealth, the
European Union, and other civilized countries of the world began treating his regime with the contempt that it deserved. Nigeria swiftly moved down from the impressive height of being the
lx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
“African Power” that it had occupied since the 1970s and became a pariah, a country derided and isolated by all its traditional allies and friends. In an ironic twist of faith, Nigeria during this regime was suspended from Commonwealth, even though she was an influential member. The global organizations investigated Nigeria for human right violations, and other countries imposed varying sanctions against the country and its citizens. Canada broke her diplomatic relations with
Nigeria at this period and all manners of economic and technical aid to the country were suspended by various countries, even Commonwealth scholarship that Nigerians had enjoyed for decades were no longer available. 92
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under General Abdulsalami Abubakar, 1998-1999
Abacha’s sudden death left Nigeria in the lurch of international isolationism, and thus the
succeeding regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar knew better than to try any form of
perpetuation of himself in power. He quickly started the process of transition to democracy,
released almost all political prisoners and generally “embarked on a foreign policy of
rejuvenation and attempted to redeem Nigeria’s image, most especially on the human rights
front.” 93 Thus, his eleven-month regime could rightly be seen as an interregnum between military domination of Nigerian politics with its peculiar brand of foreign policy, and a democratic setting. Although he had to grapple with the issue of conflict situations in the African sub-region, he chose the path of peaceful enforcement in Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. His case was such that the domestic environment more or less dictated his foreign policy – he was
92 Fawole, Nigeria’s External Relations… pp. 189, 213-214. 93 Akintola, “Nigeria and the World:…” p.462. lxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
more interested in salvaging Nigeria’s image abroad and preparing for a democratic transition to civil rule, national reconciliation, respect for the rule of law, and human rights of citizens. 94
Thus, during his time, and given that it was short, the Abubakar administration recorded such little successes in the international community as the re-admission of Nigeria into the
Commonwealth of Nations, the improvement in relations with the European Union, Canada and the United States of America that had severed diplomatic relations with Nigeria, and peaceful leadership of ECOWAS.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Olusegun Obasanjo, 1999-2007
The civilian government that assumed power in May 1999 recognized the necessity to redirect Nigeria’s foreign policy. In his speech, President Obasanjo said:
“The overriding and permanent of our foreign policy is to project and safeguard the national interest. Historically, the main thrust our foreign policy has been the struggle for peace, unity, security, economic development and cooperation. Africa will continue to be the primary theatre of our foreign policy. Nevertheless, his administration endorses the universal values of the contemporary globalization process, which are development, human security, equity ethnics, inclusion and sustainability.”95
The assertion implies a combination of Afro-centrism and multi-nationalism pattern of foreign policy. On African perspective, the administration supported to bring an end to war in
Liberia and facilitated the enthronement of democracy in that country. In August 2003, the
President of Sao Tome and Principe was ousted in a military coup while attending the Sullivan
Summit in Abuja, Nigeria but was later restored to power by Obasanjo administration. Also, at the multilateral level, President Obasanjo made the presence of Nigeria well felt with several
94 Badmus, Isiaka and Ogunmola, Dele, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under General Abdulsalami Abubakar”. Nigerian Journal of International Affairs , 29(1&2), 2003 p.383 95 Obasanjo, O., Nigeria’s Foreign Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century. Lagos: NIIA. lxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
trips abroad to attend sessions of United nations, G77, G15, G8, OPEC, World Bank, IMF,
African Union (AU), ECOWAS and many other organizations. 96 On the bilateral angle,
Obasanjo foreign policy resulted into the followings: Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National
Commission; Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Commission; Nigeria-Ethiopia on Technical Aid Corp;
Nigeria-Morocco Joint Commission; Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission; Nigeria-Egypt
Cooperation; Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Relations. 97
In 2005, Nigeria was accorded the right to host the Common Wealth Heads of State and
Government Meeting (CHOGM) which subsequently make President Obasanjo its Chairman after being suspended indefinitely in 1995. Also, Nigeria entered into more the six bilateral agreements with China, one of which resulted in the reconstruction of the Nigerian railway system. In essence, the following achievements were made: the administration reintegrates
Nigeria into the comity of nations and repairs the sore spots in Nigeria’s relations with the international community; the administration equally achieved debt relief; the administration made frantic efforts to recover stolen monies lodged in foreign banks by corrupt leaders; the
African Renaissance is another important contribution of the require foreign policy; enthronement of democracy in Liberia; attraction of foreign instruments, but not remarkably into the non-oil sector as compare to Ghana and India. 98
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Umaru Yar’Adua, 2007-2010
96 Kia Bariledum, Nwigbo Tambari S., & Ojie Peter., Foreign Policy Strategy of the federal Republic of Nigeria 1960- 2012., p.31 97 Jibril, A., Obasanjo and the New face of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, Kaduna: M O D Press. 2004 98 Kia Bariledum, Nwigbo Tambari S., & Ojie Peter., Foreign Policy Strategy of the federal Republic of Nigeria 1960- 2012., p. 33 lxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The late President Yar’Adua who succeeded Obasanjo in 2007 did not embark on as
many foreign trips as Obasanjo. This new era of foreign policy differed from the preceding
period in Nigeria’s diplomacy in which it had always prioritized sub-regional and continental
interests. At the beginning of this administration, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, declared that the Yar'Adua’s administration embraced what he called Citizens
Diplomacy. Although every diplomatic activity must necessarily be centered on the protection of
the welfare and wellbeing of the citizens of the country, this administration tried to put citizens
as its focus, at least at a conceptual framework.99 The criticisms that have followed the
introduction and articulation of this new foreign policy thrust have been so much that nobody
takes the government seriously in terms of foreign policy as the government seems to thrive on
diplomatic blunder. The extent of non-articulation and vagueness of this newly designed
ludicrous foreign policy that has been cheerfully touted as the driver of Nigeria’s policy is seen
in the fact that this is a standard consular obligation owed Nigerians and not policy.
Over the past two years since the administration of President Yar’Adua took over the
reins of governance in Nigeria from Obasanjo, it became very clear that the issue of foreign
policy is not uppermost in the administration’s plan. Much as it is not clear what the policy thrust
is, the much-touted citizens diplomacy is not even clear what it is meant to achieve as the
proponent, Ojo Maduekwe, the Foreign Affairs Minister, has not been able to fully explain what
he means by that which is known to be an obligation – that when a country does not treat another
country’s nationals right, they could also get the same treatment for their own citizens. This
99 Abba Mahmood, What Manner of Citizen Diplomacy? (16 July 2009) http://www.leadershipnigeria.com/index.php/columns/daily-columns/thursdaycolumn/3695-what-manner-of- citizen-diplomacy (Retrieved 1/09/2017) lxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
means that the government did not have any foreign policy thrust apart from the traditional
Africa centeredness that does not make much meaning anymore given the fact that the commitment to the African continent is now in doubt for a government that cannot sustain its economy or develop nor maintain its infrastructure. A country where citizens are not given the basic amenities with all the wealth that accrues from the petroleum resources the nation is blessed with cannot be serious about its citizens whether in Nigeria or outside the shores of the country. A country where virtually all the sectors of the economy are in comatose cannot impose its will on other nations to treat its citizens right when they know Nigeria cannot really do anything, and its leadership does not have the will, to do anything even if provoked. This inactivity on the part of the President and his foreign policy team left Nigeria as on lookers in a fast moving world during President Umaru Yar’Adua’s administration.
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, 2010-2015
President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan succeeded the Yar’Adua’s administration in 2010 after the demise of the former president and piloted the affairs of the nation for 6 years. In his capacity as President, Jonathan embarked on a number of diplomatic shuttles as part of a deliberate attempt to reassure the world that Nigeria was well and secure despite the internal challenges. The relationship between Nigeria and the international community has continued to thrive in the 21 st century. The US-Nigeria Bi-lateral Relations Commission was set up in 2010. It was aimed to establish a mechanism for sustained bilateral, high level dialogue to promote and increase diplomatic, economic and security cooperation between the two countries. However, the foreign policy agenda of late President Yar’Adua of “Citizen Diplomacy” was followed up by
Jonathan with visible actions. He engineered a purposeful organization of Nigerians in the
lxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Diaspora for national development. Not only did the administration encourage the formation of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) in all countries where there are Nigerians, it has gone further to establish a Diaspora communication to take charge of the affairs of Nigerians in
Diaspora. 100
Remarkably, this is a component of the foreign policy objectives of the vision 20:2020.
His prompt response to the denigrating deportation of Nigerians by South Africa sent a very strong signal that Nigeria ‘has come of age’ and that any attempt to denigrate her will have consequences. His diplomacy of consequence is one with visible actions. He was also quick to order the evacuation of Nigerians trapped in the crises torn countries like Libya in 2011 and
Egypt in 2012. In January 2012, Nigeria hosted the fifth Nigeria/EU dialogue which aimed at streaming migration in a globalizing world and in the interest of all parties. The affirmative action’s projected vividly the citizen centered focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy.
After his re-election as the president of Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan reviewed the country’s foreign policy; a foreign policy with focus on Nigeria domestic priorities. The
President noted that although the country had played a leading and facilitating role in Africa, there was need to focus on new priorities and challenges, such as job creation, economic progress, poverty eradication and security, which he said, were topmost on the nation’s national agenda.
In 2011, Jonathan declared that Nigeria’s diplomacy must articulate and vigorously market the country as an environment where business can thrive. Thus, foreign policy came rightly to be seen as the externalization of domestic priorities and aspirations of citizens. As part
100 Soyoye, A Historical Perspective of Nigeria-China Labour Relations 2000-2014, p. 40 lxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
of the economic diplomacy which is evidently at the center stage of vision 20:2020, strengthening of Nigeria’s economic interest through the protection of the country’s businessmen and women wherever they exist in Africa and the rest of the world became a top priority of government. 101 Nigeria’s diplomacy is following trade and sources of foreign direct investment for the same reason; the administration gave special attention to the improvement and strengthening of economic ties with the country’s partners in the international community as a foundation for stability and growth. According to Jonathan in 2011, Nigeria’s foreign policy and diplomacy in the 21st Century are now anchored in the realization of the transformation agenda and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment. 102 During the Jonathan administration, there
were conscious actions by Nigeria to ensure that her efforts and resources towards restoring
peace to many countries in Africa no longer go without commensurate national benefit. It
marked a paradigm shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy. To recall over the years before Jonathan’s
administration, Nigeria had merely made sacrifices without returns. In the Jonathan
administration, Nigeria’s foreign policy while upholding leadership in Africa, strives to ensure
that such role supports and benefits domestic programmes. This means that focusing on Nigeria’s
domestic priorities has not meant the abandonment of African issues. In fact, in partnership with
the African Union, Nigeria continued to lead the process for democracy and development in the
Continent. The main focus of this initiative is to see that at least within the continent there are
true democracies where people elect their leaders. This policy focus according to the president is
very much compatible with Nigeria’s economic diplomacy.
101 Nigeria’s vision 20:2020 accessed at http://www.radionigeriaibadan.com . Retrieved on 2/09/2017 102 Ibid . lxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Globally, during the Jonathan’s administration, Nigeria’s past tends to deepen partnership with other countries. This partnership for the president must be anchored on mutual respect and responsiveness. In the absence of mutual respect and responsiveness consequence will follow.
This was exemplified in the “Iran arms scandal”. On 26 th October 2010, Nigeria’s relations with
Iran became turbulent as a result of the discovery of thirteen containers arms and ammunitions secretly shipped to Nigeria from Iran, this was happening at a time of growing insecurity in
Nigeria, Iranian Mission not only got an immediate response, but Nigeria promptly reported the incident to the United Nations. Perhaps where Nigeria exhibited courage and asserted the independence of her foreign policy was at the United Nations General Assembly’s vote on the
Palestine as a non-member State of the body. Prior to the voting, most Third World countries were under immense pressure from Israel and US to vote No! Nigeria was among the majority that voted for the admission of the State of Palestine in the UN. Similar to the above is the president’s position on the International Criminal Court vis-à-vis its planned trial of the Kenyan president which clearly shows courage and independence in foreign policy. Nigeria’s visibility on the globe outside the peacekeeping/peace enforcement operation began picking up under the regime. Through campaigning, Nigerian candidates got into positions in international organizations such as: Presidency of the Executive Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) based in Montreal, Canada; member, UN Committee on the Elimination of
All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); AU Commissioner for Political Affairs;
Commissioner Political, Peace and Security at the ECOWAS Commission. In October 2011,
Nigeria was also elected to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Vice Presidency of
INTERPOL representing Africa. In November the same year, Nigeria was elected to the
lxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Executive Board of UNESCO for a term of four years while Nigeria’s Attorney General and
Minister of Justice, Hon. Mohammed Bello Adoke, was re-elected to the International Law
Commission.
The Jonathan administration also pursued Nigeria’s desire for permanent membership in the UN Security Council with proactive diplomacy 103 . In May 2011, Nigeria discussed this with
France, one of the key powers, and received France’s promise of support in this regard. 104
Similar support came from China during the historic visit of the President to that country. The election of Nigeria in 2013 as non-permanent member of Security Council is an expression of faith in Nigeria by the international community. Measured in terms of Nigeria’s visibility in the global community, the amount of foreign direct investment and foreign trade inflow which are indices of effective engagement with the outside world, Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust under the
Jonathan administration could be said to have made significant progress.
Objectives and Principles of Israel Africa Foreign Policy
Since the late 1950s Israel commenced its activity in Africa and concentrated first on
Ghana, which gained independence from Britain in 1957. During the 1960s, Israel instantaneously established diplomatic relations with thirty-three African states all newly independent states south of the Sahara except for Mauritania and Somalia, which had nearly
100% Muslim populations and had joined the Arab League, Mauritania in 1973 and Somalia in
1974. In the late fifties and early sixties, Africa south of the Sahara had an important place in
Israeli foreign policy. Israeli embassies in Africa numbered about half of its embassies in the
103 Nigeria’s vision 20:2020 accessed at http://www.radionigeriaibadan.com . Retrieved on 2/09/2017 104 Ikuomola V., France to back Nigeria for UN Security Council Seat’, The Nation , Lagos, 22 nd May. lxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
world, surpassed by the U.S, Britain, and France. 105 Like the foreign policy of other states in the
international system, Israel’s foreign policy was influenced by domestic and external factors. The
way and manner of Israel’s founding in 1948 amidst Arab nations, her domestic and foreign
policy has been geared towards her survival in the face of Arab hostilities. Therefore, this
segment seeks to examine the principles and objectives of Israel foreign policy towards African
states, Nigeria included.
