Russian Military Thinking and Threat Perception – a Finnish View

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU STRATEGIAN LAITOS JULKAISUSARJA 4: TYÖPAPEREITA No 36

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES SERIES 4: WORKING PAPERS No 36

RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING AND THREAT PERCEPTION – A FINNISH VIEW

STEFAN FORSS

MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Strategian laitos HELSINKI 2010 Stefan Forss: Russian Military Thinking and Threat Perception – A Finnish View Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos Julkaisusarja 4: työpapereita No 36 National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 36

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ISSN 1236-4983 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu – National Defence University Strategian laitos – Department of Strategic and Defence Studies

Edita Prima Oy Helsinki 2010 RUSSIAN MILITARY THINKING AND THREAT PERCEPTION – A FINNISH VIEW Stefan Forss

“The three main security challenges for Finland today are Russia, Russia and Russia. And not only for Finland, but for all of us.”1 This quote is from a speech by Finnish Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies in Washington in September 2007. His remarks were immediately strongly criticised as inap- propriate and it was pointed out that his view did not represent the official position of the Finnish Government. Mr. Häkämies seemed, however, to gain in credibility a month later, when a senior Russian diplomat gave a strongly worded presentation about the security threats in the Baltic Sea area in a seminar organised by the Finnish National Defence University and later ap- peared several times on Finnish television.2 The message sent was that Finn- ish membership in NATO would be perceived as a military threat to Russia. This peculiar episode caused cold shivers, as it reminded us of unpleasant experiences during the post-war period. The Russian military force build- up and the war in Georgia in August 2008 was the ultimate confirmation for all of Russia’s neighbours, that the Soviet-style mindset is not a thing of the past.

Russia’s self-image and perception of Yuri Andropov, was the mastermind be- security hind the unsuccessful coup attempt in August 1991 which aimed at saving the In order to understand Russian percep- Soviet Union, but instead contributed tions of security one needs to take a clos- significantly to its rapid and unexpected er look at the background and mindset demise. He was subsequently convicted of Russia’s ruling elite. Prime Minister of treason and put in jail, but was re- Vladimir Putin is the key person to con- leased in 1994. Reuters reported the fol- sider. His relation to the last Soviet KGB lowing after the death of Kryuchkov in chief, General Vladimir A. Kryuchkov is November 2007: especially interesting. Kryuchkov, a pu- “Russian media said the former gen- pil and successor to former KGB chief eral sometimes gave advice to President

______1 Jyri Häkämies, FINLAND: SIMILAR YET DIF- sian Embassy to Helsinki immediately distanced FERENT - Finland’s Perspectives on European itself from Dr. Kozin’s views and announced that Security Issues, CSIS Statesmen’s Forum Speech, he would return promptly to Moscow. Dr. Kozin, Center for Strategic and International Studies, however, seems to have acted on direct instruc- Washington, D.C., 6 September 2007 [http://csis. tions from high-level conservative superiors in org/files/media/csis/events/070906_statesmens_ Moscow, and eventually left Finland, not immedi- forum.pdf]. ately, but in normal order when his tenure came to 2 Counsellor, Dr. Vladimir Kozin at a seminar an end. See also Keir Giles and Susanna Eskola, organized by the Finnish National Defence Uni- Waking up the Neighbour – Finland, NATO and versity in Helsinki on 10-11 October, 2007. He Russia, Special Series 09/14, Research & Assess- praised Finnish-Russian relations during the Cold ment Branch, Defence Academy of the United War and suggested a strategic partnership be- Kingdom, November 2009, p. 36 [http://www. tween Finland and Russia, and military coopera- da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/spe- tion, including joint military exercises. The Rus- cial/09%2814%29%20KGSE%20Web.pdf]. 2

Vladimir Putin, who served as a Soviet The ruling conservative elite in Russia, spy in East Germany while Kryuch- however, sees things rather differently. kov was head of the KGB. Kryuchkov As a former military superpower, still praised Putin for restoring Russian influ- with the capability to destroy the rest of ence and was a frequent guest at Kremlin the world several times over, respect is spy galas under Putin, who brought back what makes a country great. For them, former security service officers to key respect means ability to invoke fear. The positions in the Kremlin.”3 American Russia-expert Strobe Talbott, presently President of the Brookings In- The coup plotters did not succeed in stitution in Washington, outlined Rus- 1991, but they got their man to the top sian security thinking as follows in Au- less than a decade later. Consequently, gust 2008, just after open hostilities in Russia’s self-image of today builds Georgia had ended: upon its Soviet past. “Never forget that our country, the Soviet Union, made the “The more authoritarian – not to mention decisive contribution to the outcome of totalitarian – Russia is, the more it tends World War II – that it was precisely our to assert itself in an intimidating or ag- people who destroyed Nazism and deter- gressive fashion outside of its borders. mined the fate of the world”, President Another point has always been, ... , that Medvedev said in Moscow at the Victory Russia has tended to define its security Day celebrations in May 2009. The pa- – and the Russian word [безопасность], rade itself, with impressively rehearsed ... literally means “absence of danger” – troops, Soviet flags, tanks and now also in a zero-sum way. It has tended to feel mobile strategic nuclear missiles, contin- absolutely secure only when everybody ues the tradition of the Soviet Union. else, particularly those around its borders, feel absolutely insecure.”4 The western perception of security is largely focussed on cooperation, shared This mindset has produced some para- values, responsibilities and mutual re- doxical results. NATO forces in Europe spect among nations. Respect, in the pos- have been reduced to only a fraction of itive sense of the word, is not imposed the manpower and equipment levels at but something that must be earned and the break-up of the Soviet Union, re- is granted on a voluntary basis. The Eu- flecting a dramatically diminished threat ropean integration process, the existence after the end of the Cold War. This has of institutions like the European Union not been very much appreciated in Rus- and NATO, is a result of the free will sia but has instead created uneasiness of peoples. War between member states among the Russian military. The Western has become all but impossible and many behaviour has been interpreted as evi- new members see these institutions as dence of disrespect and indifference with providing solidarity and a guarantee that regard to the capability of the Russian they will never be abandoned again. armed forces, i.e. as outright lack of fear. The fear-factor needed to be addressed.

