COGNITIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO FISH DISTRIBUTION IN
A TRINIDAD VILLAGE
By
BRANDON M. CHAPMAN
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Department of Anthropology
MAY 2012
© Copyright by BRANDON M. CHAPMAN, 2012 All Rights Reserved
© Copyright by BRANDON M. CHAPMAN, 2012 All Rights Reserved
To the Faculty of Washington State University:
The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of BRANDON M. CHAPMAN find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.
______Barry S. Hewlett, Ph.D., Chair
______John H. Bodley, Ph.D.
______Robert J. Quinlan, Ph.D.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Numerous colleagues, friends, and family helped make my research and career in anthropology come to fruition. For the sake of being brief, I will focus on those who surrounded me during my years working on my doctorate and dissertation at Washington
State University (WSU).
On my doctorate committee, thanks go to Rob Quinlan for providing theoretical and statistical guidance and practical suggestions for my research. Thanks go to John
Bodley for always having potential improvements in hand and providing thorough positive references when I needed them. John and Rob have helped contribute ideas, especially to the community ethnography and statistical methods portions of this dissertation, which substantially improved it. In the office, Joy Strunk, Annette Bednar, and the now retired LeAnn Couch made choosing a committee, selecting courses, processing grants and budgets, and the graduation process a breeze. Graduate students could not ask for a more knowledgeable and friendly group of academic advisors.
Thanks go to my friends throughout my time at WSU including Nick Parsons,
Ellen Rogers, Amitava Chowdhury, Pasang Sherpa, Jack McNasser, Melissa Artstein, and Kerensa Allison who were all good friends that supported me and showed me how to be a model graduate student. Among these, Beth Horton was around me for most of my years at WSU, in Pullman and later Vancouver. We spent multiple Thanksgivings, Fourth of July parties, dinners, and late nights at the bars, together. We leaned on each other
iii when we both needed encouragement to continue on and we have been enthusiastic
supporters of each other’s careers and studies. She is the most proactively friendly and
nicest person I met at WSU. Thank you Beth and I miss you.
Most thanks go to my committee chair and mentor, Barry Hewlett. Besides Doug
Jackson Smith and Jon Moris during my master’s degree at Utah State, no one has taught
me more about how to effectively conceptualize, organize, and write grant proposals and
research results. I remember first calling Barry when I started the program in 2005 to ask
him to be my chair and without hesitation he agreed, despite not having met me in person. Within a few weeks of discussing what I wanted to research and some general
ideas, he had me on track with the theoretical perspectives and literature areas that
constitute this dissertation. There were many changes, edits, and over the years, in the proposals and this final product, but the overall theoretical approach and idea of contribution to the discipline remained the same. Barry is a caring, soft spoken, generous, but an intellectually demanding and detailed mentor and an engaging and concise teacher and I thank him. Much of the following work is based on his contributions, edits, and suggestions.
Finally, thank you to the residents of Icacos for welcoming the researcher, despite his occasionally intrusive questions, into their daily lives. My multiple visits to each of their households could have been seen as annoying, but I was welcomed with joy, warmth, and often the best homemade seafood dishes in Trini. I hope this research will eventually benefit their community in some way. I will return!
iv COGNITIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO
FISH DISTRIBUTION IN A TRINIDAD VILLAGE
Abstract
by Brandon M. Chapman, Ph.D. Washington State University May 2012
Chair: Barry S. Hewlett
This dissertation utilizes human behavioral ecology (HBE) and cognitive anthropology (CA) approaches to try and understand fish distribution in a Trinidadian village. HBE identifies universal (i.e., reproductive fitness) factors that explain human cooperative behavior while CA explains culture specific factors that influence cooperation. HBE utilizes detailed behavioral measures to evaluate cooperation, but seldom systematically integrates and tests cultural factors. CA uses specific methods to evaluate cultural factors, but seldom do researchers who use this approach measure actual behavior (e.g., frequency of sharing). This dissertation is one of the first to utilize quantitative methods from both approaches to understand fish distribution in a
Trinidadian village. The actual exchange patterns and use of cultural models among two different ethnic groups (Indo Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians) of fisher folk in a
Trinidad/Tobago village are measured. These elements from cognitive anthropology are compared with metrics of HBE (reciprocal altruism, kin selection, costly signaling, tolerated theft) concerning fish catch distribution through ethnographic decision trees to test the significance and integration of evolutionary and cognitive theories on allocation choices.
v Results suggest that systematically identifying and testing cultural models alongside HBE metrics can elucidate inter cultural diversity regarding material transfers and improve prediction rates of transfers. Kin selection and reciprocal altruism show significant influence on transfer patterns, while models of courage, fishing experience, on and off water work habits, and honesty and reliability also provide reliable predictions of distribution. Local cognitive models “enhance” genetic fitness as individuals who adhere to these and transfer resources among “high quality” kin evidence higher reproductive success.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... iii
ABSTRACT...... v
LIST OF TABLES...... x
LIST OF FIGURES ...... xiv
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Research Problem...... 1
General Research Questions...... 6
Specific Hypotheses...... 7
Preliminary Studies...... 12
Methods...... 14
Study Site...... 28
Outline of Chapters...... 33
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND...... 35
Human Behavioral Ecology...... 35
Utility Maximization and Cultural Models in HBE Studies of Material Transfers ...... 35
Cognitive Anthropology Approaches...... 41
Ethnoscience, Cultural Models, and Foundational Schema...... 41
Connectionism, Motivations, and Institutions v. Interpretation ...... 47
vii Cultural Models in Maritime Anthropology...... 55
Rational Man and the Development of Ethnographic Decision Making Trees...... 58
Identifying and Integrating Cultural Models in Decision making...... 66
3. HISTORIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF THE CARIBBEAN AND TRINIDAD...... 74
Geography...... 74
Island Peopling, Early Migrations, and Archaic Horizons ...... 75
Cultural History of Caribbean Fishing...... 80
Caribbean and Trinidad/Tobago Fishing Since the Twentieth Century ...... 92
Ethnographic Background of Caribbean and Trinidadian Peoples...... 95
4. CULTURE, KINSHIP AND DEMOGRAPHY OF ICACOS COMMUNITY FISHER FOLK...... 103
The Community...... 103
Ethnicity and Kinship...... 120
Ethnicity, Household Composition, and Genetic Relatedness...... 128
Conclusion...... 139
5. PRIMARY FISH DISTRIBUTION IN THE ICACOS COMMUNITY...... 141
Discussion...... 178
Conclusion...... 181
6. CULTURAL DOMAINS AND MODELS OF GOOD FISHER FOLK ...... 183
Discussion...... 210
Conclusion...... 213
7. ETHNOGRAPHIC DECISION TREES OF FISH DISTRIBUTION ...... 215
Methods...... 216
viii
Results...... 224
Discussion...... 232
Conclusion...... 241
8. ECONOMIC GAMES ...... 244
Culture and Ethnicity in Game Theory...... 244
Methods...... 252
Results...... 257
Conclusion...... 274
9. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS...... 276
Ethnicity, Cooperation and Human Evolution...... 278
Integrating Cultural Models into HBE...... 281
Community Development: Bringing in Cognitive Decision making and Culture...... 284
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 294
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1. Marine species procured by Trinidad/Tobago fisher folk ...... 116
2. Descriptive statistics of Icacos kinship sample...... 122 3. Definitions of Indo Trinidadian cultural kin terms by descending generation...... 123
4. Definitions of additional affinal Indo Trinidadian cultural kin terms ...... 124 5. Definitions of Afro Trinidadian cultural kin terms ...... 125
6. Lineages containing Icacos fisher folk ...... 128 7. Descriptive statistics of Icacos fisher folk population...... 133 8. Mean CW ratios for different types of Icacos fisher folk’s households...... 135 9. Wright’s relatedness coefficients for the Icacos fisher folk population ...... 136 10. Reproductive success and conjugal stability by ethnicity and lineage in the Icacos kinship sample ...... 138 11. Reproductive success and conjugal stability by ethnicity among Icacos fisher folk..138 12. Definitions of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “fish distribution”...... 144 13. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “fish distribution”...... 144 14. Descriptive statistics of boat owners and/or operators in fish catch distribution
sample… ...... 148 15. Descriptive statistics of fish catch distribution sample...... 149 16. Summary of hypotheses and results from data on primary distributions, reproductive fitness, and enhancement or opposition regarding HBE metrics...... 152 17. Breadth of transfers and proportions of intra ethnic transfers from catch distribution sample… ...... 155
x 18. Regression coefficients for total catch landing per boat and CW ratios compared with
amount of catch distribution ...... 157 19. Results for equality in fish catch transfers...... 160
20. Definitions of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “status” ...... 162 21. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain
“status”…...... 162
22. Pearson’s r 2 and F statistics for kinship factors compared with amount of catch distribution...... 163 23. Pearson’s r 2 for reproductive success compared with amount of catch distribution given and received from the catch sample...... 175 24. Pearson’s r 2 and F statistics for kinship factors and reciprocal partnerships compared with reproductive success for the catch sample...... 175 25. Results of mating metrics compared by ethnicity for the Icacos fisher folk population ...... 177 26. Definitions of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “courage” and “coward”...... 188 27. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “courage” and “coward”...... 188 28. Definitions of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “fair” and “cheat” ...... 191 29. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “fair” and “cheat” ...... 191 30. Definitions of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”...... 194 31. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”...... 194
xi 32. Definitions of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the
opposing domains “friend” and “fall out” ...... 196 33. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated
with the opposing domains “friend” and “fall out” ...... 197 34. Definitions of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the
opposing domains “work” and “lazy”...... 199 35. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated
with the opposing domains “work” and “lazy”...... 200 36. Definitions of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “do well” and “fail” ...... 202 37. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “do well” and “fail” ...... 202 38. Definitions of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “successful” and “defeated” ...... 205 39. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “successful” and “defeated” ...... 205 40. Definitions of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “knowledgeable” and “ignorant”...... 207 41. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated
with the opposing domains “knowledgeable” and “ignorant”...... 208 42. Definitions of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “intelligent” and “foolish” ...... 209 43. Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “intelligent” and “foolish” ...... 210
44. Pearson’s r 2 for cultural models (overall rating) compared with amount of catch distribution received (entire catch sample period)...... 229
xii 45. Pearson’s r 2 for cultural models compared with amount of catch distribution received (final six weeks of catch sample period)...... 229
46. Pearson’s r 2 for cultural models (overall rating) and number of surviving offspring...... 231
47. Descriptive statistics of experimental games sample...... 257 48. Results of experimental games first round...... 260
49. Regression coefficients for age, household size, game offers, and counter offers for first round games...... 260 50. Ultimatum acceptances and rejections in first round...... 262 51. Results of experimental games second round...... 267 52. Results of experimental games third round ...... 271 53. Regression coefficients for age, household size, game offers, and counter offers for second and third round samples...... 272 54. Ultimatum acceptances and rejections in second and third rounds ...... 273
xiii LIST OF FIGURES
1. Riad Ali, Indo Trinidadian fisherman...... 18
2. Devin Charles, Afro Trinidadian fisherman...... 18 3. Political map of the Caribbean...... 30
4. Transportation map of Trinidad/Tobago...... 31 5. Fishing landing sites across Trinidad...... 32
6. Lithically defined periods, series and sub series with respective dates...... 78 7. Distribution of cultural groups in the Caribbean at the time of initial European contact ...... 79 8. Advance of Arawakan speaking communities from Amazonia into the Caribbean islands ...... 83 9. Taino man paddling canoe...... 87 10. Icacos Road...... 105 11. A typical house in Icacos ...... 105 12. Beach at Icacos Point...... 106 13. Fisherman trolling while drop lining ...... 109 14. Fisherman using a priest to help cut fish ...... 112 15. Various fish of Icacos ...... 119 16. Diagram of Indo Trinidadian cultural kin terms...... 122 17. Diagram of additional affinal Indo Trinidadian cultural kin terms when ego is male ...……...... 124 18. Diagram of additional affinal Indo Trinidadian cultural kin terms when ego is female……...... 124 19. Diagram of Afro Trinidadian cultural kin terms ...... 125 20. Folk taxonomy of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “fish distribution” ...... 144
xiv 21. A sample of fish caught from one of the Charles’ boats set out for distribution...... 145
22. Folk taxonomy of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “status”.....161 23. Social network graph displaying reciprocal relationships among the catch sample...167
24. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “courage” ...... 187
25. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “fair” and “cheat” ...... 190
26. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”...... 193 27. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “friend” and “fall out” ...... 196 28. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “work” and “lazy”...... 199 29. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “do well” and “fail” ...... 202 30. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “successful” and “defeated” ...... 204 31. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “knowledgeable” and “ignorant”...... 207
32. Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “foolish”...... 209 33. Fish catch distribution EDT for Indo Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos...... 226 34. Fish catch distribution EDT for Afro Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos ...... 227 35. Frequency distributions of dictator game offers first round ...... 258 36. Frequency distributions of ultimatum game offers first round ...... 258 37. Frequency distributions of trust game offers first round ...... 259 38. Frequency distributions of trust game counter offers first round ...... 259
xv 39. Frequency distributions of public goods game offers first round...... 259
40. Frequency distributions of dictator game offers second round...... 264 41. Frequency distributions of ultimatum game offers second round ...... 265
42. Frequency distributions of trust game offers second round...... 265 43. Frequency distributions of trust game counter offers second round ...... 265
44. Frequency distributions of public goods game offers second round ...... 266 45. Frequency distributions of dictator game offers third round ...... 268
46. Frequency distributions of ultimatum game offers third round...... 269 47. Frequency distributions of trust game offers third round ...... 269 48. Frequency distributions of trust game counter offers third round...... 269 49. Frequency distributions of public goods game offers third round...... 270
xvi
Dedication
To B and R: thanks for the inspiration.
xvii CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A complete behavioral ecology of food transfers should explain the function or purpose for food transfers in the first place, as well as examine the social mechanisms responsible for maintaining different levels of food transfers within populations. It should also predict quantitative aspects of sharing, based on social context, local conditions, and features of resource ecology.
(Michael Gurven 2004b:544)
Research Problem
This dissertation focuses on understanding sharing and distribution among fisher
folk in a Caribbean community. Two general theoretical approaches in anthropology have been utilized to understand sharing and distribution, human behavioral ecology (HBE)
and cognitive anthropology (CA). Much of the recent anthropological research on sharing
comes from HBE (Gurven 2004b; Hames and McCabe 2007; Tucker 2004), which
assumes that local physical, demographic and social environmental conditions determine
the cost benefit structure for decision making (Smith and Winterhalder 1992). HBE predicts sharing and distribution will primarily be based on kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signaling, and/or tolerated scrounging (Ziker and Schnegg 2005). Kin selection, often measured by “Hamilton’s rule” (Hamilton 1964), accrues biological benefits to the individual through aiding family increasing the chances of genetic relatives to survive. Reciprocal altruism, benefiting another individual who will likely bestow return benefits in the future, is valuable to the giver since future return is often assured, especially with reliable partners (Gurven, Hill, and Jakugi 2004). Costly signaling, the “advertising” of procurement ability through distributing income in public
1 settings (Bliege Bird and Smith 2005), often benefits the “advertiser” through an increase of mating opportunities. Tolerated scrounging, the acceptance by an individual of their income being taken without punishment for the thief, is prevalent when the package size of food is large, “synchrony” (number of households that possess the item) is low, and market value of the item is high (Tucker 2004). Regarding “small scale” (see Bodley
2003) societies, the HBE literature on sharing and distribution has illuminated how individual incentives for cooperation exist in these four patterns (Gurven 2004b;
Marlowe 2004; Tucker 2004). Further detail on these patterns will be examined in
Chapter four.
A limitation of the HBE research is that culture, i.e., socially transmitted and learned knowledge shared by a group (see Brown 2008), is seldom systematically tested and often does not have defined properties of its own. When culture is discussed, group norms are occasionally attributed to “enhance” (Durham 1991) food transfer patterns that result in reproductive fitness (e.g. Allen Arave et al. 2008; Alvard 2002; Alvard and
Nolin 2002). Alvard (2002) theorizes that fisher hunters of Lamalera have norms of whale carcass distribution to ensure lineage members, who are often genetic kin, receive preset portions of the catch and know future hunts will result in specific pieces for them.
Bliege Bird et al. (2002) partially attribute one way transfers of turtles and fish from haves to have nots among Meriam fisher foragers to the Meriam cultural model of debe tonar , which encourages unconditional sharing of food and bestows an enhanced social reputation and moral identity for those who practice giving without expectation of return.
These studies, however, only use norms as a way to explain quantified patterns of distribution ex post without systematically testing whether norms cause different patterns.
2 Previous HBE studies have looked at multiple cultural groups in different environments or single cultural groups in one environment. HBE needs to measure the distributional patterns of two or more ethnic groups with distinct cultures that reside in the same environment to see if or to what extent culture is relevant.
CA predicts sharing and distribution will primarily be based on cultural norms
(e.g. sharing rules), cultural models and precedents (e.g. particular preferences, values associated with fishing), and/or cultural categories (e.g. kinship categories). Cultural research on fisheries, specifically from the maritime anthropology literature, has shown how cognitive elements (e.g. cultural models) are prominent in fishers’ decision making about economic matters (e.g. Griffith and Valdes Pizzini 2002; Kronen 2004; Paolisso
2002). Cordell (1984) describes how reciprocal exchange of labor and gear is a part of everyday shoreline meetings among small scale fisher folk of Bahia, Brazil. Reciprocity in decision making is part of the local respeito model, which encourages payback to givers who perform acts of benevolence bordering on self sacrifice (Cordell 1984).
Griffith and Valdes Pizzini (2002) show how Puerto Rico small scale fisher folk, from full time fishermen to those who combine their fishing with wage labor, view fishing as a way to get away from monotonous blue collar jobs and provides them an identity of independence. This cultural model of independence is a strong motivation as to why fisher folk choose to stay in the industry full time. Cultural anthropology maritime researchers attribute economic decision making to local cultural models, but their studies are limited because they seldom systematically test the cultural models by measuring actual distribution and sharing of resources.
3 Overlap between HBE and CA predictions are possible, such as when cultural models or norms enhance inclusive fitness. HBE and CA each have their own strengths and weaknesses and the present study attempts to build upon the strengths of each approach to provide an integrated view of sharing and distribution and understand interactions between HBE and CA approaches. In this study, I use and extend an ethnographic decision tree (EDT) approach (see Gladwin 1989; Ryan and Bernard 2006) from CA, which has shown how “cultural models” (special purpose cognitive integrations of symbols enabling action in specific contexts; Casson 1983; Shore 1996) are prominent in individuals’ decision making (e.g. Garro 1998a; Mukhopadhyay 1984;
Young 1980), to test how cultural variation between East Indian descendant and African descendant small scale fisher folk 1 in a Trinidad/Tobago (hereon referred to as
“Trinidad”) village influences sharing and distribution in these groups. The Caribbean is ideal for this due to its cultural heterogeneity of multiple ethnic groups residing in the same maritime village environments and utilizing the same fisheries (Breton et al. 2006), especially Trinidad where two distinct ethnic groups live with different cultural models enabling direct controlled comparison.
EDT methods have shown how cultural models are used by individuals as criteria to categorize alternatives (e.g. Mukhopadhyay 1984,1980) and as more general “scripts”
(Gladwin and Butler 1984) to encompass criteria for decisions made in recurring contexts. Mukhopadhyay (1984,1980) demonstrates how cultural models such as gendered task expectations are the main categorizing criteria used in choosing family members that will perform household chores; that heavy, constructive, and risky tasks are
1 The small scale sector consists of fishers who beachland their craft and are either owner operators or one of a few crew members on a boat (Platteau 1989). “Artisanal” fishers are included, which are non motorized and mostly use locally gathered materials to fabricate their fishing technology.
4 considered male, while light, decorative, and sanitary tasks are considered female. Young
(1980) illustrates that Mexican peasants consider a local concept of “faith” of the likelihood that an illness can be cured as a second criteria after the geographical accessibility of doctors to decide whether to seek a folk “curer”, a licensed physician, or self treat illnesses. Decision criteria elicited from informants can be verified by observing the behavior resulting from the decision in question (Mukhopadhyay 1984,1980) and cultural groups have shown high rates of commonality (e.g. 90% and above prediction success for decision trees) among criteria individuals within the group use (e.g. Gladwin
1989; Mukhopadhyay 1984,1980; Young 1980). Fisher folk, with their recurring distributional decisions of catch in the same context upon landing their boats everyday, are prime candidates for understanding decisions through EDT methods since they should use a set script for the same daily decision. EDT’s have not looked at food distributional decisions despite the similar context in which these choices take place in many cultures everyday.
Durham (1991) theorized that cultural models and norms can “enhance” (i.e., agree with) reproductive fitness, such as that predicted by HBE. Testing if specific cultural models result in decisions with varying fitness outcomes will help determine if and/or how cultural models act in selection of more or less reproductively fit behaviors over others, which will help elucidate culture’s role on the persistence of reproductively fit or unfit actions. An example is from Leonetti, Nath, and Hemam (2007), one of the few HBE studies that has compared two ethnic groups and evaluated how their respective reproductive outcomes are shaped by cultural differences. They demonstrated that the respective matrilineal and patrilineal kinship of the Khasi and Bengali of northeastern
5 India are a primary factor in determining parents’ investment strategies in children. Khasi enroll more female children in school and adult women reduce their fertility rates if mothers have too much daily workload. Bengali women, on the other hand tended to stop having children when a male child reached a high educational level and invested resources more in just a select few male offspring (Leonetti, Nath, and Hemam 2007).
Research such as this shows that culture may play a major role in reproductive and economic decisions, but one limitation of the research is that it does not adequately control for ecological factors. The Khasi are swidden horticulturalists in a hilly environment and the Bengali are plow agriculturalists on the plains. In Trinidad for this study, Indo Trinidadian and Afro Trinidadian fisher folk maintain patrilineal and matrifocal kinship respectively while residing in the same villages and utilizing the same fisheries. Cultural kinship has been shown to influence food distribution (e.g. Alvard
2003) and Trinidad is an ideal context to systematically test the effect of cultural elements such as kinship on decision making regarding material transfers. This study examines the roles of cultural models in resource distribution in two Trinidadian ethnic groups.
General Research Questions
The previously discussed problems of the HBE and CA maritime literatures form the following research questions.
Q1. What are the Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians cultural models of fishing? How do cultural models influence the distribution of fish catch?
6 Q2. How do fisher-folk in these two ethnic groups actually distribute fish catch?
How are individuals who are involved in distribution genetically related and what are the reproductive histories of fisher-folk who distribute fish catch?
Q3. How do cultural models influence Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians responses to standardized economic games?
Q4. Do cultural models in the two ethnic groups influence HBE factors, such as inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism, hypothesized to be associated with sharing? Are cultural models and HBE predictions about resource sharing consistent or oppositional? How do biology (inclusive fitness) and culture (cultural models) interact?
Specific Hypotheses
Fish distribution hypotheses
Existing ethnographic studies on the cultures of East Indian and African descendant populations in the Caribbean (e.g. Munasinghe 2001; Palmie 2006; Sidnell
2000; Smith 1996; van Niekerk 2002; Wilson 1973), recent HBE research, and CA maritime studies were utilized to generate the following hypotheses about primary distribution of fish catch and economic game strategies among Trinidad fisher folk.
Primary distribution is the transfer of fish catch by fisher folk along the shoreline immediately following boat landings, while secondary distribution refers to non market transfers of whole or parts of the catch between individuals, households, and at community feasts subsequent to the shoreline transfers (see Alvard 2002). The hypotheses assume that culture matters in that cultural models of the two ethnic groups
7 will be a part of the groups’ EDT’s on fish catch distribution. Cultural models’ impact on shaping patterns of catch distribution will be tested and patterns are predicted to align with HBE patterns (as stated in the hypotheses below). Testing if and how cultural models enhance HBE patterns of food distribution through EDT’s will help systematically integrate CA and HBE. Genetic relatedness is also addressed in the hypotheses because HBE uses it as a predictor of sharing and distribution.
H1. Indo-Trinidadians will exhibit more primary distributions within their ethnic group and than Afro-Trinidadians. Costly signaling will occur less among male Indo-Trinidadians than male Afro-Trinidadians as Indo-Trinidadians primary distributions will be with fewer individuals than Afro-Trinidadians. Indo
Trinidadians’ cultural model of ethnic relations in the Caribbean highlights antipathy and distinction between themselves and Afro Trinidadians, while the “creole” model of Afro
Trinidadians focuses on white black opposition (Jain 2004; Palmie 2006). Munasinghe
(2001) argues that Indo Trinidadians advocate “plural” (separated) ethnicities for
Trinidad, while Afro Trinidadians support a callaloo (mixed) nation that Indo
Trinidadians equate to assimilation (derogatorily called douglarization ). These are cultural models from the domain of ethnic relations and are predicted, among Indo
Trinidadians, to be in opposition to high breadth costly signaling and tolerated theft (see also H7). These cultural models are hypothesized to be a part of Indo Trinidadians’
EDT’s for catch distribution and result in Indo Trinidadians having significantly lower breadth in catch distributions.
For Afro Trinidadians, however, the callaloo cultural model will be prominent in their EDT’s of catch distribution and will enhance costly signaling and tolerated theft
8 since this cultural model encourages high breadth. Male Afro Trinidadians also have more to gain concerning mating opportunities from showing off because of their matrifocal system has relatively weak conjugal bonds and low father saliency. In terms of reproductive history, Indo Trinidadian males will have an older onset of reproduction, a fewer mates who bear their offspring, and fewer co resident sexual partners than Afro
Trinidadian males. These three characteristics were predicted since high breadth distributors exhibit the opposite and Indo Trinidadians are predicted to exhibit low breadth (Smith, Bliege Bird, and Bird 2003). Thus, the opposite will be found among
more Afro Trinidadians since they were predicted to show higher breadth.
H2. Indo-Trinidadians will have less equality across all recipients in primary
distributions, and transfer more frequently and a greater quantity of the catch to
higher status individuals than will Afro-Trinidadians. Hierarchy in the caste tradition
(Jain 2004) and thrift (Munasinghe 2001) are two foundational schema of the Indo
Trinidadian cultures. Foundational schema are mental abstractions that mediate between perception and behavior and encompass abstract and tacit phenomena, such as the center periphery schema in Samoa that covers how phenomena as wide ranging as dance and
village space are organized. By contrast, Wilson (1973) described African descendants in
the Caribbean as practicing “crab antics”; the leveling of class differences based on the
importance of maintaining equality. Concerning reproductive fitness, the hierarchy of
Indo Trinidadians will result in the number of offspring for Indo Trinidadian fisher folk being less equal than among Afro Trinidadian fisher folk. High status fisher folk (e.g. boat owners) among Indo Trinidadians will have a greater number of children than lower
status Indo Trinidadian fisher folk.
9 H3. Indo-Trinidadians are more likely to distribute catch (frequency and total amount) with patrilineal kin, while Afro-Trinidadians are more likely to distribute catch with individuals they consider kin that reside with them and/or reside with their mothers (i.e., matrifocal). The predicted differences are due to variation in the two ethnic groups’ kinship systems. Indo Trinidadian fisher folk will allocate more to patrilineal kin due to their patriarchal and patrilocal families
(Munasinghe 2001; van Niekerk 2002), while Afro Trinidadians will distribute mostly to matrifocal kin.
H4. Neither Indo-Trinidadians or Afro-Trinidadians will preferentially distribute the catch to genetic kin. This hypothesis is based upon several other studies of fishing communities (Acheson 1981; e.g. Alvard 2003,2002). While genetic kin are likely to be part of patrilineage crews that receive distributions of whale carcass among the Lamalera, lineage membership is a stronger predictor of who receives whale meat transfers than genetic relatedness (see H3) (Alvard 2003,2002). Acheson (1981) synthesizes a number of maritime anthropology studies on small scale fisher folk concluding that in almost all cases, fisher folk are just as likely to create affiliations with a mix of friends and non genetic kin.
H5. Both Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians will distribute fish with individuals who distributed fish to them. Maintaining reciprocal exchange relations is important in both groups. East Indian descendants and African descendants in the
Caribbean maintain reciprocal and asymmetric obligation as an important part of village life (Lefever 1992; Sidnell 2000). These cultural models predict enhancement of reciprocity and support for both HBE and CA predictions. Reciprocal partners (i.e., those
10 who show balance with each other) will have a higher number of offspring than individuals who do not have reciprocal partners.
H6. Tolerated scrounging will not be a significant predictor of catch distribution for either Indo-Trinidadians or Afro-Trinidadians. Tolerated scrounging assumes procurers will accept individuals in high need of resources to freely take or receive distribution of asynchronous and lower value packages (Tucker 2004; Ziker and
Schnegg 2005). The likelihood of tolerated scrounging is strengthened when locals consider these types of foods lower value (Tucker 2004; Ziker and Schnegg 2005). The taking of lower value packages is predicted to not occur among Icacos fisher folk as higher value packages are shown subject to scrounging in other fishing studies (e.g.
Sutherland 1986).
Economic games hypotheses
H8. Ethnic affiliation will be a significant predictor of dictator, ultimatum, trust, and public goods games offerings, acceptances or rejections.
H9. Indo-Trinidadians will exhibit lower initial offerings than Afro-
Trinidadians in the dictator, ultimatum, trust, and public goods games. Given the cultural models discussed for H1, these two predictions supplement that hypothesis as antipathy between the two ethnicities is emphasized.
H10. Regarding second players in the trust game, Indo-Trinidadians will have lower offerings than Afro-Trinidadians. This supplements H2 as that predicted lower equality and more amounts transferred to high status individuals among Indo
Trinidadians compared to Afro Trinidadians.
11 A set of contextualized games with local cultural models identified during the present study (see Chapter six) and ethnic cues used as prompts (e.g. Cronk 2007; Gil
White 2004) were also played with Icacos fisher folk. I use these cultural models and previous findings from contextualized game theory to generate the following hypotheses
for the prompted games.
H11. When the opposing player is not of the same ethnicity, both Indo-
Trinidadians and Afro-Trinidadians will provide lower initial offers in the dictator,
ultimatum, and trust games, a lower rate of acceptance of offers in the ultimatum
game, and lower return offers in the trust game.
Preliminary Studies
I first visited the southwestern Trinidad fishing communities in summer 2006
including Icacos, the village of this study. Icacos is located at the southern “entrance” to
the Gulf of Paria, the west coast of Trinidad. The Gulf is home to 90% of
Trinidad/Tobago’s population and most of the nation’s commercial fishing and industrial
sector activity. It is the most active fishing area in Trinidad/Tobago with an estimated
2,500 commercial and small scale fishers as of 2001 (Chan A Shing 2001). The southern
end communities, however, are some of the most culturally and geographically isolated
on the island. In Icacos, I met with five local fishermen who served as my initial contacts
and informants. Each fisherman knew numerous other local operators and through each
of them and by meeting the rest of Icacos’ fisher folk during gatherings of the local
fishermen’s cooperative, I was able to census and build selective samples of the local
fisher folk population during subsequent fieldwork visits.
12 In January and February 2008, I revisited Icacos and met with Harnarine Lalla, the director of Trinidad’s Fisheries Division, in Port of Spain, to discuss collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Lalla provided estimates on the southwestern villages’ fisher folk populations and offered contact with the Division’s agent in Icacos to help further locate study participants.
Methodological steps outlined in the present study were carried out during two separate field seasons in the village, the first from the end of June through the end of
August 2009 and the second from the start of July to the end of December 2010. Upon my arrival at the beginning of the 2009 session, I located Prakash Narine, the Fisheries
Division agent to whom I was previously forwarded who provided names of additional fisher folk in the village and information on upcoming meetings of the local fishermen’s cooperative. Re contacting my primary informants, I confirmed the times of cooperative meetings, commenced explaining the scope of my study, discussed their opinions on the feasibility of the research, potential contributions it could have to the fisher folk, appropriate ways to approach other potential participants, possible feedback to my presence from other fishermen, and techniques of repaying fishermen and their families for time participating in the study. Upon approval from these informants and several others I met around the community, I was invited on a fishing excursion, further observed shoreline catch distribution, and attended a cooperative meeting to introduce myself to the entire group and begin explaining the economic game portion of the research.
My previous research in fisheries includes fieldwork among artisanal fisher folk in Huanchaco, Peru during my masters program. I performed participant observation including recording on water fishing techniques and carrying out semi structured
13 interviews concerning local fishery management. An article of mine was published recently testing which types of institutions lead to resilience in several Latin American fisheries (Chapman, Jackson Smith, and Petrzelka 2008). Results were drawn from previously published case studies.
Methods
HBE predictions that assume individual’s try to maximize their reproductive fitness in given natural and social environments (Smith and Winterhalder 1992) and CA predictions that assume culture plays a major role in economic decision making (Casson
1983; Chibnik 1981; D’Andrade 1989; Frake 1969) are evaluated by measuring distribution patterns of subsistence 2 fish catch among Indo Trinidadian and Afro
Trinidadian fisher folk of Icacos, Trinidad. Food distribution is often utilized to evaluate
forms of cooperation in small scale societies (Bird and Bliege Bird 2008; Hames and
McCabe 2007; Ziker and Schnegg 2005). EDT interviews elaborate what cultural models
individuals evoke in distributional decisions and determine if using different cultural
models results in different distributional patterns. Mating and reproductive success and
social status indicators determine if cultural differences in sharing and distribution result
in fitness differences. Measuring the criteria and outcomes of distributional decision
making by two distinct groups in the same environment enables a controlled test of HBE
and culturally based hypotheses to evaluate the role of culture and biology culture
interactions on human cooperation.
2 I focus on non market allocation of fish since market based transactions with catch in Trinidad go through traveling vendors who often migrate to and from urban areas like San Fernando. Market exchange of fish is potentially more susceptible to micro economic calculation by fisher folk with the transaction based on prices and involving vendors who are not community residents. This study emphasizes local culture’s influence on cooperation.
14 1. Economic Games (First Round). I started fieldwork in summer 2009 with relatively simply economic games as a method to get to know, discuss economic decisions and build rapport with informants. Dictator, ultimatum, trust, and public goods games, which test general mindsets towards selfishness and cooperation in experimental settings (Ensminger 2000; Henrich et al. 2004), were played with convenience samples.
Each game was conducted with 25 players with all players making initial offers in all four games. In addition, every player except the first of the 25, accepted or rejected the previous player’s offer in the ultimatum game and had the option of making a counter offer in the trust game. The first player of the 25 only made initial offers as there was no previous submission in the ultimatum and trust games to accept, reject, or counter.
The dictator game involves one player making an offer to a known or anonymous second player with the second player not having the chance to respond or counter offer.
This shows how positively individuals perceive sharing (Marlowe 2004). The ultimatum game of player one making an offer and player two accepting or rejecting that offer especially shows how positively “community exchange” (Gudeman 1998,1986), i.e., reciprocity and sharing, is perceived (modeled) and sanctioned (instituted) (Marlowe
2004). The trust game, where player one makes an offer that is then multiplied with player two having the option of returning the multiplied portion back to player one, tests how much individuals find others trustworthy (Cronk 2007). The public goods game, where multiple players make an offer to a central pot with the pot multiplied and the multiplied total redistributed evenly among the players, shows how much individuals are willing to sacrifice personal gain for contributing to the public good (Krupp, Debruine, and Barclay 2008), which is an experimental test of costly signaling and tolerated
15 scrounging. Games were played in a private room to avoid potential influence from on lookers (see Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter 2008) and were conducted anonymously with each player making or rejecting offers in private without knowledge of who are their
“partner” players to control for inter personal relationships shaping game outcomes.
Game results were later compared with distribution patterns of fish catch to determine if levels of sharing, costly signaling, and tolerated scrounging forecasted in the experimental setting parallel actual behavior.
2. Participant Observation. Throughout fieldwork, participant observation was used to gain a more in depth understanding of daily on and off water activities of fisher folk. This involved occasional fishing trips with key informants to examine on water work habits, techniques utilized, and conversation. Trinidad small scale fisher folk use a combination of gillnet, hand line, fish pot, and trawl gear technology sailing in fiberglass and dugout wood canoes with outboard motors called pirogues (Chan A Shing 2001;
Ministry 2005). Attending and participating in community wide events, observing casual work and household conversations, going with key informants to sell catch to vendors, attending fisher folk meetings, helping fishermen repair their equipment, and going on occasional boat rides and recreational activities provided immersion in everyday life of the fisher folk and improved comprehension of their daily routines and livelihoods.
Research was carried out during two sessions of dissertation fieldwork in Icacos,
the first from the end of June to the end of August 2009 to do the first round of economic
games. The remaining steps were completed in the second session lasting from the beginning of July to the end of December 2010. During the two fieldwork sessions that
constituted the majority of the data for this study, I resided at various locations in and
16 surrounding the community. During the two months in 2009, I lived at an apartment complex in Cedros, which is also located along the coast of the Gulf of Paria northeast of
Icacos by fifteen kilometers. Cedros is a community of approximately 1,500 with similar ethnic composition to Icacos and the surrounding southwest region. The southwest is part of the Siparia region for government administrative purposes, but also referred to as the
“deep south” or more commonly “the south” by locals and other Trinidadians across the nation. Outside of the southwest, Trinidadians often refer to it and other rural areas as simply “the country”. Maxi taxis have a dedicated route from Cedros to Icacos that I rode every morning to the community during the 2009 session and used to return to the apartment each night. As 2010 fieldwork involved more detailed methods of participant observation and interviews beyond the experimental games of 2009, I resided in Icacos throughout the 2010 session. I stayed the first month at a privately operated inn called the
“Icacos Beach House” near the southwestern tip of the community, two months at Riad
Ali’s residence (one of my initial informants), the following month at Devin Charles’ house (another primary informant), one and a half months at Avi Bujan’s house who was a fishermen I met during my 2009 fieldwork, and the final two weeks at John Kissoon’s home (another primary informant).
17
Figure 1: Riad Ali, Indo-Trinidadian fisherman and one of the author’s primary informants.
Figure 2: Devin Charles, Afro-Trinidadian fisherman and one of the author’s primary informants.
18
3. Folk Taxonomies and Cultural Domains. Folk taxonomy free lists and pile
sorts and cultural domain interviews were performed on a snowball sample of Icacos
fishermen. Through my initial informants in Icacos, I was introduced to multiple other
fisher folk and through this process, I created a snowball sample of n = 40. During my
first visit to Icacos in summer 2006, I came into contact with five fishermen, which became the initial informants that helped connect me to the rest of the local fisher folk population and community. To ensure enough respondents represented the two ethnic
groups, I found over 40 fishermen until I had twenty of each ethnicity. I then took the
first twenty of each group (including my initial informants), which comprises the sample.
I also did this separately from the fish catch distribution sample (see Chapter five) as to
draw from a different pool of fishermen and to better ensure cultural models used in
EDT’s were represented across the village fisher folk population and not just among the
fish catch sample of 69 (fish catch sample described in method four below). The majority
of the snowball sample are not of the fish catch sample as of the 40 in this sample,
sixteen were in the fish catch sample.
Cognitive anthropologists, such as D’Andrade (1984), emphasize that the
meaning surrounding cultural models are more apt to be discovered in interviews rather
than participant observation. I used “controlled eliciting”, which is a responsive strategy
utilizing informants’ categories in successive questioning. This contrasts to
questionnaires or interview itineraries where the outsider constructs categories (e.g. “is X
most like or not at all like Y”?) Perhaps X and Y are not related in informants’ minds or
even existent (Tyler 1969).
19 Once semantic features were exhausted, then I attempted formal analysis to check relations between units within semantic domains. Language tends to encode the relevant and discard the irrelevant. Words and categories are also “efficient”, which is why formal analysis is crucial (e.g. people say “boat” rather than “oblong floating object made of wood”) (Frake 1969). Based on previously identified cultural categories through interviews, I used these categories along with the aid of several informants to make flashcards for pile sorts.
After a pile sort was completed, I proceeded to elaborate distinctions between the sorts by asking “what makes X an X and not a Y” for each entity in the pile sort. This type of formal questioning has been used by ethnoscientists in helping to construct folk taxonomies (Frake 1969; Gladwin 1989). Domains covered in pile sorts were types of forms of exchange, fish species including market and non market values of different species, and categories deemed significant by fisher folk concerning persons to whom they distribute fish catch.
Taxonomies were constructed based on the pile sort results. Taxonomies require
that the top level includes all lower levels and that each category does not overlap with
other categories on other levels or the same level (i.e., they are mutually exclusive)
(Conklin 1969). Formal analysis was also used on pile sort results to identify any possible
lexicographic agreement or disagreement. This involves analysis of morphemes so
adjectives or modifiers added to words can be determined. Any synonyms that were not
directly linked in pile sorts were re visited in discussions with informants to determine
any connection between them. The highest levels of generalization were then checked
with informants as well to ensure interpretation of abstraction was accurate and to verify
20 generalizations used by individuals. Residents’ languages are English and English based
Trinidadian creole allowing a close comparison between “western” English domains with pidgin influenced concepts. There is also some French and Spanish mixed in with terms describing fishing technology, along with Bhojpuri and Hindi, especially in Indo
Trinidadian kin terms (see Chapter four). Taxonomies enhanced recognition of local terms in interviews and observations that followed. They also enabled terms used during subsequent fieldwork to be verified against previous samples to see how agreed upon concepts were and to check their meaning.
Taxonomies and cultural models were also supported through discourse analysis.
This method goes beyond lexicon (i.e., words as symbolizing categories) to map causal and correlation relations between categories and semantic features (e.g. germs cause diseases, “cold” is type of disease). A problem with analyzing sentences and other multi word utterances are “meta messages”. These are meanings not explicit in the aggregate definition of the words (e.g. “it’s cold in here” means “bring me my coat” or “we need to leave here”) (Tyler 1969). This is a concern the previously outlined cultural model interviews were designed to lessen. While some meta messages may escape discourse analysis, this type of analysis can also supply subtle indicators in language representing cultural models (Strauss 1992). I also asked about “valued ways of life” among Indo
Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians to construct a typology for what are viewed as “the best”, “correct”, or “right” ways of living (see Schoepfle, Burton, and Morgan 1984).
Once taxonomies and cultural models were identified, I conducted a set of
cultural domain interviews based on cultural consensus methods (see Dressler 2007;
Dressler et al. 2005; Ross and Medin 2005) to determine level of agreement among the
21 population regarding cultural categories and models. I asked questions to measure agreement or disagreement on a Likert scale concerning cultural models (e.g. “How important is it to have a sachcha to work with in fishing?”) (see Rocha 2005). I also inquired during these interviews about institution of cultural models to better understand if or how cultural models of distribution are subject to sanction if not followed.
Integration is key to certain cognitive anthropologists’ definition of cultural models (e.g.
D’Andrade 1989) as an instituted expectation of behavior, which individuals in a social group know to behave by, otherwise subject to sanctions. Institutions act as prescriptions to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interaction with individuals having choice within sanctions on how to behave. In other words, they can act as the “do’s and don’ts” of culture (Ostrom 2005). I asked “if you do not do X, what will others think”,
“why would (sanction) make you do or not do X”, and “what does the community or others in the community say about this”. These were asked as concrete examples (e.g. “if you did not share part of a heavy shrimp catch with David, what would he think?”) whenever possible and not as abstract hypotheticals.
4. Recording Primary Distribution of Fish Catch. The primary distributions from a selective sample of twenty vessels were recorded daily over a six month period from July through December 2010. I use Alvard’s (2002) definition of primary distribution as the transfer of catch to others that happens during a trip and immediately following boat landing. Secondary distributions, which are not recorded in the present study, refer to transfers between households subsequent to the primary distribution. The selective sample is based on demographic variables from census data and information collected from initial convenience samples. The sample was based on boat owners with
22 twenty of the 39 boats in the village as part of this sample. Icacos fishermen land their pirogues sporadically in the mid morning with the occasional simultaneous arrival by
multiple craft. This allowed the sample to be carried out as there were only a few
occasions where boats in the sample landed close enough in time to each other that a
recording for that day was missed. Total separate landings observed numbered 3,120.
Catch is immediately carried off the boat upon landing, laid out on the beach or
wood or metal tables on the beach, and then transferred by the boat owner and/or operator
and usually one or multiple crewmates to fellow crewmates and other helpers.
Distributors use a variety of techniques from shoveling handfuls into buckets provided by
each fisherman, to dumping from the net into these buckets or other nets, or throwing
larger species one by one to a receiver. Sometimes distributors will also just point to a
fish pile and tell the individual to pick up a certain amount. Since receivers and
distributors have nets and/or buckets to transport their share (with non crew helpers
having smaller buckets or carrying just a handful), weighing proved efficient.
Distributions from each landing were recorded by utilizing a small portable scale. As
distributions were completed for each landing, Chapman waited until an individual
receiving shares had his or her total amount. This was then weighed and recorded. Any
remaining share left to the distributor was also weighed and noted. Each landing event
was recorded by the date, time, and assigned sample boat number so that total catch at
each landing event could be calculated by combining all the separate weighed shares.
During primary distributions, each individual’s name that distributed or received catch
was recorded.
23 To test kinship hypotheses, Wright’s relatedness coefficients (r) for all pairs of individuals who transferred catch with each other, were computed in Descent (Hagen
2005) from the census data outlined in Chapter four. Since the finding of r depends on the depth and completeness of data on the familial line, the sample includes those individuals’ whose ancestry is known up through their grandparents. This enables resolution to the level of r = .125 (Alvard 2003). “Affiliation”, meaning individuals being on the same boat together for a fishing trip, was also determined for the catch distribution sample. Fishermen who were on each boat trip were noted as part of the catch weight recordings, enabling an affiliation matrix to be produced. Each fisherman has a row and column in the matrix and each cell shows how many times the pair was on the same fishing trip (see Alvard 2003). Affiliations allow an additional test of reciprocity, to see if individuals who crew together more are also transferring higher amounts of catch between themselves. CW ratios, described in Chapter four, were calculated for each
fisher folk household. Each fisherman is assigned their associated households’ CW ratio
for the purposes of checking the influence of household income and consumption on
catch transfers. A surplus enables less risky investments beyond immediate family needs.
High CW ratios are associated with immediate income consumption similarly making
allocations outside of family needs high risk.
5. Structured and Semi-structured Census Interviews. During the months of primary catch distribution observations, interviews were conducted with each fisher and
any other villagers involved in catch distributions to determine their ethnicity, status
within the community, chart their kin relations, determine who lives in their households,
and record their reproductive histories.
24 Ethnicity was determined through self identification by asking the individual their ethnicity along with the ethnicity of their parents and grandparents. This is used to test
H1. Most Icacos fisher folk are “purely” Indo Trinidadian or Afro Trinidadian (Lalla personal communication, January 7, 2008). Status was determined through free listing and then pile sorting names of fisher folk and villagers deemed as high status by interviewees. Individuals were asked to list who they consider high status among fisher folk and in the community (e.g. boat owners, most skilled fishermen, those with the largest families, the best caretakers, etc.) and then these names were pile sorted based on relative status. This resulted in a status score based on interviewees’ rankings, which is used to test H2. Kinship data was entered into Descent software (Hagen 2005) to determine Wright’s relatedness coefficients (see Ziker and Schnegg 2005) used to test H3 and H4.
To evaluate H5, dyad exchange relationships were mapped with UCINET
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2011) and KeyPlayer software (Borgatti 2005) to clarify the size and balance of exchange linkages. The amount given and quantity of recipients from each individual recorded during the primary catch observations enable a test of H1.
I also recorded basic demographic characteristics of household members (age, sex, marital status) and asked how many hours are worked on average by each household member to determine consumer to worker (CW) ratios for households. These provide quantification for the resource needs of a household in order to test H7. If demand sharing is occurring, recipients should be from households with high need. Concerning reproductive histories, the number of offspring, the starting age of having offspring, the number of mates who have born their offspring, and number of co resident sexual
25 partners were determined for each interviewee. These enable tests of the reproductive fitness portions of each hypothesis.
6. EDT Interviews. At the beginning of October 2010, EDT interviews started
with the selective sample of members of the twenty pirogues from the catch distribution portion of the study and a separate selective sample. With each fisherman in these
samples, semi structured questioning elicited possible alternatives regarding what one
does with distributing catch and with whom one exchanges. Once interviewees specified
their possible distribution choices, EDT’s 3 were built since the different alternatives show how many trees are needed and decisions that require criteria elicitation. The catch distribution sample was used from which to elicit criteria in structured interviews asking
“what makes you do X instead of Y” where X and Y are possible alternatives (exhausting binary alternative sets) (Young 1980:109). This provided the criteria for building initial
EDT’s to test on later selective samples 4. Comparing possible alternative sets helps to clarify under what conditions individuals invoke various cultural models (see Young
1980).
After making revisions to the EDT’s from these interviews, EDT testing was repeated by interviewing the catch distribution sample during and immediately following catch transfers to further determine how accurate EDT’s are in modeling actual choice processes. EDT’s need to be verified to at least 90% accuracy (see Gladwin 1989; Ryan and Bernard 2006). Comparing the primary fish catch distribution sample and EDT
3 I generally followed Gladwin (1989) and Ryan and Bernard’s (2006) EDT methods of eliciting criteria from an initial sample, constructing trees and testing against a different selective sample, modifying and adding criteria from the initial test, and then testing the reconstructed trees against another selective sample repeating the last two steps until a desired prediction rate was achieved. 4 Most researchers construct EDT’s by induction, starting with the most mentioned criterion at the top that separates the most respondents who “did X” v. those who “did not do X” first in order to simplify the tree building process. Generally, the most cited criteria will be at the top of the tree with the more peculiar factors near the bottom.