The Political Intention
To begin with, Israel sought to break out of the Arab embargo by enlisting the African
states political support in international forums regarding the Middle East conflict. Cordial
relations with scores of African states gave Israel’s international relations an important added
element. In her efforts to frustrate the Arabs’ goal of isolating and delegitimizing the Jewish
state, Israel considered it important to acquire friends and have a presence in many states in
Africa. Among the reasons that hastened the establishment of Israel’s presence in Africa was its
disappointment with the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung (Indonesia) in 1955. Twenty-
nine countries participated in the Conference, among them fourteen Arab and Muslim countries.
Palestinian leaders also participated as members of the Yemeni and Syrian delegations. Ethiopia
was the only independent African non-Arab country that participated; Ghana (Gold Coast, still
under British rule) sent observers. The conference adopted a one-sided resolution supporting the
Palestinians. 106 As a result of this, Israel sought to break out of the encirclement of a
105 Samuel Decalo, “Africa and the U.N. Anti-Zionism Resolution,” Cultures et Development , vol. 8 p. 92 1976 106 Arye Oded, Africa in Israeli foreign Policy-Expectations and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects. Israel Studies, vol. 15, no. 3. Indian University Press 2010 p. 123 lxx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
hostile Arab world. Another event that prompted Israel to increase its involvement in Africa was the Casablanca Conference in January 1961. Among the participants were Egypt, Morocco,
Libya, Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Israel had already established diplomatic relations with the latter three. The Conference adopted the “African Charter of Casablanca” in which there was a special chapter with six paragraphs, entitled “Resolutions on Palestine”, which called upon
Israel “to restore to the Arabs of Palestine all their legitimate rights” 107 . Paragraph 3: . . .
“notes with resentment that Israel has always taken the side of the Imperialists each time an in the service of Imperialism and neo-colonialism, not only in the Middle East but also in Africa important position had to be taken concerning vital problems about Africa, notably Algeria, the Congo and the nuclear tests in Africa. The Conference, therefore, denounces Israel as an instrument and Asia.”108
Economic and Commercial Interests
The African continent is blessed and rich in important raw materials and minerals such as diamonds, gold, timber, cocoa, coffee, and oil. Several countries, such as Nigeria, Angola,
Gabon, and Chad, produce significant quantities of oil. New sources of oil are regularly discovered in the Gulf of Guinea and in East Africa. Israel hoped to import directly from Africa a variety of raw materials and sell Israeli industrial products, thus increasing the scope of trade with Africa by several-fold. African countries can also serve a capacious operating environment for Israeli public and private companies in a variety of fields. 109
Strategic Benefits
107 Ibid, p. 124 108 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism. (New York), 1962 p.188 109 Ibid lxxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia and Eritrea, is geographically close to Israel and the Red Sea and its outlet, Bab alMandab that are of special importance in assuring maritime passage and air routes to Eastern and Southern Africa. Kenya and Uganda border Arab countries and Israel’s presence there has security importance. Mombasa, the port of Kenya, and Dar al-
Salaam, the port of Tanzania, are important for Israeli cargo and passenger ships on their way to the Far East and Southern Africa. 110
The Islamic Element
One-third of the population of Africa is Muslim as many African states have a Muslim majority or significant Muslim minority. It was the believe of Israel that cooperation with them might keep the Arab-Israeli conflict from becoming a religious confrontation between Israel and the Islamic world. 111
The Ideological Aspect
With respect to the above interests, Israel’s move to establish friendly relations with all African states and the abundance of goodwill in the 1960s evinced by most Israelis towards Africans holds into account ideological, emotional, and human factors. Israel felt a sense of identification and partnership of fate with the Africans. The Jewish people, long the victims of racial discrimination, contempt, and humiliation, felt an affinity for the African peoples, who had also suffered racial discrimination, humiliation, and impoverishment. Israel, a new and developing
110 Ibid 111 Ibid lxxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
country, was willing to make an effort to contribute some of its experience in nation-building and development to the newly independent countries in Africa. 112
It is pertinent to mention in this context that Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, wrote in his book, Alteneuland:
There is another issue involving racial discrimination which still has to be solved. The depth of this problem which involves atrocities and sufferings can be well understood by the Jews. I mean the sufferings of the blacks. It is a very serious question. Think about the horror of the Slave Trade in which human beings were kidnapped and sold as slaves only because of the black colour of their body. Their children are grown in a foreign environment, despised and humiliated only because of the black colour of their face. I am not ashamed to promise this, let people laugh at me because of that. Now that I see the revival of the Jewish nation; I would like very much to take part and assist in the process of redemption and revival of the black people. 113 Meir, the then Israeli Foreign Minister who was responsible for what she called “African adventure” stated that Israel’s motive into Africa was a combination of political and humanitarian. As for the political, she explained that in the 1950s, Israel felt isolated from the world. Israel was not invited to the Bandung Conference because of Arab pressure. Every time she was at the U.N. she felt that, “We have no family here. No one who shares our religion, our language or our past . . . We really belong nowhere and to no one except to ourselves . . . and I must admit that it hurt.” Nevertheless, she continued, “the world was not made up of Europeans and Asians, and there were also the emerging nations of Africa with whom Israel had many historical and modern similarities and with whom Israel can find friends and cooperate.” To
112 Arye Oded, op. cit. p. 125 113 Benjamin Neuberger, “Early African Nationalism, Judaism and Zionism,” Africa Bulletin, 15 (1989) p. 5 lxxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israel’s adversaries who claimed that Israel’s main interest was just to exploit Africa politically, she responded:
“Let me at once anticipate the cynics. Did we go into Africa because we wanted votes at the United Nations? Yes, of course that was one of our motives—and a perfectly honourable one—which I never, at any time, concealed either from myself or from the Africans. But it was far from being the most important motive, though it certainly wasn’t trivial. The main reason for our African “adventure” was that we had something we wanted to pass on to nations that were even younger and less experienced than ourselves.” 114 Meir initiated many development projects in Africa and in this regard she said: “I am proud of Israel’s international cooperation programme and the technical aid we gave to the people of Africa than I am of any other single project we have ever undertaken.” 115
114 Quoted in Golda Meir, My Life (London 1976) p. 264. 115 Ibid p. 265 lxxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
CHAPTER THREE: NIGERIA-ISRAELI POLITICAL RELATIONS
Introduction
Nigeria’s relationship with Israel should barely have been a routine affair, marked with the usual diplomatic and economic contacts, without anything that could be described as out of the ordinary. This is so because, Nigeria and Israel belonged to two separate worlds diplomatically. Nigeria is sub-Sahara African distinguished by its size as the most populous in the sub-region, domestically heterogenous, with equally varied political viewpoints.
Economically, it is a non-industrial raw material exporting country with special dependence on crude oil. Typically, Nigeria is a regular member of the international community, a country without marked extremes in its international relations.
lxxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israel on the other hand, is a small country of some five million 116 people which pales
beside Nigeria’s 100 million. 117 Then Israel is a Jewish, Middle Eastern country, founded by
European Jews with Western imperial support in 1948.118 Thus politically and culturally, Israel is
oriented towards Western Europe. Economically, Israel is industrialized capable of exporting a
range of goods and services. But, it has no special economic ties with Nigeria. Between the two,
neither lists the other as a major, or even significant, economic partner in its international
economic relations. Further, Israel has built a strong military industry because of its intractable
conflict with the Arab states, such that it could meet some of Nigeria’s needs in that regard.
In 1960, when Nigeria attained independence, Nigeria recognized the State of Israel and
the diplomatic ties between the two countries was halfway in the sense that Israel had an
embassy in Nigeria in 1960, while Nigeria had none in Israel. From the 1970s to the 1980s there
were no diplomatic ties because, the Yakubu Gowon military administration broke diplomatic
ties with Israel. In the 1990s, full diplomatic ties with exchanges of resident ambassadors were
established between the two countries for the first time. A related dimension to this unique
situation was that economic ties between the two countries were unaffected despite the breaking
off of diplomatic relations between both countries. Inevitably, this situation generated its own
politics i.e. the politics of restoring full ties between Nigeria and Israel.
However, as the balance of the relationship over the issue of annual pilgrimage shows,
the politics of diplomatic ties had more impact on Nigeria than on Israel. Nigeria is much more
116 Bukar Bukarambe, Nigeria-Israel Relations. Lagos, Foreign Service Academy , September 1996 117 ibid 118 ibid lxxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
vulnerable to Israel than Israel to Nigeria given Israel’s self-sufficiency on all fronts. Thus, from the Nigerian perspective, the troubled and uneasy aspects in their relationship stems from the way in which Israel impinges on its domestic politics because both countries relations were more politicized from 1960 to the mid-1990s. This has to do both with the heterogeneous characteristics of Nigeria’s domestic politics and the equally varied and contentious nature of the diplomatic linkages between the two countries. 119
Nigeria’s bilateral relations with Israel had been defined by factors such as: the way
Israel was founded in 1948 through Western Imperial support of the United States and Britain;
the intractable Arab/Israeli conflict; the African-Arab framework created through the
Organization of African Unity (OAU); and Nigeria’s categorization of Africa as the ‘centre-
piece’ of its foreign policy. On this premise, Nigeria’s relationship with Israel operates in a web
of four inter-related concentric circles. These are the international, the Arab world, the African
and the bilateral circles. 120
Methodologically, the international circle would be examined first and the bilateral circle last, so that a funnel effect would be created where the discourse would flow from the global through the regional to the domestic.
Nigeria-Israel Relations: The International Circle
For both countries, the international circle represents the general backdrop of their
respective international relations in the sense that each state views the international system from
119 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.4 120 ibid lxxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
different ideological perspectives and the pursuance of their respective national interests in their respective relations with other countries within the comity of nations. Nigeria’s world view at independence and in subsequent years was dominated by its colonial history, its regional or
African environment and the experiences of its ties with the major powers in international politics. This influenced her to take an ‘African centered foreign policy’ in which Nigeria pledged to combat issues like settler colonialism and apartheid, quests for African unity and cooperation among African countries under the auspices of the OAU.
Israel’s world view, on the other hand, was dominated by Jewish culture and the manner of its founding, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the total chain process of activities generated by these two dominant factors. Jewish history left the clear majority of Jews in Diaspora even after the founding of Israel. In Nigeria’s regional context, there are Jewish citizens in Ethiopia, South
Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. The manner of its founding by European Jews wholly supported by the West, particularly Britain and the United States of America has established
Israel as a Western State with Middle East roots. The Arab-Israeli conflict is being fought both at the military and diplomatic levels. With the latter that meant ensuring the continued support of the United States and denying the Arab states any form of diplomatic victory regarding the conflict. 121
Thus, at independence, Nigeria began its debut in international politics by debating what
kind of ties it would have with Israel, or whether it would have any at all.122 This unease
reflected the considerable differences in their worldviews and national commitments. Israel was
121 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.5 122 A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience, (Ibadan university Press, 1974). lxxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
operating as a Jewish, Middle Eastern state as core European. Thus, it had ties with apartheid
South Africa and within the Western framework it was not averse to Portugal’s imperial ambition in Angola, Mozambique and its other colonies in Africa. But at the same time, Israel was concerned about diplomatic isolation in Africa both by way of its conflict with the Arab states, and its relations with the settler colonies in Africa. Significantly, because of its status within the western system, it had the full support of the United States in its bid to preserve its diplomatic interests and status in Africa. 123
But from Nigerian perspective, Israel’s standing in Africa, particularly as it pertained to active ties with apartheid South Africa and the other settler colonies was untenable principally because, Israel was not a major power and as such it could not pretend to enjoy the stature of a major power by having unimpeded ties with apartheid South Africa and other African states.
Also, there was the extra dimension created by the OAU which has brought African and Arab states together within a continental African framework. In this context, Arab states were expecting diplomatic support from their African counterparts as a matter of rule and systematic obligation. In that regard, they point to the fact that no Arab state had any diplomatic ties with apartheid South Africa and the other settler colonies. 124
Thus, by their own national self-definitions, Nigeria and Israel were set along a contentious course where they diplomatically had more disagreements than consensus. But strategically, Israel had the easier part because it was satisfied with the situation of having diplomatic ties with all African states including apartheid South Africa. Outside Africa, such a
123 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.6 124 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.7 lxxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
situation would be a diplomatic victory over the Arab states as well. However, Nigeria was in a diplomatic quandary because, she had to decide on ties with Israel while having to contend with her own African obligations towards eradicating colonialism and apartheid, as well as her obligations towards the Arab states within the multilateral framework of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) on matters of the Arab/Israeli conflict.125
Beyond the national ideological and the regional view, there was also the added
dimension of how Israel features in Nigeria’s relations with the Western powers, particularly the
United States. Given its status relative to Israel as the key guarantor of its security and an aligned interlocutor in any Arab-Israeli negotiations, the United States has taken upon itself to support
Israel in its endeavours to expand its diplomatic network in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
With reference to Africa, at least two examples can be cited: First, the memorandum of understanding which the United States signed with Israel in November 1981 which allowed
Israel to disburse American aid fund.126 And second, the commitment by the United States to assist Israel in its bid to get the United Nations to repeal its resolutions denouncing Israel, particularly those engineered by the Arab states with the support of other developing countries.
One of the most prominent of such United Nations resolutions was the one adopted in the
General Assembly in November 1975 which equated Zionism (Israel’s Founding Ideology) with racism and racial discrimination. In effect, that placed Israel on the same pedestal with apartheid
125 ibid 126 James Adams, Israel and South Africa: The Unholy Alliance, (London Quarter Books, 1984), p. 98. lxxx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
South Africa. With American campaign, the UN General Assembly repealed that resolution in
1991.127
Thus, with their differing world views and national commitments, try as they might,
Nigeria and Israel could not avoid a contentious relationship in their respective international politics.
Nigeria-Israel Relations: The Arab World Circle
This circle relates to the impact of the African-Arab relations, within the African-Arab framework cast by the OAU on Nigeria-Israel relations. From the perspective of the Arab states,
Nigeria and other African states were under some obligation to support them in their conflict with Israel because of their common membership in the OAU. Besides that, the Arab states also invoked the principle of reciprocity by citing the special characteristics of Israel and apartheid
South Africa and the equally special ties between them and how that affects African and Arab states alike in equal measure. In this regard, the Arab states argue that none of them has any diplomatic ties with apartheid South Africa. 128 The Late president of Algeria, Houari
Boumedienne reminded African states at an OAU summit in May 1973 that it is inconceivable that the OAU would adopt a single united stand against colonialism in southern Africa while remaining divided over Zionism and colonialism in northern Africa.129
In the 1970s after the Yom Kippur War, the Arabs utilized the global oil crisis to increase pressure on African states to break relations with Israel with the promise that African states will
127 International Herald Tribune, September 17, 1993, p. 5. 128 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.8 129 African Research Bulletin, May 1973, p. 284. lxxxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
receive aid through institutions such as the Arab Bank for Economic Development in (ABEDA).