______3 Reuters, USSR’s hawkish KGB chief Kryuch- 4 The Brookings Institution, The War in Georgia kov dies at 83, November 25, 2007 [http:// – Assessing the Aftermath, pp. 41-42 [http://www. www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/id- brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2008/0814_ USL2521028720071125] georgia/20080814_georgia.pdf] 3

Several means were chosen. Ballistic terest for the Russian nation,” President missile tests were given high profile vis- Medvedev said in September 2008. “We ibility in media and Russian strategic are so close to each other, it would be bombers were sent on long-distance pa- impossible to tear us apart, to say Rus- trols to the vicinity of U.S. and NATO sia has to embark on one path, and our airspace, beginning in 2007 and still go- neighbours on another.” 6 ing on, perhaps even showing capability to intrude into “enemy” airspace.5 Words like these are for obvious reasons not very well received in the former So- This Russian show of force has mostly viet space. In an open letter to U.S. Presi- been dismissed as nostalgic posturing. dent Barack Obama, a large number of Without the massive air support that prominent former Statesmen and politi- Russia lacks at present, these bombers cians from Central and Eastern Europe could not possibly operate in such a way stated their opinion about Russia in July in wartime conditions. That may be true 2009 as follows:7 as far as the United States is concerned, but it is gravely misleading in a Europe- “Our hopes that relations with Russia an perspective. The operational range of would improve and that Moscow would Russia’s long-range strategic cruise mis- finally fully accept our complete sover- siles like Kh-55/RKV-500 (AS-15 Kent) eignty and independence after joining is sufficient to cover all of Europe even NATO and the EU have not been ful- if these weapons were launched safely filled. Instead, Russia is back as a revi- from within Russia’s own territory. sionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and What Russia demands is well known: re- methods. At a global level, Russia has spect for the Russian nation, its values become, on most issues, a status-quo and its history, recognition of Russia’s power. But at a regional level and vis-a- legitimate sphere of interest in the post- vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a Soviet space and of its right to defend its revisionist one. It challenges our claims citizens even outside Russia’s borders. to our own historical experiences. It as- “Our neighbours are close to us in many serts a privileged position in determining respects, and are a traditional area of in- our security choices. It uses overt and

______5 Aberdeen Press & Journal, Russian aircraft 6 Slawomir Debski, The paradox of an unattrac- fly over Aberdeen as diplomatic row carries on, tive Russia, International Herald Tribune, October Aberdeen Press & Journal, 21 July 2007. “Two 30, 2008 [http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/30 Russian bombers flew over Aberdeen early yes- /opinion/eddebski.php]. terday morning … . The pair of Tupolev Tu-95 7 Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constan- planes moved out of British airspace after being tinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas intercepted by Tornados scrambled from RAF Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Leeming in Yorkshire in England. Later, two Tu- Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, 160 heavy bombers flew close to the fringes of Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwas- British airspace. … A spokesman for the Ministry niewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi. of Defence … said: “Tornados from RAF Leem- Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira ing were launched to intercept two Tu-95 Russian Vike-Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Wale- Bear aircraft that entered our airspace about 2 am. sa, An Open Letter to the Obama Administra- The Russian aircraft were positively identified by tion from Central and Eastern Europe, Gazeta our aircraft. They then turned north and left our Woborcza, 15 July 2009, [http://wyborcza. airspace and our aircraft returned to base. I don’t pl/1,75477,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_ know where they turned around.” Obama_Administration_from_Central.html] 4 covert means of economic warfare, rang- tury,” written by 45 historians under the ing from energy blockades and political- leadership of Professor Andrei Zubov ly motivated investments to bribery and was published in 2009 and is hailed as media manipulation in order to advance a landmark achievement inside and out- its interests and to challenge the transat- side Russia.10 lantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.” Russia’s security policy agenda

