A LOVE AFFALR TURNED SOUR:
THE 1983 US INVASION OF GRENADA AM) ITS AFTERMATH
BEVERLEY A, SPENCER
A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Studies
m conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Maaer of Arts
Queen' s University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
January, 1998
copyright Q Beverley A. Spencer, 1998 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 191 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawaON K1AON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada
The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aliowing the exclusive permettant à la National Librv of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in rnicrofoq vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.
The author retains ownership of the L'aiiteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fi-om it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othemise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation.
Canada ABSTRAC'I'
October 25, 1983, the day that armed forces led by the United States invaded Grenada, signalled the end of four anà a half years of revolution. Grenadians commonly feel that October 19, 1983, the day ~henPrime hlinister Maurice Bishop aied alongside some parliamentarians, union officials and other supporters, really marked the end of the revolution.
President Ronald Reagan viewed the invasion as a victory for freedom. He irnmeciiatelq- offered the 6.S. business cummunitp an opportunity to turn the island into a free market aodei that would be the envy of the entire region. That plan never materialised.
The period 1983 to 1995 has been crucial for the people of Grenada* Tt has been one of disappointment in many facets of their daily lives. The C;', S. Government's promise of increased ernployment as a result of L.S. investment proved an empty one. Various social programs initiated by the Peoples ' Revolut ionary Government ( PRG ) were disrnantled, among them the Primary tiealth Care system, the cornerstone of the PRG governrnent*
This thesis offers an examination of the PRG government's activities, and of the impact that the U.S. invasion had on Grenada from 1983 to 1993. The zrgument, resting on primary and secondarv data, is that LS. promises have not been fulfilled because of the inappropriate economic policies, sponsoreà by the L.S. government for Grenada, and that government's lack of commitment to comprehensive development plans for the islanc.
As a case study in CS failure to deliver the goods, the thesis seeks to measure Grenaaa's development from the period 1983 to 1993, using health care as a key indicator. Grenada's development is shown to be anything but positive. The standard of health care as it exists today leaves much to be desired. Lnless the government is committed to making health care a priority, the people of Grenada will continue to suffer because of the substandard level of health care they received since the revolut ion. In completing this thesis, 1 am especially indebted to mg supervisor, Professor Abigail Bakan, who read each chapter as the work progressed and raised critical questions, enabling me to better clarify my thinking as 1 progressed through the various stages. Her many editorial comrnents and suggestions guideci my approach. Spec ial thanks to professors Bruce Berman, Examiner, and George tovell, Internal/Esternal Examiner for their rneticulous editing and helpful comments which greatly improved the way in which 1 expressed vhat 1 wanted to Say. Special thanks to :ayant Lele, Head's Delegate, and the Chairperson, M. F. J. Prachowny for being members of tne Oral Thesis Board.
Thanks also to professors Louise Ripley, Rudolph Grant and Peter Paolucci of University for encouragifig me to purstie the topic, and for also being a source of constant support. In addition, thanks to Sharon Xohamrned of Queen's Gniversitg, Geography Department, for her continuous involvement, and ta mu friend 9eredith Yathurin who generously contributed his time and books to help me.
Finally, 1 am indebted to my parents, eleven brothers and sisters, and my nephews Philip and Joshüa. Most important, I am especially indebted to Clarence, whose companionship, patience and support were a constant and compelling source of inspiration. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
THE BI SHOP YEARS
ACTION PtAN FOR GRENADA 15 PROTECTION FOR WORKERS AND UNION RIGHTS 19
NATIONAL IMPORTING BOARD 21
DEMOCRACY 22
STANDARD OF LIVING (YOUTH AND THE UNEMPLOYED) 25
INFRASTRUCTURE 27
AGRICULTURE 29
EDUCATION 33 HEALTH CARE 41 PRG FOREIGN RELATIONS 43 CUBA'S PRESENCE IN GRENADA 45
CONCLUSION 50
CHAPTER S
WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE COUP?
CIRCWSTANCES LEXDING Tû THE CONFLICT 53 WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE? 75
AFTER EFFECT 79 CONCLUSION 85
CHAPTER 3
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INVASION AND
THE POST-INVASION IMPACT ON GRENADA'S
ECONOMX AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
HOU THE INVASION WAS CARRIED OUT 101
THE POST-INVASION IMPACT ON GRENADA'S ECûNW AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 105 DISMANTLING THE STATE-RUB SECTOR 107
UNEMPLOYMENT 111
TAXATION 113
HOUSING 120 FISHING 122
TOURISM 124 EDUCATION 126
CONCLUS ION 128
CHAPTER 4
HEALTH CARE AS A MEASURE OF DEVELOPMENT
RESPûNSIBILITY 130 THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE AFTER BLSHOP 139 MORALE 142
CONDITION OF HOSPITALS 143 MALNUTRITION 144
ANAEMIA 146
MORTALITY 147
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 149 INFORMATION AND TRAINING 150
CURRENT REFORMS 15 1 CONCLUSION 153
CHAPTER 5
OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES IN THE CARIBBEAN & LATIN
AMER 1 CA
CONCLUSION 169
APPENDIX 176
BI BL 10Ç)RAPHY 7 INTRODUCTION
Until 1650, when the French colonized Grenada, the island was occupied by Carib Indians. The Caribs of Grenada were unsuccessful in resisting French settlement, and for the most part perished in 1631, though some of them may have joined their island neighbours on Dominica and St. Vincent, where Carib resistance was maintained into the eighteenth century and beyond. The French at first concentrated on indigo production, but soon changed to cane, processing sugar under mercantilist agreements for the home market with slave labour imported frorn Africa. Thereafter Grenada remained mult iracial, its people sharply divided by culture and language, with marked inequalities of status among its ethnic groups. The island's prosperity made it a desirable prize of war and in 1762 the British under Lord Rodney seized Grenada. In 1778 it was recaptured by the French; but by the Peace of 1783 the island was returned to the British. Tt has since remained in
British hands. In 1875 the Grenada legislature was persuaded to accept a limited change in its powers, and two years later, to vote for its own abolition. From that time the British Crown was to assume full responsibility for the government of the island.
Grenada is the smallest, most densely populated of the Windward Islands, with a population of 100,000. Like the remainder of the Caribbean Islands, it was a plantation society. Evident in its large African population was the massive importation of African slaves brought into the island by the British colonisers to labour on the sugar estates in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
As early as 1870 sugar ceased to be the mainstay of Grenada's economy, and cocoa, banana, and nutmeg emerged as Grenada's preferred crops. These diverse crops allowed the island to develop a broader economic base than many of the neighbouring islands.'
When the Crown Colony system was introduced in Grenada in 1877 it not only terminated the local assembly, but eliminated the basis of farmers' political control. The Colonial Office in London issued orders directly to the governor. The landlords did not challenge the administration; moreover, Crown Colony administration weakened further in 1915,2 with little or no opposition. In the meantime T.
Albert Marryshow, and a group of his associates founded the
Representative Government Association ( RGA ) , to exert pressure upon the British for local representation in the affairs of GrenadaS3
l Jorge Heine, A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990) pp.6-8.
* The Crown Colony Administration weakened when T.A. Marryshow, a journalist, and C.F.P. Renwick, a lawyer, founded the West Indian newspaper. The West Indian moulded the opinion of Grenadian middle class and succeeded in regulating that section behind the cal1 for reforms in the system of government, and the creation of a federation of the West Indies. Fitzroy Ambursley and James Dunkerley Grenada: Whose Freedom (London: Sphere Books Lîmited, 1984) p. 19.
There was a landmark report in the British West Indies in 1921, when Britain sent E.F.L. Wood in response to meetings, and petitions, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The report recommended that the elective principle should be advanced in stages in the colonial legislatures: at the same time official members continued to be a majority , nominated unof ficials should be reduced to accommodate elected members , next , unof f icial members both elected and norninated should be placed in a majority over the official members. Isaac Dookan, A Post Emancipation History of the West Indies. (Great Britain: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1975) p. 117. 9
The end of World War II saw large numbers of Grenadians leaving their homeland for oilf ields in the neighbouring islands.
In 1949, Eric Matthew Gairy returned to Grenada from Aruba and organised the Grenada Manual and Mental ~orkers'Union (GCLMWU).
This union, the first of its kind, was established when plantations were faced with lower prices for the island's export. Gairy was responsible for organising labour strikes among workers and poor peasants in 1950 and 1951, when the majority of employers refused to recognize the union. The union contested, and won, the 1931 general election that marked his rise to prominence inside the colonial system. Gairy established strong links with the agricultural sector and renamed his party the Grenada United Labour
Party (Gu'LP) that xon the 1934 election. This election, however, was unopposed by any other political party. The 1957 election was different in that four political parties contested it; the Grenada
National Party (GNP), Grenada United Labour Party (GULP), the
Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM), and the Grenada United Federal
Labour Party. None of these parties had secured enough of a majority to form the next government. As a result, a coalition was formed between the G.N.P. and the P.D.M. tiithin two years, the
G.N.P. had the overall majority, due to several defections.
During the decade 1957-1967, Grenada was ruled by the G.N.P. under the leadership of Herbert Blaize. Growing discord between
Fitzroy Ambursley and James Dunkerley Grenada: Khose Freedom (London: Sphere Books Lirnited, 1984) op. 17-21.-
Gairy had ordered their arrest and liquidation. Irnrnediately the leadership went into hiding. Two days later, on March 12, 1979,
Eric Gairy left Grenada for New York on the mid-day flight. Later the same day, at 4:00 p.m., the SJM leadership discussed in hiding and overwhelmingly agreed that action would be taken against the Gairg government. After twelve hours of planning, on March 13,
1979, the Gairy government had decisively fallen and the Kew Jewel Movement ' s power was secured.'
Grenada has been an independent island-country since 1974.
Grenada is a mernber of the Organisation of American States (0.A.S 1 and the Commonwealth of Nations, plus several regional organisations including the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (O.E.C.S.). On October 25, 1983, the largest military action carried out by the United States since the Vietnam War, and until the invasion of Panama, five years later, took place in the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. The operation activelg involved 6,000 CS marine and paratroopers, with thousands more in reserve. A further 400 paramilitary personnel from six Caribbean states were indirectly involved. The total cost of the invasion was estimated by the L.S.
Departrnent of Defense at US$75.5 million. Its avowed objective was to invade the island, oust the de facto government that had been in power only since October 19, 1983, six days prior to the
7 Catherine Sunshine and Phi1 ip Wheaton, Grmada: The Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C. District Lithograph, Inc. ) p. 54. 12 invasion, and return Grenada to the US sphere of influence. This came after four years of socialism under a regime led by Maurice
Bishop and his New Jewel hi~vernent.~In March 1979, Bishop and his
Sew Jewel Movement colleagues had attempted to reverse the legacy of colonial rule. They had struggled to pull Grenada out of its historic dependency and underdevelopment, and had sought imaginative solutions to entrenched problems.
This thesis will argue that in the period after the U.S. intervention, Grenada's social, political and econornic conditions have not progressed as they should have, given the US ~overnment's promises and the success of the operation. The attempted remoulding of Grenada's economy was based on one central expectation: that foreign investment, notably from the US, would be the engine for growth and development. The historic period of concentration under study, October 1983 to October 1995, offers twelve years of experience since the intervention to assess the absence of such progress.
The Caribbean drug trade was of prime concern to the United
States. First, it was becoming a domestic political issue; secondly, the profits generated from the drug trade were banked in the Caribbean. The drug problem did not generate as much concern to the United States government, however, as did the issue of left- wing governments coming to power as in Xicaragua and Grenada in
1979. The Cnited States, plus Commonwealth Caribbean elites, knew
James Ferguson, Grenada Revolution in Reverse (Great Britain: Russell Press, 1990) p. 1, 13 undoubtedly that what the Grenada revolution represented could not be permitted in the region. The murders of Yaurice Bishop,
Jacqueline Creft, Vincent Noel and Unison Whiteman on the island, provided the United States with the passport it needed to intervene. The prime ministers of Barbados, Dominica and St. Lucia requested help from the U.S. in quelling the problems in Grenada.
It would be proven that the U.S. government was not overlt. concerned about Bernard Coard and his followers. Instead, they were more interested with terminating the regime, and sending a very decisive message to the Caribbean reg ion that an independent strategy for Grenada would not be tolerated. Recently, this message was again presented with the passage of the HeIms-Burton Bill against trade and investment in another Caribbean nation, Cuba.
The Cas. goverment has undertaken desperate measures to reiterate its position towards Fidel Castro, and again toxards the Caribbean region at large.
The success of the U.S. developrnent strategy can be measured at the micro level bg researching the public health care system.
Grenada' s Health Service suf fers f rom many problems, in particular the lack of life-saving and basic drugs and surgical materials; the inability to attract and retain qualified and dedicated professionals; poor working conditions for nurses, doctors, and other health care professionals; improper and inadequate
Abigail B. Bakan, David Cox, and Colin Leys (eds) Imperia1 Power and Reaional Trade: The Caribbean Basin Initiative (Toronto: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993) p. 53. 14 maintenance of facilities; and very poor wages and salaries at al1 levels. In sum, there is an almost complete lack of interest by the government in providing a decent, well managed and well adrninistered health service. Io
In analyzing the policies of Grenada, in the Caribbean region and the United States, this thesis will outline the United States' failure to transform Grenada democratically, and economically.
Furthermore, it will demonstrate the limits of U.S. foreign policy
in the region and the constant dilemma that the Caribbean is faced with.
Grenada: Joint Country Review (Grenada, 1988-1991, July 25-26, 1991) p. 31. 15
CHAPTER 1
THE BISHOP YEARS
ACTION PLAN FOR GRENADA
On March 18, 1979, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) was cfficially proclaimed as the new government before an enthusiastic crowd of 25,000 people at a rally at the Queen's Park Stadium in the capital city, St. George's. Maurice Bishop was declared Prime
Minister and, notably for future developments, Bernard Coard was appointed Minister of Finance. The People's Revolutionary
Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Xaurice Bishop had three key objectives. The first objective focused on redirecting the economy towards more public sector input. The second concentrated on reorganizing economic activity so that new and more efficient production and marketing systems became possible, and the third focused on reconstructing the economy after years of neglect. 11
The People's Revolutionary Government's commitment to the people of Grenada was therefore multi-dimensional. The government intended to pursue several broad objectives including providing employment and food for Grenadians and improved housing and health services, ultimately leading to a bright future for the people.
" Tony Thorndike, GRENADA: Politics, Economics and Society, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1985) pp.54-56. 16 The dream of the revolution was that Grenadians would observe the construction of a new civilization, a new democracg, and that individuals would win control of their material and natural resources. It was anticipated that supporters of the ousted Prime
Minister, Eric Gairy, would recognize that the People's
Revolutionary Government was against any form of victimization. l2
In essence, Grenadians were to receive the benefits of the revolution regardless of their political affiliation. l3 Of prime importance was the government9s attempt to increase the standard of living for the country's poor, and the government's cornmitment to increase educational opportunities. The regime considered increasing the social wage to be one of the most fundamental goals of the revolution. l4
The government worked diligently to reduce the unemployment rate, and undertook extensive efforts to improve the health care system. The popularity of the People's Revolutionary Governrnent grew as it began to implement these goals. However, it was its cornmitment to providing the rudiments of a welfare system that secured the new regime's support within a broad segment of
Grenadian society. By 1979 Sir Eric Matthew Gairy and his government were generally disliked by Grenadians. By the time the
- - --
" Sunshine and Wheaton, op.cit. pp. 173-176.
13 Sinclair DaBreo, The Grenada Revolution, Management (Castries: Advertising and Publicity Services, 1979) p. 128.
l4 Jay R. Mandle, BIG REVOLUTION SMALL COUNTRY: The Rise and Fa11 of The Grenada Revolution. Maryland: (The North-South Publishing Company, Inc. 1985) p. 45. revolution occurred, Grenadians saw it as an escape from the oppression and social injustices which had existed. X large percentage of the Grenadian population who were under 30 years of age identified with the revolution's rhetoric, "Forward Ever,
Backward Never," and the declared aims and objectives of the PRG.
These aims broadly introduced greater equality of opportunities for al1 the people. The Young people, in particular, acquired a sense of identity, since they now belonged to a movement ~itha popular leader. l5
One of the most important welfare features of the new government was its cornmitment to public health care. The Grenada
Revolution brought with it free medical care and an increased per capita number of dentists and nurses. In addition, dental, emergency, and x-ray clinics were opened. Educat ion prograrns were also enhanced. School fees were drastically reduced, despi te the fact that enrolment at various secondary schools had increased, and milk and lunches were provided at no cost to children.
Furthermore, the government embarked upon an extensive housing program, and increased the amount of residences enjoying access to piped water. In general, the programmes provided Grenadians with substantial improvement in the quality of life, thereby
representing a considerable improvement over the Gairy administration.16 For a country as small as Grenada, twelve miles
l5 Interview with .Ir. Joseph C. Burke former Consul General for Grenada in Toronto, December 18, 1996. wide and twenty-one miles long with a population of 100,000,these impruvements were major accomplishments.
Another objective of the PRG was to make Grenadians aware that they were an essential part of the Caribbean, and that their economg and culture were intertwined with those of their neighbours. In the past, Latin was taught in the islands' schools; now Spanish and French were to be taught because of
Grenada's affiliation with Cuba. There was aiso a move to teach Spanish nation-wide, not only in the schools.
In forming the new government, popular support was maintained because the PRG promised a new constitution and free elections in due course. Later on, there were a number of programmes which involved the people. For example, the PRG was the first government in Grenada to involve the people in the preparation of the budget.
More than anything else, the people felt a sense of belonging.
However, neither elections or a new constitution was achieved during the PRG's term in office.'?
The People ' s Revoiut ionary Government had undertaken the creation of a new type of government for the people of this very small Caribbean island. Delivery of services to the poor was enhanced, and the government's will to carry through its promises was widely recognised. The delivery of an effective state welfare system aiso raised the credibility of local government in a country with a long colonial legacy. The attractiveness of this government
l7 'To construct from rnorning': Makina the People's Budget in Grenada. ( Grenada: Fedon Publishers , 1982 ) p. 6. 19 can also be attributed to its cornmitment to construct a more indigenous and democratic political system than the type that existed during the era of colonial rule. Every aspect of social, economic and political organisation was transformed with the revolution. It is now worth exploring the effects of the revolutionary government in more detail.
PROTECTION FOR WORKERS AND UNION RICETS
During the PRG' s administration, the Constitution Kas suspended and a nurnber of "People ' s Laws" were introduced. Regarding labour relations, Prime Minister Bishop believed that workers should have the prerogative to join trade unions of their choice, a choice that was merely a token before his government took office. The government also guaranteed the protection of workers by enacting laws that would prevent their unjust dismissal. Workers' rights played a pivota1 role in the development of the Peoples'
Revolutionary Government's industrial policy. For example, the right to organise, the right to trade union recognition, and the right to strike were al1 put on the List of new laws.18 In the past, the decision whether to recognize a trade union or whether to negotiate with a union was made by the employer.
Equal pay for work of equal value for female workers, and the upgrading of workers' compensation packages were also considered- Other reforms focused on sustainable development through the
- - l8 DaBreo, op. cit. pp. 208-209. 20 national youth services, with emphasis on increased agricultural production, the introduction of agro-industrialisation, the shift to a well established fishing industry, and tourism tied to local industry. l9 An example of the People's Law was one that established the National Insurance Scheme called ''PEOPLEy=LAW
N0.14 OF 1983 PROCLAYATION BY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT." This law Kas responsible for collecting contributions to the scheme, and for the disbursement of various benefits including sickness, invalidity, maternity, survivors' , old age and funeral benef its. This law also enabled reciprocal arrangements to be made with foreign governments regarding the above benefits; and for purposes connected with, or incidental to, those benef its. The National Insurance Scheme was, in effect, a social security program that was compulsory for al1 employed persons between the ages of 16 and 60 years. Employed individuals contributed 4 percent, deducted from the employees' earnings, while another 4 percent was contributed by employers. Self-employed individuals contributed 6.75 percent of their earnings instead of 4 percent because they were not protected against sickness, nor did they receive maternity benefits. Contributions were payable either on weekly earnings of $577, bi-weekly earnings of $1,152, and monthly earnings of $2,500. When a worker earned in excess of the stated
l9 ibid. p. 154. arnounts, no contribution was payable.2o
NATIONAL IffPOBTINC BOARD AND LOCAL INDiJSTRY Within the first three weeks of taking office, the People's Revolutionary Government introduced several new initiatives to increase national development. First, it installed a National Importing Board, which reduced the selling price of rice by 8%, and froze the prices of other basic commodities." The goal of the
Board was to regulate price mark-ups so that goods would become more affordable and, as a result, reduce the cost of living. In particular, the Board regulated the price of cernent, fertilizers, milk, sugar, and vegetables so that these basic commodities became the cheapest they have ever been in the island's history. The
National Importing Board had the sole right to import specif ic basic commodities; in effect, this Board was to ensure an affordable standard of living for Grenadian~.~~Yoreover, the
Board pioneered three new rapid-training agricultural schools in
Grenada, and reopened the Mirabeau Farm School that was closed by the former administration. An additional new rapid-training school was also established in Carriacou, Grenada's sister island.
'O National Insurance Laws and Regulations - Government of Grenada Publication, pg. 49. Earnings figure based on Eastern Caribbean Currency (E.C.) US$1 = EC$2.70, CDX$1 = ECS 1.89.
21 ibid. pp. 183-134
22 ibid. p. 166 22 One of the most significant industrial institutions introduced by the government was the establishment of the Grenada National
Institute of Handicraf t ( GNIH ) . This encouraged local industry through the creation of wood carvings, furniture, wall hangings, and other handicraft items that were marketed locally and for export .23 Another example of increasing attention to industrial development was in relation to tourism. The plan of the People's
Revolutionarg Government for tourism was to utilize the widest base of local resources possible and, at the same time, to encourage further local management and participation. As a people and as a country, the philosophy was that Grenadians must gain control of their national and natural resources. Grenada's tourism was, and still is, highly dependent upon North American tourists. However, the PRG was not only engaged in trying to increase a share of the North Arnerican market, but also in making the industry aware of
Caribbean and Latin American tourists, so that Grenada could receive a portion of the business from these markets.24
DEUOCBACY
The lack of democracy prior to the Bishop era, particularly the absence of fair elections, were part of the background against which the revolution took place in Grenada. The Grenada United
23 Rai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson, Revolution and Intervention in Grenada: The New Jewel Movernent, the United States and the Caribbean. (Colorado: Westview Press, 19851, p.47.
24 ibid. p. 159 23
Labour Party, led by the ousted Eric Matthew Gairy for over two decades, had denied Grenadians democratic rights by enacting many
repressive laws. One example was the Newspaper Publications Act.
This act required that a E.C. $10,000.00 deposit be paid to the government before newspapers could be published, thereby limiting
freedom of the press. Another example was the Public Order Act which declared the use of loudspeakers at public meetings to be
illegal unless pernission was granted from the Police
Commissioner .25 The powers bestoried on the Comrnissioner made it possible for one officia1 to prevent public meetings and gatherings. The New Jewel Movement, when it was in opposition,
fought the Gairy Government on both these laws, and endeavoured to
repeal them and return democracy to the people. Election fraud was another example of a lack of dernocracy. In many instances
deceased people remained on the electoral list, while in other
instances, electors voted in more than one constituency. Moreover,
voters under the age of eighteen were allowed to vote. The
opposition parties cried out that the elections were neither free
nor fair. However, nothing could be done to correct or prevent the
fraud because it was difficult to bring these cases to court.
The People's Revolutionary Government planned to modify the
concept of democracy, and started by enumerating voters throughout
the country. An electoral commission was appointed to oversee the
process, guaranteeing that al1 individuals eighteen years of age
25 ibid. p. 212. 24 and older would be registered and, therefore, eligible to vote.
Another cornmittee set up by the PRG, the Consultative Constituent
Assembly, comprised of organisations and individuals, was given the
important task of drafting a new constitution for Grenada.26 ~he
Consultative Constituent Assembly was comprised of the Nat ional
Coordinating Council of Delegates, which was constituted of elected representatives from al1 over the country, the Parish Councils , which consisted of the most staunch supporters of the New Jewel
Movement ( NJM ) , the Nat ional Women ' s Organizat ion ( KWO ) , the
Kational Youth Organisation (NYO) , and the Zonal Councils (a sub- division of a parish is referred to as a zone). In general, these groups had the same ideals of justice, peace and material progress
for the people of Grenada. These councils also discussed problems specific to the parish in addition to national issues. Meetings of
the Zonal and Parish Councils were attended by members of the Political Bureau whose role was to listen and answer questions from
those in attendance. The function of the Zone and Parish Councils was to distribute reports regarding the work of mass organizations, and to identify specific problems in their communities and the current political situation. Most importantly, however, these councils Looked at the question of a new constitution for Grenada. *'
26 DaBreo, op cit. p. 168
27 ' 1s freedom we making' : The New Democracy in Grenada. Government Information Services Publication, 1982. p.42. 25
Prime Minister Bishop and the People's Revolutionary Government claimed that democratic participation was the mode1 for
Grenadians. "It is the mode1 we want to see followed, and we also believe it is a good mode1, once the elections are free and fair", he said. 28 Moreover, the People ' s Revolutionary Government reduced the number of Government ministers. The ministers who formed the new government saw their salaries and allowances reduced by one-third. Under the Gairy Government, ministers were never taxed, but with the People's Revolutionary Government, ministers were now required to pay taxes.29 In an interview with a former employee of the PRG, he summed up his government's thinking by saying: "The PRG did not develop a new constitution. Instead, they suspended the existing constitution with justification. Britain has no written constitution and it is the mother of democracy.
Therefore, Grenada does not need to-have one. "30
STANDARD OP LIVING (YOUTB AND THE UNEMPLOYED)
Prior to 1979 the unemployment rate in Grenada vas high, especially among the youth. Between 1979 and 1983, the PRG put measures in place to involve youth in the army, in education, in medical training, in sports, culture, and in other occupations. Some were for remuneration, others were voluntary. This dropped the
'' ibid. p. 170.
29 ibid. p. 213.
30 Telephone interview conducted on December 10, 1996, with the former Consul General of Grenada in Toronto. 26
unemployment rate considerably. Before the revolution (1976-1978),
the overall unemployment rate was 30%; during the revolution,
between 1980-1983, the rate was gradually lowered to 20%.31
The government anticipated that it would be able to provide material incentives which would eventually increase youth morale. This Kas not only economically important, it also had a political
basis given that the youth represented a major driving force for the revolution. The Rational Youth Organisation (NYO) was the
conduit between the youth and the ~eople's Revolutionary
Government. For example, approximately 65% of the volunteers for
the Centre for Popular Education literacy program were members of
the NYO. Moreover, the NYO was successful in enlisting volunteers for the rnilitia, and was instrumental in helping youth in
employment training.j2 As a result, youth as a group became highly
motivated, often working without wages, and even without food, for
as long as twelve hours a day. Prime Hinister Bishop was so
impressed by their performance that he devised ways of ensuring
work for the so-called "young cornrade~."~~
Expectations among the gouth and the dispossessed were high after the revolution. National activities in agriculture, education, community affairs, and national security ensured
31 Interview with Mr. Joseph C. Burke December 20, 1996.
32 Catherine Sunshine and Philip Wheaton, Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution. (Washington D.C. : District tithograph, Inc. 1982). p. 101
33 Da Breo, op. cit. pp. 172-173. 2 7 involvement for the youth. Young persons, in particular, identified with the revolution. Rhetoric played its part: "We are a srnall black country, but no country however rich or large could tell us who our friends ought to be. Cuba is in the Caribbean,
Grenada is in the Caribbean, "34 said Xaurice Bishop. Many young
Grenadians saw themselves involved in the decision- making process and in positions of responsibility. Members of the PRG themselves vere cornparatively young, between 20 and 40 years of age. Also, women, including young women, for the first time, were considered to have the ability to contribute to nation building and were given the opportunity to do sd5
The People's Revolutionary Government can be credited with creating a road repair programme that restored roads that were once impassable. Farrners gained easier access going to and coming £rom their plantations as a result of the road repair programme. Easier access to the land made it very convenient for fertilizers and equipment to be transported to the farms, and for produce to be carried off the land. The repaired roads were of significant importance to the small farmer wbo needed to transport produce to the urban areas. An extraordinary amount of importance was
34 'Grenada 1s Not Alone:' Speeches By The People's Revolutionary Government at the First International Conference in Solidarity with Grenada, November 1981. ( Grenada: Fedon Publishers, 1982). pp. 129-130.
35 Interview with Mr. Joseph C. Burke December 22, 1996. 28 attached to these roads since they were a considerable element in the development plans of the nation. The repairs that were performed on the access roads benefited everyone, allowing road crews to build other roads. Construction workers and engineers were therefore able to build houses and water facilities.
The government recognized the significance of these roads not only to the economic and developmental processes, but also to the administration of social services.36 The roads were built with the masses in mind; for example, workers and small farmers, people who used public transport, or those who used trucks to transport their livestock or produce to the market, al1 needed these roads. It is precisely for these persons that in 1981-82, the government undertook to build an additional ten miles of road known as the
Eastern Main Road Project which linked the capital, St. George's, to St. Andrews parish. It should be noted that over 30 percent of
Grenada's export crops corne from these two areas.
Grenada's sister island, Carriacou, also benefitted from the policies of the People's Revolutionary Government. Without much deiay, work began on improving the electricity system, the airstrip, and the roads. There was an additional proposal to improve the infrastructure of the island with a greater focus on how it could best be developed to the full economic benefit of the people of Carriacou. Petit Martinique, Grenada's other sister island, benefited similarly from the PRG's restructuring programme.
36 Sunshine and Wheaton, op.cit. pp. 207-208. 29
An electricity plant was installed, medical services were instituted, and a catchment plant that provided a constant supply of water was constructed.37
AGRXCULTUBB
Although the pre-revolutionary leader, Gairy, was somewhat of a political id01 among some farmers in Grenada, he was widely regarded as a failure in agriculture, which has always been the backbone of the Grenada economy. He systematically broke up the larger estates which yielded the country's main crops: banana, cocoa, and nutmeg. Some estates were acquired, then divided into small allotments and distributed among persons whose main qualifications were their closeness to Gairy himself, not their ability or disposition to farm the land. Consequently, agriculture suffered, and with it, the agricultural infrastructure was in continual crisis. Most farm roads fell into disrepair and abandonnent. Because the PRG sought to re-develop agriculture, it began to re-build old farm roads as well as construct new ones.
The PRG's rhetoric,"we must eat what we grow and grow what we eat,"38 was reflective of plans to improve the state of agriculture between 1979 and 1983.
The People's Revolutionary Government achieved considerable accomplishments in the agricultural sector. For example, it
'' Sunshine and Wheaton, op.cit. pp. 214-215.
38 Interview with Joseph Burke, former Consul General for Grenada in Toronto, September 13, 1996. 30
restored the different CO-operative boards to the farmers. Before
the restoration, these boards were acquired by the Gairp administration, which passed several pieces of legislation granting
the government control of the most productive CO-operatives: banana, cocoa, and nutmeg industries. Restoration of these co-
operatives was therefore viewed as a significant political gain for
the PRG,~' given its cornmitment to more local participation.
The PRG also added an agro-industrial plant to its list of
successes achieved in the agricultural sector. This plant, erected
at the southern part of the island, utilized fruit such as mangoes,
papayas, soursops , tamarinds, guavas, and bananas to produce
chutneys, jams, jellies, and juices which were marketed in the
Caribbean and in Great Britain under the Spice Island Products
label. Other government achievements were a cof f ee processing plant, a spice grinding plant, and a national f isheries industry.
Land ownership was a major factor in the PRG's agricultural
strategy. There were three distinctly dif ferent types of landholding when the People's Revolutionary Government came to
power. The first type was comprised of small landholdings of five
acres of land or less. This type of land ownership was equivalent
to ninety-five percent of the island's cultivated land, and was responsible for three principal. crops - banana, cocoa and nutmeg
as well as breadfruit, cabbage, calaloo, eggplant, and yams. The
-
39 Sunshine and Wheaton, op.cit. pp. 210-212.
40 Schoenhals and Melanson, op.cit. pp. 45-46. 3 1 second type, known as state farms, totalling twenty-three in number, represented two percent of the island's cultivated land. The Grenada Farm Corporations, as the^ were called, focused on the output of export crops and livestock production. The third type, composed of forty private estates of uncultivated lands represented the remaining three percent. The PRG government tried desperately to acquire these estates. It was not until September of 1981 that the Land Wtilization Act was passed, permitting the PRG government to obtain a ten year compulsory lease on any estate with more tnan one hundred acres if the lands were idle or underutili~ed.~~The
Land Acquisition Act also gave the government the authority to acquire land, as long as the land was for public use such as for school, recreational, or medical purposes.
Farming, as viewed by Grenada's youth, has a distinct affiliation to colonialism and slavery. The Revolutionary
Government, committed to land development as it was, had to challenge this legacy. They did every conceivable thing to attract
Grenada's youth to farming. Youth camps were initiated which undertook an agricultural work-study programme consisting of youths working three days per week for three hours per day on the farms.
This work-study programme was in addition to one day per week in the classroom which concentrated on theoretical issues relevant to agricultural work. At the end of three weeks, the youth typically harvested 2,000 lbs. of nutmeg, cultivated 1,400 banana trees, and
*' ibid. p. 47. 32 planted 2,600 lbs. of eggplant . This made them eager to participate and therefore to appreciate the importance of agriculture to the revolut ion .4z As a result , the Nat ional Cooperative Development
Agency ( NACDA) was founded. This agency inspired unemployed youths ta build agricultural cooperatives by providing them with loans, access to land, and instructions in three key areas: farming, marketing, and bookkeeping. The loans were E.C. $25,000 on average, and were earmarked for the purchase of farm implements, fertilizers, seeds, and transportation equipment .43 Once successful, a second loan could be requested after a nine month period.