26 interview results helps determine the accuracy of the EDT’s and allows a comparison of decision criteria individuals claim they use to actual distributions individuals perform.
Further details on EDT methods are provided in Chapter seven.
7. Economic Games (Second and Third Rounds). Fieldwork concluded with second and third rounds of the four economic games, but these rounds added the invocation of cultural models and ethnic cues, respectively, to test the effect of culture on choice in an experimental setting (e.g. Cronk 2007; Gil White 2004). In the second round, player one was told an anonymous player two had one of the “character qualities” identified as crucial to defining to whom to distribute fish catch (see Chapter six). For the third round, the prompt for player one was that the anonymous player two was of a different ethnicity (e.g. player two is Indo Trinidadian if player one is Afro Trinidadian)
(see Gil White 2004).
Game theory has been criticized for not adequately accounted for cultural models
(Hagen and Hammerstein 2006), but this is beginning to change as recent research shows that the invocation of cultural models significantly alters how much individuals allocate in experimental settings (e.g. Cronk 2007). Based on findings from the previously outlined methods, I conducted the second round of games invoking cultural models at the start of each play (see Cronk 2007) to compare to previous game results and see if
“framing” an experimental setting with a cultural model resulted in individuals making choices that adhere to that model. Playing a trust game among the Maasai in Kenya, for example, resulted in significant correlation between lower monetary offers and expectations of return when framing the game with a local concept of osotua (restrained one way giving when someone is in need) (Cronk 2007). These methods allow a
27 comparison with distribution patterns of fish catch to see if the use of cultural models or ethnic cues in experimental settings more closely matches levels of sharing, costly signaling, and tolerated scrounging in actual distributions or if experimental games without explicit cultural models or ethnic cues more closely parallels actual behavior.
Greater details on methods for the second and third round economic games are described in Chapter eight.
A donation of US$1,000 was made to the cooperative on behalf of the researcher to compensate fisher folk for taking part in the study. Giving to the cooperative instead of each individual participant better ensured equality in access to materials or services purchased with the money and to avoid jealousy between villagers. Differing amounts of time were spent with each fishermen in observations and interviews. To pay each individual based on time spent would result in unequal amounts going to each and paying an equal amount could have caused resentment based on who received payouts first.
Local sentiment is generally positive regarding access to the cooperative and past utilization of funds.
Study Site
Situated in the southwest quadrant of Trinidad, Icacos is a rural coastal village with a population of approximately 1,000. Icacos is located at the southern “entrance” to the Gulf of Paria, the west coast of Trinidad. The Gulf is home to 90% of
Trinidad/Tobago’s population and most of the nation’s commercial fishing and industrial sector activity. It is the most active fishing area in Trinidad/Tobago with an estimated
2,500 commercial and small scale fishers as of 2001 (Chan A Shing, 2001). The southern
28 end communities, however, are some of the most culturally and geographically isolated on the island. Fishing provides primary income for more residents than any other activity or employment. With the development of Trinidad’s economy (Artana, Bour, and
Navajas 2007:25 6), the commercial fishing sector continues to grow leading to increases in small scale fisher folk hired as industrial boat crew.
Indo Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians are Trinidad’s two largest ethnic groups.
Their ancestors were displaced from separate continents and have maintained distinct cultural models and institutions while residing around and utilizing the same resources in the islands’ maritime villages. A large percentage of Indo Trinidadians reside in Icacos and nearby southern communities, more so than in north Trinidad. In the Siparia administrative district, which encompasses all communities on the southwest peninsula of
Trinidad except for the largest town of Point Fortin, Indo Trinidadians are 46% of the district population compared to 35% being Afro Trinidadian. Nearby districts across the south including Penal Debe, Princes Town, and Couva/Tabaquite/Talparo show higher proportions (>60%) of Indo Trinidadian residents compared to the national level where
Indo Trinidadians represent 40% and Afro Trinidadians represent 37.5% of the population (CARICOM 2009). Ancestors of the Afro Trinidadian population came to
Trinidad mostly through the late 18 th century and Afro Trinidadians have resided primarily in the south since that time. Indo Trinidadians descend from East Indian
contract laborers brought in by the British to replace African slaves in 1845. Ethnic
intermarriage has increased in recent decades with 20.5% of Trinidadians at the national
level classified as “mixed” ethnicity. The percentage is less in Siparia district where
about 18% are mixed with proportions less and as low as 9% in the other southern
29 districts (CARICOM 2009). Local fisher folk consist of Indo Trinidadian and Afro
Trinidadian males with a total of 104 small scale fishermen operating in Icacos as of late
2010, the time of this study’s census. This confirms Harnarine Lalla’s, the director of
Trinidad’s Fisheries Division, estimates that approximately 100 small scale fishermen work in Icacos (personal communication, January 7, 2008).
Figure 3: Political map of the Caribbean. Source: Dacal Moure and Rivero De La Calle 1996.
30
Figure 4: Transportation map of Trinidad/Tobago displaying population centers (Perry-Castañeda 1976).
31 Figure 5: Fishing landing sites across Trinidad. Source: FAO 2000. Notice Icacos in the far bottom left corner. This represents the late 1990’s and since that time, small storage structures have been setup across most of the southwest villages, such as Icacos, bringing them up to date with other fishing sites.
In attempts to achieve sustainable fisheries, previous development projects and the Trinidad/Tobago government have tried several strategies. Development interventions have promoted sustainable fish yield by distributing new forms of procurement technology, tried to maintain small scale fishing as an economically viable livelihood, and have strived to implement a co management plan for local fisheries integrating national with local goals (Chan A Shing 2001; Ministry 2005). These ends have not been fully met since open access conditions exacerbate problems between commercial fleets and small scale fisher folk. Commercial vessels can enter any ocean waters open to fishing along Trinidad’s coast, which has created conflict with the small scale sector and hinders them from utilizing local rules to manage the fishery since outsiders not subject to those rules operate within their waters. Encroachment and competition for catch is heaviest along the central Gulf of Paria where most industrial sized shrimp trawlers
32 operate. A lack of local management institutions has occurred in southern Trinidad communities as well due to a recent history of unstable fishing cooperatives (Chan A
Shing 2001), although such conditions are not observed in Icacos where the local cooperative is well attended and has had secure leadership for at least the past ten years.
Oil exploration is a more serious problem impeding sustainable catch and the maintenance of viable economic livelihoods for small scale fisher folk in the southern
Gulf of Paria.
Markets for commercial and small scale fishers are mostly separate as the former provide catch for export through avenues such as processing plants, which in turn sell a small proportion to local markets. Small scale fisher folk stock the Trinidad market by distributing locally and selling to roadside vendors or retail vendors who then deal with supermarkets, restaurants, and occasionally the processing plants (Ministry 2005). The
Trinidad/Tobago government (Ministry 2005) and the Caribbean Natural Resources
Institute (Chan A Shing 2001) say that studies are needed to assess the economic aspects of artisanal fishing and its importance to local communities (Chan A Shing 2001;
Ministry 2005).
Outline of Chapters
The remainder of the dissertation provides ethnographic and theoretical background, presents the results, and discusses the implications of the study. Chapter two reviews the HBE and CA literatures, which provide the main theoretical approaches of this study. Chapter three constructs a history of the Caribbean and Trinidad/Tobago from cultural and archaeological studies. Eras of indigenous inhabitation, arrival and spread of
33 non indigenous peoples, and forms of fishing are highlighted. After understanding the region’s history and cultures, chapter four focuses on the demographic features of the study community, Icacos. Data on kinship, lineage, household structure, and ethnic composition of the local fisher folk population are discussed. Chapters five through eight outline results of the study and are presented in the order they occurred during fieldwork.
Fish distribution began early and continued for the remaining six months, cultural domains and models were the result of interviews that started after recording of distribution began with participant observation happening throughout fieldwork.
Eventually EDT interviews were completed with the final portion of the study being a second and third round of economic games. Chapter five outlines and critiques HBE studies of material transfers and presents the results of the catch distribution studies.
Chapter six presents the results of cultural models of fishing for the two major ethnic groups. Incorporating these cultural models into the data on cognitive decision making, chapter seven supplies the results of the EDT portion of the study. Chapter eight presents the results of the economic games and how they support other findings. Conclusions, theoretical implications, and community development issues are outlined in chapter nine.
34 CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This chapter provides an overview and critique of HBE and CA. Recent HBE literature that focuses on food sharing and distribution is discussed and how elements of culture, such as cultural models, are being discussed and integrated into study designs. I summarize the development of CA from early literature on folk taxonomies and cultural domains to current theories of “culture in mind” (Shore 1996) whereby cultural models are meaningful interpretations of the external world held in common within a culture and are a primary influence on human behavior. Within CA, I review EDT case studies to show how cultural models can be systematically tested through identifying and testing the significance of cultural models in individuals’ cognitive decision making.
Human Behavioral Ecology
Utility Maximization and Cultural Models in HBE Studies of Material Transfers
HBE hypotheses regarding material transfers assume that a universal set of costs and benefits determine the outcome of an exchange decision (see Smith and Winterhalder
1992). Individual reproductive fitness is the utility to be maximized and aiding genetic family or one’s self is the proximate goal that results in increased fitness (Lupo 2007).
This is similar to rational choice theory (see Elster 1986), which like HBE, has not systematically addressed cultural diversity (Garro 1998) and instead presupposes that individuals possess information on multiple alternatives and make utility maximizing choices based on this knowledge (cf. Simon 1955).
35 HBE is the major domain in anthropology of conducting field studies and testing human cooperation (Gurven 2004b). It assumes cross culturally similar patterns of exchange (Tucker 2004; Ziker and Schnegg 2005) that result in fitness maximization, but has not addressed unexpected or maladaptive patterns. Even the dogmatic support of universal rationality in economics is being questioned in recent years with the development of behavioral economics (Henrich et al. 2004). Related to both anthropology and economics, evolutionary psychology has recently shown that humans are more apt to practice reasoning (i.e., understanding what is culturally acceptable) than pondering what is empirically true or false. This suggests humans are more cultural beings and are likely to utilize cultural elements in their decision making processes rather
than calculating beings (Ostrom 2005).
The importance of understanding the mechanisms underlying material transfers,
whether there exist universally similar patterns or more locally based models, is crucial
for both anthropology and economics. A common problem shared by all societies is the
searching out, defending, and exchanging of food, which creates strong selection pressures. Numerous social, political, and economic institutions have been constructed throughout human societies to answer multifaceted material distribution problems. Even the whole field of economics is based on understanding acquisition of scarce resources and how humans transfer those between themselves. Thus, the control and distribution of resources has become a primary focus of evolutionary anthropologists (Alvard 2002).
Systematically testing cross cultural variation in distributional preferences is also important because theoretical and experimental work shows that variation in prosociality interacts with social institutions to affect economic outcomes. Variation in prosociality is
36 especially critical to an understanding of aggregate economic phenomena in settings where the contracts governing social interactions are incomplete, such as in tribal and
“peasant” communities where informal institutions are paramount (Efferson et al. 2007).
HBE predicts that individuals residing in the same environment and using the
same resources should arrive at parallel decisions and patterns of sharing and distribution
(Smith and Winterhalder 1992). For instance, in high risk environments where food
returns are asynchronous and vary widely in amounts procured between trips, HBE predicts reciprocity occurs as an adaptation to buffer unpredictability and ensure food
flows from haves to have nots and back (Alvard 2002; Bliege Bird et al. 2002). Studies
with maritime fisher hunters and fisher foragers contradict these predictions, however,
and suggest cultural reasons for distributional variation (e.g. Alvard 2003,2002; Bliege
Bird et al. 2002). With the Lamalera fishers and whale hunters of Indonesia, whale is an
asynchronous and highly variant item, yet membership in the lineage of a distributor is
the best predictor of allocation and not reciprocity as hypothesized by looking exclusively
at the resource ecology (Alvard 2003,2002). Similarly, the Meriam fisher foragers of
Torres Strait, Australia do not reciprocally distribute highly variant items from hunts,
which are more likely subject to costly signaling (Bliege Bird et al. 2002). In these and
other HBE studies, one cultural group is studied in a specific context of food distribution
(e.g. feasts, shoreline fish catch transfers). HBE needs a comparison of multiple cultures
in the same environment to isolate culture’s role in transfer decisions. In addition, HBE
also needs studies of the same groups in various transfer contexts to better understand
how patterns and cultural models evidenced with transfers differ or are similar across
varying settings where available alternatives may differ.
37 Additional examples of HBE studies discussing cross cultural variation and cultural models include works by Bliege Bird and Bird. In their study of the Martu, Bird and Bliege Bird (2008) explain multiple cultural models that could account for evidenced universal patterns of transfer, but do not systematically test whether these models are causative agents in exchange decisions. Costly signaling was shown to be significant and its existence partially explained by the Martu cultural model of kurnta , which is shame upon a person brought on by forceful command and being overtly assertive. Miltilya are conceptualized as individuals who frequently give to others who may not have much and is also a person who works harder than others so that surplus production can be distributed widely. The absence of kin selection is elaborated by the authors’ observation that the Martu often say they share widely because “we are all one family”. In this sense, food sharing at camps is perhaps an expression of cultural kinship rather than genetic kinship. The authors also review numerous cultural models used in food distribution.
Hunters are expected not to lay claim to a carcass and not play a role in its distribution to others. Hunters modestly handover their kill and the cook, who handles primary distribution, pays attention to the immediate needs of all present in the foraging party.
Kin make no special claims for larger shares. Regarding gathering, if an individual is not part of a foraging party, that person cannot be assured of a share of the food. While it is not considered offensive for people to hide small portions of food or tobacco to reduce demands, if asked, it is rare for someone to refuse a demand. Under such circumstances, someone not generous would be considered nyarru ; incapable of expressing compassion,
less than human, and “like rocks”. In the food sharing among participants of a foraging party, who acquired what is known by all and asking for shares is rare because
38 distributors make efforts to anticipate any potential demands. All these cultural models suggest another universal transfer pattern; demand sharing.
Bliege Bird also discusses cultural models and how they relate to universal patterns of transfer in her study of the Meriam (e.g. Bliege Bird et al. 2002). Evidence supporting the existence of sharing and lack of conditional reciprocity is supplemented by the Meriam cultural model of debe tonar . Meriam the authors lived with interpret unconditional generosity, such as donating turtles to feasts or sharing turtles or fish with neighbors, differently than conditional reciprocity. A common Meriam conception of generosity involves referencing debe tonar , which means “the good way”. Debe tonar constitutes a set of principles to guide daily social interactions and adhering to those principles is considered a signal of Meriam moral and ethnic identity. Following debe tonar is said to mark an individual as a “good person” providing long term benefits in the form of an enhanced social reputation. This cultural model persuades individuals to be generous when distributing food and intersects with the concept of derapeili ; to share portions out. Derepeili sharing is explicitly unconditional.
While there are a handful of HBE studies mentioning cultural models as supplements to quantitative tests of food transfers, cultural economists have also used cultural models in their more qualitatively focused studies of food distribution.
Woodburn (1998) explains cultural models of meat sharing among the Hadza, how they obligate sharing amongst the group, and argues this is a model that is used immediately in decision making. This prevents any further consideration by a hunter to maximize some utility by drying and storing meat for later consumption or transfer, trading it for another item, or using it to payoff past debts. The Hadza conceptualize there to be epeme (“god’s
39 meat”) that is reserved and eaten by elders in secrecy away from others and cannot be claimed by a hunter. Remaining meat is considered manako eta Hadzabe (“people’s
meat”), which is widely distributed; first to those who helped carry meat back to camp
and then to those who remained at camp. The Hadza have cultural models for guiding
choices involving economic matters besides meat sharing. These include Hadza should
not profit from other Hadza, one should be receive for what one asks, outsiders who do
not share are wicked and individualistic, and accumulation of materials by an individual
is objectionable and denies others their entitled shares.
Sahlins (1972), in his classic overview of cultural economics, describes hunter
gatherers as possessing a cultural model of low wants regarding material items. This
results in their needs being sufficiently and consistently met and hunter gatherers
considering themselves affluent. Sahlins uses data from previous studies of the
Ju/~hoansi (!Kung San) and Australia Aborigines of Arnhem Land, which exhibit low
time allocation devoted to the primary form of work, food procurement. Combined with
high amounts of rest and sleep leads Sahlins to the conclusion that hunter gatherers
operate on this cultural model of low wants. Like Woodburn (1998), however, he
describes cultural models only and does not systematically test them.
HBE has built up a diverse set of case studies across numerous cultures
elucidating the most common patterns of material transfers, the environmental contexts
that give rise to these patterns, and how these distribution relationships shape
reproductive fitness. While HBE is increasingly integrating culture into analyses and
discussing cultural differences in cross cultural divergences of sharing patterns, the
40 approach still needs a systematic way to test and explain human cognition (e.g. cultural models) in shaping individual and group behavior.
Cognitive Anthropology Approaches
Ethnoscience, Cultural Models, and Foundational Schema
Before reviewing relevant literature from CA, two concepts from this sub field crucial to the present study need to be defined as they are sometimes used in place of one another, foundational schema and cultural models. Both are mental abstractions that mediate between perception and behavior (Casson 1983), but they differ according to level of abstraction. Shore (1996) distinguishes clearly between the two as “foundational schema” are wide ranging, more abstract, tacit phenomena. “Cultural models” are more explicitly known concepts for special purposes. This typology is useful since other cognitive anthropologists use schema and model interchangeably to describe almost all levels of cultural knowledge. Shore splits the term based on level of abstraction and range of use. Examples of foundational schema include in the U.S. and some western cultures the “hub and spoke” layout of airports, malls, and school buildings. The specific types of buildings are cultural models with the more abstract schema encompassing them, which can be recalled to figure out other types of buildings. This could be a “building” foundational schema, similar to a “building/architecture” schema for common house and
“public square” layouts in other cultures. Some foundational schema are even more abstract, such as the center periphery schema in Samoa that covers how phenomena as wide ranging as dance and village space are organized.
Cultural models are dynamic and conservative through time (Shore 1996; Strauss
41 and Quinn 1997); they provide meaning for the world that can be tweaked through similar repeated experiences occurring across a group’s members. Cultural models are not entities that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by empiricism, they are how people interpret and construct meaning, therefore valid in the minds of the individual. Culture is an arbitrary code by which meaning is constructed and phenomena classified, not based on any logic, but on the transmitted arbitrariness of culture (Shweder and LeVine 1984).
CA and the understanding of how humans mentally classify phenomena, which eventually leads to the idea of there being different cultural models and schema, begins with early studies on “primitive classification” (i.e., how tribal peoples “think”).
Durkheim and Mauss (1963) represent one of the initial works on the subject, synthesizing numerous case studies available at the turn of the twentieth century and concluding that categories of knowledge for tribal peoples are fundamentally social categories. Cultural models are parallel with and arise from social relations. The origins of “primitive classification” are in human relations as a society represents an initial ordering of the world encountered. The system of social hierarchy (i.e., differing roles for individuals) is unified with cognitive hierarchy. Thus, the socially ordered system determines the cognitively ordered system. One can see the sociological and functional influences of Durkheim here. The “social whole” is the causative agent, an ordered and functioning system that maintains order in itself and provides order to cognitive processes through classification. From this perspective, classification systems are more affective than intellectual. Individuals classify based on social relations beginning with entities nearest (i.e., emotionally attached) to them, meaning family. Bloodline becomes the basis of clan and eventually larger classification schemas (e.g. the state, multiple classes and
42 ethnicities) through the evolutionary development of larger societies.
This evolutionary theory leads Durkheim and Mauss to conclude that the development of social complexity triggered a rise in cognitive classification complexity as seen in western societies. They failed, however, to question whether primitives have
“multi system schemas” and alternate classification systems not based on western categories. Subsequent studies of “traditional ecological knowledge” (TEK) in ethnoscience, especially ethnobotany (e.g. Berlin 1992; Conklin 1969), show anthropologists that they do. The authors’ emphasis on unilinear evolution maybe due to their focus on one type of classification system for each society studied (Australia
Aborigine, Zuni, Sioux, Chinese), ignoring possibilities of multi system schemas. An additional critique is what to make of “ritual reversals” where, for example, gender and duty categories get blurred (e.g. the Naven rite in New Guinea) (Bateson 1958; Silverman
2001). Society can breach cognitive categories. Also contrary to Durkheim and Mauss’ theory, cognitive models must already exist to some general extent before classification of social categories can occur. Concepts of space and quantity (e.g. numbers of things, separating “one” from “many”) must be present in order for phenomena to be separated, allowing for distinguishing phenomena into categories based on varying characteristics.
After all, a hypothetical isolated human would categorize spatial relations to him or herself, but not necessarily model social relations since he or she would not experience that (Needham 1963). In the end, the authors make a call, pre cursing later attempts by cognitive anthropologists and post modernists, that the task for ethnographers is to shake off their own cultural categories and distinguish emic classifications of natives. One’s own cultural categories may have to be breached in order to model the world “anew”
43 (Durkheim and Mauss 1963). This will be the focus of ethnoscience beginning in the mid twentieth century.
One of the premier works explaining CA and the perspective of ethnoscience was
Tyler’s (1969) edited volume, which argued that fieldworkers need to discover “semantic features” of a group rather than explaining culture in terms of universal etic categories.
Semantic features are specific linguistic representations of cultural models; words used to distinguish elements and categorize reality. Since many anthropologists prior to the development of ethnoscience transformed natives’ models into etic universals (e.g. reciprocity, redistribution) to build generalizable theories, any data that does not conform often results in new sub categories, which then are tested and further sub categorized. CA and ethnoscience instead focuses on discovering the organizing models of behavior used by natives themselves, which constitute culture. Variants are not differences from an assumed universal type, but are part of the organization itself. Emic methods do not result in descriptions of “anatomical traits” that makeup the “material whole”, such as institutions, technology, or economic activity. Rather, focus is on how individuals perceive their materials and behavior (Tyler 1969).
Humans do not classify all phenomena in their “total environment”, but instead focus on some characteristics and ignore others. Simplest of this categorizing is naming
(conceptualization). Individuals then categorize concepts based on similar and different characteristics, which can be charted by an ethnographer into “taxonomies”. Taxonomies separate “apples from oranges” allowing for comparison of similar items based on their perceived characteristics. The vertical levels of a taxonomy signify generalization in which “semantic domains” are embedded. Semantic domains are any class of objects that
44 share at least one characteristic in common, which contrasts it from other categories (e.g. furniture, animals). Naming, categorization, and building relations between categories creates cultural models, how people make sense of reality (Tyler 1969).
Frake (1969) reiterates the need to discover phenomena that are relevant, which natives use to build cultural models. His emphasis is on the need to understand meaning of segregates within sentences, in order to build causal relationships between things.
Understanding cultural models is crucial to explain how natives make sense of their total environment, anticipate events, and distinguish criteria for decision making. In these ways, CA sees the larger discipline as a formal and not a natural science. Formal sciences are based on logic; they order phenomena in multiple ways. Natural sciences look at discrete materials, which can be isolated from each other and explained. To be a formal science, anthropology needs to be sufficient (use what is given in empirical data and not over or under predict) and parsimonious (use as few assumptions as possible to generate models) (Tyler 1969).
Through the next decade, cognitive anthropologists attempted to specify different forms of cultural models and how they relate to each other and shape actions and beliefs.
Bateson (1972) theorized that beliefs are “epistemological premises” (i.e., how we know what we know), which are high level abstract cultural models shaping perception, comprehension, and behavior. Bateson’s was attempting to outline a new sub field termed “ecology of mind”, which he argued did not exist as a unified theoretical enterprise. “Ideas”, which are similar in structure to beliefs, aggregate into “minds” (sets of related beliefs) according to this theory. Casson (1983) went on to define cultural models (he termed them “schemata”) as the “building blocks of cognition” that are the
45 conceptual abstractions mediating between perception and behavior. As an extension of previous definition, he argues they are responsible for comprehension, recognition, classification, planning, and decision making.
Casson (1983) also emphasized the importance of language’s link with cultural models; that grammar and lexicon express the underlying organization of cultural models and language acts as an external variable triggering models into “action”. For example, words like “buy”, “sell”, and “pay” bring up models of money and exchange. Other examples include different cultural models of poetry, which are triggered by certain rhetorical devices (e.g. rhyming, meter) prompting the brain to recognize “this is poetry”.
Cultural models also act as “prototypes” relating concepts to specific environmental variables. For instance, “buyer” is usually a person, but can also be more loosely linked with the concept of “business”. Prototypes are the basis of cultural models and the lowest level of abstraction. They constitute basic definitions of what phenomena are and their characteristics similar to how “semantic features” were defined years earlier.
Rudimentary language interpretation also occurs here. Prototypes can be “fuzzy” as lines between categories can be blurred. For example, two individuals in the same culture may classify the same color as blue or purple. Cultural models overlap and also build upon each other up through levels of abstraction. Prototypes become concepts used as components in more complex “orientational” and “event” models. Higher level cultural models exist as “wholes”. They are not to be seen just as aggregates of lower level concepts and relations, meaning that as wholes, related concepts take on new definitions
(e.g. how linking “buyer” and “seller” concepts in a “money transfer” can also signify dominance of seller over a buyer).
46
Connectionism, Motivations, and Institutions v. Interpretation
Ethnoscience in anthropology was part of a larger cross disciplinary “cognitive revolution” through the 1950s and 1960s, which shifted focus from Skinner behaviorism that looked at decision making as only reactions towards external stimuli to behavior being a result of internal programs of knowledge. Culture became internal, a system of encoded knowledge and symbols, not just habits and actions (D’Andrade 1984). The cognitive revolution switched anthropologists from looking at behavior (culture is “out” in the world) to looking at mind (culture is internal) (Shweder and LeVine 1984).
By the 1980s, CA switched away from semantic features towards the more complex abstractions found in cultural models, shared by social groups. Higher level cognition like metaphor, semantic domain (category terms), and linkages between cultural models through discourse analysis became dominant over the componential analysis and taxonomies of ethnoscience, which looked more at lower level semantic features (D’Andrade 1989). D’Andrade (1989) argues this is where the main contribution of anthropology to cognitive science has been; in identifying cultural models of symbolic representation (i.e., culturally unique ways for perceiving, organizing, and acting on symbols in the “total environment”). He reviews cultural models as responsible for cognitive steps from perception to behavior including perception, memory recall, and reasoning (decision making). Single characteristics (features) define cultural models, which then build through linking and overlapping to create more abstract concepts and statements. Thus, “gone” is an abstract form of “go” and “away” because it links these two in a temporal sequence. This is known as cognitive “chunking”, how models link
47 together and overlap to produce higher level abstract schema. Cognitive scientists provide the material picture of this process whereby neuron signals (as physical representations of cultural models) link and overlap to physically “chunk together”
(D’Andrade 1989).
To modernize the discussion in CA, D’Andrade (1992) uses a computer program analogy for cultural models: a program (procedure) by which abstract concepts and events can be identified from simpler pattern recognition. This is generally how computer programming and engineering works, thus a metaphor for the brain. D’Andrade mentions
“parallel distributed processing” (PDP) in cognitive psychology, which simulates
interaction between layers and within layers of models. Each model resembles an
autonomous “computer like” entity, which is able to store information and perform
calculations to link to other models. Physically, they resemble neuron like elements.
They are able to simulate such cognitive functions as completion of partial information
and formation of prototypes. He argues models are not mere objects, but processes, since
they are constantly in linkage.
This turn towards a more cognitive science style of visualizing cultural models as
different layers of linking and interacting elements is the basis for a recent perspective in
CA, connectionism. According to Strauss and Quinn (1997), connectionism sees models
not as language statements, but as memories at different distances from other memories,
which represent phenomena at various levels of abstraction. Physically, these memories
exist as neurons at various layers, which are activated by on/off switches from external
stimuli. Combinations of these “1s and 0s” (whether the concept is on or off) are
combined and the resulting combo of on/off switches lead to the linkages that form the
48 thought process. Combos of switches can be thought of as “connection weights”, which will trigger other models depending on the combination involved (e.g. buyer and seller switches “on” will weight them positive and activate “exchange” since “exchange” is programmed for this combo from previous experiences with buyer/seller interaction).
Strauss and Quinn question connectionism in regards to explaining “deliberate conscious control”. Automatic information processing (e.g. 5 times 5 equals 25) can easily be made from layered models, but calculating the “square root of 62” requires more effort beyond recalling experience. Strauss and Quinn suggest there is “experience processing” alongside “symbol processing”. This is a critique of connectionism concerning rational problem solving, that individuals are not rational calculators, but rather problem solvers based on experiences (Strauss and Quinn 1997). In classic cognitive studies, the brain was viewed as a container and contents, a storage device where events and concepts were recorded and recalled. The “cognitive revolution” has shown us that the brain is a pattern of overlapping schema; neural networks that have weighted linkages signifying remembered experiences. These weights in the network change as new sensory inputs
(experiences) occur. The brain is flexible since it learns and adapts (Shore 1996).
By the 1990s, cognitive studies increasingly emphasized emotions as partially integrated with mental processes and also began looking at motivations as driving cognitive decision making (D’Andrade and Strauss 1992). Previous perspectives in psychology had separated these with distinct realms for cognition, emotion, and motivation (Strauss 1992). As part of this perspective, D’Andrade (1992) suggests the need to investigate how cultural models not only categorize, describe, and order the “total environment”, but also link together to form scripts and goals for action. How does
49 culture influence goals? Studying motivations as embedded in cultural models allows anthropologists to explain varying decision making cross culturally. Motivations parallel cultural models (or can even be conceptualized as cultural models) in their levels of abstraction. For example, high level abstract goals of “love” or “career success” trigger low level models to gain those ends, such as “dating service” or “apply for positions” respectively. Thus, alternatives analyzed in decision making can be seen as types of lower level models with, in some cases, larger goals embedded in these alternatives as abstract “motivations” (Strauss 1992).
Besides finding motivations for individuals and how those are linked to culture, another focus of recent CA is on whether cultural models are developed from public symbols or private interpretation. A key debate concerns to what extent models reflect and are seen in public discourse and symbols or how much cultural models are private interpretations of external phenomena. Socio cultural theories including “interpretivism” sees human action as a “written text” that needs to be analyzed without regards to individual cognition. Cognitive anthropologists, such as Strauss (1992), critique interpretivism as not adequately accounting for cognitive and behavioral dimensions of spoken discourse. To interpretivists like Geertz (e.g. 1973), culture is public as seen in the widely seen and available meanings of symbols. Cognitive anthropologists counter that culture is indeed shared, but that it is not always public. Individuals can internally possess the same cultural models and scripts without the contexts that produced those models necessarily being available for all to view. Intrepretivism does not sufficiently address the role of cultural models in interpreting public and private symbols (Strauss
1992). Previous culture theory assumed in group individuals all share the same cultural
50 models and act accordingly similar. With recent focus on multiple and shifting identities, however, it is not simply that there exists a “culture X”, but that there are “shared models in group X with intra cultural variation from personal experience” (Strauss and Quinn
1997).
Culture as internal meaning contrasts to classic definitions of culture as behavior, institutions, materials, and cognition. In the 1990s, cognitive anthropologists defined culture as “meaning” (i.e., interpretation of external elements). “Meaning” (as culture) is the interpretation evoked in an individual by an object or event. Interpretation includes identification and expectations for the phenomena experienced. This makes meaning momentary, but not necessarily idiosyncratic as meaning is produced by a more stable structure of cognitive models, which can allow for similar interpretations between people within cultures and repeated interpretations of similar phenomena (e.g. scripts) (Strauss and Quinn 1997).
What something means, however, depends on both the external (phenomena itself and what it is doing) along with the internal (past experiences of the individual). This assumes a connectionist approach; concepts are not characteristics X, Y, and Z, but rather they are remembered as experiences. Cultural models are shared interpretive structures because of common life experiences in a group (e.g. watching the same mass media) and not directly because of institutions/norms, although one could argue that shared models are the same because of institutions. Culture is not an abstract and separate entity, it is instead a concept summarizing the shared interpretations (meanings) that people give phenomena because they have similar life experiences in groups and have various interactions with each other. Culture as a concept summarizes the regularities between
51 individually created meanings. It is not “culture taught me to do X”, but a more individual approach of “I experienced an interaction and taught myself X through interpreting that situation” (Strauss and Quinn 1997).
What is it about culture “out there” that is being conformed to resulting in shared meanings and interpretations? Like Strauss and Quinn (1997), Shore (1996) sees culture as common interpretation and meaning taken from similar experiences with experiences existing in interactions. Like Bruner states in his foreword of Shore (1996), “the product of meaning making is reality” (i.e., we institute our common interpretations). For Shore, meaning is “twice born”. Meaning is instituted in culture, which is the Geertzian approach that public images have meaning themselves. Also, meaning is idiosyncratic to the individual. Shore differentiates from Strauss and Quinn in taking the Geertzian view of “meaning instituted in public symbols”. For Strauss and Quinn, meaning only exists internally. Mind becomes the interaction of the nervous system and the highly variable outside world. Shweder and LeVine (1984) extend this and contrast the inter relation of mind and social context with psychologists’ quest for a “universal central processing unit”. Culture is externalized and shared, not through guessing others’ underlying thoughts, but through experiencing the representations of those thoughts. These recent advances in CA maybe the merging of the long juxtaposed “psychic unity of humans”
(universal cognitive processes) and “cultural relativism”. Cognitive structure and processes of meaning and interpretation are generally similar cross culturally since all individuals have cultural models and foundational schema layered in connectionist networks to produce action. Different locales and groups, however, produce unique experiences through interactions and give rise to particular meanings through different
52 types of interactions (Shore 1996).
There has been disagreement over the years in CA about the relationship between cultural models and institutions, which informs the public v. private debate. Some cognitive anthropologists such as D’Andrade (1989) are analogous to more classic theorists (e.g. Foster 1965; cf Tyler 1978) 5 in arguing cultural models and institutions parallel each other. D’Andrade (1989) argues a cultural model is “cultural” because it is
instituted. There exist rules and expectations to know and behave by the model, otherwise
subject to sanctions. Thus, cultural models are shared through institutions, which is what
separates them from personal cognitive models. As Foster (1965) argues, cognitive
models drive behavior, which determine the rules of a society. Members of a society
share an un verbalized perception of the “rules of the game”, that perception being a
cognitive model of institutions (e.g. what is moral). For Foster, institutions parallel the
models as well, then “feedback” (see Blau 1994) to structure behavior.
Stressing more individual autonomy in behavioral choice and motivations for behavior, Strauss (1992) counters that private interpretations are not replicas of public
messages (i.e., cultural institutions). Motivation is not automatically formed when
cultural messages are imparted. Individuals ignore “morality” to a degree. From this,
Strauss asks: how do specific types of institutions and symbols influence motivation
(beliefs)? The question is not just what the dominant institutions of society are, as
countering theoretical perspectives assume, but how do individuals internalize, perceive,
order, and link these constructs? Public messages like “be strict” or “be indulgent” can be
5 Tyler (1978) counters this perspective distinguishing between cognitive models and institutions. Cognitive models are autonomous and irreflexive. Once set in motion, they reach their conclusion since people do not conceive of the models themselves. Institutions, however, are conscious, explicit, have purpose, and can be modified.
53 vague (i.e., open to many different actions) so they cannot be precisely copied for a belief system.
Strauss and Quinn (1997) expanded upon Strauss’ previous theory, drawing from
Bourdieu’s (1977) “habitus”, incorporating both structure and agency. It is not that sometimes individuals enact learned institutions (follow the rules) and sometimes individuals are “free to choose” (break the rules). Rather, we are always constrained by our experiences. Individuals learn institutions through experience and this is imprecise knowledge with much “noise” in context. This counters D’Andrade (1989) that cultural models are cultural because they are instituted. Instead, rules are not always learned exactly and are internalized differently through experience. These learned experiences
(durable dispositions) are “habitus” (not perfectly precise habits). Individuals often learn culture, build and link schema, through “apprenticeship by familiarization”. For example, individuals sometimes do not learn the explicit rule “eat with elbows off the table”, but learn by observing over repeated experiences at the dinner table. Strauss and Quinn critique Bourdieu in respect to cultural institutions not always being explicit (e.g. cases where rules are specifically told).
Combining the previous two perspectives in a more unified theory regarding the nature of “shared” or “in common” culture is Shore (1996). He distinguishes between
“instituted models” and “mental models”, which represent external and internal (i.e., perceived culture) respectively. This returns to Shore’s perspective that meaning is “twice born”. Meaning is instituted in culture (instituted models), but also idiosyncratic to the individual (mental models). Individuals internalize unique experiences based on previous cultural models. An example would be the idiosyncratic word associations one makes up
54 when first learning a language; these are often particular to the individual and not shared.
There are also “conventional models” (e.g. the Star Spangled Banner), which are cultural experiences that have been externalized and instituted.
Cultural Models in Maritime Anthropology
Studies in maritime anthropology have only described sharing and distribution qualitatively (e.g. Cordell 1984; Kronen 2004) in specific contexts (e.g. Griffith and
Valdes Pizzini 2002), but have not quantitatively tested forms of sharing, distribution, or cognitive decision making processes to verify causes of material transfer. These are needed to authenticate what is occurring and thought about when making cooperative choices. Recent studies in the sub field claim cultural models are significant in decisions to cooperate (e.g. Griffith and Valdes Pizzini 2002; Kronen 2004), but do not systematically test against cross cultural theories nor between cultural groups
(ethnicities) to strengthen their argument. Like cultural economists (e.g. Woodburn
1998), who are also recent studiers of sharing cross culturally, they have described different local cultural models, but have not compared nor tested these local models against universal hypotheses to determine what is operating within a population. This is one reason why tests against the universal hypotheses of HBE are used in the present study.
There are a few examples of cultural models identified in maritime anthropology
(e.g. Griffith and Valdes Pizzini 2002; Taylor 1981). Griffith and Valdes Pizzini (2002) discuss the cultural models of fishing as an occupation among small scale fisher folk in
Puerto Rico. Fishing is viewed as a healthy job allowing one to keep their mind off of
55 vices, enabling exercise, independence, and personal therapy. Fisher folk see it as a sporty alternative to wage labor. Cooperation between fisher folk is described as being partially dependent on fishers sharing this cultural model of fishing as an independent lifestyle, which is further shown by fishermen who only use the profession as supplemental income as being more aloof from neighboring fishers and not sharing the same cultural models. These fishers end up switching to monetary payments for their crew instead of utilizing the fish catch share system of distribution to compensate their boat mates. Since they often do not have friends that are also established fishers, these
“part timers” turn to kin to fill a small boat crew. Taylor (1981) briefly mentions cultural models among fishermen in an Irish community. Fisher folk there view the sea as “other worldly” with fishers having to deal with supernatural forces on the ocean. Cultural models of fishing, such as these, strengthen community identity and help build identity boundaries between communities making each village unique to themselves.
Many of the other works in maritime anthropology have assumed fisher folk operate on universal rational choice. Studies by Gatewood specifically look at decisions regarding cooperation in this manner. Salmon seine fishers in Alaska cooperate with each other regarding helping each other decide where to fish due to needing information for a tough decision. Cooperation is not because of a cultural model such as reinforcement of an identity, but rather framed as a process whereby fishermen need extensive information and gather it in order to ensure they arrive at a more accurate decision of fishing location.
Partners who share information are most often kin or friends and the author portrays fishers as initially possessing incomplete information, but after gathering facts they use a matrix of criteria to arrive at a choice that is universally optimal (i.e., all fishers should
56 and do arrive at one decision based on a set of information) (Gatewood 1984). Gatewood
(1983) claims not all Alaskan salmon seiners are optimal decision makers as
“irrationality” plays a part, but the entire discussion of the choice process is centered on information gathering and how that results in an optimal conclusion. In a further reliance on utility maximization, Gatewood and Mace (1990) test optimal foraging theory among
Nova Scotian purse seiners. The decision by boat captains of where to fish is assumed by the authors to be based on a numeric function involving where high value and large schools of fish are present. The authors attempt to simulate choices by captains on where to fish by calculating a threshold of catch quantity and netting a school of fish based on the rate of occurrence of fish school sizes at specific fishing spots and past encounter rates of fish schools at those spots. They show that overly complex information leads to sub optimal strategies by some fishers.
CA has developed over multiple decades from identifying lexicon, to mapping cultural domains within the mind and folk classification systems, and more recently accounting for how the mind and culture affect each other through showing that cultural models are in common interpretations of the world that are then externalized through individuals behaving based on those interpretations. A problem with CA is the perspective has not had much emphasis on the systematic testing of cultural models in field studies nor has it linked these to patterns of sharing and distribution, which are crucial in understanding the evolution of human society through cooperation. This is what EDT’s are doing, however, and provide CA a means to systematically link cultural models to behavior.
57 Rational Man and the Development of Ethnographic Decision-Making Trees
Studies on decision making trace back to the works of Herbert Simon, who was one of the first social scientists to thoroughly critique the then widely accepted theory of universal rationality. Economics has often assumed individuals behave like “economic man”, an ideal figure who possesses much information on alternative courses of action, can calculate costs and benefits between alternative paths, and select one that will optimally meet desired goals. When applied to empirical reality, the theory often does not hold up calling into question its adequacy as both an empirical and even ideal model of behavior (Simon 1955).
As of the 1970’s, EDT’s were used to analyze how fisher folk make decisions concerning economic matters, such as at which markets to sell catch (e.g. Gladwin 1975;
Quinn 1978). These studies, however, have fallen into the same economist assumptions of maximization afflicting the discipline of economics. Researchers assume individuals calculate various costs and benefits to evaluate alternatives, which can be expressed quantitatively. Simon (1955) explained this “global” (universal) rationality, as he termed the classic theory, as an ideal that requires information and calculation too complex for most human contexts. The author attempts to re work universal rationality by simplifying it. Possible results of different alternatives can be generally ranked in three categories:
“satisfactory, neutral, or unsatisfactory” for comparative decisions to be made. Humans may not be able to compute “optimums” or ways to maximize towards ideal goals.
Instead, with limited information, individuals simply categorize alternatives as satisfactory, neutral, or unsatisfactory and will go with the most satisfying and often the least risky. Simon argues people are more goal “sufficers”; they choose that which will
58 most likely helps toward a goal. Stated another way, they look for the minimum guaranteed payoff. A problem remained beyond Simon’s critique, however, which is how does one arrive at rankings or values for alternatives? This is what EDT’s (after the initial studies in the 1970’s) and CA will specify decades later.
Another problem with the classic model is that it assumes people compare “apples to oranges” and rank preferences between things that are far different and maybe unquantifiable. How do people maximize things such as status, respect, or honor?
Further, classic rationality assumes individuals know all alternatives and then completely go through each before choosing the maximum payoff. Often, people do not go through all alternatives and simply take the first known alternative that is categorized
“satisfactory” (one that works towards the goal). Also, preferences can change during a decision making process since the considering of feasibility (practicality) between alternatives shifts attitudes towards preference ranking. More difficult alternatives may mean a lowering of preference towards those alternatives, changes not accounted for by universal rationality. If social scientists are to compare decisions on the basis of whether it is more or less “rational”, we should not use ideal models of rationality and rather more realistic “limited” rationality (Simon 1955).
Rational choice theorists, such as Elster (1986), defend universal rationality as normative; that it models what humans should do in order to achieve their goals and it is not always empirically what they do. He argues rational choice is not a moral theory, that it does not state what individuals’ goals should be. Rather, it seeks to understand how preferences are ranked to reach a desired end. If one asks “is a decision rational”, then one needs to show that the associated preferences and desires are rational. Elster outlines
59 a few conditions to be met for a choice to be universally rational. First, the outcomes believed to follow from various alternatives considered must have inductive plausibility given the information considered by the individual. Also, the beliefs on outcomes need to be caused by the available information (cf. “wishful thinking”). Even strong supporters of universal rationality such as Elster admit prior and additional critiques of the perspective.
These include universal rationality not being subject to different structures of thought as seen cross culturally, individuals not being able to quantify and equally compare widely divergent alternatives (i.e., “apples to oranges”), individuals possessing incomplete information, and having uncertainty in outcomes.
An additional problem with universal rationality, along with previous approaches identifying relations of culture and cognition in anthropology (e.g. “primitive” classification) is that these theories sometimes presented cognition in hypothetical entities and not observed and measured from actual individuals. This is what EDT’s specify years later, measuring how actual individual cognitive processes operate beyond hypotheticals or simulations. Further, post modernism has lost culture in favor of emphasizing individual thought. This is why integrating cultural models into EDT’s is a priority, to specify how cultural and personal cognitive models work at the individual level (Shore
1996).
A major step in getting away from the individual as a utility maximizing calculator and specifying how individuals’ cognitive decision making processes operate is Tversky’s (e.g. 1972) work. According to Tversky, individuals are sometimes incoherent and inconsistent when deciding between alternatives. They do not always know which alternative to choose or choose different alternatives under identical
60 conditions. This is a step removed from universal rational choice as assuming individuals calculate high amounts of information across numerous complex alternatives simultaneously. Tversky says his theory breaks down the decision process into a “step by step” evaluation of characteristics of the alternatives. Combined with Simon’s (1955)
“bounded rationality”, one could look at the decision process as a stepwise evaluation of aspects as outcomes of alternatives; thus individuals evaluate outcome parameters of alternatives one at a time. Humans have bounded information and calculating capacities.
Individuals are deficient information gatherers and calculators, therefore they attempt to simplify decision making possibilities. Since “elimination by aspects” (EBA) can describe any choice based on the aspects chosen, it can explain “irrational” alternatives as well. Tversky says it is this feature that inherently makes EBA a non rational theory.
Tversky also calls into question the objectivity of values in decision making, so differences in culture (beliefs, values) could account for differences in decision making.
Decisions are not made based on a “simple scalability” where all alternatives are weighed simultaneously and the one with the best utility is selected. Rather, criteria are
“order dependent”, which is the assumption and basis of EDT’s. Classic decision theory says that if choosing between four alternatives of equal weight (e.g. between two travel agencies offering a Europe trip and an Asia trip, each agency and trip are equally preferred), then the probability of choosing each is 25%. If that is cut into three options
(one of the Europe trips is eliminated), then the probability of choosing should be 33.3% each. However, it is not 33.3% because the travel agency chosen is irrelevant to the decision maker. So this reworks the logical probabilities of choice, especially in complex multi attribute decisions (Tversky 1972).
61 Tversky describes his theory of choice as similar to what later EDT models are like, which is one reason why this article is cited so much as a forerunner to EDT’s. A decision between alternatives is to be made and each alternative has a set of aspects with these aspects becoming the decision criteria. The highest weighted aspect (i.e., that which is most crucial) is selected and those alternatives that do not have that aspect are eliminated. This “selection by aspects” is essentially how the nodes of an EDT work, going down through aspects by what the individual sees as important and eliminating alternatives that do not have the aspect. Tversky’s model assumes people are considering and eliminating several alternatives at once. EDT’s lower the number of alternatives considered simultaneously, but raise the number of criteria (i.e., aspects, characteristics) used to choose. In this sense, EDT’s see a more considerate and slower (piece meal) decision maker compared to Tversky’s rapid chooser among many alternatives at once.
Gladwin (1975) continues Tversky’s critique of classical economic theory, but from an economists’ perspective. She argues that with the exclusive use of universal rationality, there is little need for EDT’s. Market conditions in the accessible markets will determine what people will or should do. One could build, however, a decision model specifying which economic factors are more prominent, even if exclusively utilizing universally rational assumptions. Classic economics also has linear programming for decision making, but this assumes many alternatives are calculated simultaneously.
Gladwin’s EDT portrays individuals as choosing between alternatives one at a time in a stepwise manner of evaluating aspects singularly (see Tversky 1972). This updated form of EDT also makes factors in a decision become “yes or no”; a binary set leading to a choice, while in linear programming the values assigned to criteria are numerical (levels),
62 thus making the computation more complex. With Gladwin’s EDT form, criteria are relative and not continuous. This is crucial because continuous measures for things like risk of a market are not measurable with so many exogenous factors involved beyond mere prices (which is what a linear programmer may use as a continuous measure for such a model). In EDT’s, the aspect only needs to exceed a certain property (e.g. do you have enough fish to sell at market?) rather than a continuous aspect calculated in combination with others (e.g. amount of fish you have to sell, plus the average price of fish at the market, plus average number of sellers at market). Gladwin questions classic economic models that portray persons knowing such information. EDT’s instead assume individuals decide based on whether an aspect passes a certain threshold or not (relative rather than continuous).
Gladwin separates EDT’s from Debreu’s (1954) lexicographic model since EDT’s and Tversky’s EBA model acknowledge that in many cases, multiple aspects need to be satisfied to choose an alternative whereas only one most crucial aspect is used to render a decision according to Debreu. Although there maybe a preference ordering (as shown by the highest to lowest flow of an EDT), it is not simply that the highest aspect is looked at exclusively and a choice made on the basis of that aspect without looking at other criteria.
Another early and important piece in the EDT literature is Barlett (1977) whose goal was to understand culturally modeled forms of utility in peasant farmers’ decisions on which of four crops to focus on for planting. Thus, decision criteria were elicited, but set in terms of a different aspect of utility since Barlett sees individuals as making decisions that maximize utility. Barlett says that this concept of “price utility” is what is most influential in driving decision making concerning economic matters and the primary
63 way that Paso peasants discuss their farm workings. Barlett interviewed heads of households (using household as the production unit of analysis) to elicit previous season cash and labor inputs to farming. This was a step by step recall of amount of labor over time, additions of purchased inputs (including transportation costs), and returns from total sales of crop (including estimation of market value of crop not sold). What is called emic criteria, as with Gladwin (1975), is placed within a universally rational framework.