Also, African states were promised that oil sales to them will be at concessionary rates that differs from the world market price. But Nigeria, an oil exporter like the Arab members of
OPEC, was unaffected by the pressure of granting or denying aid. 130
In the final analysis, it was the logic of national obligation within the African-Arab
framework cast by the OAU that weighed heavily on Nigeria-Israel relations. On October 25,
1973 Nigeria severed diplomatic ties with Israel to sympathize with the Arab states in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War which took place in the same month. With that Nigeria became
one of the seventeen African states that broke diplomatic ties with Israel in October 1973 alone.
(The others were Zaire, Rwanda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea; Tanzania,
Madagascar, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gambia, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Senegal
and Gabon, Zaire broke ties with Israel before the October War, while the rest did so after the
war). 131
Nigeria-Israel Relations: The African Circle
As an African state, the African circle is Nigeria’s definitive operational environment.
This is the circle that gives Nigeria its sense of statehood, its worldview, and its foreign policy focus. It is from this perspective that Nigeria designated Africa as the “centre-piece” of its foreign policy. This position does not deny the basic fact that Nigeria like other developing countries across the world remains tied to the erstwhile metropolitan powers economically and
130 Interview with Prof. Olusola Ojo 131 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.9 lxxxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
technologically. Instead of denial, the concept of Africa as the centre piece is predicated on an ideological position which ultimately seeks a reversal of that colonial legacy in favour of Africa.
This is the basis of the position commonly adopted by Nigeria and other African states in their international relations which puts them ideologically at loggerheads with the West despite the deep-seated ties between them. The regular condemnations of Western perpetuation of imbalances in international trade, and support for residual colonial relics like apartheid in South
Africa by Nigeria and other African states, might appear ironical given the intensity of economic ties between them and the West. But that is the essence of the concept of Africa as the centre. To begin with, Israel had its historic ties with apartheid South Africa at least as they pertain to the presence of Jewish citizens in South Africa. But for Nigeria, it also obtained that those Jewish citizens were a distinct strand of the white population, heavily involved in the apartheid regime as whites, industrial and corporate executives and employee of apartheid labour. They were not by-standers and Israel had always been actively involved in South Africa. Further, there was also the record of Israel’s involvement in African conflicts in ways that exacerbated them.132 For
Israel that was diplomacy as usual aimed at expanding its presence in Africa such that the involvement in the conflicts were tactical steps taken to punish un-cooperating African states trapped in conflict situations. But for Nigeria, that constituted a form of challenge because in principle such involvement by foreign countries undermines African states and African institutions.
132 Olajide Aluko, “Israel and Nigeria: Continuity and Change in their Relationship”. African Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1974. lxxxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
At the multi-lateral level, Nigeria Africa also had to contend with the impact of the Arab-
Israeli conflict on African-Arab relations. The Arab members of the OAU use the African forum to express their views, part of which includes the expectation that African states would fulfill their obligations under the OAU. They expect African states to support them against Israel.
However, until the collapse of its diplomatic network in 1973, Israel could maintain a substantial diplomatic presence in Africa. Despite its principle of denoting Africa as the centre-piece of its foreign policy and the position of Israel’s ties with apartheid South Africa, Nigeria (along with most of black African states) had full diplomatic ties with Israel until the mass severance of
1973. 133
Nigeria-Israel Relations: The Bilateral Circle
The bilateral circle hugs all the other circles enumerated above i.e. the international, the
Arab world and the African circles. It is through this that she receives all the factors funneled down from the other three circles. Thus, characteristically the bilateral circle incorporates and represents Nigeria’s domestic situation exclusively while it shares the external projection with the other three circles. This creates a two-way process where activities from the three circles reverberate on to the domestic situation represented by the bilateral circles; there the impact is transformed into policy decisions which projected outwards as Nigeria’s response to any given aspect involving Nigeria-Israel relations. In this regard, the discourse on the bilateral circle translates into a summation and recapitulation of the defining activities of the other three circles in the content of Nigeria’s domestic situation including decision making and policy preferences.
133 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.13 lxxxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
In effect, this means that the bilateral circle, involving direct Nigeria-Israel relations without the intervening forces typical of the other circles, has ‘three aspects’. These include the diplomatic relations, the functional and cooperative relations and Nigeria’s domestic, political situation. 134
The Diplomatic Relations Aspect
This pertains to the nature and substance of the diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Israel over the years since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. When Nigeria embarked on international relations as a sovereign state, it was confronted with Israel’s diplomatic stand in Africa and elsewhere to which it had to respond. This was the substance of the trend of events in the international arena, Arab world and African circles after then. There were a succession of events and issues involving Israel to which Nigeria had to respond by taking a diplomatic stand that affected its domestic base.
In the 1960s, Nigeria maintained half-way diplomatic ties with Israel in what was clearly a compromise arrangement to cater for the dictates of these pressures of all circles. Nigeria established diplomatic ties with Israel in 1960, but it refused to maintain a resident ambassador in Israel’s capital, Tel Aviv 135 while Israel had an embassy in Lagos. This situation obtained until
October 1973, when Nigeria joined other African states to break all diplomatic ties with Israel. In
the 1980s, African states began restoring ties with Israel following the lead of Egypt which
signed a peace treaty with Israel in March 1979. In that context, Nigeria restored its ties with
134 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.14 135 A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism, op.cit lxxxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israel in May 1992, but unlike the 1960s this time there was full exchange of resident ambassadors from both sides. 136
Apart from the diplomatic angle itself, there were two significant experiences throughout
this period. First, that during the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970, Israel did not
support the federal government, opting for the secessionists instead 137 . But the half-way diplomatic ties remained the same. The second experiences relate to the fact that when Nigeria resumed its ties with Israel in 1992, it did so mainly because of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, as the 1973 decision to sever ties had become obsolete.
The Functional and Cooperative Relation’s Aspect
This facet is the reverse side of the diplomatic and it is revealing in the way it exposes
how Nigeria has been practical about its relationship with Israel over the years since the 1960s.
Throughout the period when Nigeria either had only half-way diplomatic ties with Israel or none,
economic and commercial ties between the two countries remained unaffected. Nigeria remained
one of Israel’s biggest trading partners in Africa.138 Israeli companies like Soleh Boneh continued to operate in Nigeria 139 and related to all these, Israeli expatriates operated in Nigeria
unhindered.
But perhaps more remarkable given the persistent diplomatic ambiguity were the
instances of strategic cooperation between the two countries. In 1983, Israel supplied anti-riot
136 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.15 137 John Stremlau, the international politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1957-1970. (N.J. Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 235-5. 138 Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book (IMF Washington) see various years. 139 Olajide Aluko, “Israel and Nigeria” op.cit. p. 45. lxxxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
gas, bullet proof vests and other police and security equipment to Nigeria 140 . And in July 1984, three Israelis were part of a Nigerian security team which tried (unsuccessfully) to kidnap, in
London, Umaru Dikko, a fugitive former transport minister, who was declared wanted by the federal military government at the time 141 . That created a separate diplomatic storm with Britain
which came to be known as the Umaru Dikko affair.
The Nigerian-Domestic Politics Scene
The domestic facet relates to how Israel features in Nigerian politics against the backdrop
of the total sum of activities, pressures and policy stands adopted by Nigeria in relation to the
various perspectives of all the four circles examined above. In every circle, Nigeria was
confronted with an exact situation and it had to respond in certain identifiable ways in each case.
This process of deciding on a certain course of action in response to the diplomatic perspective
of each circle is what routinely creates public interest in the prevailing nature of the relationship
between Nigeria and Israel. On one hand is the broad range of opinion that come with Nigeria’s
ethnic and regional diversity and on the other hand is equally diverse viewpoints emanating from
each of the four circles. It is inevitable that public interest in Nigeria about its relationship with
Israel would ever abate and no solutions were entirely satisfactory. For example, how could the
situation where Israel would have full diplomatic ties with both Nigeria and apartheid South
Africa be assessed in the light of Nigeria’s ideological and nationalistic commitment to the
eradication of apartheid? Such contemplations are pertinent because Israel is not a great power
and therefore it is given that it cannot have maximum leeway in international politics. There is
140 The Observer (London), July 17, 1983, p. 5. 141 The Middle East, January 1985, p. 39. lxxxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
another angle, if the persistence of having strained ties with Israel is inimical to the interests of
Nigerian Christian pilgrims, does it mean that a situation of negative relations is favourable to
Nigerian Muslims who go to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage? or how would the situation where
Nigeria has no diplomatic ties with Israel but maintains active economic and security cooperation ties with it be assessed? Is it being ironical, hypocritical, and pragmatic or simply being practical? But either way, some sense of dilemma would be inevitable. 142
Significantly, Israel never had to be concerned with such self-examinations because from
its own diplomatic standpoint, Nigeria had always been just one country in the African
diplomatic mosaic to be won over. Hence, for Israel having full ties with Nigeria (and the rest of
black African states) amounts to diplomatic victory over the Arab states that seek its isolation.
Furthermore, it also amounts to a diplomatic victory over the black African states themselves
because Israel would have it both ways by continuing to maintain its historic ties with also
apartheid South Africa. Overall, all these subtle victories would serve to enhance its diplomatic
position with other countries outside the African and Arab worlds. 143
Thus, with every trip and snag in their relationship, Israel remained calm and steadfast
insisting its innocence and interest in having full diplomatic ties, while Nigeria lapses into
furious internal debate over Israel. A random sample of representative remarks by Nigerians over
the years since the 1960s would elaborate on this assertion.
i. The 1960s
142 Bukar Bukarambe op.cit p.18 143 ibid lxxxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
“I myself am almost an Israelite. I love and admire Israel …” 144 “You (Israelis) can be assured of our friendship and support at any place and we promise never to withdraw this.” 145 “To me it (Israel) does not exit…” 146 ii. The 1970s and 1980s
“Almighty God Will bless any nation that blesses Israel and curse any nation that curses her.” 147
iii. The 1990s
“We know for instance that you have the command of financial institutions of the world through your kith and kin in several industrialized and highly developed economies and we believe also that your influence can bring some meaningful investment…” 148
The Politics Of Restoration Of Diplomatic Relations With Israel
In 1973, Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with Israel in furtherance of its Cardinal foreign policy objective of “Africa as its centre-piece” of her foreign policy. The 1973 Arab-
Israeli conflict saw the encroachment of Egyptian land, the Sinai Peninsula by Israel which drew the condemnation of African states against Israel leading to the eventual outcast of Israel in
Africa. However, this position began to change in 1977 when the Egyptian President, Anwar
Sadat embarked on his bold initiatives to resolving the Middle East crisis. This eventually led to the signing of the Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel on 26 March, 1979 which was
144 Statement by Dr. M. Okpara, the Premier of Eastern Region in Akinyemi Bolaji, Foreign Policy and Federalism. op. cit. p.104. 145 Statement by Chief S.L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region. Ibid., p. 104. 146 Statement by the Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello. Ibid., p. 104. 147 The Guardian (Lagos) December 12, 1985, p. 3. 148 Statement by Nigeria’s Minister of external Affairs, Major-General Ike Nwachukwu while visiting Israel in 1991. The Guardian (Lagos) August 6, 1991, p. 2. lxxxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
received with great enthusiasm by different quarters in the Nigerian society to the extent that the
Camp David accords were among the issues raised in that year’s election campaign. 149
Although, the Nigerian government supported the agreements, she reiterated the need for
a solution to the Palestinian question and further criticized Egypt for not consulting with the
OAU before signing the accords. However, the Camp David accords provided renewed
opportunity for opposition leaders in Nigeria to extend their unreserved support. 150 Among such
leaders was Dr. Nanmdi Azikwe, head of the Nigerian People’s Party to declare that the Camp
David agreements open the way for his party to “smooth relations with Israel.” 151 The 1979
Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel had overbearing significance in Nigeria domestic polity as it sparked public discourse and arguments in support of restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel.
One of the cardinal arguments against the break of diplomatic ties with Israel by African states, Nigeria included was out of solidarity with Egypt whose territory was occupied by Israel and given that Egypt itself renewed relations with Israel, there was no reason for African countries including Nigeria to continue boycotting Israel. The Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ishaya
Audu, in an interview to the Sunday Times of Lagos, remarked that, in light of the Egypt-Israel rapprochement, Nigeria should also reconsider its stand towards Israel. 152 Similarly, Michael
Ajasin, Governor of Ondo State said that Nigeria should not share in the prejudices of the Arabs.