“In Russia, history itself is much too im- Russia’s misgivings concerning its role portant to be left to historians”, Owen as recognised global player, and its per- Matthews wrote in Newsweek Magazine ception of security and military threats, in July 2009.8 “The Kremlin is very de- has dealt with three issues: NATO en- liberately staking out an official view of largement, the U.S. plans to deploy mis- history that is not far from the old Soviet sile defence systems in Europe, and the myths. [...] Both Putin and Medvedev problems regarding the CFE Treaty. seek to create a new, great Russia, and to that end, they believe it needs a great The broad official Finnish view, spelled history, unsullied with mass murder and out in the security and defence policy secret alliances with Hitler”, he went White Paper reads: on to write. Questioning the official in- “Russia is seeking to restore its great- terpretation of modern history has now power status and considers it very im- been made a criminal offense in Russia, portant to alter the decisions of the and those who dare do that may not go 1990s, which it deems as unfavourable unpunished. The Professor of history to Russia.”11 Mikhail Suprun, at Pomor State Univer- sity in Arkhangelsk, is the latest victim.9 Russia aims for a comprehensive re- World War II in the Russian version is evaluation of treaties and organisational essentially the Great Patriotic War which structures in Europe. After the war in took place in 1941-1945, the years en- Georgia, Russia began lobbying for a graved in each war memorial from the new security order in Europe. Russian Soviet era. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wanted Finland to be active in this regard. In an Russian professional historians have, interview for the leading Finnish daily, however, been able to publish more un- Helsingin Sanomat, he pointed out that a biased accounts of World War II already in 1989. A new massive two-volume ______10 work, “History of Russia – XX Cen- Relating to accounts made twenty years ago, Professors Mikhail Semiryaga and Dmitri Volkogonov come to mind. For an account of ______the new work, see Sophia Kishkovsky, A His- 8 Owen Matthews, HISTORY WARS - The Krem- tory of 20th-Century Russia, Warts and All, The lin is trying to promote national myths—at the ex- New York Times, November 25, 2009 [http:// pense of the truth, Newsweek Web Exclusive, July www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/arts/25iht-russia. 6, 2009, [http://www.newsweek.com/id/205373] html?_r=1&ref=world] Matthews’ Russian grandfather perished in Sta- 11 Prime Minister’s Office, Finnish Security and lin’s purges in 1937. Defence Policy 2009 – Government Report, 9 Barents Observer, Barents professor detained Prime Minister’s Office Publications, 13/2009 by FSB, 2 October 2009, [http://www.barent- (5 February 2009), pp. 40-41 [http://www.vnk.fi/ sobserver.com/barents-professor-detained-by- julkaisukansio/2009/j11-turvallisuus-j12-saker- fsb.4639135.html] hets-j13-finnish/pdf/en.pdf]. 5 militarily non-aligned and “neutral” na- and the UN Charter. Moscow strongly tion could make useful contributions.12 opposes a Euro-Atlantic security envi- Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Al- ronment dominated by NATO and the exander Stubb replied promptly that Fin- US. But it has done little thinking about land is not a neutral country.13 Back in the what might emerge in its place. […] It early 1970’s, the Conference on Security is important that Europe resists attempts and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to minimise NATO and undermine the was, however, a very important issue on OSCE.”14 the Finnish security policy agenda and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 eventu- It is NATO’s political, not military di- ally came out of this process. mension that is the main obstacle for Russia to pursue and achieve her politi- On his official visit to Finland in April cal aspirations in Europe. “That is your 2009, President Medvedev returned to half [of Europe] and this is ours. And the the need for a new security architecture problem is that yours is getting bigger”, for Europe, a “Helsinki Plus” type treaty. a Russian deputy foreign minister told The interest in the West in this idea has U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State been lukewarm at best, but more often it Ronald Asmus already in 1999.15 has been regarded as a step back, essentially meaning “Helsinki Minus”. One Russia would rather see NATO gone observer notes that “President Dmitry altogether, but for Europe that would Medvedev’s proposal is largely devoid have grave repercussions. One lead- of substance, and reiterates principles al- ing Swedish security policy analyst, Dr. ready enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act Robert Dalsjö wrote already in 2003: “If NATO was now to whither away, Europe ______could become a much more dangerous 12 Susanna Niinivaara, Russia: Neutral Finland and insecure place than most people could promote new security treaty , Helsingin Sa- nomat, 9 November 2008 [http://www.hs.fi/eng- could imagine. Safeguards against a re- lish/article/Russia+Neutral+Finland+could+prom nationalisation of the security pattern ote+new+security+treaty/1135241003210] would be removed. Old rivalry of power Lavrov particularly raised the fact that Finland is not militarily aligned. “The answer is obvious: by could return in a new form. This would serving as an expert, making constructive propos- be nothing less than an earthquake in Eu- als on the implementation of treaties. The help of ropean security policy.”16 “We find ways a country like Finland, a respected European and neutral country, in starting the international dis- to work around the new member-states cussion could be important for the necessary and ______creative work.” 14 Bobo Lo, Medvedev and the new European se- 13 Stubb to Lavrov: Finland is not neutral, Hels- curity charter, Centre for European Reform Pol- ingin Sanomat, 10 October 2008 [http://www. icy Brief, July 2009, [http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/ hs.fi/english/article/Stubb+to+Lavrov+%E2 pbrief_medvedev_july09.pdf]15 Ronald D. As- %80%9CFinland+is+not+neutral%E2%80% mus, Russia’s ‘sphere’ in Europe, The Washington 9D/1135240964935] Neutrality was the declared Post, December 26, 2009 [http://www.washing- Finnish policy, supported by Western states in tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/25/ the post-war period when Finland was solidly in AR2009122501286.html] the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet Union, 15 Ronald D. Asmus, Russia’s ‘sphere’ in Europe, however, did not acknowledge Finnish neutrality The Washington Post, December 26, 2009 [http:// but for a brief period when Nikita Khrushchev www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti- was Secretary General in the Soviet Union, and cle/2009/12/25/AR2009122501286.html] once again in 1989 during Mikhail Gorbachev’s 16 Robert Dalsjö och Stefan Forss, En säkerhet- rule. As a member state in the European Union, spolitisk jordbävning, The Royal Swedish Acad- Finland of course is not longer neutral. emy of War Sciences Journal, 6/2003 [http:// 6 and deal with the big countries directly”, ones.”19 NATO enlargement evidently boasted one of Medvedev’s advisors in has made the Russian situation even London in late 2008.17 Russia’s big Eu- worse. ropean partners should, however, understand that they bear the responsibility for Assessments like the one above dis- the security risks involved. regard the fact that the prime task of NATO’s European forces is no longer Russia’s military threat assessment territorial defence, but rather crisis man- agement operations. NATO’s standing The Russian military threat perception, forces have been reduced by one third to formulated mainly by the military in- approximately two million men and the telligence GRU,18 is that the Russian trained reserve has withered from seven homeland is encircled by adversaries. to one million men.20 This general strategic threat assessment is rather traditional. The mighty Soviet If sheer manpower is no longer a threat Union could match the single other su- to Russia, western military technological perpower, the USA, militarily but in the developments are perceived to be. Lieu- chaos after the demise of the Soviet Un- tenant General Sergey Skokov, Chief-of- ion the correlation of forces tilted heav- Staff of the Ground Forces recently stat- ily to Russia’s disadvantage. One as- ed that the USA, including NATO, strive sessment made in 2006, which included for supremacy “through strategic nuclear references to the possibility of a new at- forces, the development of high-precision, tack on Russia, similar to the German at- informational, and other technological tack in 1941, was the following: means for the conducting of armed con- flict, and the development of strategic mis- “Before 2004, when new countries were siles equipped with non-nuclear warheads, admitted into NATO, the Alliance had 41 as well as through formation, unilaterally, divisions and 86 brigades in permanent of a global missile defence system and the combat readiness in the Western direc- militarization of near-earth space.”21 tion. Russia had only 4 divisions and 5 brigades there. In the Far East, the Unit- ed States and Japan have a total of 15 divisions against zero Russian divisions. ______19 Podvedoved, Security – if a war comes, De- In the Trans-Baikal Military District, we fense & Security, No. 27, March 15, 2006 [http:// have one division facing 109 Chinese dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/9167510] ”Before 2004, when new countries were admitted into NATO, the Alliance had 41 division and 86 brigades of permanent combat readiness in the West ______ern direction. Russia had only 4 divisions and 5 www.kkrva.se/Artiklar/036/kkrvaht_6_2003_11. brigades there. In the Far East, the United States pdf]. The article was published as op-ed articles and Japan have a total of 15 divisions against zero in Helsingin Sanomat and Hufvudstadsbladet on 6 Russian divisions. In the Trans-Baikal Military December 2003, Finland’s Day of Independence. District, we have one division facing 109 Chinese 17 Tomas Valasek, NATO, Russia and European ones.” security, Centre for European Reform Working 20 The figures can be calculated from the data re- Paper, November 2009, pp. 10-11 [http://www. ported in the 1991/1992 and 2009 editions of IISS cer.org.uk/pdf/wp_929_nato_nov09.pdf]. - The Military Balance, respectively. 18 This was distinctly pointed out by researchers 21 Nikolay Khorunziy, Interview with Lieutenant of the Swedish Defence Research Establisment General Sergey Skokov on three main threats to FOI during informal discussions in Spring 2004. Russia, Stoletiye.ru, November 5, 2009. 7

Figure 1. Russia’s military threat perception

The additional two main threats that General Skokov’s assessment was “that General Skokov mentions are “the Wah- those were not tactical exercises, which habites of the North Caucasus, and the are necessary for the maintenance of People’s Liberation Army of China. The a state of everyday combat-readiness. most direct threat is that of “guerilla They were maneuvers on a strategic warfare” and the threat from China is the scale. [...] Thus, operations that were most remote.” Officially, relations - be practiced in the Stride-2009 training tween Russia and China are better than exercises were not defensive operations ever, but in the long-term perspective but offensive operations.” After ruling Russia may have cause for concern. out all other possibilities than Russia as the real motive for the exercise, General The People’s Liberation Army held a Skokov formulated the rhetorical ques- large-scale military exercise, Stride-2009 tion: “But against whom?”23 in August 2009, including altogether four divisions with 50 000 troops from How is Russia to cope with China, which has four different commands. This was the a population ten times as big as Russia’s, a “largest ever tactical exercise” and its booming economy and Armed Forces that aim was to test the PLA’s long-distance are being aggressively modernised while mobility.22 Russia’s economy falters? The standard