Maybe informants did list only these types of criteria, but more discussion in terms of cultural framing, the use of non western economic terminology, and any influence or leading by the interviewer regarding EDT interviews would help.
With both Gladwin’s (1975) and Barlett’s (1977) studies, what is called emic criteria, is placed within a universally rational framework. Gladwin adopted a model of sellers using previous days’ supply and demand to calculate probability that a market would have higher demand than supply or vice versa on the next day. The model assumed an equation form with an ordinal output. Despite Gladwin’s modeling of fish sellers as “probabilistic” calculators, she was not able to elicit explicit probabilistic calculations from informants. Although Gladwin did receive some other comments about past and hypothetical market conditions, there were no informants who could recreate the formal model she created and some informants even proclaimed her “foolish to be asking such questions, expecting them to foretell the future”.
Quinn (1978) uses Gladwin’s (1975) study of Cape Coast fish sellers as an approach to critique and data to reanalyze. Quinn more so than her predecessors begins to put the “cognitive” in cognitive decision making, by building models exclusively off of informants’ criteria rather than etic economic models. Cultural models, however, are not
64 yet accounted for in these decision processes. She uses emic criteria, but does not push it much farther beyond immediate economic reasoning. Her model is based on economic criteria and perhaps this is all Biriwa sellers consider, but eliciting of semantic domains, game theory tests, or other experiments to critique universal rationality are not used or discussed. In the end, Quinn is saying that people just categorize a few types or one type of economic data to make choices.
Barlett (1980) argues much of the EDT research since the 1970’s represents another direction in economic anthropology away from formalism and substantivism.
While the previous works she mentions still focus on universally rational criteria as previously mentioned, later works by Gladwin (1984), Young (1980), and
Mukhopadhyay (1984,1980) turn away from pure formalist compensatory assumptions while integrating cultural models. More than drawing on their predecessors, they go beyond formalism, substantivism, and Marxism by introducing cognitive perspectives to economic behavior, which was not explicitly addressed by previous economic anthropology “schools”.
Through the 1970’s then, the EDT literature was still in its infancy and relying almost exclusively on concepts from western economics and theories of universal rationality, despite the insistence from some of its practitioners that EDT’s were accounting for local culture. These early EDT’s were normative rather than descriptive, argues Johnson (1980) who critiques universal rationality models from the prior decade.
When applied to peasant and indigenous (non western) societies, they do not accurately predict since cultural values are not accounted. Economists often trivially explain errors in prediction away as imperfection in the model fixable through mathematics or problems
65 with data measurement, bypassing cultural particulars. This shows economists, such as
Gladwin, preferring “well structured” (ideal) models to “ill structured” (irrational according to western standards) models that may be more complex with non maximizing strategies.
Identifying and Integrating Cultural Models in Decision-making
By the 1980’s, the EDT literature began searching for more culturally sensitive processes of decision making or what has been termed, in opposition to universal rationality, “cultural rationality” (Garro 1998a). Even as early as the 1960’s, anthropologists were critiquing universal rationality and stating that rationality (as logical construction) is culturally defined (relative) (e.g. Foster 1965). EDT’s, having been heavily influenced by its early theorists such as Gladwin who were economists, received more emic style methods once anthropologists contributed more to the literature. EDT’s initially rose from ecological and economic anthropologists’ dissatisfaction with formal economist assumptions along with increased interests in the cognitive revolution and artificial intelligence (including connectionism) (Gladwin 1984). Works in the literature since the early 1980’s represent a contribution of either (or both) new ways in eliciting criteria from informants and testing EDT’s on external samples or other data.
Young (1980) is one of the first in EDT studies to incorporate cultural models into
EDT’s with the Tarascan concept of fe . Perhaps the less economic context of the decision concerning illness treatment allowed for more idiosyncratic models to be integrated as economic theory often looks for universals. Four criteria are found significant (common among sample) concerning whether Tarascan indigenous choose home based methods, a
66 folk healer, a non physician medical practitioner, or a licensed physician to treat their own or a family members illnesses: perceived seriousness of illness, knowledge and/or experience of illness and its remedies, faith ( fe ) in western versus folk medical alternatives, and costs of treatment. Mukhopadhyay (1984) is also one of the first in EDT studies besides Young (1980) to discuss and incorporate cultural models into decision processes. Mukhopadhyay shows with the significant prediction rates and significant differences found when accounting for exogenous variables that decision models can be tested from emic data and can inform anthropologists on both “common” elements in choice and intra cultural variability. EDT’s aid in understanding not only what factors are significant (as in correlational studies), but specifies how they interact, how people come to order criteria, and how the “total environment” interacts with cultural models. EDT’s are an effective way to arrive at individuals’ attitudes, opinions, and actions (Franzel
1984).
Following advances in integrating cultural models into EDT’s, Gladwin (1989) took these lessons on “cultural rationality” and outlined a rather robust sampling and testing procedure for EDT field methods, which has subsequently become the primary field guide for EDT’s and been copied with small additions (e.g. Ryan and Bernard
2006). Other EDT theorists have utilized specific and multiple forms of Gladwin’s methods since she has outlined them in piece meal through methodology sections of her previous research articles. Quinn (1978), Young (1980), and Mukhopadhyay (1984) use initial small samples of convenience to build EDT’s that can then be tested, which Young does with a separate sample (recommended by Gladwin for external validation). While those eliciting criteria from informants often use Gladwin’s methods, the more
67 correlational approach to decision making (e.g. Cancian 1980; Chibnik 1981) has followed different procedures, sometimes using survey questionnaires to find criteria through correlations while abandoning cognitive approaches. Cognitive decision making has unique insights for ethnography in dealing with individual cognition, intra cultural variation, and building rapport with subjects through explicitly emic methods (asking informants how they think and act, not just measurement of outsiders’ desired or elicited variables).
Additional benefits of EDT methods include its cross cultural flexibility and practical applications. They can be used to examine virtually all human behavior and results of behavior. EDT’s assume that institutions and other “above micro” phenomena can be understood from individual behavior and are not somehow greater than the “sum of their parts” (i.e., no greater meaning). For development and other policy realms,
EDT’s can be fruitful since while they are an individual oriented field approach and they can yield predictive and testable models of commonalities in criteria considered among groups. Unlike etic generated decision models, which are often compensatory in structure
(linear), or correlational studies where variables interact and can be charted in a hierarchical fashion, EDT research results in hierarchies that are context sensitive and unique in structure to the decision (Gladwin 1989). To further extend the robustness of
EDT methods regarding cross cultural and intra cultural generalizing, Ryan and Bernard
(2006) made distinctions between external versus internal testing and direct versus indirect testing resulting in four possible combinations of testing procedures when these are combined. External and internal tests depend on whether the sample the EDT is tested on a group that is geographically “outside” the sample on which the EDT was built, such
68 as evaluating an EDT made from residents of Florida on a sample from another U.S. state. Direct testing of an EDT involves questioning a sample on the decision to be made and seeing if the criteria match, while indirect evaluation uses observations of the behavior in question to determine if the EDT criteria are utilized. With this, the authors combine and extend previous EDT practices to add to the types of methodologies for decision making studies.
The use of direct versus indirect testing addresses one concern that culture is not only knowledge necessarily, but also a set of skills (Palsson 1994). This “practice theory” critiques CA in the sense that culture is not simply stored as cultural models and foundational schema in the brain that acts as a container and receiver of culture. Rather, experience of putting cognitive models into practice (reality) is what determines cultural behavior. Culture is not just the knowledge an individual possesses, but how that knowledge is used. Related fields such as evolutionary psychology measure cultural transmission as knowledge that is transmitted, but not how that knowledge is put into practice and whether transmitted cultural models get reproduced in practice (i.e., externalized) (Ingold 1996).
While alternatives have been observable and verifiable (in behavior) in the EDT literature, criteria have not always been, especially in the form of cultural models. How to observe the use of Tarascans’ concept of fe , for example? Although one can see and verify the outcomes of chosen alternatives (e.g. planting crop X or Y, choosing medicine
A or B), use of criteria is not always observable since comparing aspects or recalling cultural models takes place within the brain. The amount of economic reserves an individual has would be observable, for instance, as a point of criteria in a choice on
69 whether to purchase a new item. The use of fe , however, and how much “faith” an
individual possesses towards a certain medical practice and what type of faith one has is
difficult to observe without questioning (Mukhopadhyay 1980).
Mukhopadhyay (1980) insists that EDT’s should reflect actual decision steps,
meaning they should be verifiable and show the processes that people use with criteria
rather than just listing ordered criteria elicited from informants’ statements and
interviews taken at face value. For Mukhopadhyay, this involves multiple fieldwork steps
in EDT interviewing to map alternatives and criteria. The researcher should identify how
individuals recognize and reduce possible alternatives, how interviewees select and use
multiple criteria to evaluate each alternative, the process of evaluating criteria, and the
ways individuals compare each alternative in order to arrive at a choice. This is what
Mukhopadhyay calls “accounting” for individual behavior, rather than simply
“modeling” decisions with the latter simply consisting of unverified criteria from
informant interviews.
This, however, does not address the problem of verifying cultural models during
an actual observed choice being made as cultural models are elusive to observation as previously mentioned. Although cultural models can be eluded to, be contained in
informal discourse, or explicitly stated by an informant during interviews, verification is
more difficult. In order to discover cultural models in routines and decisions, researchers
need to observe choices being made in either experimental settings where alternatives to be studied are available or in casual contexts where relevant semantic domains are being
used. When discussing choices in interviews or in informal contexts of an actual decision
at hand, individuals’ statements should differ depending on what form of criteria they
70 utilize to make the choice. If individuals rely on memory recall, for example, their comments should primarily be statements of events rather than statements of rules (if they were relying on cultural institutions). An example would be a fisherman choosing to fish at a certain spot after weeks of heavy rain because “the flood of a few years ago made this spot very good” (memory recall) versus “each of us fishermen have a set spot to go when it rains” (rule). Individuals should also elude to cultural models when using them, which can take various forms such as “this is what one does when doing X” or
“doing X is the right thing to do”. The present study follows these recommendations using economic games as experiments (see Chapter eight) and observing material transfer decisions in the context of everyday fish catch distribution. Cognitive anthropologists
(e.g. Strauss and Quinn 1997; see also Bourdieu 1977) argue individuals often do not learn cultural models through explicit rules (i.e., institutions), instead people learn culture through internalization of experiences and then attempting to mimic those actions of others through behavior. Under this theory, reciprocity, for example, is a response learned from watching others reciprocate. Thus, persistent contact with individuals acting out different cultural values can reflect heavily on an individual. The question is not what the dominant institutions of society are, as early functionalist cognitive studies portrayed
(e.g. Durkheim and Mauss 1963). Rather, how do individuals internalize, perceive, order, and link these constructs (Strauss 1992)?
The present study builds upon the strengths of HBE and CA approaches by systematically testing the affect of local cultural models on patterns of food sharing and distribution. Through utilizing HBE, CA, and EDT approaches, cross cultural patterns shown by HBE can be tested on a population and then the cultural models that refer to
71 these patterns can be tested to see if and how cultural models shape the cognitive decision making processes for these patterns. This combination of approaches can also determine whether cultural models enhance these patterns and improve prediction of sharing and distributive behavior.
72 CHAPTER THREE
HISTORIC AND ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF THE CARIBBEAN
AND TRINIDAD
Geography
The Caribbean culture area and the political and economic zone associated with it are often divided into five major island chains by cultural historians and archaeologists
(e.g. Keegan 1994; Rouse 1992). Going from southeast to north, the “southern
Caribbean” includes the small islands of Margarita and the ABC islands that are each of volcanic origin, lie along the Venezuelan coast, and share unique linkages with prehistoric mainland South American cultures such as “Valencioid” and “Dabajuroid”
(Keegan 1994:258 9). Trinidad/Tobago is considered separately due to its ancient connections with both the islands to the north through the Island Caribs having operated trade networks there and its proximity to mainland South America, which was a source of the islands’ early Arawak inhabitants. The third region of the Lesser Antilles contains the
Windward and Leeward chains, which constitute the islands north and west from
Trinidad/Tobago up to, but not including, Puerto Rico. Named by British colonial administrators, the two categories remain useful for distinction because the Leewards are smaller in size and were inhabited by the eastern population of the Tainos, while Island
Caribs occupied the Windwards (Keegan 1994:259 60).
The four largest islands, Cuba, Hispaniola, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, which were dominated by the Tainos prehistorically and experienced the earliest European contact, makeup the Greater Antilles (Dacal Moure and Rivero De La Calle 1996:4). The Greater
73 Antilles have relatively rich soils that can and prehistorically did support more dense populations through horticulture and agriculture. Northern most are the Bahamas, which are coral islands with similar marine resources, but less agricultural capacity (Rouse
1992:3). All Caribbean islands, except the Bahamas, are geographically and climatically classified as tropical (Keegan 1994:256).
As a whole, the region can be measured by the size of the Caribbean Sea, which is
1500 miles north to south and at least 350 miles east to west (Rouse 1992:1). The name
“Caribbean” was applied by the Spaniards after the Island Caribs who they described as the most vicious of the indigenous groups. This name may also have been a way to justify their enslavement of the Caribs, otherwise the region could have been called “Taino” after the largest population met by the Europeans (Rouse 1992:23).
Island Peopling, Early Migrations, and Archaic Horizons
Compared to other world regions (Africa, Latin America, Asia, Europe, and North
America), the Caribbean possesses perhaps the least archaeological literature. Less is known about archaic Caribbean peoples and their associated Circum Caribbean mainland predecessors than remote societies like Arctic hunter gatherers and Polynesian chiefdoms. Discrepancies exist despite Caribbean cultures such as the Arawak, Island
Carib, and Guanahatabey exhibiting linkages to continental peoples as far back as 9,000
“years before present” (YBP) (Dacal Moure and Rivero De La Calle 1996), which matches the antiquity of numerous American tribes. One reason for a lack of study is the quick degradation of remains from tropical soil and climate. Rarely are whole ceramics or tools found intact (Rouse 1992). The more complex societies of the prehistoric Caribbean
74 do not exhibit central urban architecture, which also contributes to a lacking scholarly interest. There is also comparatively little documentation of post colonial indigenous groups. Only a few exist in any substantial quantity to study (e.g. the Caribs on their
Dominica reservation), although there is a growing literature on Guiana Circum
Caribbean peoples (e.g., Mentore 2005,1987). Ethnographic analogy to inform prehistoric behavior is nearly non existent besides a few works on the Arawaks (see Hill and Santos
Granero 2002) and Caribs (see Basso 1977; Colson and Heinen 1984).
Studies of the Taino, who existed from 2,600 to 500 YBP and were the first New
World peoples met by Columbus, are the most famous of Caribbean archaeological literature (e.g. Rouse 1992). With more recent and substantial remains, complex political and social organization compared to preceding groups, sedentary settlement, and colonial documentation, Taino archaeology is more focused on behavioral, institutional, and cognitive elements than that of earlier foragers. The pre Taino Caribbean is one of the least studied periods in the Americas (Keegan 1994:272) and focuses almost exclusively on reconstructing material culture and dating population movements (Rouse 1992:49 92).
Three foci pervade the Caribbean archaeological literature: culture history, migration mapping, and identifying subsistence strategies. While other regional literatures have long passed culture history as a primary approach, Caribbean archaeologists continued to categorize ceramics into arbitrarily named “horizons” based on cladistic style analysis into the 1990’s. Grouping pottery and tools, however, often over emphasizes inter regional homogeneity. Problems can arise when geographically distant similarities result in a culture area that overlaps an intermediate region containing potentially diverse elements. Processualist advances since the 1960s in modeling
75 behavior and cognitive patterns (e.g. Binford 1965) are applied more with Taino remains since there is often more site context.
Pottery characteristics distinguish five material periods of Caribbean prehistory, the dates of which also correlate with changes in primary forms of subsistence (Petersen
1997:119). Pre agricultural periods include the “Lithic” period from 6,000 to 4,000 YBP
(Keegan 1994:256) and the “Archaic” from 4,000 to 2,500 YBP. Then came the agricultural and more materially complex “Early Ceramic” of 2,500 to 1,400 YBP and
“Late Ceramic” from 1,400 YBP to European contact by 1492 A.D. “Contact” is the final period from 1492 to 1550 A.D. when European influence spread and dominated, especially intense across the Bahamas, Greater Antilles, and the northern Lesser Antilles.
More Carib indigenous survived across the southern islands, many of which were later deported (Petersen 1997).
Material periods are divided into more geographically and culturally refined series and sub series names for organizing cultural chronology based on material classification using Vescelius’ (1980) typology. Suffixes “oid” denote series and “an” sub series.
“Casimiroid” covers Lithic and Archaic age Hispaniola and Cuba with the “Casimirian” complex uniting both islands during the Lithic and a split between “Courian” and
“Redondan” complexes in the Archaic period for the respective islands (Rouse
1992:51,61). Rouse (1992) argues there is enough uniformity across the Archaic Lesser
Antilles to classify this as the “Ortoiroid” series, although Keegan (1994) does not find this or categorize a series for this period of the Lesser Antilles. According to Rouse, the
Ortoiroid came near to the Casimiroid as the former advanced as far north as Puerto Rico to neighbor the Casimiroid who extended to the east side of Hispaniola. More agreement
76 among Caribbean archaeologists exists with classifying the “Saladoid” series, specifically the Cedrosan Saladoid who were also across the Archaic Lesser Antilles. The Saladoid are credited with bringing ceramics from South America to as far north as Puerto Rico from 4,000 to 1,400 YBP as they constitute the main group in the region during the Early
Ceramic period (Petersen 1997; Wilson 1997). Both the Ortoiroid and Saladoid are named for excavation sites in Trinidad and Venezuela respectively, showing the lengthy north south range of the two series (Keegan 1994:268; Wilson 1997:57). The Cedrosan
Saladoid branch in Puerto Rico eventually became the Ostionoid series, which transitions to the eastern Taino. Of all the branches of pre Taino peoples, it is the Cedrosan Saladoid of Puerto Rico that have the most in common and were likely the ones that most became the Taino (Rouse 1992:32 4). Periods, series, and associated cultural groups are matched across time in Figure 6.
Unifying much of the indigenous Caribbean and the preceding cultural horizons during the last centuries before Columbus’ arrival were the Taino. While having a unified culture, three sub groups within the Taino have been identified based on slight ceramic and demographic differences. The largest in total population and most complex concerning socio political organization and subsistence were the classic Taino of
Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. Western 6 Taino were across Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the eastern three quarters of Cuba as the Guanahatabey, a separate forager group, occupied the western portion. Eastern Taino extended into most of the Lesser Antilles east and south of Puerto Rico stopping as far south as the southern most Leeward islands. Being the most complex, the classic Taino were a formative stage complex chiefdom with
6 Geographic distinctions sometimes inaccurately portray socio cultural differences between the sub groups. For example, the Jamaican Tainos could be considered complex enough to match with the “classic” category (Rouse 1992).
77 sedentary agriculture and fishing as their foremost subsistence strategies. Showing their complexity in other ways, the classic Taino operated inter island trade networks across the region, trade outposts on Turks, Caicos, and St. Croix islands, and maintained links with South America. Spanish chroniclers’ estimates vary widely, but they initially approximated the large Taino population in Hispaniola to be anywhere from 100,000 to 1 million with about 600,000 in Puerto Rico and Jamaica each. Chroniclers observed the less populous Western Taino having 120 to 125 people per village displaying the possible large differences in total population and population density between Taino regions
(Rouse 1992). Figure 7 maps the three sub groups.
Figure 6: Lithically defined periods, series and sub-series with respective dates. Source: Rouse 1992.
78
Figure 7: Distribution of cultural groups in the Caribbean at the time of initial European contact. Source: Rouse 1989.
At the time of European arrival, the Taino were the major cultural group across the region occupying the northern Lesser Antilles and almost all of the Greater Antilles.
While the Spanish interacted with and chronicled the Taino across the larger islands in the center of their chiefdom, smaller cultures existed to the south. The Island Caribs resided mostly on Guadeloupe and Martinique and are named such to distinguish them from the Caribs who lived on mainland South America. In the Guianas of northern South
America and in Trinidad were the Arawaks. While the Taino were estimated to have a population of 100,000 to 1 million, the Caribs and Arawak were likely quite smaller residing on the tiny southern islands (Rouse 1992). The Caribs were less mobile and more protective of their territories than the Arawak who evidence mobility, occasional territorial expansion, and more of a propensity to invade neighbors for such purposes
(Allaire 1980). Although many laymans consider the Taino extinct (Rouse 1992), there still exists residue from this period in Caribbean prehistory, especially in Puerto Rico
79 where the Boriken nation has formed. Much of the modern population, up to 40% in
Puerto Rico, shows Taino ancestry (Cavalli Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza 1994).
Regarding Trinidad/Tobago, there is sparse evidence of prehistoric occupation of the islands, but some studies do exist, mostly in grey literature at the Archaeology Centre of the University of the West Indies in St. Augustine (Ramlal and Reid 2008) or are included in larger regional works (e.g. Rouse 1986; Williams 2003). At approximately
1,700 and 1,500 YBP, Saladoid groups transferred ceramics across Tobago and between the Windward Islands. Saladoid ceramics show that this culture at least exchanged, if not occupied, a large area as islands as far north as St. Croix evidence animal figures carved from shells native to the Orinoco River in South America. Beads and pendants from constructed from gemstones of Columbia, Venezuela, and the Guianas are found from
Grenada to Puerto Rico during the Saladoid period as well (Rouse 1992:85). Immediately prior to European arrival, Trinidad/Tobago was inhabited by Arawaks and Island Caribs.
The Island Caribs had linkages with South America as they likely operated long distance trade networks by canoes with mainland South American groups (Rouse 1992:23).
Cultural History of Caribbean Fishing
The first peoples to evidence fishing in what are now the Caribbean and Circum
Caribbean areas are fisher foragers across the Guiana lowlands over 9,000 YBP. Warao people entered western Guyana in 7,200 YBP, which was most likely a near shore region during this time since geological surveys show thriving mangrove swamps associated with maritime environments in the area (Williams 2003:55 7). They are classified Warao since the tool kit evidenced in the archaic record parallels the tool shapes utilized by
80 modern Warao in canoe manufacturing. These early Warao used bones as tool scrapers,
Moriche palm plants for string, and teeth for modifying woodworking wedges. Within
2,000 years, seven distinct ground stone axe ends appear with shifts from earlier chipping of spear points to later polishing and grinding of complex tools (Williams 2003:126,138
41). Inland rainforest regions of this period were attractive settlements due to food provisions and soil quality (Williams 2003:58 62). Perhaps enlarging river capacity from
increased rain also worked as a “pull” factor for potential migrants besides the
attractiveness of Amazonian soils, since they are often high in aluminum and subsequent
foragers were primarily fishers. Mostly quartz and jasper projectile points mark the
Warao of 7,000 YBP, who entered the region by the time most of the Andes were
occupied. Associated lanceolate points show continuity concerning one sided chipping
with Andean complexes of this time, one sign of eastern migration from the highlands
(Williams 2003:64 6), a model that supports most post 1940s research (Lathrap 1970).
Foragers near the Pakaraima Mountains in southwest Guyana began moving up
river drainages like the Wenamu and Cuyuni rivers, using outcrops of jasper and quartz
to construct hunting and fishing spears. By 6,000 YBP, sea levels reached their current
height, regional precipitation increased, and northern mangroves and river basins were
thriving. Swelling rivers provided enhanced protein provisions from fish, but required
deeper water fishing technology, which is evidenced by spear points near waterways that
do not show bending associated with land game hunting (Williams 2003:68 75). While
some early foragers relied on low nutritional snails, downriver fishers varied their diet
more, subsisting on mussels, oysters, and land crab (Williams 2003:86).
81 After the northwest Warao and southwest foragers respectively migrated down slopes following numerous Guiana river drainages, multiple groups begin occupying different ecological niches. Inland hunter gatherers moved into the Rupununi savannahs between 6,000 and 5,100 YBP, after several millennia of that ecosystem shifting between tall grass woodlands and more sparsely vegetated rangelands. By 4,000 to 3,000 YBP, linkages existed between coastal and hinterland peoples shown by similar petroglyphs of savanna fauna on coastline slate shell mounds and migrants moving eastward into modern Suriname and French Guinea (Williams 2003:98 9).
Near shore settlements also arise during this time period. Archaic coastal settlements tend to be on high mounds evidencing freshwater species and saline fish
(Williams 2003:104,107 9). By 5,300 YBP, near coastal foragers shifted from land crab to snails (Williams 2003:120 4). Coastal peoples gradually moved inland and the hinterland groups migrated towards the shore, with these two economically different cultures eventually converging mainly along the Essequibo and Rupununi rivers by 2,000
YBP while maintaining trade linkages (Williams 2003:203 5). By this time, horticulture appeared in the region and Arawak speakers voyaged north to the Lesser Antilles (see
Figure 8). The chronology suggests that by the time people settled the Guyana coastline before migrating back inland towards the other foragers, some had set sail for the islands.
82
Figure 8: Advance of Arawakan-speaking communities from Amazonia into the Caribbean islands. Source: Rouse 1989.
Groups that peopled the Lesser Antilles by approximately 2,500 YBP were most likely Arawak speakers linked to northeast Venezuela and the Guiana lowlands with much of the archaeology pointing to foragers of the Orinoco River valley (Haviser
1997:59). Over a 1,000 year span, the Arawaks “island hopped” rapidly across most of the Lesser Antilles starting north, then heading south (Wilson 1990). Each island exhibits continued habitation after foragers settled neighboring islands. Most 2,500 to 2,000 YBP dated settlements in this area are close to fertile soils and inland freshwater sources. The earliest foragers utilized more terrestrial resources with river access on north sides, while later southern side inhabitants occupied coasts nearly exclusively using marine foods.
Smaller islands distant from continental lands generally exhibit higher maritime food use
(Haviser 1997:66 8).
83 As migrants reached more distant islands they introduced small game, but also adapted to new and increasingly available coastal species (Wing and Wing 1995).
Saladoid sites across the Lesser Antilles evidence 38% terrestrial species, while post
Saladoid sites show 19% 7 (Petersen 1997:124). Since horticulture appeared more widespread following the Arawak migrations at approximately 1,500 YBP, inland gathering was most likely not “rotated” back to by these societies. Later Arawak maritime economies generally fit with the subsequent Taino cultures across the northern three quarters of the Caribbean, which also widely used marine resources and inter island exchange networks (Haviser 1997). Similar subsistence patterns occurred across each island of the Lesser Antilles. New settlers started with inland foraging, then groups split and spread to coastlines for marine foods. The Island Carib, who were also in the Lesser
Antilles in years closer to European arrival, gathered land crab, shellfish, hunted agouti, birds, lizards, manatees, sea turtles, and various fish species (Petersen 1997:129).
Looking at the first peoples of the western Caribbean (i.e., the Greater Antilles),
most Caribbeanists consider Cuba the first island settled by ocean voyagers as it
evidences the earliest securely dated sites in the region at about 8,000 YBP (Dacal Moure
and Rivero De La Calle 1996:14). The first Caribbean foragers most likely became the
Casimiroid horizon, which existed from 6,000 to 1,600 YBP across Cuba and Hispaniola
(Rouse 1992:51). Besides some reliance on inland hunting, the Casimiroid used fish as
their primary diet source for long periods indicated by numerous shell accumulations
along coastlines. Lithic age fisher hunter foragers toolkits consisted mostly of un
retouched macroblades struck from cores (Keegan 1994:264). Primary settlement
7 Differences in ceramic era food remains across the Lesser Antilles can also be contributed to ecosystem variation, especially differences in fauna recovered from steep side island areas with limited reefs compared to species from lower lying shorelines with more reefs (Petersen 1997:125).
84 locations were on the southwest corner of Cuba, which receives the least precipitation.
Generally, the northeast sides of Caribbean islands get most of the rainfall, while southwestern areas receive the least since fronts travel in from the northeast and mid island mountain chains pull remaining moisture down (Rouse 1992:4). Perhaps less near coastal resources were accessible by the Casimiroid and their predecessors due to more arid conditions, which is one factor why they focused on a marine diet. This era of
Casimiroid and Guanahatabey peoples was focused on maritime foods, especially in the first few thousand years.
Shoreline food gathering and fishing continued closer to the time of European arrival. Between Saladoid and later European contact periods across the Greater Antilles, especially Puerto Rico, there is evidence of crab and shellfish consumption. Saladoid sites in Puerto Rico show high amounts of land crab and use of terrestrial near shore resources, while post Saladoid evidence a shift towards shellfish and other shoreline gathered and marine foods (Petersen 1997:123). The Cedrosan Saladoid also are credited with introducing advancements in agriculture to the region and one of the initial groups to become more sedentary, which are similarities shared with the later Taino (Rouse 1992).
Through the Lithic, Archaic, and Ceramic stages of the Caribbean, tool kits and
subsistence changed generally from stone flakes, stone grinding and fishing foraging to
eventually pottery and horticulture (Keegan 1994:262). Numerous fish species have been
excavated showing use during pre ceramic times across the region including parrotfish,
snapper, porgie, jack, grunt, grouper, wrasses, leatherjack, barracuda, shark, Atlantic pearl oyster, West Indian topshell, anadara, arca, codakia, lucina, and “queen conch”
(Petersen 1997). While previously outlined evidence shows the importance and variety of
85 marine subsistence, horticulture and agriculture took a more prominent role as the Taino rose to regional power. While Taino economies were based on starch crops such as cassava (Petersen 1997:127; Wilson 1990:112 3), they also utilized shellfish, crabs, oysters, and eels (Rouse 1992:92,94). Taino also spear hunted manatees for higher amounts of protein (Rouse 1992:13). Chiefs would often send fishermen in the village to the coastlines to catch and cook fish in order to preserve it before hauling the food back to the community (Petersen 1997). Upon arrival, the Spanish described the Taino as using a variety of fishing methods (Wilson 1990), which included hooks and lines, nets, spears, poison, and trapping in weirs. Some Taino fishermen stored fish and turtles in weirs until they were consumed and fish, along with other meats, were sometimes roasted. Besides the numerous fishing methods, the Taino also built high quality canoes, which the
Spanish admired, by hollowing out logs using stone axes. Some canoes, especially those constructed and elaborately painted for chiefs, were quite large with a 150 person capacity (Rouse 1992). One European chronicler noted that an indigenous group in the region called their canoes piraguas (Dacal Moure and Rivero De La Calle 1996:4), which may have been a precursor term as it is similar to the current name across much of the
Caribbean for canoes pirogues . The Taino small canoe design (see Figure 9) was also perhaps a forerunner to currently utilized wood canoes.
86
Figure 9: Taino man paddling canoe. Source: Rouse 1992.
Archaeologically evidenced fishing methods across the region during the Taino period include reef shore, rocky shore, and on water pelagic techniques as shown by excavated species (Petersen 1997). Even upon the initial explorations in the Greater
Antilles, the Spanish documented evidence of Taino fishing. On Columbus’ first voyage, they reached what he named in his journal “San Salvador”, which was likely Bahia
Bariay of Cuba and there documented houses near the coastline that were abandoned, but had bone fishhooks, nets, and fishing spears. This may have been representative of more common Taino coastal fishing camps where fish were caught and cooked, salted, or dried for storage and shipment to inland communities (Wilson 1990:53 4). During the time of the Taino, the Guanahatabey of western Cuba also likely used marine foods as they left numerous shell accumulations with many marine mollusk shells along the coasts (Dacal
Moure and Rivero De La Calle 1996:17 19).
Post Taino evidence of fishing begins once African slaves are brought over to labor on plantations across the region. Kiple (2002) identifies categories of slave food procurement across the Caribbean. One was plantation owners rationing a variety of foods with slaves supplementing these by growing vegetable gardens. Some plantation owners provided fish and even whale meat as rations to slaves (Schwartz 1996:206).
87 Besides emergency rationing during political and ecological disasters, this method did not provide an adequate balanced diet. Rationed fish and beef was often of low quality since slave masters distributed mostly food shipped across the Atlantic where months of tropical heat spoiled the supplies. This method was prevalent in Cuba, Trinidad, and the
Guianas. Another was slaves benefitting from “off work” time to harvest food through gardening, raising animals, and/or fishing while not receiving rations. Although raising tuber crops like plaintains and yams with a supplement of rationed meats was the most regionally common diet for slaves, fishing and fish food was inter mixed across the
Caribbean and an important primary or supplement to slave diets.
Plantations allocated some slaves to be fishers to supply food for the plantation owners’ family, rations for the slaves, and provide protein rich food to meet demand of nearby European residents. On British plantations, some fishers were selected for that job being chosen from previous work in domestic chores or field labor with some ranging from age 12 to 18. Fishermen were viewed as higher skilled workers above slaves that participated in field gangs and those in artisan and transporter work. Most British plantation fishers were adult males including those slaves working closer or in the cities
(Higman 1984:189,194,247). Since more urban areas supported larger demand, up to five times as many fisher slaves worked around cities compared to rural plantations, yet even larger urban fishing sectors amounted to 1% of the total labor force (Higman 1984:236).
In high marine food procurement areas like the Cayman Islands, nearly 6% of slaves (29 of 490) were listed as fishery specialists as of 1834, with 25 in construction and a majority being agricultural laborers (Higman 1984:64). The Bahamas, another high marine procurement archipelago, showed 10% slave fishers in 1834 (Higman 1984:65).
88 In Barbuda, during British colonial administration, plantation working slaves had small plots to cultivate and used nets to fish providing for their own food. These slaves supplied a comparatively high amount of calories compared to slaves on other British controlled islands who had their food provided by plantation owners and had little or no time to fish or land to use for themselves. Besides fish, Barbuda slaves also procured crabs (Higman 1984). In the Bahamas, slaves fished and raised animals to provide protein beyond their garden plots of yams, taro, and plaintains. Their high protein intake, shaped by the large amount of fish consumed, led to Bahaman slaves being the tallest in the
Caribbean (Kiple 2002:76). In the Bahamas and Trinidad, besides slaves having their own cultivated plots, they fished on Sundays, which was their usual day off. Fishing was so prevalent in these areas that British colonial law set a maximum cap on the amount of fish slaves could keep for consumption. In locales where population centers and associated markets were distant (i.e., the Bahamas), slaves were able to keep more of their catch from plantation owners looking to sell most fish caught. Georgetown, Guyana and Port of Spain, Trinidad contained British built market areas allowing for the Sunday migration to market and selling of goods by slaves, which included fish (Higman
1984:213,214,240).
Concerning fish used as rations passed out by slave masters, Jamaica and the
Virgin Islands are examples of this as fish were a regular part of rations distributed by plantation owners with adult slaves receiving six to eight herring per week. The British
imported fish to some of their colonies and plantation owners who distributed would
occasionally withhold fish and other foodstuffs for what they considered “bad conduct” by slaves. Across the British colonies, a few fishers and other laborers became “self
89 hired” workers for slave holders, able to work outside of plantation property and the owners’ schedule in exchange for a set fee or percentage of fish catch. This arrangement was often favored by slaves when available (Higman 1984).
Compared to other slave occupations, fishers were of higher status than other slaves, enjoyed a higher quality of life, and may have had higher life expectancies
(Higman 1984; Price 1966). Despite this, marine food procurement is a high risk strategy
(Acheson 1981; Pollnac 1991) and slave fishing was no exception. One of the highest risk fishing methods in the British colonies by slaves was diving for conch, which sometimes resulted in drownings. Slave fishing technology used across the British colonies included nets, baskets, hooks, and harpoons. Seine fishing was also utilized, in
Dominica for example, which consisted of three or four canoes casting a lead weighted net while stones were thrown into the near shore waters to push fish towards the coastline with the net brought in behind to capture (Higman 1984:176). Although “maroons”, escaped slaves who resided within the colony of their former plantation, often lived inland away from the coasts, some like the Surinam maroons accessed rivers to fish for part of their diet (see Price 1996:11).
Few Caribbeanists apply any form of evolutionary or other theory to explain subsistence procurement across the region’s pre history and more recent history. Keegan
(1995) sparingly used “optimal foraging theory” (OFT) to explain patterns of natural resource use in the Arawak peopling of the Lesser Antilles. He argues that since there was no group to impede their settlement, the Arawaks “optimally foraged” using the most attractive food provisioning resource(s) on each island (Keegan 1995:407 14). OFT is not based on much empirical backing in this example, however, since Keegan assumes an
90 optimal benefit to cost ratio of terrestrial over marine resources with no cost benefit analysis of accessible foods (e.g. calories, protein, nutrients, time and energy allocations).
Petersen (1997) provides one of the most recent syntheses of archaic Caribbean
subsistence covering 4,000 YBP to European contact. He argues maritime food use was
an internal island adaptation across the Caribbean with little transmission of techniques between societies, while other subsistence strategies represent borrowings or those brought from the continents (e.g. “tropical forest” culture of inland gathering and river
use). His model supports marine fishing as generally a later occurring and non
transmitted practice.
HBE studies of maritime and near shore ecosystems offer critiques of what
appears to be optimal seeking behavior. Meriam fisher foragers that subsist on maritime
and inland resources show that in rocky shoreline ecosystems, females provide most of a
family’s calories from inland and near shore gathering. A few males evidence risky behavior through spear fishing, which raises their social status through costly signaling
and whose food income is provisioned across the group rather than the household (Bliege
Bird et al. 2001). These findings are similar to those with the Hadza (Hawkes et al. 2001)
and suggest that in maritime accessible contexts, even the little marine use that may occur
is not necessarily ensuring large returns. When high risk fishing is evidenced
archaeologically in the Caribbean, perhaps most of the diet is based on low risk procurement, especially when both marine and inland food is observed in middens. This
is the case across the pre historic periods previously outlined in this chapter. When
marine foods appear, there is at least partial inland food use with it in nearly every case.
91 Through much of written history, marine food procurement is recognized as the highest risk subsistence method with more deaths per capita than other food procurement methods (McGoodwin 1990). A consistent pattern across Caribbean prehistory is an emphasis on river fishing when settled inland. Perhaps foragers desired the positives of fish (e.g. high protein), but did not desire to risk going onto the ocean for daily food capture. With few large protein sources from island hunting, freshwater fish may have been a sizable benefit without the risk. Caribbean foragers proved their skills as ocean navigators with their impressive colonization of numerous small islands, but evidence of maritime sailing and sea craft use does not presuppose a propensity for maritime fishing.
Population expansions that can decrease per capita food returns and/or seasonal resource exhaustion are more likely “push” factors that force groups to incur risk and attempt ocean traversing for new resource claims (Keegan 1995).
Caribbean and Trinidad/Tobago Fishing Since the Twentieth Century
Recent studies of Caribbean fishers also show using near shore and inland fishing areas as a favored strategy. Jamaican coastal fishers avoid distant shore/pelagic fishing with 67% choosing near shore areas exclusively and 33% attempting distant shore fishing, even though returns are higher for the latter (Davenport 1960). Kozelka (1969) uses Davenport’s data on estimated gains or losses of near shore versus distant shore pot fishing strategies to theorize possible two set combinations of fishing methods. The author presents nine decision possibilities for two fishing attempts and calculates comparative outcomes based on ocean current changes on catch amount. Minimum and maximum potential gains show that while distant shore fishing provides the highest
92 maximum, it also brings the lowest minimum (with risk of loss). Fishing a combination strategy with a focus on near shore catch offers the least risk with the highest minimal return and supplies a potentially high maximum. Kozelka bases his model of favored strategies on risk minimization offered by Davenport.
Recent fishery studies in the region are exemplied by an ethnography of Puerto
Rican small scale fisher folk by Griffith and Valdes Pizzini (2002). While the work provides a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives, the focus throughout is on defining local cultural models of fishing, the increasing number of local fishermen who combine additional wage labor with their fishing, those who leave fishing for wage labor, and how those who leave and are still involved with fishing deviate from cultural models and local institutions of the fisher folk. The authors define fishing on a continuum from full time fisher folk to individuals who are primarily wage laborers with fishing as a side economic activity. Despite the increasing number in the community that turn to wage labor, fishing is still viewed by fisher folk as an identity of independence, which is one of the strong motivations to keep fishermen in the industry full time. Fishing allows an individual to get away from the monotony of daily wage labor and being under the control of others. Being one’s own boss and having an independent daily life are local cultural models of fishing. Other cultural models of fishing locally as an occupation include it being healthy, enabling exercise, it being therapeutic, able to keep the mind off of vices, and it being a sporty alternative to wage labor.
Griffith and Valdes Pizzini illustrate that Puerto Rican fishing communities are divided, sometimes due to oppositional political activities between fisher folk and other times by conflicts over fishing territories and use of gear. Exacerbating this are fisher
93 folk who own restaurants, seafood businesses, or sell to larger outside fish markets who are the ones that leave the local fishing associations and pay crew in wages rather than participating in the catch share system. The authors emphasize both the largest and
smallest fisher folk, in terms of fish catch size they claim through their operations, are the
individuals who deviate from local cultural models and institutions and also do not participate in local fishing associations. These outliers see themselves as and are seen by
the community as not part of the majority of local fisher folk. Much of the later parts of
the ethnography are dedicated to describing these outlier individuals, their families, and
their lack of ties with neighboring fisher folk (e.g. Griffith and Valdes Pizzini 2002:141
58).
Fisheries management and “co management” between the nation state and local
fisher folk is another recent literature area within fishery studies. Concerning the
Caribbean, Breton et al. (2006) edited a volume focusing on ethnic, cultural, and
institutional heterogeneity and how it can inform successful management of fisheries.
Chapters emphasize the use of locally devised institutions for fishery management, but
that a more thorough documentation of these local rules in the context of the numerous
local ethnic and cultural differences in the diverse Caribbean is needed. A more thorough
stakeholder presence in the design of management institutions is required to reflect the
diversity of peoples in communities. Caribbean fishing communities are internally varied,
which can make finding consensus on management strategies difficult. Compared with
other regions of the world, however, social studies of coastal communities in the
Caribbean have not given rise to a great number of scientific publications. Several exist
in masters or doctoral theses and various types of technical reports, but these have not
94 had a significant influence on the academic and intervention scenes. Authors in the volume call for more “social mapping” of Caribbean fishing communities to be undertaken. This orientation would help to persuade natural scientists working in these fisheries and writing government and national and international agency reports to build a greater appreciation of the complexity of stakeholder analysis from a management perspective.
Ethnographic Background of Caribbean and Trinidadian Peoples
The Caribbean is culturally heterogeneous; a conglomeration of bits and pieces retrieved from past cultures (Sandersen 1995:9). African slaves were “deculturalized” through forced dislodgement from their original homelands and because the colonial powers attempted to “reculturate” them in the European way of life. This is what Mintz
(1996:289) called “cultural stripping and rebuilding”.
Not all culture may have been lost, however, through the disruptive processes of slavery. Herskovits and Frazier are the two primary figures in the long standing debate
(see Barrow 1999; Smith 1996) of whether Afro Caribbeans possess remnants of African cultural models and institutions in the Caribbean or whether African culture was destroyed completely by slavery. Herskovits constructed tables ranking different African institutions (e.g. kinship, religion, economy) on a scale of how close to “African” they were during the early twentieth century. Frazier agreed that religious aspects, such as
“vodun”, were quite close and retained from West Africa (African slaves were mostly drawn from the Ashanti and Fanti of West Africa and to a lesser extent, Central Africa).
Frazier, however, also argued that because slavery separated and meshed so many
95 families and different African ethnicities together, that colonialism destroyed all other forms of African culture (Patterson 1967).
With this perspective, there is no diaspora, which supports more of an argument for “creolization”. Afro Caribbeans are more shaped by the colonial and post colonial experience as seen in the predominance of “respectability” as a form of “acting”
European and incorporating western rationality of economic achievement (Wilson 1973).
Household and family patterns of father absence, mother care taking, and marriage fidelity double standards are also seen as residue of slavery. Women were more often in house servants for white male plantation owners who had affairs with the Africans, sometimes fathering “lighter” looking children in the process (Smith 1996). Male slaves highly outnumbered females and combined with displacement, this led to men who modeled opportunities as limited and infidelity as acceptable. Females, instead, got more experience with opportunities to become free or gain better educated children through intentional or unintentional affairs with elite whites. This resulted in the “reputation”
(male fascination with maximizing children with multiple wives) and “respectability”
(utility maximization, move up economically, maintain good “appearances” locally) standards for the respective sexes (Wilson 1973).
In a sense, these theorists are arguing much of current Afro Caribbean behavior as a re playing of the horrible performance of slavery. This is why Wilson’s book is called
Crab Antics , reputation is a behavior in contrast to respectability. Individuals, in this theory, are crabs attempting to climb out of poverty, but each pulls the other down (i.e., crabs trying to climb out of a barrel). While the residue of slavery involves a modeling of respectability that preaches earning money to present a wealthy household, but a local
96 reputation to maintain multiple children in different households, these are forces pulling in opposite directions. One is economic accumulation (although respectability does entail some community exchange, e.g. buying from local producers, see Wilson’s (1973) examples in Providencia) and the other is impoverishment through splitting income (e.g. land) between multiple children. The residue of an “in common” colonial experience (not necessarily “shared”) remains throughout the region and gives a historical reason for the
Caribbean to be considered a “culture area”. Although there has certainly been a degree of creolization over the decades since slavery, I do agree with the diaspora school (as even Frazier did) on certain cultural aspects being maintained from the “Old World”, such as religion, dancing, music, and forms of social organization. Even in Christianized areas, “kumina” style dances and other African forms remain. Many Sub Saharan farmers are matrifocal in line with the prominence of matrifocality among African Caribbeans.
The earliest ethnographies of African Caribbeans discussed various cultural models such as those regarding display of wealth. African Caribbeans were described as emphasizing private displays of wealth (e.g. large tracts of land, investment in a house, educating children) over public displays of wealth around the community. Public displays, such as always wearing fancy dress in public would bring community wide envy upon the individual’s household (Herskovits 1937:134 5). Such models were later agreed upon and extended, for example Wilson’s (1973) model of “respectability” for
African Caribbeans where investment in one’s and family was the way to be an upright individual.
Also in the classical ethnography literature, Herskovits and Herskovits (1947) outline a cultural model of Afro Trinidadians in Toco, Trinidad regarding wealth and
97 community exchange. Susu savings associations existed in Toco that are composed of
several residents who are offered membership informally and who all have access to a
common pot of money from contributions made by members. The susu was an informal method of credit to neighbors and friends around the village. The susu model included ideas of reciprocity and sharing as each individual was contributing to others’ potential spending and also enabling their own access to a larger pot if they gave more to the association.
African Caribbean households have historically been characterized in the literature by “father absence”. Clarke (1957) studied three different communities in
Jamaica distinguished by economic organization: a better off farming community, a migrant labor community, and a poorer farming village. Her results show a correlation between poverty and father absence. Men are often migrant laborers due to low opportunities available locally, resulting in a household climate where the father becomes distant. Although males often control wealth (such as land property), at least by dividing it to kin members in the will, females are the ones left at home to care for the child.
Smith (1996) in his collection of essays describes the African Caribbean
household as bilateral and matrifocal. Kinship is determined through both male and
female lines (father’s name is taken, except in few circumstances of father abandonment
and complete absence). Mothers become the de facto head of household in the absence of
migrating fathers, hence the title of Clarke’s study My Mother Who Fathered Me . Most of the literature agrees with the bilateral matrifocal assessment (e.g. Clarke 1957; Wilson
1973) although Barrow (1999) argues there are more diverse forms and accentuates the positive adaptive aspects of matrifocality.
98 Clarke (1957) argues that matrifocality is a problem and also looks at various forms of African Caribbean households in nuance. As Barrow (1999) also finds, father absent homes can result in important roles for grandmothers since there is a trend towards uxorilocal (husband lives with wife’s family) organization. It is not surprising to find three generations of females residing in the same house without husbands. Quinlan
(2006) finds parents, especially female parents with breast feeding, allocate more resources towards female offspring in rural Dominica. Females are more apt to succeed economically while males can more easily become roamers or drunkards. This lends support to the historical literature on matrifocality and the “respectability” hypothesis
(Wilson 1973). There are also many instances of “concubinage” where unmarried couples live together while raising children from one of the parents (Barrow 1999).
There is also a predominance of male cheating and fathering multiple children with different women (Barrow 1998; Wilson 1973). This is what Wilson (1973) refers to as the main component of male “reputation” (as opposed to female “respectability”). This is often theorized as originating from colonialism (slavery). European ideals were modeled by African slaves where women were to act “respectable” as in house caretakers and practiced child rearing to “mixed” offspring from affairs with white plantation owners. Males were inter mixed with different women on different plantations resulting in multiple children by different wives. Males were not around to care for children because of their being traded or moved within plantations.
East Indian descendants, and specifically Indo Trinidadians, historically have been more rural compared to Afro Trinidadians who partially urbanized after emancipation. Starting in the 1940’s, Indo Trinidadians began moving to urban areas
99 more. While the cities tend to have more “creolization” (mixing of Indo and Afro cultures
and families) and this mixing has increased (Hamon and Ingoldsby 2003), some
Caribbeanists argue there is a strong cultural, economic, and political divide between
Indo Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians that is exacerbated by geographic separation.