“Egypt and Israel have settled their differences; why should Nigeria not reopen relations with
149 Oded Arye, Africa and the Middle East Conflict. Lynne Rienner Publishers: United States of America, 1987 p. 176 150 Ibid 151 Ghanaian Times, February 26, 1979 152 Sunday Times, January 27, 1980 xc This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israel?” 153 Nigerian opposition leaders and press were even more vocal. In May 1982, E.C. Ebo
moved a draft motion in the National Assembly on behalf of 106 members, titled “On the
Renewal of Diplomatic Relations with Israel by Nigeria and other African States.” In its second
paragraph the motion stated:
“Cognizant of the fact that Israel and Egypt, the principal belligerents, have already established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial levels; and that the two Heads of State exchanged visits; and that some African states, in sympathy with Egypt, severed normal relations with Israel in 1973, but have not, unfortunately, relaxed their decision; that delay lacks merit, that policy is now baseless and overtaken by events. Be it hereby resolved that this House directs that Nigeria should, with immediate effect, reestablish, renew and seek normal diplomatic, consular trade and cultural relations as well as technical cooperation with Israel at ambassadorial levels.” 154 During the 1983 Presidential election campaign, the issue of relations with Israel was
raised by all three main contenders. Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria
(UPN) and Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe of the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) declared that they would
consider reestablishing relations with Israel if elected while the incumbent President, Shehu
Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) opposed the idea. From hindsight, based on
compelling arguments and available facts, why would the incumbent President, Shehu Shagari
oppose idea of restoring relations with Israel? Perhaps, it could be as a result of political game of
numbers. 1983 was the presidential election year in Nigeria and with Shagari’s core support
coming from the North; he sought to appeal to them by aligning himself with issues which are
favourable to them. In the words of Olusola Ojo:
153 Daily Times, February 21, 1980 154 Nigerian Forum, July-August, p. 740-745 xci This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
“Shagari while campaigning in Ilorin manipulated the religious factor by stating that restoration of ties with Israel would constitute disengagement of trips to Saudi Arabia as the country would prevent such trips. However, Shagari left out a vital detail which was that all military and police equipment that were on the campaign grounds were procured from Israel with a loan from the Israeli government.!” 155 There continued favourable attitudes towards the restoration of ties with Israel in
Nigerian newspapers. The Daily Times wrote: “Anwar Sadat of Egypt made an equally moral sacrifice by giving up war and hostility and by entering into peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, our agreement upon the survival of the State of Israel could be expressed most profitably and morally by reopening diplomatic relations with Israel.” 156 Also in opposition newspapers, the
argument for the restoration of diplomatic relations was raided repeatedly. In an article titled
“Time to Think”, the Nigerian Sunday Observer said,
“In 1973 Africa, especially Black Africa broke with Israel because of Israel’s occupation of African soil and because of the Israeli war with Egypt. Both reasons have now been neutralized. The exchange of ambassadors is the final act of Egyptian recognition of Israel. If this is the case, Africa’s argument for maintaining hostilities with Israel has been plummeted.” 157 Again, another opposition newspaper, The Punch, stated that about 70 percent of
Nigerians polled favoured renewing diplomatic relations with Israel, and many explained that
since Egypt and Israel had resolved to normalize relations, Nigeria should follow suit. 158
Furthermore, there were other compelling arguments which backed the restoration of ties with
Israel especially in the area of technical assistance in the fields of agriculture, irrigation and youth movements. This came to the front burner of public discourse by opposition newspapers
155 Personal interview with Olusola Ojo. Ibadan, 17 th June, 2017 156 Daily Times, September 20, 1979 157 Sunday Observer, February 24, 1980 158 The Punch, April 27, 1980 xcii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
editorials when an Israeli delegation arrived in Lagos in April 1982 to participate in the Inter-
Parliamentary Union meeting. Much importance was attached to Israel’s aid in agriculture, a field where Nigerian government had decided to concentrate and embark on a “green revolution” programme. The Nigerian Tribune commented: “We say that Nigeria should renew relations with Israel immediately to see how Green Revolution fertilizer does not mean bloated fertilizer contracts.” 159 The Satellite said: “There is much to learn from the Israelis, who out of sheer
industry, hard work, and determination to survive, amazed the world that not long after
successfully establishing a nation-state, they have turned their barren homelands into a first-class
agricultural and industrial country.” 160 Similar opinions were also expressed in the pro-
government. For example, The Daily Times wrote: “.Despite the break of diplomatic relations
with Israel, she has played a great part in our agricultural and construction industries. We need
the Israelis to help in the battle against desert encroachment. We need them in our hospitals …
We need them for quick development of our agriculture.” 161
In March 1982, members of the house of assembly from Nigeria’s Ogun State adopted a
motion calling on the Federal Government to change its foreign policy towards Israel and to
restore diplomatic relations. They pointed out that such a step would promote Nigeria’s national
interests, because the country would benefit tremendously from Israel’s help, especially in the
development of modern agriculture. 162 Regardless of the compelling arguments in favour of
restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel, there remained one critical argument against the
159 Nigerian Tribune, April 20, 1982 160 Satellite, April 20, 1982 161 Daily Times, December 11, 1979 162 Nigerian Tribune, March 30, 1982 xciii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
collaboration with apartheid South Africa which Nigeria totally frowned at as she was the frontline state against the apartheid regime in South Africa. However, the supporters of Israel reject this claim and maintain the Israel-South Africa connection should not hamper the reinstitution of diplomatic relations. The Sunday Observer wrote:
“To claim that Israel deals with South Africa is only a belated attempt at fault-finding. First, we have to remember that this reason was not the original one given for breaking relations with Israel. It was more of an afterthought. Secondly, was it not the African cut-off that drove the latter to apartheid South Africa? Do the United States, Britain, West Germany, China, the whole Western and Eastern Europe and South America not fraternize with South Africa? Do we not have relations with these countries and these regions of the world? If foreign policy is based on the interests of states, then it is about time Africa normalize her relations with Israel.” 163 In 1991, during the military administration of General Ibrahim Babangida, the then
Foreign Minister, Major General Ike Nwachukwu admitted that “Africa could not allow itself to be left out in the current efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and other parts of the world.” 164 He also admitted that the restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel was “aimed at getting Africa back into the mainstream of world politics.” 165 However, in 1992, Nigeria restored full diplomatic ties with Israel and General Babangida noted that Nigeria’s renewal of diplomatic relations was deliberately designed for Nigeria by his administration “to remain relevant in world affairs” 166 noting that “… we do not want to be left in an empty shell.” 167 He further reiterated
163 Sunday Observer, December 20, 1982 164 African Concord, 1991 p.24 165 Ibid 166 Terhemba N. Ambe-Uva & Kasali M. Adegboyega, The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigeria/Israeli Relations. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, no. 3 & 4. Fall & Winter 2007 p. 47 167 Ibid xciv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
the intention of the Nigerian government to be part of the Middle East Peace Process, speculating that Nigeria would host one of the peace meetings. 168
The restoration of ties with Israel came after a long and cautious process of covert and overt contacts between the two countries at various international fora and levels. The resumption of political ties between Nigeria and Israel was a major foreign policy achievement for the
Babangida's regime, considering the historical opposition of the conservative Northern Muslim
Aristocrats. While the diplomatic break between the two countries was a watershed in Nigeria -
Israel relations, the restoration of ties after two decades became an even more significant event.
It was not only a Nigerian decision but a decision attributable to many factors. In other words, the diplomatic break was simply a hesitant response to an OAU collective decision, while the restoration was necessitated by many factors of domestic and external conditions. 169
While showing Nigeria's concern to the intractable conflicts in the Middle East, especially the Arab - Israeli conflict, General Babangida blamed the comity of nations for failing to resolve the conflict, and urged both Israel and Palestine to consider the peace option within the
United Nations Resolution 242. 170 Prior to the full restoration of ties between Nigeria and the
State of Israel, there have been some important events that are noteworthy. For instance, in
February 1988, General Babangida attended the burial of Emperor Hirohito of Japan; during the occasion, he met with the Israeli President. But government officials were quick to stress that the
168 Omotere Tope, The Roles of Domestic Factors in Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Relations, 1960-2007. Ego Booster Books 2011 169 Birai U.M., Major Issues in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under the Babangida Regime: Lesson for the future. A paper presented at Three Day Symposium on the Babangida Regime: Problems and Prospective of Interpretation Held at Hilton Hotel Jos, 13-15 October, 2000. P. 167 170 IBB., 1987 in Birai op. cit. p. 168 xcv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
meeting was purely at the instance of the Israeli President. 171 Nevertheless, earlier in October
1987, the then Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi had met with his
Israeli counterpart at the United Nations. This meeting was severely criticized by a section of the
Nigerian Press which saw the meeting as a move to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, some
of them called for the outright removal of Professor Akinyemi. 172
In January 1988, Akinyemi was dropped by Babangida as the Minister of External
Affairs, an action Professor Birai described thus: “That tended to confirm public opinion that
Akinyemi was as a result of his own volition as far as the meeting with the Israeli Foreign
Minister was concerned.173 However, the development between Babangida and the Israeli
President Chian Herzog, in Tokyo in February, 1988, a month later, explained that Akinyemi left the cabinet for different reasons. As rightly observed by Birai, it is very interesting to note that the Government of Babangida never denounced the Akinyemi-Peres meeting, in fact if anything;
President Babangida personally initiated rapprochement between Nigeria and Israel in the early days of his administration and he instructed Bolaji Akinyemi from 1985 to respond to the overtures with Israel at every U.N. General Assembly section.174 ` Also in January 1989, General Babangida gave an explicit hint that obviously indicated a
positive review of Nigeria-Israeli relations while on a state visit to Ghana. Asked by the
Ghanaian Press whether his government was contemplating closeness with Israel, General
Babangida responded thus: "The circumstances that brought about non restoration are fast dying
171 Birai U.M., op. cit. p. 169 172 Maina Williams A., A Critical Appraisal of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under the Military Regimes: 1966-1998. Master’s Thesis, 2003 p. 105 173 Birai U.M., op. cit. p. 169 174 News watch, 1991 in Birai U.M., op. cit. p. 169 xcvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
away and the situation may be different as time goes on."175 And responding on the same issue
while on another state visit to Egypt, on January 29 1989, Babangida cited the emergence of the
state of Palestine as "one of the most significant development in the international arena today." 176
This was followed by an official visit to Israel by General Ike Nwachukwu who replaced Bolaji
Akinyemi as Minister of External Affairs. The reciprocal visit by Mr. David Levy, Israeli
Foreign Minister and also Deputy Prime Minister was rescheduled four times but eventually took place on the 3rd May, 1992. Birai observed rightly, that the visit to Nigeria by Mr. David Levy was the final stage in the process of normalization of diplomatic ties with Israel. This came after two decades of a break and after an extensive process of careful sensitization of the domestic environment. 177 Thus, according to Professor Birai;
The issue has become easily the most politicized, elastically controversial and emotionally sensitive foreign policy matter in the history of Nigeria's foreign relations.178 The visit of General Babangida's Foreign Minister, General Nwachukwu to Israel and the subsequent restoration of relations between Nigeria and Israel were severely criticized by
Northern based Press and General Babangida had to plead to all Nigerians not to bring into the issue religious undertone because according to him, the restoration of diplomatic relations with
Israel, is not a question of one religion against the other. It is simply an issue of international relations, where there is no permanent enemies and permanent friends.179
175 Birai U.M., op. cit. p. 170 176 Maina Williams op. cit. p. 106 177 Ibid p. 107 178 Birai U.M., op. cit. p.172 179 News watch, Lagos, August 19, 1991 p.16 xcvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
In the mixed of the controversy generated by the restoration of relations, General
Babangida tried to rationalize the restoration of diplomatic ties between Nigeria and Israel on the
dynamics in the World and the dire need for Nigeria to be relevant among the comity of Nations;
to explicate further he said:
We looked at what brought about the severing of relationship between Israel and Nigeria at the time we did. Things have changed so you review relations with various countries. We are convinced that what brought about severing of relationship is no We are trying to move along with the current changes in relations between various countries… longer in existence in this country so we decided to review our ties with Israel.180 In addition General Babangida said:
There are number of developments in the World today. We don't want to be in an empty shell. We remain the most important black nation on Earth, and so we must continue to remain relevant in the affairs of the World. 181 It is not in doubt that there are several dimensions to the justification of the restoration of
ties between Nigeria and Israel after two decades of diplomatic rapture. The cautious way the
government went about the process of normalization according to Birai, simply confirmed the
controversial and religiously sensitive the issue was. The government of General Babangida
anchored the justification of the decision on issues that were apparently rational even if it is not
acceptable to those who were against the restoration of ties with Israel. The way the Babangida's
government went about the process also confirmed the fact that the domestic determinants of
180 Citizen Magazine, Kaduna, vol. II no. 35 August 31-September 16, 1992 p.21 181 The Guardian Newspaper, Lagos, August 17, 1991 xcviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
foreign policy may exert an overwhelming influence on the foreign policy pursuits of a nation- state. 182
This fact no doubt echoed Henry Kissinger's, Ibrahim Gambari's and Paul Izah's position
that domestic determinants influence the cause and context of foreign policy of nation-states. It is
very important to stress that the government's decision on the restoration of ties with Israel was
not hastily taken. The decision was carefully planned, with the domestic environment, cautiously
cultivated for its success; there was also an encouraging stimulation from the external
environment to complement its domestic determinants. Aside from the oppositions view, the
decision of the General Babangida's government to restore diplomatic ties between Nigeria and
Israel remained a very historic issue in the diplomatic history of Nigeria. As Professor Birai in
his concludes:
It was a decision that fits into the style and conduct of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida's foreign policy.183
Critique of Severance of Relationship with Israel and Middle East Crisis
The former Organization of African Unity (OAU) played a crucial role in influencing the breakoff between Nigeria and Israeli diplomatic ties. However, the Federal Military Government at the time possibly used OAU as a cover to severe her relationship with Israel. This action shows that the then government lacked national interest, a thrust that every state always claim as a backdrop for their foreign policy. Though, the government eventually severed relationship with
182 Maina Williams op. cit. p.108 183 Osaghe Eghosa E., Crippled Giant: Nigeria since independence. Hurst and Company. London. 1998 p.57 xcix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israel at the federal level, the states still permitted trading and transacting with Israeli companies.
What the military government did that time was to play along with the majority members of
OAU, and also a ‘solidarity and sympathy for Egypt, an African country.’ As Prof. Olusola Ojo aptly puts it:
“Many African leaders and diplomats continued having relations with Israel even though they had already severed diplomatic ties as African leaders never fully understood the gravity of breaking diplomatic relations with Israel…as they just felt the OAU resolution was more of a condemnation.”184
Nigerian policy makers at that time could not critically review African-Middle East
diplomacy from Nigerian-Israel Bilateral relations, both were muddled together. Their action and
decision connote lack of in-depth analysis and pragmatic approach with salient issues in foreign
policy and international relations. Finally, it pertinent to note that breaking of diplomatic ties
with other states has same effects on matters such as trade, commerce and technical assistance.
In such situation the citizen, suffer from government decision. Breaking off diplomatic ties
unnecessarily complicates bilateral relation and worsen situation. Nigeria has a lot to gain from
Israel in the areas of agriculture, irrigation, military hardware, science and technology therefore,
the past mistakes should not reoccur again.