______answer offered by Russian military ex- 22 China.org.cn, Stride-2009 military exercise, perts is reliance on nuclear weapons, es- CCTV, August 14, 2009 [http://www.china. pecially tactical nuclear weapons.24 New org.cn/video/2009-08/14/content_18337543. ______htm]; B. Raman, Stride--2009- China’s Larg- 23 Nikolay Khorunziy, Interview with Lieutenant est Ever Long-Range Military Exercise, South General Sergey Skokov on three main threats to Asia Analysis Group, Paper 3354, 13 Au- Russia, Stoletiye.ru, November 5, 2009. gust 2009 [http://www.southasiaanalysis. 24 Cf. the RIA Novosti interview with former Dep- org/%5Cpapers34%5Cpaper3354.html]. uty Minister of Defence, GRU colonel (retd.)Vitaly 8 wordings related to the nuclear doctrine The new Russian security strategy pub- are expected in the Russia’s forthcoming lished in May 2009 notes that “the exist- military doctrine.25 “Possession of nu- ing global and regional architecture” and clear weapons allows Russia to restruc- “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ture its armed forces”, Colonel Viktor are increasingly … a threat to interna- Baranets, the military commentator of tional security. […] the determining fac- Komsomolskaya Pravda, noted in No- tor in relations with the North Atlantic vember 2009.26 Treaty Organization will be unacceptable for Russia, [if] plans [for] moving Alli- NATO enlargement and CFE ance military infrastructure to its borders and [if] attempts to make [Alliance] re- The mindset of NATO as a hostile and sponsibilities global, inconsistent with overwhelmingly powerful military bloc, international law”, are being realized.28 ready for invasion has been nurtured for long in Russia. “The appearance of Russia does not fear its European neigh- a powerful military bloc along our bor- bours, most of which are small in com- ders would be taken in Russia as a di- parison with Russia herself, but this is rect threat to the security of my country,” not the point. The same mindset as in Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin the Finnish case in 1939 seems still to told a press conference after the NATO prevail. The Soviet Union was then es- Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, four pecially concerned for the security of months before the war in Georgia. “I Leningrad. The construction work in heard them saying today [4 April 2008] the 1930’s on the Finnish defensive line, that the expansion is not directed against later called the Mannerheim line, across Russia. But it’s the potential, not inten- the Karelian Isthmus was interpreted as tions that matters,” Putin said.27 offensive. The Russian threat perception was that the small Finnish army would take and hold its positions there in a crisis, ______until big Western powers deploy en masse Shlykov, head of the Security Policy Commission and use this as an attack route against Len- of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council [http:// en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20090914/156124823.html] ingrad and the Soviet Union. 25 The new military doctrine of the Russian Federation - Военная доктрина Российской The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Федерации - was published on 5 February, 2010 29 [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461]. The docu- in Europe (CFE), originally negotiated ment ”Basic principles of state’s policy in the area between the member states of NATO and of nuclear deterrence through 2020” appears to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, entered be classified. Pavel Podvig, New Russian- mili into force in July 1992. By then, the USSR tary doctrine, Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, February 5, 2010 [http://russianforces.org/ and the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved, blog/2010/02/new_russian_military_doctrine. which changed the whole context dramati- shtml] cally. Amendments to the treaty made in 26 RIA Novosti, Col. Baranets: Russia has right to use nuclear weapons as it deems necessary, RIA ______Novosti, Opinion & Analysis, November 24, 2009 28 Strategia natsyonalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi [http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20091124/156973187. federatsii do 2020 goda, The Security Council html] of the Russian federation, May 12, 2009 [http:// 27 Putin says NATO enlargement is “direct threat” www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html]. to Russia, China View (Xinhua), 4 April, 2008 29 Wikipedia, Treaty on Conventional Armed [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/04/ Forces in Europe (CFE) [http://en.wikipedia.org/ content_7920815.htm] wiki/CFE_treaty , last modified 28 October 2009] 9

1996 relaxed the so-called flank rules, a major force build-up to the North Cau- and thus benefited Russia and Ukraine. casian Military District in the early summer of 2008, in violation of the flank An adapted version of the CFE treaty rules, and eventually go to war against was signed during the Istanbul summit Georgia. The establishment of several in November 1999 and took into account military bases in South Ossetia and Abk- the different geopolitical situation of the hazia also is a violation of the EU-Russia post-Cold War era by setting national accords agreed upon after the war. instead of bloc-based limits on conventional armed forces. The future of the CFE Treaty is therefore in question. Russia may be right that NATO members were unwilling to rat- the whole framework of the CFE needs ify the treaty as long as Russia refused to be revaluated. NATO member states to completely withdraw its troops from for their part would have good reason to Moldovan and Georgian soil. Russia has broaden the agenda also to include non- demanded compensation for NATO’s en- strategic nuclear weapons.31 Russia enlargement, such as removal of the flank joys an overwhelming superiority in this rule ceilings affecting the North Cauca- category, which seems to be increasing sian and Leningrad Military Districts. as the corresponding U.S. weapons may be pulled out of Europe.32 President Putin explained the Russian position on CFE in June 2007: “We have Ballistic missile defence not just stated that we are ready to comply with the treaty, like certain others have Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) has done. We really are implementing it: we been a very high-profile political is- have removed all of our heavy weapons sue in the relations between Russia and from the European part of Russia and put the United States for decades. Unfortu- them behind the Urals.” (emphasis add- nately, BMD perceptions have lived an ed).30 Moving excess equipment outside imaginary life of their own and the is- the area of treaty implementation may sue eventually became highly distorted. not be a direct violation of the letter of Too little attention has been attached to the treaty, but it hardly complies with its scientific-technical, military-operational spirit. ______31 Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai When NATO didn’t yield to the Russian Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non- demands, President Putin issued a decree strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, The James on 14 July 2007 on Russia’s intention to Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, De- suspend the observation of the Treaty cember 2009 [http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/ obligations, taking effect 150 days later, tnw_europe.pdf]. i.e. on 12 December 2007. In the absence 32 Angela Charlton, Disarmament talks strained over Mideast, Russia, The Washington Post, of inspections and notifications of troop February 2, 2010 [http://www.washington- movements Russia was able to perform post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/02/ AR2010020200596.html]. Ambassador Rich- ______ard Burt, former nuclear chief negotiator in the 30 President of Russia, Interview with Newspaper Reagan Administration and leading figure in the Journalists from G8 Member Countries, June 4, Global Zero movement stated that the USA has 2007 [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speech- “about 100 tactical air-delivered warheads in Eu- es/2007/06/04/2149_type82916_132772.shtml]. rope while Russia has at least 7 000”. 10 and economical perspectives of the is- The efficiency of ballistic missile- de sue. These are, however, necessary pre- fence systems has, in fact, been very lim- requisites for understanding and evalu- ited and continues to be so if offensive ating the possible merits, shortcomings and defensive systems of the same tech- and implications of BMD. nological sophistication are compared with each other. Missile defence became a natural part of the strategic arms limitation process The Russian and American ballistic when the United States and the Soviet missile defence missiles of the 1970’s Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile were using powerful nuclear warheads Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 1972, which to compensate for deficient accuracy. It limited the number of strategic defen- was not known when these systems were sive missiles to 100 missiles and to one developed, that the explosion of even site each, in an amendment of the treaty one such powerful nuclear charge in the in 1974. The sites were Moscow for the upper atmosphere ionized the air mole- USSR and Grand Forks Air Force Base cules and created plasma that effectively in North Dakota. blinded the fire control radar. The radar waves simply could not penetrate the The main rationale for the ABM treaty plasma and give further information on was the need to limit the strategic arms attacking missiles. The capability of this race. An unrestrained development of nuclear ballistic missile defence system strategic defensive systems was seen as was effectively reduced to a useless sin- only accelerating the development and gle shot system. Only the first incoming introduction of more powerful strategic ballistic missile could be engaged. The offensive arms. USA soon abandoned its own system, but the Soviet Union kept its own, which To understand the real military role and still is operational around Moscow. capability of ballistic missile defence one can use an analogy between offen- The practical value of the ABM Treaty sive airpower and air-defence. From can be questioned from technical and the Great War onwards, air-defence has military operational perspectives, but played a second, and in fact, reactive role its political value remained strong espe- and has never succeeded to keep up with cially in Soviet and later Russian arms- developments in aircraft technology. control policy. The protests heard from There are very few examples in history Moscow in 1983 were very strong, after when air-defence alone has succeeded to the U.S. President launched his famous thwart massive airstrikes.33 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The scientific-technical community all over the ______world, including the Soviet Union, recog- 33Aake Pesonen, Tuli-iskuja taivaalle, Kirja- nised immediately that SDI was a utopian yhtymä, Helsinki 1983, p. 162 (in Finnish). The massive Soviet air raids against Helsinki on three project, not anchored in the real world. SDI nights in February 1944 are one such exception. soon got the nickname Star Wars, referring Because of the intense Finnish anti-aircraft bar- to the well-known fantasy movies. rage fired accurately and closely in front of the attacking Soviet strategic bomber formations, those ______were forced to change their attack direction and only moderate damage, much to the surprise of eventually dropped 95 percent of their bomb loads the Russians who thought that the city had been into the sea. The Finnish capital suffered essentially wiped out. 11