Although Indo Trinidadians are the numerical majority, Afro Trinidadians often view
them as only the “newcomer” immigrants. East Indians in Trinidad and across the
Caribbean tend to have a different family structure and higher rates of entrepreneurial
activity (Hoetink 1985). While cultural differences exist, East Indians have increasingly
urbanized and integrated alongside African descendants in politics, education, and other
major institutions in Trinidad/Tobago and elsewhere in the Caribbean (Lewis 1985).
With East Indian households across the Caribbean, Asian Indian cultural practices
of marrying within caste and patrilineality remain. Households are more dominated by
male and son presence and relationships compared to the distant father son and close
mother daughter relations with African Caribbeans. Although individuals in different
castes can achieve good economic returns, some East Indians continue to hold a cultural
model of their caste and perceptions of caste correlate with marriage (Barrow 1999).
Today, marriage partners are likely to be free choice rather than rather than picked by parents.
Clarke (1957) showed there was a positive correlation in rural Jamaican African
Caribbean households between father presence and income. The wealthier farming community showed more “stable” household structures of at home or near fathers with legally married couples residing with their own children. This lends support to the nuclear family ideal as the fix for family ills, but Barrow (1999) critiques this approach.
100 To Barrow, inter generational female households and domiciling while unmarried are
adaptive strategies in response to risky environments where males are an uncertain
investment. Women are attempting to reduce uncertainty through acquiring additional
help in parenting and household support. Barrow shows that there are women only and
“unmarried union” households that have good economic returns, i.e., the nuclear family
does not correlate with income. Women are increasingly turning to work outside the
home (beyond subsistence and small scale market gardening, shops in the house) to meet
consumption demands. This is possible with a resident grandmother, boyfriend, or
sometimes just a nearby relative aiding in raising the child.
Historically, African Caribbean fathers have split their land between all siblings
(Wilson 1973). Land became a symbol of freedom from slavery during the immediate post slavery period, although one could argue land ownership is part of the European
ideals adopted by Africans. Some slaves were partitioned land from outgoing plantation
owners, others squatted and gained de facto ownership through temporal domain (at least
10 12 years without challenge). This has been a hotbed for sibling rivalry, but it is an
institution among African Caribbeans to give usufruct rights to any sibling that desires it,
even those returning from long stretches abroad. So while females do not often control
the initial distributions of land, they do receive land and therefore have an economic
“base” from which to work.
Couples often will not live together until after having at least one child. Once the father begins to accumulate enough capital, one of his first familial investments is towards building materials for a house on family land. Houses and children seem to be two of the long term investments important to African Caribbeans, these representing the
101 respectability and reputation models respectively. Houses provide a “good appearance”
locally to show off economic status, while children provide the reputation for male
fulfillment.
More specifically in Trinidad/Tobago, M.G. Smith (1965) agrees with the
“slavery” model describing Trinidad/Tobago’s African descended middle class as exhibiting personality characteristics of anxiety and insecurity with drives for power and submission, which are “authoritarian” features from the slavery model. He also argues that Trinidad/Tobago’s lower classes, regardless of ethnicity, accept the upper class as always being a part of their society and class differences will not change significantly, which also agrees with the authoritarian characteristics from the slavery model (Smith
1965:57). As of the early 1960s, Smith portrayed Trinidad/Tobago as being more
“creolized” than other Caribbean nations, although Indo Trinidadians (and East Indian descendants in Guyana) were not creolized. He predicted that Trinidad/Tobago would increase in creolization and develop a common national culture due to its relatively strong nationally integrating economy (Smith 1965:310).
M.G. Smith’s (1965) “plural society” is one way to describe the cultural makeup of Trinidad/Tobago. Like Guyana, it is a nation where multiple ethnic groups exist, such as African and East Indian descendants being the two largest groups, but the groups do not fully combine cultures. This is more a functionalist perspective whereby conflict is de emphasized through the focus on ethnic groups mixing while maintaining separate cultural traditions (Lewis 1985:236).
102 CHAPTER FOUR
CULTURE, KINSHIP AND DEMOGRAPHY OF ICACOS COMMUNITY
FISHER-FOLK
The Community
Situated at the southwestern most tip of Trinidad, Icacos is a small community of
approximately 1,000. The name Icacos derives from the icaco ; a shrub plant of the
rosaceous family that grows in the area. Icaco also refers to the soft bluish red fruit the plant produces, which is commonly called fat port across Trinidad/Tobago. Few published sources exist covering the history of or even mentioning Icacos, but numerous
residents agree on the major “era’s” of settlement and the associated timeframe. Visited by preceding European explorers, Icacos was settled by the 1820’s with British
agricultural estates operating in the area. Prior to the first European settlements,
indigenous Arawak speakers or Carib likely inhabited the area that is now Icacos as
Christopher Columbus and crew noted indigenous peoples in the area as of August 1498
and these were the major groups in Trinidad at the time (Lucas et al. 1890:231 2). From
the 1530’s to 1797, Trinidad was controlled by Spain, but no records or local memory
exists of the Spanish settling Icacos. The British took control of Trinidad as of 1797 from
the northwest section of the island and eventually spread to the southwest, settling Icacos
as early as the 1820’s. As of the 1880’s, there were at least 500 residents of Icacos
according to the Trinidad/Tobago census (Central 1881). The population grew into the
high hundreds and low thousands through the twentieth century as European settlers
exited and freed African and East Indian slaves set up residences.
103 Today, Icacos is surrounded by similarly sized fishing towns such as Fullarton
and Granville. Few services such as food markets or places to purchase goods exist in the
community and it is one of the least developed villages in the southwest in terms of businesses operating in and services available in town. There is a grocery market and a
handful of small food and drink shops along a central strip in town, all operated by local proprietors. One public pay phone is close by this business section of town. The
remainder of the village is residential with a small school, a community center, and small
religious centers including a newly constructed mosque. Houses are typically one story
wood or concrete residences containing a nuclear or extended family with some houses propped up on wooden “legs” to escape flooding. Many have large plastic containers along the side walls that catch rain water or other water runoff from the roofs to use for additional bath and/or kitchen water. Electricity is supplied to most of the community, but similar to other rural southwest towns, this goes out occasionally, especially during windy periods and/or storms.
104
Figure 10: Icacos Road, the main road into the village, looking toward Icacos.
Figure 11: A typical house in Icacos.
Venezuela is only eleven km away from Icacos Point, the southern coastal edge of the village, and is visible from the shoreline on clear days. Icacos fishermen have historically had numerous run ins with Venezuelan authorities on water in the Serpent’s
105 Mouth (the stretch of ocean between Icacos and Venezuela). Some fisher folk families, including two that I resided with while in Icacos, have stories of at least one fisherman in the family being arrested or detained by Venezuelan authorities patrolling the Serpent’s
Mouth . Icacos residents claim Venezuela is concerned with fishermen of the area taking away their fish. Patrols still occur as of 2010, but fisher folk say the authorities are not as prevalent as five to ten years earlier. Only a couple of fishermen who navigate boats claim to occasionally go into the Venezuelan half of Serpent Mouth waters anymore, but this is difficult to verify and none of the ride alongs I was on with Icacos fishermen went past the GPS point that constitute Venezuelan waters.
Figure 12: Beach at Icacos Point looking toward the Serpent’s Mouth .
Icacos is one of the prominent spots for active small scale fisher folk along the
Gulf of Paria. Besides the two largest cities to the north, Port of Spain and San Fernando, other landing sites on the Gulf closest to Icacos include neighboring southwestern
106 villages Fullarton and Bonasse. Figure 5 in Chapter one displays landing sites across
Trinidad that are utilized by large scale and/or small scale fishing vessels. The small
scale sector in Trinidad/Tobago consists of mostly fiberglass or wood canoes, termed pirogues . Almost all fishermen utilizing the more urban landing sites, such as Port of
Spain and San Fernando, use fiberglass pirogues , while the rural southwestern villages
utilize more wood. Of the 39 small scale boats in Icacos, 56% (22 of 39) are fiberglass.
Many are equipped with outboard motors, which signifies the main difference between
whether an operator is considered “small scale” or a sub group of this, “artisanal”
(Platteau 1989). Only three of the 39 boats in Icacos are motor less. The motor less boats
have one or multiple crew members who use oars to paddle away from shore. While
those with motors can and do move quickly to and from deeper ocean waters, the handful
of motor less vessels also fish in deep waters barely visible from shore.
Fisher folk Knowledge
Small scale fisher folk in Icacos call themselves fisheners and the practice of
fishing as fishening . This is the same across the neighboring southwestern communities
of Fullarton, Bonasse, and Granville. All Icacos fishermen were familiar with these terms
and referred to their fellow fisher folk with the term fisheners , although it is a slang term
and the terms “fisherman” and “fishermen” are occasionally used. Fishing is the primary
income source for nearly all Icacos fishermen, but secondary jobs (sometimes temporary)
are common. Some fishermen supplement their fishing income throughout the year by
taking on an end (temporary job involving physical labor) in or outside of the village
and/or being fortunate enough to land five days . The latter refers to a five day work week
and means a short period of employment, often through government sponsored work.
107 Five days is preferred as these jobs last longer (while an end may only last one day) and carry basic benefits such as a more standard workday schedule. Fishermen who permanently leave fishing are most often leaving to either become crew on large scale fishing vessels or to be a rig dog . A rig dog is a generic term for any physical labor work in oil drilling, which provides relatively lucrative blue collar jobs across Trinidad.
Icacos fishermen employ several fishing methods. Boats are most often taken out in the early morning hours before sunrise to start the major fishing portion of the day. A pirogue rudder, used to steer from the back of the vessel, called a gouverneur , is controlled along with the motor to navigate toward desired fishing spots. Various forms of net fishing are the most common with trolling, hook and line methods, and pot fishing being the next most often used. Hook and line methods include drop lining and alavive .
Drop lining is done individually or in two man crew boats and is simply casting or dropping a baited single hook and line. Dead bait is used with this method. Fishermen will also “troll” (move the boat straight and slowly while keeping baited hook and line submersed) occasionally when drop lining to attract pelagic species. Multiple lines can be used while trolling and some fishermen have built small holders along the edge of their pirogues to attach their hook and line and troll without holding the line. To fish alavive is using live fish for bait and attaching it to a single hook and line. The bait swims and squirms on the hook, which attracts pelagic (non surface swimming) species including Carite, Kingfish, and Cavalli. When fish are not beating or when the fisherman does not know a quality spot to net fish, he will guess throw , which is throwing a net into the water without seeing fish or showing or knowing any indications of a good spot.
Additional fishing methods in open ocean waters are throw fresh and torch . Throwing
108 fresh is playfully called ploojunk by some fishermen as the word intends to mimic the sound of a heavy object falling into water. Ploojunk is an occasional substitution for saying throw fresh and most often used among crew who are close friends and/or on a lighter or joking relationship. Ploojunk is also used jokingly when a fisherman dives into the water to retrieve a net or other object, especially if he makes a large noise when hitting the water. Ploonks is a similar joking substitution for when fishermen guess throw or other forms of net casting as this term intends to mimic the sound of a medium sized object thrown into water that does not make a large splash. Torch fishing, which is going on a fishing trip after sunset with the aid of a light by torch, is rare in Icacos according to informants.
Figure 13: Fisherman trolling while drop-lining (fishing line at far right of picture).
Near shore and on shore fishing methods in Icacos are banking and jook(ing) .
109 Banking targets demersal fish, which live on or near the sea bottom. This involves
navigating the pirogue to a near shore area close to a river or creek channel, swamp, or
close enough to the shore in more clear water ocean where the sea bottom is shallow and
sometimes visible. Dead baited hook and line is then used, which is called a banking line
when banking . Banking lines are often longer than normal drop lining lines as the extra
long lines are pre fitted to different rods that fishermen use specifically for banking .
Banking is most often done near the swampy areas around Icacos waters and targeted
species include Redfish, Salmon, and Croakers. Pirogues that are banking at rest and not
moving are termed bank boats by fishermen.
Icacos fishermen have various local terms for fishing technology. Although by
cross cultural definitions, Icacos fishermen would be called “small scale” due to their use
of motorized boats, their local crafting of many of their fishing poles, hooks, nets, traps,
and pots makes the case for also calling them “artisanal” to emphasize the level of craft put into building materials. There are three specialized hook and line combinations that
fishermen have named. Kulika is a fishing pole made of wood (sometimes bamboo) that
has a copper wire line about six to twelve inches long with a hook at the end. The
remaining three are terms for hook and lines that are used for banking . Ling dormant is a
fishing line with one large hook and live bait set on the sea bottom targeting large fish
such as Grouper. Palang is similar as it is a long fishing line set on the sea bottom, but
also has multiple hooks attached at intervals along the line. Paternoster is another term
for palang . Fish hooks are termed bansi . A fishing net is called a filet . Especially in
larger Gulf of Paria communities, like Point Fortin and the city of San Fernando, filet
refers to a specific type of large net with a square mesh. The term has taken on more
110 general meaning in Icacos as a handful of net types exist, but filet is a generic term for all of them. To knit is to make or the process of making a new fishing net, although it is not used to note repairing a net. All fishermen have the knit skill, can often be seen working on nets in the workshop, porch, or back areas of their homes, and there is not much distinction between a good or bad knit . There are several fish traps or pots that are built
and used. Most common in usage and in quantity of fishermen who have one is a fish pot .
This is a box shaped trap made of chicken wire that is set at a specific sea location.
Sometimes these are set near a buoy, which makes them a buoy pot . Ninety five percent
(98 of 104) of Icacos fishermen have fish pots , although less (52%, 55 of 104) claim to
use fish pots on a daily basis. Less common is the drag pot , which is a similar styled fish
trap except it is connected to a rope and pulled through the water from the back of the pirogue . Drag pots are below the water’s surface and the resistance created from the pulling results in the term drag pot . The other type is the generic sounding fish trap that
is also made of metal wire, but is cylindrical shaped with a funnel like opening at one
end.
111
Figure 14: Fisherman using a priest (in his right hand) to help cut a fish at the beach.
All pirogue owners have a priest in their boats, which is a small wood club used
to kill fish. Priests are most often used when dragging in a large net catch. With little
room in smaller pirogues , large masses of flopping fish can become a problem and priests are used to knock the fish and alleviate this problem. When drop lining or alavive
and smaller quantity of fish are brought in, fishermen will occasionally tie the fish to the
side of the boat with rope to let the fish dangle in the water off the pirogue’s side.
For bait, all fishermen have a container either strapped or fastened to their pirogue , in the case of boat owners, or possess a container to carry with them. Containers vary in size from those of boat owners fastened to the pirogues that can take up a whole plank section and are rectangular to small coffee can sized cylinders that fishermen carry with them or place string around to backpack. These store live and dead bait depending on the fishing expected to be done in a day and for fishing alavive , fishermen will load
112 their containers with live bait. A fully loaded container with live bait is called full charge .
In boat and carried containers are not always used, however, as all Icacos fishermen
claim to have used and continue to use guard . Guard is a small mesh seine or purse net
that is tied to a pirogue and thrown over the side into the water with live bait inside to
effectively store them for alavive fishing. A guard filled to the brim is also said to be full charge .
When drop lining and not catching anything, a fisherman will chansay meaning
to take the bait off to replace it, but not the hook. Cha cha , the local term for Round Scad
or Round Robin (Decapterus punctatus), and to a lesser extent Chewie chewie , the local
name for Anchovy specifically used as bait, are often utilized bait and fishermen will
switch between the two depending on the size and type of fish sought or thought to be in
the particular spot being fished.
Icacos fishermen recognize and have termed multiple facets of their ocean
environment and climatic conditions. The primary time for departing on a fishing trip is phajire , which means in the early morning just before sunrise. All boats in Icacos
regularly make these phajire morning trips and these are the ones observed in the catch
sample outlined in Chapter five. On most evenings or nights just after sunset, I observed
usually one or a handful of boats heading out to fish by lamplight or to “torch” fish.
There are mangrove swamp areas around the coastal waters Icacos fishermen use, these
are called mang for short. Fishermen go to mang for drop lining or jooking . Jooking is
thought by Icacos fishermen to be more successful in near shore swampy areas as water
is shallow allowing fish to swim more near the surface and be visible. On dozens of on
water trips across my multiple field trips to Icacos including the catch sampling period, I
113 only saw one jook in a swamp, otherwise fishermen were drop lining . Either from shore
or on water, when a fisherman sees fish hitting the water’s surface, which causes a bubbling or line across the water, this is first thread . When waves become rough and/or a weather front causes the seabed to churn up mud towards the surface resulting in the ocean turning a light brown color, this is called cocoa foam for the foamy water that often
accompanies it. Seeing cocoa foam from the shore or spotting it when on water means the weather has turned bad or will and it is time to either head to shore or stay on shore.
An associated term is mud used as a verb to mud or mudding , which also notes brownish water being churned up from the sea bottom. Mud , however, refers more to this resulting from fish activity stirring up sand, mud, or debris, especially in shallow and swampy areas. Mudding is said to be closely related with jooking in swamps since hitting fish this way either results in fish stirring or is sometimes brought about because a fisherman sees fish stirring. When fish become visible in large numbers to the point they make the water froth with surface activity, this is noted by the verb beating . When participating in on water trips with fishermen during what would end up being large catch days and upon returning to shore with sizable harvests, fishermen would often note this condition by saying “they beatin’ today” (referring to fish). In calm ocean conditions, the sea is said to be cool down . On water and in good conditions, some fishermen and their boats are notorious among the fisher folk population of speeding so fast over rough waters as to be
“riding the waves” or “surfing the waves”, the action of which is termed lae lae .
Although boats spend much of their time in deep waters far enough away from
Trinidadian or Venezuelan land to see specific on shore structures, fishers do utilize landmarks when fishing within visible distance of shore to ensure they are at the spot
114 they wish to be. This practice is called bank marking or making bank mark by fishermen.
Fishers use a landmark, immediate shoreline features such as rock out croppings and particular sandy beach areas or tree clusters are most often utilized, to ensure they are in the spot good for fishing that trip. When in sight and facing parts of the village, a few small houses are used as well for noting specific fishing areas. Similar practices of using landmarks to note ocean fishing spots are done by small scale fisher folk in other villages and other cultures worldwide, but often for denoting territories used exclusively by a particular boat or family (see Chapman, Jackson Smith, and Petrzelka 2008). In Icacos, the practice is not for exclusive use territories, but rather for finding “sweet” areas that have provided abundance during certain conditions or periods in the past and with which a particular fisherman has had success.
A serious issue among village fishermen historically and currently is the relations between them and Venezuelan authorities who patrol the Serpent’s Mouth in attempts to protect Venezuelan claims to these waters and prevent Trinidadian vessels from operating there. Despite the presence of patrols and past conflicts, Icacos fishermen do recognize these waters, although fishing has tended to stay on the “Trinidadian half” of the
Serpent’s Mouth . Fishermen and villagers refer to the chute , an illegal route to and entry into Venezuela when departing from the Gulf of Paria side (west coastal side) of
Trinidad. It is illegal to enter Venezuela as a Trinidadian this way without passing through an official port and the process is termed going through the chute or less often going through or to the back door . Icacos residents and fishermen use this in a negative connotation as it infers smuggling activity of people, contraband, or both to or from
Venezuela illegally. No fishermen know of any fellow fishers that go through the chute ,
115 but such illegal activity would likely not be reported to myself as a researcher, even one
who is a trusted and long term community researcher. A more neutral term that does not
infer illegal activity is going down the main , which refers to going by water near to
Venezuela.
The typical day for an Icacos fisherman is marked by high amounts of physical
labor. There are three primary forms of income, meaning items that are procured directly by the individual or that which can be used to exchange for other items. These are cash,
seafood, and other foods coming primarily from the few chickens and/or pigs that some
families or single dwellers keep in their yards. Much of the land in Icacos is sandy
resulting in an almost complete absence of subsistence agriculture in the village. The
most common household crops in Trinidad, such as potatoes, corn, rice, and various
vegetables and fruits are sparsely present. Types of fish caught in the Gulf waters off
Icacos and returned by Icacos fishermen are shown in Table 1. Besides the local words
for specific fish species, machri is a generic term for fish. “Fish” was used more often during my presence in conversations, on water trips, and interviews, but machri is sometimes heard as an exclamation on its own when a fishermen brings up a sizable catch or when pointing to a possible fishing spot when on a pirogue . Galla refers to plankton or very small marine organisms that are still visible.
Scientific name Common English name Icacos name Acanthocybium solandri Wahoo, King fish Wahoo, Kingfish Achirus lineatus Flatfish, Lined Sole Aileronde Aetobatus narinari Spotted eagle ray Wacawa Albula vulpes Bonefish Banane Anableps microlepis Four-eyed fish Big Eye, Goziey Anchovia (genus) Anchovy Chewie-Chewie, Fry-Dry, Jashwa, Anchois, Zanchois Anisotremus surinamensis Black margate Lippe Archosargus rhomboidalis Western Atlantic Seabream Mawan Arius proops Catfish Catfish
116 Bagre bagre Gillbacker Catfish Bagre Carangidae (family) Sapatay Caranx bartholomaei Yellow jack Coulirou Caranx hippos Cavalli, Crevalle Hourel/Jourel (very large, over 4 ft long and 15 lbs) Carcharhinus limbatus Black tip shark Black shark Cetropomus ensiferus Snook Robalo Chaeodipterus faber Atlantic spade fish Palomette, Pawa Chaetodon capistratus Foureye Butterflyfish Marguerite Chaetodon striatus Banded Butterflyfish Mariposa Shoemaker, Plateau Chloroscombrus chrysurus Atlantic bumper Cro-cro Conodon nobilis Yellow cro-cro, Cro-cro grunt Dorado Coryphaena hippurus Dolphin fish, Dorado Platefish, Saucer fish Cyclopsetta chittendeni Mexican Flounder Cynoscion jamaicesis Jamaican weakfish Weakfish Decapterus punctatus Round Scad, Round Robin Cha-Cha, Small jack Decapterus tabl Redtail scad, Jack Diapterus rhombeus Blinch Pretty fish Diplectrum formosum Sand perch Rainbow Elagatis bipinnulata Rainbow runner Elops saurus Ladyfish Banane Epinephelus flavolimbatus Grouper, Yellowfin grouper Grouper Epinephelus guttatus Red Hind Koon Epinephelus itajara Grouper, Jewfish Grouper Epinephelus morio Red Grouper Red Grouper Epinephelus striatus Nassau Grouper Tamboline, Tienne, White Grouper Euthynnus alletteratus Bonito, Little tunny Bonito Genyatremus luteus Torroto grunt Tarwat Gerres cinereus Yellow fin mojarra Macabal Gymnotus carapo Banded knifefish Tiger Knife Fish Haemulon bonariense Grunt, Black grunt Haemulon melanurum Grunt, Cottonwick grunt Sarde Haemulon plumieri Grunt, White grunt Sarde Halieutichthys aculeatus Batfish Crapaud Hemicaranx amblyrhynchus Palomette, Bluntnose jack Hemiramphus and Halfbeak fish Balahoo Hyporhamphus (genus) Hurudichthys affinis Flying fish, Four wing flying fish Holocentrus ascensionis Squirrelfish, Maryanne Maryanne Istiophorus albica Sailfish, Atlantic sailfish Sailfish Larimus breviceps Shorthead Drum Marciani Lobites surinamensis Atlantic Tripletail Marrocoto Loligo plei Small squid Cheche Lutjanus analis Mutton snapper Sorb Lutjanus apodus Schoolmaster snapper, Dogtooth Schoolmaster, Yellow snapper Pargue Lutjanus griseus Grey snapper Grey snapper Lutjanus jocu Dog snapper Dog snapper Lutjanus purpureus Redfish, Southern red Redfish Lutjanus synagris Lane snapper, Redfish Walliack Lutjanus vivanus Silk snapper Vivanot
117 Macrodon ancylodon Yellow mouth salmon, German Rock Salmon salmon Makaira nigricans Marlin, Blue marlin Micropogonias furnieri Cro-cro, White mouth croaker Rocando Mugil curema Mullet, White mullet Lebranche Octopus vulgaris Octopus Devil fish Oligoplites saurus Leatherjacket Zapate, Tie-pin Opisthonema oglinum Atlantic thread herring, Herring Harang Paraexocoetus brachypterus Flying fish, Guineaman Guineaman Penaeus notialis Pink shrimp, Southern pink shrimp Shrimp
Penaeus schmitti White shrimp, Southern white shrimp, Cork shrimp Shrimp
Penaeus subtillis Brown shrimp, Southern brown shrimp Peprilus paru Harvestfish Tabac Polydactylus virginicus Barbu Barbay Pomacanthus arcuatus Gray angelfish Sabellick Pomatomus saltator Bluefish Ancho Porichthys plectrodon Atlantic midshipman Goby Rhizoprionodon lalandii Puppy shark, Shark plumhead Shark Rhomboplites aurorbens Vermilion snapper Sciaenidae (family) Salmon/Saumon Scarus guacamaia Rainbow parrotfish Guachawo Scomberomorus brasiliensis Carite, Serra Spanish mackerel Seezo Scomberomorus cavalla Kingfish, King mackerel Kingfish, Taza
Selene setapinnis Atlantic moonfish La Lune Seriola rivoliana Amberjack Amberjack
Sparisoma chrysopterum Green Parrotfish Green jacket Sphyraena guachancho Barracuda Chooka (small versions
called Bechine/Becune)
Hammerhead shark Sphyrna lewini Atlantic needlefish Strongylura marina Big Scale Tarpon, Grande ecaille Tarpon atlanticus Yellow fin Yellowfin tuna
Thunnus albacares Blackfin tuna, Albacore (Tobago) Thunnus atlanticus Pompano, Florida pompano Pamp Trachinotus carolinus Great Pompano, Palometa Zelon, Zelwan Trachinotus goodei Cutlassfish Cutlass fish Trichiurus lepturus Needlefish, Houndfish Orphie, Zorphie Tylosurus crocodilus Seabob, Honey shrimp, Jinga Shrimp Xiphopenaeus kroyeri Table 1: Marine species procured by Trinidad/Tobago fisher-folk. Adapted from FAO 2010. Those included in the Icacos catch sample outlined in Chapter five are in bold. Additional species that Icacos fishermen claim have been caught by fisher-folk of the village are italicized.
118
Figure 15: Various fish of Icacos.
Boats are either operated solo (by one fisherman) or a crew consisting of two to ten men. Seeing a crew at the high end of this size spectrum is rare, especially any crew above five. Solo operations are almost always an owner operator, although there are two instances in Icacos where the solo boat operator works for a boat owner. There are eight solo operations and 31 crew boats in Icacos. Twenty five boats that are crew operations are owned by one fishermen and six are owned by multiple. Locals refer to a partnership in boat ownership as company . Thus, there are six boats that are said to be of company or
that have company . Crew members may be kin or drawn from the owning fisherman’s
household, but this is not always the case. Crew are most often generalists, meaning
fishermen tend to perform the same work on and off water regardless of their status as an
owner or crew member. Even the local term for crew members is taken from a more
commonly used concept across Trinidad meaning “associates”, this is kind or sometimes
kine . It is used with a personal pronoun beforehand by Icacos fishermen; my kind/kine or
119 his kind/kine become often heard utterances when fishermen discuss crew. Like its larger
usage across the nation, it denotes associates or a group who are close and friendly and is
appropriate to Icacos fishermen given the high rate of kin that crew together. Icacos
fishermen use this term exclusively for their crewmates to indicate the close bond and
cooperative efforts needed for many types of fishing, one will not hear them use it for
other friends or associates.
Ethnicity and Kinship
Kinship terms and degrees of genetic relatedness were identified for the Icacos
fisher folk population (n = 104). Along with the fisher folk, the kinship sample included
members of their families either living in their household or identified by the fishermen
or others in the sample as familial relations that reside in Icacos. Thus, there are
individuals identified in the kinship sample who do not reside in fisher folk households.
All residing members of fisher folk households are included in the kinship study. Kinship
data was gathered on these non fishermen in order to have as complete a picture as possible of the fisher folks’ families for identifying relatedness coefficients and
reproductive success (n = 549). Having this data for Icacos fisher folk enabled testing of
the reproductive fitness portions of hypotheses one, two, five, and six described in
Chapter one to see if and how sharing and distribution patterns (and any associated
cultural models) relate to reproductive success. Basic age, gender, and ethnicity
descriptive statistics for the entire kinship sample are shown in Table 2. Essentially half
the village can be traced starting from the fishermen population with 549 of the
approximately 1,000 residents included in the kinship sample. Individuals identifying as
120 three quarters or more of one ethnic background were included in that ethnicity for
analysis and other mixed ethnicity persons were few. Since some people were of a variety
of ethnic backgrounds consisting of mostly “half and half” (e.g. half Chinese and half
East Indian), they are placed in a third category as otherwise each ethnic combination
would produce small sample sizes (under n = 20). While average age is older for fisher
folk specifically (see Table 7 in this chapter), the kinship sample shows an expectedly
lower mean age given the children included.
Indo Trinidadians have numerous and specific cultural kin terms compared to
Afro Trinidadians in Icacos who have less specialized terms and more that overlap with
English. Although multiple aspects of Western and Central African culture such as
religion, dancing, music, and kinship organization exist in similar forms among African
Caribbeans across the region as noted in Chapter three, Afro Trinidadians’ kin terms in
Icacos did not show African cultural influence nor inclusion of French terms. Indo
Trinidadians’ terms are based on Bhojpuri, which is a language of the northeast region of
India from where much of the East Indian ancestors of modern Indo Trinidadian population arrived to Trinidad. A few terms are also related to Hindi such as mami , which
is a maternal aunt. Indo Trinidadians’ cultural kin terms are diagrammed in Figures 13
through 16 with Afro Trinidadians’ in Figure 16. A majority of Afro Trinidadians’ kin
terms parallel with English, so only terms not commonly found in U.S. or British English
are included. Tables 3 through 5 show definitions for each of the Indo Trinidadian,
additional Indo Trinidadian affinal, and Afro Trinidadian terms respectively. Besides the
specialized cultural kin terms, Indo Trinidadians have a few concepts for family and
121 familial heritage. Pariwaar is a term used to refer to family in general. Parampara means one’s family heritage or tradition.
Age Age Gender Gender Household Household (mean) (SD) (males) (females) Size (mean) Size (SD) Afro 33.2 20 134 125 2.9 1.4 Trinidadian (n=259) Indo 31.7 18.4 152 138 3.8 1.3 Trinidadian (n=290) Total (n=549) 32.4 21.2 286 263 3.3 1.6 Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Icacos kinship sample.
Figure 16: Diagram of Indo-Trinidadian cultural kin terms. Percentages are proportions of Icacos households surveyed in the kinship sample that use the term compared to the respective synonym. With bhe/bhai and sissy/chotki bahin , the second respective words are not used by any households surveyed, but were mentioned as possible synonyms.
122
Grandparent’s generation Child(ren)’s generation Aja paternal grandfather (FF) Bahu daughter in law (SW) Granpupa paternal grandfather (FF) Pato daughter in law (SW) Aji paternal grandmother (FM) Beta son (S) Nana maternal grandfather (MF) Beti daughter (D) Nani maternal grandmother (MM) (also a generic term Damad son in law (DH) of respect for an older woman) Child(ren)’s In-laws Parent’s generation Samdhi child’s father in law (SWF or DHF) Phupha affinal paternal uncle (FZH) Samdhin child’s mother in law (SWM or Phua paternal aunt (FZ) DHM) Dada paternal uncle, father’s elder brother (FB) Dadi affinal paternal aunt, father’s elder brother’s wife Grandchild(ren)’s generation (FBW) Natin granddaughter (SD or DD) Kaakaa paternal uncle, father’s younger brother (FB) Nati grandson (SS or DS) (also any male cousin of father’s generation younger Nat Pato grandson’s wife (SSW or DSW) than ego) Kaaki affinal paternal aunt, father’s younger brother’s Additional terms wife (FBW) Bacha affectionate reference to a male child *Baba father (F) Didi all female siblings and cousins older Bap father (F) than ego, most often used for oldest sister Mami mother (M) (also grandmother or maternal aunt) Katbap step father (MH) Moi mother (M) Katmai step mother (FW) Maamil affinal maternal aunt, mother’s brother’s wife Majhilaa modifier placed before kin term to (MBW) note the subject is younger or smaller than ego Mowsaa affinal maternal uncle, mother’s sister’s *Papa Jab most important male in the family; husband (MZH) family patriarch Mowsi maternal aunt (MZ)
Ego’s generation Bhai brother (B) Bhe brother (B) (also any male sibling or cousin older than ego) Bhaabi sister in law (BW) (sometimes exclusively used for older brother’s wife) Bhowji sister in law, older brother’s wife (BW) Bahnoi brother in law, older sister’s husband (ZH) *Sissy sister (Z) Chotki Bahin younger sister (Z)
* Term used by Indo Trinidadian, Afro Trinidadian, and mixed ethnic families. Table 3: Definitions of Indo-Trinidadian cultural kin terms by descending generation.
123
Figure 17: Diagram of additional affinal Indo-Trinidadian cultural kin terms when ego is male. Percentages are proportions of Icacos households surveyed in the kinship sample that use the term compared to the respective synonym.
Figure 18: Diagram of additional affinal Indo-Trinidadian cultural kin terms when ego is female. Percentages are proportions of Icacos households surveyed in the kinship sample that use the term compared to the respective synonym.
Ego = Male Ego = Female
Patni wife (W) Pati husband (H)
Ego’s Parents In-law Sasur father in law (WF or HF) Saas mother in law (WM or HM) Mai mother in law (WM or HM)
Ego’s Siblings In-law Ego’s Siblings In-law Saari sister in law, wife’s younger sister (WZ) Dewar brother in law, husband’s younger brother Sarubhai brother in law (WZH) (HB) Saar brother in law (WB) Chotka sister in law, husband’s younger Sarahaj sister in law (WBW) brother’s wife (HBW) Sari – sister in law (WBW) Barka brother in law, husband’s older brother (HB) Barki sister in law, husband’s older brother’s wife (HBW) Nand sister in law (HZ) Nandoi brother in law (HZH) Table 4: Definitions of additional affinal Indo-Trinidadian cultural kin terms. Words noting in-laws of ego’s generation differ depending on sex of ego.
124
Figure 19: Diagram of Afro-Trinidadian cultural kin terms. Percentages are proportions of Icacos households surveyed in the kinship sample that use the term compared to the respective synonym. A majority of Afro-Trinidadians’ kin terms parallel with English, so only terms not commonly found in U.S. or British English are included.
Grandparent’s generation Nennen maternal or paternal grandmother (MM or FM) (also maternal or paternal aunt, godmother, or an older woman who takes care of or is guardian of ego) Gangan maternal or paternal grandmother (MM or FM)
Parent’s generation *Baba father (F)
Ego’s generation *Sissy sister (S)
Additional terms *Papa Jab most important male in the family; family patriarch * Term used by Indo Trinidadian, Afro Trinidadian, and mixed ethnic families. Table 5: Definitions of Afro-Trinidadian cultural kin terms by descending generation.
Most households surveyed had one or multiple relatives who were either residing permanently far away from Icacos on the other side of Trinidad or in another nation or had relatives that had go to come back . This phrase indicates a relative is gone for a short period and planning to return soon. Far family refers to relatives who live at a distance,
125 i.e., on the other side of Trinidad or on another island or nation, and are not seen
frequently. That term is used across ethnic groups as is pumpkin vine family , which can
also refer to relatives who are at a similar “far” geographical distance. Pumpkin vine family adds the implication that those relatives are far away enough, in terms of relational perception (i.e., cultural kinship) to be an option for marriage. Pumpkin vine relatives are thus, usually those at a geographical distance (at least in a neighboring village) and could be married to the subject and this would be locally acceptable. While the kinship survey of this study finds no marriages consisting of individuals related closely enough to fall under this term (i.e., no two individuals with the same relations going back three generations), the concept does exist and was brought up by interviewees.
With marital and relationship infidelity and people occasionally taking on multiple partners, terms have developed for these situations. At least three terms exist for a third person or outside lover of an already romantically involved individual. Afro
Trinidadian interviewees especially emphasized the word combosse , which refers specifically to a woman in a sexual relationship with a man while the man is living with or sexually involved with another woman. Deputy was also emphasized by informants across ethnic groups, which means the lover of a married person and most often refers to a man’s mistress. Patesri is less commonly used and also means the lover of a married man. To bull around is a verb referring to when a male produces multiple children with different women. Terms exist for the children of some of these contexts as well. Locals call a child born many years after the previous one from the same woman a love child noting the possibility that the women took in a different man for conception due to the length between offspring. Interviewees noted the existence of ethnically mixed children
126 from such co partnerships and also that there are some thought to be illegitimate children.
These are privately called sailor child(ren) by locals, which references potential
illegitimacy as when a sailor visits a port town and fathers a child with a woman. There
are also a few terms used generically to refer to old men and young men, by age. Uncle is
a commonly heard word used when a younger man refers or is speaking with an older
man, usually when the age difference is great enough so the man could be the young
man’s father or older. This is considered a show of respect. Youthman is occasionally
used in the opposite context, older men referring to a young male.
Five lineages were identified, which includes three patrilineages and two
matrilineages. 8 Lineages were identified during census interviews as multiple adult members of each lineage helped to recognize lineages by naming the same ancestors at least two generations older than them. Twenty eight fishermen belong to one of the five lineages. Other fisher folk either migrated to Icacos from other parts of Trinidad solo or with their wives or nuclear families, are part of a family that has been in Icacos less than three generations, or has a large number of family members who have emigrated from the village to the point that a substantial (e.g. ten or more members) lineage residing in the village was not counted. The three patrilineages are large compared to the matrilineages and encompass nineteen of the fishermen, while the two matrilineages claim nine fisher folk. Patrilineages are primarily Indo Trinidadian and the matrilineages consist of Afro
Trinidadians with mixed ethnicity individuals existing in all of the lineages. Table 6 shows the lineages anonymously numbered with quantity of members residing in Icacos
8 See Alvard (2003) for the importance of lineages on identifying cooperative units. While crews in Icacos are not as large as whale hunting crews in Lamalera and thus, sibships may provide sufficient boat crew in Icacos, the potential influence of lineage identity on subsistence cooperation is recognized and thus part of the analysis in the present study.
127 along with Wright’s relatedness coefficients (r) for the relatedness within each lineage.
Due to there being a smaller number of village members and a higher proportion of
sibling relationships compared to inter generational relationships among the Afro
Trinidadian lineages, these evidence higher intra lineage relatedness.
Lineage ID # of Members # of Fisher folk Wright’s Residing in Icacos Residing in Icacos Relatedness Coefficient (r) Patrilineage 1 20 7 .098 Patrilineage 2 16 5 .108 Patrilineage 3 14 7 .121 Matrilineage 1 11 3 .247 Matrilineage 2 13 6 .196 Table 6: Lineages containing Icacos fisher-folk. Complete lineages are larger, but only living lineage members residing in Icacos, as of 2010, are counted. Fishermen names are in bold.
Although the literature on Indo Trindadians refers to their kinship as patrilineal
(e.g. Munasinghe 2001; van Niekerk 2002), a more appropriate term for those in Icacos may be “patrifocal” given that only a handful of patrilineages are recognized by locals, but they have male heads of households and residence and crewing (see Chapter five) tends to be based on relatives of the male’s side. Tests of significance regarding lineage membership or non membership compared with amounts of fish catch distributed will be explored in Chapters five.
Ethnicity, Household Composition, and Genetic Relatedness
This section describes variables regarding ethnic affiliation, household
composition, and genetic relatedness and initial analyses of each. The research questions
and hypotheses for the present study, outlined in Chapter one, are based on analyzing
ethnic differences, requiring that each individual’s ethnicity be identified. Household size
128 was determined along with consumer to worker (CW) ratios for households, which give a
further snapshot of household composition and could be a significant variable in material
distribution as individuals from high CW residences may have more resources available
and therefore give more of their potential income to others. “Mixed household” ratios,
figured by dividing the number of individuals in a house of a different ethnicity (in cases
of there being more than one ethnicity represented in the household) by total household
size, is calculated to help show the relationship between ethnicity and household
composition and as another way to see if ethnicity (through household composition)
affects distribution patterns. Wright’s relatedness coefficients (r) are calculated, which
show the degree of genetic relatedness of individuals in the ethnic groups and may be
useful for understanding in forthcoming chapters as to whether one distributes more to
genetic kin. Three measures of reproductive success, number of surviving offspring,
mean number of mates with whom an individual had children, and father absence (the
latter two being measures of conjugal stability) were determined to help evaluate the
reproductive fitness portions of hypotheses one, two, five, and six described in Chapter
one.
Genetic relatedness analysis and census compiling of the demographic and kinship variables in the present study is based on Quinlan and Hagen’s (2008) genealogical method (with some modifications). Interviews with all members of fisher folk households and relatives to fisher folk not residing in house when that person was available for interview within the village (n = 549) consisted of the following: name, age, ethnicity, date of birth and death, name of parents, grandparents, siblings, offspring, grand offspring (offspring and grand offspring included living and deceased), aunts,
129 uncles, and cousins. I also inquired about names of any family members older than the
generations initially asked (e.g. great grandparents, great offspring) until memory was
exhausted. All females mentioned were identified through both current and maiden
names when known. Along with names and dates of birth for each individual entered into
the genealogical database, each interviewee was asked if there was a term (of
endearment), “special name”, or “relational name” they called each relative. The above
mentioned kinship data was entered into Descent software (Hagen 2005) along with an
identification number for each household (based on order of interviews), an identification
number for each individual (based on order of interviews), and “9999” for missing data.
Database columns were error checked using Descent. Analysis of the kinship sample is presented later in this chapter.
Basic age and ethnicity descriptive statistics of the village’s fishermen population
(n = 104) are shown in Table 7. All fisher folk are male. The average age of Icacos fisher folk is 46.1 with Afro Trinidadians being older on average, in their late 40’s, on average compared to Indo Trinidadians in the early 40’s on average. Difference in mean age between the two groups is statistically significant at the p < .05 level (t = 2.44, df =
102). Average age is old among fishermen as there are very few in their 20’s or 30’s.
Most are in their 40’s and 50’s (62%) and concerns abound about who will fill the void when this generation passes and/or becomes too old to fish regularly. A handful of older fishermen’s sons in their 20’s are a part of the village’s fisher folk population, but unless immigration of fishers from outside Icacos occurs, fishermen convince more of their offspring to enter the profession, other village residents learn to be fishers, or younger fishermen begin to have a large number of children and convince them to follow in their
130 footsteps, the number of small scale fishermen in Icacos will likely dwindle over the next
generation (approximately 25 years).
Ethnicity was determined by asking the person explicitly what they considered their ethnicity to be and then inquiring about their parents’ and grandparents’ ethnic background. Determining ethnicity and utilizing it in the preceding and following statistical analyses were easy for the fisher folk sample since 95% of fishermen were fully of one ethnic category or the other; full Afro Trinidadian or Indo Trinidadian.
Ethnicity was calculated in quarters out of one for each ethnicity. For example, if a person is full Indo Trinidadian, they receive a “one” for that ethnicity variable and “zero” for the rest. If a person is half Afro Trinidadian and half Chinese Trinidadian, they receive .5 for each of those respective variables. Ninety five percent of the fisher folk sample falls under a binary ethnicity variable. This variable has “zero” representing full
Afro Trinidadian, “one” for full Indo Trinidadian. Variations exist in between showing mixed combinations of the two (e.g. .75 is three quarters Indo Trinidadian and one quarter Afro Trinidadian, .25 is one quarter Indo Trinidadian and three quarters Afro
Trinidadian) for the five fishermen who are considered “mixed”.
Household data were collected as part of census of the community. For the present study, household is defined as a set of individuals who co reside within a dwelling. A one person dwelling can constitute a household as well and to be considered a co resident, a majority of the other members of the household must agree that person resides there. Differences exist in household size with mean Indo Trinidadian households having nearly five members and Afro Trinidadians’ having less than four. Reproductive success of male heads of household is unlikely to explain this disparity because no
131 statistically significant difference exists in living offspring between fishermen from the
two ethnic groups (t = 1.43, df = 69, see Table 11 later in this chapter). A large difference
exists in conjugal stability (see Tables 10, 11, and analysis later in this chapter).
Differences in household size are outside the scope of this study as numerous
unmeasured variables could play a role. With not much difference in number of children
fathered by males on average when comparing ethnicities, but conjugal stability being
significant, this may speak to low familial stability in general resulting in more split
households or households with more emigrated or far family for Afro Trinidadians.
A “mixed household” ratio was calculated for each Icacos fisherman by dividing the number of individuals of a different ethnicity residing with in the household by the total number in the household. Afro Trinidadians show a significantly higher mixed household ratio than Indo Trinidadians (t = 52.77, df = 102, p < .005, see Table 7), although both groups’ ratios are low compared to district and national rates of mixed ethnicity. The national rate of mixed ethnic individuals is 20.5% with Siparia district, home to Icacos, being 18%. Mixed ethnicity proportions across southern Trinidad are low compared to the rest of the nation with some as small as 9% (CARICOM 2009). Afro
Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos are identical with the district concerning ratio of persons in their households who are mixed when looking at the mean percentage of their households containing 18% persons of mixed ethnicity, but Indo Trinidadians have much less diverse households showing only 6.5% of members as being “mixed”. The medians are zero and demonstrate that mixed ethnic persons are concentrated in only a few households, some being children born from a previous marriage or partnership with a mate of the other ethnicity or family friends residing in the house. Nearly all of the 9.1%
132 of fishermen’s household members who are mixed are a combination of Afro Trinidadian
and Indo Trinidadian with at least one of those components accounting for 50% of their
ethnic background. Five of the 104 fishermen are of mixed ethnicity. These mixtures are
mostly Afro Trinidadian and Indo Trinidadian, while one is one quarter Lebanese, and
one is one half Chinese. The occurrence of mixed ethnicity among the fishermen population is quite small and, when controlled for, barely affects subsequent analyses based on ethnic background. This will be further explored in Chapters five, six, seven,
and eight.
Age Age Household Household Mixed Mixed (mean) (SD) Size (mean) Size (SD) Household Household Ratio (mean) Ratio (SD) Afro 48.3 10.2 3.7 1.6 .18 .013 Trinidadian (n=50) Indo 43 11.8 4.99 1.1 0.065 .009 Trinidadian (n=54) Total (N=104) 46.1 12.1 4.5 1.3 .091 .01 Table 7: Descriptive statistics of Icacos fisher-folk population. The “mixed household ratio” is calculated by dividing the number of individuals of a different ethnicity residing with in the household by the total number in the household.
Trouillot (1988) provides a typology drawn from Chayanov (1966) of household types estimating levels of consumption versus production within the household based on age of residents and how much work they contribute. This is potentially useful for the
Caribbean since it is one of the few surveys of this manner carried out in the region, being drawn from Wesley Village in Dominica. Trouillot identifies three types of households: type one consists of couples below the age of 30 with a child birthed, on average, every four years with each adult contributing a full unit of work and children over eight contributing a half unit. Type two is characterized by a chronological phase
133 where children leave the home and diversification of income strategies increase as
sometimes remittances come in. Type three consists of an adult couple each over the age
of 50 with at least one second generation individual living with them at the house and
usually multiple third and fourth generation children and teenagers contributing to
household income. Often, there are at least two co habiting couples in type three houses
since multiple generations reside there. Type three households usually exhibit the lowest
CW ratios as there is high consumption, but the large amount of workers trumps that.
They are also the least common of the three types. This typology also supplies a model
for looking at households longitudinally since “cycles of strain” where CW ratios are
higher can be identified. Income strain often occurs when newborn children arrive since
this adds a consumer only and not a worker. In some cases, couples avoid this early strain by residing with one of the spouses’ adult families. Children tend to contribute more production in their teen years above a half unit, which enables them to become adults (in
terms of work) quicker.
During census interviews discussed earlier in this chapter, I asked average current number of hours worked and types of worked performed by each household member to help calculate CW ratios. When specific hours could not be estimated by informants, average number of “full or half days” worked per week were estimated. A full day of work for Icacos fisher folk is considered from seven to ten hours per day when accounting for on and off water activities associated with fishing, distribution, marketing, and transporting and repairing equipment. Household types based on Trouillot’s typology and associated CW ratios are displayed in Table 8 in total and separated by ethnicity.
Type three is the least common for Afro Trinidadians, but there are more than a handful
134 of Indo Trinidadian type three households. Higher conjugal stability and reproductive
success among Indo Trinidadians may help account for this, especially with the
moderately high rates of father absenteeism among Afro Trinidadians. Type two is most
common for each ethnicity, although none of the three types exist in any great quantity.
CW ratios rank from highest to lowest from type one through type three respectively for both ethnicities, which is expected. Only slight, but consistent differences exist with
Afro Trinidadians evidencing more consumers to workers across all three household
types. Divergences are slight, however, and all CW ratios based on this typology show a
small range between 1.13 and 1.75. Since the number of households that fit these types
are low with two of the three types below n = 20, ANOVA was not performed. CW ratios
for all fisher folk households (n = 72), regardless of type, resulted in a slightly higher
number of consumers for Afro Trinidadian households with inter ethnic difference only
slight (t = 1.02, df = 70). CW ratios will further be discussed and used in analyses in
Chapter five.
All Households Household Type 1 Household Type 2 Household Type 3 Afro Trinidadian 1.42 (n=32) 1.75 (n=8) 1.38 (n=8) 1.19 (n=2) Indo Trinidadian 1.39 (n=40) 1.7 (n=8) 1.36 (n=13) 1.13 (n=9) Total 1.4 (n=72) 1.73 (n=16) 1.37 (n=21) 1.14 (n=11) Table 8: Mean CW ratios for different types of Icacos fisher-folk’s households.
