CHAPTER NINE

THE SPANISH USE OF DECEPTION AND THE DEFENSE OF AMERICA DURING THE WAR OF JENKIN’S EAR (1739–1740)

Ignacio Rivas Ibáñez

The War of Jenkins’ Ear between Britain and Spain was a conflict over trading interests in America and during the conflict the government of Felipe V of Spain showed its full determination to mobilize the country’s resources in the defense of the Spanish dominions. Before the declaration of war, the Spanish authorities recognised the superiority of the British navy and decided to create the threat of an invasion of Britain. The pur- pose of this threat was to force the British government to dedicate large amounts of resources—in terms of manpower, ships and intelligence— that would have been otherwise destined for the military expeditions to America, to defending Britain. The Spanish stratagem was conducted with French support, although it did not oblige the Spanish to give in to French comercial interests in America. Ultimately, it enabled the Spanish authori- ties to put their territories in America in a good state of defense before the arrival of the British expeditions. The war broke out after years of tension between the two countries in the West Indies and the origins of this tension are to be found in the peace treaty that ended the War of Spanish Succession (1702–13). The Treaties of Utrecht awarded Britain two concessions that provided a legal trading route into the Spanish colonies. The navío de permiso gave Britain the right to sell products to be transported in a single ship into the annual fair in Portobello. The asiento de negros gave Britain the monopoly of the sale of African slaves in the Spanish colonies. Immediately upon obtaining these concessions, the British government granted a monopoly of both to the South Sea Company.1 However, during the following years the South Sea Company used its privileged

1 Alejandro del Cantillo, Tratados, Convenios y Declaraciones de Paz y de Comercio que Han Hecho las Potencias Extranjeras con los Monarcas Españoles. Desde el año 1700 hasta el Día (Madrid, 1843), pp. 115–53.

166 ignacio rivas ibáñez position to smuggle important quantities of British goods into the Spanish colonies.2 In Spain, after the War of Spanish Succession, the new Bourbon dynasty introduced several administrative changes to modernize the country. Indeed, the new generation of Spanish statesmen considered that effec- tive control of the Spanish colonial empire was necessary to obtain the resources to carry out their policies more successfully. The Spanish deter- mination to keep foreign merchants away from its colonies was a reason for anxiety among certain lobbies in London, whose business depended significantly upon their capacity to smuggle their contraband. Tensions between Spain and Britain escalated during the 1720s due to the depreda- tions of the Spanish guarda costas and they resulted in an undeclared war in 1727. After an unsuccessful Spanish attack on Gibraltar in that year, a truce was declared in 1728 and a peace, which confirmed the previous sta- tus quo, was concluded in 1729 with the Treaty of Seville.3 However, only two years later, on 9 April 1731 Captain Robert Jenkins was captured off Cuba by the guarda costas and his ear was allegedly amputated as a pun- ishment for carrying contraband.4 A few years later, this episode would be remembered by the advocates of war in Britain during the parliamentary debates to declare war on Spain. Meanwhile, in January 1739, the diplomatic negotiations between the British and the Spanish governments to solve the rift over the depreda- tions led to the Convention of el Pardo. Spain agreed to pay £95,000 to the South Sea Company as compensation for the Spanish guarda costas and Britain accepted that the South Sea Company would pay £68,000 in compensation for contraband. However, on 1 March 1739, the directors of the company denied having ever agreed to pay this compensation and the negotiations ground to a halt. The British squadron operating off Cadiz was reinforced with more ships and on 6 May 1739, the Spanish

2 Ernest G. Hildner, “The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy Leading to the War of Jenkins’ Ear, 1729–1739”, Hispanic American Historical Review 18 (1938), pp. 322– 41; William Thomas Morgan, “The Origins of the South Sea Company”, Political Science Quarterly 49 (1929), pp. 16–37; George H. Nelson, “Contraband under the Asiento, 1730– 1739”, The American Historical Review 51 (1945), pp. 55–67; Harold W.V. Temperley, “The Causes of the War of Jenkins’ Ear”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Third Series 3 (1909), pp. 197–236; Philip Woodfine, “Suspicious Latitudes: Commerce, Colonies and Patriotism in the 1730’s”, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 27 (1998), pp. 25–52. 3 Agustín González Enciso, Felipe V: La renovación de España. Sociedad y economía en el reinado del primer Borbón (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2003). 4 Philip Woodfine, Britannia’s Glories. The Walpole Ministry and the 1739 War with Spain (Woodbridge: Royal Historical Society/Boydell Press, 1998), p. 1.