SDI, however, set the stage for ambi- been somewhat inflated. More than two tious R&D in the field of non-nuclear decades after Reagan’s initiative Rus- ballistic missile technology. The general sian military and political leaders were perception was that President Reagan able to state proudly that this missile and was willing to throw unlimited amounts other new and upgraded land and sea- of money into this project. Soviet lead- launched missiles have the capability to ers understood that there was no way penetrate any missile defence system in for them to match this American effort, the world.36 and they became extremely suspicious and apprehensive. The U.S. spending It is important to note that ballistic mis- on BMD was not actually that big, just sile defence has for long enjoyed biparti- one percent of the U.S. defence budget. san support in the United States and that When spending on such a scale contin- development work has gone forward re- ues for decades, results are to be expect- gardless of who has resided in the White ed even if the level of ambition is signifi- House. The difference in opinion be- cantly lowered. tween Republicans and Democrats is not that big. Democrats tend to favour de- The Soviet response to SDI was to imme- ployment of only technically mature sys- diately launch countermeasure projects, tems, while President George W. Bush’s aiming at nullifying the efficiency of any administration gave more emphasis to future U.S. missile defence. The cost is the political will and determination to estimated to be but a small fraction of actually claim an initial operational ca- the cost of BMD systems themselves. pability, in fact on a rather dubious tech- The improvements could include hard- nical basis. Present U.S. missile defence ening of missiles against laser radiation, system programs are, however, not aimed development of more sophisticated war- at defeating state-of-the-art Russian bal- head decoy systems and introduction listic missiles, but rather unsophisticated of a new ICBM, Topol-M (a.k.a. SS-27 missiles, comparable to U.S. and Soviet Stalin), which has higher acceleration missile technology of the late 1950’s and in the vulnerable ascent phase and may 1960’s. Such missiles are found in North also fly in depressed trajectories.34 The Korea and Iran. missile has been tested with a maneuver- ______able warhead.35 The unpredictable flight 36 For a recent statement, see Nikolay Khorunziy, trajectory makes defence against it ex- Interview with Lieutenant General Sergey Skok- ov on three main threats to Russia, Stoletiye.ru, tremely difficult. Altogether, Topol-M is November 5, 2009. General Skokov: “For exam- a very potent strategic missile although ple, there has been a lot of discussion about the its performance characteristics may have fact that Russia will have new RS-24 missiles, with individually targetable reentry vehicles, by ______the end of 2009 and that our new submarines will 34 Wikipedia, RT-2UTTH Topol-M [http:// be equipped with Bulava missiles in 2010. The en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RT-2UTTH_Topol_M number of such missiles and when they will be #cite_note-27]. deployed is not so important. It is most impor- 35 Pavel Podvig, Putin’s miracle weapon revis- tant that there be a capability for the countering ited, February 7, 2005 [http://russianforces.org/ of threats. The Americans have been frightening blog/2005/02/putins_miracle_weapon_revisite. the world with their “star wars” projects for dec- shtml]. There is reason for caution concerning ades but they simply have not developed a reliable maneuverable re-entry vehicles. The stress and shield against Russian missiles.” See also USATO- thermal load on re-entry is extreme and the test DAY, General says Russia will counter U.S. missile made on February 18, 2004 is reported to have defense plans, May 25, 2008 [http://www.usatoday. ended in failure. The re-entry vehicle burned up. com/news/world/2008-05-27-us-russia_N.htm]. 12