Military Aid
Israel is one of the numerous suppliers of major weapons and other military equipment to
Nigeria and other sub-Saharan African states. She has long been involved in selling weapons to
developing countries and the deals are often accompanied by serving or retired Israeli military
184 Personal interview with Olusola Ojo, 17 th June, 2017 c This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
personnel and Israeli civilian contractors as instructors. 185 For most years since 1975, Israel has
ranked generally just below the 10 largest exporters of major weapons. 186 For the period
reviewed, Israel delivered major weapons to Nigeria and eight other African countries with
Nigeria the largest importer of Israeli weapons accounting for almost 50 per cent of Israeli
deliveries to sub-Saharan African states. 187 In 2009, the reported value of Israeli deals with
Nigeria since 2006 was $500 million 188
Table 1: Transfers of Major Weapons by Israel to Nigeria 2006-10
Recipient Number Weapon Description Order Delivery Number Comments Ordered Year Year Delivered Nigeria (9) Aerostar UAV 2006 2007 (9) Part of $260m deal; part of 3 Aerostar UAV systems 2 Shaldag Patrol craft (2008) 2009-10 2 $25m deal
() = uncertain data, UAV= unmanned aerial vehicle. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://www.sipri.org./databases/arms/transfers 31 Mar. 2011
Israel delivered few major weapons to Africa during the period reviewed. However, the
largest weapons deals in which actual deliveries were identified was the sale of an integrated
coastal surveillance systems to Nigeria in 2006. The deal included three (3) Aerostar unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) systems each with three (3) to six (6) UAVs, three (3) Seastar unmanned
185 Beit-Hallahmi B., The Israeli Connection. Pantheon Books: New York, 1987 p. xii 186 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers 187 Siemon T. Wezeman, Israeli Arms Transfer to Sub-Saharan Africa. SIPRI Background Paper 2011 p.2 188 Melman Y., Why did Lieberman really go to Africa?, Ha’aretz, 9 Sep. 2009; and Melman Y., Israeli Arms Dealers join Lieberman entourage to Africa. Ha’aretz, 6 Aug. 2009 ci This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
surface vehicle (USV) systems and ten (10) unidentified coastal radars. 189 According to
Aeronautics, the Israeli company involved, the deal was worth $260 million 190 as such, the arms deal is possibly the largest that Nigeria signed within this period. In 2008, Nigeria signed a $25 million deal that included two Shaldag patrol craft delivered in 2009-10 and training by Israelis for Nigerian crews to take place on both Nigeria and Israel. 191
Conclusion
The first three decades of Nigeria’s relationship with Israel has been strained and uneasy by the turns. Within this period, normal and smooth relationship between the two countries have been extremely rare to the point that such notions can be discounted.
But perhaps more significant in all this is the fact that the pattern of uneven relationship between them was brought about more by their historical backgrounds and diplomatic circumstances than by some other deep-seated antagonisms. Nigeria operated in the specific context of African and Arab framework cast by the OAU while Israel operated within the western system and it has had conflicts with the Arab states. With the involvement of African states, Nigeria became totally variant over its relationship with apartheid South Africa.
From the vantage point of the mid-1990s, it can be asserted that the two countries are set on the course of normal and smooth relations for the first time in their bilateral diplomatic history due to changing circumstances in their respective regional environments. For Nigeria, the
189 Siemon T. Wezeman, op. cit. p.4 190 The value has also been reported as $200 million and includes also 2 maritime patrol aircraft sourced from a non-Israeli company. Daily Trust, Israeli Arms Contract- Government paid 107.5 million Euros from crude account. Aug. 1, 2006 191 Volman D., Nigerian Government gears up for another offensive in the Delta. , African Security Research Project, Sep. 2009 http://concernedafricascholars.org/african-security-research-project/?80 cii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
demise of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 has brought the nagging question of residual colonialism in Africa to a close. As such there are no inhibiting ideological differences between the two countries in the African setting. For Israel, progress in peace negotiations with the Arab states (in that it has already signed peace agreements with Egypt, Jordan and the PLO) has softened the hard edges of the Arab-Israeli conflict such that African states are no longer under
OAU obligations like in the 1960s and 1980s to isolate it. For both, the old obstacles inhibiting their relationship are falling away.
However, the matter that can cause uproar in both countries political relations stems from the movement of Nigerian embassy in Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem in which both the Palestinians and the Israelis have claimed to be their capital but at this point, the Israeli government has tacitly accepted the fact that states are not moving their embassies to Jerusalem and the Israelis are not making any moves to change such action. In other words, relations between Nigeria and Israel will continue to deepen as envisaged with the visit of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan official visit to Israel in 2013 which was the first ever visit of any Nigerian head of state to Israel.
CHAPTER FOUR: NIGERIA-ISRAEL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Trade
ciii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israel offered to assist African states as a way to engage them on an economic plane in their decade of independence. Prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960, there were already established contacts between the Israeli government and the regional governments of the
Western and Eastern Nigeria. This effort by the Israeli government was facilitated by the constitutional provisions of the Nigerian government which allowed constituent regions of the federation to develop their own ‘foreign policies’ as each region could establish autonomous offices in London, and develop contacts with foreign governments in pursuit of their own social and industrial developments. This initiative facilitated the visit of a Western regional delegation to Israel in 1958 led by its Minister of Agriculture, Chief Akin Deko to observe cooperative movements as well as cooperation negotiation agreements in the field of agriculture and cooperatives. In addition, the delegation negotiated the setting up of a few joint ventures with the
Israeli concerns. Because of these negotiations, the Nigersol Construction Company and the
Nigerian Water Resources Development Corporation were set up in 1959. 192
Similarly, joint ventures such as the Eastern Nigeria Construction and Furniture
Company were also set up between the Israeli government and the Eastern Nigeria
government. 193 Subsequently, the Nigerian government formalized political relations with Israel in 1960 which extended to economic engagement between both countries. Israel set up her embassy in Lagos in 1960 and given the antagonistic attitude of the ruling class preponderantly
192 Ojo, O., “Nigeria and Israel in: Nigeria’s External Foreign Policy: Twenty-Five Years” Olusanya and Akindele (eds.) Ibadan: University Press Limited. 1986 193 Ninth Annual Report of the Eastern Nigeria Development Corporation, 1963-64 (Enugu: Government Printer), pp. 31-32 civ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Northern, the Federal Government declined to open a consulate in Tel Aviv.194 The implication
of this was that Nigerian government could not engage in direct trade relations with the Israeli
government. It was the regional governments in Nigeria, particularly the Western Region, that
built up formal commercial ties with Israel in the 1960s. As indicated by Israeli insights, the
trade volume between the two nations as at 1962 stood Israeli exports at $2.874, 000 and Nigeria
Imports at $282, 000.195
Between 1960 and 1966, Nigeria and Israel had series of bilateral agreements that cut
across trade, agriculture, educational network, medical institutions and technological training.196
Hundreds of Nigerian farmers, experts, educators, academicians, students, doctors, community workers and engineers were trained in Israel. Top level ministerial meetings of both countries were held and friendly relations, beneficial to both countries, were developed.197 Mutually
beneficial economic ties were also developed between the two nations including many joint
ventures including the Israel-Nigeria Water Company. Major Israeli companies and private
entrepreneurs became involved in the development of the newly independent Nigeria.198
Nigeria gave precedence to social and economic developments of the regions over other issues of concern. To this effect, it welcomed assistance from any country that was willing to be
194 Omotere Tope, The Role of Domestic Factors in Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Relations, 1960-2007, Ogun State, Nigeria. Ego Booster Book. 2011 p.28 195 Tope Omotere, op. cit. p. 29
196 Ibid 197 Ibid 198 Aluko, O. Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy . London: Allen and Uwin.1981 p. 44
cv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
a partner in fulfilling this objective. Significantly, Nigeria and Israel interacted in areas of trade, mutual aid, investment, as well as political cooperation, especially where they have reciprocal benefits like in the agricultural aspect. Nigeria has agricultural resources to develop but lacked adequate skills, techniques and technology. Israel has a comparative advantage and accumulated expertise in water resources management and irrigation, environmental and natural resources protection, desert agriculture and combat of desertification. 199
However, there was extensive decrease in commercial relations between Nigeria and
Israel from the late 1960s. This is traceable to series of events starting from 1966 when a military overthrow happened in Nigeria and in 1967 when the Nigerian civil war broke out. In the expressions of Adefila:
"The Nigerian-Israeli monetary relations similarly endured an extraordinary set back in light of the 1966 military overthrow and the resulting common war that engulfed the country for about 30 months. Nigeria saw a treachery by Israel for its affirmed thoughtful pretense by supporting the defunct Republic of Biafra amid the nation's civil war."200
This significantly affected the trade relations between the two countries as Nigeria sought under 0.3 percent of total import from Israel between 1966 and 1972. This was because of the hostile policy kept up by General Yakubu Gowon towards the Israeli government because it was believed by the Nigerian government that the Israeli government provided aid to the defunct
199 Obilor, E. J. Nigeria-Israeli Economic Relations :( 1992-2010) Ph.D. Thesis. 2017 p. 63 200 Adefila, A. “Israel and Nigeria”. International Studies 18 (4):621-640. 1979 cvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
republic of Biafra but in comparison to France, it was significantly less.201 Thus, there was no obvious tremendous volume of exchange between Nigeria and Israel in the period 1967 to 1973.
However, during the Shehu Shagari civilian administration, trade relations increased between the two countries as the trade volume between Nigeria and Israel from 1970 to 1980 expanded from $20 million to $40 million. The initiative of Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) favored the restoration of ties with Israel. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) authority seen as representing the enthusiasm of the Northern Muslims was apathetic. The UPN and NPP with prevailing Christian roots upheld the rebuilding of Nigeria-
Israeli relations. 202
From 1984, Israel forged ties with Nigeria; principally economic ties but with certain twists driven by two developments. First, the inclusion of three Israelis – Dr. Lev-Arie,
Alaxandre Bara and Felix Abitol – in the failed endeavor to capture the previous Nigerian
Minister of Trade, Umaru Dikko in London 203 . The event strained Nigeria's economic relations
with the Israeli government as it was accepted that the Israelis were contracted to work for
Nigerian Agency.204 The second undertaking started with a visit to Israel in August 1984 of two prominent Nigerian rulers – the Emir of Kano and the Oni of Ife. They affirmed that they were on a private visit to the Holy Places, however confessed to seek for possible technical assistance
201 Tope Omotere op. cit. p.30 202 Tope Omotere op. cit. p. 32 203 Alex Last, How the kidnap of Umaru Dikko from London was foiled in 1984. Sahara Reporters. November 12, 2012.
204 Terhemba N. Ambe-Uva and Kasali M. Adegboyega (2007) “The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigerian/Israeli Relations”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No.3&4, Fall & Winter, P 41. cvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
for Nigerian agricultural activities. This act was humiliating to the Nigerian government that has been mindful of seeking economic assistance from the Israeli government. The two rulers were suspended from office for six months. 205 By and by, the two nations kept up genial financial
relations from 1984 to 1991. 206 For example, more than 1500 Israeli nationals, for the most part representatives and specialized guide specialists worked in different segments of the Nigerian economy. Nigeria additionally sent out agricultural items to Israel. 207 Also, Israeli firms worked
in withdrawals and a few mechanical endeavors.
Nigeria's trade with Israel increased to $34.7 million in 2002 representing an increment
of 40 per cent over the $25.8 million figure in 2001. Mr. Amir Lati, the Second Secretary
expressed that both countries trade has expanded and that Nigeria is one of the greatest trading
partners of Israel and that the Israeli community in Nigeria is the greatest in Africa. 208 Under the
President Olusegun Obasanjo's civilian administration, the relationship has been reinforced for the shared advantage of the two nations. Nigeria and the State of Israel introduced an instrument of holding yearly exchange for reinforcing the current discretionary and political relations between the two nations. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to that effect was signed in Jerusalem by the agents of the two nations, in which subtle elements of the agreement were illustrated. Under the terms of the agreement, the two Ministries consented to set up a procedure
205 Ibid 206 Tope Omotere op. cit. p. p. 33 207 Ibid 208 The Guardian, 22/06/2003 cviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
"for bilateral consultations at diplomatic level that will constitute a useful mechanism to promote their bilateral interests." 209
Unsurprisingly, under the President Goodluck Jonathan administration, an administration headed by a Christian, both countries enjoyed fruitful relations with flowing trade, commerce and collaboration in a number of areas as Nigeria is in the top 20 destinations for Israeli exports.
Between 2012 and 2013, Nigeria’s exports to Israel rose from $165m to $276m. 210
Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Economic Activities
Although international relations may be cordial, or hostile, Adeniran (1983) 211 observed that “all the various countries regard the need to cooperate as paramount and no matter what their belief or their ideological orientations are, the need to cooperate is usually stressed and considered very important by each of them...they do often select areas for cooperative enterprise but generally, they cooperate on all areas and issues which would promote their sovereignty, increase their political influence and economic strength”. To this end, nations are selective in their areas of relations with preference attached to these areas that promote state sovereignty, increase political influence and economic viability. This gives credence to the Nigeria-Israel economic cooperation especially in the area of investment and agriculture as well as technical aid.
According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria is Israel’s second-largest export market in Africa. The trade volume between both countries is not just a one-way traffic
209 Tope Omotere op. cit. p. p. 35 210 Jonny Paul, What Makes Nigeria Israel’s Strongest Ally in Africa? Arutz Sheva. September 11, 2014 211 Adeniran, Tunde. Introduction to international relations . Macmillan, 1983. cix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
however, as Nigeria also imports an average of $300.4 million of Israeli goods every year, and is
consistently one of the top 20 importers of Israeli goods 212 . This economic tie is said to have
proven throughout the years to be solid and to prevail over diplomatic rupture 213 . The number of
Nigerian tourists to Israel is on the increase annually as the foreign exchange brought in by
Nigerians is a major contributor to the growth of the Israeli economy. For example, according to
the Israeli Embassy in Nigeria, 31,570 Nigerians visited Israel in 2010 and 50,620 in 2011 214 .
The influx of pilgrims is a welcome boost to the Israeli economy, and numbers have not been
affected by trigger events in the region.
With Nigeria’s position as the most populated country in Africa and largest economy on
the continent with an annual growth rate of 7.4 per cent 215 , it is hardly surprising that Israel increasingly sees Nigeria as a viable economic and strategic partner. Between 2012 and 2013,
Nigeria’s exports to Israel rose from $165m to $276m 216 . There have also been reciprocal visits
by high-level government officials and exchanges of technical and professional knowledge
through MASHAV, the Israeli Centre for International Cooperation. In furtherance of their
economic objectives, both countries signed a Bi-lateral Air Services Agreement October 2013 in
order to make it easier for Israelis to invest in Nigeria, with travel time significantly reduced
between the two countries as a result of direct flights. In the same light, the agreement will aid
212 Jonny, Paul. What Makes Nigeria Israel's Strongest Ally in Africa? Israel National News. September 11, 2014. 213 Ambe-Uva, Terhemba N., and Kasali M. Adegboyega. "The Impact of Domestic Factors on Foreign Policy: Nigerian/Israeli Relations." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 6, no. 3&4 (2007).