Wright’s relatedness coefficients were also calculated for the entire fisher folk population and the entire kinship sample separated by ethnicity with results shown in
Table 9. The entire kinship sample relatedness is expectedly miniscule given the size of the sample and there is little difference in level of relatedness when comparing ethnic groups.
135
Icacos Fisher folk Icacos Kinship Sample Afro Trinidadian .021 (n=50) .001 (n=259) Indo Trinidadian .026 (n=54) .001 (n=290) Total .008 (n=104) .001 (n=549) Table 9: Wright’s relatedness coefficients for the Icacos fisher-folk population and samples within it. Values lower than .001 are rounded up to the thousandth decimal place.
Number of surviving offspring and conjugal stability were calculated for each ethnic group. Results are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Conjugal stability was measured two ways: father’s presence or absence and number of mates with whom an individual had children were utilized as two proxy measures (see Quinlan and Hagen 2008). Father absence is defined by two circumstances: a) a father of a child is not identified by the child or immediate relatives; and, b) an individual’s mother and father had that individual as a child together, but the father had additional children with at least one other partner.
This is used due to the father potentially splitting time and resources between the various step siblings. Data from the kinship sample was used since this showed number of offspring for each individual and enabled persons with children to be identified for follow up questions regarding number of mates. For reproductive success and the number of mates measure of conjugal stability, n = 420 as this was the number of individuals with offspring. Within this, n = 71 are fishermen with children. For the father absence measure of conjugal stability, identification of fathers and father’s and mother’s offspring of children age eighteen and under was carried out. This could also be determined for adults as well based on recall of parental names and their parent’s offspring, so father absence data was also collected for adults resulting in n = 499 for this measure of conjugal stability. Nearly all fishermen were able to provide this data resulting in n = 98 for them.
136 Number of offspring was initially asked of each individual and cross checked with the
individual’s spouse or mate(s) (when available) and immediate family members
(grandparents of the offspring, siblings). This resulted in four individuals having
contradictions in number of offspring that could not be completely verified and these
were eliminated from the reproductive data. Number of mates was initially asked of each
individual and cross checked with immediate family members (parents and siblings of
individual, when available). Given the occasional secrecy of mate relationships (as
opposed to the more openly known nature of how many offspring one has), there were 28
instances of contradictions in mate data that could not be verified and these were
removed. Identity of father was initially asked of each person and cross checked with the
individual’s mother (when available) and the person’s siblings. There were 24 cases that
contained unverifiable contradictions concerning father absence and these were removed.
137
Age Number of Number Conjugal Conjugal Conjugal (mean) surviving of Stability I Stability Stability II children surviving (mean # of I (SD) (% of (mean) children mates with children (SD) whom with father individual absent) has children) Afro 37.8 1.97 .44 1.19 .41 30% Trinidadian (n=204) (n=204) (n=204) (n=241) Indo 39.2 2.03 .58 1.09 .37 6% Trinidadian (n=216) (n=216) (n=216) (n=258) Patrilineage 1 40.3 1.8 (n=10) .24 1 (n=10) .2 0% (n=17) (n=10) Patrilineage 2 38.1 .916 .31 1 (n=12) .08 0% (n=15) (n=12) (n=12) Patrilineage 3 37.3 1 (n=9) .44 1.22 (n=9) .35 0% (n=11) (n=9) Matrilineage 35.6 .77 (n=9) .19 1.55 (n=9) .43 88% (n=8) 1 (n=9) Matrilineage 36.9 1.1 (n=10) .23 1.2 (n=10) .35 8% (n=12) 2 (n=10) Total 38.5 (n=420) .51 1.17 .39 17% (n=420) (n=420) (n=499) Table 10: Reproductive success and conjugal stability by ethnicity and lineage in the Icacos kinship sample. All adult males and females over 18 are included in the sample are included in “number of surviving children” and “conjugal stability I”. Parts of the sample accounted for with “Conjugal stability II” are explained above.
Number of Number Conjugal Conjugal Conjugal surviving of Stability I Stability Stability II offspring surviving (mean # of I (SD) (% of (mean) offspring mates with children with (SD) whom father absent) individual has children) Afro 2.09 (n=34) .52 1.69 (n=34) .24 33% (n=48) Trinidadian Indo 2.25 (n=37) .42 1.12 (n=37) .08 4% (n=50) Trinidadian Total 2.17 (n=71) .47 1.49 (n=71) .16 18.2% (n=98) Table 11: Reproductive success and conjugal stability by ethnicity among Icacos fisher-folk (all males of same average age).
Reproductive success across the kin sample averages to approximately two for both Afro Trinidadians and Indo Trinidadians with the latter higher. This holds accurate
138 for the fishermen in the sample as well. While dozens of fishermen have several children
and larger households, accounting for the many that have one or none results in average
number of surviving children that is near two. Neither difference is statistically
significant (t = 1.19, df = 418 for kin sample, t = 1.43, df = 69 for fishermen). This is
close to the total fertility rate Trinidad nationally, which is 2.21. Mean conjugal stability
is similar with both ethnicities slightly over one average number of mates and Indo
Trinidadians showing nearly higher stability. The difference is only significant in the
fisherman sample (t = 1.92, df = 418 for kin sample, t = 2.05, df = 69, p < .05 for
fishermen). The father absence portion of conjugal stability, however, shows a large
statistically significant difference between ethnic groups (χ 2 = 48.08; p < .005 for kin sample, χ 2 = 12.16; p < .005 for fishermen). Although Afro Trinidadians evidence higher
father absence, Indo Trinidadians also show multiple cases. Cases and stories of
emigration from the village among fisher folk and their families are high, so desire to
leave and/or opportunities elsewhere may be pulling some male fathers away from
Icacos. This question is too broad for the present study, but father absence is significantly
higher among Afro Trinidadians.
Conclusion
Icacos is a relatively typical small village of southwestern Trinidad. Reliant on
fishing, mostly bi ethnic with a majority Indo Trinidadian population and a small mixed
ethnicity contingent, it is a place where people get along, but ethnic differences remain
influential in the private (household) sphere and in the way people perceive sharing,
distribution, and portions of their jobs (see Chapter six). Such cultural divergences
139 become clearer when looking at the census and interview results of this study. Indo
Trinidadians have greater father presence and more stable families that remain in the
village with more ethnic homogeneity and larger household sizes than Afro Trinidadians.
These cultural differences significantly affect familial structure among Icacos fishermen
and their relatives, but do they heavily influence fish distributions? This is the subject of
the next chapter.
140 CHAPTER FIVE
PRIMARY FISH DISTRIBUTION IN THE ICACOS COMMUNITY
This chapter examines fish distribution in Icacos and evaluates the first research
question and seven hypotheses outlined in Chapter one. Methods were also described in
Chapter one and consisted primarily of monitoring non market primary catch
distributions through weighing and recording on shore transfers after boat landings,
which allowed for the evaluation of HBE distribution patterns by frequency, breadth,
depth, and equality. Crew memberships were also recorded for each landing to
investigate the affect of crewing affiliation on catch distribution patterns and along with
the collected demographic and kinship data, enabled further testing of the HBE
hypotheses.
As part of free listing and pile sorting, I had fishermen construct a folk taxonomy
of terms associated with fish distribution by small scale fishers. I completed these with
my initial informants and after I built a snowball sample of n = 40 for additional free lists, pile sorts, and folk taxonomies of “character quality” cultural models (see Chapter six for
descriptive statistics of this sample) through these initial interviewees, I also completed
the “fish distribution” domain with the whole snowball sample. This sample consists of
an equal number of Afro Trinidadian and Indo Trinidadian respondents. Respondents
were asked to list words and phrases associated with a domain, rate each terms’
importance to fishing on a scale of 1 to 5, provide a meaning for each (oral or written),
and then sort the piles into those most associated with each other trying to account for
general v. more specific terms. Figure 20 and Tables 12 and 13 show the results. Table 13
141 displays the proportion of the snowball sample that included the term in their free list, an
average ranking when respondents were asked to sort terms into piles from most general
to specific, and an average importance rating when respondents were asked to tell how
important the concept is for fishing on a scale of 1 to 5. Figure 20 visually shows the pile
groupings and hierarchy of terms based on the hierarchical rankings in Table 13 and the
most often used groupings from pile sorts. Table 12 list the meaning of each term.
Chapman arrived at definitions from synthesizing commonly used words and descriptions
from respondents in the snowball sample and translating those into U.S. English when
needed. These are the analytical methods used for remaining domains in the present
study, which are discussed later in this chapter and into the next chapter.
Icacos fishermen, regardless of ethnicity, perceive fish catch transfer as being a
type of change, meaning a form of exchange without money. Numerous forms of transfer
fall under change , whether the transfer is one way giving, a balanced or unbalanced trade,
or part of a reciprocal exchange. Fishermen need to come round in order to change on the
shore, that is they need to bring back enough catch from their fishing outing in order to
share appropriate amounts with their crew and other helpers. Fishermen recognize two
more specific terms under change , share out and pass . Most often used as a verb like the previous terms, sharing out is the most crucial concept regarding fish distribution and
was the most referenced term when discussing it informally in interviews and
conversation. Share out is a way to describe the whole non market fish transfer system in
Icacos. It is the concept that each fishermen, regardless of whether they are a boat owner
or crew contribute to the success of the fishing vessel on each on water venture and that
they lay legitimate claim to the portion of catch for which they helped procure. In
142 practice, the share out system does not follow these rules exactly as there are multiple
“character” measures fish distributors account for, in place of calculating exact amounts of fish procured, when determining amounts to transfer (see Chapters six and seven).
Still, sharing out is a strong concept that all Icacos fishermen follow; giving parts of catch to individuals as their shares.
Pass also falls under change and is Icacos fishermen’s concept for reciprocity, whether balanced or unbalanced. Having someone to regularly pass with is seen as an advantage by many fishermen. When a fishermen properly come round , brings in an ample landing, and share out , there usually is makafooshet and pachay near the end of primary distributions. When boat owners transfer catch, the most valuable species are usually given out first with the least valuable remaining at the end. These often smaller and least valuable fish are often termed makafooshet and fish that are either partial or deformed and meant for discarding are called pachay . Makafooshet is seen as supplementing other transfers already given and will often go to on shore helpers or added to fishermen with especially low quantities of non market fish. Pachay is sometimes taken by fishermen to their homes in buckets to feed their dogs and other animals or is thrown back into the ocean from shore.
143
Figure 20: Folk taxonomy of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “fish distribution”. The structure is based on the hierarchical rankings in Table 13 and the most often used groupings from pile sorts.
Change – v. to exchange, barter, trade goods without money Come Round v. to make (catch, bring back) enough to share Share Out v., n. give parts of catch to individuals as their shares Pass v., n. reciprocal sharing of catch or other food items between villagers Makafooshet n. leftovers, remains of catch to be given once best is already distributed Pachay n. (mostly Afro Trinidadian use) bits and pieces of fish and other food that are usually discarded Windpie n. lack of food to eat Table 12: Definitions of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “fish distribution”. Definitions were arrived at from synthesizing commonly used words and descriptions from respondents in the snowball sample and translating those into U.S. English when needed.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Change .91 1.1 4.8 Come Round .71 2 4.6 Share Out .96 3.3 4.8 Pass .72 4.1 4.6 Makafooshet .82 5.4 4.2 Pachay .75 5.7 4.2 Windpie .58 6.6 2.1 Table 13: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “fish distribution”. This displays the proportion of the snowball sample that included the term in their free list, an average ranking when respondents were asked to sort terms into piles from most general to specific, and an average importance rating when respondents were asked to tell how important the concept is for fishing on a scale of 1-to-5.
144
Figure 21: A sample of fish caught from one of the Charles’ boats set out for distribution. Jayson Charles (right) holds a scale that is occasionally used to weigh fish.
Distribution of fish catch is almost always handled by the boat owner, in the cases where a crew boat has one owner. Specific percentages and breakdown of distributions observed between crew members and others will be covered in later in this chapter and
Chapter seven. Once the non market portion is distributed, multiple events can occur regarding what one does with their share. Of the portion taken home, nearly all fishermen have a small area of their workshop or kitchen for what the locals term corning ; drying and salting fish for preservation. While some of more elaborate setups, most fishermen have at least a board or a few boards laid out to drop a fresh catch onto and use this area to corn them. Once every few days during the sample catch period, I would see a fishermen use a publicly available fire pit near the launching beach to fry fish over fire on a stick framework. The stick frame for holding the fish over the fire is boucan and to use this to smoke or cook fish is the act of boucanay . Fishermen use this fire pit to eat lunch
145 from part of their catch share. This is also known as a cook up , which is to prepare food,
especially fish, in an improvised manner. Of portions taken home that are not corned ,
some are used as cook up fried over a home fire pit or a metal barbeque style stand and
shared with household members present.
Of recorded catch landings during the catch survey period of this study, from July
through December 2010, 82% of total landings (by weight) from a daily survey of 20 boats were designated to go to market. This matches what multiple informants claimed
was the proportion for market through casual conversations and interviews as all
fishermen claimed it was a large majority or specifically 70% to 90%. The range of
average daily market share of catch across the 20 boats was tight and ranged from 79% to
84% market share. The present study focuses on the non market portion of catch since
decisions concerning allocation of the non market portion are under the control of fisher
folk themselves and not of outsiders. Traveling vendors have set prices paid to fishers for
their catch in Trinidad (Ministry 2005) and often have control of which and how many of
the fishermen provide catch to them. Informants repeatedly explained this is highly based
on price; as such studying the distribution of the market portion of catch would likely be
highly influenced by market forces and outsiders. Although a vast majority of the market
share catch is purchased by vendors, a few fishermen set aside a pile of catch on occasion
to walk into town near the grocery store to sell. All leaders of the 39 boats have a vendor
they transact with on a regular basis with multiple boat leaders dealing with the same
vendor. These vendors a fishermen deals with on a regular basis is often referred to as a pwatik , which means a regular business partner and/or vendor.
146 While the catch distribution sample of 69 out of 104 local fishermen is
representative and quite large given the total local fisher folk population (see below in
this chapter), the distribution measured constitutes only eighteen percent of the total catch
as noted above. Although a large kg weight amount and number of transfers comprise the
catch sample (see below in this chapter), it is still a small portion of the total catch
available and should therefore be treated with caution in terms of generalizing transfer patterns (this chapter), cultural domains and models (Chapter six), and elements of the
decision trees (Chapter seven) to all fish distribution in the community.
Descriptive statistics for the twenty boat owners and/or operators in the catch
distribution sample are shown in Table 14. Age, household size, and mixed household
ratios follow the overall village fisher folk population in that Afro Trinidadians in both
samples are on average a few years older, have smaller households, and show slightly
higher mixed household ratios (see Table 8 in Chapter four). Reproductive success is also
displayed and shows that boat owners and operators have approximately three times the
amount of surviving children compared to the Icacos kinship sample. While there is a
moderate difference regarding reproductive success between the ethnicities in this
selective sample, there is significant difference within each ethnic group when comparing boat owner/operator reproductive success to that of non boat owner/operators (F = 5.85
for Afro Trinidadians, F = 6.14 for Indo Trinidadians, p < .05). Being head of a fishing
vessel comes from having a relatively lucrative fishing income and/or possessing years of
on water experience and success, which are qualities that enable to the fathering of more
children. Boat heads also have high amounts of quality kin and reciprocal relationships
compared with other fishermen, which will be explained later in this chapter. Hypotheses
147 tests that follow in this chapter will further explore reproductive success between the
ethnic groups and how it relates to catch distribution.
Age Age Household Household Mixed Mixed Reproductive Reproductive (mean) (SD) Size Size (SD) Household Household Success Success (SD) (mean) Ratio Ratio (mean) (mean) (SD) Afro 50.2 7.1 4.1 1.2 .025 .06 2.8 1.7 Trinidadian (n=10) Indo 47.3 9.5 5.8 1.7 .016 .03 3.5 1.6 Trinidadian (n=10) Total 48.8 9.3 5 2.4 .021 .07 3.15 1.6 Table 14: Descriptive statistics of boat owners and/or operators in fish catch distribution sample.
Of the twenty boats in the sample, all used a variety of fishing methods. Sixty six
percent (69 of 104) of the noted fisher folk in Icacos were noted as part of the twenty
boat sample through the study period. Descriptive statistics for the 69 fisher folk included
in the distribution sample are shown in Table 15. These variables parallel the overall
fishermen population well and provide a representative sample concerning age, ethnicity,
type of households residing in, and reproductive success. Mean size of crew for all
sampled fishing ventures was 2.7 with a range of one to eight. Solo fishing trips account
for 14% of all observed trips.
148
Age Age Household Household Mixed Mixed Reproductive Reproductive (mean) (SD) Size Size (SD) Household Household Success Success (SD) (mean) Ratio Ratio (mean) (mean) (SD) Afro 47.5 10 3.8 1.6 .02 .03 1.9 .8 Trinidadian (n=33) Indo 43.5 10.6 4.7 1.2 .032 .04 2.4 1 Trinidadian (n=36) Total 45.4 11.3 4.3 1.9 .026 .06 2.2 .8 Table 15: Descriptive statistics of fish catch distribution sample.
Total harvest for the twenty sampled vessels was 140,712 kg over the entire
sample period. This breaks down to an average of 45.1 kg per day for an average boat,
which is comparable to previous catch landing statistics supplied by the Fisheries
Division of Trinidad/Tobago’s Ministry of Agriculture. Of this total harvest, full boat
owners and partial owners received 4%, while crew retained 12% (82% goes to market).
The remainder of primary distribution (2%) went to non fishermen. While there is not the
level of specialty for maritime food procurers in Icacos as seen in other settings where
shoreline primary distribution occurs (e.g. Alvard 2002; Firth 1946), distribution of catch
does go to a smaller variety of specialized crew and on shore helpers. Two of the sample
boats, both run by Indo Trinidadians, had a boat member who was exclusively a net
fisher who would cast, retrieve, keep track of, and repair nets only. One of these
specialists was the Indo Trinidadian brother of the boat owner and the other net fisher
was a mixed Indo Afro Trinidadian unrelated to their respective boat owner. Six of the
total fishermen sample were identified as this type of specialist, a tombay , meaning “very
abundant catch”. Tombay (occasionally called tombay throwers due to their specializing
in net fishing) are said by informants to have unique abilities of finding ocean “sweet
149 spots” where fish “fall into the net”, and be assets to a boat operator looking to be
efficient. The two in the sample showed more of a reciprocal relationship with their boat
owner than others as transfers between both and their respective owner were more near to
even (14% and 17% asymmetry compared to a mean asymmetry of 28% for all other
identified reciprocal dyads) than other dyadic pairs.
Besides this small and rare specialization on water, a few other specialty on shore
helpers receive shares of catch. Those that help pull the boat onto shore and/or carry it to
a docking or tie up location receive partial catch, which is similar to the practice of
giving Élé alep shares as observed by Alvard (2002) in Lamalera for on shore boat helpers. As these shares in Lamalera were the less desirable fatty tissue of the hunted whale, so to are the catch portions given to Icacos on shore helpers. While not the worse portions of various species, on shore helpers often receive the less valued items such as
Cottonwick Grunt, White Grunt, and various marine Catfish, which they receive most at a rate of 41% and 30% respectively. One percent of total catch went to these on shore boat helpers.
Fish marketers, referred to as fish ladies , is another category of helper. These are often the wives of fishermen who eventually aid in bringing the market portion of catch to fish vendors. The term lady is used across Trinidad as a respectful generic name for female vendors who sells items, often at a roadside stand or larger outdoor marketplace of vendors. Various modifiers are placed in front to note what the woman sells. Since fishing is the primary vocation and fish are the most sold item in Icacos, fish lady has become a commonly used and pleasantly received term around the village for a woman at the shoreline helping with packing the market catch, walking through town with fish, or
150 selling catch at a stand. Informants told me and I occasionally heard the term marchand
used for fish ladies , although it is used much less often. This also refers to a female
vendor who either sells from a fixed stall or travels carrying goods to sell. On occasion, fish ladies will show up at a boat landing and begin looking through the catch to separate
out market portion. In these cases, a non market portion is immediately transferred to the fish lady . There were 44 total fish ladies working with fishermen during the sample period and all received shares. Thirty nine of these were wives or co habiting mates in a
relationship with the fisherman whose boat with which they associated. Others were
various kin either in the fisherman’s household or residing nearby. Four of these were
male who were not called by a specific term since they were not termed lady due to
gender. One percent of total catch through the sample period went to fish ladies .
Twenty of the fish ladies were Indo Trinidadian and married to Indo Trinidadian
fishermen. Among Indo Trinidadian fishers, during off loading of catch and in casual
conversations at their homes, the term patibrata was used. Never utilized by one’s
husband, it was said by fellow fishermen recognizing specific wives as “faithful” and
“obedient”; a wife that served her husband and his boat well and had done and would do
so always. Seven women in particular were often identified as patibrata , although this
does not seem to have much influence on catch received. There was no significant
difference between patibrata and other fish ladies regarding total non market catch
received (F = 2.12). How tombay , fish ladies , and other specialists and helpers are
incorporated into the decision making process when fishermen distribute catch is further
discussed in Chapter seven.
151 Regarding fish species, shrimp, both pink and white, are kept by distributors at the
highest rate (86% and 85% respectively) compared to other species. This goes against
HBE theory whereby highly valued resources are theorized to be widely shared with
foods that come in smaller packages or acquired reliably tend to be rarely shared (see
Bliege Bird et al. 2002). Similar to this, low value species such as Catfish are widely
shared (82% distributed to others). Marine Catfish were the second most procured species by weight in the catch sample and are considered an inferior food source by Icacos
fishermen due to their abundance (in both marine and freshwater areas) and the existence
of other available fish with more preferred taste and market or distribution value.
Although widely shared, Catfish are near the low end of Icacos fishers’ species value
hierarchy, seen as a more of a supplement in primary distributions; at the bottom of the procured species list and just above those small species used as bait.
Table 16 summarizes the results of the hypotheses tests concerning elements
related to HBE.
Frequency Depth Breadth Equality Balance Reproductive Enhancement Fitness or Opposition Outcome H1 Not Increases Indo Decreases Sizable More Indo Douglarization Supported with higher Trinidadians with Trinidadian model as cost less breadth package Significant males with opposition for procurement than Afro size across older onset of Indo Trinidadians; sample, reproduction, Trinidadians, Differences Significantly Differences but kin less mates, Callaloo in cost of wide in package transfers less co model as procurement audience for sizes not and few resident sexual enhancement negligible Afro significant other partners for Afro Trinidadians predictor reciprocal Trinidadians of partners Indo- Yes, but not distribution more Trinidadians These models significant sizable with less not difference; and mates and significantly Not account less sex used significantly for most partners, but wide of the not
152 audience for sample significantly Afro- balance different Trinidadians onset of reproduction H2 Not Indo Number of Models Supported Trinidadians offspring for neutral less equality Indo than Afro Trinidadians Models not Trinidadians less equal in used number than No among Afro significant Trinidadians… difference High status have higher number of offspring than low status
No significant difference in equality of offspring quantities, high status do have significantly higher quantity offspring H3 Indo Indo Supported Trinidadians Trinidadians higher to higher to patrilineal patrilineal kin, Afro kin, Afro Trinidadians Trinidadians higher to higher to “matrifocal” “matrifocal” kin kin
Kinship Kinship systems systems significant significant H4 Not No No No Negligible Supported significant significant significant relationship relationship relationship Kin with with with transfers relatedness relatedness relatedness sizably balanced Significantly Significantly Kin more given more genetic transfers to genetic kin receiving more equal kin transfers H5 Similar Specific Contingent Negligible Reciprocal Reciprocity Supported means, high cooperative on previous partners higher models variance, and individuals transfers Kin number of enhancement asynchrony favored tran sfers offspring than
153 in production Reciprocal sizably those without Models more “High dyads balanced partner explicitly Low quality” kin significan t reference variance in favored Reciprocal individuals’ production, partners qualities doesn’t significantly support higher “risk reproductive reduction” fitness H6 Marginal High Not related Moderate Partially units not producer with non supported transferred control possessors’ Significant need across Marginal Sizable sample, units often producer No but kin transferred control significant transfers relation w/ and few need other reciprocal partners more sizable and account for most of the sample balance Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and results from data on primary distributions, reproductive fitness, and enhancement or opposition regarding HBE metrics. Predictions are in plain text and results in bold. Adapted from Ziker and Schnegg 2005.
H1 is not supported as Indo Trinidadians do show more transfers within their ethnic group than Afro Trinidadians along with less breadth, but not to a significant level.
Total number of recipients were calculated for each individual as a measure of breadth and separated by individual ethnicity for testing. The difference was only slight as shown in Table 17. F statistics were also found by comparing individual ethnicity to total number of recipients who were of the same ethnicity as that individual. Given the more stark separation of ethnic groups within the fisher folk population and the significant results regarding kinship, described later in this section, this result makes sense given the associated findings. Eighty percent of all transfers were to a person in the same ethnic
154 group with 85% intra group for Indo Trinidadians and 73% intra group for Afro
Trinidadians. This is a significant difference given the thousands of transfers that are
accounted (χ 2 = 763.04; p < .005). Both ethnicities give a large amount to their own group and despite the high amount of intra ethnic transfer among Afro Trinidadians,
Indo Trinidadians do so at an even significantly higher rate. Much of this intra ethnic transfer is accounted for by kinship as giving to genetic kin accounts for 72% and 70% of intra ethnic transfers for Afro Trinidadians and Indo Trinidadians respectively. Breadth and genetic relatedness are not significantly related (but does show moderate influence) as fishermen that give to more people are not necessarily giving to a wide range of individuals who may be unrelated to them. Rather, even those who give to more individuals seem to be giving to more kin. For each fisherman in the catch sample, a breadth number exists for the number of different individuals that person distributed to and this was compared with a genetic relatedness variable by summing Wright’s r’s for each recipient of a fishermen and dividing that by total number of recipients resulting in an “average relatedness of recipients” for each individual. Comparing these showed moderate influence (Pearson’s r 2 = .02).
Breadth % of transfers that (Total # of are intra ethnic recipients, mean # of recipients) Afro Trinidadian 208, 6.3 73.3% (n=33) Indo Trinidadian 205, 5.7 85.3% (n=36) Total (n=69) 413, 5.9 80% F 3.15 Table 17: Breadth of transfers and proportions of intra-ethnic transfers from catch distribution sample.
155 Breadth is also low for both ethnic groups and the catch sample in general with an
average of 5.9 recipients per fisherman. This means the average fisherman is transferring
with a handful of individuals, less than 10% of fellow fishermen, and a smaller average
number of on shore helpers. Costly signaling requires large breadth and this is not
occurring. If costly signaling was happening, another characteristic of food distribution
would be maintaining equality in consumption (i.e., high food producers giving to low
food producers). A benefit of this in terms of culture is often a gain in political
reputation; a wide distributor gains large social networks (Bird and Bliege Bird 2008).
The highest producing boats in Icacos are not giving to the lowest, however. Total catch
landing for each boat was regressed with total amount of catch given and received by
each boat over the catch sample period (n = 20) since individual crew members’ production was not able to be determined as boats bring back net loads of fish without
markings for who specifically caught which fish. Results in Table 18 show a moderate
negative relationship for production and receiving and a moderate positive relationship
for production and giving suggesting that there are light flows occurring from higher producing fishermen to lower producing fishermen, but this is not significantly strong. A proxy measure for examining individual fishermen’s economic well being is the previously outlined CW ratio (see Chapter four). Table 18 also displays fishermen’s CW
ratios regressed with total amount of catch given and received during the catch sample period for the 69 fisher folk in the catch sample. Results follow the boat comparisons on production and transfers with a moderate positive relationship between CW ratios and
amount received and a moderate negative relationship between CW ratios and amount
156 given. None of these are strong enough or vary enough between ethnicities to support the
occurrence of costly signaling.
Amount Amount (kg) (kg) distributed distributed catch given catch received
Total catch landing, Afro-Trinidadian led .174 2066. boats (n=10)
Total catch landing, Indo-Trinidadian led .1547 .1709 boats (n=10)
Total catch landing, .146 .1787 all boats (n=20)
CW ratios, Afro- .1394 .217 Trinidadian (n=33)
CW ratios, Indo- Trinidadian (n=36) .1326 .1811
CW ratios, total (n=69) .1358 .168
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 18: Regression coefficients for total catch landing per boat and CW ratios compared with amount of catch distribution given and received.
Fisheries studies show total catch size and equality of distribution to recipients are negatively correlated (e.g. Forman 1970; Sosis 2000) contrary to costly signaling predictions (Ziker and Schnegg 2005). Ifaluk fishermen keep the majority of their large summer fish catches within their residential compounds (Sosis 2000) and boat owners at
Coqueiral, Brazil retain a larger proportion of the catch as its size increases (Forman
1970). Icacos fishermen keep much of the larger species they catch partially supporting
157 these previous findings and there is a slight negative correlation between catch size and
equality of distribution, but this is not to a statistically significant level (Pearson’s r 2 =
.02). The total daily fish catch from the boat a fisherman was on each day was averaged to produce a mean number of total daily fish production for a fisherman, which was regressed with each fishermen’s standard deviation of catch distributions resulting in this slight negative relationship.
Costly signaling also assumes high value packages will be exchanged widely.
Distribution according to value of species is rarely studied in the fisheries literature and those that have evidence low value species in regards to potential market returns being distributed broadly, such as common species caught in seines at Coqueiral widely given away (e.g. Forman 1970). Costly signaling can take different forms, however, and perhaps simply bringing in high valued fish is a costly signal since other fishers and onlookers see it on shore. This could be significant if total catch amount and/or the quantity of fish exchanged within the community is positively correlated with showing off high value catch. Landing records from the sample period can also test if high value species procurement and quantity of catch supplied to the village is correlated with status in the community and/or reproductive success. Reproductive success is discussed later in this chapter. Mean status scores for each fisherman (see H2) in the catch sample was regressed with total amount of catch given by kg weight. This resulted in a moderate positive relationship (Pearson’s r 2 = .02, n = 69), but not reaching statistical significance.
Combined with the results from H2 (see below), it is possible that high status fishermen give and receive slightly more, although these are not strongly supported. High status is moderately positively correlated with total amount procured (by boat) (Pearson’s r 2 = .07,
158 p < .05, n = 69), so high status fishermen may have their status due to leading boats with higher returns and having control over those higher returns enabling them to give more of a larger pie and receiving larger amounts back through balanced reciprocity with fellow high status fishermen.
Costly signaling, in the form of “showing off” without necessarily having the distributional patterns associated with it, has precedent in the HBE literature. Alvard
(2002) reviews work by Bliege Bird and her colleagues (2001) who show spear fishers share little if any of the fish they catch outside the nuclear family, yet, there is strong support from their data that spearing serves as an honest signal of the spear fisherman’s phenotypic quality. Men might also directly target resource transfers to specific individuals or households in order to signal their own quality and receive benefit in return via some commodity other than food. Alvard continues that harpooners and boat masters at Lamalera are roles that may involve “showing off” or signaling. Both harpooners and boat masters have powerful roles that are visible to many in the community and also costly in terms of the risks associated with the occupation. Harpooners, for example, risk injury and death more than others as part of their role.
H2 is nullified as equality in transfers for Indo Trinidadians is not significantly different than among Afro Trinidadians. A standard deviation of amount (by kg weight) of transfers was calculated for each fisherman in the catch sample, which is used as a measure of distributional equality. These were then compared by ethnicity. Table 19 displays the results, which are not shown significant. Afro Trinidadians do evidence more equality, but it is slight and neither ethnic group addresses equality explicitly in their respective cultural models used when making transfers (see Chapters six and seven).
159
Standard deviation of amount (kg) distributed catch Afro-Trinidadian
Mean .31 Median .31 Standard Deviation .14 Range .45
Indo-Trinidadian
Mean .33 Median .33 Standard Deviation .15 Range .49
Total Mean .32 Median .32 Standard Deviation .15 Range .49
F 1.78 Table 19: Results for equality in fish catch transfers.
Status was also shown to not be significant in catch transfers. To operationalize status, a folk taxonomy for understanding local concepts of “status” was created through free lists and pile sorts. The 69 fishermen in the catch sample were asked to list words, ideas, and/or concepts related to “status”. Once lists were exhausted, each word or concept was written on separate cards and each fisherman was then asked to sort the cards into piles based on which cards were related closest to each other. Figure 22 and
Tables 20 and 21 show the results. While there is overlap on some adjectives to describe a person in the village as prosperous or having attained higher status, the ethnic groups have separate nouns for noting who is a person of status. Big wah and waj are associated
with Afro Trinidadians and bakra with Indo Trinidadians. The term big wah is less used
160 than waj and refers to someone of great prestige, who has wealth (in material form or having a large family with multiple children) and possesses lots of social and/or political power in the village (i.e., many people listen to him). Waj is more common and notes an important person, someone who does not necessarily have the level of wealth as a big wah , but still has a relatively comfortable life, wields influence, and is listened to by others. A bakra is a similar concept for Indo Trinidadians identifying an individual of high social and/or political influence in the community who also often has a comfortable life in material terms. Photos were taken of each of the 69 fishermen and then each fisherman was asked in a subsequent visit to sort the pictures into a pile from their opinion on each individual’s status, from highest to lowest (e.g. bakra to patak for Indo
Trinidadians). This resulted in a status score for each fisherman in the sample calculated as the mean of their rankings. Rankings are likely accurate as boat owners constitute most of the highest rated individuals (15 of the 20 highest rank individuals were boat owners).
To test status, each fishermen’s status score was regressed with total amount of catch received by kg weight. This resulted in moderate, but not significant influence (Pearson’s r2 = .03). While there are cultural concepts of status, it does not seem to be as important
as kinship, which will be seen in the next two hypotheses tests, H3 and H4.
Figure 22: Folk taxonomy of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “status”.
161
Well Up adj. prosperous, respectable Come Up v., adj. improve, attain higher status, grow up Big Wah n. (mostly Afro Trinidadian use) rich, socially, or politically powerful, prestigious or important person Waj n. (mostly Afro Trinidadian use) important, powerful person Bakra n. (mostly Indo Trinidadian use) important, powerful, wealthy person Play With phr. said to someone to indicate that person has admirable luck, power, or influence Hurry come up n., adj. said of person who has risen rapidly in status, implying they have not earned it
Antonym Patak adj. (mostly Indo Trinidadian use) worthless, without pride or status, lowly Table 20: Definitions of Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “status”.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Well Up .72 1.7 3.6 Come Up .72 2.8 3.7 Big Wah .58 3.3 2.2 Waj .58 3.4 2.1 Bakra .57 4.1 2.4 Play With .64 5.4 1.5 Hurry come up .6 6.5 1.3 Patak .52 1.4 Table 21: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “status”.
H3 is supported and H4 is nullified as kinship is shown significant for both Indo
Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians with the respective kinship systems being the strongest HBE indicator for catch transfer. Indo Trinidadians transfer between patrilineal biological kin at a significant rate as do Afro Trinidadians with biological kin in their matrilineage. Regressions comparing coefficient of relatedness with amount of catch distribution in total and performed separately for each ethnicity show high significance as displayed in Table 22. As expected from this result, comparing lineage membership and catch distribution amounts also resulted in significant findings. Table 22 also displays associated F values with this comparison. Lineage accounts for much of the individual
162 and inter ethnic variation regarding catch transfers and the wider kinship system even
more so. Looking at the household level as well, results match that of Allen Arave et al.
(2008) who show that Ache households give preference in food distributions to recipient households that contain at least one close relative in terms of genetic kinship. In Icacos, transfers between households with at least one genetic relation of r ≥ .125 account for
76% of all transfers, showing that frequency of transfers among genetic kin are quite high.
Amount (kg) distributed catch Afro-Trinidadian
Matrifocal Kin .46*** Lineage (F) 4.51*
Indo-Trinidadian
Patrilineal Kin .51*** Lineage (F) 5.58**
Total Genetic Kin .48***
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 22: Pearson’s r 2 and F statistics for kinship factors compared with amount of catch distribution.
Understanding the composition of fishing crews in Icacos gives insight into this result as those that crew together spend their on water work time together (and thus almost all their total labor time together) and do almost all of their catch exchanges with each other. Partially following Alvard’s (2003) results from Lamalera, crew members in
Icacos are more closely related to each other than expected by chance and this is in part due to the correlation between lineage membership and genetic kinship. Crews are more
163 likely to consist of lineage members, especially among Indo Trinidadians, but given the
number of “friendship” relationships among other crews, the likelihood of a crew
consisting of lineage or friends is about equal among the whole sample (higher lineage
likelihood for Indo Trinidadians). For each fisherman in the catch sample, I have record
of who was crew on which boats for each landing. Afro Trinidadians and Indo
Trinidadians showed a mean proportion of .08 and .31 (total mean = .264) respectively of
their trips being on a boat with a member of their lineage. While these numbers seem
low, the number of fisher folk in the sample for which opportunities exist to crew with a
lineage member must be accounted. Of the five fisher folk lineages in Icacos (see
Chapter four), three were represented in the catch sample with fifteen members of the
sample thus having the opportunity to crew with a lineage member. The previously
mentioned mean proportions essentially show these lineage members crewing together as
among the fifteen, the mean proportion was .97 for the Afro Trinidadians and .98 for the
Indo Trinidadians. Fishermen that are part of a lineage tend to crew together almost
exclusively as the rest of the fisher folk population with smaller nuclear families and/or
those without relatives going back multiple generations in the village tend to crew with
friends or immediate kin. Of trips consisting of a crew (at least two individuals on a boat)
out of the catch sample, 85% had at least one pair of fishermen with r ≥ .125.
Reciprocity is shown to be significantly present among both ethnic groups, supporting H5. Reciprocity in food sharing or other social interactions can be measured a few different ways, including general contingency, which focuses on the total amounts or frequencies with which any individual or household gives to and receives from a sharing network, and dyadic contingency, which focuses on each of the possible pairs in a sample
164 (Bliege Bird et al. 2002). I utilize both methods to see if dyadic pair reciprocity is
occurring and whether larger networks, which may include some of these dyadic pairs,
exist. Testing for significant positive correlations between received and donated food between entities is how Hames (2000) interpreted there to be reciprocity among the
Yanomamo, for example, but this was at the household level.
Balance exists among the entire fisher folk population and among ethnic groups
in terms of both weight and frequency of giving and receiving catch. To first test for balance, total amount given by each individual was regressed with total amount received.
This was done separately for each ethnic group and resulted in a positive relationship for both groups (Pearson’s r 2 = .1 for Afro Trinidadians, Pearson’s r 2 = .08 for Indo
Trinidadians, both p < .05). Comparing frequency of giving and receiving for all Icacos fishermen also resulted in significant positive relationships (Pearson’s r 2 = 11. for Afro
Trinidadians, p < .01, Pearson’s r 2 = .07 for Indo Trinidadians, p < .05). Balance in transfers among kin is higher, however. Another regression was done, this time only using transfers among kin. For each individual in the catch sample, total amount given to genetic kin was compared with total amount received from genetic kin. This shows significant balance among kin transfers for both groups (Pearson’s r 2 = .38 for Afro
Trinidadians, Pearson’s r 2 = .41 for Indo Trinidadians, both p < .005). Comparing frequency of giving and receiving among genetic kin shows similar results (Pearson’s r 2
= .43 for Afro Trinidadians, Pearson’s r 2 = .43 for Indo Trinidadians, both p < .005).
To test for dyadic reciprocity relationships, I used a matrix constructed from the catch sample period. The matrix lists the 69 fishermen from the catch sample, each on a row and column, allowing data boxes for each possible pair of fisher folk. With each
165 pair, there are data for amounts given and received in terms of frequency (number of transfers) and weight of catch. This enables finding balanced pairs for these variables across all possible relationships. Dyadic reciprocity is highly present as out of these possibilities, 125 potential dyadic pairs were identified as these had catch weight amounts given and received between two individuals that were within 10% of each other. This sets a threshold of less than a 2% per month average difference in balance between partners.
Such a small difference suggests the existence of a reciprocal relationship, especially if the frequency of exchanges reaches a threshold as well. Of the 125 identified balanced relationships, 108 show a number of exchanges of 25 or above (average about one exchange per week), 79 show 50 or above (average about two exchanges per week), and
32 show 100 or above (exchange nearly every day). With nearly half of the catch sample fishermen evidencing exchanges nearly everyday with the same person (and each fishermen having on average more than one “partner” with whom they exchange multiple times per week), while maintaining with a few percentage points balance in those exchanges with that individual, is further support for reciprocity being a key local component of catch transfer.
UCINET software (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2011) was used to further detect reciprocal relationships using the “profile similarity” function, which measures similarity between entries in a matrix. The KeyPlayer program (Borgatti 2005) tested for the existence of networks through the “reach” function that shows how many distinct other nodes (i.e., individuals in the sample) to which a node is linked. Also used was the
“fragment” function that counts how many separate components are in the system (i.e., number of clusters, networks) and calculates percentages of all nodes that are in each
166 component. The sum of squares of these proportions provides a measure of the extent that people are bunched into just a few components. This output ranges from zero to one with
one being lots of multi node clusters (i.e., numerous networks exist and makeup the
system). Large reciprocity networks do not exist. There are only eight fishermen who
have more than five distribution linkages that are balanced within 10%, but these
relationships are not much inter connected across the eight fishermen as only four balanced linkages cross between them. NetDraw (Borgatti 2011), a network graphing program distributed with UCINET, created a visual representation of pairs and any possible networks shown in Figure 23.
Figure 23: Social network graph displaying reciprocal relationships among the catch sample. Points represent the 69 fisher-folk of the catch sample with identification numbers assigned randomly to each fisherman. Lines show a reciprocal relationship, i.e., fisher-folk that transferred catch between each other at any point during the catch sample period. Nodes in the network are dispersed with no key clusters identified.
167 Risk reduction is sometimes used in HBE to explain reciprocal altruism. With this
explanation, unpredictably acquired resources are likely to be shared to counter high
variance in harvest success or resource availability, which decreases the possibility of a
shortfall in resources. Risk involves uncertainty in availability of returns and a chance
that unpredictable losses will occur, which result in non linear consequences for an
organism’s fitness (Cashdan 1985; Winterhalder et al. 1999). The ‘‘risk reduction
reciprocity’’ theorizes that sharing is a form of reciprocal altruism, wherein individuals pool their harvest and consume equal or near equal shares from this common pot,
reducing their own variance in consumption. Multiple factors, such as consistency of
returns and the occurrence of diversification are ways to help understand whether risk
reduction is happening, beyond just testing for marginal valuation (sharing contingent on
harvest size) (Bliege Bird et al. 2002). Although equality is moderately high across the
entire sample, among each ethnic group, and there exist numerous dyadic exchange
relationships, risk reduction is likely not occurring with Icacos fisher folk or a potential
reason for reciprocity occurring. Risk reduction would be happening if there were large
variation in harvests (Bliege Bird et al. 2002). This is not the case in Icacos, where
accounting for total harvest of the sample, the largest week to week variation was 1,281
kg out of an average per week total catch sample of 5,412 kg. This was an outlier,
however, with the average week to week variance in total catch being 390 kg (7%
average weekly variance). Individual boats differed more with the largest variation week
to week for a single boat being 255 kg out of a 270.6 kg average per week catch per boat.
Again, such large fluctuations are outliers and rare events; the average weekly variance
for all sampled boats was 21 kg (8% average weekly variance).
168 Risk aversion is also theorized to occur when there is diversification of
investment strategies, e.g. more variety of crops, sources of income, numbers and type of people with whom others share resources (Winterhalder et al. 1999). Neither are
happening with Icacos fisher folk. Variety of species caught was consistent over the
sample period (37 number of species each week with weekly range of 35 to 37; Cro cro,
Catfish, and Mullet were the most caught species each week by kg) and catch transfer patterns were consistent over time. One way to determine consistency in transfers is to
focus on the established dyadic relationships and these showed little variance over the
study period (largest ranges for dyadic pairs were four and three kg between consecutive
weeks with an average week to week variance of .5 kg).
Alvard (2002) showed that while HBE theory would predict reciprocity to occur
at Lamalera among whale hunters, it did not happen for various reasons. Whale hunting
at Lamalera paralleled conditions that were predicted to result in reciprocal exchange of
meat. Whales are large and unpredictably acquired resources as hunters return with
nothing on 85% of all hunt days. When a whale is killed and brought back, however, this
means thousands of kilograms of meat will be available (Alvard and Nolin 2002).
Successful hunters are expected to value each additional unit of meat less than do those
with little. Although such conditions favor reciprocity to decrease daily variation in
consumption, Alvard’s (2002) data on primary carcass distributions provide no evidence
of reciprocity. Returns in Icacos are oppositional to Lamalera as returns are rather
consistent and more predictable and the outcome on reciprocity is oppositional to
Lamalera as well as reciprocal exchange does seem to be occurring. Data on the Meriam,
Ache, and Yanomamo (like in Lamalera) also show that large package resources
169 associated with procurement types that have high failure rates are in many circumstances
shared more frequently than resources from more reliable activities, but not necessarily
reciprocally. Results from Gurven et al. (2001) also show that reciprocity more likely
applies to the sharing of non game or non forest resources, though the opposite pattern
was found for Hiwi sharing (Gurven et al. 2000). Results from Icacos support these HBE
findings as it seems more consistent and smaller resources are likely to be subject to
reciprocal exchange than large and rarely procured with high failure rates. This also
suggests that contexts where fish of non hunting size are the primary subsistence resource
and show consistent returns over time is where reciprocal altruism may be a prominent
form of distribution (see Chapman, Jackson Smith, and Petrzelka 2008).
Also, unlike Lamalera where successful corporations do not transfer with
unsuccessful ones, in Icacos there is some of this exchange occurring. Of the dyadic
relationships in Icacos, 29 out of 125 have large differences between their average
weekly returns (e.g. from 14 to 40 kg). While this is not many, it does occur. Correlation
of total returns per boat by kg (a measure of fishing success) with amount of catch
received by kg from other boats results in an insignificant negative relationship
(Pearson’s r 2 = .09), but does show there is light occurrence of such relationships. While lineage membership explains transfers in Lamalera and not reciprocity, in Icacos there seems to be a kinship component driving transfers as explained in H4. As Alvard (2002) states of a whale carcass landed in Lamalera, it is not a public good (i.e., hunters have control over it and at least have a sense of with whom it is going to end up). A similar statement can be made for fish catch in Icacos. The existence of reciprocity, while not explained by HBE and the associated risk hypotheses, is explained by cultural models of
170 fishing and fishing livelihood and their integration into decision processes. These two
topics will be covered in Chapters six and seven, respectively.
Recent HBE hypotheses from Bird and Bliege Bird (2008) involving networks
and kinship are partially supported. They propose if sharing acts as reciprocity, that it
serves to create and maintain social networks of cooperation and obligation for resources
and services beyond food, then co residents and affines should be favored in sharing
distributions. Individuals living together, affines or just co residents could most
effectively reciprocate due to their proximity. While there is a significant correlation between co residency and amount of catch transfer (Pearson’s r 2 = .23, p < .05), again,
larger networks do not exist. Correlation between co residency and transfer amount is
driven by crew membership as crewmates tend to also be co residents (46% of all fishing
trips with a crew of two or more consisted of at least one pair of co residents). Fishermen
seem to be more selective in who they transfer with and this is shown in their cultural
models and decision processes outlined in Chapters six and seven.
H6 is partially supported. If tolerated scrounging was important, evidence of free
riding would exist, such as in the form of individuals who take shares, but do not
reciprocate. Further, those who share more often and more generously would not receive
more and there would be large amounts of one way flows between individuals and/or
households (Bliege Bird et al. 2002). Such results are seen with the Martu, for example,
who show high and medium ranked foragers producing significantly more than they
consume, while low and unranked foragers produce significantly less than they consume.
This even outcome of sharing results from consistent one way flows from those that work
harder to those that produce less, which is part of demand sharing (Bird and Bliege Bird
171 2008). Transfers from high producers and individuals from low CW households to those
that produce less and reside in larger CW households are occurring slightly in Icacos, but
not to a significant level (see Table 18 in this chapter and discussion for H1).
Tolerated scrounging is also much in opposition to reciprocity. Tolerated
scrounging is, as opposed to reciprocal altruism, characterized by one way flows from
those that have much and need less, to those have less and need more, regardless of past
or expected future exchanges. Larger procured packages are also often treated as public
goods in cases of tolerated scrounging. When scroungers cannot be excluded from such
large packages, it becomes available for all to consume. In these situations, reciprocity is
difficult to maintain. This creates a collective action problem since large packages are pubic goods, there is little incentive for lower producing food procurers to reciprocate in
collective action with high production food procurers (Alvard 2002). Distributors exhibit
control over the transfer of catch, as described in Chapter four and earlier in this chapter,
and Chapman did not observe any taking of fish catch upon landing without a
distributor’s knowledge and/or approval during the catch sample period. I informally
asked numerous fishermen in the catch sample about scrounging, unauthorized taking of
catch by fellow fishermen and villagers, and “theft” and most emphasized that a good
fishermen knows how to distribute and keeps eye on his catch upon landing and that
taking in such a way would be difficult given the process of immediately dividing shares
after landing. Large packages, in the form of the most caught species by weight, are
distributed widely as previously discussed with marine Catfish, for example. Numerous
other species caught in smaller portions, however, are also given away at similar rates
172 such as the three lowest caught fish by weight from the catch sample, Batfish (66%
given), Barbu (70% given), and Squirrelfish (56% given).