With a view to achieving one of the government's social plans, many agricultural workers ' councils were inaugurated. These councils elected their own representatives for the purpose of discussing working conditions, wages, and other pertinent matters related to their jobs. It was the first time in Grenadian history that workers were given the opportunity to participate in matters that were directly related to their interests.44 Furthermore , agricultural lands left idle by the former Gairy Administration were used to create numerous food farms, and many unemployed
Grenadians became employed in food production.
- -
42 Sunshine and Wheaton, op.cit. p. 102.
43 ibid. p. 46.
'* DaBreo, op. cit. p. 162. 33 The Government also established the Sational Emergenc~Food
Plan, a policy designed to achieve maximum use of governrnent-owned estates. The policy was not only designed to inspire peasant farrners and large plantation owners to become committed to food production for export, but was also to encourage a system of import substit~tion.~'This policy vas integrated into the school education and feeding programme, thereby givins students the opportunity to learn about agriculture from the onset.
EDUCATION
Education Kas ano ther important area of national development iri which the new People's Revo1utionar:- Government made considerable changes. Grenada, when it Kas governed by Eric Gairy, o~edthe
Cniversitg of the West Indies approsimately E.C. S1.5 million in outstanding fees." ln a period of 120 days after the revolution, the PRG had reduced the outstanding balance Dy S.5 million, and made provisions for paying off the remainder. Also, the government declared that it would decrease the cost of schocl fees at every
45 ibid. p. 314.
46 ~hhe L'niversity College of the West Indies located in Jarnaica was established in 1948. It was an adjunct of the University of London, but Secame a full-fledged Lhiversity of the West Indies in 1962. Shortly thereafter, campuses were opened in Barbados and Trinidad. The university has been subsidized by all the English speaking Caribbean Governrnents, and has provided scholarships, bursaries and loans to numerous students. Dookan Isaac, A Post Emancipation History of The West Indies, (England: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1975). pp.74-75 secondary school on the island to E.C. $25.00 per term from
September of 1979. The long term goal was to provide free secondary education to al1 children on the island. The schools were to provide a curriculum that would eliminate irrelevant courses f rom the classrooms . Prime Minister Maurice Bishop emphasized the irrelevance of the schools' curriculum in that they focused only on academic subjects that catered to the needs of a modern industrial country and not that of Grenada, a Third World
Country. In addition, it was thought that the students were taught to dislike everything that was 'negro' and also everything related to rural life, and to appreciate everything white and related to an urban life~tyle.~'The curriculum designed by the PRG was therefore supposed to shape the children's minds regarding finding their own solutions to the problems that confronted them. "For too long, we had been brainwashed to think that only Europe and America held the answer, " declared Jacqueline Creft , the PRG' s education minister .48
The stated educational strategy of the People's Revolutionary
Government embodied five pillars. These were: (i) continuous education; (ii) education for all; (iii) a work-study approach;
(iv) new content in curriculum; and (v) the integration of school and community. With the continuous education pillar, a substantial
47 Anton De Grauwe, "Education and Political Change: the case of Grenada ( 1979-89 ) " in Comparative Education Volume 27 No. 3, 1991. pp. 340-341.
48 Schoenhals and Melanson, op.cit. pp. 48-49. 1iteracy campaign was launched through the centres for popular education whose prime objective was to reduce illiteracy on the island. In the latter part of the 1970s, (1976-19781, the illiteracy rate on the island was twenty percent. During the PRGSs term in office, (1979-1983), that figure decreased to twelve percent .4g The PRG scheme was responsible for having taught 881 illiterate people and 287 semi-illiterate people to read; these figures represented 58 percent of illiterate women and 32 percent of illiterate men respecti~ely.~~
Another element of continuous education involved the 'iational In-Service Teacher Education Program (NISTEP), which was designed to improve the education of almost six hundred Grenadian primary school teachers. The majority of these teachers had only attained a primary school level of education, or at most, a secondarg school level of education. To accomplish this monumental task, the government initiated a compulsory three-year in-service programme at three principal locations: St. George's, Grenville, and the sister island of Carriacou. This programme included teaching participants one dag per week throughout the school year, and several other courses during the regular vacation time. Emphasis in the f irst and second year of the programme was in language arts, mathemat ics, and education methods . In year three, the teachers concentrated on science, social studies, agricultural science, and
49 James Ferguson, GRENADA: Revolution in Reverse. (Great Britain: Russell Press, 1990) p. vi.
50 ibid. p. 49. 36 health education The government hoped that teachers, who completed the programme, would choose teaching as their permanent career rather than as a temporarg job in anticipation of more gainful professional employment in the future.
The People's Revolutionary Government7s second pillar was titled "Education for AU."Under this scheme, the government registered between 10,000 and 12,000 Grenadians in adult education courses covering basic sciences, English, and mathematics .j2 The
PRG concentrated on adult education because it was regarded as important to economic, social, and political development.
The third pillar of the government's education strategy, the work-study approach, had as its centrepiece the Comrnunity School
Day Programme (CSDP). This was established in 1980 and was of primary importance to the PRG. The key purpose of this programme was to ensure that students xere still learning when their teachers left the schools for training. Artisans who replaced the teachers taught the students new skills and, at times, took them on guided field trips to the local sugar factory and other places of economic
interest. On other days, students had the opportunity to work in factories, offices, or shops. In this way, the CSDP assisted in eradicating the biases students had towards manual labour. Moreover, the programme also assisted in creating the technical and agricultural manpower Grenada needed. Prime Minister Bishop was
ibid. p. 51.
52 ibid. p. 51. committed to this programme; he had this to Say about it:
We can no longer tolerate a situation in which our youths leave school clinging to certificates ..... Rather, our educational system must produce the skills that can be absorbed in our economy--we must produce the agriculturalists, the mechanics, the engineers, the hoteliers, the boat captains, etc.. .that we need to man our agriculture, our agro- industries, our fisheries and Our t~urism.'~
In essence, the PRG viewed education as an important element in obtaining economic development. Deputy Prime Ninister Bernard
Coard endorsed this when he said: "Many of the problems affecting the economy can only be solved if we can raise the educational levels of our people. "54 The PRG was able to provide more scholarships to Grenada' s youths , thus enabling them to study in Cuba, Europe and North Arneri~a.~~
The fourth pillar focused on changing the curriculum. This change resulted in the introduction of a new type of textbook to the classroom. T. Albert Marryshow, a prominent Grenadian politician, and one of the founding members of the Caribbean
Federati~n,~~had textbooks written in his name titled "Marryshow
53 ibid. p. 53
54 De Grauwe, op.cit. volume 27 No.3, 1991.
55 Sunshine, and Wheaton, op. cit. p. 102.
56 An Act of the British Parliament vas passed on August 2, 1956, for a Federation of the West Indies consisting of the islands of Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward Islands (Antigua, St . Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and Monsterrat ) and the Windward Islands (Grenada, St . Vincent, St . Lucia and Dominica). The constitution provided for a Governor-General as its president , a Prime Minister and ten other ministers, a Senate of nineteen members, two £rom each island except Monsterrat which had one. The Federation was established April 22, 1958 and was formally dissolved in 1962. Dookhan, Isaac. pp.148-149. 38 Readers." It was widely accepted on the island that the Marryshow Readers related more to Grenadian children from grades one to three because the books focused on rural life and the nuances of the
English language spoken on the island. The new curriculum regarding secondary school therefore combined the academic, creative, and technical subjects into one curriculum. For example, home economics, industrial arts and needlecraft were found in one curriculum. Curriculum change were also responsible for the introduction of political science which the Central Committee was especially interested in.57
The fifth and final pillar which concentrated on the integration of school and community was the responsibility of the
Community Educational Councils ( CECs ) . The CEC functions concentrated on the supervision and maintenance of schools , the transformation of students from school life to life in the society, and the responsibility for school curricula. In addition, the
Community Educational Councils made a significant contribution to refurbishing Grenada's school buildings. j8 The short term goal was to affect major repairs to the present primary schools during the ensuing three to four years beginning in 1979. Blueprints were designed for the construction of new primary schools, and a more logical zoning of these schools was to take place. The government ' s intention was to construct more secondary schools ; the
j7 De Grauwe, op. cit. Volume 27 No. 3 1991, pp.340-341.
ibid. p. 53. ultimate goal was to have al1 primary school students eventually
proceed to secondary schools.
Education was in a state of flux for many years during Eric
Gairy's reign. Though Gairy valued education in his own way, there was no consistent emphasis. Whenever there was conflict among the
teachers, Gairy would resolve the matter bg sending some teachers
home, and f ire others. Ultirnately, education suffered. While
Gairyls behaviour was somewhat unorthodox, he nevertheless built
some schools with the assistance of donor countries like CanadaOsg
Historically, only one student a year in Grenada received what was
referred to as an "island scholarship" to study abroad. During the
People's Revolutionary Government, that figure was notably
increased. Jacqueline Creft, the Minister of Education, described
the increase in island scholarçhips in a speech given at the First
International Conference held on the island on November 23, 1981,
in this way:
The one yearly island scholarship, that ornament to colonial elitism, has grown to 300 university scholarships last year, to countries stretching as far as the world stretches. Look for us in Rungary, in Australia, in India, the Soviet Union, in Venezuela, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, Cuba, Bulgaria, France and Mexico-you will see young Grenadians studying hard preparing to return to serve our people. 60
The educational system during the PRG's reign was, however,
overly politicised. The PRG introduced the Sational In-Service
59 Interview with Mr. George .Ic.Guire, a former Minister of Education, Grenada, January 8, 1997 in Grenada.
Grenada 1s Not Alone, p. 59. 40
Teacher Education Program (NISTEP) which, although it had noble
intentions, faced serious problems because its ideological element
tended to conflict with its development goals. The teachers were untrained, and lacked either the ability or skill to irnprove the program. This program could have done a great deal more for teachers in Grenada if the Xarxist ideology was not pushed from the onset. There was resistance to NISTEP mainly because teachers were
taken from the classroom and sent to the farms to take care of
produce on Saturdays, a non-traditional school day, while other
teachers were taken from classrooms to do other types of non-
academic training. 6'
The Centre for Popular Education (CPE), also a product of the
PRG government, was unable to record the positive aspects of the
program it hoped for. As described by a former education minister,
"It was clearly a state of controlling the mind."" Children were
schooled in Harxist/Leninist principles, were involved in military
training, were given guns instead of books, and were involved in
military manoeuvres instead of exams.63
Between 1984 to 1990, the education system in Grenada
underwent momentous changes; new education strategies were created
to replace the ones initiated by the PRG. The greatest challenge
facing the education system after 1983 was that of changing the
61 Interview with Mr. George Mc Guire, former Minister of Education, Grenada, January 8, 1997 in Grenada.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid. 41 teaching philosophy. George Mc Guire , the Minister of Education during the Herbert Blaize admini~tration,~~had a constant f ight to change the emphasis on Marxist ideas of some of the teachers and administrators in the department of education. This was f inally accomplished through continual consultation and dialogue with teachers.
BEALTE CARB
Good health increases the economic productivity of individuals and the economic growth rate of countries. Investing in health is one way of accelerating development, and, perhaps more importantly, good health is a goal that is worth achieving. Health is much more than the well-being of the individual; health makes a fundamental contribution to the economy of any country. There is a direct relationship between health and productivity. As health improves, productivity increases as workers perform better; therefore, it is imperative that the Pan American Health Organisation's (PAHO) goal of health for al1 must be pursued. Health care is a measure of development. Its post-PRG impact will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. What follows therefore, is merely an overview of the
64 On December 3, 1984 Grenadians went to the polls to elect a new government. The New National Party (NKP) under the leadership of Herbert Blaize won 14 of the 15 seats contested. Iiis cabinet consisted of himself as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Trade, Home Affairs and Security; Ben Jones, Minister of Foreign Af fairs; George McGuire, Minister of Education; Danny Williams, Minister of Health; George Brizan, Yinister of Agriculture; Francis Alexis, Minister of Labour; and Keith Mitchell, Minister of Works. Ferguson, James, Grenada: Revolution in Reverse. (Great Britain: Russell Press, 1990) p.49. health care system.
The Cuban government's support in assisting Grenada in developing its health care system was needed to repair a rapidiy declining system. In a period of three to four months after the revolution, the People s Revolutionary Government started with a team of seventeen Cuban volunteer health riorkers, inclitding doctors, dentists, and other specialists. This almost doubled the total number of doctors on the island, increasing the total from twenty-three to forty. At the same time, the volunteers enabled the entire health care sj-stem to be decentralized and to be expanded. Additional health care workers helped to establish a polyclinic in each parish, in addition to twenty-eight other smaller medical stations throughout the island. A poiyclinic is a clinic that takes care of several illnesses. For esampie, polyclinics of fered services in ante-natal and post-natal care, dealt with social disease such as Hansen/leprosy, and took care of child welfare, dressings, home visits, domiciliary midwifery, dental care, and diabetic and hypertensive patients. A public dental clinic Kas zlso established in each pari~h,~~and Cuban dentists were responsible for organizing dental clinics in
Carriacou. This meant that the residents of both Grenada and
Carriacou received dental care in each parish for the f irst time in the country's history.
6 5 EPICA TASK FORCE, GRENADA : The Peacef ul Revolut ion, Washington D.C: Epica Task Force, 198%). p. 86. 43
A Maternity Benefit Regulation called the People's Law Xo. 14 of 1983, was introduced to provide payments for various benefits including sickness, maternity, invalidity, age, survivors and funerals. This law became necessary, because it was realized that the scope of coverage before the PRG was either limited or inadequate. Prior to 1970, most workers, particularly those in the agricultural sector , suf fered extrerne f inancial hardships when they were no longer able to work. On the other hand, persons ernployed in the civif service and many private sector businesses enjoyed the benefits of pension schemes provided by their ernpl~yers.~~
eac pouercw aeLaTroNs On the international front, the PRG was successful in extending relationships with several countries, and supported the resistance movements in Africa and Latin America. Moreover, it pledged to maintain relationships with international organisations such as the
Organisation of American States (OAS ) , the United Xations ( UN ) , the
Caribbean Cornmon Market (CARICOM), and the non-aligned states. Regionally, Prime Minister Bishop vowed to have better relationships with the various islands and their governments including Cuba, and also planned to reinforce the unification movement in the Caribbean.67 Prime Minister Bishop explained his government's intention by stating that his government needed "to
------
66 Annual Report : The Nat ional Insurance Scheme . ( Grenada: Hi-tech Printery Ltd., 1994). pp. 38-39.
67 DaBreo, op.cit. pp. 216-217. establish bonds with different organisations, groups, and countries that would assist Grenada in making the island less dependent and to give its people the possibilities of breaking their dependence on imperialism. "68 At the same time, Grenadians wanted the opportunity to reclaim their resources and to work out a truly independent economic path.
Regarding its relationship with the most powerful country in the western hemisphere, the U.S.A., the People's Revolutionary
Government requested military protection in the event of a counter- coup. However, this request was rejected by the United States. The United States ambassador , Frank Ort iz , explained his government's refusa1 by saying that:
Although my government recognizes your concern over allegations of possible counter-coup, it also believes that it would not be in Grenada's best interest to seek assistance from a country such as Cuba to forestall such an attack. We would view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba. 69
The People's Revolutionary Government was then prepared to welcome assistance from any available source. Within three weeks of Prime Minister Bishop being in office, a Cuban ship, carrying weapons and ammunition, arrived in ~renada.~~On April 6, 1979, the Cuban government sent a shipment of arms and cernent to the new revolutionary government. This introductory assistance continued
68 ibid. p. 155.
69 Mandle, op.cit. p. 50
'O Robert J. Beck, The Grenada Invasion: Politics, Law, and Foreign Pol icv Decisionmakin~. (San Francisco : Westview Press, 1993). p. 25. throughout the ensuing four-and-a-half years, and continuous Cuban aid was manifest in several ways. Apart from the much advertised arms shipments and training provided for the Grenada People's
Revolutionary Army ( PRA) and milit ia, Cuban government military advisers were also made available to the PRG. Grenada also received a donation of Cuban fishing trawlers that enabled the
People's Revolutionary Government to establish its own fishing industry. The Cuban Government also granted thousands of scholarships to the Grenada government making it possible for
Grenadian students to further their education at Cuban universities and technical schools.
Agreements were also made between the Government of Grenada and the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the delivery of military and other equipment . 72
CUBA 'S PRBS~NCEIN CRBNADA
Of particular international importance was the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government on April 11, 1979. This action annoyed several
7 1 See Appendix A, for the protocol of the rnilitary collaboration between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People ' s Revolutionary Government of Grenada. See also Appendix B, reports on political and academic education.
72 See Appendix C for the special and other equipment agreement between Grenada and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. governments; the most disconcerted was the American government. Prime Minister Maurice Bishop justified his government's actions when he said: "Grenada's concern is to develop relations with countries which reflect its views, needs or problems that reflect
its desire to move forward as a country and as a people." '3
On April 14, 1979, Cuba and Grenada opened embassies in each other's countries. This action clearly disturbed the U.S. administration. United States Ambassador to Grenada, Ortiz, warned
the People ' s Revolut ionary Government not to develop closer ties with Cuba if it wanted to establish relations with the United
States. Lyden Ramdhanny, Minister of Tourism, recalled that Ambassador Ortiz attempted to set the terms of PRG foreign
relations. Ramdhanny responded to the ambassador's warning by
saying: "We'd like to have relations with everybody, left-leaning
and right-leaning."74 The U.S. arnbassador replied by stating that
he saw difficulty with that, and tried to prevent Cuba and Grenada
from initiating relations. However, the U. S. effort failed. Prime
Minister Bishop was upset with Ortiz's response, and other similar remarks regarding Grenada' s foreign relations. In a radio address ,
Bishop sent a decisive message to the U.S. government outlining
what his government aspired to do. Bishop declared that:
From aay one of the revolution we have always striven to have and develop the closest and friendliest relations with the United States, as we11 as Canada, Britain, and al1 our Caribbean neighbours .... But no one must misunderstand our
ibid. p. 155
74 Hugh 09Shaughnessy, Grenada: Revolution, Invasion and Afterrnath, (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1984. p.81 friendliness as an excuse for rudeness and meddling in our affairs, and no one, no matter how mighty and powerful they are, will be permitted to dictate to the government and people of Grenada who we can have friendly relations with and what kind of relations we must have with other countries. We are not in anybody's backyard?
With its focus on national developrnent and self sufficiency, it was therefore understandable that the new Grenada administration intended to achieve that goal. In particular, there was a legitimate need for a new airport with the appropriate specifications and modern facilities that would accoamodate larger airplanes, more tourists, and aircraft arriving after 6: 00 p.m.
Pearls, the old airport, situated in St. Andrews, had a 5,300 foot runway with several limitations. First, Pearls could only service small propeller-driven planes. Second, situated in a mountainous area along the eastern coast, Pearls was subjected to dangerous crosswinds. Third, Pearls Airport possessed no night landing rights which meant that aircraft could not travel and land at the airport after 6:00 p. m., any day of the week. This resulted in an early closure each evening. Late evening travellers to Grenada had no alternative but to stag overnight in Barbados or
Trinidad, which could be very costly. 76
Grenada was a British colony before it gained independence on February 7, 1974, but neither the British, the former colonial masters, nor the Americans, nor any other country, offered to assist the island in building a much-needed modern airport. None
75 Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p. 36.
76 ibid. p. 55. 48 of Grenada's earlier trading partners or benefactors was prepared to bear the cost of dredging the salt ponds and levelling the hills to accommodate a nen airport. Cuba, however, was eager to help.
It took Grenadians fifty-four years from the initial study done in
1926 to the beginning of January, 1980, when the Cuban Government dispatched equipment, expertise, and financial and technical help, to begin building a new international airport at Point Salines.
In 1926, the British Government had its first design prepared and a survey conducted for an airport at Point Salines. In 1933, the
British undertook another survey of the Point Salines site, but no action was taken. In 1967 a tripartite econornic commission was established comprising Bri tain, Canada, and the United States. The commission acknowledged that economically , tourism could not be developed unless something was done to the existing airport. In 1969, the British Government commissioned another survey that coincided with the findings of the tripartite group. Still nothing was done. In 1976, the World Bank became involved, and it also commissioned a survey. The patience of earlier Grenadian governments began to wane at that point since no positive action was taken concerning the construction of the airport. '? Now the
PRG was prepared to put the plan int.0 practice. The single most important industrial pro ject undertaken under the PRG, and the one that obtained the most publicity from the international community, was the Point Salines Airport; Cuba's
Thorndike, op. cit. pp. 124-125. 49
involvement in building the airport was no small factor.
Approximately three hundred Cuban construction workers along with
engineers brought trucks and heavy equipment from their homeland
and worked in groups covering twenty-four hour shifts, six days a
week, to build the new airport. In January 1980, 1,500 tons of steel, 4,000 tons of cernent, and 1.5 million gallons of fuel were
sent to Grenada for the construction of the airport. Other shipments followed as the need arose. '' The contributions totalled
U.S. $60 million and consisted not only of materials and labour, but designs as well. Considerable amounts of aid were also received
from Algeria, the European Economic Community, Iraq, Libya,
Nigeria, and Venezuela, but the most substantial contribution towards building the new airport came from
In conjunction with the airport pro ject, the Cubans constructed an asphalt factory as well as the Quintana Stone Crushing Plant.80
The Sandino Cornplex, a cernent factory completed by the Cubans in March of 1983, was instrumental in the construction of inexpensive housing in Grenada.
Ultimately, Cuba's assistance improved agriculture, water supply, and fishing; in fact, the assistance stemmed from a sixty- three point economic and technical agreement that was signed in
June, 1980. Public manifestations of the alliance were further
78 ibid. p. 126.
79 Schoenhals and Melanson, op.cit. pp. 53-56.
p0 ibid p. 37. 50 enhanced by the inauguration of direct flights by Cubana Airlines to Grenada in February, 1981, and the cancellation of visa requirements for nationals travelling to and from both countries.
In July of 1982, Cuba's partnership with Grenada expanded when it decided to sel1 rice, sugar and cernent to Grenada at subsidized prices. In June and December the same year, the Cuban Government signed two other development pacts with ~renada;~'hence, Cuba became the largest provider of aid to tne People's Revolutionary Government during the latter's four-and-one half year reign,
CONCLUSION
Based on an early assessrnent of the most pressing needs of
Grenadians, the People's Revolutionary Government went about implementing certain priorities that it had set for itself upon taking power. True to its fundamental objectives, the PRG created jobs for the unemployed, free health care for the indigent, improved the infrastructure for industry and agriculture, and a process of mass education for all. Its final objective, the democratization of the society, however, was never to be fully achieved.
Al1 of the initiatives discussed above represented attempts by the People's Revolutionary Government to place the national economy on a more sound footing given the conviction that a strong economy is the only guarantee of the social and material well-being
- -
81 Thorndike, op. cit. p. 136. 5 1 of Grenadians. Although the PRG was prepared to confront certain difficulties such as a U.S. economic squeeze, what was not envisioned, was the sudden and untimely demise of the PRG. Chapter
2 will discuss the events that led to the demise of the Grenada
Revolution and the actions of those who altered the course of history forever on this tiny Caribbean island. 52
CHAPTER 2
WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE COUP?
The internal problems of the People's Revolutionary Government had
many unexpected repercus~ions.~~The summary executions of Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop; Minister of Education, Jacqueline Creft; Minister of External Affairs, Unison Whiteman; Minister of ffousing,
Norris Bain; trade unionist , Vincent Noel ; plus hundreds of innocent Grenadians , who involuntarily f led to their deaths , while being shot at by the People's Revolutionary Army, have astounded
not only citizens on the island, but the world at Large.83 The
revolution came to an end primarily due to the clash in both the personalities and political strategies of Prime Yinister Maurice
Bishop and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. The two factors
were related, Matters that concentrated on political strategies
and party discipline sharpened incipient dif ferences such as
approach, style, and strategy. These dif ferences gradually caused
the deterioration of relations between certain factions within the
People's Revolutionary Government. Of central importance for this
work, however, is the argument that the crisis was internally
generated, and therefore required internal remedies. The t'. S.
invasion was justified politically and ideologically by taking
82 See Appendix J for a list of the members that comprised the Government of Grenada, as of August 31, 1983.
83 Fitzroy Ambursley and James Dunkerley, GRENADA: Whose Freedom? (London: Russell Press Ltd., 1984). p.55 53 advantage of the internal crisis. This is developed further in the following chapters. What follows here is a description of the internal parameters of the conflict.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE CONFLICT
To adequately conceptual ize the conf 1 ict that ensued between the two most influential leaders, their personalities must be brought under close scrutiny by assessing each one's strengths and weaknesses. These issues are of further impact given the small size of the population in Grenada and the generally familiar relations with governing personalities. Prime Minister Bishop was capable of associating with al1 levels in society; he was charismatic, intelligent, extremely motivated, sympathetic, and generally, a conciliator. He listened attentively to the concerns and recommendat ions of al1 individuals regardless of their status . He was skilled in delivering insightful speeches, and was regarded as an accomplished politician who continuously maintained popular support. 84
At first, Lieutenant Colonel Liam James credited the Prime
Minister personally for the successes of Grenada's revolution.
Qualities such as having the ability to inspire and instil confidence in people, uniting the masses and holding high the banner of the revolution, regionally and internationally, were
84 ibid. pp. 55-57. a4 credited to Maurice Bi~hop.'~ Prime Minister Bishop provided a link between the Government and the majority of Grenadians, and was also the bond between the New Jewel Movement and the People's Revolutionary Government. Ironically, Liam James later became one of Bishop's most vociferous critics. Bishop was condemned for lacking the necessary skills that were required to move the
revolution forward in difficult tirnes.
The other members of the Central Ruling Committee (C.C. jB6 comparable to the cabinet in a parliamentarg style of government, regarded Bishop as a poor administrator who was not highly disciplined. He was considered neither a theorist nor a strategist; in fact, the majority of the C.C. believed that Bishop lacked a "Leninist" style of organisation and discipline, depth in ideological clarity, and brilliance in strategy and tactics,
Central Committee members Liam James, Ewart Layne, Chalkie Ventour, Leon Cornwall, Tan Bartholomew , Selwyn Strachan , and Unison Whiteman felt that reliance only on tactical skills and the Prime hiiinister's natural popularity were thwarting the advancement of the partyOs7 The general perception of the C.C. Nekr Jewel Members was that the prime minister possessed only some of the qualities required of an effective revolutionary leader. This, they claimed in the extraordinary meeting of September 14-16, 1983, could be
85 Schoenhals and .(elanson, op.cit. P. 66
86 See Appendix G for the list of Central Committee members of the New Jewel Movement.
*' ibid. very dangerous in the long run; if the problem was not corrected,
the outcome would be the menace of one man ruling the party as he pleased.
Members of the Central Ruling Committee held meetings once per month. This monthly meeting was in addition to three plenary sessions each year. At the monthly meetings, information was exchanged on many issues, in addition to focusing on party and state work. The C.C. developed and rnaintained links with the masses and the rest of the NJM leadership, organised participation
in zona1 and parish councils, and visited schools. Furthermore,
it developed a mechanism for accountability , and constantly
reviewed feedback from the membership to ensure that the channels of communication were open. The C.C. constantly observed the progress of its members, and monitored them on their weekly achievements, as well as their monthly and yearly performance^.^^
Bernard Coard, on the other hand, was chiefly interested in planning, administration, and promot ing his interpretation of
Leninist ideology. His dedication to the revolutionary government rivalled that of the Prime Minister. As a theoretician and an
intellectual, ~oard's responsibilities centred on economic management. Under Coard's direction, the New Jewel Movement's
image changed from a heterogeneous grouping of radicals and
See Appendix D regarding the extraordinary meeting held September 14-16, 1983, and the collective and individual analysis of the Central Committee.
89 See Appendix H for the role of the Central Cornmittee. 56 nationali sts to a regulated vanguard that Kas partially built on officia1 "Marxist-Leninist" ideas. However, this image was plagued by the question of whether a country as small and underdeveloped as Grenada, with a small working population, could reallg constitute a socialist state since socialism has many requirements. For example, classical socialism requires a substantial level of development of the productive forces, infrastructural development, agricultural development, industrialisation, a high Ievel of cultural development among the people, and an even higher level of political development and political consciousness. Socialism also requires central planning of the economy and society as a whole. In particular, classical socialism required a committed Marxist- Leninist party guiding and directing the whole process. Clearly, socialism in Grenada would not follow a classical model. Not surprisingly, this became a subject of profound interna1 debate.
Bernard Coard was the prime mover of Liarxism-Leninism; he emphasized this as a state ideology and an established science. To this end, he founded the Organisation of Revolutionary Education and Liberation (OREL) as far back as 1976, and was responsible for the training and education of Leon James, Ewart Layne, Liam
Cornwall, Chris Stroude, John Ventour, Basil Gahagan, Raymond
Layne, Nazim Burke. These people were part of a group of eighteen members specifically trained in Marxist theory. The roots of OREL were comprised of former students of the Presentation Boys College 5 7 and the St . Joseph's Convent By June 1983, it was apparent that the New Jewel Movement's Central Committee was dominated by the
Marxist-Leninist approach as it had been understood and generalized by Bernard Coard. 91
The personalities of Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard did not directly clash until September of 1983. Prior to the 1979
Revolution, both Bishop and Coard CO-operated warmly and harmoniously, and defended each other against criticism. However, the relationship began to erode in October of 1982 when Bernard
Coard retired from the Central Committee and its political bureau.
The reason he gave for his resignation was that he vas excessively overworked and was obliged single-handedly to develop and administer party and government polîcy. 92 In an unusual twist of logic, he also claimed his retirement was needed because of his unique contribution. He believed that if he had continued to fulfill his role, the revolution would be faced with a predicament should he die, since he believed that there was no one capable of replacing him. In fact, xhat was later to becorne obvious was that
Bernard Coard's resignation was a calculated strategy to undermine the prime minister's popularity. By placing himself outside the policy-making circle, Coard believed that he could re-enter the arena as the "saviour" when matters went askew, just as he
09Shaughnessy, op. cit. p. 71.
91 Ambursley and Dunkerley, op. cit., pp. 55-57.
92 ibid.p.58 58 cautioned they might.
On the heel of Coard's resignation, in July of 1983, the
Central Committee held an extended extraordinary session to assess
the progress of both the New Jewel Movement and the revolution.
This meeting resulted in the implementation of a variety of
administrative changes such as the systematic development of the
interna1 political and ideological work of the party- A system to guarantee more careful selection of cadres entering the part? was adopted, and a mechanism to gradually weed out the weak elements
from within the ranks of the party was put in place. The party's dernonstrated weaknesses ideologically, politically, and
organizationally were identif ied and challenged, as well as the
emergence of so-called deep petty-bourgeois manifestations. Two
ideological trends, a Marxist-Leninist trend, and a non-Marxist- Leninist trend, came into open ~onflict.'~
Septernber 14 to 16, 1983, was the date scheduled to hold the next extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee. The purpose of this meeting was to examine the decisions that were made at the
July meeting. There, the question of leadership was to corne up. At this meeting, Lt. Col. Liam James, Deputy Minister of the Interior, recommended that both Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard
assume joint leadership roles. Maurice Bishop would mobilize the
93 GRENADA DOCUMENTS: An Overview and Selection. Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 1984 Document 110-7 and 110-9. See Appendix E for the strengths and weaknesses of the party as discussed in the July 13- 19, 1983 plenary session, 5 9
masses and the militia, and would also be responsible for
fulfilling regional and international obligations. 94 Bishop would
continue to chair the Central Committee and sign its documents, as well as maintain his position as commander-in-chief of the army.95
On the other hand, Lt. Col. James recommended that Bernard
Coard be made responsible for party organization, ideological
development, cadre formation, strategy, and tactics. Coard would also become a member of the Central Committee and the Politburo (Political Bureau), and be given the responsibility of chairing al1 Politburo meetings. Together, the Central Committee and the
Politburo would negotiate and approve the main propositions and resolutions that either Maurice Bishop or Bernard Coard sought in
order to strengthen the Leninist principle of collective
leadership.96
Prime Hinister Bishop acquiesced in the criticisms of his performance and assured the cornmittee members that he would
consider the proposal. Upon further consideration, however, Bishop
realized that the joint-leadership motion called for a possible "no
confidence" vote in him. He rejected this motion in its totality and only agreed to consider other aspects of the proposal. When
a final vote was called, George Louison, Minister of Agriculture was the only person to vote in support of the Prime Minister's
94 Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cite p. 66.
95 Ambursley and Dunkerley, op. cite p. 60.
96 Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p. 66. 60 proposal. It was evident from the results of the vote on the proposa1 that the Central Committee members were in support of joint leadership since they voted nine to one in faveur.'' Army chief Hudson Austin, Minister of External Affairs, Unison Whiteman, and Prime Minister Bishop himself abstained. 98 Needless to Say, the meeting concluded in a tense atmos~here.~~
Prime flinister Bishop boycotted the Central Committee meeting of September 23, 1983 that was to determine the power sharing formula. Two days later, September 25, the Prime Minister again decided not to be present at the extraordinary meeting of al1 members to determine the power sharing formula. This time, his absence was not tolerated. A five-man delegation was assigned to persuade him to attend the meeting, advising him that Coard would not be present if he was absent. He was persuaded that it was appropriate for him to attend the general meeting and to hear the views of the party membership. When the meeting got underway, the Prime Minister's attitude and behaviour were attacked by the majority of speakers who agreed with the Central Cornmittee's proposa1 for joint leadership. After 15 hours of debate, forty- eight of the seventy-f ive New Jewel Members voted overwhelmingly to introduce the joint leadership scheme. The impassioned speeches presented by the rnembers so affected the Prime Minister that he
97 ibid. p.67.