214 Rob Dyer. Jonathan and Jerusalem: Would a new Nigerian President hinder Nigerian/Israeli relations? Jerusalem Post. March 3, 2015. 215 The Telegraph. Nigeria overtakes South Africa as biggest African economy. April 7, 2014 216 Ibid cx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigerians travelling to Israel especially in light of the tourism potential of Africa’s most populous country. A flight to Israel from Nigeria can cost up to $2,800 but Nigerian tourists still flock to Israel in impressive numbers. With Nigerian carrier, Arik Air, passing an Israeli security audit after the signing of the agreement, flying has gotten a whole lot easier for Nigerians. After the US, Nigeria has the highest number of pilgrims travelling to Israel annually. In 2012 and
2013 over 30,000 Christian pilgrims made the trip to Israel.
On the other hand, the presence of Israeli companies in Nigeria with their varying expertise has provided much needed jobs for the teeming unemployed youths and contributed to the growth of the Nigerian economy in payment of taxes and performance of corporate responsibilities. Such Israeli organizations operating in Nigeria include Motorola Israel
(automobile), Bnot Harel Nigeria Limited (agriculture) Etco Nigeria (construction) Elbit systems
(computing and internet security) Emi Systems (security), Evi and Sons Nigeria Limited
(agriculture) Lavenjok (manufacturing). Yair Frommer (2007) 217 validates the above assertion
when he states that many Israeli companies operate today in construction, infrastructure, Hi-tech
communication and IT, agriculture, water management and other sectors. The trade between the
two countries is on the rise, while joint efforts by the government of the two countries aim to
ensure the ongoing experience of these mutually beneficial economic relations. The dynamic
economic relations include bilateral consultations and discussions between the two governments;
mutual visits of business delegations, participation in international exhibitions and other
commercial events in the two countries, various activities to promote trade and commerce carried
217 Yair, F. (2007): Israeli-Nigeria Economic and Trade Relations an Overview. On-line: http://abuja.mfa.gov.il cxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
out by the Israeli Export and International Cooperation Institute, the Nigeria-Israeli Chamber of
Commerce (NICC), the Israeli-Africa Chamber of Commerce and other institutions.
Evaluating the Impact of the Bilateral Relations on Trade, Aid and Investment
Irrespective of the setbacks caused by the severance of diplomatic relations in 1973, the level of political and economic interactions between Nigeria and Israel has been appreciable especially from 1990s. Consequently, Birai (1996) 218 observed that, although Nigeria and Israel maintained no diplomatic ties from 1973 to 1992; trade has been active between them. However,
Nigeria had been on the losing side with huge deficits; Birai (1996) 219 observed that:
In 1988, while Israel's exports to Nigeria amounted to 13%, imports from Nigeria were less than 1 % ... In 1989, there were no imports from Nigeria, but exports through non-governmental concerns amounted to 19.8%. In 1991 exports from Israel was put at 22.9% while imports from Nigeria was only 0.7% ...
This suggests that the economic basis of Nigeria-Israel relations endures much more than political basis because commercial ties persisted between the two countries during this period when diplomatic ties had been severed. Besides, Nigeria had been on the losing end in unofficial economic relations with Israel, enabled by the country's private business interests. Israel's economic activities touch on virtually every sector of the economy and the security of the nation.
But the strongest presence of Israel's companies is felt in agriculture where they are involved in
218 Birai, U. M. Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy: The Role of Religion in Nigeria-Israel Relations 1960 –1996 . Sahab Press. 1996
219 Ibid cxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
partnership with big capitalist farmers. 220 Therefore, this segment takes into cognizance the
effects of the bilateral relation on trade, aid and investment.
Bilateral Trade: The 2003 Draft of the bilateral trade agreement 221 between Nigeria and Israel provided that the trade relation is based on equality and mutual benefits. Article 6: Rules of
Origin, provided that goods and commodities to be exchanged shall only be those originating in their countries either by production; or by transformation of unfinished goods and commodities imported from other countries. Similarly, Article 7 of the 2003 draft of the bilateral trade agreement provided for the freedom of transit of goods, trade information and facilities for the for the expansion of trade and commercial activities. These provisions’ have been the terms of the sustenance of trade relation between Nigeria and Israel. The trading activities are facilitated mainly by the Israeli Export and International Cooperation Institute, the Nigeria-Israeli Chamber of Commerce (NICC), Nigeria Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Nigeria Export
Promotion Council (NEPC) and the Israeli-African Chamber of Commerce (IACC). The table below presents a clearer picture of Nigeria’s trade transactions with Israel from January 1990 to
June 2007.
220 Ibid 221 Nigeria and Israel (2003): Draft of Nigeria-Israeli Bilateral Trade Agreement. cxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Table 1: Trade between Nigeria and Israel: 1990-2007
Year Value of Nigeria’s Value of Nigeria’s Total (N) Trade Balance
Imports from Israel (N) Export from Israel (N)
(N)
1990 294,189,926 2,165,329 296,355,255 -292,024,597
1991 309,537,835 5,228,774 314,766,609 -304,309,061
1992 525,348,500 2,123,276 527,471,776 -523,225,224
1993 1,264,692,645 1,691,815 1,266,384,460 -1,263,000,830
1994 512,719,175 290,650 513,009,825 -512,428,525
1995 738,364,995 18,451,750 756,816,745 719,913,245
1996 1,146,000 210,000 1,356,000 -936,000
cxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
1997 2,388,621 - 2,388,621 -2,388,621
1998 1,402,732 1,409 1,404,141 -1,401,323
1999 1,878,885 43,018 1,921,903 -1,835,867
2000 1,294,700 - 1,294,700 -1,294,700
2001 1,683,600 - 1,683,600 -1,683,600
2002 1,495,800 - 1,495,800 -1,495,800
2003 1,881,147,458 305,795 1,881,453,253 1,880,841,663
2004 3,602,802 500,158 4,102,961 -3,102,644
2005 5,628,839 439,085 6,067,924 -5,189,754
2006 51,239,205 4,586,865 55,826,070 -46,652,340
2007 12,882,627 15,097,896 27,980,613 2,215,359
Sources: 1990-2003: National Bureau of Statistics; Foreign Trade Section, Abuja; 2004- 2005: Nigeria Export Promotions Council; Marketing Section, Abuja; 2006-2007: The Embassy of Israel; Economic Assistance Unit, Abuja.
Basically, Nigeria imported the following commodities from Israel: life animals/animal products, prepared foodstuff, foot wear/head gear, metals, agro-industrial machinery, transport equipment and optical medical equipment; while she exported the following to Israel: mineral products, chemical products, rubber/plastic, hides/leather, and non-metallic mineral product. The following items are both exported to as well as imported from Israel depending on the stage of
cxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
production and need: plants/vegetable products, wood/wood products, paper/paper products and- base metals. 222
Significantly, the balance of trade remained deficit for Nigeria from 1990 to 2006 but
recorded surplus in the first half of 2007. Within the period reviewed, Nigeria's export to Israel
in 1995 recorded an export value of N 18,451, 750 (62.48% increase) which is very minimal
compared to the value of imports that amounted to N738, 364,995 with a deficit ofN-
719,913,245. Nigeria recorded the highest deficit in 2003. The increased deficit could be blamed
on increased importation from Israel following the 2003 trade Memorandum of Understanding
signed by the two countries. The trade deficit however declined in 2004, 2005 and had some
increase of -7.99% in 2006. The decline in the trade deficit in 2004-2006 compared to 2003 was
due to (a) the general ban and restrictions on the importation of certain goods and commodities
which had constituted a substantial part of Israel's trade items with Nigeria like textile materials
(b) the diversified export base resulting from Israel's technical assistance/training programmes
especially in the agro-industrial sector. The trade between Nigeria and Israel as at June 2007 was
increasing after the preceding declines. This indicates improved political and economic
cooperation which needs to be sustained for the mutual benefits of the two countries.
Observably, the trade composition is dominated by agro- industrial commodities. The
composition of the exchange commodities further shows that the bilateral trade is more oriented
towards production than consumption. On the other hand, exports comprise both industrial
222 Nwaogbaga, D. Nigeria-Israeli relations: Prospects for a diversified and integrated economic development. AJPAS Vol. 5. 2010 p. 20
cxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
exports (e.g., chemical products) and non-industrial exports (e.g. food items). It should be noted that very many of the manufacturing concerns in Nigeria depend critically on imported raw materials, plants, machinery and other input components; while industrial production in Nigeria depend heavily and critically on imported inputs. Hence, to weigh influence in international political and economic relations, the economy should not be import-dependent, and if it is, productive imports should outweigh consumption imports while exports should comprise more of industrial than non-industrial exports. Although Nigeria's and Israel's economies are import- dependent based on the selected items listed above, the percentage distribution of imports and exports show that productive imports outweigh consumption imports while industrial exports outweigh non-industrial exports: between January 2006-June 2007, the productive imports (base metal, machinery, and optical/medical) amounted to $130,440 while the consumption imports
(life animals/animal products, textile/textile articles and footwear/head gear) amounted to
$35,360.223 Also, from January 2006- June 2007, the industrial exports (Chemical products and machinery) amounted to $135,460 while the non-industrial exports (prepared foodstuff and base metals) amounted to $26,890 only.224 Essentially, the trade transaction is favourable to both
economies because productive imports for Nigeria constitute industrial exports for Israel.
Foreign Investment: The trade agreement between Nigeria and Israel on mutual protection of
investments encouraged many Israeli companies to invest in the Nigerian economy through joint
ventures, subsidiaries and corporations. Many of the companies engage in the fields of
construction, infrastructure, Hi-Tech, communication and information technology, agriculture
223 Embassy of Israel, Economic Assistance Unit, Abuja (2007) 224 Embassy of Israel, Economic Assistance Unit, Abuja (2007) cxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
and water resources management. 225 The number of Israeli companies operating in Nigeria has been on the increase from forty companies in 1983 to one hundred companies in 1991, two hundred and fifty nine companies in 2004 and three hundred and thirty seven companies in
2005. 226 Hence, even without diplomatic cooperation between Nigeria and Israel, the latter has
been able to penetrate the nooks and crannies of Nigeria’s economy virtually touching all the
sub-sectors. Moreover, it appears proper to state that the severance of diplomatic relations did
not deter Israel from advancing its economic and commercial interests through unofficial
means. 227
Table 2: Prominent Israeli firms operating in Nigeria
S/N Company Nature of Activities
1. Afro Continental Hotel and Agri-business.
Shareholder in NICON Hilton Hotel
Abuja. Handled the National I.D
Card project in Nigeria.
2. Apro firm Electrification and water project
3. Dizengoff (W.A) Ltd Agricultural machinery, chemical
and irrigation technology, Air
conditioning and refrigeration
4. Dispharm Drugs and Hospital equipment
225 Yair, F. Israeli-Nigeria Economic and Trade Relations An Overview. On-line: http://abuja.mfa.gov.il. 2017 226 Ibid 227 Ibid cxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
5. IGI General business and merchandising
group
6. Motorola Major supplier of walkie-talkies to
Nigeria police, Navy, Army and Air
force.
7. Reynolds Construction Road construction
Company
8. Gadish Group Engineering and Management
Services
9. Herouth (Nig) Ltd Agriculture
10. Ejco (Nig) Ltd Structural plumbing and electrical
engineering work
Sources: Birai, U.M. (1996): Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy: The Role of Religion in
Nigeria-Israel Relations, 1960-1996. Kaduna: Sahab Press; The Jerusalem News: October 2007.
UNN: Nsukka.
Foreign Aid: Israel's economy is not so strong as to demonstrate flamboyance in foreign aid.
Nevertheless, though Israel's economy is comparatively moderate, it has high potentials in terms
of technical capabilities. 228 After the U.S., Russia and China, Israel has comparative advantage
228 Papp, D. S. Contemporary International Relations: Framework for Analysis. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. 1988 cxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
over nations to offer technical aid where it has accumulated expertise. 229 Israel has provided aid
to Nigeria in times of distress. In March 2006, Israel donated 8 tons of emergency medical
supplies to combat avian flu in Nigeria; also, in September 2006, Israel donated bags of cement
for the construction of Communal Mosque for the Fulani Muslim tribe. 230
Most of the Israeli aid to Nigeria comes in the form of technical assistance and
cooperation. This is evident in the various human capacity building training programmes either
wholly or partly organised or sponsored by Israel through the Embassy, Israeli firms and the
Israeli Institute for International Cooperation, MASHAV. The training programmes which hold
in Israel and Nigeria under the full or co-sponsorship of the former are designed to improve
human capacities in economic development, cooperative management and other managerial
issues. 231
229 Ibid 230 Katz, N. Nigeria-Israel Cooperation on Agriculture. On- line: http://abuja.mfa.gov.il 2006 231 Ibid cxx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Table 3: Israeli-sponsored Training Programmes and Technical Assistance for Nigeria: 1990- 2007
Date Aid
Sept. 1990 On-the-spot training courses on Beekeeping in Ogbomosho at the Ladoke Akintola University of Technology Dec. 1990 Consultancy, technical assistance to some staff of National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) on (a) nursery establishment & management techniques (b) citrus production, agronomy and integrated pest control under nursery & field conditions. Jul-Aug 1996 Raw Material Research & Development Council Industrial Training Programme: A Course on Industrial Development in Rural Areas Feb. 2002 Beekeeping workshop in Jos, Delta, & Lagos in collaboration with Aquaculture workshop, ADPS & Ministry of Agriculture, Lagos Chamber of Commerce. Oct. 2006 Workshop on Income Generation Projects in Lagos
Nov. 2006 Workshop on Agro-Meteorology in conjunction with the Metereology Department of the Federal Ministry of Aviation Dec. 2006 Management & Leadership in the era of Globalisation
Jan. 2007 4-Day workshop on Fish Farming in Massaka organized ny Non-Governmental Organization: Samaritan Grace & Dizengoff (W.A) Nigeria Limited Sept. 2007 Support systems for economic development and service delivery
Source: Nigeria Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Multi-lateral Economic Division: Trade and Investment Section, Abuja
Based on the available data within the period reviewed, 1990-2007, the number of trainees was fifty thousand, five hundred and eleven persons while the estimated cost of each training programme per participant was $2,250. This suggests that the amount spent on human capacity building through Israel technical assistance programmes between 1990 and 2007 was
$113,649,750. The Israeli aid to Nigeria has led to the development of human capital in various
cxxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
sectors of the economy but with much emphasis on the agricultural sector where Israel has accumulated expertise. 232
In conclusion, this study reveals that Israel is more favoured than Nigeria in the economic relationship that exist between the two countries. This is because, Nigeria primarily trades with
Israel by exporting raw materials to them while they export finished products, technological and technical expertise. As such, there is imbalanced economic relationship between the two countries. Hence, the economic relations cannot be said to be mutually beneficial. There is the need for further cooperation and collaboration between both countries in order for Nigeria to improve on their economic interactions. Essentially, since the restoration of the diplomatic cooperation in 1992, the bilateral relation has been cordial. However, it should be noted that though the bilateral relation is partly hinged on the diplomatic and ethno-religious interests of
Nigeria and Israel, their economic interests are paramount. Hence, bilateral economic activities have survived even periods of political crisis between the two countries. More so, though Israel’s economic activities touched virtually on all the non-oil sectors of the economy, the greatest presence of Israeli is felt in the Agric-industry.