Reciprocity is prominent as discussed with H5 with balance in terms of catch weight exchanged and frequency of exchanges significantly even across the catch sample.
Distributions among kin, which constitute the most transfers, show an even higher significance and strong balance. With balance high across the catch sample, almost half of the catch sample fishermen having reciprocal partners on a near daily basis on average, and each fisherman having an average of more than one reciprocal partner with whom they exchange multiple times per week (see discussion on H5 earlier in this chapter), these all strengthen the case for reciprocity and deny tolerated scrounging. The widespread and consistent existence of dyadic reciprocal relationships across the catch sample combined with only slight relationships between catch production and giving and receiving further show that tolerated scrounging cannot be fully supported in this study.
Contexts that sometimes surround tolerated scrounging, such as those among the
Hadza (see Woodburn 1998), for example, do not exist at any significant level on a daily basis in Icacos. Cultural models or institutions of recipient entitlement do not exist, at least not independent of work experience, reputation of trustworthiness, and other perceptions of an individual’s “character” (as will be outlined in Chapter six).
Distributors also possess some freedom over to whom to transfer resources and is not
under as much obligation compared to a more strict set of sharing rules that exists with
groups exhibiting significant tolerated scrounging.
Having summarized the results on fish catch distribution concerning the four HBE patterns of resource transfer, now I outline the results concerning reproductive fitness.
173 Data on reproductive success and conjugal stability were collected on the entire kinship
sample, which contains all Icacos fisher folk (see Tables 10 and 11 in Chapter four).
When catch and distribution data are used in comparison with these, only the data for
fishermen in the catch sample (n = 69) can be used. Significant positive relationships
exist in total and by ethnic group among the catch sample between amount of catch given
and received with number of surviving offspring (see Table 23). Individuals who are
giving and receiving more have significantly higher reproductive success with the
relationship being slightly more powerful with Indo Trinidadians. This suggests
fishermen are focusing catch distribution on and/or contributing to a result of high quality
males through transferring resources. This result concerning reproductive success makes
sense given the high balance within the catch sample (i.e., individuals who give more
receive more). With the high amount of intra kin transfers and those transfers being balanced, the similar balance shown by the reproductive success data further suggests
that kinship maybe a driver of reproductive success. Table 24 displays a comparison of
kinship (genetic relatedness) and various levels of reciprocal partners previously
identified in the catch sample (see H5) with reproductive success. This helps to test the
outcomes of the two significant transfer patterns shown in the sample, kinship and
reciprocity, and provides the reproductive fitness tests for H3, H4, and H5.
174 Amount Amount (kg) (kg) distributed distributed catch given catch received
RS, Afro-Trinidadian .26*** .22*** RS, Indo-Trinidadian .27*** .26***
RS, Total .25*** .24***
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 23: Pearson’s r 2 for reproductive success compared with amount of catch distribution given and received from the catch sample (n = 69).
Reproductive Success Afro-Trinidadian
Matrifocal Kin .5353*** Lineage (F) 1.12 Reciprocity, balance ≥ 90% (F) 5.02* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 25 (F) 2.59 Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 50 (F) 7.9** Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 100 (F) 14.03***
Indo-Trinidadian
Patrilineal Kin .37*** Lineage (F) 2.77 Reciprocity, balance ≥ 90% (F) 4.24* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 25 (F) 4.85* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 50 (F) 6.25* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 100 (F) 15.39***
Total Genetic Kin .35*** Lineage (F) 1.53 Reciprocity, balance ≥ 90% (F) 4.5* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 25 (F) 4.36* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 50 (F) 6.6* Reciprocity, n partners ≥ 100 (F) 14.87***
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 24: Pearson’s r 2 and F statistics for kinship factors and reciprocal partnerships compared with reproductive success for the catch sample (n = 69).
Table 25 shows mean numbers of sexual mates and co resident sexual partners compared between the ethnicities of the entire village fisher folk population, which is a
175 test of reproductive fitness for H1. Methods for collecting and cross checking number of mates was discussed in Chapter four. Number of co resident sexual partners was asked and cross checked in the same manner. With the occasional privacy and secrecy issues regarding sexual activity, there were nine fishermen for whom I could not obtain consistent data concerning co resident sexual partners. These persons were not included in the data below, which brings that sample to slightly less than the total fisher folk population of 104. Age of onset of reproduction was also asked for each Icacos fisherman and compared between the ethnic groups in Table 25. Age of initial reproduction was cross checked by asking mates who were in a relationship with the fisherman as of having a first child (when available) or the fisherman’s next closest relatives (siblings, parents). Verified data was obtained for 71 fishermen regarding age of initial reproduction.
176 Sexual Co-resident Age of Onset of Mates Sexual Reproduction Partners Afro-Trinidadian
Mean 1.69 .98 23.8 Median 2 1 23 Standard Deviation .76 .26 4.5 Range 4 2 14 Frequency 34 45 34
Indo-Trinidadian
Mean 1.12 .67 24.5 Median 1 1 24 Standard Deviation .52 .22 4.9 Range 4 2 15 Frequency 37 50 37
Total Mean 1.49 .81 24.1 Median 1 1 24 Standard Deviation .78 .27 5.2 Range 4 2 18 Frequency 71 95 71
F 4.21* 4.48* 1.16 Table 25: Results of mating metrics compared by ethnicity for the Icacos fisher-folk population (n = 104).
For H2, quantity of offspring for each fisherman in the village was recorded. For each ethnicity, the standard distributions of each ethnicity’s offspring quantities were compared as a test to see if significant differences in equality of number of offspring exist between the groups. Results show little difference between offspring quantities by ethnicity (SD = 1.44 for Afro Trinidadians, SD = 1.52 for Indo Trinidadians, F = .87, n =
71) further nullifying H2. Status scores for each fisherman in the catch sample, as a representation of status outlined in the earlier discussion of H2 in this chapter, were regressed with number of surviving offspring to compare status with reproductive success. For Indo Trinidadians and in total for the fisher folk population, status shows slightly significant influence on reproductive success ( Pearson’s r 2 = 07. for Afro
177 Trinidadians , Pearson’s r 2 = .11 for Indo Trinidadians , p < .05, Pearson’s r 2 = .06 for total , p < .05, n = 71). Given the nullifications for H2 and that the status measures are the only possible backing for H2 and these are slight, H2 is not supported.
Discussion
Kin selection theory predicts that group cooperation and intra group relatedness are positively correlated (Krupp et al. 2008) , which is shown to be the strongest
relationship occurring in the present sample. Since kin share genes due to common
descent, behaviors that increase the reproductive success of biological relatives can
increase the representation of ego’s genes in future generations. Thus, individuals will
likely favor close kin, and to a lesser extent distant kin, when deciding whom to aid,
share with, and, with whom to cooperate (Alvard 2003). The results support these
assertions as kin who are supported through catch transfers have higher reproductive
success.
Kin selection predicts that, all other things being equal, individuals should prefer to cooperate with kin rather than non kin (Alvard 2003). All other things are not equal, however, and this certainly includes what is happening with distribution in Icacos.
Reciprocity is the other HBE distribution pattern that is occurring at a significant rate.
One of the better explanations from HBE to explain results in Icacos comes from Allen
Arave et al. (2008). They show that while kin are favored in distributions, it is not just selection of kin, but of high quality kin. What constitutes “high quality” kin in Icacos are components of cultural models of fishing discussed in Chapters six and seven. Beyond cultural definitions of high quality kin, food distributions also favor kin that have given
178 more to the distributing individual in the past rather than kin that would benefit more from the aid as shown by those individuals’ production levels and CW ratios. Results from the Ache show dyadic contingency is stronger among close kin than when considering closeness of genetic relations and other factors. Households distribute to
other households if they contain kin and provide ample food in return, thus kin favored
reciprocity is the best explanatory model as kin are favored most when food is returned
(i.e., acting as reciprocal partners. With the Ache, 60% of inter household exchange is
explained by genetic relatedness and reciprocal dyad, 18% is explained by dyad
reciprocity alone (so some non kin reciprocity occurs), and 16% is explained by
differences between households in net caloric production (i.e., household need/hunger)
(Allen Arave et al. 2008).
Like the results from Allen Arave et al. (2008), many of the reciprocal relationships and the strongest in Icacos are between kin. These relationships, however, are associated with cultural models of who a person considers displaying courage, robust on and off water work habits, someone who has quality fishing experience, and those who are honest and reliable . The presence of both nepotism and those relationships being dyadic pair or larger reciprocal relationships shows fishermen favoring both kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Allen Arave et al. (2008) suggest that transfers between kin are important, but that these are better explained more in terms of direct payoffs of reciprocity than the indirect payoffs of kin selection theory. When choosing reciprocal partners, individuals should generally prefer closer kin since there are indirect benefits on
top of direct benefits, even if the receiver does not return the favor, the initial giver still
receives indirect benefits. This is one reason why it is advantageous to choose kin for
179 reciprocal exchanges (Boyd and Richerson 1990). Transfers with kin should favor low production households if indirect payoffs of kin selection are correct, which is not occurring in Icacos. From a pure fitness maximization perspective, reciprocal altruism can evolve as long as the cost of aiding another individual is outweighed by the benefit of receiving aid from that individual later, devalued by the probability that aid will be returned (Trivers 1971).
The existence of cultural models involving personal qualities of who is desirable to exchange with in Icacos also suggests that nepotism can emerge independent of inclusive fitness benefits if individuals find their relatives more desirable as reciprocal exchange partners than non relatives (Boyd and Richerson 1990). The existence of two ethnic groups in Icacos, each with easily perceivable ethnic markers, may also play a large role as genetic kin are obviously along ethnic lines, but also cultural models differ between the ethnicities and are used nearly exclusively within them. Alvard (2003) argues from his results at Lamalera, that kin selection by itself cannot structure cooperation in groups larger than the nuclear family due to the ambiguous group membership it provides. Cooperative behavior cannot be predicted using Hamilton’s rule with its sole focus on coefficient of relatedness unless the costs and benefits of cooperating with kin are held constant. In many cases, however, costs and benefits of alternative social behaviors vary independently of biological kinship. Positive assortment occurs when a population is structured in such a way that individuals tend to form groups with others with whom they share traits. Using such traits can aid in strengthening cooperation because individuals who cooperate without regard for these are vulnerable to non cooperators who take advantage of a cooperator’s willingness to help others and act
180 collectively. For example, the tit for tat solution to the prisoner’s dilemma will spread
among a population of cheaters only if tit for taters can somehow preferentially identify
and play with other tit for taters. Recent theory suggests that individuals use a variety of
mechanisms, in addition to biological kinship, to identify fellow cooperators. These
mechanisms involve honest signals linked to discriminating cooperative behavior that
allow fellow cooperators to identify one another. Group markers, such as dress, speech patterns, and ornamentation, allow individuals to identify individuals of similar type and assort positively. Cultural models, which identify additional personality or behavioral traits, of potential cooperators, can also help when selecting specific types of individuals with whom to cooperate.
Conclusion
Cultural difference, specifically kinship, accounts for a significant amount of the divergence between to whom Afro Trinidadians’ and Indo Trinidadians’ transfer their fish catch. Kin selection and reciprocity are shown important for both ethnic groups, although different patterns exist within these frameworks. Both groups give most to individuals of their own ethnicity who are close genetic kin and/or reciprocal partners with Afro Trinidadians focusing on matrifocal relatives and Indo Trinidadians on patrilineal kin. Intra kin exchanges are the most equal and balanced transfers across ethnicities. Afro Trinidadians give to more receivers, are moderately more equal in their distributions, and focus on matrifocal relatives. Indo Trinidadians show less breadth and equality and focus on patrilineal kin. Predicted cultural models of ethnic difference were not utilized by fisher folk in these material transfers. In EDT interviews discussed in
181 Chapter seven, fishermen outline various types of fellow fishermen with whom they tend
to transfer catch. Those are the cultural models, also explained in Chapter six, that Icacos
fishermen use to help guide their distributional decision making.
Kin selection and reciprocity are also shown to be significant regarding
reproductive success, while indicators such as breadth show less relation to reproduction.
Individuals that transfer more and reciprocally exchange more with kin have a higher
number of surviving offspring. Indo Trinidadians have had less sexual mates and co
resident sexual partners through their lives, but there is not a significant difference in the
equality of quantity of offspring between Afro Trinidadians and Indo Trinidadians. The
number of sexual mates and partners are the major differences between the ethnic groups
concerning reproduction as both groups evidence similar quantities and qualities of
offspring across the various samples and controlling for status. Individuals of status do
have more offspring, but the increase is only slight. Reproduction is similar between the
ethnicities, while mating and partnering differs. While reproduction is similar, those parallels result from culturally unique kinship systems. Individuals that are able to and do
transfer resources with and between their kin and reciprocal partners tend to increase
their reproductive success. Both ethnicities have cultural models of fishing that, given
these results on reproduction, enhance reproductive fitness, which is the focus of the next
chapter.
182 CHAPTER SIX
CULTURAL DOMAINS AND MODELS OF GOOD FISHER-FOLK
In order to begin to understand how Indo Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians
think and feel about fishing and sharing I examined nine domains that emerged from participant observation, free lists, and pile sorts about what constitutes a good fisherman.
The domains provide the basis for understanding Indo Trinidadian and Afro Trinidadian
cultural models of a good fisherman. The domains and cultural models described in this
chapter provide the basis for constructing the ethnographic decision making tree for fish
distribution in the next chapter. Along with a cultural domain approach based on cultural
consensus methodology, these methods test whether domains and cultural models
hypothesized to significantly influence cognitive decision making (see Chapter one) exist
among either or both the Indo Trinidadian and Afro Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos and
to identify any additional domains and cultural models that exist among a significant proportion of the fisher folk. This helps to answer multiple parts of the research questions from Chapter one including the first part of Q2 and these methods also verify cultural models for eventual testing in economic games and EDT’s to answer Q3 and Q4 respectively.
From participant observation and initial free lists and pile sorts, nine domains (or sets of oppositional domains) were identified. Concepts within each domain are displayed through the remainder of the chapter in three forms: cultural domain scores, a list of definitions, and a folk taxonomy. Cultural domain tables display the proportion of those sampled including the concept in their free list, the mean ranking of the concept within
183 the taxonomic hierarchy, and the mean rating of the importance of the concept to local
fishing (on the one to five Likert scale described in methods). Concepts are listed in the
cultural domain tables in descending order based on their taxonomic hierarchical ranking
(most general terms at the top, most specific at bottom). Lists of definitions elaborate
what each term means and concepts are again shown in descending order based on
hierarchical ranking. Definitions are a combination of the most often utilized descriptions
from the snowball sample. Folk taxonomies visually illustrate relations between the
concepts and show which terms are nearest to each other in meaning, share a similar level
of generality or specificity, and which terms fit under other concepts and are included in
larger concepts. In taxonomies, horizontal is differentiation and vertical is generality
(D’Andrade 1989).
Two of the main concepts used by Icacos fishermen regardless of ethnicity are the opposed expressions ishuay and pailass or make pailass . Both ethnic groups use these terms and Afro Trinidadians even consider it an integral part of their choice process when distributing fish catch (see Chapter seven). While the other cultural domains discussed in this chapter and that define fishing, fisher folk livelihoods, and fishermen relations are based on “character” qualities of individuals, ishuay and pailass represent opposing ends of a spectrum upon which village fishermen sit (although this position can change based on what one caught each day). Ishuay means “to be plentiful” in specific reference to fish and fishing and is most often used as a verb. To ishuay is part of being a successful fisher by catching and bringing a bountiful catch to shore. In opposition, pailass means a failure to catch anything. Although these terms do not necessarily reference character qualities as the terms discussed in the following sections, they do help
184 identify the best fishermen in the village at a particular point in time or in general as used
in the commonly heard statements dare (there) ishuay real good and every noon to night, pailass . Fishers who ishuay regularly are the best of the best and are often the most
experienced and respected fisher folk. Ishuay does not only note especially successful
fishers, however, as it is also utilized during fishing ventures and on shore after a landing
as recognition of a fellow fisher having a plentiful catch that day or having a particularly
good haul in from the net or multiple catches by hook and line. In this sense, ishuay
encompasses a variety of temporal positions as it can refer to having long or short term
“plenty”.
Pailass is also used in a variety of temporal ways, but most often in short term scenarios where a fisherman does not catch much of anything. An often heard phrase is ya na got none, pailass said to a fellow fisher as he is walking away from the shore and leaving with none or just a few bits of distributed fish catch (showing they did not catch much on water that day). Although no fisher would show enough arrogance to proclaim their own ishuay , pailass is occasionally said self referentially in a joking manner. When
a fisherman comes to shore empty or with only a few small fish he can claim, either a
fellow fisher or even he will call his day and his effort pailass .
Figure 24 and Tables 26 and 27 show the results for the opposing Afro
Trinidadian domains of “courage” and “coward”. Of all the domains identified as
important by Afro Trinidadians, having courage was one of the most crucial in terms of
fishermen rating it essential to fishing and the percentage of respondents having
knowledge of the concept. Terms in the courage domain have a 3.4 average rating of
importance, which is larger than all other Afro Trinidadian domains except for the
185 “knowledgeable” domain (4.18 average). Dangeray (perhaps related to the English term
“danger”) refers to situations that are unsafe, dangerous, and/or frightening and is a concept that defines how courage is measured. Dangeray situations often have to do with being out on rough and choppy waters, fishing during or right before large storms, fishing
at night with little or no light sources, and/or having to swim out in open ocean waters to
retrieve gear or fish. To show fortitude or stamina in standing up against difficulty or
fears such as these is someone that has belly . Belly had one of the highest ratings of
importance across domains and each Afro Trinidadian sample participant noted it in their
free lists showing how widely known and crucial is this concept. It is the most important
term describing courage by nearly a full rating point. Encompassing more specific forms
of courage, a person who has belly is someone who has shown courage in dangeray
contexts many times over a period of many months or years. A person has belly , it is not
a result of simply displaying or showing it as the latter can be more fleeting moments of
showmanship or courage. Rather, it is seen as an innate quality that people have and then
can put on display. Informants sorted brave up , play brave , and take courage as more
nuanced forms that people with belly have displayed. Brave up is the process of building
up the courage to take on a frightening action, play brave is the act of doing what one will brave up for, and take courage is to summon courage or motivation in the face of danger. The combination and consistent displaying of these actions over time helps identify those who have belly . These more specific forms of courage all have relative importance compared to concepts in other domains as they scored between a three and four on importance rankings.
186 While showing courage in dangeray to the point that one has belly is crucial for fishermen to be taken seriously by their fellow fisher folk, being a yay yay fly (the local
equivalent of “coward”) will earn someone a reputation of not being a serious or
courageous fisherman. A yay yay fly involves not only avoiding dangerous situations as described earlier, but also actively complaining about them . With over 90 percent of
respondents listing this term and having a 3.8 importance rating, yay yay fly is the only
word that consistently was listed in opposition to “courage” and it does show the
appropriate power as a concept in relation to belly .
Figure 24: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “courage”.
187 Courage Dangeray adj. dangerous, frightening, unsafe Belly n. courage, fortitude, stamina, ability to stand up against difficulty or fear Brave Up v. gather courage, get up nerve or strength to do something Play Brave n., v. individual who wishes to appear fearless and strong in action Take Courage phr. summon up courage, motivation in face of difficulties Whip whap adj. acting quickly without hesitation or distraction, acting strongly Damblay v. take a chance, but only after careful planning Madinga n. person with a reputation for toughness, bravery
Coward Yay yay Fly n. coward, someone who always complains Table 26: Definitions of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “courage” and “coward”.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Courage
Dangeray .94 1.3 3.9 Belly 1.00 1.7 4.9 Brave Up .91 2.8 4 Play Brave .88 3.1 3.6 Take Courage .82 3.5 3.3 Whip whap .76 4.9 2.1 Damblay .82 5.1 2.5 Madinga .91 6.8 2.9
Coward
Yay yay Fly .91 3.8 Table 27: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “courage” and “coward”.
Figure 25 and Tables 28 and 29 show the results for the opposing Afro
Trinidadian domains of “fair” and “cheat”. Although there are some related words in the fair domain and numerous terms listed for a cheat or cheating, kaiso is by far the most important of all these concepts representing fairness for Afro Trinidadian fishermen. No other concept rated above three in importance in the fair and cheat domains compared to kaiso , which is a powerful outlier at a 4.8 rating. Kaiso was also listed by all Afro
Trinidadian informants compared to the other concepts where only two barely reached above 90 percent. To be kaiso is to be fair, which is to act in what is seen as a “proper”
188 way among fellow fishermen. An individual who can act fairly in distributing fish catch,
choosing crewmates when organizing a fishing venture, and treat fellow fisher folk justly
in social and business transactions is kaiso . Kaiso is a more utilized synonym of true
true , which is another adjective that describes someone who is genuine or authentic.
Beyond fairness being a quality of someone who can also be “real” much of the time, being kaiso means to treat everyone else the way they are supposed to be treated (i.e., to
treat people properly). This is summarized well by multiple statements from informants
who said that kaiso is about taking good care of the people who do right by a person and
their family. Individuals who have helped an individual out in the past and have been
good to them and their family are people who one should also be nice to, distribute to,
and help when needed. To be kaiso is not to try and get ahead of others (which is what
the opposing domain of “cheat” suggests), but rather to help those who help you.
There are numerous terms for “cheat” among Afro Trinidadians, but none rank highly (above three) in terms of importance. From people being greedy, covetous, and showboating, to acting unfairly, being deceptive, and hatching schemes, a “cheat” in
Icacos in the larger social sense means that individuals cannot work together as a unit.
This is shown by the most general concept in the taxonomy, the phrase crab in barrel .
Parallel to and possibly related to what Wilson (1973) described among Afro Caribbeans in Providencia as “crab antics”, crab in barrel is said to indicate an inability of people to work together with individuals trying to get ahead at the expense of others as in crabs climbing out of a barrel, but pulling fellow crabs down in the process. Kaiso remains the dominant term in the “fair” domain, however, as the crab in barrel concept does not break a 90 percent threshold on being part of free lists (nor do other “cheat” concepts)
189 and shows a low importance rating. The “cheat” domain provides a counter balance
“fairness”, specifies what is in opposition to it, and aids in further defining fairness, but
does not hold much importance despite the specificity.
Figure 25: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “fair” and “cheat”.
190 Fair True true adj. real, genuine, authentic Kaiso adj. fair, proper Ask to trot phr. compare favorably with Asal adj. pure and/or moral
Cheat Crab In Barrel phr. said to indicate inability of people to work together towards improvement with each person trying to get ahead at expense of others Drop Words v., n. say something to people aimed as criticism at one individual Eyeball v. to fool, deceive Have Head n. be clever, untrustworthy, tricky Try Screw v., n. use unfair means, cheat Jook Out v., n. steal from, swindle, cheat someone Bramble v. to deliberately confuse or deceive someone with smart talk or a well orchestrated scheme, succeed through trickery On Head adj. at someone’s expense, by taking advantage of someone Sharpman n. conman, someone who cheats in business dealings or financial transactions Conconsa adj. hypocritical, deceiving, patronizing, naive, showing off Gallery/Gambage n., adj. show off, boast, make a big display, but does not live up to threat Burn Eye v., n. make someone envious, covetous, aiming to cause someone to desire to have the same thing La Titick n. someone’s whose actions are mysterious or sly and whose life is not open to others Table 28: Definitions of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “fair” and “cheat”.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Fair
True true .85 1.5 2.6 Kaiso 1.00 2.4 4.8 Ask to trot .61 3.7 1.2 Asal .88 4.3 2.6
Cheat
Crab In Barrel .70 1.4 1.8 Drop Words .91 2.4 2.9 Eyeball .88 3.9 2.2 Have Head .82 4.2 2.4 Try Screw .82 5.6 2.1 Jook Out .91 6.0 2.8 Bramble .79 7.1 1.9 On Head .70 8.9 1.4 Sharpman .82 9.9 1.9 Conconsa .73 10.6 1.7 Gallery/Gambage .91 11.2 2.6 Burn Eye .67 12.4 1.3 La Titick .61 12.9 1.3 Table 29: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “fair” and “cheat”.
191 As courage is the most crucial domain for Afro Trinidadians, trustworthiness is
the most important for Indo Trinidadians. Figure 26 and Tables 30 and 31 display results
for the Indo Trinidadian domains of “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”. Average
importance rankings for trustworthiness concepts is a high 4.13. Although there are only
three concepts in this domain, two of the three ( sachcha and able ) score at a four or
above in terms of importance and even after removing the highest ranked term ( sachcha ),
the average rating is still the highest compared to other Indo Trinidadian domains (not
counting the “intelligence” domain since it only has one term, see Table 42 in this
chapter). Sachcha is the most crucial and often cited concept representing trust, by far,
with all Indo Trinidadian informants listing it and it scoring a near perfectly high
importance of 4.9. What makes sachcha such a significant concept in fishing is what the term implies. Used as an adjective, it describes individuals who are trustworthy.
Trustworthy includes individuals who do right for others when saying they will do an action, return borrowed equipment after using it, offer their full aid when helping someone else, and will follow (in action) what they say they will do. The term and these qualities further imply experience as only those fisher folk with multiple years of fishing on their own or with a quality crew, who have provided robust and consistent catches, or have lead a successful fishing vessel are able to be referenced in terms of sachcha . With
Indo Trinidadian fishermen, trust comes from and is tightly linked with such on water experience and to have sachcha is to have both those experience and trusting qualities.
The phrase as man is similar to sachcha as it also notes the same forms of experience, but
notes truthfulness in words (e.g. someone who speaks honestly) more so than being
trusted in actions. As man is used less, as is the adjective able . Able specifies both
192 sachcha and as man as it describes someone who is capable of dealing with most situations. This capability presupposes the on water experience communicated in the terms sachcha and as man .
Opposing trustworthiness are words for “dishonest”, which include terms
describing individuals who are irresponsible, unreliable, liars, and deceptive. Langera and jhut are the two most important and commonly known terms. Langera describes a person who is irresponsible and unreliable, which encompasses the opposition to experienced and trustworthy (i.e. sachcha ), respectively. A jhut is a false statement that
can often be told by a langera person. A liard is someone who is a habitual liar and this term is especially meaningful as it encompasses all the qualities of the “higher” concepts in the taxonomy.
Figure 26: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”.
193 Trustworthiness As Man phr. said to show experience, truthfulness Sachcha adj. trustworthy, honest, show experience Able adj. capable of dealing with
Dishonest Langera adj. irresponsible, unreliable Zig zag n., adj. unreliable, dishonest Back squeeze v. to not keep a promise, go back on commitment Wrongside n., adj. incorrect, unreliable, deceptive Jhut n. lie, falsehood Bahana n. mischief, trouble, excuse, lie Turn Tongue v. to lie Liard n. a habitual liar Table 30: Definitions of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Trustworthiness
As Man .83 1.3 3.5 Sachcha 1.00 1.5 4.9 Able .92 2.6 4.0
Dishonest
Langera .92 1.5 4.3 Zig zag .75 2.6 3.2 Back squeeze .72 3.3 3.1 Wrongside .83 4.2 3.7 Jhut .92 5.0 4.2 Bahana .89 5.2 3.9 Turn Tongue .75 6.4 2.9 Liard .83 7.6 3.3 Table 31: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “trustworthiness” and “dishonest”.
Figure 27 and Tables 32 and 33 show results for the Afro Trinidadian domains of
“friend” and “fall out”. Four nouns used interchangeably mean “friend”: breds , horse , compere , and dost . Breds and horse are the two most important and commonly known with breds especially scoring high with 97 percent of Afro Trinidadian respondents listing the term. It also scored the highest mean rating of importance in the domain at 4.7.
Breds and horse can be heard often among long time fishermen friends and came up
194 often in interviews and informal conversations I had with fisher folk. While the other
terms mean “close friends”, breds adds the idea of kinship, whether those that call their
friends breds are genetic kin or not. Someone who is breds is like a brother, a person
exceptionally close and could be considered a fisherman’s “best friend”. In this way,
breds acts as a cultural kinship term for Afro Trinidadians who, as an ethnic group of
Icacos fishermen, have smaller biological families to rely upon. Identifying one or a
couple individuals of exceptionally close friends as breds may allow Afro Trinidadians a
cultural way of expanding their kinship to promote and strengthen dyadic reciprocal
exchange relationships. Numerous other terms populate the friends domain and specify
what friends do for or with each other, such as helping, showing support, taking one’s
side in an argument or conflict, reconciling and getting on good terms again, and
watching over the other person. Being particular is another often used term that scored
near breds and horse in importance and is included under all the other concepts in the
domain. To be particular is to do those things that a good friend does, watch over an
individual, to care about them, and to show concern for and support them.
In opposition to friends, “fall out” is one of the weaker domains of all those
identified in this study as no term in this area scored above a 2.6 in importance or reached
above 85 percent of respondents listing it. Getting on bad terms, having quarrels or long
standing fights, to not be on speaking terms, thinking about a person in negative terms, or being stubborn are characteristics encompassed in the terms included in falling out.
195
Figure 27: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “friend” and “fall out”.
Friend Breds n. friendly and respectful term for fellow man or close friend, like a brother Horse n. friend, someone you can rely upon, used between men Compere n. close friends Dost n. friend, term of address between male friends The Old phr. used before someone’s name to indicate familiarity with that person’s ways Put Hand v. to help, aid, support someone Take Up For v. to take someone’s side in an argument, to join in support of someone Hold Up v. to be strong and supportive for someone Make Back v. to reconcile with, renew friendship, get on good terms again Particular v., adj. show concern for, care about, watch over
Fall Out Get Away v. to get on bad terms, quarrel In Noise n., adj. not on good terms, having a long standing quarrel Batai n., adj. a fight or quarrel, to not be on speaking terms Have In Mind v. to think about with bad intention or feeling Mind Turn v. to change one’s mind about someone, to lose respect for a person (Ears) Hard n. being stubborn, closed to reason Table 32: Definitions of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “friend” and “fall out”.
196 Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Friend
Breds .97 1.5 4.7 Horse .94 2.0 4.1 Compere .79 2.9 2.8 Dost .61 4.1 1.3 The Old .64 5.2 1.6 Put Hand .61 6.6 1.4 Take Up For .85 7.6 2.0 Hold Up .73 8.1 2.1 Make Back .7 8.9 1.8 Particular .94 9.7 3.7
Fall Out
Get Away .82 1.4 2.5 In Noise .73 1.8 2.2 Batai .61 2.8 1.6 Have In Mind .85 3.7 2.6 Mind Turn .67 4.6 1.9 (Ears) Hard .73 5.5 2.4 Table 33: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “friend” and “fall out”.
For Indo Trinidadians, besides being trustworthy, showing a good work effort is an important quality among fishermen. Figure 28 and Tables 34 and 35 show the results for the Indo Trinidadian domains “work” and “lazy”. The over arching concept of work is encompassed in the term kaam kare , which is used as a verb meaning “to work”. The important terms underneath kaam kare refer to starting serious work and spending a lot of effort at that work. This is the term down hand and the phrase put down work . To put down work is to do something well through a strong work effort and infers displaying a
high amount of effort. Someone who puts down work is seen as a hard worker and giving
a lot of themselves in order to have a successful outcome. Application of this term to
various fishermen is a cultural method of showing who is a good and willing laborer
among the group. Bringing back a large catch despite fishing solo on a boat, looking
197 after, hauling in, or being the first to grab nets, or carrying much of the catch from
landing to the homes or selling area for one’s self or a fellow fisherman are some of the
ways to put down work. Closely related to put down work and scoring an importance
rating near it, barakat adds the condition of good fortune or prosperity that results from putting down work. Fishermen who run long standing boats and operations that bring in high amounts of catch are often seen as barakat and having put down work. Unlike the other important Indo Trinidadian cultural domains, such as sachcha , put down work is applied in a larger number of situations. Qualities like trust, which sachcha implies, usually build over multiple incidents and are not applied hastily. Put down work is a phrase, however, that can be said to describe a fisherman after a morning or a couple days of high effort. In this way, it has a shorter temporal framework and can be more fleeting than other terms Indo Trinidadians use.
There are also numerous terms for the opposing domain, “lazy”. Concepts such as foolish, reckless, sluggish, not taking obligations seriously, and irresponsibility are encompassed by the terms in this domain and define laziness for Indo Trinidadians in
Icacos. A locho is the most important term in the domain and is used as an adjective or noun to describe males who are slack and thought of as “good for nothing”. This is a derogatory term not often used and is only utilized in private conversations where the person being called the name does not have knowledge of it.
198
Figure 28: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “work” and “lazy”.
Work Kaam Kare v. to work Down Hand v., n. get to work, start serious activity Put Down Work phr. do a job, spend lot of energy, do something well through effort Take Night To Make Day phr. work harder than imaginable, make all out effort Barakat n. good fortune or prosperity, especially gaining through hard work Under Four Eyes phr. closely, with great care and attention
Lazy Fouben adj. foolish, reckless, not recognizing risk, in a wild, reckless manner Kicks v., n. not to take things seriously, foolishness Ratch adj. something done in makeshift, careless, or slightly devious way Ready done n., adj. not properly done, hastily done Aadhaa adj. carelessly, half way Jhaare Lapai adj., n. incompletely or poorly, in a hurry Slackness adj. lack of attention to obligations, laziness Haale Dole adj. sluggish, clumsy Vaikivai adj. disorderly, chaotic, irresponsible Locho adj., n. slack, good for nothing, lazy, despicable (used towards men only) Table 34: Definitions of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “work” and “lazy”.
199 Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Work
Kaam Kare .83 1.2 4.1 Down Hand .83 1.6 4.3 Put Down Work .97 2.2 4.9 Take Night To Make .86 3.4 4.2 Day Barakat .94 4.4 4.6 Under Four Eyes .72 5.4 2.5
Lazy
Fouben .67 1.3 2.8 Kicks .72 2.3 3.3 Ratch .77 3.5 3.7 Ready done .72 3.7 3.1 Aadhaa .7 4.5 2.9 Jhaare Lapai .64 5.4 2.6 Slackness .83 6.5 4.1 Haale Dole .61 7.2 2.2 Vaikivai .61 8.4 2 Locho .86 9.3 4.4 Table 35: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “work” and “lazy”.
A less important set of opposing domains for Afro Trinidadians are those which note more general notions of success and failure, “do well” and “fail” (see Figure 29 and
Tables 36 and 37). Unlike the other Afro Trinidadian domains of “courage”, “friend”, and “fair”, “do well” contains a positive set of qualities that were often listed by fishermen as being known and important, but are not included in the decision tree outlining catch distribution choices (see Chapter seven). No terms in these domains reach
90 percent of respondents listing them nor do any reach a 3.5 importance rating. Still, enough are listed by three fourths or more of respondents and reach moderate importance
(above 2.5) to be included for discussion. In thing and dog behind are the two over arching and crucial concepts in the respective domains. To be in thing is to have influence or power over others, be making progress, and/or doing well in life. Fishermen
200 are said to be in thing when they are of a certain well off condition, such as owning
and/or operating a boat. It can also be applied to a less permanent condition, however,
such as referring to somebody who is on a hot streak fishing. Bringing in large landings
for a few weeks can result in being in thing and displaying progression as a fisher, the
ability to wield power over fish, and displaying the necessary skills to eventually lead a boat (if that individual does not operate one already) are other ways to be in thing . Part of
doing well includes being popular among fishermen, as noted in the term saltfish . Those
who are in thing , finding success in catch and/or leading a boat, and especially display a
likable personality are occasionally called saltfish to note that they are particularly popular among the group.
To dog behind , in opposition, is to beg for favors. For Afro Trinidadian fisher
folk, to fail is to constantly beg for help from others, to attempt to get favors in return for
nothing, and being someone without the skills needed to be a fisherman (e.g. no
knowledge of prime fishing spots or navigating the Serpent’s Mouth, little experience in
net throwing and retrieving, has not apprenticed long enough to be a quality fisherman).
Various nouns are used to name such people. Terms like gawar , jumbie , and pot hound
cover these qualities and are used sporadically as derogatory terms for those individuals
who are not skilled and/or lowly crewmembers that always need help to just scrape by.
201
Figure 29: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “do well” and “fail”.
Do Well In Thing phr. have influence, be making progress, doing well (also refers to success in romantic relationships) See Way v. succeed, get by Saltfish n. well liked, popular, favorite person Liver n. elderly person who manages well
Fail Dog Behind v. to beg for a favor Gawar n. vagabond, beggar Jumbie n. someone who is always trying to get something for nothing, an annoying individual because they are always asking for favors Pot hound n. abusive term for someone without skill or credentials, who survives on handouts from others Table 36: Definitions of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “do well” and “fail”.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Do Well
In Thing .88 1.3 3.4 See Way .79 2.4 2.6 Saltfish .7 3.2 1.7 Liver .73 3.9 2.3
Fail
Dog Behind .82 1.4 2.7 Gawar .61 2.3 1.2 Jumbie .85 3.5 3 Pot hound .61 3.8 1.5 Table 37: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “do well” and “fail”.
202 Indo Trinidadians have a similar set of domains to Afro Trinindadians’ “do well”
and “fail”. These are described as “successful” and “defeated” by Indo Trinidadian free
listers (see Figure 30 and Tables 38 and 39) and while they also refer to concepts of
success and failure, the specific qualities, actions, and results that constitute these
concepts differ from Afro Trinidadians’ terms. Like Afro Trinidadians’ terms for success
and failure, Indo Trinidadians also do not integrate any of these terms into their decision
making process on catch distribution (see Chapter seven). There are a couple especially
important concepts, however, that stand out in the “successful” domain that are worth
noting. Prove and free up are the two that scored above an importance rating of four and
were listed by more than 80 percent of Indo Trinidadian respondents. To be successful, in
Indo Trinidadian terms, is not only about being a fisherman that brings in much catch, but it also having the freedom to do what one wants with their time while being able to
enjoy relaxation and taking life as it comes. Free up is sometimes used as a verb to
describe such behavior. To free up is to behave in a relaxed, unrestrained, and lively
manner without worries of the future. People who are prove or have proved (depending
on whether the word is used as an adjective or verb) are those that have gained success
and can act free up without such worries or troubles. To be able to show such a carefree
demeanor while enjoying success is a marker of the “good life” for Indo Trinidadians.
Terms in the “defeated” domain consist mostly of nouns used to identify
fishermen or types of fishermen who are not doing well. As with the Afro Trinidadian
domain of “fail”, these words are almost always said in private conversations without the
knowledge of the person or persons being called that name as they are derogatory
comments. Similar to the fail domain as well, these terms did not score of high
203 importance (none over a 3.5 rating) nor were as widely listed (none over 77 percent)
when compared to the domains included in the EDT’s and more tightly integrated in
decision processes. Still, these domains contain concepts with three fourths of
respondents listing them and terms with importance ratings above three. While failure for
Afro Trinidadians concerns begging, getting something for nothing, and not having the
skills needed to be a fisherman, failure for Indo Trinidadians is more about experiencing
misfortune or troubles from struggling with a situation, which results in acting sad,
having lots of worries (in direct opposition to Indo Trinidadians’ successful domain being “worry free”), and experiencing pain. While Afro Trinidadians’ cultural models of
success and failure are more about actions and behavior, it seems Indo Trinidadians’
cultural models of these concepts emphasize whether an individual is in an unfortunate
situation (whether it is of the individual’s making or not) and the resulting actions (e.g. behaving worry free). Indo Trinidadians also seem to emphasize the resulting emotions from failure as well (e.g. pain, sadness, having worries).
Figure 30: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “successful” and “defeated”.
204
Successful Fly Kite phr. have your own way, do what you want Prove adj., n. turn out well, be successful Diray diray adj. taking life as it comes without anxiety or worrying about the future Free Up v., adj. (act in) unrestrained, relaxed, lively manner
Defeated Bichaari adj. helpless, poor, pitiful, sad Bipat n. trouble, difficulty, pain, worries Dookh n. misfortune, trouble Bhagna n. blighted person, broken, defeated Brokoji n. a lame person Kaakhay n., v. struggle with, have difficulty with Table 38: Definitions of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “successful” and “defeated”.
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Successful
Fly Kite .61 1.6 1.9 Prove .89 2.0 4.4 Diray diray .64 2.6 2.0 Free Up .83 3.3 4.1
Defeated
Bichaari .72 1.5 3.2 Bipat .77 2.8 3.5 Dookh .61 3.1 1.8 Bhagna .67 4.5 2.4 Brokoji .72 4.9 2.9 Kaakhay .70 5.5 2.8 Table 39: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “successful” and “defeated”.
Another domain important for Afro Trinidadians is where someone falls on the scale of “knowledgeable” to “ignorant” (see Figure 31 and Tables 40 and 41). Only a few terms were listed for these domains, but the “knowledgeable” domain shows concepts all with especially high importance ratings (none below 3.6) with a mean importance rating in the domain of 4.18. While this is quite high compared to other Afro Trinidadian
205 domains, these concepts tend to be more equal (i.e., all are fairly highly ranked)
compared to other domains where there exists ranges of two points or more (where here
the range is only one point). One could think looking at the high mean ranking that this
domain would be represented most prominently in the decision tree, but since there is not
one very high standout (e.g. a term that is of 4.9 importance and 100 percent listed like
belly ), this domain is not the most crucial set of concepts represented in the EDT (see
Chapter seven).
Two terms stand out as important from this domain, however, long head and jur .
These terms describe what being “knowledgeable” is for Afro Trinidadians in Icacos, being smart and having intelligence that is often displayed by the choices one makes. To
have kidney (intelligence) is a trait of those that are long head or jur . Showing knowledge
through decision making takes a variety of forms with Afro Trinidadian fishermen
including distributing catch to crew and helpers with accuracy and a fairness accounting
for an individual’s contributions and qualities, consistently picking and gaining
knowledge of prime fishing locations at sea, choosing productive fishing spots seasonally based on knowledge of fish migration and spawning patterns, deciding on appropriate
times to go fishing based on weather that day, and being able to keep oneself and crew
members away from harm by choosing to avoid dangerous waters or areas where
Venezuelan coast guard could be patrolling.
“Ignorance” for Afro Trinidadians involves not only a lack of knowledge, but also
having low competence and being an inadequate decision maker. This also relates to an
individual causing aggravation for others. As with other “negative” characteristic
domains from both ethnic groups, this domain contains terms that are mostly rated with
206 lower importance compared to “positive” qualities. Perhaps informants were not readily willing to admit such negative characteristics were influential and considered in decision making processes when they had the opportunity to instead emphasize positive traits, but there is a consistent pattern throughout the cultural domain measures of positive being more important than negative.
Figure 31: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “knowledgeable” and “ignorant”.
Knowledgeable Sabby adj., n. knowledge, sense, savvy Kidney n. brains, intelligence Long Head n. smartness, intelligence, cleverness, long sightedness Jur n. smart, intelligent decision maker
Ignorant Bullplug adj. very stupid, without intelligence, ignorant Ask For Bakes phr. low competence compared to speaker Pooch n. worthless, stupid, or aggravating person Table 40: Definitions of Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “knowledgeable” and “ignorant”.
207
Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Knowledgeable
Sabby .88 1.9 3.6 Kidney .88 2.4 3.8 Long Head .97 3.3 4.7 Jur .94 3.4 4.6
Ignorant
Bullplug .76 1.4 2.4 Ask For Bakes .67 2.2 1.4 Pooch .7 2.6 1.9 Table 41: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Afro-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “knowledgeable” and “ignorant”.
Along with Afro Trinidadians’ cultural models of knowledgeable and ignorant,
Indo Trinidadians in Icacos have domains covering “intelligent” and “foolish” (see
Figure 32 and Tables 42 and 43). Indo Trinidadians’ concepts covering these topics seem to be more straightforward. There was only one term listed by a majority of respondents for intelligent, which is husiyaar , meaning smart or clever. This scored a high importance
rating of 4.5. More terms exist for foolish, but with less importance as only one scored
above an importance rating of four. A fool is someone who is ineffective, unwilling to
help or do work, or a simpleton. As with most of the other “negative” domains with both
ethnic groups, this domain consists of mostly nouns or derogatory names used to identify people as such without their knowledge. The most powerful from this domain is
boodhoo , which is interchangeable with gandhoo and sometimes cataplam . They all refer
to someone that is stupid and are not terms an individual would use in front of or in the presence of the person to which they are ascribing the term. Rather, they are used in
casual private conversations to reference a set of or one particular individual who has
208 been identified as having those qualities and can be shown as an example of someone not well liked or someone whom one should not be like or imitate.
Figure 32: Folk taxonomy of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the domain “foolish”.
Intelligent Husiyaar adj. intelligent, clever, smart
Foolish Jhatoor n. a negative term for a stupid person, a “prick” Salop n. unhelpful, lazy, unwilling individual Cataplam n. an ineffective, stupid person Boodhoo n. a stupid person Gandhoo n. a foolish person Kunumunu n. fool, simpleton, someone easily taken advantage of Table 42: Definitions of Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “intelligent” and “foolish”.
209 Proportion Rank of Rating of Term in Term’s Grouping Importance Hierarchy in Fishing Intelligent
Husiyaar .86 4.5
Foolish
Jhatoor .64 1.4 2.4 Salop .75 2.6 2.7 Cataplam .64 3.5 2.2 Boodhoo .83 4.1 4.2 Gandhoo .81 4.7 4.0 Kunumunu .72 5.4 3.8 Table 43: Cultural domain statistics for Icacos Indo-Trinidadian fishermen’s terms associated with the opposing domains “intelligent” and “foolish”.
Discussion
Casson (1983) discusses various levels of abstraction for cultural models and domains, resulting in a hierarchy that is also seen in Icacos fishermens’ domains, supported by the hierarchy rankings from the cultural domain questioning, and illustrated through the folk taxonomies. A standard hierarchy covers most of the domains discussed in this chapter as nearly every domain (except Afro Trinidadians’ “coward” domain and
Indo Trinidadians’ “intelligent” domain) has at least two levels and the function (e.g. noun, verb) of each word results in similar placement within the hierarchies. The most basic terms are mostly nouns that are used to identify individuals with specific qualities covered by the higher concepts in the domain (e.g. liard meaning “a habitual liar” within the “dishonest” domain, locho meaning “slack, good for nothing” within the “lazy” domain). A majority (11 of 16) of the domains with more than one hierarchical level have at least one noun at the bottom of the hierarchy that is used in this way. A similar majority (12 of 16) of the domains with more than one hierarchical level have at least one adjective or phrase at the top of the taxonomy. These adjectives and phrases tend to
210 describe the most crucial characteristics of the domain under which the other terms fall.
These highest terms in the domains do not meet the criteria for being cultural models,
however, as most provide a generalization within the respective domain only. There are a
few examples of concepts that are linked with other terms in neighboring domains.
Sachcha , for example, implies experience, which was mentioned as a characteristic associated with husiyaar . This is only one example, however, and it shows influence on a
domain with only one term (e.g. husiyaar encompassing the “intelligent” domain). Ishuay
and pailass remain the most generalizable and linked across the important fishing
domains as the other “top” terms are concepts more isolated within their domains.
Another form of cultural model is metaphor (i.e., comparing without spelling out
the comparison), which is a type of meta message and at a high level of abstraction
(Bateson 1972). “Metaphorical equivalencies” are a type of cultural model, which allow
for non explicit comparisons to be understood. In the U.S., an example of a
“metaphorical equivalency” is “control is up”. So the statement “Jill got passed over for a promotion” triggers the “control is up” metaphor schema, resulting in the interpretation
that Jill did not receive the promotion (D’Andrade 1989). There are a few such metaphors
with Icacos fishermen. Afro Trinidadians have multiple terms using “up” as a
representation of fortitude as brave up means gathering courage for dangeray and take up for and hold up are having the strength to support a friend in an argument. Things that are
“up” seem to be of positive connotation and noting strength for Afro Trinidadians. For
Indo Trinidadians, there are not as clear metaphors. Although “down” is used in the work
domain (e.g. down hand , put down work ) to represent working at a serious activity, the
211 similar word “drop” is used in a different and negative connotation as in drop words
(criticize someone).
Many in Icacos explain their terms and cultural models in the form of memory recall. One useful way to think of this is using Tulving’s typology of memory, semantic and episodic. Semantic memory is encyclopedic, relatively permanent, and known independent of experience (a storehouse of cultural concepts), while episodic memory is more specific and idiosyncratic (one’s own individual experiences) (Casson 1983). Shore
(1996) argues that cultural models are most often remembered as experiences with some information being left out and some information added. This editing is called
“schematization”, the process of turning life experience into cognitive models. Although definitions were arrived at for analysis purposes in this chapter, many fishermen either explained a term using a life example or at least supplemented a definition with an example from their life. Belly , kaiso , and sachcha were terms often elaborated on with life experiences. Rather than offer explicit definitions, many fishermen would tell stories when I asked about these terms following free listing and pile sorting. Belly was associated with Afro Trinidadian’s recollections of breds or others who succeeded in the face of dangeray . As a 47 year old Afro Trinidadian fisherman put it describing a fellow fisherman who saved a few crewmembers from possible drowning
I tell you ‘boud Keron. He my breds, long time. Warm fishener, long time. He wid his crew outside dare on da Serpent’s Mouth, way oud. Ya know it was summertime come in, gettin stormy come in one day. Big storm, get real dangeray an’ Keron oud dare wid crew, four men. Wavez hittin, two men into wader, keep hittin, two more in. Keron don’ give in, he lae lae on doze wavez and find hiz men. Led me tell ya. He have it in him. Not that one thing be tellin’. Belly a part of ya.
