! DENATURING NATURE ! Philosophical and Historical Reflections on the Artificial-Natural Distinction in the Life Sciences ! ! by ! S. Andrew Inkpen ! B.Sc. Saint Mary’s University 2008 ! ! ! ! ! A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF ! Doctor of Philosophy ! in ! The Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies ! (Philosophy) ! ! ! ! ! THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) ! August 2014 ! © S. Andrew Inkpen, 2014 ! ! ABSTRACT ! ! The philosopher Georges Canguilhem observed that the “physician’s thought and activity are incomprehensible without the concepts of the normal and the pathological.” I argue similarly regarding the biologist, only it is “the artificial” and “the natural” that are indispensable. Whether it is their objects of study, the methods used to investigate those objects, or even fellow researchers, biologists have habitually classified aspects of their discipline in a way that reflects the artificial-natural distinction. Why this way of classifying? What purpose does it serve? What principles guide its application? With what repercussions? Tracing the transformation of these concepts through a series of historical episodes, I explore the reasons why biologists use this distinction and how it has influenced the practices and directions of certain biological fields—specifically evolutionary biology and ecology. The argument of this dissertation is that in biology decisions concerning the choice and evaluation of experimental and evidential practices, objects of study, and even assessments of scientific personas betray the artificial-natural distinction. Invocations of this distinction, like the normal-pathological, code normative contentions about proper biological practice. “The natural,” I argue, often functions as an epistemic authority. The methodology I employ in this dissertation is conceptual and historical. The arguments marshalled are supported by conceptual-philosophical analysis, close readings of primary texts, and archival work. In the end I aim to problematize a set of widely invoked, but heterogeneously used, biological concepts. My arguments undermine a commonplace view according to which the collapse of the artificial-natural distinction is a prerequisite for contemporary science. This distinction is not, I argue, an outdated, pernicious relic; it has continued to exert a significant influence on scientific practice, and should not be ignored. !ii ! PREFACE ! ! This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, S. Andrew Inkpen. A shorter version of Chapter 4 has been accepted for publication in the December 2014 issue of Endeavour as “‘The Art Itself is Nature’: Darwin, Domestic Varieties, and the Scientific Revolution.” ! ! ! ! !iii ! TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................ii PREFACE .......................................................................................................................iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................iv LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................viVI LIST OF FIGURES ..........................................................................................................viiVII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................................viiiVIII DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................xX CHAPTER 1 .....................................................................................................................1 The Artificial-Natural Distinction An Introduction CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................................................................32 Art, Nature, and the Scientific Revolution Making Modern Experimental Science CHAPTER 3 ...................................................................................................................57 Denaturing Nature Disturbing Conditions and Classifications CHAPTER 4 ...................................................................................................................84 The Art Itself is Nature Darwin, Domestic Varieties and the Mechanical Philosophy CHAPTER 5 .................................................................................................................112 Selection in the State of Nature Darwin and Wallace on Domestication CHAPTER 6 ................................................................................................................159 Searching for What Nature has Wrought Dobzhansky and the “Natural” Experimental Fruit Fly !iv CHAPTER 7 ................................................................................................................219 Communities, Natural Experiments, and “Soft” Science Jared Diamond’s Community Ecology CHAPTER 8 ................................................................................................................267 Conclusion REFERENCES .............................................................................................................275 APPENDIX 1 ...............................................................................................................305 A Note on the Artificial-Natural Classifications of Persons APPENDIX 2 ...............................................................................................................311 What is a Natural Experiment? APPENDIX 3 ...............................................................................................................316 Diamond on Experimental Tradeoffs ! ! ! ! ! ! !v ! LIST OF TABLES ! ! Table 7.1 Abridged table from Diamond 1986a comparing the advantages and disadvantages of different types of experiments in ecology......................251 Table A3.1 Full table from Diamond 1986a comparing the advantages and disadvantages of different types of experiments in ecology......................318 ! !vi ! LIST OF FIGURES ! ! Figure 2.1 The Mirror of Nature and the Image of Art..........................................43 Figure 2.2 An Air Pump Used by Robert Boyle....................................................45 Figure 4.1 An Elaborate Astronomical Clock in Strasbourg (c. 1875)..................89 Figure 4.2 Clockmaker About to Fix a Clock........................................................92 Figure 4.3 A Mechanical Toy.................................................................................94 Figure 4.4 Victorian’s in Domesticated Nature, “Botanising”...............................95 Figure 4.5 The Polish Pigeon or Polish Cock......................................................102 Figure 5.1 Wallace’s Variation in the State of Nature..........................................128 Figure 5.2 Darwin’s Variation in the State of Domesticity..................................129 Figure 5.3 An Argus Pheasant Sitting on a Branch of a Tree..............................144 Figure 6.1 The Mutant Type: “eyeless”...............................................................171 Figure 6.2 The First Linear Linkage Map............................................................172 Figure 6.3 A Postcard from Dobzhansky to L. C. Dunn......................................204 Figure 7.1 Diamond’s Geometric Principles for Nature Reserve Design............227 Figure 7.2 Distributions of Two Macropygia Cuckoo-Dove Species..................229 Figure 7.3 Experimental Types............................................................................313 !vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ! ! I owe a tremendous debt to two people in particular. First, my supervisor, John Beatty. Some time ago John took a risk on an eager biology undergraduate with little training in philosophy or history and who was, probably unbeknownst to John, predisposed to intellectual wandering. John has seen me through every step of graduate education and has been a good friend as well. The best parts of this project are a result of his insight. The worst parts are of my own doing. I owe him a debt I could not possibly repay. Without him, this project would never have begun. Second, my partner in crime, Dani Hallet. She has unscrambled more drafts and heeded more complaining than anyone should be asked to bear, and through this has remained her marvelous and clever self. Her mark is indelibly left on the pages that follow. Without her, this project would never have concluded. I have accrued less tremendous, but still significant, debts to a number of other people. My transition to philosophy can be blamed on Lisa Gannett and John MacKinnon at Saint Mary’s University. The former has become a close friend and has provided needed feedback on this project. The other members of my dissertation committee, Alan Richardson and Chris Stephens, were helpful throughout course work and with aspects of this project as well. Other members of the UBC philosophy faculty have been influential on the direction I have taken, in particular, Margaret Schabas and Sylvia Berryman. Finally, I would like to thank those members of my dissertation examination committee not mentioned above, Bob Brain (university examiner) and Garland Allen (external examiner). Thanks to all my friends at UBC, particularly Chris French, Taylor Davis, Tyler DesRoches, Alirio Rosales, and Jiwon Byun. You have