98 Ambursley and Dunkerley, op.cit. p. 60
99 See Appendix F for the minutes of the emergency meeting August 26, 1983. 6 1 accepted the criticisrns and the final vote. Bishop emphasized that his entire life was dedicated to the party and the revolution. He further stated that he would view the criticisms constructively and march along hand in hand with the entire party to build a Marxist-
Leninist state that coulà lead the people of Grenada to socialism and then cornmunism. He further promised to do everything in his
power to alleviate his "petit bourgeois traits. " Bishop was then assured that he would never encounter any dif f iculties working with
Comrade Coard, and that joint leadership would help tkrust both the party and the revolution forward. 'O0
Xlthough Bishop Îarmally acquiesceci in the criticisms
Ievelled against him, the Prime Xinister was still truly unco~fortablewith the joint leadership decision to which he had agreed. This became apparent 9efore and during his Eastern European trip of September 27 to October 10, 1983, that took hirn to
Czechoslovakia, Hungary , Russia and Ezst Germany. His derneanour throughout this two-week tfip seemed to some of his close supporters as that of a man without a firm direction. Before his departure, he seerned disturbed by- the planned events taking place around him. He failed to adhere to an agreed timetable, did not appear at meetings where his attendance was expected, and totally ignored tne protocols of the party and the new agreed-upon responsibilities. These actions made Bishop appear contemptuous,
'O0 ibid. p.69. 62 and that did not go over well with the entire mernber~hip.'~' For example, Liam James pointed out that Prime Hinister Bishop refused to attend an important C.C. meeting on September 24, 1983, after be had previously agreed to do so, citing that more time was needed to reflect on the conclusions reached by the C.C. the week before.
Although the question of joint leadership clearly upset Prime klinister Bishop, in a meeting with the Central Committee he explained that the question of sharing power was not new to him and definitely not something with which he had difficulty. In the past, he explained that he had shared policy decisions, had shared authorship of the New Jewel Manifesto, and had shared the People's
Congress indictments of Gairy with Bernard Coard. The Central
Committee was further reminded that in 1977, Bernard Coard was accused of aggressiveness and power grabbing and it was Bishop who defended him. Apart from enduring the pain of being reluctantly forced into joint leadership, equally perplexing for the Prime
Minister was the approach the Central Committee took in presenting the joint leadership proposa1 to the population. Hainly because
Grenadians were kept uninformed of the interna1 problems, joint leadership was seen by many people as a power struggle that would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the revoluti~n.~~~
As the leader of the revolution in the tiny island for four- and-a-half years, Bishop became accustomed to enjoying local
'O' ibid. p. 70.
'O2 Schoenhals and Melanson, op.cit. p. 67 popularity and to being held in high esteem by regional leaders.
Despite his forma1 agreement, in reality, he found it inappropriate
to share the leadership with Bernard Coard who , though intelligent, vas not well liked by the masses. Upon reflection, and after some discussion, Maurice Bishop realized that it was not in his best
interest to embrace the notion of joint leadership. He believed
that to do so would have portrayed a negative image of his performance as leader of the People's Revolutionary Government.
Furthermore, Bishop told his securitg guard, Cletus St.Pau1, that the crisis within the party did indeed arise from a power struggle,
and that he could not recall any country that had joint
leadership. 'O3
Scepticism and doubt engulfed the party leadership when Cletus
St. Paul made a cal1 from Cuba on October 7, 1983, to a New Jewel
Movement member telling the member that the Prime Minister no
longer wished to tolerate the joint leadership decisi~n.'~~Worst
of all, St.Pau1 mentioned to the member that there would be
bloodshed. Bernard Coard, being closest to the Prime Minister,
perceived this as a threat on his life. Coard and his farnily then
went into hiding .'O5
The ensuing days did not become any easier for Bishop. The
Central Cornmittee performed its responsibilities with unanimity and
'O3 ibid. p. 41
'O4 GRENADA: A Preliminarv Report. Washington D. C . : Department of State and the Department of Defense, December 16, 1983, p. 34.
lo5 Ibid. p. 72 64 determination.lo6 It was at this point that Bishop became avare that a serious power struggle was to be anticipated in the future.
It also became obvious to Prime Minister Bishop that he had to seek some time to reflect, to decide on the future course of the revolution because political power was at stake. With the decision to change the leadership structure, Bishop's opponents were at an advantage. They had the support of the Central Cornittee, plus the support of the party membership, making it feasible for them to adhere strictly to party rules. Lacking the support that this group had, Prime Minister Bishop envisioned himself outnumbered, losing control, incapable of presenting a coherent case for himself, and unable to reinforce the New Jewel Movement's popularity with the average Grenadian.
Apart from the support the Central Committee had from many of its members, it was still suspicious about events taking place abroad. For exarnple, when George Louison, and u'nison Whiteman, both supporters of Prime Minister Bishop, accompanied him on his
Eastern Europe trip, between September 28 to October 6, 1983,
Louison addressed Grenadians in Hungary and discussed the problems on the island, advising them that neither the Prime Minister,
Unison Whiteman, nor himself, accepted the joint leadership idea.
His comments were perceived by those in Grenada as a violation of party discipline."' A short time later, the Prime ninister and his
-- --
'O6 Ibid. pp.32-33.
'O7 ibid p. 34 65
touring party stopped over in Cuba on the night of October 6, 1983,
enroute to Grenada, departing on the morning of October 8, 1983.
The stopover created speculation among committee members that Fidel
Castro was sending a message to the committee that he was advising
Prime Yinister Bishop, by then a persona1 friend of Castro. On his
return to Grenada, the Prime Minister was shunned on this basis.
This uneasiness occurred even though Fidel Castro denied being
informed about the interna1 affairs on the island. However, what
should have set off alarm bells for Bishop was that upon arriva1
at Pearls Airport, he did not receive the customary protocol;
instead, Selwyn Strachan, not known to be a staunch supporter, was
the lone cabinet minister at the airport to wekome him. The reception the Prime Minister received at home was very unenthusiastic compared to that received in Cuba a few days bef ore. log
The tensions increased when an expressed request of Prime
Minister Bishop was misinterpreted by Selwyn Strachan. Bishop
requested that the leadership consideration appear on the agenda of the Central Cornmittee meeting scheduled for October 12, 1983.
This was interpreted as a rejection and a challenge to officia1 party policy. The situation became very tense when, on the same day, the People% Revolutionary Army held an early morning meeting where a resolution was presented directly targeting the Prime
Minister. The leadership of the armed forces believed that the
'O8 Ibid. p. 71. situation demanded Bolshevik staunchness; therefore, the security forces adopted a number of measures to secure the lives of the C.C. members and party comrades. The following is a list of the more important measures.
(1) Confine Maurice Bishop indefinitely. (2) Phones of Maurice Bishop to be cut off. (3) Disarm Maurice Bishop for his own safety, and Police Service comrades to guarantee his safety. (4) Suspend and confine Einstein Louison for his opposition and petty bourgeois behaviour on this issue. Einstein Louison tried to influence comrades in the armed Forces. (5) People spreading rumours to be called in for strict warning and others for indefinite detention.'Og
The resolution was passed among those in attendance at the
October 12, 1983 rneeting.l1° These conditions created fear in the mind of Bernard Coard, which resulted in he and his wife, Phyllis, leaving their home. Notably, the Coards lived adjacent to the Bishops.
The situation within the government further intensified when
Maurice Bishop was placed under house arrest at about midnight on
October 12, 1983. This latest action was followed by a cal1 to the entire Sew Jewel Movement membership requesting a meeting on the afternoon of October 13, 1983. The meeting was conducted with almost no opposition to the motion that the Prime Minister be expelled £rom the party. In addition, the motion also proposed that the Prime Minister be stripped of al1 his prominent
'O9 ibid. p.35.
'Io ibid. p. 71. 67 positions."' The hasty decision taken by almost every member of the New Jewel Movernent was in fact superfluous, as his authority was already rendered nul1 and void. But the most objectionable aspect of these events was the lack of respect for, and lack of trust in, the Prime Minister himself. He had been detained based on accusations made bg a security officer. It was not suggested or thought necessary to allow Prime Minister Bishop, leader of the revolution, the benefit of the doubt. There was no due process; instead, the words of a security officer seemed more trustworthy, and ultimately his word was more acceptable than that of the Prime
3inister. lf
As the days progressed, the situation on the island worsened.
Life on the island was characterised by anarchy. Selwyn Strachan,
Minister of National Mobilization, felt it necessary to address the people on Radio Free Grenada (RFG)+ He explained the unfolding events to them, but he was threatened with violence and raced off the site. In other areas, impromptu non-violent demonstrations were taking place, al1 demanding the Prime !4inister9srelease. In the interim, on October 1 1983, Bernard Coard was proclaimed
Grenada's new leader, but resigned at the end of the day to avoid rumours that he was planning the assassination of Prime Minister
Bishop.
Ambursley and Dunkerley, op. cit. p. 72.
Il2 ibid pp. 31-35.
ibid. p. 73. 68
Tension continued to rise everywhere. Kenrick Radix, Liinister of Legal Affairs, together with Norris Bain, Minister of Housing, orchestrated a counter-demonstration in the capital, St. George'sl to liberate Maurice Bishop from house arrest. At the completion of the demonstration, on October 12, 1983, both Radix and Bain were arrested. These arrests suspended negotiations between George
Louison and Unison Whi teman, two staunch supporters of Prime
Minister kfaurice Bishop, on one side, and Selwyn Strachan, representing the Central Cornmittee majority. Not even the slightest change in position came from the Central Committee during that weekend. The Central Committee mistakenly believed that the people of Grenada would eventually become tired and frustrated, and would cease demonstrating or making demands for Bishop's release.
Tirne was considered to be on the side of the Central Committee and, therefore, a "wait and see" attitude was followed. Moreover, it was felt that the Prime Minister would acquiesce in the major demands . 'l4
On Sunday October 16, 1983, further arrests took place.
General Hudson Austin in a radio address to the people of Grenada indicated that the major problem was the refusal of Prime Minister
Bishop to agree to the principle of collective leadership. To many Grenadians, Bishop was the person that made the revolution possible, and it was preposterous to associate him with a plot to murder others .Il5. George Louison attempted to arrive at a compromise with Coard and the Central Committee in order to end the state of affairs, but this was to no avail. Clearly, Coard was not bothered by the daily grumbling which he summarized in these words:
[Tlhey can stay on the streets for weeks; after a while they are bound to get tired and hungry and want peace ...Williams did it in 1970 in Trinidad, Gairy did it in 1973 to us in St. George's, and it can be done again. Il6
Coard's callous disposition did not thwart George Louison's determination to search for answers or a workabie solution to the problem. To this end, George Louison was allowed to meet with
Maurice Bishop at 6:30 a.m. on October 19, 1983, to discuss the
Central Committee's six demands. These six demands were that:
1. The NJM should remain on a socialist path and Maurice Bishop should do nothing to alter it. 2. Maurice Bishop should accept the principles of criticism and democratic centralism. 3. Maurice Bishop should accept that the state is subordinate to the party. 4. The post of commander-in-chief be abolished and military affairs be directed by the Central Committee. 5. Bishop should accept responsibility for the crisis. 6. Bishop remain Prime Minister, an ordinary member of the NJM, and only attend Politburo meetings for consultations.
Demands 5 and 6 were initially declined by both Bishop and
Louison while the remaining demands were queried .l17 After several hours of deliberation, it was agreed that Prime Minister Bishop
ibid. p. 73.
ibid. p.74
Ibid. p.74. 70 return to both the Central Committee and the Politburo. It would appear that the joint leadership proposa1 presented by Lt. Col.
Liam James on September 15, 1983 was no longer an acceptable compromise since it was not stipulated in the six dernands.
In the meantirne, segments of the population were taking matters into their own hands. Students in the parish of St. Andrews occupied Pearls Airport in support of their prime minister singing, 'no Bishop, no school' . Although some of the students were detained, that did not prevent further demonstrations. By 10 :00 a.m. on the morning of October 19, 1983, three thousand people marched to the Prime Minister's residence and released him and Jacqueline Creft , Minister of Education, from house arrest. The people faced no opposition from the guards.'18
St. George's was the scene of a second protest rally that day when a crowd, in excess of ten thousand, converged on the central market square, objecting to Bishop's arrest. By now, al1 the schools on the island were closed; so too were offices, stores, and restaurants. The indications were that a significant section of the population was refusing to accept the reforms, and continued to be behind their prime minister. Chants of "We want Maurice!"
"We want we Leader! " "C for Corruption, C for Coard! " were heard.
Now free, the Prime Minister thought it necessary to defy the
Central Committee with the assistance of some of his supporters,
Ibid. p. 75.
ibid. p. 75. namely, Jacqueline Creft , Minister of Education, Youth and Culture, and Minister of Women's Affairs; Fitzroy Bain, a union leader;
Norris Bain, Minister of Housing; Vincent Noel, a union leader; and
Unison Whiteman, Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Lands and Forestry, plus a large crowd of supporters. They converged on
Fort Rupert, which is an 18th Century Fort that was started by the
French and completed by the British during the period when Grenada changed hands between these two colonial powers. The fort has txo landings: the lower landing where most of the activities of October
19, 1983 occurred, consists of concrete barracks while the upper landing was one of the ~eople'sRevolutionary ~rmg's (PRA1s) military headquarters.
By 11 :O0 o'clock on the morning of October i9, 1983, Bishop and his supporters were in control of the fort. in a decisive move,
Bishop ordered more arms to be brought out while he made an effort to medizte with the army commanders by radio. About 1:00 p.m. the
situation escalated when three armoured troop carriers arrived outside Fort Rupert facing a large gathering of Bishop supporters already assembled. Suddenly, without warning, soldiers f ired on unarrned civilians. The Prime Minister, having understood the
army's intention, ordered his supporters to surrender after the
loss of twenty civilian lives.120 hiaurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman,
Jacqueline Creft, Norris Bain, Fitzroy Bain and Vincent Xoel were
captured, arrested, and brought into the fort's small interior
120 ibid. p. 76. courtyard. Astonishment filled the air and the people were dumbfounded when they realized that the soldiers were not firing blank bullets. However, most of the other Bishop supporters at Fort Rupert were ordered out at gunpoint and allowed to go free.
Meanwhile, Prime Xinister Bishop and his remaining supporters were informed by First Lieutenant Abdullah that disobedience would be dealt with by punishment resulting in execution as ordered by the Central Cornmittee. With the exception of Jacqueline Creft , they were al1 ordered to disrobe tu their waists and face the wall.
Maurice Bishop, recalling that his father was shot in the back in
1974,~'' refused to face the wall. First Lieutenant ~bdullahthen gave the order to shoot, and Bishop was the first to be executed; his head was literally blown off. His throat was later cut and a finger severed to remove a ring.lZ2 Before her execution, Jacqueline
Creft, fearing for her life, pleaded with the soldiers.
Xevertheless, she was cursed, humiliated, accused of allowing the irnperialists to enter Grenada and then shot.123
Around 1 :40 p. m. , about twenty minutes after the fort had been seized, a second burst of gunfire was heard. lZ4 The executioners
12' January 21, 1974, Bishop's father Rupert Kas shot and killed by police as he sought to block the doorway of a first-floor room at Otway House, headquarters of the Seamen and Materfront Workers' Union on the Carenage in St. George's. Rupert Bishop tried to prevent the Mongoose Gang from attacking women and children.
lZ2 Thorndike, op.cit p. 162.
'23 Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p. 78.
'24 Ambursley and Dunkerley, op. cit.p. 76. were yelling %ong live the Central Committee!' and 'Forward ever, backward never!' This was a very popular slogan with the PRG and was repeated at every gathering , meeting, speech, or conference sponsored by the government .125
The rnurder of Maurice Bishop and his supporters not only shocked and divided Grenadians then; this division persists to this day. A significant percentage of the population has informed the present Prime Ffinister, Dr. Keith Mitchell, that the people of
Grenada are not emotionally prepared to have these sadistic murderers, who were responsible for the deaths of Bishop and others, walking the streets of Grenada. The memories remain. Andy
Bain, son of executed Housing Minister Norris Bain, made this impassionate plea in February of 1997:
1 was only a kid when my father was murdered. Do you know how difficult it is for a young bop growing up without his father being there to throw or kick a bal1 or give him guidance? My mum was shot by these people and today she still carries a bullet in her hip and has suffered tremendously both ~h~sicallyand mentally. Now is the time for the Mercy Committee to give us consideration because releasing these people could cause more trouble in this small nation.126
A letter written on February 10, 1997 to the Mercy Committee, headed by Dr. Raphael Fletcher, regarding freeing the group of 17 former government and military officials of the PRG convicted of the murders reads:
1 lost two brothers-in-law, and have one sister and one sister-in-law who were widowed, three nieces and one nephew who were seriously affected spiritually, mentally, physically,
lZ5 Searle and Rojas, op. cit. p. 34
126 ore trouble in this small nation" in Grenada Todas Newspaper (February 14, 19971, p.8 emotionally and financially as a consequence of what happened at Fort Rupert on that day. 1 have not had one bit of sympathy or compassion shown to them by the Council of Churches, Amnesty International, or any of the several groups that are now so vocal in their pleas for mercy. They are imprisoned as the direct result of the actions of Bernard Coard and his gang of whom the master-mind was Phyllis Coard who in no uncertain terms had avowed that she did not corne to Grenada to be the wife of a deputy Prime Minister, but the wife of the Prime !dinister, making reference to hek husband Bernard Coard . l2
Glen St.Louis, Chairman of the National Democratic Congress
(NDC), was advised to resign his position for endorsing the
Caribbean Council of Churches'(CCC) call for the freedom of Phyllis
Coard and Colville McBarnette, two of the prisoners serving life
sentences. This call to free both persons was made on humanitarian grounds because both persons are reported to be seriously i11.'28
Grenada, an island of 121 square miles with a population of
100,000, where almost everyone knows almost everyone else, has not
been able to overcome completely its mourning and start anew. It
is particularly distressing to learn tbat one's brothers, sisters,
husband, father, or otber relatives participated in such gross wrongdoings. The Grenadian Voice newspaper of October 26, 1996,
"' "Letter to Mercy Cornmittee" in Grenada Informer ( February 21, 1997 ) . p. 9. Jamaican born Phyllis Coard, wife of Bernard Coard arrived in Grenada in 1976. She is a mernber of the Evans family who are large shareholders in the Tia Maria coffee liqueur Company of Jamaica. In an interview conducted with Leslie Pierre, editor of The Grenadian Voice, on December 27, 1996, in his office in St. George's, Grenada, he reiterated Phyllis's statement of wanting to be the number one lady.
'28 "St. Louis told to resign" in The Grenadian Voice (February 01, 1997). p.3 75 listed those killed during the fighting on October 19, 1983, as
Andy Alexander, Simon Alexander, Gemma Belmar, Alleyne Romain (al1 students), Eric Dupont, Avis Ferguson, Vincent Noel (trade unionists), Nelson Steel (worker), Glen Satham, Dorsette Peters,
Rudolph Mason, and Conrad Yeyers (soldiers). In addition, the paper also listed others in government and civil servants executed on the same da^.'^' Three soldiers died when Bishop's supporters retaliated; clearly, the People's Revolutionary Army was better equipped and under orders to shoot to kill. The October 19th firing squad was comprised of its Officer-in-Charge, Callistus
Bernard (sub machine gun), Cpl. Raymond Joseph (machine gun), Sgt.
Fabian Gabriel (machine gun), Cosmus Richardson (machine gun) , Maj .
Chris Stroud (AK assault rifle), Capt. tester Redhead (AK assault rifle) and P. Andy Mitchell (AK assault rifle).130
WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?
No one individual or group has accepted responsibility for the rnurders of Maurice Bishop, his parliamentarians, and his supporters. Although it is difficult to establish who ultimately gave the orders for the shootings, today, seventeen members of the former government remain in prison for the murders . Conventional wisdom has dictated that Bernard Coard and the Central Cornmittee
12' "Remembering Victims of October 19th" in The Grenadian Voice (October 26, 1996). p. 2A
''O Ibid. See Appendix I for the victims of October 19, 1983, the names of those killed during fighting on that day, and the members of the firing squad. were culpable; together they insisted on Prime Yinister Bishop endorsing the joint leadership proposal presented at the July 1983 meeting.
On October 2, 1996, a group of Caribbean journalists conducted an interview at the Richmond Hill Prisons in St . George's, Grenada, with Lt. Colonels James, Layne, and Bernard, Major Cornïall, and
Bernard Coard. The group of journalists included Claude Graham of the Caribbean Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in Barbados, Lennox
Grant, editor of The Trinidad Express, Hamlet Mark, news director of the Grenada Broadcasting Corporation, and Leslie Pierre of The
Grenadian Voice. They posed many questions to thern including: "Kas there any meeting of the Central Committee on October 19, 1983?"
"Who was in charge?", "Who can tell us what happened at Fort
Rupert?", "What happened that dag, the killing of Bishop, the execution and al1 that?" , "How did you move from that to the point where these fellows were lined up against the wall?", and "What happened to the bodies?" Yang of the questions put forward by the panel were not directly answered, but the key question of who accepts responsibility was answered in this way by Bernard Coard:
With respect to the legal process, it is very important that people throughout the region understand that there is a very clear distinction between moral and political responsibility for the tragedy and catastrophe which took place, for which I personally accept responsibility; it is a great weight on me. 1 have felt it for the last 13 years; 1 will feel it for the rest of my life. And criminal liability. It is one thing to Say that one took certain political decisions and/or failed to take certain political decisions at different stages in an unfolding crisis and you look back and you Say, if 1 had done this instead; or if 1 had only done something that 1 didn't do things mal- have been different. And you reflect on that and you think about it al1 the tiute and it is an enormous weight on your shoulders. That's just a fact. And you cannot be one of the top leaders. 1 was one of the two top leaders in the rnovement, and not accept responsibility for the catastrophe. 1 feel politically and morally responsible for al1 that took place and 1 have felt it every day of the last thirteen years and 1'11 feel it for the rest of my life and that's just the reality. I3l
In a general sense, there is certainlg grounds to believe that both Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard were jointlp liable for the untimely demise of the revolution. Prime Minister %aurice Bishop was liable because he failed to maintain the confidence of the
Central Committee. The criticisms, although difficult for him to accept, emphasized the Prime Minister's inability to provide guidance and resolute leadership during times of crisis. He was also seen as being a 'petit bourgeois', opportunist, and contemptuous of central control .13* Even if some of these charges were not accurate, Bishop nevertheless failed to retain majority support of his party mernbership.
On the other hand, the persona1 ambition of Bernard Coard, cornbined with the belief by the Political Bureau that the revolution was deteriorating, precipitated a power struggle.
Bernard Coard resigned from the Central Committee and the Politburo because he was frustrated with his lack of influence in making difficult and expeditious decisions. If there was a problem that required immediate attention, Coard, as Deputy Prime Minister, was
131 "Layne declines to answer who gave the order to shoot" in The Grenadian Voice (Novernber 02, 1996). p. 24
13"choenhal~ and Melanson, op.cit. p. 70. 78 obliged first to discuss ways of dealing with the situation with the Prime Minister. The individuals directly responsible for planning the actual murders of Bishop and others in the government were military officers Major Leon Cornwall, Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba;
Lt. Col. Liam James, Deputy Minister of the Interior; and Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, Deputy Defense Minister of Grenada, who was on assignment in the USSR prior to October 19, 1983. The trio was fully trained in Marxist-Leninist ideology which they espoused at al1 times. Since their attitude was one that did not welcome negotiation, this exacerbated the tensions within the government. Major Cornwall and Lt.Co1. Layne were directly answerable to the people of Grenada for leading the armed assault on Fort Rupert on
October 19, 1983. They were similarly responsible for instigating verbal assaults on Prime Minister Bishop at several Central
Committee meetings. Tt is widely accepted that they were liable for ordering the ferocious executions of Prime Minister Maurice
Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Fitzroy Bain, Norris Bain, Vincent Noel,
Unison Whiteman, and two rank and file supporters after these supporters surrendered. '33
The news of the assassinations came as a shock to the people of the Caribbean. Some people speculated whether such crimes could have been committed in any other Caribbean country. Prior to the
People's Revolutionary Government seizing power on March 13, 1979,
- - 133 ibid. p. 83. 79
Grenada, under Eric Gairy, experienced acts of violence perpetrated on the population by a gang of political thugs under the government ' s direct ion known as the "Mongoose Gang. " Although the
Mongoose Gang was extremely brutal in some cases, nothing could possibly measure up to the ghastly rnurders committed on October 19,
1983. This is a day that Grenadians would never forget.
AFTER EFFECT
The Revolutionary Military Council was established and functional by 3:00 p.m. on October 19, 1983. Its purpose was to govern until a state of tranquillity could be restored. To achieve tranquillity, the Revolutionary Military Council called for absolute obedience; anyone cauqht demonstrating or disturbing the peace would be shot. During this tense period, the People's
Revolutionary Government was dissolved; its cabinet members were dismissed. Later the same day, a curfew was imposed from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., for four days. No one was allowed to leave their homes during these times, and any person caught disobeying curfew orders could be shot on sight. Al1 schools and places of employment were temporarily closed until further notice, and a news blackout was enforced which created a regional and hemispheric atmosphere of suspicion. The curfew resulted in havoc on October
21, 1983, when the public was granted only four hours in which to
obtain food. Only the shops could cater to buyers; it was
impossible for farmers to organise transportation to deliver their
produce to the market in the allotted time frame. Many of the 80 small farmers felt the pain of the curfew in their pockets because
the majority of them depended upon the daily sale of fresh produce
for a livelihood. Thus their main source of income rotted in the
fields. Further, the trade in fruit between Grenada and its sister
islands, and between Grenada and neighbouring Trinided, was interrupted, and fruit destined for export from Grenada eventually
spoilt. 134 The curfek- was devastating for the Grenadian poprilation
as it was imposed in conditions which created chronic food
shortages.
Life on the island became almost unbearable. For example,
passenger flights coming into Pearls Airport came under tight
scrutiny, and essential service employees were issued passes and
escorted to their workplaces. Mothers of new-born babies lacked
community support; in fact, one infant died and was left unburied
for several dayç.13= There was a pervasive feeling that the entire
island was under house arrest. It became especially unbearable for
people who were accustomed to working in their gardens, or visiting
their neighbours, family and friends on a daily basis.
These conditions created mounting anger and frustration among
local and international observers alike. Conditions deteriorated
and frustration grew when even foreign journalists were prevented
from entering Grenada, while access to Telex and other
-- - -
134 Thorndike, op. cit. p. 165.
135 Ibid. p. 165 81 communication facilities was denied. 13' Pilister Hughes was the only independent reporter on the island to file on-the-spot reports of
Bishop's release from house arrest, and subsequently, the shooting at Fort Rupert. He was immediately arrested after Maurice Bishop's murder and imprisoned until the arriva1 of the combined
intervention forces. 137
The Revolutionary bfilitary Council was cavalier in its
treatment of the people of Grenada. It is widely believed in
Grenada that "you can take anything away from Grenadians evcept for
their church and the right to worship." Yet the military council
on October 19, 1983, closed al1 churches and made further arrests.
These included such persons as Einstein Louison, chief of staff
Kith the PRG and a Bishop supporter, prominent business people, and others who the Revolutionary Military Council characterized as
counter-revolutionaries. '13' These people were sent to the
Richmond Hill Prison on October 19, 1983, adding to the already
overcrowded and deteriorating conditions there.
With the economy in partial ruin, an emergency economic programme was established October 22, 1983, on the insistence of
Bernard Coard. An Emergency Economic Commission, under the
direction of Bernard Coard, was set up. This Commission would be
responsible for the overall direction of the economy. In addition,
lJ6 Ibid. pp. 163-164.
137 GRENADA: A Preliminars Report, op.cit. p. 36.
13$ ibid. p. 166. it would supervise any controls that were necessary. Senior bureaucrats and managers of state enterprises would be given responsibilities, and were expected to report to Commission members. The Commission and the Revolutionary Military Council
outlined detailed tasks and work programmes designed to conserve
food and fuel, and ration cards were prepared and ready to be printed. Guidelines for public education and propaganda programs
were also initiated, and a program was established to bring certain 139 private property under Martial Law.
Bernard Coard, the Revolutionary Hi1 itary Council , and their
advisers were acutely cognizant of the magnitude of hostility meted
out to them locally and from abroad. At a meeting scheduled to
discuss the situation on October 22, 1983, three major priorities
emerged :
(1) To esplain the position to the people as the Council saw it.
(2) To prepare economic survival plans to counter the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and the Caribbean Common Market's trade, fuel, and transport embargo that had been swiftly imposed.
( 3 To stave off the growing threat of rnilitary intervention by making contact with neighbouring and other countries.
The threat of outside military intervention was of particular
concern because morale was low among the Revolutionary Mili tary
Council. In an effort to raise morale in the military, salaries
were increased by fifteen percent on October 20, 1983. As a
result, a private's pay was increased from EC $200.00 to EC $230.00
13' ibid. p. 168. per rnonth. ''O
The news of Yaurice Bishop's deatn sparked outrage and condemnation from Fidel Castro. He advised his Miiitary Council
that Cuba's poL itical relations with Grenada's new leadership would
be subject to profound and serious analysis. Moreover, Castro
emphasized that Cuba wouid iake into consideration the interests of the Grenadian people as well Grenada's economic and technical
cooperation, providing this t>-pe of cooperation h-as possible with
the new government.141 However, on October 20, 1983, the day after
Bishop and his supporters were murdered, Fidel Castro made this
statement regarding the deaths:
No doctrine, no principle or proclaimeci revolutionary position and no interna1 division can justify atrocious acts such as the physical elimination of Bishop and the prominent qroup of honest and worthp leaders who died yesterday .... The death of Bishop and his conirades must be cleared up. If they were executed in cold blood, the guilty should receive exemplary punishment. L42
Grenada's Revolutionary Military Couficil was visioly perturbed
by Fidel Castro's condernnation of the death of his persona1 friend,
Naurice Bishop. Castro knew it was just a matter of tirne before
he was approached by the new government for financial assistance,
and that it would becorne obvious with whorn his logalties rested.
Bernard Coard's request on October 21, 1983, for a desperately
needed E.C.S5 million loan to pay the salaries of civil servants
- - ibid. p. 167.
ibid. p. 163.
14* Schoenhals and Xelanson, op-cit. p. 79. was denied the same day. '43 Though re jected, Coard remained unabashed; he approached the Cuban leader a second time on October
22, 1983, requesting Cuban military reinforcements. That request was also rebuffed on October 23, 1983. Castro told the new government that it was impossible and unthinkable to request reinforcements. Somehow the new government never anticipated this manner of treatment from Grenada's previously greatest benefactor.
Michael Manley, former and now deceased Prime Yinister of
Jamaica, was similarly upset. He had tnis to say on October 30,
1983:
The brutal killings of Maurice Bishop and many of his cabinet and union colleagues by the Grenadian Army represents a squalid betrayal of the hopes of the ordinary people of our region. The thousands who demonstrated for Bishop during the day were expressing their faith in a leader who had given them a new sense of hope and pride as a people. History will pass a terrible judgement on those who are responsible for this murder. 144
Partial reopening of the country took place on %onday October
24, 1983. Shops, offices, and Pearls Airport were opened for business. Schools remained closed for the week October 24 to 28,
1983. The curfew was reinstated, this time from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.rn.14j By now, the people of Grenada believed that they needed to be rescued from a situation of virtual house arrest and the stressful conditions that they had endured over the past several
- --
'43 Thorndike, op.cit. p. 169.
144 Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit. p. 79
145 ibid. p. 170. 83
days. Anyone able to rescue them from their present plight would have been regarded as a saviour. Not only Grenadians, but the rest
of the Eastern Caribbean had difficulty in coming to terms with the brutality of a few misguided politicians in their midst.
CONCLUSION
From the beginning of his political career in the New Jewel
Movement, Maurice Bishop proved himself to be highly charismatic, immensely popular leader who consistently espoused the vision of
a riew society. However, because of Bishop's relatively privileged
upbringing, and the dif ferent personalities and backgrounds within
the PRG, there was always a certain faction that secretly accused Bishop of having petite-bourgeoisie tendencies. According to this
line of thinking, later personified by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and others, a Bishop-led administration could hardly
be expected to develop into a genuine Marxist-Leninist regime in
the true Soviet sense. A regime led by Bishop alone, it Fias
thought , could only hope to be regarded as "progressive," " ant i- imperialist," or at best, on the way to socialist orientation.
The turning point in Bishop's hold on the leadership of the PRG came when he tried to seek U.S. assistance. This was
interpreted by the Coard faction as a sign of weakness on the part
of Bishop. Alarmed at Bishop's evolving moderation, the Central
Cornmittee adopted a resolut ion for restructuring the party
leadership, leading to a proposa1 for joint leadership. While on
a trip outside of Grenada, Bishop came to the conclusion that the 86 joint leadership proposa1 was a plot to depose him as leader, and it was widely believed that, with Coard's active support, the conspiracy was formulated then.