President George W. Bush announced in violating basic physical laws (Newton’s December 2001 that the USA intends to laws). If one, on the other hand, pulls a withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The de- string on a globe from Iran towards the cision came into effect six months later. USA one immediately finds out that Po- Russia, for its part, announced immedi- land and the Czech Republic are in the ately that she was no longer bound by right place, below the potential missile the provisions of the unratified START trajectory. II Treaty, which particularly prohib- ited multiple warheads on land-based The second Russian concern dealt with ICBM’s. the uncertainty of what kind of missiles would indeed be deployed in the planned The first new generation of U.S. ground- ten silos in Poland. Without powerful based interceptor missiles were deployed inspection rights Russia could not rule at the Ft. Greely Army Base in Alaska, out the possibility that offensive me- beginning in July 2004, and at Vanden- dium range ballistic missiles could be berg Air Force Base in California late deployed instead of ground-based inter- the same year. Discussions with Poland ceptors. The experience of the medium- and other potential European partners range accurate Pershing II missiles from regarding a possible third site in Europe the 1980’s, that scared the Soviet leader- began in 2002. This plan to counter a fu- ship, thus came back to haunt the most ture threat from Iranian ballistic missiles suspicious.38 It seems that the advice met with very strong opposition in Rus- given to the Russian leaders dismissed sia and set the political stage for many the nature of decision-making in the years to come. United States Congress as well as the public control mechanisms in the USA. Russia was from the very beginning convinced that a ballistic missile defence site ______in Poland, with its tracking radar to be a shadow of a doubt that ballistic missiles on their located in the Czech Republic, were not way from Iran … to the United States do not need aimed at Iran but at Russia herself. From to cross Poland or the Czech Republic. … Iranian missiles would find it more convenient to travel the Russian side it was pointed out that a to the Western Hemisphere via Turkey, Greece, mere look at the map is proof enough. And Italy and Spain. When you realize this, it becomes indeed, a look at a flat map would suggest clear that U.S. anti-missiles in Poland are meant that the straight path from Iran to the USA to intercept Russian, rather than Iranian, missiles, because one of their possible trajectories to the passes over southern Italy and Spain, and United States would go over and across Europe.” over the Atlantic to the U.S. east coast.37 38 Dr Vladimir Kozin made a direct reference to the Pershing-2 issue at the seminar in Helsinki in October 2007. President Putin compared the U.S. This impression is false, however. The plans with the situation in Cuba in 1962, when earth is not flat, but a globe. A ballistic Soviet medium-range missiles were perceived to missile cannot fly such a route without be a deadly threat to the USA. See RIA Novosti, Putin compares U.S. missile defense plans with ______1962 Cuban crisis, 26.10.2007 [http://en.rian.ru/ 37 Vladimir Belous, Outside View: The missile- russia/20071026/85635882.html]. This particular defense flap, UPI, Moscow, April 11, 2007 [ac- Russian mindset was revealed also to Israel, when cessed at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/ the Russians had asked the Israeli missile engi- article-1G1-161861095/outside-view-missile- neer Uzi Rubin when Israel intends to fit nuclear defense.html] Major-General, Doctor of Technol- charges to their Arrow interceptor missiles. Uzi ogy, Vladimir Belous: “The second reason is that Rubin, private communication, Helsinki, 11-12 a look at a map or a globe will show you beyond December 2009. 13

The third argument has been that mis- nent scientist who has argued in the same sile defence systems in Poland would manner as the Russians, namely that an undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence X-band radar in the Czech Republic posture. The number of interceptors en- would be very well suited for collecting visioned (10 missiles) are thought to be sensitive data from Russian missile tests. able to destroy about three unsophisticat- As arguments he uses slides showing ed ballistic missiles. Even if the Polish Russian missile trajectories, the missiles site was enlarged several times over, that being launched from missile bases at Vy- would not matter. polzovo, Tatishchevo and Dombarovskiy towards Washington, D.C. Some of the When the Russian side reluctantly began missiles could at least in theory be inter- to admit that Russia’s strategic deter- cepted over Finland.40 rence posture was not threatened in the foreseeable future, the argument was It is important to point out, that the tra- focused on the European Missile Radar jectories are deliberately chosen in such (EMR), a high resolution tracking X- a way as to prove the point that Russian band radar, albeit of rather limited range, missiles would be in danger. As an illus- that was planned to be stationed in the tration of operational targeting, this rep- Czech Republic. A panel of American resents but a very limited case. The bulk and Russian technical experts concluded: of the Russian strategic missiles would “The main Russian concern is the EMR. be assumed to fly along more northern The Czech Republic is a convenient trajectories towards other targets, outside place from which to gain a better view the reach of the U.S. interceptor missiles. of Russian ICBMs and to defend the east coast of the United States. The Russians Even the simplified set-up used contains see enormous potential for upgrading the several fundamental flaws. Firstly, the power of the EMR, giving the U.S. glo- impression is given that the military set- bal missile defense system a broad ca- ting discussed is valid at present and also pability to track ICBMs launched from in the future. No missile defence is, how- the European part of Russia, providing ever, deployed in Europe now and there- information not only for the missile in- fore the risk to Russia’s strategic deter- terceptors based in Poland but for those rence is for the time being nil. Secondly, based in Alaska too. Deployment of the if the plans of the former U.S. govern- EMR will, in the Russian view, create ment would have been implemented and over the territory of the United States a the GBI’s in Poland and the EMR in the “missile defense umbrella” against a po- Czech Republic had achieved anything tential Russian ICBM attack.” 39 reminiscent of credible combat capability, then the SS-25 Topol missiles in Vy- The EastWest Institute’s assessments polzovo as well as the remaining SS-19’s draw heavily on results obtained by Pro- in Tatishchevo would be gone. fessor Theodore Postol at Massachusetts ______Institute of Technology. He is a promi- 40 Theodore A. Postol, The Proposed US Missile Defense in Europe: Technological Issues Relevant ______to Policy, American Association for the Advance- 39 EastWest Institute, Iran’s Nuclear and Missile ment of Science, Washington, D.C., August 28, Potential – A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. 2007 [http://russianforces.org/files/BriefOnEast- and Russian Technical Experts, May 2009, p. 15 EuropeMissileDefenseProposal_August24,2007_ [http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf]. FinalReduced.pdf]. 14

The Soviet-built strategic missiles have the EMR radar would not be able to see been phased out successively for many anything, since the missiles’ flight trajec- years now. The Commander of the Stra- tories remain below the radar horizon. tegic Rocket Forces, Colonel-General Andrei Shvaichenko said in December Russia’s opposition to the U.S. plans was 2009, that by 2016 the old missiles with so strong, that she on several occasions extended service lives will constitute threatened to implement military coun- just 20 percent of the strategic missile termeasures.44 Deployment of the new force.41 The remaining missiles will be nuclear capable theatre missile system retired, the last heavy SS-18 Mod2 (R- Iskander in Kaliningrad was mentioned 36M2 Voyevoda) missiles will be with- repeatedly. The Bush Administration drawn from combat duty in 2019.42 signed agreements related to the missile defence infrastructure with both the The most important flaw is, however, Czech Republic and Poland in July and that the Postol pictures don’t repre- August 2008. By then the issue had be- sent normal Russian peacetime testing come much more than merely an issue behaviour, but rather wartime combat of missile defence. For the political lead- situations. Peacetime tests are often per- ers in Poland and the Czech Republic formed from the Russian space base at Iranian missiles were irrelevant, what Plesetsk a few hundred kilometres south counted was the possibility to engage the of Arkhangelsk, or from other missile United States militarily in the region.45 proving grounds such as Kapustin Yar or This was perceived as perhaps the only Baikonur, both far away.43 The distance way to ensure that NATO’s security from the planned radar site in the Czech guarantees became more credible. Republic to Plesetsk is 2 000 kilometres. The missiles launched from Plesetsk fly President Obama’s decision in Septem- east, over uninhabited ground, toward ber 2009 to abandon the so-called mis- the target area in Kura on the Kamchatka sile defence shield in Europe changed Peninsula, practically in the opposite the stage in a moment. The USA is es- direction from the proposed EMR site. sentially returning to missile defence Because of the curvature of the earth, concepts developed during the Clinton

