The Shadow of the Past: the Influence of Reputation on Alliance Choices
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THE SHADOW OF THE PAST: THE INFLUENCE OF REPUTATION ON ALLIANCE CHOICES DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Gregory D. Miller, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Randall L. Schweller, Advisor Professor John F. Guilmartin Professor John E. Mueller Advisor Graduate Program in Political Science Professor Alexander S. Thompson ABSTRACT Although alliances are the most studied phenomena in international relations, there are a number of unanswered questions. Numerous theories explain why alliances form and end, but we do not know how states choose their partners, or why they end when they do. In addition, despite the voluminous literature on alliances, almost no work explains the variation between alliance institutions. I suggest that a better understanding of reputation may help fill these gaps. If reputation matters, then we should see unreliable states (states that fail to honor their alliance commitments) being treated differently than reliable states (states that honor their commitments). Drawing from existing work in political science, as well as from anthropology, business, and game theory, I argue that reputation can affect a state’s alliance autonomy. States that are perceived to be unreliable should have greater difficulty attracting new partners and preserving existing alliances than states with a reputation for being reliable. Furthermore, a state’s reputation may explain some of the variation between alliances, such as the up- front costs incurred by the signatories, the explicitness of the language, and the level of military integration. To determine the effect of reputation on alliance choices, I test my argument against four cases prior to the First World War. I find that while a state’s reputation has little influence on the duration of alliances, unreliable states do have more trouble forming partnerships, especially with reliable states. I also confirm that a state’s reputation affects the institutional design of its alliances. Specifically, states with ii unreliable reputations have more autonomy in choosing their partners and in setting the terms of the alliance. I also discover that a reputation for reliability creates a moral hazard problem, whereby a state with reliable allies will be emboldened to challenge its adversaries. These findings have implications for theories of alliance formation, duration, and variation, but they are also relevant for policymakers; if leaders are concerned about their state’s autonomy, then they must act to develop and preserve its reputation for reliability. iii Dedicated to my wife Cindy and to my parents Daniel and Susan iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A number of people influenced me long before I reached the dissertation. Some of this praise may go back farther than is the norm, but I might not have had the desire or ability to pursue an advanced degree without the influence of these individuals. First, are the faculty of the History and Political Science departments at the University of California, Los Angeles. Scholars like Deborah Larson and Robert Dallek provided me with valuable insight into world affairs. I was also fortunate to work briefly for Albert Pierce at the National War College. He not only gave me a greater appreciation for research, but our many conversations strengthened my curiosity about international relations. I also have to thank the faculty and graduate students in the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. That program provided me with knowledge and abilities that greatly aided this project. Faculty members like Deborah Avant and Ron Spector helped me take concepts I learned as an undergraduate and apply them to the policy realm. I owe a special thanks to Lisa Spahn (nee Giuntini) for being a great friend and colleague. I am forever indebted to the faculty and graduate students at the Ohio State University. Paul Beck, Richard Herrmann, Don Sylvan, and Herb Weisberg have all been valuable instructors and mentors. Numerous conversations with Erik Gartzke, while v he was a Mershon Fellow, fed my intellectual curiosity at just the right time. In addition, my fellow graduate students provided a valuable mixture of inspiration, competition, and friendship, frequently at the same time; I especially thank Bridgett Coggins, Paul Fritz, Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Haftel, Brian Harpuder, Jeff Martinson, Pat McDonald, Amy Oakes, Brent Strathman, and Zach Mears. Kevin Sweeney, in particular, was a true friend during our time together at OSU, and I will miss our almost-daily lunch/bull sessions. The people who had the most direct influence on this project are the faculty who served on my committee. One could not ask for a more intellectually diverse, yet valuable committee. John Guilmartin has profoundly enhanced my appreciation for history. I can only try to live up to the standards he sets for himself both in research and in the classroom. John Mueller conceptually pushed me the most, but in doing so, he challenged me to think about my objectives in this project, and I have no doubt that this resulted in a better research design. Alex Thompson has been an amazing resource, providing advice on nearly every paragraph I wrote, and on the academic profession in general. Randy Schweller, the Chair of my dissertation committee, is the one person who has had the greatest influence on how I research, write, and think about international relations. I came to Ohio State specifically to study under Professor Schweller, and I learned more than I could have imagined. In sum, this product is infinitely better because of the important contributions of each of these individuals. I only hope that wherever my career takes me I am able to make them proud to have served on my committee. Finally, I thank my family for having put up with everything that graduate school requires of loved ones. My parents, Dan and Sue, have always pushed me to reach my vi potential in whatever I do, and the last few years have been no exception. They have provided me with invaluable stability and encouragement. Last but not least is my wife Cindy. Marrying a graduate student is a noble act worthy of praise in its own right. But the courage and strength she has shown in her life have made my own challenges seem easy to overcome, and I love her more every day for it. I can only promise to spend the rest of my life trying to repay the love that she has already shown me. vii VITA February 27, 1973……………………..Born – Newport Beach, California 1996……………………………………B.A. Political Science, B.A. History, The University of California, Los Angeles 1998……………………………………M.A. Security Policy Studies, The George Washington University 2000……………………………………M.A. Political Science, The Ohio State University 1998-2001……………………………..Graduate Teaching and Research Assistant, The Ohio State University 2000-2004……………………………..Adjunct Professor, Columbus State Community College 2001-2004……………………………..Instructor, The Ohio State University 2004 – present…………………………Visiting Instructor, The College of William & Mary PUBLICATIONS 1. Gregory D. Miller, “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past,” Security Studies 12:3 (Spring 2003), pp. 40-78. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Minor Field: International Relations viii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. v VITA................................................................................................................................viii LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................xiii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION....................................................................................... 1 1.1 THE PUZZLE......................................................................................................... 1 1.2 REPUTATION AND ALLIANCES ............................................................................. 4 1.3 PROJECT OUTLINE.............................................................................................. 11 CHAPTER 2: REPUTATION, ALLIANCES, AND IR THEORY................................. 16 2.1 STUDIES OF REPUTATION ................................................................................... 16 2.1.1 Reputations in Business............................................................................ 16 2.1.2 Reputation and International Relations..................................................... 24 2.1.3 Deterrence and Reputations for Resolve................................................... 26 2.1.4 Reputation and Game Theory ................................................................... 30 2.1.5 Mercer’s Critique of Reputation ............................................................... 38 2.2 DEFINING REPUTATION...................................................................................... 43 2.3 THE STUDY OF ALLIANCES ................................................................................ 48 2.3.1 Alliance Formation ................................................................................... 49 2.3.1.1 Capability-Aggregation........................................................................