After October 19, 1983, known throughout Grenada as "Bloody Wednesday," history in Grenada changed course. The U.S. invasion of Grenada which followed in the wake of the events of October 19,
1983, marked the final demise of four and a half years of revolution in Grenada, already derailed by interna1 strife. By the early 1990s, however, the promise of an economically prosperous
Grenada, buoyed by massive U. S. investment, turned to a reality far less hopeful. Xot only did meaningful C.S. investment fail to materialise, but the progressive social programs of the PRG were dismantled. Ultimately, political stability proved uncertain with the United States government abandoning the island amid controversy, bitterness and chaos. Chapter 3 looks closely at the mie of the American government in Grenada, the promises it made, and the impact of American involvement on the island. 8 T
CHAPTER 3
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TH6 LWASION AND THE RIST-INVASION IMPACT
ON GRGNADA'S ECONOW AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE.
On the morning of October 19, 1983, the Barbados cabinet assembled for an emergency meeting with the explicit purpose of deciding what measures should be taken to alleviate the deteriorating conditions in Grenada. After an intense deliberation, the Barbados Prime
Hinister, Tom Adams, and his cabinet recommended that a collaborative mission should be organized to deal with the Grenada situation. At about 1:00 p.m. the same day, Prime Xinister Adams held a meeting with the U.S. Arnbassador to Barbados, Milan D. Bish, and Deputy Chief of the G.S. Mission, Ludlow Flower, to discuss his growing concern over the Grenaàa crisis. The prime minister tuas most interested in whether the tinited States would consiaer invading Grenada.
He informed the U.S. represîntatives that should the situation continue to deteriorate, the leaders of the entire Eastern
Caribbean, to whom he had already spoken and obtained their commitment, were ready to act by themselves if required. The prime minister's only request, at that tirne, was that any military assistance the U.S. was prepared to give must be kept in the strictest confidence. ''6
146 Beck, op. cit., p. 101 88 Prime Minister Adams also told the U.S. Ambassador that, in the present circumstances, there was an urgent need to seize the opportunity to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the Caribbean. An implicit invitation to the G.S. government to intervene militarily in the Grenada crisis was given by Adams through the U.S. diplomats, The diplomats were eventually persuaded to ask their government to assist in launching a military operation to rescue Grenada from anarchy-. Prime 3inister Adans was later advised that his request would be forwarded to the appropriate channel in the Gnited States government.
On Friday October SI, 1983, the authoritative body of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)'" assembled in
Bridgetown, Barbados, to evaluate the situation in Grenada in light of Bishop's assassination and the politically-motivated deaths of several parliamentarians and civilians. The meeting focused on the anarchic situation on Grenada, especially the violation of human rights and the unprecedented threat to peace and security in the region that the vacuum of authority in Grenada posed. The OECS was extremely concerned about Grenada; the level of sophistication and size of the Grenada arrned forces were perceived to exceed the interna1 needs of a small nation. Moreover, the governments
147 The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is comprised of the islands of Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Monsterrat, St. Christopher & Nevis, St.Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The OECS Treaty signed by the seven governments on June 18, 1981, at Basseterre, St.Kitts, is a sub-regional agreement that is concerned, in part, sith the collective security of these islands. 89 comprising the OECS knew that theg did possess the overall capability either to defend or defeat such well equipped forces.
The member governments of the OECS were also aware that the military government in office in Grenada had demonstrated that it was capable of doing whatever was necessary to rnaintain its authority and to achieve its ends. The OECS was therefore determined to undertalce immediate action that would ultimately restore order in Grenada. The decision reached by the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States was to form a security force comprising soldiers from each OECS country. To reinforce this group, however, help was requested from the governrnents of Barbados, Jamaica, and notably, the United States.
The decision made by the OECS to pursue the military option was a decision of last resort; immediately prior to this political and economic sanctions against Grenada were announced. The sanctions consisted of cutting off the additional quota of banknotes from the Eastern Caribbean Currencg Authority that was earmarked for Grenada, and interrupting al1 sea and air contacts between Grenada and the other OECS countries. Dominica's prime minister later informed Tony Gillespie, the United States representative, of the OECS decision to pursue the military option if everything else failed. He later informed the Caribbean leaders that military intervention by the United States required a written request .'48 Ultirnately, in responding to the request for military
148 Beck, op. cit., pp.112-113 assistance, L'. S. Secretary of State George Schultz asked Dominica's
Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, as chairperson of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, to provide the U. S. State Department with a forma1 evaluation of the situation in Grenada. This evaluation, Schultz suggested, would serve as the fegal basis for a U.S. invasion.14g
On Saturday, October 22, 1983, a special meeting, this time, organized bu the Heads of Governments of the Caribbean Community and Common Harket (CARICOM) took place at the Hilton Hotel in Port of Spain, Trinidad. The meeting, chaired by Trinidad and Tobago's
Prime Minister George Chambers, was held in the presence of al1 the representatives of the CARICOM States with the exception of
Grenada. The Port of Spain special meeting centred its discussions on a specific settlement of the Grenada crisis, but no mention was made of the decision the day before by the OECS to embark upon possible military intervention. The special meeting of CARICOM heads continued until 3:06 a.m. the following day Sunday, October
23, when an accord was finally reached.
Prime Minister George Chambers, as chair of the meeting, outlined the points of the agreement thus:
1. There should be no extra-regional involvement in a solution to the Grenada crisis.
2. The Grenada crisis should be solved within CARICOM confines.
3. CARICOM should act in accord with international law and the U.N. Charter.
lQ9 Ibid., p.99 Al1 efforts should be directed toward restoring normality on the island of Grenada.
Conversations should be carried on through Grenada' s Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, and CARICOM leaders.
The immediate establishment of a broad-based civilian governrnent of national reconciliat ion whose composition was acceptable to the Governor General . This government would put in place arrangements for holding elections at the earliest convenient tirne.
The establishment of a fact-finding mission cornprising eminent nationals of CARICOM states.
Final arrangements to ensure the safetg of nationals of other countries in Grenada, and their evacuation if desired.
The deployment in Grenada of a peace-keeping force cornprising contingents contributed by CARICOM countries. lS0
In explaining the importance of the involvement of CARICOM states in the Grenada crisis, it must be pointed out that the
Caribbean Communitg and Common Market (CARICOM) was initiated as a result of a 15-year struggle to accomplish the goal of regional integration after the collapse of the British West Indies
Federation, which was established in 1938. The Sederation was a political union with a federal governrnent that was made up of
Caribbean parliamentarians selected by their respective governments. The West Indies Federation which terrninated in 1962 signalled the beginning of CARICOM. The Caribbean Community and
Common Market was established by the Treaty of Chaguramas (Trinidad) on July 4, 1973, and includes the countries of Barbados,
Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, commonly referred to as
Beck, op.cit, pp.140-141. the more developed countries (HDCs) of the region, and the countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat,
St. Kitts and Sevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, generally referred to as the less developeci countries I LDCS ) .lS1
What this means is that members of the OECS are also members of
CARICOM. The government of the Bahamas became the 13th hfernber State of the Communitp on July 4, 1983, but is not a member of the common market or joint forces. The three main objectives of the Cariobean
Community and Common Yarket are : lS2
(1) to foster economic CO-operation through the Caribbean Common Xarket.
(2) to CO-ordinate foreign policy arnong the independent member states.
/ 3 to promote common services and CO-operation in functionai matters such as health, education and culture, communications, and industrial relations.
CARICO3 is a much older and more widely recognized institution than tne OECS. Although not a regional security organisation, it Kas however anticipated that CARICOY might request help from tne United
States if any of its constitutionally elected governments faced
Before a CARICOM accord was reached, Prime %inisters Charles and Seaga and ministers Bird and Tu11 expressed dismay with the discussions. These representatives complained that their colleagues were a disappointment because of their reluctance ta
'" Consulate Newsletter, op.cit. p.1
lS2 Ibid., p.4 93 recommend the use of force. It therefore became the task of these four representatives to devise a suitable strategy for introducing a solution to the Grenada crisis.
As the CARICOM special meeting went into its final session, the tone of the meeting changed somewhat with representatives adopting a different strategy. In the end, al1 CARICOX states with the exception of Guyana agreed to the proposals outlined, and the group emerged with an approved package of sanctions sirnilar to those adopted by the OECS. These sanctions were specifically designed to isolate Grenada politically and, at the same time, to exert economic pressure upon the Revolutionary Yilitary Council.
CARICOM, like the OECS, supported a ban on al1 sea and air links with Grenada. 153
Despite the initial disagreements between the two regional groupings (CARICOM and OECS) over military intervention, U.S. President Reagan articulated his intention to accept the invitation of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States to intervene in the
Grenada crisis. The possibility of an American invasion of
Grenada, however, became a distinct possibility as early as October
20, 1983, following a U.S. cabinet-level meeting. When the American
Government first held informa1 discussions with OECS leaders, it pointed out that its highest priority was the safe evacuation of
U.S. citizens, most of whom were students attending medical school
Is3 Ibid. p.141. in Grenada.'" As the situation in Grenada worsened, another high- level meeting took place in Washington on October 21, 1983. This meeting was of significant importance in the decision of the
American Government to invade Grenada. At this meeting, Vice
President George Bush, despite having some initial doubts, decided that the United States should provide militarp aid, and plans for military action xere to be completed as quickly as possible.
President Reagan was advised by Secretary of State George Schultz, and the National Security Adviser, Bud XcFarlane, at 5:00 a.m. on
October 22, 1983, that the United States was formally invited by the OECS to invade Grenada. The president was later briefed on military strategy and the concerns of his advisers in undertaking such a mission. An hour later, President Reagan ordered invasion plans to proceed.
The stage was then set for operation "Urgent Fury."lj5 Khat finally secured the United States cornmitment to invade, was an urgent, formal request, on Sunday October 23, 1983, from the
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States to support thern in a joint endeavour to restore order and democracy to Grenada. The United
States, it was believed by the OECS, would become part of a multinational venture with contingents f rom Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dorninica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. Barbados and Jamaica, although not rnembers of the Organisation of Eastern
lS4 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 31, 1983. pp.1487-1489.
lS5 Department of State Bulletin, December 1983, pp.69-72. Caribbean States, like the United States, were approached by the
OECS to participate in the joint military offensive. President
Reagan then signed the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that authorized the Grenada invasion to take place not Later than daybreak on October 25, 1983 .Is6
Soon after the NSDD was signeci, President Ronald Reagan scheduled a highly confidential meeting xith the leaders of
Congress for 8:00 p-m. on October 24th. He informed the military personnel and officiais assembled that he made a national security decision to launch an invasion of Grenadz. The President justified his decision by stating that he considered the risks American students could confront. These risks, he said, included concrete evidence of increasing Cuban involvement, the growing absurdity of the Revolutionary Military Council when it enacted the twenty-four hour shoot-on-sight curfew, the dangers of a vicious island wide civil war, and the recognition of Soviet involvement in Grenada.
President Reagan stressed the predicament the students faced; his biggest concern was that they might be taken as hostages. In closing, the President stressed the fact that he felt obligated to comply with the request from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean
Stâtes, and believed that the risks attached to the invasion would be much less than those of not intervening.lS7
Grenada Prel iminary Report, "Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Request For S. Assistance in Grenada". (Washington: Department of State and the Department of Defence, Document #656, October 23, 1983). p.1397
15' Beck, op.cit. p.163 96
Shortly before 9:00 p.m. that same evening, British Prime Minister Hargaret Thatcher telephoned President Reagan and requested that he halt the imminent invasion of Grenada. The island, she said, was once a British protectorate and a member of the Commonwealth. The suggestion was that the United States should not become involved, at any time, in the island's interna1 affairs .lS8 Xargaret Thatcher, ridely referred to as "the iron lady," displayed that resolute disposition that she was well known for when she spoke with Reagan. She could not see the justification for Reagan's decision, and continued to suggest that there was the possibility that the invasion could result in negative international implications. Nevertheless, President Reagan, with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff, continued to pursue their plans for the invasion. As far as the U.S. government was concerned, Grenada required a full fledged invasion as opposed to a rescue mission. Undertaking the former required evaluating the risks, and President Reagan was aware that he would be confronted with criticism from ordinary Americans and the leaders of other countries, much of which would not be positive, Despite the political risks involved, it was determined that Tuesday October
25, 1983 would be the most suitable day for a full-scale landing in Grenada. The LT.S. military determined that it would not be a pragmatic strategy to attempt the invasion any earlier because a
lS8Public Staternents of U.S. Secretary of Defense, Weinberger , "U.S.-6.K. Relations and the Grenada Invasion". ( iiashington: Transcript of interview with Weinberger, Document gS63, October 38, l983), p.614 rapid, low-casualty operation could not be guaranteed.
The American operation had three key political objectives.
First, the aim was to ensure the safety of American citizens;
second, to restore democratic government to Grenada; and third, to eliminate current and future Cuban/Soviet involvement on the island.'jg On the other hand, three military objectives dominated
American intentions. These were, Eirst, military planning was to be contemplaled immediately and with utter secrecg, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were advised to proceed sith invasion planning.
Second, steps should be followed to assess the military Sefences
on Grenada, and to evaluate the extent of CO-operation from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. United States diplomats
were therefore sent from the Bridgetown Embassy in Barbados to
Grenada. Third, regarding the role of the American press, ît was
to be stated that Grenada's invasion was imminent.160
The capital cities of the Eastern Caribbean States and Washington were filled with excitement and, at times, frustration
on the final weekend before the invasion. The citizens and political authorities in Grenada also had anxieties. The Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) was increasingly agitated over
the inevitability of an invasion by the United States and Caribbean
troops. General Hudson Austin, Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne, and
15' Remarks of the President and Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica Announcing the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada. (Washington: October 23, 1983). pp.1503-1506
I6O Beck, op. cit, p.133 Major Leon Cornwall were confident that a U.S. naval task force
had been diverted to the island. They were also aware of the
pending economic sanctions decided at the CARICOM meeting which was held in Trinidad, and the American policy of protecting its
citizens, if the US. Government perceived, in anp way, that American lives were threatened. The latter was, in itself , seen as sufficient reason for the United States to invade. Also of grave
concern to the Revolutionary Military Council sas the fact that it could not obtain the quantity and type of arms if needed to have at its disposal. Castro rejected the Council's request for a
shipment of arms, thereby making it virtually impossible for the
Grenada military to protect itself from an attack mounted by American forces vith superior weaponry.161
On Sunday October 23, 1983, the evening before the invasion, meetings were held between 3ajor Cornwall and American diplomats regarding the evacuation of American students on the island.
Cornwall assured the diplomats that any individual wishing to leave Grenada could do so on any regularly scheduled flight. This offer,
in itself, was without basis in fact. Regional airlines were not
flying into Grenada, the result of a decision reached by both the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and CARICOH. Upon further discussions, Cornwall then informed US. diplomats that the American government would not be allowed to charter flights into
Grenada in order to take out its citizens, and that no allowances
--
161 Ibid. pp. 141-142 were to be made to accommodate such action. As the hours progressed that Sunday evening , the attitude of Major Cornwall changed somewhat. He agreed to the suggestion that a cruise ship be allowed to enter the St. George's harbour and be used to evacuate U.S. citizens. However, it did not corne as a surprise when the American diplomats were informed by the Revolutionary Yilitary Council that their citizens would not be receiving any special privileges, and that customs inspection would not be ~aived?~
The Revolutionary ?filitary Council consisted of sixteen of the
PRA's most politically active officers, namely: Xrmy Chief Hudson
Austin; Lieutenant Colonels Leon James and Ewart Layne; Majors Leon Cornwall, Yan Bartholomew, Chris Stroude, Keith Roberts and Basil
Gahagan; Captains Lester Redhead and Huey Romain; First Lieutenant
Ashley Foulkes, Rudolph Ogilvey and Iman Abdullah; Second
Lieutenants Kenrick Fraser and Raeburn Selson; and Bernard Coard as its key advisor. The council, conscious that its bargaining position was quickly dissipat ing , cont inued to feed the Grenada public with misinformation. For example, Major Chris Stroude, in a radio address, told Grenadians:
[A] new cabinet would be appointed within ten to fourteen days in which al1 classes and interests would be represented and which would work for peace, national unity and national reconciliation. Agriculture as well as Tourism would be encouraged, and efforts made recently to better relations with the United States would continue.
Shortly after this broadcast was made another release was aired
16' Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean: Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs. House of Representatives. Xinety-eighth Congress. First Session, Washington, 1984, pp.23, 28-28. stating that:
In the future, the Revolutionary hiilitary Council wili permit no harassment, intimidation or victimization on any persons or social groups in Grenada. Our Country cannot be built on the basis of hatred or bitterness.. . Let us now, in an atmosphere of calm and of love for one another, unite as one people. Long live our Grenadian people. Long live our unity as one people. Long live the revolution. Forward ever, backward never. 163
Before it exhausted al1 its contacts, the Revolutionary Miiitary
Council , in another propaganda ploy, contacted the U. S. Embassy in
Barbados, and the British Foreign Office in London. The RMC requested the assistance of the British government in preventing the United States from invading; hoxever, this assistance never materialised.
While al1 these manoeuvres were taking place, the Caribbean press decided that it was the right time for an invasion of Grenada and the toppling of Hudson Austin and the RK. For instance, the
Barbados Natioa of Friday October 21, 1983, wrote:
The next hours and days xi11 decide the future of the Spice Isle whose innocent people are now beating their breasts. The meeting of the Caribbean heads this weekend will provide the consensus frorn which any decision to rescue the people of Grenada will be made. The task of our leaders is an unenviable one, but we are confident that they will respond to the exigencies of the hour.
On the f ollowing day, Saturday October 22, 1983, the Trinidad Express reported the following:
It becomes, therefore, increasingly clear that the gangsters now in charge of Grenada by the gun are not only unapologetic about their execution of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop but are persisting in the bloodbath which they have unleashed against the people of Grenada. And it therefore also makes it urgent that the Caribbean heads of Government not only meet quickly
163 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, GRENADA: Revolution, Invasion and Aftermath. London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1984 pp.159-160 as they plan to do but take a firm decision to mount a security force to enter Grenada and free the people from this terror . Finally, the editorial of the Sunday Sun of October 23, 1983, read as follows: . . . the only possible solution will be the use of force. It should not be impossible for the defence forces of the region to institute a blockade of Grenada - and of Grenada's air space if we can obtain assistance from our international friends. Such action, we believe, is justified by our regional interests. 164
On the penultimate day of the invasion, the Revolutionary Military Council encouraged the public to resume work. Schools , however, were ordered to remain closed, and the curfew continued
from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. In the meantirne, prominent Caribbean journalist Alister Hughes and opponents of the Revolutionary
Yilitary Council were incarcerated. ~lthough the Revolut ionary
Council believed that the closure of the airport was consistent with its military ambitions, the situation worsened when both
Britain and Canada applied added international pressure, making it impossible for even emergency supplies to enter Grenada. On October 24, however, flights in and out of Grenada were permitted on
humanitarian grounds. 16j
HOW THE INVASION WAS CARRIED OUT
In the early hours of October 25, 1983, the operation, code-named "URGENT FURY," began. The invasion of Grenada was ultimately a
164 09Shaughnessy op. cit, pp. 195-198
165 lbid. pp. 167-168 joint endeavour including contingents from the Organisation of
Eastern Caribbean States, Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States.
Barbados was the starting point for the airborne landing. Thirty- five men £rom the G.S. army's elite Delta Force flew from Barbados to the airfield at Point Salines on the southern tip of Grenada.
Their intention was to ciear the way for marine landings. The 1,900 marines that landed in the early hours of October 25 were al1 U.S. troops. Over 4,000 marines were needed over the course of the next two days to serve as support troops because unexpected opposition was encountered. The Member States of the OECS plus Barbados and
Jamaica provided a Caribbean detachment of 300 men, half of whom were from Jamaica. The Caribbean troops, however, were not to be involved in actual combat; instead, they were to be deployed on police duties once the fighting was over. In fact, the Caribbean contingent reported to United States authority since al1 orders were given by the U.S. military. In essence, then, the invasion was planned and executed by the Gnited States g~vernment.'~~
The first group of U.S. soldiers that came ashore in the early hours on the morning of October 25, 1983, was a squadron of naval commandos. They went directly to the residence of Sir Paul Scoon,
Grenada's Governor General, and attempted to rescue him. An
Ib6Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment of United States Forces in Grenada. ( Washington: Administration of Ronald Reagan, October 25, 1983) p.1513 Note: This is the text of letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. , Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate. 103
exchange of gunfire ensued between the People's Revolutionary Army
and the naval commandos, making it difficult to rescue the Governor
General whose safety then became uncertain. It was not until two
days later that he sas rescued and moved to a G.S. warship. About
three hours after the commandos moved inland, numerous marines descended on Pearls and Point Salines Airports. The marines
experienced no resistance at Pearls Airport, but the same cannot
be said for Point Salines. At Point Salines, the marines surprised
several Cuban construction workers; ironically, that element of
surprise resulted in a lengthy exchange of gunfire. The Cubans had
received strict orders from President Fidel Castro that they should
defend themselves if attacked, but under no circumstances should
they be the first to fire. In similar circumstances on the
following day, another group of Cubans refused to surrender and
were attacked, resulting in the deaths of twenty-four Cuban
personnel and injury tu fifty-nine others.16' Further, the Point
Salines Airport was not proclairned safe until October 27 because
of determined resistance from the People's Revolutionary Amy.
Meanwhile, panic filled the air with the continuous bombing on the
first two days of the invasion. The destruction of life and
property was severe. For example, the Richmond Hill Mental Hospital
was completely ruined in the bombing, resulting in the death of
thirty patients. The main jail was also bombed and an unspecified
167 Among the roughly 800 Cubans on the island, these were the total number of casualties during the invasion. Grenada Preliminary Report, op.cit., p.1 104 nurnber of prisoners either died or escaped. The capital city of St.Georgels was not occupied by U.S. troops until three days after the operation began.I6& Late on the third day of the operation, members of the People's Revolutionary Army started to surrender.
It was only then that the people of St.Georgers extended their appreciation to the government of the United States for freeing them from two weeks of intense anxiety and repres~ion.~~~
Also on the third day after landing in Grenada, teams of military psychological personnel from the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIAI packed the majority of Cubans captured on the island into a supervised area in Point Salines. Several hundred Grenadians were also picked up by the same teams. Following cross examination, several prominent members of the PRG, including Bernard Coard, his wife, Phyllis Coard, and army chief Hudson Austin were taken aboard
U.S. ships for further questioning. They were returned to the island a few days later under intense security.17*
As planned, the combined U.S.-Caribbean security force succeeded in minimizing casualties on al1 sides. The U.S- casualties totalled eighteen killed in action while one hundred and sixteen were wounded. The Grenadian numbers were larger on both counts, with forty-five killed, and three hundred and thirty seven wounded. Of the Grenadians killed, twenty-four were civilians
Ibid. p.91
''O ''O Interview held in North York, Ontario, January 15, 1997, with a former Lieutenant of the People's Revolutionary Army. 105 including twenty-one killed in the accidental bombing of the mental hospital located next to the anti-aircraft installation. 17'
The United States forces worked extensively during the first week following the invasion. Road blocks were tightened, hills were combed by troops, and numerous house-to-house searches were undertaken which required the assistance of the Caribbean troops acting as police. By the end of October, resistance by the People's
Revolutionary Government was weakened to the point where a majority of the People's Revolutionary Arrny had fulfy surrendered.
The reason for the invasion of Grenada remains a source of intense debate. From the American perspective, the first and overriding reason given was the protection of innocent lives, including the lives of 1,000 Americans, many of whom were medical students and senior citizens. Together, these U.S. citizens formed the largest single group of foreign residents on the island. The action undertaken by the United States military in securing and evacuating its nationals, according to U.S. officials, was executed in accordance with established principles of international law regarding the protection of one's nationals. lï2
"' Grenada Preliminary Report, op. cit . , p. l
172 White House Press Release, Statements and Remarks by President Reagan and Dominican Prime Minister Charles. "Announcement of the Sendinp of C.S. Troops Into ~renada". (Washington: Document $657, October 23, 1983, p.1398) 106
From the perspective of the Eastern Caribbean governments, the
reason for the invasion was to prevent further anarchy on Grenada. The Organisation of the Eastern Caribbean States was decisive in asking for military assistance under its 1981 treaty. The request
for assistance would serve a two-fold purpose. First, it would halt
the spread of Communism in the region; and second, it would deliver a decisive message to other like-minded groups, informing them that
contemplating Communism as a form of government would be dealt with in the same manner. By deciding on collective action, the nations
of the OECS were entitled to cal1 upon friendly states for assistance, Lt was therefore lawful for the United States, Jamaica, and Barbados to react positively to the OECS request.
From a joint U. S. -Eastern Caribbean perspective, the officia1
reason for the U.S. invasion was to assist in restoring lakT and order, as well as restoring the constitutional institutions of government. There was a common fear that Grenada, after the coup, was controlled by 'leftist thugs' who had illegally seized power.
Accordingly, then Governor General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, was the only legitimate government official on the island during the invasion. In this capacity, he appealed to the OECS and other states to restore order on the island. Scoon's request was
important both legally and politically for the U.S. and Eastern Caribbean governments . Despite the possible short term benefits of the invasion, it
is the long term results that are the more substantive issues of
the debate. What follows is a brief assessrnent of the economic and IO7 social impact on the Grenadian economy and society as a result of reforrns taken after the invasion. In chapter four, the political impact will be considered.
DISMANTLING THE STATE-RUN SECTOR
Between 1983 and 1989, United States aid to Grenada went into a rapid decline. The investment that was promised after the invasion did not materialise to the extent that was suggested. In 1989 the last U. S. pro ject off icer abandoned Grenada and transf erred al1 work concerning the Grenada economy to the USAID regional office in Barbados. Accordingly, this withdrawal of U. S. support signalled the termination of American interest in the economic well-being of Grenada. From the beginning, the S.government dictated an economic policy that was doomed to failure given the size and structure of the Grenada economy. In spite of some U.S. financial assistance, only 7 percent of expenditure on the island was focused on education, health care, agricultural research, and community based programs. The majority of the funding Kas spent on dismantling the state sector, encouraging private businesses, and paying USAID'S exorbitant overhead and consultancy c~sts.'~~
On November 15, 1983, Sir Paul Scoon comrnissioned an advisory council to serve as the interirn administration until elections could be held. The Council cornprised Nicholas Braithwaite,
Chairman, responsible for heal th, educat ion, youth and cornmunity
"3 Ibid. pp.38-39 108 development and sports; Dr. Allan Kirton, Deputy Chairman, responsible for the civil service and secretaru to the Advisory Council; Arnold Cruickshank, with responsibilities for agriculture,
natural resources and industrial development ; Dr. James Pitt,
responsible for construction, housing environmental matters,
science and technology; Patrick Emmanuel, responsible for foreign affairs, civil aviation and tourism; Joan Purcell, responsible for
labour, employment and women's affairs; Raymond Smith, responsible
for telecommunications, information and postal services; and
Christopher Williams and Randolph Hark, both without portf~lios."~
Mr. Killiam Demas, past Director of the Caribbean Development Bank, served as econornic advisor to the council.
First, the Council, with the help of C.S. advisors, oversaw
the dismantling of the Spice Isle Agro-Industri- Plant that Kas
initiated in the latter part. of 1979. This plant was established
to process surplus agricultural produce into a variety of food
products. Second, the Grenada coffee processing plant and the
Sandino prefabricated housing factorg were also disrnantled. With
the closure of these facilities, over two hundred full-time positions and several part-t ime positions were eliminated, resulting in increased unemployment . Third , the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) recommended the
closure and the sale of several companies owned by the state.
State-run enterprises closed included the carpentry department,
17* Grenada Preliminary Report, op. cit. , p. -16 the central garage, the national electricity company, a printing company, and the national telephone company.'75 Fourth, the Advisory
Council and GSAID together were also responsible for the closure of the Nat ional Cooperat ive Development Agency . This agency had encouraged the formation of cooperatives in agriculture, crafts and retailing ; moreover, it was responsible for generating employment, particularly for the young people in the rural areas.
With the closure of this agency, several employees lost their jobs while others were fortunate to be transferred to other positions within the Ministry of Agriculture.
Frank M. Coffin, former deputy U.S. administrator, concisely expressed the political objective of the Cnited States Agency for
International Development when he said:
Our basic, broadest goal is a long-range political one. Kt is not development for the sake of sheer developrnent.. . An important objective is to open the maximum opportunity for domestic private initiative and enterprise and to insure that foreign private investment, particulary frorn the United States, is welcomed and well treated.. .The fostering of a vigorous and expanding private sector in the less developed countries is one of our most important responsibilities ...Politically, a strong and progressive private business comrnunity provides a powerful force for stable responsible Government and a built-in check against Communist d~grna.'~~
In the scheme of things, the once state-owned Grenada Farms
Corporation was privatized. This action was ironic in the sense that these farms were controlled by the state because the previous private owners had neglected them. The PRG, after acquiring ~ower
'" James Ferguson, op. cit., p. 23
L76 Ibid., p. 18 110 in 1979, realised that 33 percent of the island's productive land was uncultivated. The PRG therefore acquired these lands in order to develop the banana, cocoa and nutmeg CO-operative industries.
From a pragmatic standpoint, returning these farms to their idle condition, under private reappropriation, was economically unsound.
To make this point in concrete terrns, it should be revealed that between January and June of 1984, only 8 of the 38 state farms were put under production. "'
Next on the agenda was the slashing of the public sector wage bill, especially the ministries directly associated with the
People's Revolutionary Government. The downsizing of ministries such as the ministries of Mobilisation, Culture, Women's Affairs, and Education was the first to be tackled. Not surprisingly, the overall impact of cutting programmes that were initiated by the
People's Revolutionary Government through these ministries resulted in a further deterioration of the employment situation.
In September of 1984, several measures were undertaken by the interim adrninist rat ion to liberalise the system of foreign exchange restrictions with the objective of improving private sector confidence and, at the same time, to increase the market orientation of the economy. For example, approval was no longer required for remittances of documented imports and most services including those related to medical, educational, and maintenance services. Regulations governing investment income, royalties,
'77 ibid. p.18 111 management fees, and the proceeds from the sale of local property and legacies were eased. Moreover, local residents were allowed to open foreign currency accounts . In the past , only non-res idents were allowed to have these accounts. Furthermore, business travel and vacation limits were raised from EC Sï,000 anci EC
$3,000, to EC $10,000 and EC S 5,000 respectively.
UNEMPLO'YMENT
From October 1983 to December 1994, Grenada's unemployment rate increased steadily. This was the result, for the most part, of the break up of the state sponsored CO-operative sectors and the mass dismissals from the civil service, especially the dismissal of known supporters of the People's Revolutionary Government. State farms and agricultural industries sustained a total loss of 1,000 jobs, while farm road construction discharged 300 ernployees. Fouth emplogment projects, the quarries, and construction al1 experienced shrinking employment figures due to the dismantling of the state- run sectors. The unemployment rate in 1988 was estimated at 28 percent although unemployment varied by gender and age.
Unemployment among women was particularly high at 36 percent, while for men it was 20 percent. However, unemployment among youth, fifteen to nineteen year olcis, was the highest at 49 percentmXg
17' World Bank Economic 'lemorandum Grenacia, Report No.5606- GRD, May 10, 1983, pp.7-8
179 World Bank Report No. 10160-GRD, Hay 30, 1992. p.5 Since 1991, the unemployment rate in Grenada increased significantly as a result of the continuous reduction of public sector workers and the slow rate of economic growth. Xoreover, the
1994 labour force survey estimated that the rate of unemployment had increased to 29 percent, from 13.7 percent in 1991, with the level of unemployment among youth still the highest.la0
The election of the New Xational Party in December 1984 initiated a retrenchment scheme that resulted in the immediate loss of 600 civil service positions. According to officiais of the
Technical and Allied Workers Union, no severance pay was paid when these positions were terminated. Lrnemployment on the island was most severe in the parishes of St. David's, St. Mark's, and St.
Patrick's. These parishes never benefitted much from manufacturing or tourism; instead, they depended solely on agriculture and
fishing as the main means of economic survival. Grenada's youth in
these parishes were faced with a dilemma, since agricultural work did not appeal to most of them, thereby making it virtually
impossible to obtain meaningful ernployment. Emigration was,
therefore, the alternative to unernployment in these and other parishes, prompting the American Embassy in Barbados to issue 5-
year visas to thousands of Young Grenadians. The Grenada ,Vational
Po~ulationPolicy, the government newspaper , revealed, in its September 1989 issue, that two thousand Grenadians on average were emigrating
annually, the majority of them settling in Canada and the United
180 Grenada: Medium-Term Econornic Strategy Paper, 1996-1998, May 1996. Government of Grenada, West Indies. p.12 113
States .18' Less fortunate youth, however, moved to the capital city,
St . George ' s , where the opportunities for employment as domestic servants or factory hands far exceeded opportunities in the rural areas.
A World Bank studg on Grenada gave the 1984 unemployment figure at twenty-five percent.18* The Caribbean Developrnent Bank
(CDBj and USAID estimated unemployment figures at well over 30 percent, but Trade Union Council (TUC) officials have argued that the figure is much closer to 49 percent.Is3 The challenge that faced the 1983 advisory council and the Xew Sational Party government in December 1984, is still facing the current government. Today, the challenge is to encourage both domestic and foreign investment through an appropriate incentive structure, and to upgrade the economic infrastructure so that more jobs can be generated.
TAXATION The social reforrn programmes of the People's Revolutionary
Government was supported by a progressive redistributive taxation policy. This policp did not tax low-income earners, but both the medium and high income earners were taxed at a rate of 40 percent and upwards after deducting allowances. Companies were also taxed
Ibid. p. 78
lBZ World Bank Economic Memorandum Grenada, Report No. 5606- GRD, May 10, 1985, p.2.