212 The concept of being fair towards others, kaiso , was often expressed through
examples of a fellow fisherman acting justly when distributing catch or being equitable
when gathering a crew for a day as shown by the following quote from a 60 year old
Afro Trinidadian fisherman.
It like dis man I know. Fairest man I met. We crew together, long time. He always share out right. Every pass right, equal. He make dings fair. I remember one time, he share out and miss a turn wid me. I don’ go, say nuddin’. He goin dong de road da nex day, he see me and say “wah ya do? remember I light on you, led me give you more.” He invite me into hiz place and give me extra. Diz happen many timez. To me eyes, dat man fair, kaiso. He at it many yearz, he know fairity (fairness).
Indo Trinidadians elaborated most on sachcha . Similar to the concept of kaiso , sachcha indicates that an individual does right by others. Indo Trinidadians, however,
emphasized in their examples of people that kept their word and followed through on a proposed action. From a 42 year old Indo Trinidadian fisherman
Sachcha, it Icacos dang. People here know it, not everyone like dat, but de know. Imar like dat. He help everyone. How he just say pull in (boat) or lift out or help with net. He alwayz help wid boatz, sandin’, buildin’. Everytime he say help, he come over. I try be like that. Ya gotta help people, dat how we get along. Everything he say he do, he do. Raid too. He my pardneh.
Conclusion
The three primary ways social scientists have explained human economic behavior is by referencing culture (see Rao and Walton 2004), psychological motivation
and emotion (Lewis 2008), political economy (Alt and Shepsle 1990), or economic
utilitarian assumptions of universal rationality (Elster 1986). Even the more classic
literature (e.g. Simon 1957) emphasizes universally similar utility maximization, the
affect of group membership and the influence of fellow humans has been acknowledged,
213 such as by classic psychologist Herbert Simon that “the characteristic environment of
man is constituted not of nature but of his fellows” (Simon 1957:196). When explaining
human behavior, a theory is needed that applies to what is considered universally rational
and also non rational behavior, accounts for group influence, the effects of interactions
within groups, and how individuals are induced to join and remain in a group (personal
communication with John Bodley, August 16, 2007).
Centered around the village wide concepts of ishuay and pailass that define abundance and absence of fish catch, Afro Trinidadian and Indo Trinidadian fishermen each have sets of domains and underlying concepts that encompass positive and negative characteristics differentiating and specifying what it takes to be a good or bad fisherman.
For Afro Trinidadians, possessing innate courage, behaving fairly and justly with fellow fishers, being able to support someone through all their actions (to be a standup and close friend), wielding power over fish, and to be a keen decision maker constitute the cultural model that make a good fisherman. Indo Trinidadians emphasize keeping one’s word and the trust that comes with experience, displaying a large work effort and work ethic, being able to enjoy success without worries, and having intelligence. These are the cultural models of fishing as a livelihood for the two ethnic groups. In the next chapter, these cultural models of good fishermen are integrated into fish distribution decision trees.
214 CHAPTER SEVEN
ETHNOGRAPHIC DECISION-TREES OF FISH DISTRIBUTION
This chapter ties the previous two chapters together; it incorporates the fishermen’s cultural domains and models outlined in Chapter six into an EDT and evaluates how these models help to understand the inclusive fitness enhancing behaviors described in Chapter five. What is the role of culture in fish distribution? How do cultural models and inclusive fitness considerations interact?
If culture was important, distinct cultural domains and models would be utilized by the two cultures in the same environment and resources of Icacos and these would shape the sharing patterns evidenced. This would be shown, for example, if the highly known and utilized cultural model among Indo Trinidadians of quality fisher folk being someone who keeps their word, displays a large work effort and work ethic, is able to enjoy success without worries, and has intelligence are criteria used by those fisher folk during catch distributions. These criteria would also need to be integrated in their decision making processes (evidenced in EDT’s) and fishermen who possess these qualities that constitute the cultural model of a quality fisherman would be the persons who receive fish catch transfers. If inclusive fitness was the prime driving force, the two groups should have the same fish distribution patterns while controlling for environment and cultural domains and models would not show significant influence on sharing patterns.
215 Methods
EDT’s pose three general research questions: what are alternatives that
individuals view they have available, what criteria are used to make a choice (i.e.,
information used), and what is the process by which this information is utilized (i.e.,
ordering and importance of criteria) (Young 1980).
At the beginning of October 2010, I conducted EDT interviews with the 69 members of the twenty boats from the catch distribution sample outlined from Chapter five. The first set of interviews were to elicit criteria utilized in distributional decision making as EDT methods recommend starting with a selective sample to obtain criteria for building EDT’s to eventually test (e.g. Gladwin 1989). Other EDT studies have used convenience samples instead of using nominal variables for ensuring selectivity (e.g.
Mukhopadhyay 1984; Quinn 1978; Ryan and Bernard 2006). Convenience samples could be more appropriate if EDT’s were the first line of interviews with a population. It would be easier to build rapport since conversations could be started more casually without relying on eliciting lists of personal information from informants. With previous months of rapport building (e.g. economic games, participant observation), however, selective samples worked for each stage of the EDT methods. Initial samples for eliciting criteria in homogeneous populations should be at least 25 to adhere to the central limit theorem
(distributions tend to normalize when n approaches 25). Ryan and Bernard (2006) argue an initial sample for eliciting criteria in EDT’s should range from 20 to 60 as they use an initial sample of 21 to elicit criteria. With the present starting sample being 69, these conditions are met.
216 With eliciting criteria, I began an informal line of questioning as it is
recommended to start with “grand tour” questions to show interest and avoid
ethnocentrism in showing that the informant is an expert and not the researcher as the
researcher should want to be taught how informants think. Such questions included “tell
me about your decision to distribute fish” and “to not distribute fish” as these were
different alternatives and “what do you do when you consider people to distribute to”
(Gladwin 1989; Schoepfle, Burton, and Morgan 1984). A goal is to let the informant provide as much as possible through their own cognition and expression, so alternatives
considered and criteria used are provided by them and not “led into” by the researcher. A
laid back, casual, and even sometimes timid demeanor with informants is often a good
start to gaining insight. This is especially the case with lower class populations that
maybe used to unequal patron client power relationships. Beginning with less formal
methods may help to lighten tension and smooth transition into cultural learning
(Gladwin 1989). Previous rapport building activities such as the economic games, participant observation, and the researcher’s previous months and commitment to Icacos
have made numerous informants more at ease in comfort level and forwardness during
conversations and questioning.
Alternatives for a distributional decision in this study are different specific individuals and types of individuals. After alternatives were established with each interviewee, I used “binary opposition of alternatives” in the format of “what leads you to do X instead of Y” for each possible combination of alternatives. For example, one combination from this study was: “for what reasons would you give to person A rather than person B” as some fishermen have multiple persons who they crew with nearly
217 every day. They know such a choice of giving between these fellow crewmates intimately
and these often repeated decisions supply practical examples for the fishermen to recall
and cite. This is a recommended and more formal method after the more general initial
questions (Gladwin 1972; Young 1980). This technique allows the informant to consider
numerous possible choice contrasts whereas simply asking “what makes you do or what
do you consider when you do X” may result in short and incomplete replies since
informants are not directly in the context of a decision and may not recall. This method
can also separate multiple alternatives by the same criteria since reasons are sometimes
repeated for different pairs, allowing for an “on the fly” method for the researcher to better comprehend important criteria while interviews are conducted. Also, using formal
methods after beginning with casual conversational questions can avoid first impressions
of being rushed. I avoided asking leading questions to elicit criteria (e.g. “do you give to
your brother because you are family or often on the same crew”) as this contains criteria
(types of answers to get voluntarily) in the question (Gladwin 1989). A goal of this form
of criteria elicitation was to identify cultural models or other forms of criteria that
fishermen utilized to separate potential recipients of fish catch.
Following the binary opposition questions or if that method was not well received
or did not elicit a substantial response, I asked a more open ended question of “think
about the last time you distributed fish catch, who did you give to? why did you give to
this person?”. Although such open ended methods have been critiqued as not allowing
specific criteria to be elicited, recent EDT studies have found enough criteria to construct
EDT’s to over 90% accuracy even after only approximately getting criteria from twenty
informants (e.g. Ryan and Bernard 2006). This method was utilized in all EDT criteria
218 elicitation interviews and provided the most criteria in 32 of the 69 total criteria
interviews. To aid in criteria elicitation and make the process more casual and
entertaining, a typical catch landing was reconstructed based on pictures and sketches of
the fish species caught. This allowed the interviewee to point to different species and tell
what he would do with each. Fishermen were also asked during this process to tell who
would be receiving catch shares or, in lieu of a specific individual, what “type” (based on
type of work performed, personal qualities) of individual would receive shares (see
Alvard and Nolin 2002).
Cultural models of fishing were outlined in Chapter six and were elicited through participant observation, casual conversations, and interviews as explained in that chapter.
This enabled me not only to listen for cues of cultural models being utilized in informants’ explanations of decision making processes in the EDT interviews, but also to more directly question whether Indo Trinidadian and Afro Trinidadian models entered the choice process. Previously identified cultural models involving concepts such as sachcha , put down (work) , and belly were brought up after eliciting criteria if they were not a part of the criteria the informant mentioned.
After establishing criteria from the initial informants in this sample, I ended criteria elicitation with subsequent informants by checking through the list of previous informants’ criteria to see how much and if there was agreement on specific items. I explicitly asked about any criteria that was mentioned by previous informants, but not outlined in interviews by the current interviewee. Gladwin (1989) recommends this as a method after open endingly eliciting criteria. This acts as an “initial testing phase”, although it is checking a few informants’ criteria against one individual at a time.
219 Gladwin also critiques this method since it can act as a “lead”. Informants are presented an additional checklist of criteria and may just passively agree or disagree since they are not actively involved in expressing their own reasons for decisions.
All of the methods used for criteria elicitation in this study are based on a recall approach, as opposed to a think aloud approach, except for the final test of the EDT’s during the catch sample. These are the two main types of criteria identification used in
EDT studies. The former is dependent on human memory, which can be faulty and the latter is when an informant is asked to relate their thoughts while performing a choice, which has the problem of how verbalizing thought patterns while deciding shapes the choice process itself (Ryan and Bernard 2006). Young (1980) argues that the faulty memory problem can be lessened with specific methods comparing known alternative sets, which was performed in this study. The use of illustrations and reconstructing a distributional process may also help thwart this problem. The most reliable method to resolve this problem, however, is having actual behavior of the decision to compare to what informants claim, which the present study has.
With criteria from this sample, I constructed an initial EDT to test on an additional sample for verification. Testing of the EDT was done on both the criteria elicitation sample (to determine if the tree accurately represents the ordering of their own criteria) and the second selective sample (to ensure external validity). Some past EDT studies have only tested on the criteria elicitation sample (e.g. Mukhopadhyay 1984), but as Ryan and Bernard (2006) later contend, building an EDT for the sample which you derive the criteria from should automatically give you high accuracy since you trust the informants to be correct in their assessments. Testing on a different sample can better test
220 the “common ness” of criteria across a population. Gladwin (1989) agrees that EDT’s
should be tested on multiple selective samples to ensure theory is applicable across the population. Decision criteria were entered into the tree based on the order they were most
often forwarded by informants (see Franzel 1984). The most used criteria were placed at
the start of the tree to begin the building process.
Ten criteria for Indo Trinidadians and eight for Afro Trinidadians were found to be highly used compared to others. Hypotheticals were then created based on the most
significant criteria to further elucidate the importance of each. Young (1980) does this to parse which features are the most significant. For example, he used all possible
combinations of each pair of three criteria, such as “serious illness, remedy known,
money available” or “serious illness, remedy not known, little money available”, so that
each criteria is divided into “yes or no” extremes when applicable. This allows for
ordering of criteria because when one criterion varies and a different choice is made, the
criteria that varies is most likely to be more important in causing the switch of choice.
A second selective sample of twenty, independent of the criteria elicitation sample
was chosen for additional testing of the EDT. Age, ethnicity, village location, years
experience as a fisherman, genetic relatedness, and lineage membership were variables
utilized for selectivity. Ryan and Bernard (2006) advocate using a formula to choose a
selective sample size depending on how large the tree should be. Although arbitrary, this
is done to ensure that multiple individuals will reach different ends of the tree (need
certain number in a sample so different alternatives are represented) and there will be
multiple levels (need certain number in a sample to elicit multiple criteria). The formula
is S = 2(E2 L) (S is sample size, E is number desired at each tree endpoint/alternative, L is
221 number of levels/aspect sets in the tree). The 2 L represents that each level may split off,
which is why this equation is using the two. The equation is multiplied by two since only
using the equation inside the parentheses would result in a sample size at just the amount
to cover the desired end structure. This ensures the desired structure is met since
informants’ responses will not align perfectly along alternatives. This is done to avoid
simple one branch trees.
For testing, the previously mentioned hypotheticals involving the most significant criteria were used in all possible combinations to measure how much agreement in decision criteria there were between informants based on these features. After each hypothetical, I asked what would the course of action be (assuming another alternative chosen) until the informant indicated there was “nothing left to do, no other alternatives”.
Hypothetical testing of various criteria combinations also allow for those criteria to be correlated with nominal variables of the individual and their household (Young 1980).
After testing the initial most significant factors that were a part of the decision table, I went through each branch of the subsequent decision tree with interviewees to determine agreement on decision criteria and accuracy of the EDT.
Once criteria were verified across the selective samples, I tested the EDT against the fish catch distributions shown in Chapter five. By mid November, I had the EDT’s created and ready to test on actual decisions. For the final six weeks of the twenty boat catch sample, I conducted brief interviews with fishermen in the sample during the same day after their landings and catch distributions. Having the catch distribution record available, I asked each fishermen why they gave X amount to each individual. This resulted in a list of characteristics associated with the EDT for each person to whom
222 catch was distributed enabling a check against the amount given to determine if those
with specific qualities mentioned in EDT criteria elicitation were receiving more than
others who did not show those desired characteristics.
Another test of the EDT’s against the fish catch distribution sample involved brief interviews during the final few weeks of fieldwork. I asked fishermen to identify persons who had high amounts of the characteristics emphasized in the EDT’s. Since EDT outcomes in this study identify a certain “type” of individual to who catch is distributed, these outcomes were sometimes identified as a specific individual during the EDT interviews, and there exists a record of actual distributions to individuals, these were compared to see if what people say they would do matched the actual behavior. This goes beyond previous efforts of external verification in EDT studies as these have only verified through additional interviews and not checked against actual behavior.
These tests needed to meet standards of predictive accuracy established for EDT modeling. A threshold of 90% accuracy (predicts the correct decision 90% of the time) has been established in the EDT literature as the benchmark for a robust and usable EDT
(see Gladwin 1989; Young 1980). Ryan and Bernard (2006) claim EDT’s should predict to at least 80% accuracy, although most EDT’s published in anthropology do meet the higher 90% threshold. Ryan and Bernard test their tree by internal direct and external indirect procedures to claim validity of their model at both local and national levels, which utilizes a much larger national sample than other EDT studies, which are conducted in a single community. This is likely the reason for their exception and accepting a lower accuracy rate.
223 Initially, after one week of testing from the catch samples, both EDT’s were
highly accurate, but not above 90%. Gladwin (1989) suggests three actions if an EDT
does not meet the 90% threshold prediction accuracy on a test: generalize criteria that are
causing the failures (nodes where errors occur), add or eliminate failed criteria, or re
arrange criteria. Re arrangement of criteria in the mid section of the Indo Trinidadian
EDT and re arrangement of less significant criteria near the end of the tree for the Afro
Trinidadian EDT worked and improved prediction rates to over 90% for each. Gladwin
reminds that using the most important criteria across a sample (using one or two highly
significant aspects or simply modeling the first criteria used across individuals in a tree)
may result in high prediction rates (some even go above 90% threshold), but one point of
a “decision making” approach is to understand and represent choice in terms of how
individuals perceive and carry out their choices. One not only needs accurate prediction, but also accurate representation of individuals’ thoughts. Otherwise, this just becomes
more like a descriptive model where the most significant factors are emphasized.
Results
Figures 33 and 34 show the EDT’s of Indo Trinidadian and Afro Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos, respectively. The decision process for each group heavily relies on the cultural models outlined in Chapter six. As shown in Chapter five, kinship is the most significant predictor of catch distribution. Kinship is represented from the EDT interviews and on the decision tree themselves as the first and most important criterion, whether an individual was on the boat’s crew that day. Crews do not always consist of genetic relatives, but most often they do as corroborated by the high percentage (i.e., over
224 96%) of fishing trips that members of a lineage take with fellow lineage members and the
85% occurrence of fisher folk on a fishing trip having at least one other fishermen on their crew with r ≥ .125 as discussed in Chapter five. Whether an individual is on the same crew is the most important criterion in the catch distribution for both ethnic groups.
Both the EDT interviews and regression analyses support this (see Tables 44 and 45).
225
Figure 33: Fish catch distribution EDT for Indo-Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos. Heavy means “good” or “excellent” and notes when an individual has a quality, in this case sachcha , in a large amount. Warm is a local term meaning “plentiful”, which in this case means to give plentiful when a criterion is met.
226
Figure 34: Fish catch distribution EDT for Afro-Trinidadian fishermen in Icacos.
Each fisherman has a “character quality” score in total and separately for each character quality concept in the cultural models of a quality fisherman. These scores are the number of times a fellow fisherman identified that person as having the quality, the collection of which is described in the methods section earlier in this chapter. Character quality scores for fishermen were then regressed with amount (by kg weight) of catch distribution received (n = 104), which resulted in the statistics in Table 44. Each
227 fisherman also has a “character quality” score in total and separately for each character
quality concept in the cultural models of a quality fisherman, but for the last six weeks of
the catch sample when Chapman asked for fisher folk for criteria considered during
ongoing distributions after each boat landing (see methods section earlier in this chapter).
These scores were also regressed with amount (by kg weight) of catch distribution
received during the final six weeks of the catch sample (n = 104), which resulted in the
statistics in Table 45.
The most important criterion from the Afro Trinidadians cultural model of a quality fisherman that is represented in the EDT is whether a person has belly or not.
Afro Trinidadian Icacos fishermen tend to perceive others in their profession based on this concept more than any other factor. For Afro Trinidadians, when accounting for the significance of single terms as shown by regressions in Tables 44 and 45 and when accounting for the total significance of terms combined (i.e., accounting for the whole cultural model), this accounts for over 50% percent of the variance in catch distribution
(significant at the p < .005 level, see below) showing that the EDT predicts much of the catch distribution. Belly and kaiso are highly significant decision criteria at the p < .005 level as displayed by Pearson’s r 2 in Table 44. Ishuay reaches p < .005 significance for
the final six week period while the friendship and knowledgeable cultural concepts of
breds and long head also reach significant explanatory power at the p < .01 level.
Correlations did lower across all terms within the cultural models when accounting for
the entire sample period as compared to the final six weeks. Still, for the entire sample period, the cultural models emphasized by fishermen are highly significant in explaining
catch distribution for both ethnic groups.
228
Amount (kg) distributed catch received Afro-Trinidadian
Crew .27*** Belly .13*** Kaiso .11*** Ishuay .06** Breds .05** Long head .04**
Indo-Trinidadian
Crew .3*** Sachcha .15*** Barakat/Put down work .12*** Jur/Long head .06**
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 44: Pearson’s r 2 for cultural models (overall rating) compared with amount of catch distribution received (entire catch sample period).
Amount (kg) distributed catch received Afro-Trinidadian
Crew .28*** Belly .17*** Kaiso .16*** Ishuay .09*** Breds .06** Long head .04**
Indo-Trinidadian
Crew .33*** Sachcha .19*** Barakat/Put down work .16*** Jur/Long head .1*** .
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 45: Pearson’s r 2 for cultural models compared with amount of catch distribution received (final six weeks of catch sample period).
229 For Indo Trinidadians, the three cultural concepts of sachcha , barakat/put down
work , and jur/long head are significant predictors of catch distribution to the p < .005 level for the final six weeks of the sample period and at least p < .01 for the entire sample period. Trustworthiness (i.e., sachcha ) is consistently the most powerful term explaining
catch distribution for either ethnicity. As with Afro Trinidadians, being a crewmate is the
most powerful predictor of catch distribution.
When cultural models and crewmate factors are combined for each ethnicity,
explanatory power jumps to .53 and .6 (p < .005) for Afro Trinidadians and Indo
Trinidadians, respectively. Crewing, and by association, kinship (see Chapter five) are
the most powerful predictors of catch distribution in the two EDT’s. In addition to biological kin, cultural domains are also significant decision making factors in the two
cultural models. The cultural models illustrate how both biology and culture influence
material transfer. Cultural models are not mutually exclusive between individuals (i.e.,
some fishermen have been labeled with multiple cultural models across sample periods),
which accounts for the high predictive power of each separate cultural model. Seventy
four percent of Afro Trinidadians and 70% of Indo Trinidadian fishermen in the catch
distribution sample were described by multiple terms within the groups’ respective
cultural models across the entire sample period and 74% and 72% for each respective
group during the final six week period.
During the final six weeks of the catch sample period, the above EDT’s accurately predicted distributional decisions at 92% and 95% for Afro Trinidadians and Indo
Trinidadians respectively. From the daily interviews during this period, the characteristics
each distributing fishermen said others had was compared with the amount given to those
230 other fisher folk each day. If the amount of catch an individual received matched their place in the decision process based on the respective EDT, this was counted as a
“correct” outcome of the decision process. For example, if a distributing fisherman said fisherman A had belly and fisherman B was kaiso , then fisherman A should have had more catch received from that distributing fisherman on that day.
Number of surviving offspring Afro-Trinidadian
Belly .29*** Kaiso .24*** Ishuay .17*** Breds .06** Long head .05**
Indo-Trinidadian
Sachcha .34*** Barakat/Put down work .14*** Jur/Long head .05**
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 46: Pearson’s r 2 for cultural models (overall rating) and number of surviving offspring.
Table 46 shows regression analysis results comparing individuals’ total character quality scores to reproductive success (i.e., number of surviving offspring, see Chapter four). Only fisher folk 45 and older were included as younger fishermen that have not had enough years to produce multiple children could skew results. As with catch distribution, the cultural models correlate well with reproductive success as multiple cultural concepts reach significance levels of p < .005. For Afro Trinidadians, belly and kaiso are the most powerful predictors of reproductive success, which parallels significance levels regarding catch distribution. Less significant cultural models, breds
231 and long head , do reach p < .01. Sachcha is the most powerful predictor of reproductive success for Indo Trinidadians and for either ethnic group as with catch distribution.
Barakat /put down work also reaches p < .005 significance, but sachcha is easily the most significant predictor. Fisher folk that are recognized by these cultural models within their respective ethnicities are likely to have a higher quantity and quality (measured by those that survive) of offspring than fishermen who are not. This makes sense given the high level of correlation between catch distribution received and reproductive success (see
Chapter five).
Discussion
The decision of who to distribute catch to can be broken down into several components. The alternatives can be separated into binary “yes or no” alternative sets since they are independent, but can be performed in combination. As Barlett (1977) does,
I combine alternatives into one EDT with all alternatives represented at the end branches of the tree. In Barlett’s example, four crops that are often used in mixed combination are available to farmers. Although each crop can be analyzed separately as a “yes or no” decision, combining them is appropriate due to the use of each in various combinations.
Since catch is distributed in various combinations between multiple “types” of individuals, this method of combining multiple alternatives into one tree is also appropriate for the present study, although each could be analyzed separately if needed.
Using one tree is more efficient as almost all criteria in the present study would overlap between trees resulting in high redundancy. Criteria in EDT’s can be treated as
232 observable variables and the paths on the tree as sets of hypotheses for different behavior
(Mukhopadhyay 1984).
Most criteria in the EDT’s for each ethnic group consist of local terms that describe character qualities of an individual who could potentially be recipient of non market catch distribution. These terms are almost all positive and when used toward or about a person, identify that individual as having admirable qualities such as fortitude, trustworthiness, reliability, or intelligence qualities discussed in Chapter six. This is similar to an early EDT study done by Gladwin and Gladwin (1971) that elicited verbal categories concerning economics and they found that the perceived “goodness” of a market is based on the number of people and fish there (demand and supply). Quinn’s
(1978) informants in her study often used the term sweet to signify a “good” market. In both, informants immediately utilized slang terms to represent a high level of a perceived
good quality.
This style of building decisions around simple classifications is what Young
(1980) observed in his EDT study of Tarascan illness treatment choices. As he points out,
individuals use these types of general classifications categories for understanding and
making decisions; they do not calculate all known qualities for a ranking on any sliding
scale. Locals in his study classified three types of illness (“small”, “more complicated”,
“heavy”) concerning seriousness of disease, which were a starting point in a choice between various available treatment options. Cognitively it is more “qualitative” as
Quinn (1978) argues it is with economic decisions. Individuals do not calculate, instead
they reduce decision information to simpler form (classify rather than quantify). Ortiz
(1980) had similar findings in eliciting cultural models of prices for crops from
233 Colombian farmers. She found that farmers model prices in terms of qualitative
categories and less on quantified exact amounts, generally supporting individuals are not
calculators and also supporting EDT studies which show people make decisions using
information in a categorical format (“yes or no”, “low, medium, high”).
Quinn’s (1978) informants, regarding choosing a fish market at which to sell
catch, repeatedly stressed that they did not use today’s supply demand prices in a formal
calculation because of market variance, they could not possibly (did not have the
capacity) to predict the next day’s conditions. Sellers, however, did cite using today’s
information to generally categorize conditions and would use this information in different
combinations, even sometimes ignoring information (e.g. demand). Some informants
stated that they had lost money choosing to use other indicators besides supply to
categorize the market, so they started ignoring that information even if they had it. This
goes against economists’ ideal models of not only complete information, but also using
all knowledge one has to make a calculation.
Cultural models are cognitively prominent and statistically significant in Icacos fishermen’s decisions regarding catch distribution. Mukhopadhyay (1980) refers to such a procedure as a “routinized” decision; using cultural models as the criteria resulting in routine actions that do not require much active thought. Gladwin, Gladwin, and Murtaugh
(1978) agree that these cultural routines are a “black box” for decision making (e.g. give task A to a female because culturally that is normal) and active decision making occurs when cultural routines cannot be followed. In the present study, most decisions follow one or a multiple set of cultural models. Given the corroboration of cultural models’ prediction of catch distribution amounts by the final six week period of primary catch
234 recordings where fisher folk were directly asked during catch distributions why they
were giving to individuals, this supports the conscious use of the EDT criteria in
decision making processes. Individuals do not compensatory calculate all available
information like previous hours worked by a fellow fisherman, number of years or
months experience as a fisherman, or number of reciprocal distributions of catch to make
a choice of to who to distribute resources. Rather, individuals follow the cultural models,
which in this case of having a significantly accurate set of concepts, could be termed a
“cultural routine” (see Mukhopadhyay 1980). These act as efficient cultural scripts used
when there is a decision that repeatedly needs to be made.
When faced with a recurring problem, Young (1980) argues that a culture comes
to have a cultural script, i.e., a common procedure for how to solve it. He argues
decisions that are more critical (if wrong will result in dire consequences) and recurrent
are more likely to have specified procedures, perhaps scripts, for making a choice.
Gladwin and Butler (1984) agree that decision processes to solve recurring problems
involving serious problems of livelihood become cognitive scripts (relatively stable
mental model linkages), set processes to go through when making decision on the problem that end up acting as pre attentive plans. Casson (1983) and Chibnik (1981)
argue that decisions just need to be repeated enough whereby cultural scripts develop
from them, regardless of how serious is the choice. Familiar decisions have often used
cognitive scripts that overlay and guide linking criteria in the decision making process.
Scripts become the basis for choosing from alternatives in recurring problems faced by
the individual. Numerous people within a culture share scripts (e.g. U.S. doctors easily
going through a decision processes on how to treat the flu, but must gather information
235 and experiment if treating an Asian immigrant with a tropical disease). The decision process becomes automated in the sense that time and stress is saved because the process
of behavior becomes automated. If recurring, individuals save themselves the hassle of
constantly attentively going through a whole process of deciding, they simplify instead.
This automating is why culture becomes “implicit” by those in it, decisions made
and scripts form from repetitively used decisions leading to automation and a “taking for
granted” of the criteria used to get there (Gladwin and Butler 1984). The study of cultural
scripts can be extended beyond the recurrent and important choices of illness treatment as
shown in Young’s study to economic decisions that also determine livelihood, such as in
the present research. Economics and illness are things that all individuals have to face
and make decisions on, making such studies important and repeatable in numerous populations. Only when choices are highly different will a person deviate from cognitive
scripts to “novel experimentation”, which may require gathering new information and perhaps a new set of decision criteria unfamiliar to the individual. Scripts, such as the
EDT’s in this study, are what provide the “cultural logic” for choice (Chibnik 1981). In a precursor to illustrating how individuals use cultural models and categorical criteria
rather than numerical formulas as theorized by universal utility maximizing rational
choice, research in behavioral economics and psychology in the 1970’s showed that
individuals employ “heuristics” in place of complex calculations. Individuals will use one
feature of a proposed complex outcome calculation and use it to represent the entire
context. An example of this Quinn (1978) uses from her study of Mfantse fisher folk is
that a fish seller may see high demand in one market for three to four days and then
decide to go to a distant market the next day because the seller uses demand as the
236 criterion to represent market conditions. These studies did not investigate or identify cultural models beyond a handful of economic (i.e., supply and demand) criteria, however, which studies since the 1980’s and the present research does.
Statements in this study that informants often repeated such as “ it Icacos dang
(thing)” “ and dat (that) proper ” are examples of individuals expressing cultural models.
This is similar to “that’s just right, the way it is”, which Mukhopadhyay (1980) noted one of her informants saying concerning allocating household tasks based on gender. All informants in this study eluded to models in some form. The significance of cultural models in the present study may also be due to the decision under observation involves actions towards other individuals. Such as with Mukhopadhyay’s (1980) study of household tasks, such choices maybe more influenced by cultural models or institutions
(e.g. how people feel an obligation to behave towards each other) than other types of decisions. Also, the distributional decision in Icacos being a choice that has been made and passed down for generations of fishermen may also play a role in it being heavily reliant on culture.
Shared (external) properties of culture include “historical durability”. This is when internally durable cultural models are recreated in public form so that the next generations experience these ideas and internalize them. Thus, culture is not something
“innate” passed on through the brain, but rather much of culture is socially transmitted and learned. Icacos fisher folk use cultural models in decisions that are on public display in the sense that to whom catch is distributed is publically viewable along the shoreline.
Individuals that most often view these decisions besides fisher folk themselves are fishermen’s wives, offspring and other kin of fisher folk that are often on shore helpers
237 for unloading fish, pulling boats in, and hauling equipment, and passers by who may stop
to help or watch. Although cultural models are not often verbalized during distributions,
viewers of the process see who is receiving what and how much. Opportunities for
verbalizing cultural models occur pre and post distribution as fisher folk talk about their
fellow fishers occasionally when walking back from the shoreline to the storage shed, to
their homes, and when liming (hanging out). On multiple occasions, I observed fishermen mentioning the qualities of their fellow crewmates in the previously outlined cultural model and domain terms between each other and with their offspring and/or other kin during walks to and from the shoreline. These were the occasions I saw this the most and fisher folk expressed that, especially slow walks along the beach and to their residences after landings was often a time for talking about what fellow fishermen did that day, how the venture went, and what others were contributing. These contexts are where cultural models of fishing become explicit.
Culture is also “shared”. Individuals do not have the same exact experiences, but similar general patterns of experience, which result in the general shared patterns of models (and thus interpretation and meanings) (Strauss and Quinn 1997). With Icacos fishermen, not only are certain cultural models across domains widely shared (see
Chapter six), but also cultural scripts for catch distribution processes as shown with the
EDT’s and the above 90% accuracy rates for these. A majority sample from the village fisherman population (69 of 104) evidence this rate of agreement with only a handful of deviators from each ethnic group. Meanings of cultural models of fishing are widely shared with numerous terms showing agreement in meaning above 60%, 70%, 80%, and
90% thresholds across the fishermen population (see Chapter six).
238 When discussing individual qualities with Icacos fishermen, there was partial reliance on recalling experiences with people. Afro Trinidadians made numerous comments and told short stories during EDT interviews, especially about the concept of belly and kaiso . Although going through the concept of giving to crew members and helpers rather quickly, Afro Trinidadian fishermen tended to elaborate on cultural models at length. Stories and descriptions of courage were most prevalent with those regarding fairness were also high. Many elaborations on belly focused on on water examples of fortitude and acts of courage. These included examples from their own experiences and others who they had observed and who they considered having the quality discussed (see
Chapter six for examples).
Although there were some difference between sachcha and barakat/put down work in terms of significance on catch distribution amount and reproductive success,
Indo Trinidadians elaborated most on trustworthiness relying on memory of experiences
(see Chapter six). These descriptions of cultural models support connectionist theories of cognition, i.e., using recall of experience to explain a situation or concept rather than just referring to the concept itself (see Strauss and Quinn 1997). Some previous EDT studies, such as Ortiz (1980) have found the opposite. When asked about the frequency of good and bad harvests, Colombian farmers tended not to refer to specific experiences (e.g. good harvest three years ago), rather they would cite vague variables (e.g. depends on the weather).
These cultural scripts meet part of Gatewood’s (1983) criteria defining
“rationality”. Gatewood (1983) emphasizes intuitive, situated procedures, contrasting them to “rational” procedures of decision making by means of terms not unlike those
239 used by Gladwin. For Gatewood, a “rational” procedure involves conscious consideration
of alternatives (usually involving ranking alternatives based on known consequences
from information known, see Chibnik 1981), deliberation in terms of these
considerations, thoughtful reflection on the process itself, and adherence to well defined procedures for selecting the right alternative. Although there is not sufficient evidence to
suggest ranking of alternatives by Icacos fishermen, there seems to be a well defined procedure for choices given the high prediction rate of the EDT’s for each ethnicity.
Conscious consideration and reflection during the decision process occurs as well as
Icacos fisher folk do occasionally discuss with their fellow fishers who were crewmates
during the day and character qualities (cultural models) of their fellow fishermen. With
such a well defined procedure unique to each ethnic group, these EDT’s could be called a
form of “cultural logic” (Garro 1998b).
Some of the hypotheses for this study were designed to test whether types of material transfers, such as those proposed by HBE (e.g. reciprocity), exhibit cultural models consistent with fitness maximization (a relationship termed “enhancement” by
Durham 1991). Use of “character quality” cultural models is significantly positively related to reproductive success with these models consistently used in over 90% of catch distribution decisions. Combining these cultural models with the underlying behavior of kin selection, which also significantly predicts fish catch distribution and reproductive success, results in fishermen giving to “high quality” kin whereby cultural models enhance the practice of kin selection. Kin selection and reciprocity, the two HBE patterns that significantly positively relate to catch distribution amounts given and received (see
Chapter five), are the two HBE patterns that are integrated into the EDT’s. This is shown
240 by the “kin” criteria appearing first in each ethnic groups’ EDT, the “given to me
recently” criteria used in Indo Trinidadians’ EDT, and the regression statistics for the
cultural models’ relation to catch distribution amounts discussed earlier. Individuals who
use these models distribute to high quality kin, increasing their reproductive success,
making this set of cultural models consistent with fitness maximization. Numerous predictions in this study, such as the first and second hypotheses on intra group
allocation, evaluate Durham’s (1991) concept of “opposition” where cultural models
from domains outside of economics lead to exchange patterns that decrease reproductive
fitness. No evidence of this existed in the cultural models in this study.
The EDT’s represent a map of an “ecology of mind”: a series of overlapped
models of various abstractions that represent culturally typical decisions. In this sense,
criteria in a decision tree can be seen as various types of models and the shape of the tree
their interaction. Models can relate to each other in this complex cognitive network based
on time/sequence, abstraction levels, and causal or correlation relationships (Casson
1983).
Conclusion
Folk and EDT elicitation methods demonstrate how fisher folk make allocation
decisions. EDT methods allow for the testing of actual behavior with criteria perceived to be used by individuals. This allows for greater expression and integration of cultural
models, such as belly and sachcha .
These cognitive models may represent culturally evolved adaptations due to the
two ethnic groups different cultural models significantly shaping the respective groups’
241 reproductive fitness and food distribution outcomes (see Henrich n.d.). Adaptations are
inherently choices between alternatives; changes in behavior and reallocations of
resources over long periods of time in order to survive. Thus, patterns that survive
represent an accumulation of knowledge that has been socially transmitted; patterns that
have been repeatedly used by individuals and come into the culture through these
repetitions eventually being seen as “right” or “good” ways of acting locally. Adaptations
are thus choices made intentionally by individuals. They are choices subject to cognitive processes and can be understood as such, which is why studying commonly used EDT
scripts can uncover types of adaptations as this study has shown (see also Gladwin and
Butler 1984). These patterns likely came about, and are maintained, by the operation of
cultural learning mechanisms predicted by an evolutionary approach to cognition (see
Henrich n.d.). Culture, then, is an aggregation of multiple individuals’ actions. As
individual observations are pooled and transmitted, cultural scripts develop (Gladwin and
Butler 1984).
The emphasis on the significance of culture in local, behavioral, and evolutionary
terms supports the continued call for each branch of anthropology to study the nature of
culture as a key driving force of human action, thought, and diversity or at least to find
ways to more thoroughly integrate and test cultural elements. Shweder and LeVine
(1984) noted as far back as the mid 1980’s that anthropology has shifted focus from
classical theory of culture to a more splintered foci on economic, demographic, psychological, and other variables from separate disciplines, all encompassing studying behavior and not “culture”. LeVine argues for a return to studying “culture” as the
“shared organization of ideas” and meanings of communicative actions. He argues
242 ethnography is not simply a background to more systematic studies, but it should be central. It is the only satisfactory way to cultural inquiry. Ethnography as a method uniquely observes four properties of culture: collective, organized, multiplex (i.e., explicit and implicit simultaneously), and variable.
243 CHAPTER EIGHT
ECONOMIC GAMES
Culture and Ethnicity in Game Theory
Game theorists have traditionally adopted a rational choice approach (Camerer
2003), which rests on the micro economists’ orthodoxy that humans everywhere arrive at decisions regarding economic matters based on a universally same maximization of one’s utility (see Roth et al. 1991). While these “agent centered” models consider only individual level variables in calculations of economic costs and benefits (Gurven,
Zanolini, and Schniter 2008), recent game theory from HBE (e.g. Henrich et al. 2004;
Macfarlan and Quinlan 2008) and behavioral economics (e.g. Fehr, Fischbacher, and
Gächter 2002) is beginning to account for group level variables (i.e., culture) theoretically and methodologically. Much of this work tests the affect of cultural institutions, rules or constraints formally or informally implemented in a society to ensure compliance with a groups’ decisions (North 1994), on players’ strategies (e.g. Gurven,
Zanolini, and Schniter 2008; Lesorogol 2007). Although cultural institutional differences allow for inter group differences to be seen, these studies have shown that discrepancies in game play exist only between communities of the same ethnic group (e.g. Gurven,
Zanolini, and Schniter 2008; McElreath 2004). Cultural institutions are theorized as the primary cause based on casual observations of differences between village life and not systematic tests of variation in institutions between communities. This perspective does not adequately account for other possible reasons for salience at the group level between
244 ethnicities (since one ethnicity is studied) or occasional discrepancies in game play between individuals.
There are, however, other constructs such as ethnicity and cultural models that can explain both inter village and individual level differences within a culture area.
Cultural models exist as interpretations of cultural institutions that exist within the individuals’ mind; interpretations often held in common by affiliated members of a group
(D’Andrade 1992). Unlike cultural institutions, cultural models can account for the group and individual level since models bring in the individual’s interpretations of institutions and the external world. In addition, ethnic affiliation, which may precipitate the bringing in of specific cultural models to a game situation (see Cronk 2007), has not been systematically tested within one community to control for inter village affects.
Controlling for village residency, if ethnic affiliation is shown to be significant in shaping game strategies and there also exists significant difference in game strategies between individuals of the same ethnicity, then this would appear to support cultural models as a construct for further breakdown and study in game theory.
Recent results from game theory additionally suggest the importance of cultural models over cultural institutions on decision making (e.g. Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter
2008; Lesorogol 2007). Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter (2008) directly test the affect of norms on monetary transfer offers in a dictator game (one player chooses how much of a given amount to offer to a second player, see Marlowe 2004) among Tsimane foragers.
Results show no significant difference between offers made in public where individuals were subject to a crowd of villagers who could sanction rulebreakers versus privately made offers with private offers more corresponding to individuals’ opinions about
245 culturally appropriate amounts to give (Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter 2008). At the village level, private offers correspond to individuals’ opinions regarding appropriate amounts to give to others, suggesting that cultural models maybe a way to explain individual variation in place of norms being insignificant. Lesorogol (2007) also directly tests norms on dictator game offers. She found that among Samburu pastoralists of
Kenya, when monetary distribution is contextualized as a food distribution with coins representing cuts of goat meat, givers adhered closely to the 50% offer that local elders said was the culturally acceptable offer to make. Individual level variables also predicted distributional offers with women and wealthier individuals offering less (Lesorogol
2007). These experimental results suggest that norms are not significant, but cultural models maybe since these would account for individual level variation in villagers’ use of cultural traditions in decision making. Lesorogol agrees that cultural models need further study as to the reason why distribution and punishment varies cross culturally; individuals bring internalized norms into economic games differently between cultures.
Also in Lesorogol’s (2007) study, players in the contextualized game adhered closely to the cultural norm, while those participating in the uncontextualized version evidenced a wider range of behaviors. In a contextualized dictator game with money representing distribution of goat meat, individuals were told of a cultural norm that
Samburu elders thought giving 50% would be an acceptable and normal distribution.
While the uncontextualized game had a mean offer of only 19.3%, the normative game had a 41.3% mean offer adhering significantly closer to the cultural institution.
Elaboration by players supports the significance of their interpretation of the institution driving decision making. Almost all players referenced the “giving hind leg” norm when
246 dividing coins in the contextualized game and made almost no comments justifying their
distributions in the non context game.
Even with the norm being invoked in the contextualized game, individual demographic variables (e.g. gender, wealth) still predicted the resulting behaviors. Thus, individuals differed on their internalization of cultural institutions, i.e., differed on their cultural models. Lesorogol argues distribution and punishment varies cross culturally because individuals bring internalized norms into economic games differently between cultures. Studying how players apply their normative frameworks (i.e., cultural models) to experimental situations may help illuminate specific structuring of cultural models that determine levels of sharing and will explain cross cultural variance. Players bring norms into games in the form of other regarding preferences, but it becomes difficult to understand these in an uncontextualized situation. The prediction for the present study is similar; there should be larger variance of outcomes in games with no context given while contextualized games should produce a tighter range and results that adhere to the norm. Uncontextualized games present players with a less clearly defined and broader set of choices for behavior, so context bounds the variance of behavior.
Although recent critiques of game theory address the lack of integrating cultural models (e.g. Hagen and Hammerstein 2006), subsequent studies are beginning to show that the invocation of cultural models significantly alters how much individuals allocate in experimental settings (e.g. Cronk 2007). Playing a trust game among the Maasai in
Kenya resulted in significant correlation between lower monetary offers and expectations of return when framing the game with a local concept of osotua (restrained one way
giving when someone is in need) (Cronk 2007). Cronk (2007) also notes Ensminger’s
247 (2004) experiences with the Orma of Kenya who refer to the public goods game (multiple players make an offer of a given amount to a central pot with the pot multiplied and the
multiplied total redistributed evenly among the players, see Krupp, Debruine, and
Barclay 2008) as harambee , which is a local term associated with fundraising projects.
Efferson, Takezawa, and McElreath (2007) mention the cultural model of “limited good”
(see Foster 1965) as a possible explanation of significant aversion to inequality in the dictator game among the Makonde in Tanzania. They also suggest that seeing such significant differences between the Makonde and three neighboring ethnic groups supports limited cultural mixing and maintenance of cultural differences despite ongoing contact and similar economic circumstances for generations between the groups.
The significance of ethnic differences on game play has also been shown in these and related studies. Efferson et al. (2007) performed a dictator game in Tanzania where, besides ethnicity, the independent variables were sex, age, level of education, wealth, and market integration. Since too many ethnicities were present in the area to estimate reliable parameters for each, each player was assigned to one of four larger ethnic groups:
Southern Highland, Central Highland, Nyamwezi, and Makonde. The largest effect from the study was the dramatically higher level of aversion to advantageous inequality among the Makonde; a group with unique cultural features compared to the other three. This group, originally a coastal and matrilineal people, is quite different linguistically from the others. They are famous carvers and historically have lived in semi independent villages.
The Makonde may be the only ethnic group in the sample that did not have chiefs of some kind at the time of European colonization. This result suggests a type of cultural inertia and limited cultural mixing in the sense that people with different cultural histories
248 often long maintain their differences even in the face of ongoing contact and similar
economic circumstances.
Gil White (2004) explicitly makes ethnicity the focus of his study among the
Torguud Mongols and Kazakhs of Mongolia. Although ethnicity is found significant in
Gil White’s study, there need to be tests of economic games performed in the same
village to further control for inter community cultural differences. The influence of
ethnicity may not only include that of institutions and models, but also an underlying perception of closer genetic relatedness or a feeling of kinship with others of the same
group. In a public goods game, Krupp et al. (2008) show that a cue of genetic relatedness
(showing a closely matched facial self resemblance of a second player matching that of
the first player) significantly increased individuals’ contribution. Thus, individuals are
more likely to trust kin and distribute wider if it is known that many of the individuals the player is distributing to are kin or somehow related.
What is needed is a study of multiple ethnic groups with different cultural histories living in one community, which controls for possible inter village cultural salience, to determine if ethnic affiliation and its associated cultural models are significant in various decision making settings. Besides ethnicity providing further support for the significance of culture and cultural maintenance in contact and mixing situations, showing ethnicity matters in social relational contexts supports the importance of ethnic markers from an evolutionary perspective. McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson
(2003) created a formal model demonstrating how marked groups, or ethnicities, can develop when social interactions are structured as coordination games. They argue natural selection favors a linkage between ethnic markers and normative behavior since it
249 pays for individuals to signal honestly in the context of needed collective action that is
structured as a coordination game. Other evolutionary anthropologists, such as Gil White
(2001), contend that individuals maintain ethnic group differences, although ethnic
“essences” (fixed properties that individuals must possess to be categorized in a group)
do not exist. Selection may have favored this maintenance since stereotyping people into
ethnic groups enables people to induce generalizations about others’ unseen
characteristics (see Alvard 2003). Atran (2001) agrees that individuals privilege others
from their own group first when engaging in collective action such as mating or
economic cooperation and that people form beliefs about themselves and others based on
inferences made about essentialized groups.
Trinidad/Tobago is an ideal setting for this study as the nation has two major ethnic groups of near equal proportions populating the main island, Indo Trinidadians and Afro Trinidadians, whose ancestors were displaced from separate continents. Both groups have maintained distinct cultural models and institutions while residing in and utilizing the same resources within the islands’ maritime villages. Kinship is an example of continued divergence in cultural institutions with Indo Trinidadians being patriarchal and patrilocal (Munasinghe 2001; van Niekerk 2002) while African descendants here, and the rest of the Caribbean, exhibit matrifocality, low father salience, and weak conjugal bonds (Smith 1996). The coastal communities around the perimeter of Trinidad, including Icacos, have had residents of East Indian and African descent settled in, maintaining contact, and interacting with each other since the 1880’s (Khan 2004).
I use existing ethnographic studies on the cultures of East Indian and African descendant populations in the Caribbean (e.g. Munasinghe 2001; Palmie 2006; Smith
250 1996; van Niekerk 2002; Wilson 1973) to generate the following hypotheses about
economic game strategies among Icacos fisher folk (see also Chapter one for a review of
these hypotheses). H8. Ethnic affiliation will be a significant predictor of dictator,
ultimatum, trust, and public goods games offerings, along with acceptances and
rejections in the ultimatum game and offerings by the second player in trust games.
H9. Indo-Trinidadians will exhibit lower initial offerings than Afro-Trinidadians in
the dictator, ultimatum, trust, and public goods games. Indo Trinidadians’ cultural model of ethnic relations in the Caribbean highlights antipathy and distinction between themselves and Afro Trinidadians, while the creole model of Afro Trinidadians focuses
on white black opposition (Jain 2004; Palmie 2006). Munasinghe (2001) argues that
Indo Trinidadians advocate “plural” (separated) ethnicities for Trinidad, while Afro
Trinidadians support a callaloo (mixed) nation that Indo Trinidadians equate to assimilation (derogatorily called douglarization ). H10. Regarding second players in the
trust game, Indo-Trinidadians will have lower offerings than Afro-Trinidadians.
Hierarchy in the caste tradition (Jain 2004) and thrift (Munasinghe 2001) are two models of the Indo Trinidadian population. Wilson (1973) described African descendants in the
Caribbean as practicing “crab antics”; the leveling of class differences based on the importance of maintaining equality.
A set of contextualized games with local cultural models (see Chapter six) and ethnic cues used as prompts (e.g. Cronk 2007; Gil White 2004) were also played with
Icacos fisher folk. I use these cultural models and previous findings from contextualized game theory to generate the following hypotheses for the prompted games. H11. When the opposing player is not of the same ethnicity, both Indo-Trinidadians and Afro-
251 Trinidadians will provide lower initial offers in the dictator, ultimatum, and trust
games, a lower rate of acceptance of offers in the ultimatum game, and lower return
offers in the trust game.