Significantly, irrespective of the fact that the balance of trade and payments remained in deficit throughout 1990 to 2006, it is logical to state that the bilateral relations strengthen the economic potentials of both countries given that the trade, aid and investment activities are production oriented. Besides, the bilateral relation is largely contributing to the diversification
232 Nwaogbaga, D. Nigeria-Israeli Relations: Prospects for a diversified and integrated economic development. AJPAS Vol. 5. 2010
cxxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
and articulation of the Nigerian economy through the various schemes in small and medium scale enterprises development; also, Israel's technical assistance and training programmes immensely improve the quality of Nigeria's labour force. Nevertheless, a successful diversification and integration of the economies heavily depend on the abilities of Nigeria and
Israel to play down on sentiments arising from ethno- religious factors and the Middle East crisis, in favour of core economic interests.
Agriculture
Through the initiative of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe who had established contact with the former Prime Minister Golda Meir, farm settlements schemes were first established by the Western and Eastern regions before Nigeria’s independence. The Israelis assisted the two regional governments in establishing farm estates in oil palm in the East and cocoa in the West. 233 Chief Akin Deko, who was the Minister of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in the Western region had led a government delegation to Israel which resulted in the
establishment of some joint ventures such as the Nigeria Construction Company and Nigerian
Water Resources Development Company between the government of the Western region and the
State of Israel. 234
Also, the Israelis had been actively involved in water supply projects. They have supplied technical equipment’s teaching aids and specialists in agriculture and other fields to various
233 Ekpu Census, Israel-Nigeria Co-operation in Agriculture. ISRAELIGHT: a publication of the Embassy of Israel. Lagos, Nigeria. May/June 1997 p.8 234 Ojo, O., Nigeria and Israel. In: Nigeria’s External Foreign Policy: Twenty-FiveYears, Olusanya and Akindele (eds.) Ibadan: University Press Limited. 1986
cxxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
institutions of higher learning. Professor Ishaya Audu, former vice-chancellor of Ahmadu Bello
University, Zaria stated that ‘there was an exchange programme with Israel. We had Israeli irrigation and agricultural experts teaching (at ABU) and some students went to Israel to finish their courses. It was a two-way traffic.’ Under the MASHAV programme, the International
Cooperation Department of the Foreign Ministry of Israel built its field of cooperation in agriculture around the training. Its focus has been to practically expose trainers and farmers to modern scientific methods, tools and current discoveries in agriculture either in Israel or in
Nigeria. 235 The overall idea is to sharpen the knowledge of the farmers by providing them with
the basic frame and tools that would help to increase their yields.
In July 1996, Dr. Moshe Wolfovitch, a renowned Israeli mushroom grower, visited
Nigeria to carry out feasibility studies on the possibility of cooperation with Nigeria in the area
of mushroom production. The ambassador of Israel to Nigeria, Gadi Golan described the project
as a new ‘dimension to agricultural cooperation between Nigeria and Israel.’ Following the end
of the study, Dr. Wolfovitch informed Nigerian journalists that about six Nigerian universities
have agreed to provide extension services and serve as extension centres to train small-scale
mushroom farmers. Among the institutions are University of Ibadan, the Enugu State University
of Technology, the Ladoke Akintola University, Ogbomoso and the University of Agriculture,
Abeokuta. Wolfovitch estimated that 20 million tons of mushrooms could be produced in a year
235 Ekpu Census, op. cit. p.9 cxxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
for a start. He further estimated that about 5000 farmers could be involved in the plot scheme and that a mushroom grower can make about $1000 (N82000) from a square metre of flow area. 236
In addition, Israel was also in a bilateral cooperation with Nigeria in the field of bee- keeping. Between August and September 1996, a team of Israeli bee-keepers undertook a month training programmme in beekeeping which took place at two important institutions in Nigeria: the National Agricultural Extension and Research Liasion Services, Zaria and the University of
Ibadan. Also, Israel helped to promote Kenaf Processing for the pulp industry in Nigeria. This project will involve the private sector to the mutual benefit of both sides. The Ambassador of
Israel, Mr. Golan reiterated that Israel believes in integrated agriculture i.e. agriculture that spreads across mutually beneficial multidimensional fields, so it has decided to introduce small but important fields of agriculture in its cooperation with Nigeria. 237
The Federal government and an Israeli firm are to spend $10 million on joint venture integrated farm projects in 2002. The Federal Government would hold 85 per cent equity participation in the scheme while the company would account for the rest and provide technical expertise. The project was to cover 400,000 hectares of land. Nigeria’s belief was that the project would stem the annual food wastage of more than 40 per cent of agricultural produce lost to inadequate storage facilities. 238 Furthermore, in March 2004, the Federal Government and the
Hovev Agriculture Limited agreed on the establishment of a joint agricultural development
aimed at setting up export-oriented farms and agro-processing outlets in all the geo-political
236 Ibid p.9 237 Ekpu Census, op. cit. p.10 238 The Punch, 07/05/2002 p.56 cxxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
zones in Nigeria. As explained by the then Minister of State for Agriculture and Rural
Development, Chief Bamidele Dada, the farms in the South West, located in Saki would be producing quality and high yield vegetables like tomatoes, basil and chive potatoes, bell pepper and high yields fruits such as mangoes, citrus, pineapples, and cashew. 239 It was also in 2004 that the Israeli Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Noam Katz pledged the assistance of his country in regaining Nigeria’s lost glory in the area of agriculture through training and re-training programmes. 240
More so in 2005, Israel helped Nigeria in beekeeping as a possible major revenue earner for Nigeria in the future. The Israeli Centre for International Cooperation (MASHAV), in collaboration with Maizuble Farms in Nigeria, commenced the pilot project in 2005. As noted by
Ambassador Noam Katz, ‘add big business, we should look at the hive’s products-honey for export, especially since Nigeria has the potential to produce organic honey which is highly valued in the foreign markets. We should look at wax and propolis as important commodities for industry and with special value to the cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries’ 241
In 2014, Nigerian and Israeli government signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) to boost knowledge transfer in micro irrigation farming, horticulture, livestock
production, aquaculture, mechanization and sustainable land management. The MoU signed
between the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina and his
Israeli counterpart, Yain Shamir, was to facilitate the management of adoption of improved
239 Nigerian Tribune, 10/03/2004 p.17 240 The Guardian, 25/11/2004 p.61 241 The Guardian, 19/09/2005 p.80 cxxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
modern technology to boost agriculture production in the country. Dr. Adesina noted that Nigeria was ready to tap into the huge knowledge resources that enabled Israel with meagre resources to feed themselves and even export compare to Nigeria with huge resources and is barely self- sufficient in food production. 242 Given Israel’s comparative advantage and advanced knowledge
in the agricultural sector, she has since Nigeria’s independence contributed to the growth of the
Nigerian agricultural base with technical training as well as joint venture projects. Further
strategic agricultural collaboration is germane between the two countries especially in agro-
processing for Nigeria in order to be able to process her raw food materials into finished
products.
Israeli Agricultural Growth And Technology
In the contemporary world, Israel is known for its agricultural revolution and
sustainability. This innovation has allowed her to possess arable lands for cultivation amidst
desert lands. Ever since the 1950s, the Israelis have been making great strides and breakthroughs
in ways to green their own desert lands but have also shared their discoveries far and wide
through channels including MASHAV, the Israeli Agency for International Development
Corporation. In respect to the above facts, over the last six decades, the Israelis have made
massive impacts in agricultural technology which has made their food not only sufficient but also
exporters of food which serve as a challenge for developing country like Nigeria, blessed also
with rich and fertile topography and suitable climate for cultivation purposes, but still lacks
sustainable food supply to feed her populace. It is on this premise that this segment intends to
242 Falaju Joke, Nigeria-Israel Seal Pact to Boost Agriculture, Research. The Guardian, 02/03/2014 p.13 cxxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
examine various Israeli agricultural development and innovation that has helped contribute to her agricultural success.
1. Drip Irrigation : This can be regarded as one of Israeli greatest achievement in agricultural
development. An Israeli water engineer, Simcha Blass revolutionized drip irrigation system
as he created tubing that slowly released water where it was most effective. Israeli drip and
micro-irrigation solutions rapidly spread worldwide with the newest models are self-cleaning
and maintain uniform flow rate regardless of water quality and pressure. Tipa, an example of
the newly developed equipment is a simple irrigation system that uses gravity when there is
no water supply or water pressure coming to rural areas. In Nigeria, during the Shehu Shagari
administration, the River Basins Development Authorities were created which can be seen as
a understudy to Israeli drip irrigation system but three decades on, the River Basins are
falling to improve its agricultural growth. 243
2. Grain Cocoons : The Israeli designed grain cocoons provide a simple mechanism for farmers
to keep their grain market-fresh as it keeps both water and air out. In developing countries in
which Nigeria is one, subsistence farmers tend to store their crops in primitive bags or
baskets which are not effective in keeping hungry bugs and micro-contaminants out thereby
causing reduction in harvest. This cocoon solves that problem even in extreme heat and
humidity as it preserves harvested grains which reduces the farmers loss. 244
3. Biological Pest Control : This was designed to reduce the use of chemical pesticides by
farmers. An Israeli company, Bio-Bee breeds beneficial insects and mites for biological pest
243 Leichman Abigail K., Top 22 ways Israel aided Africa in the last three years, 2014. https://www.israel21c.org/top-22-ways-israel-aided-africa-in-last-three-years/ accessed 28 th August, 2017 244 Ibid cxxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
control and bumblebees for natural pollination in greenhouses and open fields. Through the
use of this technology, sixty percent of California strawberries since 1990 are treated with
this predatory mite from the Holy Land. 245
4. Tailor-made Farm Solution : This is also known as Agriculture Knowledge On-Line
(AKOL). It is a unique software which help producers grow fruits and oil. The software is
hosted in IBM’s clod and its latest project gives farmers anywhere in the world access to
information from Israeli experts as hundreds of thousands of farmers can obtain tailor-made
solutions (such as: advise farmers on when to plant, irrigate and harvest; how to cope with
drought; how to choose the crops best for their area; how to implement ideal storage and
temperature control etc.), arrange group purchases of supplies and communicate with
colleagues. 246
5. Unparalleled Crop-protection : This technology was designed to develop and
commercialize slow-release herbicides and a targeted insecticide that does not harm
beneficial insect. The technology was developed by Hebrew University’s tech-transfer
company in conjunction with Makhteshim Agan, a world leader in crop protection products.
The Israeli approach incorporates herbicides into micelles or vesicles which are absorbed
onto negatively charged clay minerals to enable a slow and controlled release, reducing
leaching to deeper oil layers. This enhances efficiency and reduces the required doses. The
novel insecticide kills caterpillars of night-flying moths which are scourge for farmers. 247
245 Ibid 246 Ibid 247 Ibid cxxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
6. Fishing in the Desert : Given the necessity of fish to world population as a source of protein,
the Israelis developed a technology which would allow them to raise fishes anywhere even in
the desert. This has been actualized through the use of GFA (Grow Fish Anywhere)
Advanced Systems. The Israeli “zero-discharge” system eliminates the environmental
problems in conventional fish farming and does not depend on electricity or proximity to a
body of water. Specially developed microbes purify fish waste byproducts right in the tank,
with no need for spillage and refilling. In 2010, the largest facility in New York using the
GFA technology produced about 100 tons of sea bram, bass and tilapia. 248
7. Hardier seeds for better crops : This technology was designed by Hebrew University
agricultural scientists, Ilan Sela and Haim D. Rabinowitch. This trademarked technology,
traitUP enables the introduction of genetic materials into seeds without modifying their DNA.
This method immediately and efficiently improves plants before they are even sowed. It is also
utilized for curing fruit-tree diseases in orchards and groves, and for seedling treatment in the
nursery. 249
Given Israeli comparative advantage in agricultural technology, a three-day
conference was organized by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and
MASHAV, Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation held in Israel on
December 2017 The theme for the conference was “Enhancing Sustainable Agricultural
Productivity in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions”. Nigeria being one of the West African states
attended the conference as the participants learned about irrigation and land management
techniques, diary technology and agricultural extension at the MASHAV Agricultural Training
248 Ibid 249 Ibid cxxx This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Center in Kibbutz Shefayim near the central coast. Also, participants interacted with several
Israeli agricultural technology companies and researchers and saw crops grown in harsh climatic conditions. 250 Similarly, the Lagos State Governor, Mr. Akinwumi Ambode on April 2017 reiterated the readiness of the state government to tap into the agricultural expertise and technological advancement of Israel in a meeting with the Ambassador of the State of Israel, Mr.
Guy Feldman. 251
The discussed subject matter has provided Israel a platform to advance her technology despite her climatic and topographic conditions. Not only have these technological innovations helped in production of food in its immediate environment, these technologies has been utilized in different countries with excellent results. In essence, one could categorically attest that Israeli agricultural technological innovation has revolutionized modern agriculture in the world. Hence, developing countries like Nigeria, have lessons to learn from Israeli agricultural innovations and breakthroughs which could also be beneficial to its agricultural sector.
One factor that has remained critical and constant to Israeli agricultural technological breakthrough stems from the role and impacts of its research and development and there is the need for Nigeria to imbibe this culture. The aforementioned Israeli agricultural technological innovations and agricultural discoveries were as a result of research and development carried out by both its private and public institutions. Israeli Hebrew University through its tech-transfer
250 Israel Science info, How to grow crops in the desert: West Africans attend first-ever Israel-Africa Agricultural Summit, 2016. http://www.israelscienceinfo.com/en/international/agriculture-en-regions-desertiques-les- africans-de-louest-a-lecole-israelienne accessed 28th August, 2017 251 News Express, Ambode seeks partnership with Israel on Agric, Technology, 2017. http://www.newsexpressngr.com/news/36770-Ambode-seeks-partnership-with-israel-on-agric-technology accessed 28th August, 2017 cxxxi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Company provided and in some instances partnered with other Israeli concerns to make these discoveries which has greatly improved her agricultural development.