183 Ibid. pp.77-78 114 at a corporate tax rate of between 40 and 55 percent of net profits la4. After the invasion, specialists from the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) recommended a reform policy which shifted the burden of taxation from the medium and high-income earners to rich and poor persons alike by introducing a national sales tax. This tax would have a twofold purpose. First, it increased revenues. Second, the taxation burden was placed on basic goods consumed by both rich and poor. This resulted in the poor experiencing greater hardship.
United States AID experts stated in no uncertain terms that
U.S. financial aid was entirely dependent upon implementing both budgetary and tax reforms. Furthermore, Grenada's April 1983 budget reduced some income tax rates and increased allowances which benef itted higher income earners. In fact, the 1985 budget provided the tax relief on higher persona1 incornes. Other major reforms included a reduction in import and export duties, a change in the tax structure thereby reducing the nurnber of tax brackets and lowering the highest marginal rate from 65 percent to 50 percent, and the elirnination of the tax on dividend incorne. Further, a decrease in the Company tax rate from 53 percent to 50 percent plus a decrease in the stamp duty were in~luded.~~~The NNP government undertook these reforms because it believed that the system of
lS4 Ibid. pp.78-79
'85 World bank Economic Memorandum Grenada, Report No. 5606- GRD, May 10, 1985, p.4 Ila taxation in effect at the time did not provide sufficient incent ive for productive activities. Also, revieris undertaken by the International Yonetary Fund (IXF) ana consultants financed by the USAID in 1984, concluded that the tax system in effect at that time was inelastic and contained no provisions ïhich encouraged private sector activity*lS6
By February 1986, the former income tax policy was completely abandoned and repiaced with a 20 percent vaiue added tax. Then
Prime Minister Herbert Blaize predicted a deficit of USS6.6 million in 1986 which he believed could be reduceci with U.S. aid. The
U.S., however, was concerned about the huge unfinanced deficit of
C'SSIG. 3 million from the previous year's budget .ls7 Because the Xew
Xational Party (3)laclied the ability to honour its recurrent obligations, Prime Minister Herbert Blaize levied another 10 percent surcharge on goods that were irnported from outside the
Caribbean Common Market area. This met with stem objection from the local Charnber of Commerce, the Grenada Ernployers' Federation, and the Hotel and Tourism Association. In addition, the 1986 reforms calied for another value added tax of 10 percent that was levied on wholesale and retail goods, while a 2.5 percent tas increase was levied on some commodities which hitherto were subject to price control. Property taxes, previously not imposed on houses worth ECS30,OOO (USS11,OOO ) or less, were reinstated.
Ibid. p.52 Despite these new taxes, Prime Minister Blaize declared that revenues for the first six months of 1986 totalled US$11.6 million instead of the US$40 million he had estimated. He was therefore forced to acknowledge that the revenue generated was only 29 percent of the intended total. This shortfall was partlg due to the fact that the VAT was not imposed on hotel rooms, resulting in a loss of EC$6 million in revenues. Above all, the tax collection mechanism proved grossl y inef f icient . Accordingly , tax revenues expected in 1986 were less than forecasted, contributing to the deficit on the current acco~nt.~~~
By July of 1987, Prime Minister Blaize announced to the nation that his government was once again experiencing a cash shortage due entirely to a recurring shortfall in revenue collection.
Transfer taxes, property taxes, and a business levy, initiated in
February of 1987, were proving dif f icult to collect, thereby contributing to a further loss in revenue.IBg Things did not get anp better when in October 1987 it was brought to the attention of
Grenadians that the revenue generated from the Value Added Tax was
US$1.85 million, a figure far below what was anticipated.
Similarly , the business levg tax had generated only USâ0.26 million
as opposed to the expected amount of US$1.83 million. The property
transfer tax generated about US$74,000 instead of the predicted US$2.6 million. To make matters worse, financial support from the
188 World Bank, Grenada L'pdat ing Economic Memorandum, Report no. 6292-GRD, September 5, 1986, pp.2-3
la9 Ibid. pp.52-53 11 7
United States was US$5.2 million less than expected. The government maintained that its only alternative was to withdraw u'SS2.6 million from the National Insurance Scheme to honour its current expenses.
The Grenada government only managed to avoid bankruptcy in 1987 because it borrowed US7.4 mil1 ion f rom the Kational Insurance
Scheme and another USS6.9 million from Grenada's commercial banks.
The government was fortunate to receive a further USSI0 million in
1989 which represented a partial payment from the telecornmunications Company, Cable & Wireless. The privatization of the largest public enterprise in Grenada, the Grenada Telephone
Company, was completed the same year when 70 percent of the shares were sold to Cable & Wireless (UE). The sale ultimatelg garnered
ECâ 19 million which partly f inanced the Central Government ' s deficit in 1989.190
For its part, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank reported that between January and September of 1988, the revenue collected in
Grenada amounted to only 56 percent of the estimated total, while the Value Added Tax generated 42 percent of estimated annual revenue. Thereafter, changes were repeatedly made to the tax system, and by April of 1989, a 10 percent tax was levied on importers, and manufacturers, and removed from wholesalers and retailers .lgl
lgO World Bank Grenada Country Economic Memorandum, Harch 30, 1992, pp. 14
lgl James Ferguson, op cit. p. 54 The experiment in fiscal reform encouraged by the United
States had by 1990 done considerable damage to the Grenada economy- The government was compelled to administer an unpopular taxation system that favoured the wealthy , and further disadvantaged the working poor. The abolition of taxes on persona1 income and the loosening of foreign exchange controls brought relief only to
Grenada's private sector and wealthy minority. Horeover, the diminished regulatory role of the Marketing and Xational Import
Board made it possible for the srnall group of import/export traders to return to making substantial profits from imports that were once controlled by the state. Indirect taxation affected the poor more than the rich in that most basic items such as agricultural equiprnent, building materials, and school books, which could only be purchased from outside the Caribbean Common Market region, attracted an additional ten percent surcharge. This method of taxation was devastating for low-wage earners who had not paid the bulk of income and other taxes under the PRG. To demonstrate to what extent the tax burden had shifted, by 1989, more than 73 cents of every US$1 collected was derived from consumption taxes which everyone paid. With the decreaçed purchasing power of average
Grenadians came a congruent drop in the standard of living, primarily in the areas of education, health care, and housing. It should be noted that the People's Revolutionary Government had focused on improving these areas despite the tough economic climate. The tax reforms between 1983 and 1989 undermined the revenue base and weakened tax collection in Grenada resulting in the deterioration of the finances of the Central Government. The frequent changes to the tax system and the numerous exemptions militated against any efforts tu improve the collection process.
The current account surplus of one percent of GDP in 1983 turned into a deficit of 8 percent in the period 1983 to 1990.192
A significant effort was made by the National Democratic
Congress (NDC) government in its 1991 budget to revise the existing tax system. To accomplish that, several changes were made including such rneasures as: the introduction of a debt levy of 10 percent on income in excess of ECS 12,000, and, the adoption of the Common External Tariff (CET)which lowered tarif fs on CARICOM irnports while increasing tarif fs on non- CARICOM imports.
These changes to the tax system were supposed to increase revenues by ECS61 million or 11 percent of GDP; instead, total revenues increased by only EC$13 million. In fact, the debt service levy generated onlp two-thirds of the expected revenue, or EC$6 million.
Again, this short fa11 was due largely to administrative ineff iciencies. Also , tax revenues on international f inancial transactions fell by ECS30 million, an amount equal to 75 percent of the estimated budget. Tax revenues fell because of trade diversion from non-CARICOM to CARICOM countries where tariffs were
'O2 World Bank, Grenada Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 10160-GRD, May 30, 1992, p.10-11 120 lowered, faced with contraband restrictions, or net problems in the overall tax collection sysiem.
Today, Grenada's investment climate is plagued by uncertaintg as a result of the fiscal crises of the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
Since 1985 the tax reform gave a supply side stimulus to private
sector investment, but the government was deprived of an adequate
revenue base. These difficulties, when coupled with some wasteful
expenditure, have contributed to the current fiscal crisis. The tax
systern in existence in Grenada is complex, inequitable and, most of all, inef ficient.
In the final analysis, the introduction of the CET contributed
to increased protectionism for goodç from the CARICOM countries at
a time when Latin American countries and other non-CARICOM trading
partners were shifting towards signif icant trade liberalization.lg3
It is not surprising therefore that there bas been a tendency
towards contraband and less non-CARICOM imports that would normally
cal1 for custom duties.
HOUSING
The People's Revolutionary Government, in an effort to improve the
living standards of low-income families in particular, had budgeted
US$0.35 million a year, beginning in 1979. The PRG also extended
US$350 in loans to low-income families to repair or improve their
homes. Regrettably, government spending for new homes and home
lg3 World Bank, riarch 30, 1992, pp. ii-iii repairs diminished shortly after the invasion. The Sandino prefabricated housing factory, which would have produced 400 new prefabricated houses each year, was not allowed to operate after the invasion. Equally disappointing, funding for the government housing repair scheme was drastically reduced f rom USSO. 33 million in 1987 to US$185,000 in 1988. This was despite the fact that those who received loans during the reign of the People's
Revolutionary Government were compelled to continue paying back these loans at a nominal interest rate.
Although the 1987 budget allocated US$1 million for building low-cost housing, the opposition party, the biational Democratic
Congress (MX), rnaintained that not one house was actually built during 1987 or afterwards. -4 1986 report, requested by the
Grenadian government and funded by the British Government under the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation scheme, summarized
Grenada's housing dilemma thus:
- Grenada's housing requires huge investment in order to raise standards from near slum conditions. - Of a total of 21,016 registered homes, 32 percent are comprised of one or two rooms.
- 40 percent of the houses accommodated between 5 and 13 people.
- 33 percent of the houses are considered totallg unfit for human habitation.
- 61 percent are made of wood. - 34 percent depend on water from public standpipes, while only 17 percent depend on rain collection and wells. 122 - 62 percent have pit latrines instead of modern toi1ets.ls4
The 1986 report recommended that the government strengthen the
People's Revolutionary Government house repair programme that was in effect from 1979 to 1983, and that the government provide additional funds to households, so that more systematic repairs could be done and more households could be furnished with toilets and baths .lg5
A 1986 biorld Bank report summed up the housing situation in
Grenada in much the same way as that reported by the British experts. The World Bank report described the housing situation in
Grenada as poor and in urgent need of repairs. The report also suggested that funds for new homes could be financed by the
Nat ional Insurance Scheme . lg6
FISHING
As indicated earlier, the People's Revolutionary Government established a National Fishing Corporation with the support of the
Cuban Governrnent . The National Fishing Corporation was a state- controlled fishing enterprise and, in spite of the problems encountered with boat engines and production levels during the
PRG's administration, Grenada was successful in establishing a fish
Ig5 National Democrat ic Congress, Cry Deliverance l April 1988.
lg6 World Bank Grenada L'pdat ing Economic Memorandum , Report No. 6292-GRD, September 5, 1986 p.8 processing plant which supplied both the local and regional markets with salted fish. The People's Revolutionary Government also
inspired the private sector by introducing innovative training methods such as providing boats ~ithcold storage facilities, making credit available, and modernizing fish markets in certain villages like Gouyave and Sauteurs. Joseph Suraiie, a fisherman for more than twenty years £rom the parish of St. Yarks, had this to
say about the fishing industry under the PRG: Before the revolution 1 had a very small six-foot open boat. Every time we went out there we risked our lives in that. Ke did long-line fishing, so we didn't catch many fish, even though there are so mang fish out there. In those days the government was Gairy's, so he didnyt check the fishermen at all. We had no support or help from him at all. So we money was small and the fishermen were poor and unorganised.
From the time 1 began to support the PRG 1 saw they were good for me and the other fishermen. They made promises to the fishermen then, and now they fulfilling it. We see life better for we now. Thirty fishermen now working for government on the boats and earning a monthly salary. Before, we never even knew if we would earn a dollar. And was no money for we if we were sick or the sea rough so we can't go out. Kow we get we salary every month. We have good boats for bottom and ocean fishing, given to us by the Cubans, and their fishermen been teaching us al1 kind of new technique - for example, catching shark. We never knew much about this because our boats were small, small, but now we catching thousands of pounds of shark. Organising with the PRG has saved the fish for Grenadian fishermen, and the people of Grenada, and prevented the South Koreans from taking our fish like they did in the days of Gairy.lg7
In dismantling the fishing industry, in 1985 the New National government sold the Cuban-donated trawlers to private fishermen,
lg7 Quoted in Merle Hodge and Chris Searle, 1s freedom we making': The New Democracy in Grenada. Published by Government Information Service, Grenada. People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada. p. 75-76 124 at prices much lower than the amount spent by the People's
Revolutionary Government to upgrade ihem. Instead, licences were granted to foreign trawlers, thereby gïving foreigners permission to f ish in Grenadian waters. The result was that fishing in Grenada reverted to the traditional way of small scale units with decreased government inve~trnent.'~' Disappointment ïith the throwback to the old inef f icient pract ices was shared by f ishermen throughout the island. One fisherman explained that by using his srnall boat, his daily catch amounted to about 60 pounds, hitherto, with the use of a bigger boat, he caught approximately 730 pounds a day, making a huge dif ference in income .lg9
TOURISM
The People's Revolutionary Government had regarded the airport at
Point Salines as the centrepiece of a diversified economy in which tourism would play a major role. The PRG therefore overcame its pessimistic view about tourism and its negative impact on the local economy and culture. For example, the view that enclaves would be created was abandoned, the fear that transnational businesses would be too prominent in Grenada was downplayed, and the view that tourism devalues cultural traditions was jettisoned. With a more optimistic view about the economic importance of the industry, the
PRG championed a new kind of strategy linking tourism to other
lg8 Interview conducted with a Grenadian Businessman vacationing in Korth York, Ontario, April 15, 1997.
lS9 Merle Hodge and Chris Searle, p.76 industries such as agriculture and manufacturing. Although impediments such as the global recession of the early 1980s, and persistent negative press coverage about 'the Communist islandl in the LS. media, the PRG continued its aggressive promotion of tourism in the U.S. and Europe. The government also ventured into new tourist markets such as other Caribbean islands, and tried to attract low-budget travellers from North Xmerica.
After the Revolution, the tourism industry in Grenada looked to foreign investment from the United States in the form of building large hotel chains on the island. Apart from the t'.S. based Ramada Renaissance chain which built a 186-room hotel, foreign investment in tourism did not materialise to an appreciable extent, even though foreign investors were offered generous incent ives .*O0 Smaller local establishments on the isiand like the
Silver Beach Resort, the Blue Orchid Hotel, and Roydon's Guest
House were, however able to expand. Although total visitor arrivals in 1995 were up by 16.3 percent, this figure represented a modest increase from the slow growth periods experienced between
1992 and 1994. The current government (NKP) has plans to collaborate with the private sector in providing further development incentives for tourism investment, and to establish supporting infrastructure .201
'O0 The Grenada Board of Tourism, Caribbean Communications, Inc. Florida, U.S.A. 1993, pp.14-17
'O1 PAHO-Country Aealth Prof iles: Grenada, 1995, pp. i3-14 EDUCATION
The achievements made in education by the People's Revolutionary
Government were no longer allowed to continue after the invasion.
In other words, many educational programmes were simply abandoned.
For example, the Centre f~rPopular Education, which had successfully addressed functional illiteracy under the PRG, was disbanded. It was replaced with the Continuing Education Programme which was less effective, focusing on skills training rather than literacy. Jacqueline Creft , the PRG' s Minister of Education, addressing delegates at the First International Conference in Solidarity with Grenada in 1981, outlined her government's ambitious plans when she referred to structures being built to ensure mass education for al1 adults in the community who want it.
But, in 1984, after the L.S. invasion, the ûrenada Union of
Teachers concluded that free education, initiated by the People's
Revolutionary Government, had deteriorated due to government policies which focused on spending reductions. For instance, children of low income families were no longer eligible to receive free school books and uniforms. Children's meal programs were also cut in some schools while in others children were provided with meals on a much more diminished scale. Some schools in effort to
stop this decline, undertook to assist by subsidising the cooks' wages while others sold snacks and drinks at break-time, with the proceeds used to purchase chalk and other basic school items.
The standard of education in Grenada declined steadily after
1983. This was apparent in the results of the 1983 school-leaving 127
Caribbean Examination Council exams (CXC),~hen 59 percent of the students who wrote those examinations failed. The results worsened in 1986 and 1987 with failure rates of 61 and 6 percent respectively. Results at the advanced level of the CXC was also poor with the Xational College recording a 40.9 percent success rate in 1988 which fell to 33.6 percent by 1989. The Ministry of Education was so concerned about the poor academic results that the government established a committee to investigate the reasons for the high failure rate. The committee concluded that there were too few teachers who were well trained. Furthermore, the syllabi were not current, and the lack of continuous teacher assessment led to less committed teachers, thereby compounding the overall problern. With the deterioration of public sector education, the onlg other available alternative was private schools at the primary level.
However, tuition for private schools was ECS220 per semester2O2 which excluded the majority of children. The quality of education received at private schools was, nevertheless, relatively high.
Schools such as Sunnyside and Westmoreland, for esample, had very high success rates in the Common Entrance Examination which determines eligibility to the island's secondary schools. Likewise,
in 1987, the New National government allocated only a meagre US$ 110,000 for purchasing supplies for over 20,000 primary school children,*03 an amount which was obviously not sufficient to meet
202 Ibid. p.83
*O3 Ferguson, op. cit. p.83 128 the basic necessities of many schools. A 1986 World Bank report indicated that Grenada's Ministry of Education received 14 percent of the total 1986 budget. This is in cornparison to 16-18 percent in the other Windward Islands (St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica).
CONCLUS ION In the final analysis, Grenada has not benefitted economically or socially from the United States invasion of 1983. Grenadians have experienced an island-wide antithesis of the People's Revolutionary
Government policies and agenda. In fact, Grenadians have paid a high price for a failed experiment in economic deregulation. Education, employment opportunities, housing, fishing, and especially health care (see chapter 4) have al1 drastically deteriorated. At the same time, indirect tasation has hit those least able to pay.
Grenada has had difficulty in attracting foreign investment in rnanufacturing to the island over the pears, and the United States has done little to help. With declining financial assistance from the United States government and the negative reporting about the island in the U.S. media, the people of Grenada have corne to resent what the United States government stands for because, in their minds, the U.S. administration has been the source of dashed hopes and broken promises. Despite promises of financial aid and U. S. investment , since the invasion, Grenada has experienced economic stagnation and polit ical disenchantment for the most part. i29
Chapter 5 will present an overview of the American Foreign Policy
Objectives in the Caribbean, and Latin America, and also look keenly at the Caribbean Basin Initiative, sho~ingxhat benef its , if any it has brought to the region. 130
CHAPTER 4
HEALTH CARE AS A MEASURE OF DEVELOPMENT
RESPONSIBILITY
During the Maurice Bishop administration, the Government of
Grenada, Carriacou, and Petite Martinique endorsed the World Health Organization' s (WHO) de£ inition of health. Tidef inition declared that health is not just the absence of disease or inf irmity, but it is also a satisfactory state of physical, mental, and social well-being. 204 The objective of the People's
Revolutionary Government's (PRG) National Health Policy was to ensure that adequate health care was not only fully available, accessible, efficient, effective and equitable, but, most of all, that it was also available at an affordable cost. This was made possible not only by maximiting the governrnent's resources, but by inviting community participation in the decision-makinp process regarding rnatters of health care. The government's overall policy, then, was to make health care a basic human right. This intention was made quite clear when Maurice Bishop, Prime Minister and Minister of Health, addressed a symposium at York House in the parish of St. George's in 1981, in which he indicated that the PRG was committed to reducing human poverty and inequality through the health sector. Furthermore, he announced that the catalyst for the
204 Policv Statement "National Health Policy" (~t-~eorge's: Ministry of Health, 1991). p.1 131
provision of adequate health care that would lead to a socially and economically productive life was a Primary Health Care system.
The success of the Primary Health Care system was dependent
upon several strategies , namely :
( 1 ) Programme development in the health information system,
environmental health, community services, institutional development and administration.
(2) Protection and promotion of the health of special groups.
For example, materna1 and child health, health for the
elderly, and health for disabled persons.
(3) Health protection and promotion with the focus on food and nutrition, dental health, accident prevention, and mental
health.
( 4 ) Protection and promotion of environmental health, with
emphasis on solid waste management, liquid waste
management, food protection, morbidity and mortality of
food borne diseases, sanitary control of housing, and
control of physical and commercial pollution.
( 5 ) Disease prevention and control . (6) Specific attention to disease preventable by vaccination. (7) Eradication of parasitic diseases.
The Primary Realth Care system emphasized the need for the overall development of health care infrastructure , primarily to increase
the operating capacity of the health care sector through the
establishment of a planning, monitoring and evaluat ion unit.
Moreover, the Primary Health Care system introduced guidelines for community, administrative and institutional services, environmental heal th, as well as health information systems development .205
From the oiltset, realizing that much needed to be done to achieve the type of health system he believed Grenadians deserved,
Prime Minister Yaurice Bishop approached the American Ambassador in Barbados for economic aid and assistance. These prelirninary requests for funds demonstrated the government's determination to obtain the much needed financial resources to introduce a cornplete transformation of the health care system that would provide care, especially to the elderly and the Young, and to guarantee daycare facilities and food supplies for babies. A national milk distribution program, introduced by the Sutrition Council in May of 1979, dispensed about 1,100 tons of milk to the elderly, the gouth, and expectant mothers .206 . S. Ambassador Ortiz was only able to guarantee loans of USS5,000 each for srnall projects. Prime
Minister Bishop seemed hardly impressed when he responded, in part,
to the ~mbassador'soffer in an address he made to the nation. In his address, Bishop declared that:
Sisters and brothers, what can a few $5,000~ do? Our hospitals are without medicines, sheets, pillowcases, and proper equipment. Our schools are falling down. Most of Our rural villages are in urgent need of water, electricity, health clinics, and decent housing. Hal£ of the people in our country who are able to and would like to work are unable to find jobs. Four out of every five women are forced to stay at home or scrunt for a meagre existence. $5,000 cannot build
205 National workshop on Primary health Care: Primary Health Care Concepts, February 16-22, 1983, Grenada. pp. 1-6.
'O6 Haurice Bishop "Grenada 1s Hot Alone" in Maurice Bishop S~eaks: The Grenada Revolution 1979-83 (St. George's: Selected Speeches, 1983). p.245 a house or a health clinic. We feel forced to ask whether the paltry sum of a few $5,000 is al1 that the wealthiest country in the world can offer to a poor but proud people xho are f ighting for democracy, dignity, and self-respect based on real and independent econornic development .'O7
in keeping with a key aspect of its National Health Policy, the PRG promoted a comprehensive heaith care system by strengthening and modif ying the strategies for implement ing a prirnary health care network. For example, it committed the government to strengthening primary health care teams whose objectives were to decentralize decision making, and to strengthen and advocate community responsibility and involvement in health care matters within each community. Furthermore, community health care teams were responsible for expanding communication, and for reporting on inadequacies within the health care system. As an integral part of the primary healtn care system, doctors, nurses, paramedics, and medical technicians, working as teams, went around the country deliver rnedical care needy patients their homes.
The promotion of prirnary health care was successful in adding thirty-three new health centres and medical stations throughout the six parishes on the island* In addition, health centres and rnedical stations were also built on the islands of Carriacou and Petite
Martinique. The personnel at the health centres and medical stations were staffed by district nurses and community health aides
'O' Maurice Bishop "In Nobody's Backpard" in Haurice Bishop Speaks:The Grenada Revolution (St.GeorgeYs:Selection of Speeches, 1983) p.29 133 who extended services on a regional basis. Several types of
clinics were available at both the health centres and medical stations, specifically antenatal and postnatal clinics, dental
clinics, and diabetes and hypertension clinics. The health centre
at Gouyave, on the western side of the island, and the one at Sauteurs, on the northern side of the island, were appointed as
obstetrics centres with delivery rooms assigned to them. The
system also offered important benefits through village health
communities in two important ways. First, these communities became
involved in public health educat ion; and second, they became
involved in community heal th work such as cutting overhanging trees
and unblocking drains which, if not done, would have contributed much more to the mosquito problem, probably leading to yellow fever and other related diseases.
The People's Revolutionary Government was instrumental also
in increasing the number of medical specialists including dentists,
optometrists, gynaecologists, and anaesthetists. In the first six
months of the PRG1s administration, the number of specialists
increased to thirty-four, an increase of 100 percent. The Medical Pract i t ioners, Dent ists and Veterinary Surgeons Reeistration Law
was promulgated in 1982. The main objective of this law was to
regulate the registration of the categories indicated in the title,
as well as dental auxiliaries, hygienists and technicians. Those
'Os Maurice Bishop "The Class Struggle in ~renada"in Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution, 1979-83, (St.GeorgeYs: Selection of Speeches, 1983 ) . p. 108 i33 eligible to practice medicine on the island after the law was passed were either graduates of the Wniversity of the West Indies, in Jamaica, or graduates from Britain, Cuba, the St. George's
University in Grenada, or other graduates the Grenada ?.ledicalBoard deemed eligible. There was alço a fa% passed to regulate opticians called the Opticians Registration Ordinance. This Ordinance called for the establishme~tof an Opticians Registration Board, which was to be chaired by the Senior Xedical Officer and two medical practitioners, one of whom vas required to be an opbthalmic specialist, and the other an optician. Only the people approved by the board for registration would be permitted to practice in the delivery of eye care, and to carry on business as opticians. Only those opticians that xere registered in Britain, or those naving a diplorna, license, or certif icate from ansT other country approved by the Board, would be accepted to practice. Also eligible to practice would be suitably qualified persons, domiciled in Grenada longer than three years, who could pass an examination set by the
~oard.*O9
The relatively larger number of practitioners was responsible for the significant difference in the quality and quantity of health care on the island. The PRG was determined that medical and dental care should be free for the majority of the population. To this end, medicine was provided at no cost for the neediest patients, and at a low cost for others. Kith assistance from Cuban
209 David F. Clyde Health In Grenada: a social and historical account. (London: Vade-Yecum Press 1983). pp.361-363 and Venezuelan doctors, clinics sprang up throughout the island as the number of doctors and dentists more than d~ubled.~~*On the question of eye care, a hospital was established in the first quarter of 1981 to ensure that Grenadians received care without leaving their homeland. This meant that patients no longer needed to travel to neighbouring islands like Barbados and Trinidad for eye surgery. On April 15, 1981, successful retinal surgery vas done for the first time in Grenada and, indeed, the Eastern Caribbean.
Moreover, on September 28, 1981, a successful corneal transplant operation was perforrned. In 1981 also, the operating room at the general hospital has expanded from one to three functioning operating rooms, ~ithone of those rooms being used specifically for ophthalmic services. Furthermore, an intensive care unit, the first in Grenada's history, was established, while more facilities were added to the casualty, maternity, and x-ray departments. 211
Throughout its term in office, the People's Revolutionary
Government continued io allocate a sizeable proportion of its budget for operating and improving the country's healtb care services. The government also continued to scrutinize the financing of the health care programme, noting the importance of both public and private sector contributions.
''O Maurice Bishop, in Maurice Bishop Speaks :The Grenada Revolution 1979-83. S.George's: Selection of Speeches, 1983 ) p-xxiii
211 Maurice Bishop "Two Years of the Grenada Revolution" in Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution 1979-83 (St. George's: Selection of Speeches, 1983) p.131 137
The PRG 's cornmitment to a comprehensive strategy was ref lected not only in the type of health care offered, but in the quantity and quality of training in the field. With the development of human resources in minci, the PRG embarked upon an organized system of training health care workers. Health care workers were trained in Barbados with assistance from the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the Pan American Health
Organisation ( PAHO), and the World Health Organisation (WHO) regional pro ject. The training lasted for eight weeks for a total of 200 hours. One Hundred and twenty five hours were devoted to classroom work that consisted of lectures and discussions, another fifty hours were allocated to practical demonstrations, while the remaining twenty-f ive hours were allocated to field visits . The training included simple basic anatomy and physiology , persona1 hygiene and persona1 health, environmental health (village and home), materna1 and child health, first aid, nursing skills, prevention of the spread of infection, care of the elderly, care of equipment, ethics and conduct, and hurnan relations. The key objective of this undertaking was to provide health care workers with the advanced knowledge and skill necessary to strengthen their capabilities to understand the increasing complexities of health care. In a further attempt to improve its human resources, the PRG joined the Health Ministry with the Department of Personnel
Management Services to enhance the personnel management and 138 administration within the Health Ministry's many programmes. 212 The government, by recognizing that the preservation of health was the key to productivity, the enhancement of family life and the general quality of life, provided f inancial incentives for health personnel to be actively involved in health promotion, maintenance, and rehabilitation within their local health systems. 213
Although the Bishop government did not construct ant. new hospitais, major remodelling and upgrading of the general hospital took place. Bishop also had built an intensive care unit for patients needing surgery, remodelled the maternity unit, extended the casualty department, and constructed an out-patient department, al1 of which was intended to meet the needs of the primary health care system. Bishop undertook not only the construction of an
Ophthalmic Unit at the General Hospital to accommodate in-patient and operating facilitie~,~'~but also the expansion of the x-ray and iaboratory facilities, as well as refurbishing and upgrading the outpatient facilities at the Princess Alice and Princess Royal
Hospitals. General upgrading of the institutions for the
*12 The Development of Mode1 District Health Teams in Grenada: DRS. X. Holding -Cobham & K.L. Standard, September 1981. pp. 2-4.
'13 Maurice Bishop "The Present Stage of the Grenada Revolution, July 1981." first cited in Granma Weekly Review, July 12, 1981. Interview with Grace Dana in Maurice Bishop Speaks. pp.174-178
'14 GRENADA IS NOT ALONE. Fedon Publishers, St. George's, Grenada, 1982. pp.73-76. physically and mentally handicapped were also ~ompleted.~'~
It is difficult to deny that the People's Revolutionary
Government brought concrete benefits to the people of Grenada through its health care policy. The increases in medical personnel and new regulations, the expansion of services and institutions, community participation and f ree health care, especially in the rural areas, were rnainly responsible for transforming the original pattern of health care in Grenada, leading to a relatively success£ul program.
THE STATB OP BSALTB CARE APTEB BISEOP
The health care delivered in Grenada after the collapse of the
People ' s Revolutionary Government ( 1983 ) was vastly dif ferent f rom that received during that government's term in office. One of the first effects of the U.S. invasion on Grenada's Health Care systern sas the repatriation of al1 Cuban personnel who had assisted in
"' The General Hospital was built in 1738 while Grenada was under French control. In 1762 the British occupied Grenada and the hospital operated as a government supported institution with an independent board of trustees. The British operated the hospital until 1779 when the French re-occupied Grenada for a four year period before the island returned to British rule once more. In 1878 the hospital abandoned the board of trustees and became a full scale government institution. Between 1896 and 1897 major renovations were ucdertaken and the facility was able to accommodate four hundred admissions per year. In 1921 a private patient building was constructed with sis private rooms, as well as a twelve bed paediatric ward. Supplemental buildings such as a pharmacy, laboratory and residence quarters for hospital staff were also constructed. Nurses ' residences were constructed in 1924, with further expansions made in 1927. Eventually bed capacity increased from one hundred and forty-one in 1925, to one hundred and seventy in 1948. 140
Seveloping the sector. Replacements were provided bg volunteers from the U.S. Peace Corps and medical personnel from Pro.ject Hope, a C. S. funded voluntary organizat ion. After the invasion, there was a drastic shortaqe of drugs at Grenada' s General Hospital ; man? prescriptions could not be filled, and most patients had to purchase the prescribed medicine froïn private pharmacies. Upon the recommendat ion of the United States Agency for International
Development, it was decided that Grenada should introduce a host of administrative fees, includinq f ees for eye examinations , dental
examinations, and x-rays. Further reduction in government expenditure adversely affected the medical services. For instance, the health centre improvement pro ject , worth US$25O, 000, was abandoned. Project Hope, though highly recommended by USAID and
by the Sational Party's Health Minister, encountered friction with the U. S. controlled St. George's University School of ?iedicine
regarding hospital facilities and teaching methods. Worst of all,
the reputation of Project Hope Kas severelg damaged when it was
accused of in~ornpetence.~'~In the end, health services on tne
island deteriorated to the point where American citizens were
advised to seek medical attention either in Barbados or Trinidad
if they became seriously ill. Wealthy Grenadians opted to travef
as far as North America and England to receive medical care.
Ferguson, op. cit. p. 81 A survey of eight respondents, conducted as part of this thesis,'I7 revealed that 62.3 per cent of the respondents believed that the quality of health care delivered during the administration of the People's Revolutionary Government was better than that delivered by previous or subsequent administrations.21s While this
is a srnall sample, not numerically representative, it is instructive for its qualitative findings. The respondents include
knowledgeable Grenadians living abroad and on the island. It was generally believed that the level of cornmitment demonstrated by the
Cuban doctors and specialists far exceeded that of the local doctors.
In 1995, in an interview conducted with a top civil servant
in the Ministry of Health in Grenada, this author was told that
"the health care system after 1983 can only be described as
inferior. "2'9 The officia1 said that after the PRG vas deposed, doctors, especially in the rural areas, were not properly monitored. In particular, recent graduates required an enormous amount of supervision which was unavailable. The overall problem within the system was attributed to management. Brief ly , management was incapable of gaining respect, disciplining staff,
2'7 See appendix K for the questionnaire given to the respondents.
411 Primary Surveys in this section conducted in September, 1996 with respondents in the United States, Canada, and Grenada.
219 Interview with Public Servant in the Xinistry of fiealth- Grenada in 1995. Interview was conducted December 29, 1998, Eorth York, Ontario, Canada. Officia1 requests to remain anonymous. 142 and there was virtually no system of scheduling. For instance, on many occasions, doctors were not available at the clinics, and nurses only worked £rom 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. In the circumstances, chronic cases were referred to an alread~over- burdened General Hospital.