______41 RIA Novosti, Russia to keep silo-based ballistic 44 RIA Novosti, Russia could aim rockets at Eu- missiles in the future, 8 December, 2009, [http:// ropean missile shield – Putin-2, 14 February 2008 en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20091208/157155105. [http://en.rian.ru/world/20080214/99238596. html]. html] Putin: “Our experts believe the system 42 RIA Novosti, Russia to keep SS-18 missiles in threatens our national security. … If it appears, service until 2019, 10 April 2009, [http://en.rian. we will be forced to respond appropriately - we ru/russia/20090410/121049655.html]. will have to retarget part of our systems against 43 Peace-time testing from some operational mis- those missiles.” sile bases like Vypolzovo or Tatishchevo may 45 Andrew Nagorski, Lech Kaczynski: How the imply safety risks for the local population as the West Got Georgia Wrong, Newsweek, October missiles fly over inhabited areas. A successful 6, 2008 [http://www.newsweek.com/id/161170/ test launch of a R-36M2 (SS-18) missile from a page/2]. President Kaczynski: “I’m a proponent silo of the missile division in Dombarovskiy was of this [missile shield] not because I believe Iran performed on 24 December 2009. Pavel Podvig, will launch a nuclear attack or that this is a tool in Successful launch of R-36M2 missile, Russian the struggle with Russia, but because this deepens strategic nuclear forces Blog, December 24, 2009 the interest of the United States in this area. It’s [http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/12/success- in the interests of my country to have the closest ful_launch_of_r-36m2_mi.shtml]. possible relations with the United States.” 15

Administration. Emphasis is on flexible Prime Minister Putin voiced strong res- systems like the sea-based Aegis system ervations also about the present revised and Standard Missile-3. It is still too ear- U.S. missile defence plans at the end of ly to analyse the implications of the U.S. 2009.49 “In order to maintain the balance policy change, but altogether the new without planning to develop a missile policy may strengthen the defence pos- defence system, which is very expensive ture of those U.S. allies in Europe that and of unclear effect, we should develop have expressed the greatest concern after offensive strike systems.” the war in Georgia.46 Russian and U.S. views on nuclear The UK House of Commons Defence weapons – fundamental differences Committee recently made the following recommendation:47 Two quotes from a report, written by very influential Russian individuals “NATO has an important role in reassur- (Professor Sergei Karaganov is the main ing its Eastern European members about writer), sums up the Russian perception their security. NATO should provide this of the value and role of nuclear weapons reassurance through robust contingency for the country:50 plans that cover the eventuality of attack on Baltic Member States and that set out “Russia views [the] preservation [of the NATO’s planned military response. In nuclear arms parity] as the foundation of addition, NATO should maintain a visi- its military security, one of the main levers ble military presence in the Baltic States, ______including maintaining its air-policing D.C., December 2-3, 2009 [http://www.ndu.edu/ and conducting exercises in the region.” ctnsp/NCW_course/Sea%20Based%20BMD%20 Agenda,%20Updated%2011-03-2009.pdf]. See also Pravda, New Anti-Russian Missile Defense It is worth noting that the Aegis cruisers Plot Brewing in Washington, October 16, 2009 are formidable air-defence assets, and [http://english.pravda.ru/russia/kremlin/109931- they also have a very potent offensive anti_russian-0] 49 capability as platforms for Tomahawk Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin talks with journal- cruise missiles. If these ships deploy to ists about the outcomes of his visit to the Primorye the Baltic Sea or the Arctic, as has been Territory, 29 December 2009 [http://premier.gov. suggested, it means quite new challenges ru/eng/ ;accessed at Johnson’s Russia List, http:// 48 www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-237-41.cfm]. for Russia. It is important to note that See also Tom Balmforth, START As You Mean ______To Stop, RussiaProfile.org, 30 December, 2009 46 Reuters, Poland agrees rules for hosting U.S. [http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid= forces, November 27, 2009 [http://www.reuters. International&articleid=a1262195983] “Having com/article/idUSTRE5AQ3IP20091127] The established for themselves a shield against our USA and Poland have agreed on compensatory offensive weapons systems, our partners will feel security measures in late 2009, as the USA is to completely secure…Then our partners will be deploy Patriot missile units in Poland. able to do anything they want. Aggression will 47 House of Commons Defence Committee, Rus- immediately increase both politically and economi- sia: a new confrontation?, Summary, Tenth Re- cally. The balance will be broken,” Putin said. port of Session 2008–09, prepared 10 July 2009 50 Sergei Karaganov et al., RECONFIGURA- [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ TION, NOT JUST A RESET: Russia’s Interests cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/276/27602.htm] in Relations with the United States of America, 48 Rear Admiral Brad Hicks in, The Changing Report for the meeting of the Russian-U.S. sec- Strategic Landscape for (Sea-Based) Missile De tion of the Valdai International Discussion Club, fense, Center for Technology and National Secu- Moscow, June 2009 [http://en.rian.ru/valdai_ rity Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, op/20090701/155399564.html]. 16 of influence in the world arena, and the dents, Barack Obama seems to have a most important argument in favor of equi- personal interest to influence the final table dialogue with the United States.” wordings in the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, which may in fact turn a “Since the United States enjoys uncon- completely new chapter of how nuclear ditional preponderance over the rest of weapons are perceived by the U.S. gov- the world in the sphere of conventional ernment. There are indications that the weapons, deep nuclear cuts may lower only practical operational role left for the deterrence potential of the Russian U.S. nuclear weapons may be to deter nuclear arsenal, which is the main fac- other states from attacking or threatening tor of Russia’s security and of its influ- to attack the United States and its friends ence in the international political system. and allies with nuclear weapons.51 [emphasis in original].” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clari- U.S. President Barack Obama’s commit- fied during her congressional nomina- ment to a world free of nuclear weapons, tion hearing that the ambition of this first stated in Prague in April 2009 and Administration is to address all nuclear reiterated at the UN Security Council weapons, not only long-range strategic special meeting on nuclear weapons in weapons. The Obama administration September, poses grave challenges for would seek to negotiate “deep, verifiable Russia. Russia formally endorses the reductions in all U.S. and Russian nucle- concept, but not with the same enthusi- ar weapons, whether deployed or non- asm as the last President of the Soviet deployed, strategic or non-strategic.”52 Union Mikhail Gorbachev did in the mid That is way beyond Russia’s readiness. 1980’s. Moscow greeted with satisfaction Wash- ington’s readiness to resume negotia- President George W. Bush was not in- tions on a follow-on treaty to START, the terested in lengthy arms control nego- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The tiations, but preferred unilateral decisions. question of the grave imbalance in non- With a stroke of his pen in December strategic nuclear weaponry (a.k.a. tacti- 2007 half the U.S. nuclear stockpile, some cal nuclear weapons) will have to wait. 5 000 nuclear warheads, were transferred to dismantlement. Just before the end of The Karaganov discussion group men- his tenure as President the USA had re- tioned above recommended in June 2009 duced the number of operational strategic that “Russia should only agree to minor warheads to below 2 200, the upper ceiling cuts of nuclear weapons to a level that of the so-called Moscow Treaty of 2002. ______This took place almost four years earlier 51 Paul Richter, Obama’s nuclear vision mired in than the Treaty mandated. Both events did debate, The Los Angeles Times, January 4, 2010 not receive any attention in the news me- [http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/ la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04,0,1799502. dia, a clear sign of how irrelevant President story]. The new Nuclear Posture Review will be Bush found nuclear weapons to be. delivered to the Congress on March 1, 2010. 52 Hillary R. Clinton, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Janu- President Obama’s ambition is to fur- ary 13, 2009 [http://foreign.senate.gov/hear- ther reduce nuclear weapons well below ings/hearing/20090113/ and http://www.senate. today’s numbers. Unlike former Presi- gov/fplayers/CommPlayer/commFlashPlayer. cfm?fn=foreign011309&st=435]. 17 would not be much below the ceiling number of technical problems still re- stipulated in 2002”. This of course also main to be solved, which will prolong reflects the view of the Russian military. the negotiations.55 The ratification of the General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the follow-on treaty is also expected to take General Staff, stated in early June 2009 several months. Interim arrangements that “we will be making practically no concerning implementation and verifica- changes to the Russian strategic missile tion therefore had to be agreed upon. forces.” 53 Russia published its long awaited mili- Framework numbers were agreed upon tary doctrine on 5 February 2010 after in Moscow in July 2009 during President many delays.56 The Secretary of Rus- Obama’s visit. START ceilings were de- sia’s National Security Council Nikolai fined as 1 500 – 1 675 strategic nuclear Patrushev, the former chief of the FSB, warheads on 500 – 1 100 strategic deliv- indicated in October 2009 in an inter- ery vehicles. Later in the negotiations it view for Izvestia that the new military was reported that the ceilings for deliv- doctrine may have clearer wording ery vehicles would be set at 700 – 800.54 concerning the use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts, essentially meaning a The agreed ceilings concerning war- lowering of the nuclear threshold.57 In heads, modest reductions below the ______that interview Patrushev stated: Moscow Treaty, seem to correspond well 55 Prime Minister Putin’s remarks on 29 Decem- with the recommendations of the Kara- ber 2009 added to the confusion regarding the ganov discussion group. The operation- state of the talks. He strongly linked the missile al nuclear weapon requirements have defence issue with the eventual outcome of the START negotiations, which probably reflects changed so dramatically since the end of military hard-line attitudes and practical diffi- the Cold War that deploying many war- culties in the end-game of the negotiations. See heads on American delivery vehicles no note 51 and Will Stewart, Vladimir Putin calls for more weapons to stop America doing ‘whatever longer makes sense. The Russians think it wants’, The Times, December 30, 2009 [http:// rather differently. The awesome heavy www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/ missile R-36M2 (SS-18 Satan) with its article6970921.ece]. 56 The new military doctrine of the Russian ten high-yield warheads, each with about Federation - Военная доктрина Российской 50 times as big explosive power as the Федерации - was published on 5 February, 2010 Hiroshima bomb, still commands re- [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461]. See also spect. Russia Today, Russia’s new military doctrine: more threats, smaller risks, 17 December, 2009 [http://rt.com/prime-time/2009-12-17/russia- The negotiations have been described as new-military-doctrine.html]. “The number of mil- constructive, but eventually the START itary threats listed in the document has also been enlarged, according to the 17-page draft docu- Treaty expired on 5 December 2009 be- ment. Those will include other nation’s ignoring fore a new treaty was agreed upon. A of Russia’s strategic security interests, attempts to tip the balance of power in the neighbourhood of ______Russia and her allies, and moves to change the bal- 53 AFP, Russia to wait on US before cutting nu- ance in “nuclear and missile sphere”, like deploy- clear arsenal, June 5, 2009 [http://www.google. ment of an anti-ballistic missile system. Also on the com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJeUjaEpdT threats list is interference with Russia’s internal poli- ZJB0NGuwAT8qN_4LTg]. cies, territorial disputes, arms race and undermining 54 Jonathan Weisman, U.S., Russia Close In on of international measures on arms limitation and re- Nuclear Treaty, The Wall Street Journal, February duction, possible deployment of weapons in space, 3, 2010 [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 and military conflicts near Russian borders.” 4052748703338504575041562540396530.html]. 57 Pavel Podvig, New Russian doctrine and pre 18