In relation to Nigeria, there are pertinent questions that ought to be posed such as: is the
Nigerian government committed to research and development especially its agricultural sector?
Are there budgetary allocations dedicated to this? Do we possess research institutes that are equipped to unearth new discoveries in the area of agriculture? More importantly, what is the reason for the establishment of Federal University of Agriculture? Are they equipped to undertake research and unearth new discoveries? Do they possess a technology transfer company? Are they committed to teaching practical knowledge that could advance the country’s agricultural development or is it the same old teaching of theoretical principles? All these critical questions are vital to the development of Nigeria’s agricultural sector and could serve as a roadmap to overcoming the challenges faced by the country’s agricultural sector.
In addition, there is the need for the Nigerian government to encourage private agricultural sectors, especially, in the development and enhancement of Agro-processing. Given the abundance of raw materials, yet, Nigeria still imports manufactured food items. This is not sustainable for a country like Nigeria. Therefore, in order to boost agricultural growth and attain food sufficiency, the government needs to encourage the private sector into processing of raw farm produce into finished products for consumption and eventual export. However, given the inadequate technical and technological know-how, the Nigerian government needs to take a step further by seeking agricultural training agreement and partnership with Israel given her capability in this sector through its modern innovation and technology in the field of agro-
cxxxii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
processing with the Nigerian private concerns, the focal point of the agreement. This would allow Nigerian private interests to learn technical expertise from their Israeli counterparts. This move will place Nigeria on the part of food sufficiency, as it shall not only grow her food, but also manufacture and process raw food items into finished products. This shall improve her gross domestic product (GDP), which is one of the indices of economic growth.
CHAPTER FIVE: NIGERIA-ISRAEL SOCIO-CULTURAL RELATIONS
Introduction
The strongest tie that binds most countries is soft diplomacy, otherwise known as cultural diplomacy. The narrative of Nigeria-Israel relations is no exception to this rule. The role of
cxxxiii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
religion in strengthening this cultural tie with Israel cannot be overemphasized as Christianity in
Nigeria (particularly South) has its roots in Israel’s Judaism. Also, in Nigeria it has become an established tradition to sponsor and organize pilgrimages for her citizens even though, there is theologically no basis for Christians’ pilgrimage to Jerusalem. This link is what has prompted
Nigerian Christians to revere modern Israel with Biblical Israel especially, with her control of
Christian Holy sites. This religious activity affects Nigeria at two levels diplomatically; firstly, it involves consular arrangements with the host countries which apart from Israel, also include
Saudi Arabia and Italy (the Vatican). The second level is domestic politics of numbers, allocations of foreign exchange and appointments of officials.
However, given the preponderance of religion in the socio-cultural ties between Nigeria and Israel, there are other areas which both countries collaborated such as agriculture, military aid, scholarships, and cultural festivals. Therefore, this chapter seeks to examine cultural links between Nigeria and Israel.
Religion and Tourism
Following the independence of Nigeria in 1960, Nigeria operated a federal structure with three regions which were segmented into ethnic and religious zones with the Northern region, predominantly the Muslims, and South (East & West regions) predominantly Christians. The government of the first republic 1960-66 led by the prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa tried to divorce matters of religion from politics and foreign policy however, this position became tenuous as the independence constitutional provision provided a side-door entrance for the regions on matters of foreign relations. Religion played a crucial role in matters of foreign cxxxiv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
relations especially on the Middle East impasse making Nigeria’s posture contradictory in the international arena. 252 This position aided Israeli penetration into Nigeria especially, Southern
Nigeria (Eastern & Western regions) due to preponderance of Christian population who were more comfortable with Israel. On the other hand, the Northern region favoured Saudi Arabia due to considerable Muslim population who never wanted anything to do with Israel.
However, Nigeria and Israel maintained positive reputation abroad between 1960 and
1966. It must be noted however that the agricultural achievements of Israel attracted countries like Nigeria to connect with the Israelis to provide technical assistance regarding the development of cooperative agricultural settlements. This later impacted on the socio-cultural relations between the two countries starting from the 1960 as Nigerians and Israelis formed partnership education, tourism and pilgrimage. 253 Unfortunately, the main defects in Nigeria-
Israel socio-cultural relations between 1967 and 1973 were issues of religion and regionalism and ethnic politics. The counter coup of July 1966 was perceived by Israel, as the growth of Arab ascendancy in Nigeria and given the high population of Christian population of the Igbos, the
Israelis felt the need to support the Republic of Biafra in terms of training, military personnel and provisions of weapons during the civil war. 254 These issues affected the already established halfhearted diplomatic ties between the two countries.
In 1975, the Federal Military Government led by General Yakubu Gowon institutionalized government involvement in religious activities in terms of organizing
252 Akinyemi Bolaji, Federalism and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Experience. University of Ibadan press. 1994 253 Omotere Tope, The Role of Domestic Factors in Nigeria-Israel Bilateral Relations, 1960-2007 , Ogun State, Nigeria. Ego Booster Books 2011 p.44 254 Ibid cxxxv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
pilgrimages. A Pilgrims’ Board funded by the government for the exclusive use of Muslims was established. This act was to have profound impact on Nigeria-Israel socio-cultural relations as a
Christian Pilgrims’ Board was established by the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979. 255 With the establishments of these boards, the Federal Government took over the control and management of holy pilgrimage in Nigeria. The year 1999 marked significant difference in Christian Pilgrimage in Nigeria after democratic elections with a new administration under Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as Christian Pilgrimage was placed under the overall charge of the Presidential Committee with a President and members appointed for a five- year term. Under this civilian dispensation, big impetus was given to Christian Pilgrimage and the number of pilgrims going on holy pilgrimage to Israel rose steadily. 256
Interestingly, Section 10 of the 1999 constitution257 states “the government of the
federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State religion”. However, the federal and
state governments spend billions of naira every year sponsoring people on holy pilgrimage and
given the secular nature of the country, such exercise sounds very odd. Religion is a personal
belief and the way and manner anyone chooses to practice their religious beliefs should be
independent of the state. The establishment of Nigerian Pilgrim Commission was approved by
the late President of Nigeria, Alhaji Umar Musa Yar’Adua on 9 th June 2008 and was inaugurated by the Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan on 23 rd June 2008. The Commission is headed by a
Chairman, and also an Executive Secretary, alongside six other members representing the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. The tenure is for five (5) years term and there is an annual budget
255 Personal interview with Yemi Oyeleye, 24 th June, 2017 256 Personal interview with Yemi Oyeleye, 24 th June, 2017 257 The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria cxxxvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
provision for the Commission. 258 The Commission further strengthens cultural ties with Israel as they are charged with organizing and coordinating the movement of persons from Nigeria to
Jerusalem, and other Holy Sites. 259
In 2014, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan visited Israel on a pilgrimage making him the first ever sitting Nigerian President to visit the state of Israel. He led a team of official delegates from Nigeria which included eight governors, seven ministers, three members of the national assembly and several church leaders. President Jonathan and his entourage visited the most important Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and Nazareth. 260 In addition, the President during his trip discussed counterterrorism operations with his Israeli counterpart and also signed the Bilateral Air Services Agreement (BASA) which would open new horizon for travelers between both countries. 261
258 Ibid p.45 259 Nigeria Christian Pilgrims Commission, www.ncpc.gov.ng/ncpc/ncpc-act accessed 4th July, 2017 260 The Jerusalem Post, 20/10/2014 261 Ibid cxxxvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Cultural Affiliations
The Junior Club of the Uzomiri Study Centre in Enugu, received an award package of a computer, books and other materials from the Embassy of Israel on behalf of the Israeli Government for their success in the Children of the World Draw Jerusalem competition, organized in Israel. The competition which attracted entries from children all over the world was one of the activities to mark the 3,000 years of Jerusalem since King David made it the capital of Israel. 262
262 Omotere Tope, op. cit. p. 52 cxxxviii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Nigeria's Cultural Troupe in Israel
Nigeria was the toast of spectators at the 12th International Folklore Festival organized by the centre for encouragement of Cultural Exchange and Folklore in Israel. Featuring artists from 15 countries, the occasion provided an opportunity for cultural interactions among nations and peoples of the world. 263
263 Omotere Tope, op. cit. p.53 cxxxix This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The study embarked on the historical survey and analysis of Nigeria-Israel relations from
1960-2015 from the political, economic and socio-cultural viewpoints. The foreign policy of
each nation-state underlies their view of the international arena and determines their relations
with other states in the international system. Also, the foreign policy of any nation-state is
determined by both internal and external factors, as well as their ideologies. In the case of
Nigeria-Israel relations, these factors played crucial role in inhibiting political relations between
the two countries as diplomatic ties was severed in 1973. However, it was later restored in 1992,
and since then, both countries have enjoyed smooth and uninterrupted relations. However, it is
pertinent to stress that external factor such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict should not infringe
on diplomatic ties between both countries. As Prof. George Obiozor, former Director General of
the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and former Nigeria Ambassador to the State of
Israel (1999-2003) puts it about Israel’s relation with Africa: ‘African leaders allow themselves
to be victims of sentiments and conduct international relations as if they were attending Red
Cross conventions or playing Good Samaritan. They lose themselves and their goals getting
involved in other people’s problems, often coming out like Aaron: empty handed, no gratitude
and no reward for their efforts.’ 264
Economically, relations with Israel predates Nigeria’s independence in 1960, as the
Eastern and Western regions established contacts with Israel in 1958, and as such, joint
economic ventures were set up. However, economic relations persisted even after severance of
264 Thisday Newspaper, Dynamics of Israelo-Nigerian Relations, 1960-2015: The Case of Small and Medium Enterprises . March 6, 2016 cxl This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
diplomatic ties, as Israeli companies operated in Nigeria. Similarly, unofficial economic activities persisted between Nigerian business concerns and their Israeli counterparts. With the restoration of diplomatic ties in 1992, both countries have enjoyed fruitful economic collaboration. This was strengthened by the 2003 agreement on bilateral trade, predicated upon the basis of equality and mutual benefits. However, trade statistics of both countries has failed to reflect the principle of equality and mutual benefits. Also, Nigeria and Israel signed the Bilateral
Air Services Agreement (BASA) in 2013 to further ease economic activities between both them.
The prospects for Nigeria economic relations with Israel are bright and there is the need for further strategic economic collaborations in areas of Israel’s comparative advantage that will help improve and increase the growth of the Nigerian economy. For Nigeria to benefit from
Israel economically, economic partnerships in these two vital sectors: agriculture and small-scale enterprises development are highly imperative. In such economic arrangements, the focal point of such agreements should be centered on private Nigerian business concerns as this will help in the growth and manufacturing of domestic products thereby placing the country on the path of economic growth and industrialization.
In addition, the socio-cultural tie between the two countries is predicated upon the preponderance of religion because of two factors. First, is the institutionalization of religious activities by the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1975 and the eventual creation of a Christian
Pilgrims Board in 1979 whose main aim is to coordinate religious pilgrimages to Israel. Second, is due to high Christian population in Southern Nigeria. The combination of these two factors have further deepened relations with Israel and has provided course for religious tourism to Israel
cxli This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
with Nigeria pilgrims increasing each year because of government sponsorship. More so, another way to deepen socio-cultural ties between both countries should be centered on education in which there would be agreements between both Nigerian and Israeli institutions of higher learning that would allow for exchange programmes that would equip students with much needed technical expertise and new innovations in areas of Israel’s comparative advantage such as agriculture and security which are of utmost importance to Nigeria at this period.
cxlii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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Appendix
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Delegates of Western Nigeria, During performance of 'Cry, My Beloved Country' at the opening of the Afro-Asian Seminary, HaBima Theatre, Tel Aviv, 1958, 20th November
Israeli Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, greets Honorable P.N. Okeke, East Nigeria Minister of Agriculture, at Independence Day, 1960, 8th May.
cli This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Israeli Minister of Education, Mr. Abba Eban, with a delegate from Nigeria to the Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States, Rehovot. 1960, 14th August.
clii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Chief S.L. Akintola, Prime Minister of Western Nigeria and his wife, with the President of Israel, Itzhak Ben-Tzvi, his wife and Senior Government Officials, at the Presidential Residence, Jerusalem. 1961, 10th September.
Chief S.L. Akintola, Prime Minister of Western Nigeria, at a Dinner in His Honor at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, with the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben Gurion and other Senior Government Officials. 1961, 9th October.
cliii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Ms. Charlotte Assagbe, 18 years old pupil from Lagos, Western Nigeria, Winner of the first prize for the Best Essay on Israel, dancing with Israeli Youth in Yad-Eliyahu, Tel Aviv. 1961, 28th December.
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Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levi, and Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ike O.S. Nwachukwu, following the Signing of an Agreement Restoring Diplomatic Ties between the Countries, Abuja 1992, 4th May
The President of Nigeria, Alahaji Ibrahim Babangida, meeting with the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in Abuja, to welcome the restoration of diplomatic ties between the two countries. 1992, 4th May clv This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Dr. Nwiloh of the University of Lagos, presents a gift to Mr. Gil Lainer of the Embassy of Israel, at a Yam Festival at Adazi-Enugu. With Dr. Nwilo are the Chairman of Anaocha Local Govt. Area and the Adama of Adazi Nwuke-Nnukwa.
The Ambassador of the State of Israel, H.E Mr. Noam Katz, his Deputy, Mr. Shahar Shelef, and participants of the anti-violence election-walk. clvi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
2003, 5th of April,
Former Nigerian President, General (Rtd) Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Speaking at the opening ceremony of the MASHAV Poultry course. 2005, May 20th
Launching of Green Wall Sahara initiative: President Olusegun Obasanjo clvii This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
planting a tree, with Ambassador Katz and other distinguished guests. 2006, 7th December
The President-elect of Nigeria, late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua and the Israeli Ambassador to Nigeria, H.E. Noam Katz. May, 2007
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President Jonathan, with CAN President Oritsejafor & ESNCPC Opara arriving Mount Carmel, Sat.
#2014Pilgrimage
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President Jonathan lighting a candle of prayer at Mount Carmel. #2014Pilgrimage to Israel
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President Jonathan, Gov Obiano, CAN President, Bishop Oyedepo, Primate Okoh praying at Mt. Tabor.
#2014Pilgrimage
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President Jonathan & Prime Minister Netanyahu meeting this morning at the Prime Minister’s Office in
Jerusalem #2014 pilgrimage
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