MORALE
Another serious drawback in the health care system, after the faIl of the PRG, was the loss of morale. Morale among employees became very low due to limited promotions from the rank of junior to senior among the island's nurses. The health care system also suffered from a lack of effective and efficient management. Manv observers accused the personnel department of contributing to the morale problem. For example, the personnel off icer was often described as crude and unapproachable, and spoke to doctors with little respect. It was also observed that the personnel off icer Kas very friendly with the junior staff, and was constantly involved
in gossiping. ZZo The Eastern Caribbean News, a regional newspaper, reported in its October, 1988 issue that poor working conditions, dilapidated equipment, and low wages at the ~eneralHospital made
it difficult for the nurses to continue to provide qua lit^ service;
instead, many of them were cornpelled to emigrate to the United
States in order to seek employment in their profession. The newspaper also stated that, there was such a shortage of senior
220 Joint Country Review, op. cit. p.31 143
nurses, twenty nursing supervisors performeà the work intended for thirty, emphasizing the acute shortage of qualified staff at the
General Hospital. To compound matters, the Blaize administration
refused to employ Grenadians who received their medical training
in Cuba.221
CONDITION OF HOSPITAL
Maintenance of the physical plant and equipment at the general hospital which serves as a referral centre for the entire country,
has always been a serious short-coming of the Ministry of Health.
This was only made worse after the fa11 of the PRG. The Xinistry of Health was a long way from achieving an acceptable level of sanitation and care in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For
example, the general hospital was reported to have been infested with rats and cockroaches, and the problem was often referred to as an epidernic. In the end, cats had to be brought into the hospital to control the rats. 222
Between 1993 and 1994, no surgery was performed at the general hospital. Al1 acute and complex cases involving surgery are
referred to this hospital. However, surgery was not performed
because both operating roorns were not functioning. As a result,
certain emergencies had to be flown out of Grenada to Barbados,
'*' Ferguson, op.cit. p.81
222 Interview with a retired civil servant of the 'linistry of Health, now residing in Toronto, conducted January 19, 1997. Individual wishes to remain anonymous. 144 Trinidad, or the United States.z23 In fact, equipment in the operating rooms could not be repaired because there was no budget
for maintenance. There was also no budget provided for basic procedures such as x-ray , laboratory , and theatre maintenance. 224
The budget was prepared without taking the needs of the specific districts into account. In fact, hospitals went for entire fiscal years without receiving adequate financing; only salaries and wages, allowances, and routine supplies were incl~ded.~~~
MALNUTRITION
Between 1983 and 1991, the Grenada Food and Sutrition Council
(GFNC) undertook several studies of the nutritional status of
children in Grenada.226 In one study involving sisty pre-schoolers
in eight daycare nurseries, the results indicated that there was
a fairly high percentage of mild to moderate-mild malnourished children in these institutions. The most northern parish, St.
Patrick's, recorded an under-nutrition rate of five percent, while St . George's, the capital, showed the highest under-nutrition rate, at ten percent. Sot surprisinglg, the under-nutrition rate in the urban area, where ready access to fresh vegetables and fruits was
223 inter vie^ with top civil servant in the -iinistry of Health. December 29, 1993, Grenada.
Glennis Andall, Cornmunity Health Services, Grenada. p.31.
Z25 ibid. p.31.
226 The following Studies were conducted by the Grenada Food and Nutrition Council between 1985 and 1991. Information contained in Joint Country Review (July, 1991). pp.45-46 145 lacking, was higher than the under-nutrit ion rate in rural Grenada.
The positive results in the overall nutritional level during the
Bishop era were attributed to a greater awareness of nutritional facts, possible by agencies that disseminated information to the various communities. During that era also, nutrition officers and aides, affiliated to the clinics, worked in close collaboration with nurses. Together they monitored the health of young children attending the clinics, thereby providing counselling to mothers, and conducting food preparation classes and seminars on proper diets. After the fa11 of the PRG, these practises disappeared*
It is not surprising therefore, that a 1989 report, put out by the
C;'X Economic and Social Council , revealed that Grenada' s population, women in particular, experienced lower than the recommended intake of calories, protein, and vitamin A between 1983-1983. In fact,
Grenada's population shoxed an intake of vitamin A that was so low that it bordered on severe rnalnutriti~n.~~'
In the post-Bishop era, the most important factor that
influenced the nutritional status of young children has been farnily
income and expenditure on food. Households, spending less than
EC$20.00 per week on food per child, have suffered an under- nourishment rate of 68.5 percent. Statistics from the Grenada
Ministry of Health indicated that in 1990, although there has been a reduced occurrence of severe malnutrition, mild to moderate
levels of malnutrition were still prevalent. While it may be true
- .-
22i Ibid. pp.87-88 146 that the problem of malnutrition has improved recently, evidence suggests that malnutrition lingers in some sections of the population.
ANAEHIA
The Grenada Food and Nutritijn Institute (GFNI1 indicated in its
1986 study that anaemia has always been a problem, and has continued to be so over the years. A survey dating back to 1972 found that anaemia was present in al1 the age groups studied. For example, in school children, 63 percent were anaemic; in adult males, it was 25 percent; in pre-school children, it was 38 percent while 49 percent of non-pregnant , non-lactating women vere f ound to be anaemic. A country vide study conducted four years later
( L 976 ) indicated that , based on World Health Organisation ( WHO ) standards, 18.5 percent of pre-school children had haemoglobin levels that registered less than 10g/dl. (ten grams per decilitre), while among child-bearing age women, 33 percent were found to be anaemic . 229
However, the Grenada Ministry of Health conf irmed that the problem became particularly widespread during the late 1980s and early 1990s. During 1989, 293 one-year old children were tested.
The results revealed that 57.3 percent of those children had haemoglobin levels less than 10g/dl (ten grams per decilitre). Two
22B Ibid. pp.15-46
229 Ibid. pp.31-52 147 years later, the figure increased to 67 percent. According to nutritional experts, diet was mainlp responsible for the high levels of anaemia among young children. This was especially the case given that bush tea (tea made from local herbs), which is iow in iron, foïmed an integral part of the diet. Furthermore, yams, potatoes, and some poultry meats constituted the mainstaq- of family meals, and these foods are also low in ir~n.~~OThe above data indicate that there was a marked decline in health care among Young children following the fa11 of the PRG and the U.S. intervention.
MOBTALITY
The progress made in controlling and reducing rnortality rates during the 1980s remains unclear. For esample, between 1986 and
1988, the crude death rate (CDR) remained at about 10 pez: 1000 population; infant rnortality decreasea from 80 per 1000 live births in 1960, to 20 in l986 further decreased to 18 by 1988. The crude death rate, briefly defined as the total nurnber of deaths per 1000 population, in a given area during a given time period, usually one par. During the same period, 6 materna1 deaths were recorded.
However, between 1985 and 1387, a significant number of deaths among babies occurred during the first 28 days after birth. Düring this period, seventy-five percent of those deaths occurred mainly
£rom prematurity, congenital anomalies, and asphyxia. On the other hand, seventy-five percent of the neonatal deaths occurred twentl-
Ibid. pp. 51-52 148 four hours after birth, with prernaturity as the principal cause.
It is important to emphasize that the most crucial time in the life of an infant is the first twenty four hours; the care provided during this period therefore has the greatest influence on the survival of the infant. During the mid to late 1980~~prematurity among pregnant women resulted from either mothers contracting infection, or from mothers who were generallp classified as high risk patients. 231
Another cause of earlg death among infants was hypertension among mothers, thirty years and older. Between 1986 and 1988, a large percentage of asphyxiated babies was born to mothers with hypertension. Hypertension was also responsible for the birth of
infants who were considered small for their gestational age.
Although the still-birth rate has fluctuated over the years, between 1986-1988, the figure remained between twelve and thirteen per 1,000, with some medical personnel in Grenada believing that this statistic has been downplayed. These deaths were caused by problerns such as pneumonia encountered either late in the pregnancy or in the early stages of birth. Deaths among children between one and four years rose from nine in 1986 to fifteen in 1987, decreasing slightly to fourteen by 1988.232 Immunization against polio and measles in Grenada espanded in 1980, resulting in reduced
incidences by IWO. Consequently, this programme, initiateci by the
- 231 rlinistry of Health (Grenada) "Health Situation" (St. George's: Statistics Office, Grenada, 1987). p.15
23Z Joint Country Review, op. cit. pp. 37-38 149
PRG has reduced the occurrence of these diseases and has continued
to contribute to one aspect of irnproved health care for
Grenadians .233
Another, area of major concern during the mid and late 1980s was in regard to statistics recorded in the "major causes of death"
chart. This chart revealed that deaths were not classified
according to causes. This lack of proper classification has
demonstrated that there was an absence of careful diagnosis since
the end of the Bishop era. Careful diagnosis would have explained
the cause of deaths simply listed in the chart as "other, not
classified," and as "senility without psgchosis." Together, these
dubious categories incorporated two hundred and fifty-nine deaths
out of a totôl of six hundred and seventy-one. Generally however,
the greatest number of deaths were attributed to chronic diseases
of the elderly who were no longer the beneficiaries of Bishop's
subsidized health care sgstem. 234
OCCUPATIONAL BEALTH
Between the mid and late 1980s, safety standards and sanitary
conditions were found to be inadequate in the local factories-
Factory inspectors faced difficulties due to the reluctance of
employees to make demands for better working conditions, simply
because they feared being terminated. Furtherrnore, the majority of
233 Ibid. p.41
234 Ministry of Health (Grenada) Statistics Office, op. cit. pp. 15-16 150 workers in these factories were women. Many factories lacked suitable sanitary conditions, and chernical substances were constantly used that were not endorsed by the Ministry of Health and the Ministrg of Moreover, the public health monitoring was generally inadequate to handle the problem or" deteriorating occupational health.
INPORHATION AND TRAINING
In the area of information management, there existed a nurnber of problems with the collection, dissemination, and use of data. For example, between 1988 and 1991, specific indicators were not available in a timely manner. Prompt action with respect to information management Kas desperatelp needed in order to improve this critical and significant area of government responsibility.
Also. training programmes for the Yinistry of Health required improvement. One of the major constraints of this programme was the uncertainty of funding for programmes that exceeded one year.
Due to unreliable funding, programmes that exceeded one year continued to be aborted, hile other shorter programmes needed to be more clearly defi~ed.~~~One expert on information training believed that a sub-regional project that concentrated on sharing specialist services would create the opportunity to improve the
*'' Joint Country Review, op. cit. p.21
236 GRENADA: Country Review, op. cit. p.32 15 1 management of this important area. 237
CURRENT REFORMS
The Xew National Party (XXP), elected to office in 1995 under tne prime ministership of Dr. Keith Mitchell, has recognised that the standard of health care available to the people of Grenada has beer~ and continues to be vers poor. As explained earlier, the health care system has suffered from several problems. The XXP, in its
1993 manifesto, has pledged to improve the level of health care, not only in Grenada, but also in Carriacou and Petite Hartinique.
In attempting to do so, the NNP has set out a nurnber of objectives they wish to acbieve. These objectives include: - A Statutory Body to manage the hospital.
- The level of specialized service at the general hospital to be
improved.
- The general hospital to be renovated to accommodate better diagnostic facilities.
- A qualified hospital administrator to be appointed to run the hospital . - Improved working conditions and bonus pay incentives for nurses
and other staff. - The primary health care system to be revitalized.
- Al1 districts to have an assigned medical officer who resides in
the immediate area.
237 Ibid. p.32 152
- The general hospital and the district medical centres to
establish new lines of communication. - Polyclinics to be constructed in the districts of Gouyave, Sauteurs, and St. David. The polyclinics are aimed at reducing
overcrowding at the general hospital. 238
Today, the National Primarg Health Care system, instituted by the PRG, is non-functional. Some of the primary health care teams still meet for discussion, but in most health districts membership has dwindled to only some health professionals, mainly nursing staff. Community participation therefore has not been a successful part of the health system in Grenada since the PRG. Many of the more recent health professionals are relatively new employees, thus they do not fully understand the concept of primzry health care and a community based health care system. Since the invasion, there has been a rapid turnover of staff, and, as yet, no system has been put in place for the orientation of new employees. This void thus creates an urgent need for education and training of each category of health ~orkerat the community level .239
As recently as 1995, the general hospital could not meet the current plans for improved health care because of the age of the buildings and the continuing lack of repair. However, a recent edition of the Grenadian Voice Newspaper reported that the senior
238 The ?iew National Party Manifesto "Pledge to the Nationf? ( General Elections, 19% ) . p. 14
239 Community Health Services, op. cit. 31 153 planning officer in the Yinistry of Health, Hs. lessa Stroude, said that renovations to the hospital have started. The entire project is expected to cost the Ministry of Works approximately EC
S500,OOO. The renovations include replacing the roofs at the recovery , wai t ing , and x-rag rooms , renovat ing Albert, Ales and
Aquart hospital wards, and repairing the flooring in several parts of the hospital. A cafeteria and staff room will also be built as part of the overall pr~ject.~~'Two other hospitals that will be looked at during the term of the project are the Princess 41ice Hospital in Grenville and the Princess Royal Hospital in Carriacou.
As mentioned earlier, both hospitals are much smaller than the general hospital, consequently, neither one of these hospitals provides adequate diagnostic facilities, although they- both provide casualty and obstetrical care.
CONCLUSION
The need for quality health care in Grenada today has become a real concern. Users of the health care system have continually experienced the lack of many basic services, and the services that have been provided leave much to be desired. Politicians of every political stripe and citizens at large have continually recognised the need to provide better health care services. It would be unrealistic to expect Grenada to compete with the industrialized world and some developing countries in terms of medical technology
240 "Hospital undergoing major repairs" in The Grenadian Voice (St. George's: October 26, 1996). p.21 153
and the sophisticated level of heaith services these countries are
able to provide. Certainly, however, the island is expected to
offer much better services than are being presently offered, especially after experiencing the efforts made by the People's
Revolutionary Government. Although the cost of providing health care per individual is not available, it is %ide17 acknowledged by
residents to be very costly. Consequently, from the individual
visiting the doctor for a routine appointment to the acutely il1
patient to the baby fighting for survival to the poor and the
elderly, together they should al1 have the right to the same level of health care; unfortunately, they do not.
Good health encompasses much more than the well-being of an
individual. In other words, the health of an individual affects
the general prosperity of entire communities and nations.
Moreover, health makes a fundamental contribution to a country's
economy. For instance, better health among adults means a bigger and better workforce. There is a direct relationship between health and productivity, and productivity increases as health improves.
Improved health among children translates into a higher rate of
attendance and greater performance at school, as supported by a
Thai study. In particular, education leads to a greater awareness
of how to be, and remain healthy. Investment in the education of
women, especially those women who make decisions about their families' health, is a definite prerequisite to good health.
Spending more on health in a cost effective way will have as its outcome an improved standard of health for the population. 155
Investing in proper health care saves money as well as lives.
It must be understood that expenditure on health is not a drain on national resources but a prerequisite for economic and social progress. Poor health impairs an individual ' s ability to work, reduces earnîng capacity, and deepens poverty. Health policies are not only humanitarian policies, they also make a major contribution to econornic growth. Good health is an integral part of human welfare; it is therefore the ultimate goal of development. The positive economic returns that some corporations receive result
£rom investment in promoting and maintaining healthy practices.
There are alternatively, negative economic results such as slow or no economic growth that are the result of diseases and il1 health.
In a developing country like Grenada, the ernergence of an economic crisis suddenly intensifies the interest in health as a development tool. xon-development in several so-called developing countries has resulted €rom the decline of the heaith status of workers.
Clearly, there is an important link between health and economic development. For example, in 1981, St. Lucia's plantation workers' productivity was lowered when they were infected with schistosorniasis. On the other hand, improvea health conditions in
Guyana were responsible for the increase in agricultural productivity experienced between 1955 and 1960 after the decline in the occurrence of malaria in the period immediatelg preceding De Lisle Worrell, who conducted a study of the Barbados economy betkTeen 1946 and 1980, presented a striking record of postwar economic growtb in that island which showed increased productivity, even though there was a decline in the agricultural sector. Zccreases in both the tourism and manufacturing sectors contributed to much of this growth in proauctivity. For instance, employment doubled while tourism increased the island's GDP fivef old . Worrell was convinced that Barbados ' increased labour productivity would not have been possible without serious improvement in the health status of Barbadians. He concluded that
an investment in human capital not onlg represented an investment in health, but contributed to the promotion of economic gro~th.~~~
Worrell's conclusions were supported Dy an earlier study done
bi- the late Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric
Killiams. Dr. Williams, wrote in the first issue of the journal
k'orld Development that:
Our experience, however, has shown that development bas a face, and that face is the face of man. Development must therefore cater for the total needs of that man, food to sustain him, clothing and housing to shelter and protect him, medical care and environmental control to preserve and protect
'" Caribbean Group for Cooperat ion in Economic Development : Caribbean Regional Health Study, Inter-American Development Bank, Pan American Health Organization, May 1996. p.9.
242 De Lisle Worrell in Dr. George Allepne (ed) tiealth and Development in the Caribbean Perspectives (Port of Spain: April, 1989). p.16 i 5 7
his health and strength. z43
For Dr. Williams, development was rrot thereforo a single discipline that permits a unique solution. Instead, development consisted of a matrix of inter-dependent relationships including medical care and environmental control. Moreover, the Korld Bank reported in
1993 that an investment in Sri Lanka's sanitation did not only improve workers' heaith; it also led to an increase in output in areas that were once destroyed by insects.244
A country's health depends on much more than the quantity of money spent. It also depends on effectiveiy using the money allocated for health. The requirement is for allocative and technical efficiency, thereby investing in health interventions that have the greatest influence on the largest number of people, and making sure that those interventions are delivered to them at the lowest cost with the hast quantity of wa~te.~';
Government has obvious responsibilities regarding proper health care in its capacity as representative of the whole population. Government must therefore guarantee the provision of public goocis such as properly run hospitals ana clinics, qualified and adequate medical personnel, safe water and sanitation, suitable
243 Dr. Eric Williams in Dr. George Alleyne (ed), "Health b Development in the Caribbean Context," op. cit. p.4
244 Caribbean Regional Health Study, Pan American iiealth Organization/World Health Organization, 9ay 1996 p.9.
245 Health Economics: A WHO Perspective. WHO Task Force ON Health Economics, June i993, p.2. 158 infrastructure, and proper control of disease vectors to the benefit of everyone's health. Because the ill-health of one individual or group of persons may affect the lives of a community or country, Iifestple or disease prevention are justifiable areas of in\-olvement for government. Immunization against infectious diseases, treatment of sexually transmitted disease, and limitation on smoking in the workplace and other public spaces, not only protect the imrnunized, treated or protected person, but can also do much more. For instance they can diminish the chances of diseases being transmitted to others. Government also has a role in assuaging povertg since health services play a predominant role.
However, simply giving money to the poor does not necessarily improve health care. Instead, access to free or low-cost health care, in addition to adequate food and shelter will make the poor much more healthy. The market for health services is like no other in the sense that consumers are less informed about treatment methods and their likely effects than the providers. Therefore, government should have an interest in ensuring that treatment is germane and that standards are maintained. Government involvement in this area is critical in terms of drafting and enforcing regulations that establish standards of care.
In the final analysis, there is a moral, economic, and social obligation for governments to invest in the health of al1 people.
The people of Grenada have been deprived of the development of their island over the past years, in part, because of a lack of good health cars. It is imperative therefore that changes to the island's system starts forthwith. The dilapidated conditions of the health institutions warrant immediate attention. Destitute
Grenadians who need the system most, but are least able to afford it, need to be assured that the facilities and services will not only be improved, but will also be accessible to them at an affordable cost.
The words of the Director-General, at the World Health Organization's Geneva Conference in 1994, deserves repeating. He declared :
Health is a fundamental right. Fe must uphold this right. Ve must fight for it. Xe must do so with peaceful but powerful weapons - care, compassion, mutual respect and education. Health is inseparable f rom individual rights and freedoms, and from tne right to development. Al1 countries and peoples together must enter this new partnership for health. 246
Health must therefore be made a priority for any responsible society. The resources must be used effectively to ensure that the health system is as efficient as possible in achieving the goal of health for allaz4' As a measure of development, the Post-Bishop era has displayed a general decline in the quality of health care.
The implications of this in the context of U.S. foreign policy in the region will be considered in the nest chapter.
246 Health Economics: A IYHO Perspective (Speech made in Geneva, April, 4, 1994). p.4
247 Ibid. p.4 160
CHAPTER 5
OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES IN THE CARIBBEAN & LATIN
AMER 1 CA
The United States became z power in the Caribbean after the
Spanish-American War and the acquisition of Puerto Rico. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Caribbean had become the centre of irnperial conflict involving European countries such as Denmark,
France, Great Britain, Holland, Spain, and Sweden. Several of the
islands in the Caribbean changed hands on more than one occasion, and some of them prospered by growing sugarcane, and trading sugar, tobacco and slaves. However, European interest in these islands diminished once their plantation economies declined in the early nineteenth century. z48
The Gnited States reacted to these events as weil as to the perceived threat that Russia posed to the United States Xorthwest with the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, established in 1823, was a set of practical and normative principles that concentrated on the moral and security claims of the Western Bemisphere. Then
L.S. President James Monroe was aware that the European political
institutions were unlike those of the United States. The heart of the Monroe Doctrine therefore centred on the claim that the quality
24s Schoenhals and Melanson, op. cit., p.86 of the United States' domestic institutions vas significantly and necessarily affected bg the kinds of institutions maintained by other states in the Western Hemisphere. The United States defense policy was based on the assumption that it would not start a war, neither would it be the f irst to use aggression. It Kas proclaimed that the U.S. would not seek to occupy other lands or control other peoples; in fact, the U.S. strategy Kas defensive with the aim of protecting peace oy- ensuring that no adversaries would be inciined to conclude that they could successfufly challenge the C.S. in a war of their own choosing. Above all, President James Monroe declared that :
We would consider any attempt on their part [Europeans] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. Any desire to intervene with ' existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, ' were denounced bg Xonroe. Yonroe cautioned that if they ventured to intervene 'for the purpose of oppressing' governments 'who have declared their independence and maintained it' or of 'controlling in any other rnanner their destiny would be viewed as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.
With the advent of the atomic age, the Gnited States deemed it necessary to lessen the danger of war by seeking genuine arms control, and by maintaining military forces as a deterrent. In this way, it hopeà to ensure that any adversary who considered attacking the United States, its vital interests or its allies, would conclude that the risks far outweigh any potential gains.
The security of the United States was therefore based on being
'*' Ibid. pp.86-87 prepared to meet all threats, which requireé a military that was trained and readg to respond to any emergency. Since zhe 9onroe
Doctrine, the C.S. has insisted that peace can only be achieved through military strength, while weakness brings aggression.
In 1983 President Reagan, reiterating the importance of the defense theory, repeated Winston Churchill's plea to stop dismantling Great Britain's defenses. In a speech to the English
House of Commons in 1934, Churchill said:
To urge the preparation of ciefense is not to assert the imminence of war. 1 do not believe that war is imminent or that war is inevitable, but ... that if we ao not begin forthwith to put ourselves in a position of security, it will soon be beyond our pouer to do SO.'~~
Over the years, the strategy of deterrence has changed little, out the way it is maintained has changed. For example, it took one type of military force to deter an attack when the L.S. had far more nuclear weapons than any other country. On the other hand, it took another type of military defence knowing that the Soviets had an ample supply of accurate and powerful nuclear weapons that could destroy al1 the missiles the 6.S. had on the ground. Although
President Reagan stated continuously that he did not believe war was inevitable, he wanted the U.S. public to recognize that security for the United States was based on being prepared to meet
''O American Foreign Pol icy , Weekly Compilation of ~residential Documents (Washington: March 28, 1983 1. p. 56 "Peace and National ~ecurity"in American Foreign Policy Document. (Washington: Speech given by US President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983). p.58. al1 threats. '''
Historically, and in the present , the Caribbean and Central American Region is very important to the Cnited States in terms of trade. As stated in its security policy, the Caribbean is a very important passage way for international commerce and militarp 1ines of communication to the U.S.A. Xoreover, over fifty percent of al1
American oil imports pass through the Caribbean. 252 Therefore, the
region is of vital strategic importance to the United States. The
Reagan administration thought that by introducing a trade
initiative for the region, it would show that the G.S. was more concerned about the well-being of the people of the Caribbean and
Central America. Eiowever, of particular note for this discussion, the Grenadian and Micaraguan revolut ions and the guerrilla movement
in El Salvador threatened U.S. hegemony in the region. These
revolutions were widely believed to have given birth to the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) .253
Trade, being the centrepiece of the CBI, syrnbolized a digression from traditional U.S. economic programs that emphasised
financial assistance. This meant that the CBI countries would be
in a position to make use of the marketplace, specifically the
market of the Americas, thereby enabling them to attain self-
251 "Peace and Sational Security" in American Foreign Policy Document. (Washington: Speech given by US President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983). p.58.
252 Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Yarch 28, 1983, op. cit., pp. 59 & 146
253 Bakan, Leys and Cox, op. cit., p.5 sustaining growth. Successfui countries ~ouldtherefore zttribute their success to market oriented policies and aggressive involvement in the international economy.
The catalyst for economic growth under the Caribbean Basin
Initiative was the free flow of capital, goods, and services; these were to be policies that advanced and encouraged private investment, risk-taking, innovation, and competition. These policies would be the instruments for success in meeting the recovery and ~roxth challenges that these cosntries faced. According to . S. thinking, economic reactivation depended on millions of entrepreneurs and workers in the private sector who make Saily decisions in their area of competence.254 Paradoxicaliy, the Gnited States government was committing itself to open trade with al1 nations despite strong domestic demanas for widespread protection.
The CBI was proposed by the Reagan administration, specifically to promote economic and political stability in designated Caribbean and Central American countries. The plan was announced at a February 1982 meeting of the Organization of
American States (OAS), and was designed to attract both foreign and indigenous investment , thereby diversifying the economies of the countries involved. It was also to boost employment opportunities and foreign exchange earnings in the region. The primary provision
254 "U.S. Policy in Latin America" in American Foreign Policy Document $608. (Washington: Address by Deputy Secretary of State before the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, November 14, 1983). p.1270 of the CBI was to allow eligible proàucts, from designated CBI countries, to be imported duty-free into the United States. In particular, the CBI encompasses three key elements, namely:
(1) bilateral aid
(21 tax incentives in the Caribbean for certain C.S. businesses activities
(3) concessionary trade agreements
To enjoy duty-free status, the Caribbean Basin Initiative calls for certain eligibility requirements to be met. For example, articles must either be grown, produced, or manufactured in a beneficiary country, and must meet the rules of origin to be eligible under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recoverg Act. In addition, articles must be imported directly f rom a benef iciary country. Furthermore, the value of most zrticles must include at least 35 percent in direct processing costs in one or more beneficiary countries. However, the 35 percent may incorporate up to 5 percent in L'.S.-made cornponents, while the remaining 20 percent could constitute material and/or labour costs from benef iciary countries. *j5 Because the majority of the Eastern
Caribbean countries are rnuch too small to produce both the quality and quantity of cornponents that are needed to qualify for the duty- free privilege, the CBI allows combining local content inputs from
2 5 5 CARIBBEAN BASIN IXITIATIVE : Impact on Selected Countries Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Cornmittee on Foreign Relations, US. Senate. (Washington: United States General Accounting Office Document, July, 1988 ) . p. 8 al1 CBI eligible countries to meet the specific product requirement. For example, an export from Grenada nay include components from other CBI countries to meet the 33 percent local requirement.256
The Caribbean Basin Initiative also has exclusions to the program, which stipulate that:
(1) an? country designated "Communist" could not be includeci in the program.
(21 any country, expropriating or utilizing property owned or controlled bp LS. citizens without adequate compensation, is not eligible.
(3) any country that provides preferential treatment to commodities from a developed country, other than the C.S., to the detriment of U.S. commerce, can not be part of the program;
(4) any country that fails to satisfy Washington that it is co-operating adequatelp in combatting narcotics trafficking can not be in the program;
(5) any country that violates U.S. copyright laws governing broadcast material can not be in the program;
(6) any country that abrogates contracts with, or awards made to U.S. citizens, can not be in the program;
(7) any country that has no estradition treaty with the G.S. can not be in the program.237
Aithough the implementation of the CBI centered on the countries in the Caribbean and Central America, not al1 the countries were eligible for benefits because of criteria
256 ibid. p.15
25Ï Bakan, Cox and Leys , op. cit . , p. 3 167 req~irernents.''~ Yeither Grenada, nor Cuba, was eligible for any type of benefit offered to the other countries in the region because, in the eyes of the United States, these countries were viewed as Communist satellites. Aithough the Reagan
Adrninistr~tion'sdeclared goal was to improve the economies of the countries in the region, not everg one was treated the same. The decision to exclude Grenada and Cuba was made some time before, contradicting Reagan's earlier pronouncemeni, that we sees to exclude no United States antagonism towards Cuba is well known; the presence of some 2,000 Cuban military personnel on the island of Grenada was enough f~rthe Lr.S. to dub Grenada a Yarsist- oriented country.260
The political importance of Grenada to the United States became obvious after Jamaican left-leaning Prime Minister Hichael
Manley was defeated by the Western-oriented Eciward Seaga in the election of 1980. This meant that Grenada became the only Caribbean island under Cuban-Soviet influence. In 1982 an Assistant Secretary in the State Department reiterated the belief shared by the U.S. government when he said:
Ne are very ~orried .. . about the trends in Grenada. It is an oppressive one-party society. Whetber it is in fact or should be so qualified at this moment as being a "Communist Country" is uncertain to us, but we have to be very
258 Ibid. p. 32
259 Reagan Address to the OAS, op. cit., p.1386
T'estimony before the U.S. Senate Cornmittee on Finance, Xugust 2, 1982, p.84. preoccupied about the direction of events there.2s1
The CBI also embodied an alternative that Kas cost-effective in its approach. In other k-ords, the alternative was to spend more on the development of the region and, in the long run, less rnoney would be needed to correct the problems that are associated with underde~eloprnent.~~~Clearly, United States policy concerning
Central America and the Caribbean was concentrated on discovering ways to encourage American style development and regional cohesion.
The policy was intended to encourage vigorous support for a U.S. form of political democracy and economic reform, as much as for El
Salvador, Grenada, and Guatemala as for Nicaragua. Xccording to
American Foreign Policy documents, the 6.S. claimed that it supported the cessation of terrorism and a halt to destabilization,263
Clearly, CBI governments which adhered to C.S. policies expected to be treated xell, whereas countries that showed some
independence or did not fail in line with S.policies could expect to be punished severely through economic isolation. But a brief review of the data does not support this assumption. In the fiscal year 1982, the C. S. Agency for International Development
261 Ibid., p.77.
262 ibid. p.1385.
263 "The Origins, Developrnent, and Impact of LS. Participation in the Grenada Missionr' in American Foreign Policy Document +666. Address by the Deputg Secretary of State before the Associated Press Managing Editors Conference in Kentucky, Xov.4, 1983. (Washington: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Xovember 4, 1983). p.1420 169 received a supplernental allocation of US$350 million to support the
Reagan administration aia component of its trade initiative. Of the USS350 million, USS223 million was allocated to Central
America, USSI0 million of ïhich was given to Belize. The remaining cS$127 million was allotted to the Eastern Caribbean islands. But since 1982, the Agency for International Development (AIDI has not
received any additional funding specif ically designated for tne continued support of CBI countries, mainly because the agency does not receive discrete CBI funding. Furthermore, Lts efforts to support investment and esport-led growth cannot be easily
identified because AID does not maintain an account that can
identify assistance for CBI related acti~ities.'~"
In terrns of credit to CBI countries, assistance given bu the
United States declined from $13.1 billion in 1983 to $8 billion in
1986.~~' At the same time, financial assistance changed -rom development aid to balance of payments assistance. It is worth
noting that in the past, development aid c~nstituted75 percent of the external capital for low-incorne countries. International
lending institutions are unable to fil1 the void, while private
banks are concerned that the debt might not be repaid, leaving the
CBI countries with no alternative but to shift their scarce
264 United States General Accounting Office, op. cit., p.33
265 Related Programs Appropriations Bill. 1987, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 99th Congress, 2nd. session. Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986 1. pp. 5-7. 170 resources to debt servicing instead of deve10prnent.~~~
COXCLUSION
Althouph proponents of the CBI have argued that trade liberalkation vil1 provide gains in the Long-cerm, if should not be overlooked that trade initiatives such as the CBI also carry costs, and these costs will affect certain countries and regions more than others. In order to evaluate the impact of the CF31 on
Caribbean trade, it is useful to briefly review the region's recent performance.
The trade performance of the Caribbean (CXRICOH and OECS) as a group, under the CBI, has not been satisfactory in light of special market access provisions. Figures from the C.S. Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce revel that between 1983 and 1996, exports from Central America to the LTnited States grew by almost
70 percent, while exports from the Caribbean grex by oniy 30 percent. The disparity in export capabilitg between these two regions is particularly alarming in light of the $11.6 billion worth of exports from CBI beneficiary countries in 1996- Although
Jamaica's exports increased by twenty five percent in 1996, and there has been a phenomenal increase in the value of Trinidad and
Tobago's exports, due mainly to methanol and in the case
266 External Debt: Crisis and AdiustmentInter-Americarr Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. (Washington D.C. : IDB 1983 Report, 1983). p. 18
26' A SELA unpublished paper (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Lau, Carlton University, 1997). Faxed pp.2-3 1.71 of the smaller OECS economies, of which Grenada is a rnember, the performance has been dismal. Three major reasons nave been advanced for the sub-grouping's weak performance. First, the insignificant performance of the OECS countries is indicative of their limited agricultural-based esports oriented mostly to the European Union, and the focus on tourism related investrnents instead of manufacturing. This has meant that the region has suffered from a lack of product capacity, leading not only to supply side problems, but also to an erratic and not weli sustained product range.