Methods
Dictator, ultimatum, trust, and public goods games, which test general mindsets towards selfishness and cooperation in experimental settings (Ensminger 2000; Henrich et al. 2004), were played with convenience samples of Indo Trinidadian and Afro
Trinidadian fisher folk in Icacos. The dictator game of one player making offers shows how positively individuals perceive sharing (Marlowe 2004). The ultimatum game of player one making an offer and player two accepting or rejecting that offer especially shows how positively reciprocity and sharing are perceived (modeled) and sanctioned
(instituted) (Marlowe 2004). The trust game, where player one makes an offer that is then multiplied by three with player two having the option of returning the multiplied portion back to player one, tests how much individuals find others trustworthy (Cronk 2007). The public goods game, where multiple players make an offer to a central pot with the pot multiplied and the multiplied total redistributed evenly among the players, shows how much individuals are willing to sacrifice personal gain for contributing to the public good
(Krupp, Debruine, and Barclay 2008). Each game was conducted with 25 players with all players making initial offers in all four games while being able to keep the remaining amount they did not offer. In addition, every player except the first of the 25 accepted or rejected the previous player’s offer in the ultimatum game and had the option of making a counter offer in the trust game. The first player of the 25 only made initial offers as there
252 was no previous submission in the ultimatum and trust games to accept, reject, or
counter. This resulted in a total of 148 separate decisions with 25 in the dictator, 49
ultimatum, 49 trust, and 25 public goods.
A second and third set of the four games was later conducted containing the same
individuals from the convenience sample from the first set. Both sets of games consisted
of prompts before each play with the second round having cultural models frame the
game decision (e.g. Cronk 2007) and the third round having ethnicity become explicit in
the playing strategy (e.g. Gil White 2004). The number of participants, plays, order of
games, and the rest of the game protocols were identical for the second and third round
compared to the first. In the second round, however, the first player (if Afro Trinidadian)
was told that the second player (who was either fictitiously receiving an amount or had
given them an amount) had belly, was kaiso, or was breds . If the first player was Indo
Trinidadian, he was told the second player was sachcha , had put down work , or had jur .
Since there were three cultural models to test for each ethnicity, I used the belly and jur prompts with the dictator and public goods plays (players in the public goods game were
told the majority of others receiving the public goods amount had belly or jur ), breds and put down work for ultimatum plays, and kaiso and sachcha for the trust game.
Contextualizing an experimental game with local cultural models in this way should
result in significant differences in game strategies adhering to the parameters of those
models (see Cronk 2007; Lesorogol 2007). For the third round, the prompt for the first player was that the second player was of a different ethnicity (e.g. second player is Indo
Trinidadian if first player is Afro Trinididian). Significant differences between
unprompted and ethnicity prompted game strategies can help enlighten inter ethnic
253 relations and better understand if positive and/or derogatory perceptions are being applied
(see Gil White 2004).
The first round of games were played, in the order listed above, in one sitting with each player over a span of four weeks in July and August 2009. The second and third round of games were conducted during December 2010 in the same order and protocol as the first round. Players were recruited from the Icacos fishermens’ cooperative, to which all local fisher folk belong. Chapman taught how to play each game at the end of a cooperative meeting in July 2009 with all fisher folk that eventually participated in attendance. Two days later, game play started with games played in a private room to avoid potential influence from on lookers (see Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter 2008).
Chapman went over the lesson again in November 2010 before beginning the final rounds since over a year had passed from the prior plays. Games were conducted anonymously with each player making, rejecting or countering offers in private without knowledge of who were their “partner” players to control for inter personal relationships shaping game outcomes. The room was located in a shed style outbuilding next to one of the cooperatives’ fishing equipment storage areas. Most fishermen stop by this area on a daily basis to retrieve, return, or check fishing gear.
Players were recruited on a first come first serve basis for the convenience sample. Upon verbally consenting to participate and entering the room, demographic variables were collected on the individual. These included age, ethnicity, residential location, number of residents in their household, and number of persons of different ethnicities living in their household. Players were presented with a row of ten TT$1 bills, representing TT$10 total, lined horizontally on one side of a table with a piece of tape
254 separating one side of the table from the other. Before the official play of each game with
each player, Chapman provided a demonstration and explanation of the game and its
rules following a script that was carried out the same for each individual. Chapman also
asked the potential player a few questions regarding what would be the consequences for
themselves and the second player under varying offer amounts, which enabled
confirmation that the person understood how to proceed 9.
In standard economic game protocol (see Henrich et al. 2004), players were told which game was being played, what their position was in the game, that the second player of the game would be a fellow fishermen in the village, and asked how much they wished to offer, if they accepted or rejected the shown offer, or asked how much they wished to counter offer (depending on their position in the game). During second and third round games, the relevant prompt was added at this point. Players then slid their offer amount to the other side or, if they were the second player in the ultimatum game, verbally accepted or rejected a shown offer. Games were carried out in the order listed with each participant playing all four games in one sitting. The protocol was repeated until 25 individuals had each played the four games. Three individuals were asked to leave and not participate during the course of participant recruitment during the first round in 2009 as they did not show adequate comprehension of the games after making several errors on simulations during pre game questioning. Chapman exited the room after each player left to ensure no immediate communication occurred with others. While no fail proof guarantees can be made regarding whether players eventually discussed their results at any point over the course of the study period, ongoing informal
9 Templates for pre game explanatory scripts and questions were derived from Barr’s (2004) versions for use in ultimatum and trust games.
255 discussions and semi structured interviews with fisher folk re iterated that players were
following what was taught; not discussing their game plays with other potential players.
Incentive for players to participate included the ability to keep the money used for each player and a US$500 donation the author made to the cooperative for this study and
additional studies leading to his dissertation research.
For data analysis, descriptive statistics consisting of mean, median, standard
deviation, range, and frequency were calculated for proposals, acceptances, rejections,
and counter offers in the respective games in total and separately by nominal and ordinal
variables such as ethnicity and age. A “mixed household” ratio was calculated for each participant through dividing the number of individuals of a different ethnicity residing
with them by total number in their household. ANOVA was utilized and F statistics were
generated to determine relationship strength of ethnicity on the various game offers and
counter offers testing the three hypotheses. Counter offers in the trust game were
converted to a decimal percentage of the counter offer amount out of the total amount
available to return to player one. Regressions were performed and resulting Pearson’s r
determined comparing age and household size one at a time with offers and counter
offers since sample size is small (see Macfarlan and Quinlan 2008). Pearson’s r was also
computed comparing monetary amounts of offers and counter offers to check for
significant relationships. Chi square was used to see whether cultural models and/or
ethnicity have a significant influence on acceptances and/or rejections in the ultimatum
game.
256 Results
Table 47 shows descriptive statistics for the first round sample. The majority of fishermen in the sample are middle aged ranging from forties to sixties and all of them live in the village as only a small percentage (6 of 104 = 5.8%) of the total Icacos fishermen population reside outside the community. Ethnic makeup of the sample is fairly representative of the national population as it compares closely to proportions at that level (Indo Trinidadian 40%, Afro Trinidadian 38%, see Verrest 2007). Average household size of the sample is 4.08, which compares well with the average size of all fisher folk’s households of 4.5. Mixed household ratios are only an average of .008 as one household in the sample has a friend of the family living with them who is of mixed
Indo Afro ethnicity. Inter ethnic marriages and partner co habitations are also low among the entire Icacos fisher folk population with an average mixed household ratio of .091.
Mixed ratios are slightly higher for those of Afro Trinidadians (.18) than those of Indo
Trinidadians (.065) in the entire village fisher folk population.
Age Age Household Household Mixed Mixed (mean) (SD) Size (mean) Size (SD) Household Household Ratio (mean) Ratio (SD) Afro 47 10.2 3.25 1.2 .02 .05 Trinidadian (n=12) Indo 43.9 11.6 4.85 1.5 0 0 Trinidadian (n=13) Total 45.4 10.8 4.08 1.5 .008 .04 Table 47: Descriptive statistics of experimental games sample.
Figures 35 through 39 show frequency distributions in total and based on ethnicity for each of the games in the first round. Mean, median, standard deviation, range, and
257 frequency for each game play type, covering the sample and separated by ethnicity, are
displayed in Table 48. Comparing this to a sample of 75 cross cultural experimental
games (see Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen 2004), mean offers in the trust and
especially the dictator and ultimatum games conform closely to the cross cultural average
of mean offers in ultimatum games, which is 40%.
6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 35: Frequency distributions of dictator game offers first round.
6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 36: Frequency distributions of ultimatum game offers first round.
258 6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 37: Frequency distributions of trust game offers first round.
6
5
4
3 Ethnicity
Frequency 2 Afro Indo 1
0 [0,2) [2,4) [4,6) [6,8) [8,10) [18,20] [10,12) [12,14) [14,16) [16,18) Figure 38: Frequency distributions of trust game counter-offers first round.
6
5
4
3 Ethnicity Frequency 2 Afro Indo 1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 39: Frequency distributions of public goods game offers first round.
259 Dictator Ultimatum Trust Offer Trust Public Offer Counter- Goods offer Afro-Trinidadian
Mean 4.33 4.75 5 .45 5.67 Median 4 5 5 .5 6 Standard Deviation 1.56 1.36 .85 .09 1.72 Range 5 4 2 .22 5 Frequency 12 12 12 11 12
Indo-Trinidadian
Mean 3 3.46 4.08 .32 4.77 Median 3 3 4 .33 5 Standard Deviation 1.35 1.71 1.26 .17 1.09 Range 5 7 4 .67 4 Frequency 13 13 13 13 13
Total Mean 3.64 4.08 4.52 .38 5.2 Median 4 4 5 .33 5 Standard Deviation 1.58 1.66 1.16 .15 1.47 Range 7 7 4 .67 5 Frequency 25 25 25 24 25
F 5.24* 4.29* 4.54* 4.92* 2.46 * p < .05 Table 48: Results of experimental games first round.
Age Household Dictator Ultimatum Trust Trust Public Size Offer Offer Offer Counter offer Goods Offer Age .1788 .0184 .0559 .478* .3206 .1482 Household .3726 .1619 .3196 .091 .1506 Size Dictator .6492*** .2889 .4345* .3731 Offer Ultimatum .3681 .4637* .4546* Offer Trust Offer .3167 .2784 Trust .374 Counter offer
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 49: Regression coefficients for age, household size, game offers, and counter-offers for first round games.
260 For H8, mean and median offers are different between ethnicities with Afro
Trinidadians offering 22% or more than Indo Trinidadians in all games except the public
goods game. Differences by ethnicity are significant at the .05 level for all games, except
the public goods game. While ANOVA shows differences to be moderately significant,
the consistent divergence of offers across all games except one lends further support to
the three hypotheses. There is support for H9 as Indo Trinidadians’ offers were lower
across all games, found significantly at the .05 level, except again for the public goods
game. There seems to be a tendency for higher offers among Afro Trinidadians and lower
offers among Indo Trinidadians across all these experimental game forms. This helps
support the presence of cultural models in these decisions, especially the previously
mentioned thrift model for Indo Trinidadians and leveling of inequality model for Afro
Trinidadians. H10 is supported with the difference between Indo Trinidadians’ and Afro
Trinidadians’ counter offers in the trust game being significant at the .05 level. The
higher mean and statistical insignificance, concerning ethnicity, of the public goods
offers does not seem to fit any of the previous cultural models outlined. While Indo
Trinidadians may distinguish between themselves and Afro Trinidadians more than vice
versa, perhaps such cultural or ethnic distinction is not paramount when super ceded by
the option to contribute to the whole community and/or village wide beneficial projects,
which the public goods game may represent for the players as shown in other
experimental game studies (e.g. Ensminger 2004).
Table 50 provides Pearson’s r for each form of game play along with age and household size. Age and household size are shown not to be influential on first round game play. Of all combinations, there are a few moderately significant relationships, but
261 the standout is the high correlation between dictator and ultimatum game proposals.
Taking these correlations and the data from Table 49 suggest players may have adhered
to a set way of handling the first two games, but then increased their offers for both the
trust and public goods games to “play the odds” of having a piece of a larger multiplied pie. While it cannot be stated that the amounts offered in the dictator game are not
entirely independent from the amount of proposals in the ultimatum game, the games
following these do not show a consistent significant relationship. If the way one game
was played affected another, it was likely only the ultimatum game offer that was shaped by this.
Accept Reject Afro Trinidadian 9 2 (n=11) Indo Trinidadian 5 8 (n=13) Total 14 10
χ2 = 4.61; p < .05 Table 50: Ultimatum acceptances and rejections in first round.
Besides public goods being an outlier from the rest of the game plays, there are a high number of rejections of ultimatum offers compared to the cross cultural sample of ultimatum games (see Oosterbeek, Sloof and van de Kuilen 2004) where 16% of offers are rejected on average. In the present sample, more than twice that average (42%) are rejected (see Table 50). A possible explanation for the high rate of ultimatum offer rejections is the previously proposed cultural model of Indo Trinidadians holding antipathy and distinction between themselves and Afro Trinidadians (Jain 2004; Palmie
2006). This could clarify why Indo Trinidadians have a significantly higher rejection rate
262 (62% for Indo Trinidadians v. 18% for Afro Trinidadians, χ 2 = 4.61; p < .05) as Indo
Trinidadians propose lower offers across most games. Perhaps they reject offers more frequently due to the uncertainty of the characteristics of the person doing the receiving or the offering. If this is the case, it would again make a strong argument for cultural models of ethnicity being significant in the decision making process.
Second round results also showed many significant differences between the
ethnicities with mostly higher offers by Afro Trinidadians as in the first round games (see
Figures 40 through 44 and Table 51). Offers were higher for both ethnicities across all
games in the second round compared to the first round displaying a significant affect of
cultural models on game play. Across all offer types, ethnicity specific cultural model prompting resulted in increases of TT$.50 to up to TT$2 in offer amounts. Ultimatum and trust game offers surpassed public goods offers in the second round, which emphasizes the positive influence of cultural models used in those games in promoting giving (e.g. sachcha , kaiso , breds , put down work ). The increases and decreases in intensity of difference between the ethnicities when comparing each game offer can help show which cultural models are more strongly affecting material transfer decisions. For example, sachcha is shown to be highly significant considering using it as a prompt resulted in the largest mean increase in offers. Kaiso for Afro Trinidadians also raised their average offers by TT$1.33, but the difference between Afro Trinidadian and Indo Trinidadian trust game offers became statistically insignificant in the second round since the sachcha prompt also raised Indo Trinidadians’ trust game offers to higher levels. Breds and put down work were also highly significant resulting in nearly TT$2 and TT$1.50 gains in offers, respectively, while maintaining a significant inter ethnic difference in ultimatum
263 offers. Jur seems to be of weaker influence as it resulted in only a TT$1 and less than
TT$.50 increase in the dictator and public goods offers, respectively, of Indo
Trinidadians. Sachcha , breds , and kaiso evidence possibly intense affects on game play as each produced quite high statistical significance when comparing their respective ethnicities’ offers between the unprompted games and when those respective prompts were included. The trust game ( kaiso and sachcha ) evidenced especially large changes between the unprompted and prompted games. These results support the EDT’s of
Chapter seven well as the level of influence of cultural models shown in those decision trees parallel significance levels in the game offers (e.g. jur being of less significance, sachcha , belly , breds , and kaiso being of higher significance).
6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 40: Frequency distributions of dictator game offers second round.
264 4.5 4 3.5 3 Ethnicity 2.5 Afro 2 Indo
Frequency 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 12 34 5 67 8910
Figure 41: Frequency distributions of ultimatum game offers second round.
7
6
5 Ethnicity 4 Afro 3 Indo Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 56 7 8 910
Figure 42: Frequency distributions of trust game offers second round.
6
5
4 Ethnicity 3 Afro Indo Frequency 2
1
0 [0,3) [3,6) [6,9) [9,12) [27,30] [12,15) [15,18) [18,21) [21,24) [24,27) Figure 43: Frequency distributions of trust game counter-offers second round.
265
4.5 4 3.5 3 Ethnicity 2.5 Afro 2 Indo
Frequency 1.5 1 0.5 0 0 12 34 5 67 8910
Figure 44: Frequency distributions of public goods game offers second round.
266 Dictator Ultimatum Trust Offer Trust Public Offer Counter- Goods offer Afro-Trinidadian
Mean 5.83 6.5 6.33 .49 6.16 Median 5 6 6 .5 6 Standard Deviation 1.46 1.31 1.3 .044 1.26 Range 5 4 5 .15 4 Frequency 12 12 12 11 12
Indo-Trinidadian
Mean 4.15 5 6 .44 5.07 Median 4 5 6 .47 5 Standard Deviation 1.62 2 1.73 .12 1.11 Range 5 7 6 .55 4 Frequency 13 13 13 13 13
Total Mean 4.96 5.72 6.16 .46 5.6 Median 5 6 6 .49 6 Standard Deviation 1.74 1.83 1.51 .09 1.29 Range 7 9 6 .55 5 Frequency 25 25 25 24 25
F (Afro v. Indo 2nd 7.31* 4.81* .29 1.23 5.22* round) (Afro unprompted v. 5.9* 10.29*** 8.8** .03 .65 prompted) (Indo unprompted v. 3.86 4.43* 10.73*** 4.80* .83 prompted) * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 51: Results of experimental games second round.
Concerning third round games, H11 is nullified. Each game offer is less in the third round compared to the other two rounds with about TT$1 less on average for each offer type compared to the unprompted first round (see Figures 45 through 49 and Table
52). While offers are consistently lower, they are not lower to significant levels. Public goods and ultimatum offers in the third round are closer to the unprompted offers compared to the other game types, but still slightly lower. Similar significant differences remain between the ethnicities concerning mean offer amounts, but third round games do
267 not differ much from the unprompted games in other respects. These results suggest that
considerations of ethnicity may play a role in material offers, but they are minor.
Although crews in Icacos are mostly intra ethnic as is non market fish catch distribution
(see Chapter five), there are inter ethnic relations within the fishing population and much
of this occurs informally along the shoreline during landings, repairing gear, setting up boats, and at meetings of the local fishermen’s cooperative. Eighty six percent of all
crewing opportunities are intra ethnic, which was found by counting each individual being part of a crew during the fish catch sample period with each time a person was a
member of a crew as one crewing opportunity.
6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 45: Frequency distributions of dictator game offers third round.
268 6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 46: Frequency distributions of ultimatum game offers third round.
6
5
4 Ethnicity Afro 3 Indo
Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 47: Frequency distributions of trust game offers third round.
6
5
4 Ethnicity 3 Afro Indo Frequency 2
1
0 [0,2) [2,4) [4,6) [6,8) [8,10) [18,20] [10,12) [12,14) [14,16) [16,18) Figure 48: Frequency distributions of trust game counter-offers third round.
269
7
6
5 Ethnicity 4 Afro
3 Indo Frequency 2
1
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Figure 49: Frequency distributions of public goods game offers third round.
270
Dictator Ultimatum Trust Offer Trust Public Offer Counter- Goods offer Afro-Trinidadian
Mean 3.75 4.5 4.66 .42 5.33 Median 3.5 4 5 .44 6 Standard Deviation 1.35 1.56 1.23 .10 1.77 Range 4 5 3 .31 6 Frequency 12 12 12 11 12
Indo-Trinidadian
Mean 2.53 3.23 3.53 .31 4.3 Median 3 3 4 .33 4 Standard Deviation 1.5 1.69 1.19 .13 1.18 Range 5 7 3 .5 4 Frequency 13 13 13 13 13
Total Mean 3.12 3.84 4.08 .36 4.8 Median 3 4 4 .33 4 Standard Deviation 1.53 1.72 1.32 .12 1.55 Range 6 7 4 .53 6 Frequency 25 25 25 24 25
F (Afro v. Indo 3rd 4.43* 3.77 5.38* 4.63* 2.93 round) (Afro unprompted v. .95 .17 .59 .31 .21 prompted) (Indo unprompted v. .67 .05 1.25 .002 1.06 prompted) * p < .05 Table 52: Results of experimental games third round.
As with the first round games, there are a few moderately significant relationships between game offers in the second and third rounds with a rather high correlation between dictator and ultimatum game proposals (see Table 53). As stated earlier in this chapter, this suggests players may have adhered to a set way of playing the first two games, which are the most similar in their presentation and composition. Players then may have increased their offers in the trust and public goods games to have a chance at a piece of a sizable multiplied pie. Offers in the public goods game are especially
271 correlated with offers in the other three games in the second and third rounds. There is
not a consistent pattern of correlation with the second or third round games when
comparing each to the first round, so generally it can be said that higher offers by a player
in previous games will likely result in higher offers by that player in the public goods
game (and lower initial offers will result in lower public goods offers). With the public
goods game being played last, this maybe the one explanation as to why that game is the
most consistently correlated with the others. Perhaps once a player offered an amount
over, for example, half of the amount available for the first two or three games (e.g.
making an initial offer of TT$5 or more), this behavior remained consistent through the public goods game.
Age Household Dictator Ultimatum Trust Trust Public Size Offer Offer Offer Counter offer Goods Offer Age .1788 .1611, .2495, .028 .2655, .2762, .3182 .1867, .192 .1415 .4845** Household .362, .394, .1328 .4052, .0907, .0035 .2494, Size .279 .203 .2139 Dictator .7376***, .569***, .399*, .3391 .4554*, Offer .6996*** .6524*** .6037*** Ultimatum .808***, .5452***, .4777**, Offer .4451* .459* .5161*** Trust Offer .3572*, .374*, .5025** .6374*** Trust .5712***, Counter .3284 offer
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 Table 53: Regression coefficients for age, household size, game offers, and counter-offers for second and third round samples. Second round comparisons are listed before third round comparisons in the respective cells.
Table 54 shows results for ultimatum acceptances and rejections for rounds two and three. Afro Trinidadians’ acceptances increased by one and Indo Trinidadians’ by
272 four comparing second round to first round results. Both cultural models of breds and put down work increased acceptances, although neither reached statistical significance
despite the larger increase shown by put down work . This makes sense as put down work
is higher in the decision tree of Indo Trinidadians compared to breds in Afro
Trinidadians’ EDT (see Chapter seven). While more Afro Trinidadians accepted
ultimatum offers than rejected them in round three, Indo Trinidadians’ rejections
increased dramatically in this round resulting in a statistically significant difference between the ethnicities’ acceptance rates and a significant difference between Indo
Trinidadians’ first and third round acceptance rates. This does not show much about
ethnicity, however, since this difference only holds for one of the three rounds of game plays. Given the mostly insignificant findings across third round games regarding the
other game play types shown in Table 52, there is not enough to suggest that fishermen
are switching their game play strategies explicitly based on ethnicity.
Accept Reject Afro Trinidadian 10, 7 1, 4 (n=11) Indo Trinidadian 9, 3 4, 10 (n=13) Total 19, 10 5, 14
Afro v. Indo 2nd round χ 2 = 1.69 Afro unprompted v. prompted 2nd round χ 2 = .385 Indo unprompted v. prompted 2nd round χ 2 = 2.47 Afro v. Indo 3rd round χ 2 = 4.03; p < .05 Afro unprompted v. prompted 3rd round χ 2 = .91 Indo unprompted v. prompted 3rd round χ 2 = 3.93; p < .05 Table 54: Ultimatum acceptances and rejections in second and third rounds. Second round results are listed before third round results in the respective cells.
273 Conclusion
Recent studies within small scale societies suggest differences in culture account for divergences in game outcomes (e.g. Cronk 2007; Lesorogol 2007) and that cultural distinctions are sometimes due to individual players residing in separate communities
(e.g. Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter 2008). Controlling for village residency, the present study suggests salience in cultural background within a community can explain such differences. Although previous studies show institutions not to be significant, cultural models offer an alternative explanation of intra village differences in the present study and inter village and individual differences in previous studies.
The present research shows ethnic affiliation to be a significant predictor of experimental game outcomes regarding initial offers in the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games and counter offers in the trust game. Cultural models of Indo Trinidadians and
Afro Trinidadians provide a potential explanation to why significant differences between the ethnicities’ game offers. Further studies are needed in contexts controlling for ecological and inter community difference along with utilizing methods to evoke, identify, contextualize, and isolate cultural models within individuals’ cognitive decision making processes. This will help to further effectively test for the affect of culture on choice about economic matters.
For game theory and an associated perspective in anthropology relying on utility maximization, HBE, to adequately understand human behavior in different environments, both theories need to integrate cultural models for specific situational contexts. This can help us better understand economic choice since cultural models are evolved for specific distributional situations, drive decision making, and are brain mechanisms subject to
274 natural selection for those particular purposes. EDT studies show that variation in the
context of a choice lead to individuals relying on different cultural models (e.g. Garro
1998a; Young 1981). Perhaps observing material transfers in settings that HBE has
favored to measure such as village wide feasts (e.g. Bliege Bird and Smith 2005),
shoreline exchange (e.g. Alvard 2002), inter household meal sharing (e.g. Ziker and
Schnegg 2005), and foodstuff sharing (e.g. Hames and McCabe 2007; Tucker 2004)
would provide “real world” context for studying decision making while making
exchange settings comparable between studies.
Game theory is beginning to address culture showing that village affiliation (e.g.
Gurven, Zanolini, and Schniter 2008) and the invocation of cultural models (e.g. Cronk
2007) significantly alter how much individuals allocate in experimental settings, but this perspective does not cover “real world” contexts. Methods like EDT observations and
interviews when added to experimental game or HBE studies have the capacity to provide “real world” context to material transfers, as in the present study. These
combinations of methods can help isolate culture in the form of cultural models and
cultural institutions providing further support for these driving decision making.
275 CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The present study has identified cultural models of the two major ethnic groups in a Trinidad fishing village and shown their significance predicting material transfers and reproductive fitness of local fisher folk. Cultural models and domains of fishing described as important by Icacos fishermen are integrated into their cognitive decision making regarding to whom to distribute fish catch. These cultural models are shown to enhance HBE patterns of fish distribution. The affect of cultural models on decision making and enhancement of HBE patterns of sharing are seen in several of the tests done in this study.
• HBE patterns of food distribution were tested. Indo Trinidadians and
Afro Trinidadians follow kin selection and reciprocal forms of fish catch
transfers as shown through the recording of catches and transfers daily
over six months with a representative sample of local fishermen. Fisher
folk with more incoming and outgoing primary transfers evidence higher
reproductive success (i.e., surviving offspring).
• While HBE patterns are similar for Indo Trinidadians and Afro
Trinidadians, the two ethnic groups have distinct cultural models of what
defines a quality fisherman. Cultural domains, free lists, pile sorts, and
participant observation with fisher folk identified highly shared cultural
domains concerning these definitions for each group. Afro Trinidadians
emphasize innate courage, behaving fairly and justly with fellow fishers,
276 being able to support someone through all their actions (to be a standup
and close friend), wielding power over fish, and being a keen decision
maker. Indo Trinidadians focus on keeping one’s word and the trust that
comes with experience, displaying a large work effort and work ethic,
being able to enjoy success without worries, and having intelligence.
• Regressions comparing fish catch distribution by weight and the qualities
by which each fisherman is identified by fellow fisher folk results in
increased prediction levels for primary catch transfers. Cultural models
predict catch distribution for each group and show enhancement of kin
selection by defining who are “quality kin”. Respective cultural models
for each group are integrated into individuals’ cognitive decision making
regarding fish catch distribution. Individuals identified as having these
quality characteristics have higher reproductive success (i.e., surviving
offspring).
• Dictator games, ultimatum games, trust games, and public goods games
show ethnicity to be a significant predictor of game play strategies. Afro
Trinidadians give significantly more than Indo Trinidadians across all
games, except the public goods game, and have fewer rejections of offers
in the ultimatum game than Indo Trinidadians. Offers increased
significantly across games when the same sample of fishermen from the
first round of games were prompted with the respective groups’ cultural
models defining quality fishermen. This evidences the affect of the
respective groups’ cultural models on distribution strategies.
277 The eleven hypotheses outlined in Chapter one were tested and mixed results concerning
support for these were found. H1 and H2 were not supported as there were not significant
differences regarding breadth and equality of fish catch distribution between the two
ethnic groups. Costly signaling is not supported as difference in package sizes is not a
significant predictor of distribution. The highly significant relationship of genetic kinship
with catch distribution amounts (catch weight given and received) does not support H4, but does confirm H3 since the proposed differences between Indo Trinidadians and Afro
Trinidadians distributing to patrilineal and matrifocal kin, respectively, does exist.
Reciprocity (H5) is supported as transfers between genetic kin, which constitutes a highly
significant portion of catch distribution, is also significantly balanced. Tolerated
scrounging (H7) is not supported as marginal units of catch are often transferred. While
there are slight relationships between amounts distributed (given and received) with
consumer need, they are not significant. With economic game hypotheses, H8 and H9
were supported as ethnic affiliation is a significant predictor of offer amounts across
games with Afro Trinidadians offering significantly higher amounts in all except the public goods game. Afro Trinidadians also have significantly higher counter offers in the trust game, supporting H10. H11 is not supported as prompting first players with the ethnic affiliation of second players lowers offers for both ethnic groups, but not significantly.
Ethnicity, Cooperation and Human Evolution
This study demonstrates that cultural and ethnic variability significantly influence material distributions and reproductive fitness. This agrees with the evolutionary
278 perspective that culture has functioned as a way to distinguish groups for cooperation in
the course of human evolution (see Alvard 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2005; McElreath,
Boyd, and Richerson 2003). Many instances of food transfers seem designed to signal a
willingness to cooperate (Gurven 2004b) and ethnic and cultural markers distinguishing
groups for cooperative purposes may enhance the ability of people to solve common and
crucial coordination problems. If individuals interact in coordination games preferably
with others who have the same marker traits (e.g., language, dress, hair styles) as them
and if they acquire markers and cooperative behaviors through imitating successful
individuals, then groups distinguished by cultural models and institutions may develop
and persist despite regular communication. Culture is often portrayed as a complex and
internally consistent whole, which suggests a set of co varying features. Cooperating or
“playing” with someone who shares markers increases the probability that ideas of
saliency will be shared (Alvard and Nolin 2002).
Clan totems, language, costumes, scarification, tattoos, rituals, and other identifiers indicate group association, decrease anonymity, and provide assurance that all are playing by the same rules (see Barth 1969). Anthropologists have long studied such cultural markers, but looking at them as helping solve recurring coordination problems is an important theoretical insight. Many evolutionary anthropologists now agree that humans developed the ability to transmit large amounts of cultural information beginning approximately 40,000 to 50,000 YBP resulting in a large increase of cultural diversity in the archaeological record (Diamond 2006; Klein and Edgar 2002; Mithen 1998). The
Upper Paleolithic transition represents a vast change; what were the selective forces that favored the development of these numerously diverse cultural traits? The adaptive
279 advantages of being able to cooperate within a group may have been one such force. This
is a basic social problem: cooperation is ideal, but which individuals does one trust and
how do you maintain that trust? Being able to perceive, internalize, act upon, and
transmit cultural models and cultural institutions is crucial for solving coordination problems and accessing synergistic payoffs (Alvard and Nolin 2002; see also Richerson
and Boyd 2009).
Alvard (2003) outlines many relevant arguments for supporting this perspective
that the results from this study suggest. McElreath et al. (2003) created a formal model to
show how marked groups can arise when social interactions are structured as
coordination games. They show that under plausible conditions, selection can favor an
association between markers and behavior because it pays for individuals to signal
honestly when collective actions are structured as coordination games. Gil White (2001)
notes that people reify ethnic groups despite ethnic “essences” not existing. He
hypothesizes that selection favored people stereotyping others in terms of ethnicity,
which facilitates inductive generalizations about their non obvious properties. Atran
(2001:537) agrees that “people cognitively privilege essentialized groups as providing the
most dependable or trustworthy context for forming and inferring beliefs about
themselves and others and for taking life enhancing collective action based upon those beliefs (mating, war, economic cooperation)”. Groups involved in certain types of
cooperation, technically referred to as coordination or mutualism, benefit greatly from
social organization that produces unambiguous group membership (Alvard 2003).
Alvard’s (2003) study of the whaling community of Lamalera, for example, also
shows the importance of getting larger groups of individuals to cooperate. He finds in
280 Lamalera that sibships are not large enough to field a crew for whale hunting, much less produce enough members to form the corporate units required for whaling operations.
Organization based on larger kindreds would also provide ambiguous membership and result in similar problems. Group identity based on unilineal descent, however, is evidenced to facilitate formation of large enough corporate groups whose members have confidence enough in each another to follow norms of participation in resource acquisition, distribution, and defense. This is also shown in the patrilineal favored distributional patterns among Indo Trinidadians in the present study who evidence significant distributions with fellow patrilineal kin and closely follow intra ethnic cultural models of material transfer.
Integrating Cultural Models into HBE
Recent research on economic game theory and HBE studies of cooperation discuss the importance of contexts of decision making (e.g. Gurven, Zanolini, and
Schniter 2008). Along with experimental games (e.g. Cronk 2007; Lesorogol 2007),
EDT’s have also shown that different contexts lead to individuals relying on different cultural models to make choices (e.g. Mukhopadhyay 1980; Young 1980). While the present study provided various prompts in the experimental games to determine if the invocation of cultural models is significant and contextual, more field studies in HBE are needed elaborate and understand the roles of context. While many HBE studies focus on one particular setting for a cooperative decision such as feasts (e.g. Bliege Bird, Smith, and Bird 2001), meal sharing (e.g. Hames and McCabe 2007; Ziker and Schnegg 2005), or shoreline exchange (e.g. Alvard 2003), future studies could observe transfer patterns
281 across multiple settings to determine if certain fitness maximizing efforts are related to particular contexts. If cultural models are important for material transfer decision
making, as the present study suggests, then continuing to identify and specify the
mechanisms that lead to certain cultural models being used in cooperation is essential.
Perhaps certain settings trigger cultural models to be used, as shown by EDT studies, thus
HBE controlling for external factors and varying the setting of transfers in field tests
would help determine if the context of a cooperative event is important. If feasts result in
costly signaling (e.g. Bliege Bird, Smith, and Bird 2001) while inter familial and inter
household primary food distributions evidence reciprocity and tolerated scrounging (e.g.
Gurven 2004a; Tucker 2004), then the context itself may play a significant role.
Distinguishing how groups use cultural models to make important daily choices
can provide insight into cognitive processes of cultural evolution. If groups that have
resided in an environment longer use accumulated knowledge, while others rely on
cultural models, predictions can be made concerning how different cultural groups will perceive recurrent problems. The growing sub field of evolutionary anthropology needs more field tests on how cognition shapes decision making.
An example of a study comparing cultural models and fitness maximization hypotheses in HBE is a review cultural and evolutionary theories on “why women hunt”
(Noss and Hewlett 2001). The authors review rational choice explanations and compare those to local cultural models of hunting by Aka and Mbuti foragers. Female decisions to hunt or not can be seen as whether it is reproductively fit for them to do so (i.e., evolutionary, rational) versus how females are placed in and can navigate social obligations and group roles (i.e., cultural models and institutions). Most relevant to the
282 HBE and CA literature from this article is the integration of cultural models; generally
that groups have transmitted cultural models of experiences, emotions, and thoughts of
how to allocate tasks in a sexual division of labor. The authors use culture history to
critique rational choice approaches to Mbuti hunting by showing that Mbuti net hunt because of experience with Bantu farmers who also net hunt.
Noss and Hewlett argue for integrating cultural models into evolutionary
approaches. For example, reproductive fitness is why hunting is often important to males, perhaps explaining why cultural models associating men with control of hunting
technology have spread. Hewlett gives the example of New World forager societies
where men are more likely to contribute the majority of calories to the diet, while in the
Old World the caloric contributions of the sexes is more equal. This suggests a bundle of
cultural rules and models exclusive to each set of groups were passed down and split off.
While the data presented in their study is not a systematic test between CA and other
approaches, it is an example of how to understand and integrate cognitive decision
making and universal rationality perspectives. The present study suggests that perhaps
there are “merged models” (Kleinman 1980) that combine culturally specific ways of
thinking with fitness maximizing behavior and that this is not a question of one used in place of another.
A way of relating cultural models to fitness maximization is outlined in the co evolutionary approach of Durham (1991). Durham argues that these two relate through
“enhancement” (when cultural elements promote reproductive fitness), the opposite
(termed “opposition”), or when culture neither promotes nor hinders reproductive fitness
(“neutrality”). Enhancement can occur due to individuals perceiving positive
283 consequences of a cultural element; this can then lead to that feature being transmitted
and continued through to the next generation. Opposition can continue through
generations as well and occurs when cultural elements for one domain (i.e., socio
ecological context) are utilized in another domain or context in which they are not
appropriate or elements that are continually being used through time as contexts change
(i.e., outdated culture). Modification in cultural descent can also happen through
individuals’ own evaluation and choice (“selection by choice”) or “selection by
imposition” when new cultural elements are imposed on individuals from an over arching power. This study examined a particular type of cultural element, cultural models, and
showed how they relate to reproductive outcomes. The cases in this study show cultural
models help identify high quality kin, which enables fishermen to distribute to preferred partners, enhancing kin selection and reciprocity as fitness maximizing benefits. Future
studies can test cultural models longitudinally to determine if continuation or
modification correlates with reproductive fitness. This would help in understanding how
and why enhancement and/or opposition continue in a population and thus the processes
influencing cultural selection; whether by choice or imposition.
Community Development: Bringing in Cognitive Decision-making and Culture
This study also has practical implications regarding development practices. The
history of international development is one filled with the discussion and application of
economic universal rationality (Rao and Walton 2004). This has often been due to
economists dominance as project leaders and staff within development agencies who
have emphasized economic rationality models of development. Despite the numerous
284 failures of these approaches, the prevalence of economic ways of thinking has remained
institutionalized and implemented in subsequent development interventions overlooking
the validity of local peoples’ perspectives (Chambers 2008). While there has been an
increase in the use of participatory research in recent years, an understanding and
application of culture in development projects is still needed (Rao and Walton 2004).
More specifically applicable to the present study, fisheries development in
Trinidad/Tobago is one example of many projects that adopt universal economic
rationality perspective. Trinidad/Tobago has had a history of operating technology
transfer projects historically and more currently promoting value added services for
economic development of the fisheries and fisher folk livelihoods (Ministry 2005). What
these projects have not addressed is local culture or ethnicity and how that shapes
decision making.
Understanding cultural decision making processes is crucial for international and community development since development policies and programs seek to change the behavior of a target population through various incentives and sanctions based on assumptions about that target population’s behavior and what changes can be achieved.
Often times, however, these assumptions have been solely based on universal economic decision making. Initiatives seek either to prevent a particular behavior or to protect or treat a target group of people from perceived social ills (Tucker and Taylor 2007). Project planners typically do so without understanding how people themselves judge the value of
their activities. When alternatives planners recommend do not replace the value of banned activities, alternatives are unlikely to be adopted, and individuals will refuse to participate (Tucker 2007). Development policy of the past has suffered from this,
285 focusing on breaking what the development experts once termed “toxic cultures”.
Examples include modernization programs of the 1950’s and 1960’s that relied on technology transfers to break inefficient “traditional” culture through identifying early adopters who would be the first to bring new technology into and spread it through communities (Rao and Walton 2004). Since the international development “project” (see
McMichael 2007) began in the 1950’s, development interventions have seen planning, implementation, and research at the local level based on assumptions that when faced with a decision, individuals can and will consider a parallel set of costs and benefits and compare alternatives to arrive at a utility maximizing solution.
In the eyes of development practitioners and agencies, indigenous peoples and
“peasants” have often been viewed as having “irrational” cultural practices who inefficiently over allocate resources to communal events (e.g. feasts, weddings) and status building items or activities (e.g. pastoralists with cattle). It is assumed that maximizing profit can become a main goal of individuals targeted by development interventions and that these individuals will respond to price signals and new technological opportunities (Adams 1986). Universal rationality has been prominent in development studies, such as the well known work of Robert Bates in Africa, who is one of the more widely cited development scholars. Bates (1988) argues that individuals’ decision making processes are based only on maximizing income and that non economic factors should be treated only as constraints to maximization and not as potential causal variables (Stein and Wilson III 1993). By the last half of the 1990’s, however, broader trends came into international development with more of a focus on community based development and participatory research specifically on poverty analysis for poverty
286 alleviation. This was seen even at the World Bank, in their projects, and through these
themes being promoted throughout the development organization by then President
James Wolfensohn. Community development, however, has often used universal
rationality as its working model and it has not been effective (Adams 1986). There
remains a large gap in how culture is conceptualized and implemented in development projects and what cultural concepts mean to local people (Rao and Walton 2004).
Behavioral economists and policy analysts are increasingly agreeing culture is a
fact of life, but are not specifying how it matters (Rao and Walton 2004; Tucker 2007).
What has not been stressed enough in discussions of rationality, and the roles of
individual action and culture, is to what extent culture (i.e., cultural models, cultural
institutions) shapes choices individuals make (Adams 1986). For economists, who
constitute major roles as social scientists in development interventions and research,
culture is often seen as a barrier to development, which has resulted in the continued
application of universal rationality with cultural complexity and diversity not being
accounted (Douglas 2004). Economists’ rational choice models have occasionally
attempted to bring in socio cultural elements and when they do, they tend to over
generalize similarities across space and assume primacy of only one cultural element (e.g.
all of one ethnic group will behave/believe X) without accounting for individual
differences (Cramer 2002). The political economy literature in development accounts for
institutions as constraints (Stein and Wilson III 1993), but these are variables external to
the individual and do not directly test or account for individuals’ cognitive processes.
Thus, culture and economy have been dichotomous in the universal rationality approach
to development. Individuals targeted as the recipients of development are often viewed as
287 incapable of “western” rationality because of “traditional” cultural constraints. This is a
dichotomy of development, that individuals “should” act “rationally” in a western sense
with projects designed assuming this. In reality, however, they often do not and culture
takes the blame (Stein and Wilson III 1993).
More theoretical works on rationality in development have been critical of this
“classic” rationality and help move the concept more towards ideas of “cultural rationality” (e.g. Garro 1998a,1998b). Sen (e.g. 2004,2000) in particular has widened the concept of universal rationality to mean that individuals subject a choice to the demands of reason. This includes a scrutiny of the goals and ends of a decision, which accounts for more variability than goals always being economic maximization. Cooperative efforts and other values that are not seen from the western sense as maximizing self interest can be seen as “rational” (logical) in other societies, and these can drive decision making.
Sen (2000) argues culture is part of a set of capabilities, a framing device that conditions how decisions are made by individuals. Beyond Sen’s work, a more explicit call for culture in development practices has been through works involving indigenous knowledge (e.g. Sillitoe, Bicker, and Pottier 2002). More specifications are needed, however, of how knowledge and associated cultural models interact and work in cognitive decision making beyond a litany of lists or taxonomies. Important questions concerning culture in development should be: what is valued in terms of well being by individuals at the local level and who does the valuing (Rao and Walton 2004)?
There has been a recent call from HBE to critique international development policy through the use of HBE study findings as HBE has not previously been utilized much to help development interventions. A special volume of a prominent journal
288 publishing HBE studies, Human Nature , focused on this subject. Since the focus of human behavioral ecologists is often on rural subsistence decision making, sharing, and distribution, they may have substantial contributions to make to the conservation and economic development programs that touch the majority of the world’s subsistence natural resource users (Tucker and Taylor 2007). A rather straight forward example of the potential applications from HBE findings is Tucker’s (2004) study of the Mikea of
Madagascar. Tucker found a low amount of food sharing among the Mikea, which suggests that reduction or removal of local subsistence activities (which was being proposed for the Mikea) would be detrimental to individual and household nutrition since there is little access between households regarding food. Development experts need to understand why individuals make decisions to engage in activities as a way to understand whether to reduce or increase access to the activity under question (Tucker and Taylor
2007).
A continued problem with HBE, though, is the downplay of culture. Taking
Tucker and Taylor’s (2007) and Tucker’s (2007) recent examples of HBE potentially informing development, these cover individuals’ time preferences for subsistence returns in experimental settings and time and calories returned across types of food production.
They do not explicitly test cultural models or institutions. Efficiency of different foods based on the amount of time and labor spent to produce it is what is studied and not, for example, cultural perceptions of food or cultural reasons why some foods are used more than others. Focusing on efficiency and production, these studies fall into similar limitations of previous development work. HBE needs to integrate culture in more specific and integrative ways that will improve upon efficiency and universal rationality
289 explanations. HBE has discussed culture in terms of, norms and preferences, signaling
and symbolic capital, psychosocial stress, and cultural consonance, but has not
systematically tested the roles and interactions with cultural models (Tucker and Taylor
2007).
A better understanding of culture can assist international development projects (as seen in World Bank projects); many projects do not adequately account for adverse effects to local cultural traditions and miss opportunities of using possible economic gains from local skills and knowledge (e.g. culturally based industries such as tourism, handicrafts, food vendors/cafes). Instead, the big complaint to development agencies such as the World Bank by local peoples is that they impose a “one size fits all” economic business model and displace others (Alkire 2004). The involvement of local communities in development interventions is today recognized as a necessity and accounting for a peoples’ model of their own livelihood would be a good start (Novellino 2003). The present study provides examples of methods and theories how this might be done as it elaborates and quantitatively tests the perceptions of work and character qualities fishermen possess about their colleagues and occupation.
Development projects also need to account for culture beyond the individual level, however, in terms of cultural groups’ relations to each other, especially if there are multiple ethnic groups in a community or region under study. Many interventions rely on forms of collective action and this can only be achieved by ensuring individuals and families will engage each other and cooperate despite ethnic differences. Effective agency, especially for impoverished people, relies on forms of collective action, but also on the “terms of recognition” that link subordinated groups to the larger society, terms
290 that concern inter group relations (Rao and Walton 2004).
Because human behavior is the focus, effective policy needs effective cultural behavioral theory. When projects do not account for and integrate people’s values, preferences, and constraints, irreversible damage may be done to people’s livelihoods and projects fail as people refuse to participate (Tucker and Taylor 2007). Thus, culture must play a leading role and we need to understand individual behavior as variant and diverse beyond universal rationality. For culture to have a prominent place in development,
researchers and practitioners need to investigate local understandings of the concept,
understand cultural logic of why certain decisions are made (observe patterns and explain
those patterns through cultural logic), and work with community members towards
solutions to the problem under consideration. The old development model is “advise and
invest in clients” versus this new model, which involves exploring and discovering local
conditions and integrating participation in project design (Rao and Walton 2004). An
approach is needed that emphasizes factors that maybe common sense to locals, but
“irrational”, exotic, or irrelevant to policymakers. Such a culturally informed perspective
is more of a lens (way of seeing) than a prescription. Perhaps the hardest question left
unanswered involves culture’s “incommensurability”. How is the value of cultural goods
different from that of other goods? How do societies evaluate trade offs between material
capabilities and socio cultural capabilities (Rao and Walton 2004)? Development
economists may see anthropology as less quantitative than sociology or political science,
especially cultural anthropology, but the present study displays extensions of recent
approaches at how culture can be identified, measured, and integrated into studies from both qualitative and quantitative methods. Game theory in particular, which shows how
291 people judge fairness, may be particularly useful for understanding how communities will
redistribute incentives and perceive income inequality (Tucker 2007).
A key question remaining for the present study, taking into account the preceding
discussion, is how to implement the cultural findings? Alkire (2004) argues that participatory design in constructing projects should at least include locals being informed
of possible alternatives for poverty reduction or economic development, which
capabilities will change because of the project (this can take the form of community
meetings, large scale consultations), and which group makes the final decisions on
implementation should be binding and public forums available for challenging. Even
when there are attempts to involve locals, problems can arise. While the involvement of
local communities is now recognized as important, there is still a tendency to
underestimate the role of the factors that jeopardize successful communication between
development workers and local people. The conditions under which people may decide to
communicate their knowledge and ideas and make their needs explicit are sometimes
difficult to create. Interaction between community members and project workers does not
always result in mutual comprehension. Negotiation may end up building upon a number
of misunderstandings that may be intentional or spontaneous due to differences in
cognition, expectations, background knowledge, language, and attitudes (Novellino
2003).
Knowing decision criteria is critical for induced development projects. The
Caribbean has a history of attempted fisheries development. Many projects involve technology transfer and loan dispersals and have not met expectations as have much of the technology transfer programs in the early years of international development
292 (Berleant Schiller 1981). Local fishery management literature, which has informed fisheries development worldwide, has assumed universal rationality (Burger et al. 2001;
McCay and Acheson 1987; cf. Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2003; Berkes and Folke 1998) as have studies of Caribbean fisher folk (e.g. Davenport 1960). Project leaders need to know how locals make decisions differently based on culture and how people interact due to this diversity so more sensitive project parameters can be designed and implemented with integration of locals’ opinions and approval. Studies done by Breton et al. (2006) across several Caribbean small scale fishing communities begin to emphasize cultural diversity as crucial in designing successful development projects, but do not systematically test the affect of culture on fishing practices by locals. Case studies in this volume provide descriptions of multiple ethnic groups residing in Caribbean fishing communities, small scale fishing techniques, and local institutions utilized by various cultures to manage access to and subsistence use of fisheries. While Breton et al. illustrate the cultural diversity of Caribbean small scale fishing villages, research is needed on the interaction of ethnic groups within communities and individual level decision making regarding fishing practices and material distribution.
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