Second, Caribbean exporters lack much of the marketing informztion and expertise that would allow them to take better advanta.ge of opportunities in the ES market. Market information and expertise are costly and therefore prohibitive for most Caribbean producers.
Third, some commentators have argued that non-tariff barriers have been responsible for the Caribbean' s poor performance, but this seems to be a weak argument since Central American countries also face the same barriers. It is noteworthy that some countries in
Central America have been torn by civil war and economic chaos for much of the 1980's and early 1990's. Given this fact, a better performance by the Caribbean countries was expected. However, for at least the first and second reasons just given, as well as the others given earlier in this chapter, it is ciear that the
Caribbean countries, including Grenada, are unable to take
significant advantage of market and other opportunities under the
CBI because of their structural ly weaker economies . Furtherniore ,
since the CBI expired in September of 1993, some Caribbean i T2 countries have expressed their concern about the increasing diversion of the apparel trade from the region to Mexico following the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA), which involves Canada, the United States, and Yexico . Some Caribbean governments have also been urging the bnited States
Congress to consider a CBI enhancement programme for the region, or, at least, to grant SAFTA parity with Xexico. Xevertheless, there is little support in the U.S. Congress for any of these initiatives. For one, Congress is reluctant to grant "fast-track" approval for any new trade initiatives. Fast-crack approval. entails granting the US president the authority to negotiate trade agreements, within a given time, without amendments from Congress.
Another reason for the lack ~f support is that some congressional representatives, who have their own agendas, would like to have a
Say regarding what form any further economic assistance to the
Caribbean should take. Clearly, the benefits to the Caribbean derived from the CBI, to date, has been minimal, and in Grenada, the expected improvement in health care, education, infrastructure, and widespread economic growth have not occurred. CBI-related employment has been primarily in a few assembly industries which do not offer either long-term employment or high-wages . kforeover, f inancial assistance under the CBI has been insuff icient to address Grenada's debt-servicing needs. The tragic outcome has been that Grenada has paid and enormous price in the face of -4rnerican-style economic assistance.
From the beginning the Grenada revolution had to contend with i 73 hostility from the U. S. government. Fortunately for Grenada, the island's trade ïith the L.S. vas minimal, and the amount of US capital investment on the island was negligible. Nevertheless, the
U.S. government endeavoured to persuade European and Caribbean governments riot to give ang assistance to Grenada. On another occasion when the PRG applied to the IMF for a CSS19 million loan, the E.S. askea that the request be deleted from the Board's agenda.
This was done, but the PRG lobbied so hard that 20 of 21 Executive
Direciors on the Board eventually voted for a reinstatement of the loan. Yoreover, when the US government offered the Caribbean
Development Bank financial assistance on the terms that Grenada be excluded, representatives of al1 the governments involved voted not to accept the offer on those terms.
On the other hand, Cuba, became vigorously involved in supplying economic, militarv, and other aia to Grenada from the onset. In December 1979 hundreds of Cuban workers and technicians, using heavy Soviet equipment , were instrumental in construct ing the
Point Salines Airport, other infrastructure such as roads and low- cost housing xere accomplished witn substantial Cuban aid. Thanks also to the services of Cuban doctors and dentists, the PRG was able to provide the type of extended medical services it could not otherwise provide. The Cubans also helped to build Grenada's fishing industry by supplying six trawlers during the first three
Years of the revolution. During the revolution also, more than fifty Cuban military advisers helped to build the new revolutionary army and equipped the local militia xith several thousand AK-41 174 rifles and other equipment. According to Bishop, al1 this aid was intended to help Grenada disengage from the capitaiist world.
In analyzing the pol itics and economies of a post-invasion
Grenada, developments reveal that the island has not produced a government capabie of taking up the challenges the PRG tried to tackle. Instead, under US patronage, Grenada's politicians have made various alliances and formed several coalitions only to split up and regroup into new combinations. For example, the Xew
'iational Party which won the election of December 1984 was regarded as little more than an anti-Gairy party. Halfway through its term in office, the government, led bg Herbert Blaize, Kas in tatters.
Kith the death of Blaize in 1989, a ne% coalition of forces made up of a defector from Gairy's party and t~osurvivors from the
Blaize administration was able to put together a government, known as the Yational Democratic Congress, with a 10-5 majority. As it turned out, this government had neither the philosophy nor the support to carry out the type of fiscal and economic measures needed to bring Grenada out of the serious econornic and social problerns it faced. On the economic front, the long awaited dollars from US investments never came; indeed, the U.S. sponsored economic development mode1 imposed on Grenada, after the revolution, brought about a sense of hopelessness, political instability, frustration, and confus ion.
Grenada is yet to find a credible alternative to the revolutionary legacy, nevertheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the experience and involvement. First, the 175
Grenada electorate is reluctant to risk its future with another radical government with radical programmes, especially af ter the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, in small underdeveloped states like Grenada, governments must be prepared to play a pivotal role in productive economic development, or run the risk of experiencing Little or no development. Third, by dismantling the economic infrastructure and social policies of the PRG, it can be assumed that policies that give priority to the interest of the masses, and are designed to control private capital investments in accordance with the interests of the nation state, will incur opposition from the United States, even if there are no appreciabie amounts of US investments in the country. Fourth, resistance to
US domination %il1 be seriously undermined, at al1 costs, if
socialist-oriented governments in this hemisphere do not maintain
a united front, which is difficult enough to do. Finally, C.S.
security depends on the abîlitg to prevent the military build up
of non-conformist regimes in the hemisphere. The political crisis
in Grenada therefore provided an irresistible challenge to the
United States in coping with a possible security threat. " SECRET" Cop~xo. ----
PROTOCOL
OF THE MILITARY COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNYENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA AXD THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERXMEST OF GREXAD.4
The Government of the Republic of Cuba and People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, in full exercise of their sovereign right as free and independent state, based on the interna1 relations existing between both countries with the aim of making a contribution to the strengthening of the defensive capacity of Grenada, have agreed upon the following:
ARTICLE 1 The Government of the Republic of Cuba in agreement ~iththe request formulated by the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, will maintain Cuban Yilitary- specialists in that country in quantities and specialists established in Annex 50. 1 of this document. ( Protocol ) .
ARTICLE Il The Yilitary specialists from Cuba on behalf of strengthening the military capacity of the Armed Forces will assist Grenadian militarg men on the question of Organisation of the Organic Structure, Organisation of the Instruction and Combative and campaign training of the troops and staffs in the preparation of cadres and minor specialists, and in the elaboration of the operative and mobilization plans for the defense of the country.
ARTICLE 111
The Government of the Republic of Cuba will grant scholarships to military personnel of Grenada in the Yilitary Training Centres of the Revolutionary Armed Forces with the quantities - and specialist with the requirements that will be established in Annex Som 3 which will be elaborated afterwards. "SECRET" . .2 ARTICLE IV
The Governrnent of the Republic of Cuba has the pleasure of receiving during 1982 four delegetions of the Armed Forces of up to three members each, of the following specialities:
- Engineering, (the fourth-three months period) - Communication, (the first three-months period) - Logistics, (the first three-month period) - Exploration, (the fourth three-month period)
The dates in which these delegations should travel to Cuba will be communicated to the Grenadian side, by the Cuban side twentp days in advance.
ARTICLE V
In order to lead the activities of the Cuban Military Specialists, the post of chief of the Cuban Military Specialists was established to develop functions in the Ministry of Defense. ARTICLE VI
The Cuban side according to the plans approved by its governments will carry out the systernatic change of Cuban Lfilitary specialists in the quantities foreseen in the present protocol.
ARTICLE VI1
The People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada will give facilities to the chief of the Cuban Military specialists in the work places and for using the communication means esisting in the country in order to assure the direction of his activities of Technical Military assistance to the Armed Forces.
ARTICLE VI11
The Cuban and Grenadian Military specialists who in virtue of the present Protocol are in the Republic of Cuba or in Grenada will respect the sovereignty and customs and vil1 observe the laws.
Document 16-2 ARTICLE IS The People's Revolutionary Government will give facilities to the Xinistry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba to check the work of the Cuban Hilitary Specialists.
ARTICLE X The medical, technical and material assurance and the espenses as a result of the permanency of the Cuban Xilitary Specialists on the Grenadian territory will be implemented according to the time period established in Annex No. 2 of this Protocol.
ARTICLE XI The People ' s Revolut ionary Government wili pap the expenses of the Custom-House and fees of the men sent to the Cuban Yilitary specialists, by sea and by air.
ARTICLE XII
The Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, will take all measures depending on them in order to assure the secrecy of the permanency of the rnilitary personnel in both states and the character of the activities, as ïell as the mail and information related to the present protocol.
ARTICLE XII1
4ny kind of situation that cornes out in respect to the present protocol or its accomplishment, it will be solved by friendly conversations' between representat ives of both sides in Havana City or in the City of St. George's.
Any charges or additions to the present protocol ~illonly be effective in case they are elaborated in a written way and signed by authorized personnel of both sides. ARTICLE XIV Annex No.3 of the Protocol of Xilitary Collaboration on scholarships to the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada will be included in the present protocol, by means of a written request through the chief of the group of Yilitary Specialists after having finished the studies that will be carried out. '* SECRET " 4 ARTICLE XV
The present protocol will 'De put into effect from the date of signature and it will be effective until December 31, i984.
The Annexes Ko. 1, 2 and 3 are part of this Protocol.
Written up in two copies, original, in spanish and english, both texts are valid and signed in the citp of ------on the ------day of ------of 19-----
By the Government of the By tne People's Revo- Republic of Cuba lutionary Government of Grenada " SECRET" Copy No. -
AXNEX 30. 1
PROTOCOL OF THE MILITART COLLABORATION ABOUT THE LEVELS OF WORK OF THE CUBA&' MILITARI- SPECIXLISTS IK THE PERMANEXT XRMED FORCES.
The Government of the Republic of Cuba will rnaintain military specialists in Grenada whose composition will be as follows:
Permanent Specialists
Interna1 Assurance Groups of the Military Specialists. - Officers, Sergeants and Soldiers ------16 ----- TOTAL 29
S~ecialistsfor short periods and for 2-4 month periods
------TOTAL 12-13 "SECRET" COP)? No. --
PROTOCOL OF THE MILITARY COLLABORATION ABOUT THE YATERIAL MEANS, SERVICE AND ASSURING PERSONNEL.
The Government of the Republic of Cuba and the People's Revolutionarp Government of Grenada agree to guarantee the material, technical and medical assurance of the Cuban Militarr specialists according to the time period mentioned belou.
CLAUSE No. 1 The People's Revolutionary Governrnent of Grenada will ,euarantee the material means, equipments anci the following services: a) Maintenance of furniture and properties sent and constructed by Cuba and those given by the country to the Cuban military personnel. b) Equipment and office material for the usage of the Cuban military specialists. c) Fresh food-stuff for the feeding of the Cuban Military personnel. d) The necessary transport means for the development of their functions inside the Armed Forces, guaranteeing the fuel and lubricants, its maintenance and repair. e) Armament and ammunition for the Cuban Military specialists. f) Qualified medical assistance in the hospital of the country as well as the necessary medicines for disease prevention and the maintenance of health of the Cuban military specialists.
8) Means of personnel hygiene of every kind. h) National transportation required for the accomplishment of the service activities. i) Public Services (water, electricity, telephones and others). j) A small stipend for the persona1 expenses of every member equivalent to (30) U.S. Dollars. "SECRET" .. 2 K) Entrance visa and Identification Documents which accredit them for the civilian and military authorities of the country.
1) Personnel that guarantee the driving and usage of the transport technique, the elaboration of food, washing and ironing of the clothes, the cleaning of furniture and properties and the security of the house. m) Other means and services non-specified which are required for the development of the work of the Cuban Military personnel.
CLAUSE NO. 2
The Government of the Republic of Cuba krill guarantee the means equipment and services we mention as follows: a) The sendinq of technical personnel, material means and necessarF furniture for the construction of the necessary installation for the living-conditions and work of the Cuban-Militarp Personnel. b) Dried foodstuff of every kind for the feeding of the Cuban Hilitary Personnel.
C) The trip ciothes of the Cuban Yilitary Specialists. d) The necessary consultative material for the execution of the functions of the Cuban Yilitary Specialists. e) The salary in Cuba of the Military Personnel. Eastern Caribbean Dollar (EC$) COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL A-WALYSIS OF THE C.C. Cde. tiam James leading off said that this is the last chance for the C.C. to pull the party out of this crisis and on a firm M.L. patn. This crisis is not only among the masses but in the party membership as well. Over the past few months one could have seen that the party and the C. C. were not moving forward. The way forward is to take an honest, cold blooded, objective and scientif ic approach to the situation, Within the C.C. there are many problems al1 Cdes must be criticised for the levels of disorganisation, low ideological level and failure to put the party on a firm M.L, footing. These weaknesses are so evident that party Cdes are saying that certain Cdes must be chopped from the C .C. ft is clear that party Cdes have lost their level of respect for the C.C. The removal of Cdes from the C.C. will no way have solved the problem, in his view al1 the Cdes of the C.C. are by far the best Cdes in the party, what is needed is firm Leninism. He pointed out that the most fundamental problem is the quality of leadership of the Central Cornmittee and the party provided by Cde. Maurice Bishop. In his view the Cde has great strength, his ability to inspire and develop Cdes, his ability to raise the regional and international respect for the party and revolution; he has the charisma to build the confidence of the people both in and out of the country, anà to put forward clearly the positions of the party. Today these strengths alone cannot put the party any further in this period. The qualities he lacks is what is needed to push the revolution forward at this time:
(1) A Leninist level of organisation and discipline. (2) Great depth in ideologicôl clarity.
(31 Brilliance in strategy and tactics. These qualities which are essential for M. L. leadership has proven to be lacking in the Cde at this time. Cde. Layne said that based on al1 analysis, discussions and conclusions it is quite clear that the C.C. has not been able to give ideological leadership to the process. If we are ta be honest and frank throughout the crisis we go through more and more Cdes coming to realise that we face a real possibility of the revolution being turned back.
Doc 112 - 14 It is clear that Cde. Bishop lacks these qualities put forward bl- Cde. James. Despite his strengths, the strengths that he lacks is vitally needed to steer the revolution off the dangers and ta corne out of the crisis. The salvation of the revolution calls for us to take a mature proletarian decision to save and carry the revoiution forward.
Cde. Ventour agreed with the two cdes. that the type of leadership that is necessary to pull us out of the crisis is lacking in the Cde. Leader. These criticisms were made to him on more than one occasion which he zccepted. He shows that he does not have the quality to put the party on a firm 3.L. footing.
He also criticised the C. C. for not criticising the Cde for areas of work e.g. Armed Forces and Propaganda. However, he thinks that the main fetter is that the Cde. àaes not have these qualities.
Cde. Cornwall agreeing sith al1 the Cdes who spoke so far. He said that we have O.P.P. Seven points were made one of which was a Leninist C.C. as a principle for the building of a Y.L. party. He agreed that the root cause is the C.C. For quite some time we have been seeing the problem. The chairmanship and leadership of the C.C. appears very weak. He said that there are great strengths in the Cde. Leader that have carried the process, but as the complexities grows these qualities alone is proving inadequate. He also added that the Cde. Leader ability to supervise and stay on top of the work is also lacking. These weaknesses create a fetter on how we organise to carry the work forKard. Instead we move from one crisis to another and the frequency of crisis becoming more and more frequent. If we fail to transform the party we &il1 lose state power, lives will be lost, history has piaced a great responsibility on our shoulders which we must seek to deal with in the correct and scientific way.
Cde. De Riggs said that he has been giving the work some deep thought over the past months. He agreed that the situation is favourable for counter revolution in this time, state power can be easily overthrown. The low mood of the party and the masses was also very clear to hin. He said that the C.C. has failed to match up ideologically to the situation. The removal of any Cue on the C.C. will not help this situation.
The main problem is the question of leadership. There is irnmediace need for the reorganization of the C.C. in order to rebuild the confidence of the membership and masses in the party in solving this problem. The interest of the party and revolution must be taken first, he pointed that he agreed with al1 the points made by Cde. James.
Doc Il2 - 15
Cde. Bartholomew agreed with what he called very frank and open analysis Sy the Cdes He said that he had never raised any criticism of the C.C. Leadership though Be was dissatisfied with the quality of the leadership. He agreed with al1 the points made on the strengths of the Cde. Leader. He continued to Say thzt his weaknesses were known al1 the while, but Cdes were hesitant to raise them. Though he accepted earlier criticisms of this, he had never fulfii them in practice. The quality of the C.C. has deteriorated very badly, there is too much vacillation by the Cde. Leader. The Y. L. quality is becoming even more critical as the revolut ion develops.
Cde. Kamau said that since the last C.C. meeting he has been giving deep thought to the work of the C.C. Overall the C.C. is very weak, disorganised and haphazard in its approach to the work. His personal work is still disorganised and weak which is true to say of most C.C. Cdes, there is also a serious absence of deep thought and study. He said that the Cde. Leader has shown great strengths and remained in the positive qualities mentioned by Cde. James. However, the main problem remains the role of Cde. Bishop as the leader of the C.C. He said that the C.C. continue to be loose and disorganised and not focused, he said that the Cde. Leader lacks the quaiity to lead the C.C. as spelled out by Cde. James. He agreed that removal of Cdes from the C.C. cannot solve the problem until we deal with the question of leadership of the C.C.
Sister Phyllis Coard commented that when she read the minutes of the C.C. in July she was shocked. From the beginning of the year she had began to prepare herself more for stuciy though she had not been doing broad reading. However, she feels that the Central Committee cannot move forward unless it is involved in more in- depth studies. As things began to get more complex the C.C. have not met seriously to deal with the fundamental problems and in the absence of the C.C., the P.B. have not done any better.
She said that she had identif ied a number of questions for the C. C. to deal with in order to move forward, being that we now have to decide what perspective to use and how to develop political education, strategic long term and short term goals for propaganda- The best way to coordinate media propaganda with the propaganda work of the party, how do we develop our lines quickly to the party members, how to structure the C.P.E. programme to encourage more participation, the level of party participation in C. P.E. , what amount of programmes can the party sustain and maintain, qualities to look for in the selection of new party Cdes, how do we improve communication from the higher organs to the lower organs, how to structure the secretariat, should the NYO become a semi vanguard, how to direct political education, how to organise militia to ensure maximum participation, what is the long term future of the zona1 councils and how do we sacrifice quantity for quality.
Doc 112 - 16 She said that neither the P.B. nor the C.C. have analyzed these fundamental questions that is why these problems exist today, when and evsn if it is done it is limited and vacillation follows. She agreed that the leaders of the partp have failed to provide the necessary leadership to the party. She comrnented that the main problem of the C.C. is idealism, voluntarism, failure to face up to hard decisions, illness as a result of psychological pressures in this context the Cde. Leader has not taken responsibility, not given the necessary guidance, even in areas where he was directly in charge of the guidance was not adequate. He was disorganiseci very often, avoid responsibilities for dealins with critical areas of work e.. study class. She criticised the C.C. for not criticising hirn in the past, some time ago he pointcd out that he was not capable but the C.C. ignored him. Some Càes became scared to criticise him because he had been hostile to criticism.
The P.B. and C.C. leaned on the O.C. to take decisions that they should have taken. Cde. Strachan has taken the full responsibility to hold the party together when the C.C. and P.B. had failed to provide the necessary politicai guidance under this pressure he had taken, bound away decisions, shown hostility to criticisms, though she had seen some improveinent of this in the past two veeks. The Cde must be complimented for the proletarian qualities he displayed. -4 number of C.C. Cdes are demoralised because their work bave fallen. Xe also need to consider whether the C.C. will be stronger or weaker if Cdes are chopped, in her view it wiil be weaker. She agreed to changes in the composition of the C.C.. She concluded that the C.C. will have to take the hard decisions that xi11 improve the quality and levels of the C.C. in terms of ideological and organisational directions.
Cde. Bain said that the analysis is difficult for him in the given circumstances, problems in work, health and a number of Cdes being out of the country. The iàeological levels of the C.C. was definitely a great concern e.g. we are not sharp in determining the main feature of the period of July plenary, which he was worried about particularly when the revolution is 4 1/2 years old. He said that another feôture was that we came up with hasty decisions as a result of premature thinking. Cdes are able to identify that the C.C. collectively was weak, he agreed with the points made by Cde James and added that it was greater demanding the leader to give more guidance to the process at this time.
Cdes are looking to the C.C. for this quality, it is dangerous if leading Cdes cannot show these qualities. He said that he would have preferred if the Cdes had named the C.C. Cdes that the membership was doubtful of. He said that if this consensus is widesprsad and the part^ do not take action on it, it can lead to more problems, how will these members respond and what will be the C.C.'s answer to it. He feels that whatever decision must be taken should be given the greatest thought, not only for now but throughout the future. DOCU!dEKT 112 - 17 Cde Louison said that the =I problem was the qualitg of leadership given the process by Cde Bishop. He loses focus and spends too much time on details. The points made by Cde. James and Cornwall have really crystallised the problern which se have to find ways and rneans of sofving. He said tnough that the C.C. has not been able to assist the Cde in developing these strengths.
He said that the names of C.C. Cdes mentioned by the membership as doubtful were H.A., Uni, Fitzy, Karnau and St. B. though in his view reduction or expansion of the C.C. cannot solve the problern. He suggested a cross system for developing the rvork, how to find a methodology for helping and forcing C.C. Cdes to develop ideologically. This problem is a fundamental problem we have been extremely weak, the criticisms are correct we have to corne up with a solution quick and ensure that it is communicated to the partg within hours. He added that we need to spend much more time doing preparation for study and rigorouslg execute the tasks. We also have to get rid of trivial issues.
Cde, Strachan said that one of the most striking thing was that he never heard any member of the C. C. ask for a report from the Political Bureau on its week to week functioning. The P.B. is a cornmittee of the C.C. and at no point in time Kas a report summoned. The C.C. Cdes do not get any minutes or report from the P.B. This is very serious, because the P.3. is left to do their own thing.
He pointed that he is in total agreement with the points made by Cde. James he again referred to the Fedon study seminar making the point that Cdes always wait for sorneone else to take the lead, which is one of the reason for this rut. Ke now have to take the responsibility of demanding higher qualities from the Cde Leader. The Cdes should have dealt with him every time he slipped in the past. Xe recognised the brilliance of the Cde. but agreed that this was not enough to carry the process forward and to build a serious hLL. party. He used the exzmple of Cde. Fidel who is always reflecting and thinking saying that these are the qualities that a Y.L. leader must have. He said this is the iime when we have to deal with the main problems of the C.C.
Cde. Gnison Whiteman said that the weaknesses mentioned of the Cde. Leader are correct. Since October there have been some improvements in scheduling and study but these improvements are not fundamental enough. He said that the Cde Leader had not enough time to the fundamental but we have to be careful that we donst shift too much blame from the C.C. collectively. We need to have a commitment on the C.C. to new norms, prioritization, greater reflection, better style of work, we have to build up cornrades, e.g. Cde Leader, we have to assist on higher standards from which he is capable of. Document - 112 -18 Cde. Leader thanked the Cdes for their frankness in their ticisms. He said that Cdes in the pasi have given serious ught to the question of leadership and failed to raise it for lomatic reasons which was not good. He was dissatisfied over fact that C.C. Cdes have not raised these points before r~ith frankly, though a couple non C.C. Cdes have done it. He picked up ôn overwhelming sentiment that the qualities required are not possessed in him. He agreed that the points are correct especially correct application of strategg and tactics which cannot be achieved except the other qualities are fulfilled. He had found difficulties in finding relevant material to study the question of the functioning of the P.B. and C.C. which reflects a weakness, he don't think that he had given adequate leadership to bodies. He had several problems over the years especially the style that entails consensus, and unity at al1 costs xhich can result in blunting class struggle. He had tried to keep a certain kind of relationship with Cdes even though it was not what it used to be before. He also questioned his approach as regards to collective leadership, he said that there is not enough participation and discussions. Too much decisions are taken by smaller and smaller organs which affect collective lezdership.
On the question of crisis and problems it is correct as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities. He needs time to think of his own role and to give a more precise response to the problem addressed which he thinks is a correct approach.
Document 112 - 19 APPENDIX E
CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON FIRST PLENARY SESSIOK
Historically, the Central Committee met on many occasions to analyze al1 areas of the Party, State and Hass work. This however, is the first full scale holistic plenarg of the C.C.
Between Wednesday 13th Julg, 1983 and Tuesday 19th July, 1983, the C.C. of N.J.Y. spent six and a half ( 6.3 1 days in plenarg - a total of 54 hours assessing all areas of Party, 3ass and State work. The strengths and weaknesses of the Party' s performance were highlighted and a number of conclusions were made. SECTION I
(1) Main Feature
In its analysis of the present political and economic situation, the main feature was identif ied as follows: -
The continued failure of the party to transform itself ideologically and organisationally and to exercise firm leadership along a Leninist path in the face of the acute rise in the complexities and difficulties facing the revolution on al1 fronts - economic, political, social, military and international. The evidence to support this conclusion is as fo1lows:-
The Party
Over the period under review our Party has demonstrated many weaknesses - ideologically, politically, and organisationally. Yost strikingly, there has been the emergence of deep petty bourgeois manifestations and influence in the party which has led to two ideological trends. The feature came to the fore when the Party had to step up its work amongst the masses. The petty bourgeois response and attitudes have continued as can be seen by the low rate of attendance at house to house and community work and the lack of consistently large sections of the party in carrying out cornpulsory areas of Party work.
In the face of ail this, there was a slowing down of the important task of Party building. The Party has also failed to recruit into the ranks members of the working class, the most strategic class.
THE POLITICAL AKD ORGASISATIOKAL WORK AMONG THE MASSES In the period, the work of the mass organisation was stagnated and the lack of their presence and influence has opened a definite gap in the political work among the masses. In addition, the political work in the regions has been weak and ineffective, as a result of poor leadership by the P.C.B. 'S. In the particular case of St. Andrew's the situation has reached crisis proportions.
Coupled with this, we have witnessed the intensification of the ideological struggle and at the szme tirne the spread of anti- communism within the country, as seen through the Worker Education Clzsses. The response of the church has been tc step up its activities organisationally and ideologically to spur on tbis trend and strengthen idealism. At the same time, Our propaganda machinery has been incredibly weak leading to the near collapse of our propaganda xork among the masses. This has resulted in the overall mood of the masses being low.
THE ECONOMY
%hile our economy has continued to grow we are experiencing extreme difficulties in mobilising external finance and receiving already promised amounts. This has led to a serious cash flow problem which has slowed down and is even threatening to halt key capital investments projects, caused limited lay-off and sunken the confidence of broad sections of the masses.
The alliance with the local bourgeoisie aimed at developing a national economy, has become much more cornplex. Recent IMF negotiations and imperialism's growing attempts to provide ideological guidance, and possible finance, through CBI to the local bourgeoisie has made the need for a much clearer appreciation by the entire Party of the strategy and tactics on how to maintain that economic alliance, and use it in the interest of the working people, even more urgent. We need to bear in mind therefore, that the coming two years will be particulary difficult and complex on the economic front. SOCIAL BENEFITS
Xotwithstanding an increased milk distribution programme, a more efficient housing repair programme, a deepening of free health and medical care, expanded education opportunities, economism, and consumerism have remained deep in the society. MILITARY
In this perioa, we have seen the development of the Regional Defence force, increased aggressive U. S. manoeuvres in the region and stepped up covert activity against our revolution.
On the other hand our village militia units have decreased in quantity and size in most geographic regions, and the workplace militia units which are now developing are stili at an embryonic stage and thus need to be strengthened. REGIOKAL
In the Caribbean region there has been signs of increasing co- ordination between the more developed countries (particularly Jamaica and Barbados) and G.S. imperialism. They have also begun to increase their pressure on the OECS countries in their attempts to isolate the Grenadian Revolution. At the same time there have been strong indications of a gradua1 snift in the balance of forces in CARICOM in our favour based on our economic performance, international work, prestige and growing mass base in their territories. INTERNATIONAL
The Reagan Administration and U.S. imperialism are growing more and more aggressive and are at present rushing ahead with plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Western Europe later this year. This has led to the heightening of East/West tension, pushing a grave danger to peace. At the same time, the world peace rnovement is growing and the Korld Socialist system is continuing to be consolidated.
( ii ) OTHER FEATURES OF THE PERIOD
The C.C. also took note of the following features: LOCAL (a) The positive impact of our regional and international work on the masses. our propaganda victories against Reagan on the Airport question; victories in Ocho Rios and Trinidad CARICOM Summits; victories at OECS meetings impact of the P.Y.'s successful visit to the USA
(b)Greater CO-ordination between regional progressive Parties.
(c) Our continued efforts at building links with the Socialist World.
(Cl The growing role of the state sector in the economy. REGIOXAL
(a) The continued victories of FMLN in El Salvador. (b) The growth of left and progressive organisations in the Caribbean, together with the growing positive sentiments towards Grenada in the OECS countries and the growth of our mass base in the Caricom countries.
(c) The improving relations with World Socialism and some Caricom countries.
(d) The growing contradictions anong and within Caricom countries.
(el Our improving relations with some key Latin American Countries e.5. Columbia and Argentina.
( f 1 Growth in formal and informa1 relations beiween Grenadô and other Caricom Countries making it objectively more difficult for U.S. imperialism to achieve their strategic objective of isolating Grenada.
( g ) Our developing relations with Trinidad.
(hl The recent package of the CBI. INTERNATIONAL
( i ) The consolidation and advancement of the national Liberation struggles - Xamibia, El Salvador, South Africa. (ii) The survival of the Front Line status in the face of tremendous pressure.
(iii) The survival and expansion of the Non-aiigned Movement.
( iv) The aggressive role of U.S. imperialism in Africa, the Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean using reactionary regimes - South Africa, Israel, El Salvador and Hounàuras.
(VI The victories of Margaret Thatcher of Britain and Kohl in West Ge rmany . (vil Great strains and problems in the P.L.O. (vii) The ongoing senseless Iran-Iraq war. D3CUYEXT 1 10 110 - 4 REVIEW OF THE LIXE OF MARCK
During the plenary, the CC reviewed the Line of Yarch of the Party which was laid down in September '82. The CC analyzed that events of the period demanded higher ideolosical conviction, greater sacrifices, stronger leadership of the masses by al1 party comrades.
Additionally, the CC calls on al1 party comrades to better prepare the masses for the sacrifices that they will have to take in the coming period by giving them clearer and more detailed esplanations of what will be requirea of al1 sections of the people in order that we continue to build and advance the Revolution.
The CC also agreed that the main feature of the present political situation demonstrates very clearly that if the Party Kas to fail to pursue our Line of March, then our process will be most definitely turned back. Furthermore in reviewing the six specific tasks of our line of Yarch, we can see that in the few areas where we have made any progress, it was as a direct result of our pursuit of the Line of March. Proof of the above can be seen in the following:
(1) The positive response by the working class to the Reagan attack, and its emergeRce on the most active and leading class force in the revolution today is a direct result of the ongoing socialism classes. In this respect, the failure of the CPE to function has weakened our implementation of priority number one.
(2 Our failure to build the mass organisations, sports and culture, and the organs of popular power has adversely affected the mood and political disposition of the masses.
(31 The Party has failed to make any progress in strengthening its Leninist character.
(4) We have failed to build the sector which can ensure the sustained grosth of Our economy, making it possible to expand the programmes of the Revolut ion f rom a- tax-revenue . However , at the same time, we have witnessed the expansion ana development of the state sector and irnprovement in the structural adjustment of the economy.
(5) The Party has also failed to live up to its responsibility of building the Militia quantitatively and qualitatively. Our only area of progress here has been the workplace Xilitia.
( 6 ) Despite the fair amount of progress in our international work, we still need to resolutely pursue the foliow up work or the potential will never be realised.
History has therefore proven the correctness of the Line of March, and it must therefore remain the guiding principle for the coming period. SECTION III
HkIK FOCES IS THE 5EXT QCARTER Following this review of the Line of March, the C.C. concluded that the main focus of the present period must be:
( 1 ) Internal Party development , uith special emphasis on ideological development and character building.
( 2 ) Stepped up ideological work arnongst the working class, students and the working people.
(3) The reorganisation and massive stepping up of the work in CPE.
( 3 ) The adoption of concrete measures to expand and deepen the work in the geographic regions. Internal Party Development:
Here the CC concluded that the following are required: a. The systematic development of the interna1 political and ideological work of the Party. Continuation of the "weekend" training courses is vital. However, we Kill have to find more creative methods of implementation since the courses will be held once every six weeks. The main focus of these course wifl have to be: i Further development of the character qualities of party cadres within an ideological framework. ii . Further development of the organisational skills and talents of party comrades. b. A methodology of systematic guidance, supervision and control of party comrades at al1 levels and in al1 areas of party and state work - political, ideological , economic, military and overseas must be developed. c. A methodology for the professionalism of the Party's work in al1 areas. This means that the question of speciafisation is of paramount importance.
d. A systematic approach to our work. This has assured enormous importance since we do not have a "structures" problem. The key is to ensure that Our structures function permanently. e. Gradua1 weeding out of the work elements from within the ranks of the Party. f. A system to guarantee a more careful selection of cadres entering the party. p. Permanent structures for the development of the Party overseas. h. A time perspective for our ne% Party Constitution. i. A time perspective for the development of a new Party programme. j. The creation of a Party School. k. Tirne perspective for the construction of a new Party Headquarters.
Ideological Work: a. Worker education classes will commence in the private sector. The appropriate steps governing the implementation of this decision will be worked out by the Workers Committee and the Yinistry of National Mobilisation. A special programme for these classes xi11 be developed by the Sociaiism Tutors Committee. b. The ideological work among the farrners must be stepped up. c. The NYO has been directed to make more creative use of their radio programme on RFG. d. Political Education for al1 primary and secondary school students. e. Political eduction for al1 teachers.
Reorganisation of CPE
The CC analyzed the work of the CPE as being weak and identified the main problem as follows: a. Subjective weaknesses of the leadership at the national and parish levels.
b. iow involvement and inconsistent attendance of workers ic the classes. c. Inadequate and inefficient mobilisation by the mass organisations. The CC then concluded that:
i. Cde. Tan Bartholomew will nos lead the CPE:
ii. Xaterial incentives are to be linked to each phase of the programme, with a small incentive to students who successfully complete each level
iii. The curriculum be expanded to include History and Social Studies, Science and the equivalent cf secondary school education.
iv. Fundraising activities be stepped up.
v. A more adequate administrative office be found for CPE.
vi. The leadership of CPE at the parish level be strengthened through the appointment of new parish CO-ordinators.
vii. The C.C. ensures that the mass organisation make CPE a main focus of tbeir work.
Work in the geoeraphic regions:
The C.C. examined the state of its work in the geographic regions, The work in St. George's was analyzed as 'Deing the most positive while that of St. Andrew's was cause for great concern. The CC was of the view that consideration should be given to the role of the regional G.M.'s and regional Party cornmittees. This arises from the need for greater Party guidance of the work regionally and the dynamic development of regional structures including the P.CeB.'s.
The parish of St. Andrew's was also identified as a major source of counter-revolution characterised by the following factors: a. many social benefits, but little political results; b. a proliferation of petty rumours in the parish; c. the continued inflow of marijuana and the increased planting in some areas; de evidence of hoarding of money by some elements of the rural bourgeoisie. 110 - 8 The CC therefore concluded the following:
i. The redeployment of some Party comrades to live and work in the outparishes.
ii. Cde. Ian St. Bernard to visit Carriacou fortnightly.
iii, A task force of two comrades to be identif ied and sent to Carriacou to live and work there.
iv. Cde. Kamau McBarnette to become the resident Political Chief of St. David's. v. Special emphasis on house to house, community work, formation of Village-Co-ordinating Bodies (VCB's) with Party members as the chiefs and the stepping up of our propaganda work.
vi. That St. Andrew's is a particular problem parish and therefore special attention must be given by al1 cornmittees to al1 aspects of their work that affect St. Andrew's. APPENDIX F
YINFTES OF EMERGENCY HEETING OF N.J.M. CESTRAL COMMITTEE DATED 26TH AUGUST, 1983
COMRADES PRES ENT
Maurice Bishop Selwyn Strachan Hudson Austin Unison Whiteman Liam James Tan Bartholomew Fitzroy Bain Leon Cornwall Ian St. Bernard Kamau McBarnette Chris De Riggs
COMRADE ABSEST
Phyllis Coard - Excuse - il1
AGENDA
1. Concern of Party Membership
Central Committee Chairman and Party Leader Comrade claurice Bishop called the meeting to order at 8: 00 a.m. He asked Comrade Cornwall to summarise the concern expressed by a member of senior party member .
Comrade Leor. Cornwall reported that he had held discussions with some senior party Comrades in order to get their views on a number of issues. This, he said vas based on his own feelings that we do not have an effective way of assessing the feelings of party membership on key matters.
Comrade Cornwall summarised the feedback as follows:
( i Some conclusions of the C. C. are not correct.
( ii Some C.C. Comrades are not functioning properly, are in a state of rut or performing in a weak manner.
(iii)He had been told by a Cozmade from the G.D.R. that tne state of work is bad.
(iv) Similar allegations were made by Cuban Comrades Carlos Diaz and Pinero. (v) Comrades in the Armed Forces complained that thep were not happy with the level of party guidance even after C.C. deliberations and the recent general meeting.
hi) There was a feeling among some partg Comrades that the C.C. did not criticise itself in a serious way before tne G.H.
(vii) Cde. Cornwall concluded by recommending that C.C. look into these concerns.
Other Comrades reported on the feedback they had received.
Cde. Ian St. Bernard: He reported that he had picked up similar responses. (i) That the C.C. performance in guiding the work has been weak.
(ii) There is a general feeling by Comrades who have been abroad that the work has fallen.
(iii)There is concern over the C.C.'s failure to assign a C.C. member to St. Andrewss even after analyzing this parish which is the weakest link, also dissatisfaction over the nature of the task force so far selected.
( iv) Party Comrades have noted the lack of a serious approach to the Militia.
(VI Comrades say that they feel intimidated over raising these concerns at the level of G.?f.'s
(vi) A number of C.C. Comrades have been identified as failing to adequately lead and guide the work.
Comrade Tan Bartholomew reported on what had reached him:
( i) Fraternal Comrades had raised certain concerns with him. Conversation between Carlos Diaz, Kamau and himself, special concern over Army/Miiitia and Youth. - Concern by U. J.C. about the quality of regional and International work of NYO.
Concern over the presence of G.D.R.. Technical delegation down here for a month and having nothing to do, while having to live in unsatisfactory housing at the risk of their persona1 security - noting that this can tarnish our image in the eyes of fraternals. (ii) Comrades in St. Patrick's had expressed concern over: - Persona1 problems
- Lack of supervision (implied lack of satisfaction with C.C. leadership of work) - Disciplinary measures taken bp O. C. against a particular Comrade (Cornrade Tan personally agrees rvith O.C. on this ) . - Attitude of the Party to the Youth.
- State of work in the Yilitia
- Party's neglect of work in the Militia. It does not seem that Imperialism exists anymore. - A lot of pettiness among soldiers and Iikely esodus from the Armed Forces next year when 5 (five) years contracts ends. - Lack of supervision of the work among police control by RightWing elements, lack of respect for party among police, demoralisation among newiy recruited police making it difficult for transformation of this section of the Xrmed Forces to take place.
Comrade Liam James commented:
(il We should trg to identify the basis for this.
(ii1 It is char that little progress has been made in irnplementing C.C. resolutions of five weeks ago.
(iii)We need to convene once more a new holistic assessing by the Central Committee.
(iv) We need to look at this situation in a special way - We are seeine the beginnin-g of the disintegration of the parts. This period calls for a full meeting of al1 members of the C.C. - last assessrnent was not deep enough.
Comrade Strachan:
(il Sections of the party have begun to rebel against the higher organs of the party. This is serious and dangerous development. 111 - 3 (ii) This silent rebellion will turn into open rebellion and if we do not address it now it will be resolved in a petty bourgeoisie way.
(iii) At the heart of the matter is the C.C. the situation cafls for a more critical reviex of the C.C. - C.C. 's last assessment of itself was opportunist - C.C. did not really criticise itself.
l iv) There is need for a meeting of the fui1 C.C. 111 - 3 (VI Khereas October deliberations held back the party from a social democratic path, the situation now is qualitatively worse. Mernbership is now attacking Central Cornmittee.
(vi) Cornrades are saying that the C.C. is being dishonest with them, for example, the Dix issue.
Comrade Hudson Austin reported on a meeting he had held with the motorised unit. - Comrades are in a serious state of demoralisation. - Good Comrades are asking to leave,
- Comrades are saying that at the end of five (5) pars they are not materially better off.
Comrade Austin recomrnended that the C.C. must set aside a day to sit down and look at the Armed Forces. He also recommended that he should be in the work of the Armed Forces full time.
Comrade Unison Whiteman:
(il The reports have serious implications.
(ii) Things are pointing in the direction of a breakdown of confidence in the C.C.
(iii) There is need for a round of G.H.'s to assess how wide is the discontent.
( iv) These G. M. ' s can prepare for an overall assessment in six (6) weeks. Comrade Tan Bartholomew:
fi) We cannot wait. We need to urgentlg address the question. 111 - 3 (ii) G.M.'s can folloK the C.C.'s deliberations where Cdes can be given frank explanations.
Cde Fitzroy Bain:
( i 1 We need clarification as regards the depth of the criticism of the C.C.
(iil There is division between party and masses - concern over the image of the party before the masses.
(iii)Some responses are genuine %hile others are petty-bourgeoisie.
Comrade Kojo commented as follows:
(i) It is clear the C.C. is facing a confidence crisis.
(ii) The reports tell us that there is grave danger of open rebellion and disintegration of our party.
(iii)The heart of the crisis is the Central Cornmittee. - at the level of its composition. - at the level of the assignment of duties both in the party and state.
( iv) We need to do an assessrnent based on identif ied priority areas of concern rather than a holistic.
(v) There is need for full membership of C.C. to address these issues.
Comrade Leon Cornwall:
(il We need to begin to think more strategicallg than tactically. C.C. tends to think more tacticallg.
(ii) We need to decide on measures for arresting the situation now and for looking down the road.
Cde. Kamau Mc Barnette commented on the lack of critical responses to the C.C.'s conclusions at the G.M. He said we need to ask ourselves to what extent do we provide rank and file party members with the opportunity to speak out and do as frankly?
Other Comrades commented on the need for C.C. Comrades to lead discussions at xorkshops level in future, Cornrade Owusu maintained that the basis for timidity in membership is the attitude of some C.C. Comrades to criticism and the fear of membership if being labelled revisionist.
DECISION: (i) The full C.C. of XJM will meet on the 13th, 14th and 15th of September to examine the issues raised in this meeting and to corne up with appropriate steps.
( ii ) Cde. Valdon Boldeau will be the recording Secretary for this meeting.
SUMMARY REYARKS BY CDE. MAURICE BISHOP
The meeting in spite of its duration has been useful.
In agreement with Owusu that we are faced with the threat of disintegration.
Agrees also with analysis that Comrades of the party are afraid to raise criticisms.
By way of preparation C.C. members should do the follorving: rap with party members ; particularly senior party members on al1 the critical issues. rap with key section of the masses with the following in mind - the increasing disrespect for the party among certain sections of the masses. rap with leadinp mass orgs. activists, leading rnilitia types, consistent participants in zona1 councils, leaders of party support groups.
Agrees with the postponement because of the need for C.C. members to adequately prepare themselves.
July C.C. resolution should be discussed in work cornmittees and study groups.
hii) C.C. members should research on the history of the party during the last five or sis years. Hinutes and conclusions will be useful to look at. (viii) There is reasonable basis to share the concern that many key decisions of the party, if not the majority have been made informally outside of higher organs.
I ix Fie should study the history of the C. P. S. C.
(x1 We should re-read Standards of Party Life by Fronin.
(xi1 We should reflect on the individual stïengths and weaknesses of al1 C.C. members. k-e should also think about the specific responsibilities of C.C. Comrades both at the partg and state levels - this should be in writing.
The meeting ended around 10:00 a.m.
Cde. Chris DeRiggs. 206
APPENDIX G
CEKTRAL COMXITTEE OF THE NEW JEUEL MOVEYENT
(As of August 31, 1983)
Xaurice Bishop, Chairman
General Hudson Austin
Selwyn Strachan
George Louison
Unison Whiternan
Phyllis Coard
Yaj. Leon Cornwall
Lt. Col. Liam James
Lt. Col Ewart Layne
Christopher De Riggs
Chalkie Ventour
Kamau Flc Barnette
Tan Bartholomew
Fitzroy Bain
Ian St. Bernard APPENDIX H
THE ROLE OF THE C.C.
Cde. Bishop said that on many occasion we have tried to look at the role of the C.C. He referred to the documents of June '81 and subsequent minutes of the C.C. that dealt with its role.
He proposed that the C.C. move to meetings once per month and to have three holistic plenary, each year.
He said that the monthly meetings must be seen as a medium of analysis, exchanging information of various sections, and pre- schedules should cover special areas of party and state work. He sees that at the end of October the main topic being C.P.E., in November the study commission ~illalso have to determine the role of the C.C./ secretariat which is key in operationalism the sub cornmittee in terms of reports frorn various bodies etc. Also getting to the party guidelines on major issues ensuring conclusion and resolutions are drawn up after our deliberation and be circulated to the membership.
To develop and maintain links with the masses the leadership must personally get on the ground among the people, step up participation in zona1 and pariçh councils, visit schools, and push production. The role of the C.C. must be worked on in this regard. Develop mechanism for accountability, and to review constant feedback from the membership and to ensure channels of communication with them.
The C.C. must do a constant evaluation of the progress made by members, receive reports from O.C. on the re rationalisation of the work, prioritise the work of Cdes on the C.C. and set targets to be achieved on a ~eekly,monthly, and yearly basis.
Cde. Kamau Mc Barnette said that the C.C. needs to explain the criteria for mernbership on the C.C. and by what mechanism are Cdes work on the C.C. judged. Ensure the right atmosphere was convened for free and frank discussions. The party must be honest and frank with its members and for the last time esplain the truth about Cde. Radix.
Cde leon Cornk-al1 said that the C.C. must have a prospective on its role. We need to work out the framework for the kind of party we would like to build so when Cdes. are recruited we will know what structure we must put them in. The commission that is travelling to Cuba and the U.S. should know what should be done on their return. They should know how we are going to build the party, drawing the experience of other countries .
DOCUMENT 112 112 - 19 We aiso need to start tüorking on a party constitution in a concrete way* Pie must develop commission for different areas of work.
These are concepts that we need to start the work on ho%- we are going to build people's power. A conference should be set up to look at the submission from the commissions to take decisions and develop the line of rnarcn.
Cde. Layne said that he shared the views of Cde. Cornwall. He said that the crisis cannot Se solved immediately. There are a number of fundamental questions that the party nceds to look at over a period of time. The party has a very unscientific approach to the work, we rush to do things without deep analysis which further push us into problems. The NJM does not face a problem cornmitment. Ke need to find the root of the contradiction or we will continue to face pro blems . When comrades are working hard without any rest it leads to frustration and demoralisation. We have taken an incorrect position in terms of what is necessary to build the party. He pointed to the fact that Cde. Strachan commission visit to Cuba was not dealt with seriously. He pointed that there are committees but no structures, there is no clear role for the function and future of the V.C.B. and we do not have a C.C. Secretariat. We have to make the question of supervision a profession. The O.C. has been successful in carrying us to power, the tasks it faces now is enormous. Cdes. quality on the O.C. has gone down, Cdes cannot supervise the work effectively, good ideas are accepted in principle. However, he complimented the new approach by the O.C., he said that the O.C. has been good but we are asking the Cdes to take too much heavy ideological and political decisions in the absence of the functioning of the C.C. and P.B.
He made reference to the Ethîopian Party and the method they took to develop their party, he said that even though their method cannot be applied immediately so that it can be developed in the future, we need to have a policy for the development of Cdes, in the party, Cdes will make mistakes but they will be helped and pulled forward.
He said that the struggle for socialism is won, lost or divided in the army. The party must now be organised in the work places. Cdes with state post must be prepared to carry out the lines of the partp in the work places* We have experience in mobilising the masses but we do not know how to build the party. We have to lay the basis for taking a strategic approach for the building of a M.L. party learning £rom the experience of other parties. Cde. James agreed with the positions of Cde. Cornwall and Cde. Layne, he made the following proposals:
(1) The C.C. must become fully accountable to the members, su that Cdes can evaluate the work of the C.C . on a whole and the C.C. members.
(2) 411 C.C. Cdes. must be based in the country at this time until the situation is resolved.
(3) The C.C. and party must study Brutens. (4) Recall the conclusions of the July Plenary.
(5) Proposed a mode1 of joint leadership, marrying the strengths of Cdes. Bishop and Coard. He went to def ine the responsibilities of the two Cdes.
CDE. MAGRICE BISHOP
(il Direct work among the masses focus on production and propaganda.
(ii) Particular attention to the organs of popular democracy, working class, youth masses, visits to urban and rural work places.
(iii) Militia Yobilisation
(iv) Regional and international work.
CDE. BERNARD COARD (i) Party organisation work / Chairman of the O.C.
( ii ) Party organisational deveiopment and formation of Cdes.
(iii) Strategy and tactics.
The C.C. must discuss and ratify al1 proposals and decisions sought by the Cdes. Both Cdes will ïrite quarterly reports to the C.C. for review. The membership must be told of this decision.
Cde. De Riggs commented on the brilliance of the contributions of Cdes. Layne, James and Cornwall and supported their positions. He proposed that:
(1) Cde. George Louison be placed to head the St. Andrew's work while maintaining the teachers, farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture work. 112 - 21 (2) Cde. Strachan to head C.P.E. and propaganda work.
( 3) Cde. Bartholomew responsible for youth and St. Patrick's.
(4) Cde. Austin - construction. (5) Cde. Layne chief of the Armed Forces with Cde. Cornwall chief of political and acadernic ~ork. (6) Cde. Whiteman, Foreign Affairs and Chief of I.R.D. of the Party.
(7) Fitzroy Bain - Rural workers work.
(8) Cde. Chalkie Ventour Grban Working Class.
(9) Sis. Phyllis Coard, St. George's PCB and NWO. (10) Cde. St. Bernard, West Coast and Carriacou.
(11) Cde. Mc Barnette, St. David's P.C.B. (12) Cde. De Riggs - Health. (13) Cde. Liam James Yinistry of Interior. Cde. Ventour agreed with Cde. Chris especially with the position on Cde. George Louison. He proposed that Cde. Strachan remain as Deputy Chairrnan of the O.C. He does not agree with the position on H.A. because he feels that there is great admiration and respect for the Cde. in the Arrned Forces. However, he should also retain his position in construction.
Cde. Mc. Barnette agreed with the positions of the Cdes, he complimented Cdes, Cornwall, Layne and James for the depth of their contribution. He took the opportunity to put out his interest in propaganda work.
Cde. Layne agreed with the position of Cde. James on the question of Cde. Coard's return to the C.C. and P.B.. He said that Cde. Bishop's qualities are still necessary, but as Cde. James said these qualities cannot push the process forward. The only Cde who have these qualities is Cde. Bernard Coard, and if one look at the situation in practice he has been giving ideological and organisational leadership, and elaborating strategy and tactics even outside of the C.C. e.g. the land question. The reason why these qualities are lacking on the C .Cm and P.B. is because Cde. Coard has been out of the party leadership. He sees Cde. James mode1 as the best hope of pulling the party out of the crisis. He also feels that Cde. Austin should rernain in the army because of his qualities and prestige there. Il2 - 22 211
-XPPENDIX 1
Rememberine October 19/23, 1983
Hon Sir Eric M Gairy - Prime Yinister/?linister Foreign Affairs Hon Herbert Preudhomme - Deputy P M Hon George Hosten - Minister of Finance - Minister of Legal Affairs
Hon A O Forsythe - !finister of Communication & Works Hon Cynthia Gairy - Xinister of Social Xffairs Hon George Donavan - ?finister of !Cational Security- Hon WRL Friday - Minister of Education Hon OAT Raeburn - !finister of Agriculture Hon Roy St John - Yinister of Sport St Bernard - Minister of Health Hon Derek Knight - Minister Kithout portfolio BISHOP CABIKET 1983
Cde Xaurice Bishop Prime Minister/Xational Security Cde Bernard Coard Deputy PM/%inister of Finance Cde Kenrick Radix AG/Xinister Legal Affairs Cde Unison Whiteman Minister of Foreign Affairs Cde Selwyn Strachan Minister of Sational Yobilisation Cde George Louison Minister of Agriculture Cde Hudson Austin General Xrmed Forces/Yinister of Communications and Korks Cde Jacqueline Creft Yinister of Education Cde Xorris Bain !finister of Housing Cde Lyden Ramdhanny Yinister of Tourism Cde Chris De Riggs Minister of Health
OCTOBER 19TH FIRIXG SQUAD
O/c Callistus Bernard (sub machine) Cpl Raymond Joseph f machine gun ) Sgt Fabian Gabriel (machine gun) Cosmus Richardson ( machine gun ) 3aj Chris Stroud (AK assault rifle) Cap Lester Redhead IAK assault rifle) P and^ Yitchell (AK assault rifle ) 212
APPENDIX 1
REMEMBERING VICTIMS OF OCTOBER i9TH
KILLED DURING FIGHTING EXECUTED
Andy Alexander (Student) Maurice Bishop ( Prime Minister ) Simon Alexander (Student) Fitzroy Bain (Trade Unionist) Gemma Belmar (Student) Evelyn Bullen (Insurance Execut ive ) Eric Dumont Jacqueline Creft (?finister of Educat ion ) Avis Ferguson Keith Hayling Vincent Xoel (Trade Unionist) Evelyn Maitland Alleyne Romain (Student) Unison Whiteman (?finister of ForeignAffairs ) Xelson Steel ( Worker ) Glen Nathan ( Soldier) Dorsette Peters ( Soldier ) Randolph Hason ( Sof dier ) Conrad Meyers ( Soldier) 213
APPEXDIX J
The Government of Grenada
As of Aueust 31, 1983
Governor General ...... Sir Paul Scoon Prime Xinister ...... Yaurice Bishop Deputp Prime 3inister ...... Bernard Coard Xinister of Agriculture ...... George Louison ginister of Communications, Works and Labour ...... Gen. Hudson Austin Minister of Defense anci Interior ...... 3aurice Bishop Minister of External Relations ...... Unison Whiteman ginister of Education, Youth and Culture ...... Jacqueline Creft
Minister of Health ...... Christopher De Mggs Minister of Housing ...... %orris Bain Minister of Industrial Development and Fisheries .,...... Kenrick Radix Yinister of Lands and Forestry ...... Unison Whiteman Minister of Justice ...... Kenrick Radix Yinister of National Yobilisation ...... Selïyn trach han Minister of Tourism ...... Lyden Ramdhanny Minister of Komen's Af fairs ...... Jacqueline Creft Attorney General ...... Richard Hart 1 Do you feel the quality of life in Grenada before or after the coup was:
(a) Better (b) Worse (c) XO different
Please explain the reason for your answer
2 Was the standard of education in Grenada before the People's Revolutionary Government:
(a) Better ( b ) Worse (c) No different
Please explain the reason for gour answer
3 Was Grenada's politics more democratic under the Eric Gairy (GULP) regime or Maurice Bishop's (PRG) regime:
(a) Very democratic (b) Kot very democratic (c)Sot at al1
Please explain the reason for your answer 4 Was the quality of health care delivered during the People's Revolutionary Government better or worse from that delivered by previous governments?
(a) Better (b) Worse fc) No different
Please explain the reason for your answer
5 Was Grenada's infrastructure better developed under: Eric Gairy , Maurice Bishop, Herbert Blaize , Nicholas Brawaithwe
(a) Better (b) Fiorse (c) XO different
Please explain the reason for your answer
K.B. This survey will only be successful if respondents are kind enough to state their reasons clearly.
Thanks for your kind assistance.
Beverley Spencer. Aileyne, Georqe Dr. iieal th and ije~.-eioprnent in the {Jari~bean C-pntesL ( Port of Spair, 1983).
LIel Fi tzroy and .James Diinkerley (jrenaria: \,hose Fr-eedo~'.' i London: Russel 1 Press itd. , 1984,.
Eiakan. bal Da\-id c.'ox, (_'O: in Leys ( ecis. 1 imperial-Power anci Re~i-onzlirade: The Caribbean Eiasin Initiative ! Toronto: isiifria Laurier Cniversi t-y Press, 1993 1.
Beck, Robert J' The Grenada In=sion: Pciiitics, Law an(: E=oreio;n Po-i ic~-UeQs ionmaking ( San Francisco: \;est\- rer; Fress, 1953 1.
Clyde, aavia F. Heal th in GrenadaA Soc iai and H isr-orirai .'icco~in_t ! London: i'ade-?!ecum Press, 1983 1 .
Lia Breo, Sinciair The Grenada Kevoi:it ior! ((:itstries: '!anaqemenr. Ad\-ert ising ar:i ?ubiicit:- Seri-ices, i9IY J.
Epica Task Force (irenada: The e:Rei O:( k'ashingtor, D.C. : Epica Task Force, 19821.
Frisonl James na:HF!\-O illt. IO^ i es( Great Bri 7-ain: Russel l Press, l93O 1,
'~renada Is Sot- .AI on5 Speeci-les o'- The People's He\.oi utionarF- Go'.ernment at the Fi rst International ionferenc-e in So Iidar r t>-wi tn Grenada (Grenada: Fedon Pi.rblishers, 1 Y82 ) .
He ine, Jorge -4 Hel-oLirt ion A90rted: 1'he Lessons or tirenad;-: (Pittsbur2h: ïniversity of Pittshur9h Press, 1990 1.
' 1s freeaom we making' : The les Democrac3- In Grenada (barbados: (:oies Printer)- Limited 1. ?landle, Jay H big Revolut ion Srnall :-ountr'- ( Yarylancî: The h3rth- Soutn Pubiishinq Company Inc., 1983 1.
?!arable, ?f -ifrica and Caribbean Poiitics: Frorn I\b-ame Skrumah tc taurice Bisbop ( London: [-ers0? 1987 i . il'Sh~ii~hnessy,dugh cirenada: Hel-olutian, In[-asion and lftermath ! London: Sphere Books Limited, 1984 1.
Paterson, Ya:irire Big Sk:-: Li:.tle bi.illet [(irenada: St. George's Bookshop itd, i 936 1.
Paterson, ?laiir ce 50 Far So ?ad (Gr-enkda: 5t. cleor=e's Book~i-iop Ltd, 1994).
Schûenhals, Iiai P. and Richard >leLanson Hevol.ut ion and Inter\-ention in (;renada:The Stiw Jewel ?Io\-ernent, ~heLni~ed States anu tng Caribbean (Colorado: h-est:.ie~ Press, 1985).
Searle, Chris and Don Ro.jas ' to construct ?rom rnorning: ' 'laking the People's Budge~in Grena~a I Barbacios: (:O Les Printer:.-, i932 1
Sunshine, Catherine ana Phi1 ip hheaton Gretlada: Ttie PeaceiuJ Re\-olution (Washington D.S. : District Lithograph Inc., i982 1.
Thomas, Clive i'. The Poor and The Poweriess: Cconomil:: Policy and {Jhange in the Caribbean ('iew 1-ork: Yonthl5- 2e\-ier; Press, 19871.
-. - ihorndike, iony Grenada: Politics, Econorn: CS and Soc: iety (Colorado: Lvnne Rienner Publishers, lv8.5).
19Y7 Bahamas Hanribook I Diipticn Z'iibi icat ions ) . "The Presenr Stage of the Grenada Re\-oluticn, July 1981 .*' Granrna heekly Revi~(Jul:- 12, 1981).
"Hospital undergo in% ma.jor repairs" The (irenadain L oice t October 26, 1996).
"Rernembering i-ictims of October 19r,inU The Grenadian 1.0 ire i 0ctober 26, 1396 ) . -. "Layne declines to ansr%-er rvho gave the order to shco~" i hr Grenadian L-oice ( SOL-ember02, 1996 1.
"St. Loriis tolu to resign" The Grenadian :.-oice ! Febriiary 01, 1991 1. ..i\nonymous, a top civil servant in the Yinistrj- of fiealth in Grenada. Interview with allthor \%-asconducteci December 29, 1995. i'ictor Philip, a Grenadian doctor residing in Tesas. Completed the puest ionnai re Septeinber 17, 1996.
Anonymous, a businessman, and rnernber of the c'harnber cf in Grenada. Completed the questionnaire Septembcr i8, 1996.
Joseph Burke, former. Consul for rirenada in Toronto. 1nterx.i~~r\.i th author on December i8, l996.
Les1ie Pierre, edit~rof te i;renar-i ian leoice. Inter\-iew i%-itii author on Deceaber 27, 1996.
George Yc. Guire, former Yinister of Educat ion, Grenada. Interx-ic;; ~.-ithauthor on January 8, 1997.
Anonynious, former Lieutenant of the People'.;; He\-oliit ionar>- Arnj-. Inter\-iew ~ithauthor January 15, iY91.
Arionymoiis , Grenadian Biis inessm:+n. Inter.. ieh- r%yi th author xhii~ 1-acationing in Ontario, April iS, 1997. .\ntigua and Rarbucia Consulate 'ter*sLetter "The 14 istor5- of Caricorn" (Toronto: !-lay, 1991 1.
Administration of Ronald Reagan "Remarks of the Pres ident and Prime ?linister Eugenia Charles of Liominica Announcing the Deploument of Cnited States Forces in Grenada" (bashingtcn, iLC. tktober 23, 1983 ) .
Department of State anci the Department or' Defense, GRES.-iG-4 DOCL..YE?;TS: n O\-er\-iew and Select ion Document 110-7 and i i0-9 (i;ashington, D.C., 1984).
Department of State and tne Department c.f Defense, GREX.AD2.: -4 firelirninary Report (Kashington, D.C., December 16, 1S83 1.
Department of State Biireau of Public Affairs " 1:tirren t Po L i~l S0.3261 (Lashington, D.C. : Sovember 4, 1982 ),
?lepartment of State fiLes (Fi'ashinqton, D.C. SOL-ember 14 . i!j.%3 1.
Department of State Builet in (h-asnington, D.C. : December, 1983 ).
ikpartment of State and the Bepartment of I~efense rirenada Prel iminary i4eport .rstion of k:astern t_'aribbean States Reqiiest for 1.. .J.ss i stance in (irenada (hashingtorl, D.C. : Docu~ent=656, October 23, 1983 1.
i-io~ise of Representat i\.es: Hear ings Defore th.. Scibcornni ttrp on Internationai Secirrity and Scient if ic :ffairs " Implicat ions for 1.. Policy in the Eastern f:aribbeari" f sinn1934 1.
United St.atis Congress: Senat-e ilornrnittee on .Apprqpriations, Relateri Programse .Appropriations Bill, I987, 99th Con : n iteci St-ares Oeneral -Accot.int inq rjf iice: 511bcclrnrnittee on ; L'nited States Secretart- of Defense - Weinberger S.- la'./\. Reiat-ions and the Cirenada In\-asion" (Washington, D.C.: t~ctober25, 19s3 1. Cnited States Senate (:ornmittee on Finance i hashington, D. C. : Augus t 2, 1982 ) . Weekl:.- Compilat ion of Pres ident ial Dociiments, .\meriean k'oreign -PoLicu (Kashington: Yarch 28, 198.3 i . Keekly Compilation of Presicient-iaI Doctirnents (kashirigt.on, ü.i', : October 31, 1983). Khite House Press Helease " Anno~incement of the Sending of L.S. Troops lnto Crenadô" t h-ashington: Document =65Î, te.., - 1983 1. Yinistry of Heaith, PoIicy Staternent '*'.~ationaLZI~alth Poiici-" f St. George's, 1991 1. '1inistr'- of Heal t.h. "Health Situation" ( Gr~nada: Stat ~stics office, 1987). National Insurance La~sand Heqiilat ions ( Go\-ernment 3f tirenada, 1983 1. bational h-orkshop on Primary Health C'are: Pr-trnary Healtn lare t:oncepts ( Grenada: Febr!iar>- 16-22, 1983 1. .4nnual Report : The Sat ional Insiiranc~Scheme [ !irenaria: Hi- tei-h Printery Limited, l99-l). The (irenada Hoard of î'ocirism ( Flor ida: Caribbean t'ommunicat ions Inc., 1995). Cornmiinity Health Sert-ices iiepo rt ( Grenada : Balfour, Byron "The Organization of Eastern Çaribbean Scates Enformat ion Booklet" (Ontario: 1989 1. De Grzuiie, Anton Comparative Educat ion ( London: L-oiume 27 No. 3, 1391 1. Ho Lding-C'l~bham, ?!a.jor-i r and K.. Standîrrf , DPS. "?'he De\-elopmenc of !!ode1 Di strict Heal th Teams in Grenrida (Grenaria: Septrmber, 1981 1. liain; Coiintry Rec-iek; (Grenada: .July 25-26, 1991 ). "Pledge to the Nation:" The Xew Sational Party Yanifeçto, f;eneral Elections gr en ad^: 1933). "Esternal Debt: Crisis and .-\d.jitstment." (k'ashington, U.C.: Reporr. on the Econornic and Social Pro~ressin Latin Arnerica prepareti Oy the Inter-Amer ican De\-e lopment Bank, 1985 1. Organisation of American St-ates Report "K. S. Espianat ion of i ts Art. icns anri 0b.ject ix-es i n Grenacia" (hashington, . : Docliment =660, October 26, 1983 i P.AH~-(:oi/ntryHea1t.h Profiles - Grenada !C.S..4., 1995). Pan 4merican Heal th Organi zat ion/World Health ;lrganization: "C'sr-i hbean Reg ional Heal th ~tiidy" ([:.S. 4.: Yay, 1996 3. \;HO Task Force on Heal tii Economics: "-4 kH0 Perspect i\-e" (Gene\.a, April 4, 1994). h-orlcl Bank Grenada Ilpcia~inqEconornic: ~lemorandurn-fieport So. 62~2- GKD (k'ashington: September 5, 1986 ). h'orld Rank Grenaria country Economic Yemorandum ('larch 39, 199'1 1. iiorld Bank Grenada Country Economic ?lemorandum - Report S0.10160- GKD {Washinqt.on: ?la>- :3U, 1992 . IMAGE NALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3) APPLIED 2 INIAGE . lnc a 1653 East Main Street -*- Rochester. NY 14609 USA -3------Phone: il6/4û2-0300 ---- Fa: 716/288-5989 O 1993. Applied Image. Inc.. All Rtghts Resewed