“With regard to the provisions that reg- cept of de-escalating military conflicts ulate the possibility of using nuclear by using single tactical nuclear weapons weapons, this section of the military became public. doctrine is written in the spirit of the fact that Russian Federation is a nuclear The supplement to the military doctrine - power, which is capable of using nuclear ”Basic principles of state’s policy in the deterrence to deter potential adversaries area of nuclear deterrence through 2020” from aggression against Russia and its - was also signed by President Medvedev allies. It is the most important priority of on 5 February 2010. Unfortunately, it ap- our country in the foreseeable future. pears to be classified.59

We also adjusted the conditions of use The Russians have, alas, made clear of nuclear weapons to counter a conven- that the role of nuclear weapons for the tional aggression – [now they apply] not defence of their country is increasing, only to full-scale wars, but also to re- and that even preventive nuclear strikes gional and even to local wars. should not be ruled out. Citing the Chief of the General Staff, Army General In addition, the doctrine provides flex- Nikolai Makarov, Rossiiskaya Gazeta ibility in the possibility of use of nuclear reported in December 2009 that the new weapons depending on the situation and doctrine endorsed by the National Securi- the intentions of the enemy. In situa- ty Council would express Russia’s intent tions critical for national security we do to use nuclear weapons in a first strike not rule out a possibility of using a pre- in defence of its statehood.60 General ventive (or pre-emptive) nuclear strike Nikolai Makarov provided the context against the aggressor.”58 in a subsequent article. He described the use of nuclear weapons for self-defense This clarification indicates that the doc- against enemies threatening Russia or its trinal adjustments to Russia’s strategic allies with nuclear weapons, and when a posture emphasize the context and ra- threat to Russian statehood emerged. “In tionale for non-strategic nuclear weap- extreme circumstances, when there are ons. Substantially this is nothing very no other means to save the country, then new, since military-theoretical discus- nuclear weapons will be used.”61 sions about this topic were published already ten years ago. At that time the con- ______59 Pavel Podvig, New Russian military doctrine, ventive nuclear strikes, Russian strategic nuclear Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, February forces blog, October 14, 2009 - [http://russian- 5, 2010 [http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/02/ forces.org/blog/2009/10/new_russian_doctrine_ new_russian_military_doctrine.shtml]. and_preve.shtml. Article in original: Меняется 60 Vladimir Poletayev, Right to Nuclear First- Россия, меняется и ее военная доктрина Strike, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 22, 2009 Izvestia, - http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/arti- [http://www.rg.ru/2009/12/22/doktrina.html; cle3134180/]. See also RIA Novosti, Russia may http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21102830] revise use of nuclear weapons in new military 61 Jacob W. Kipp, Russian Nuclear First Use: A doctrine, 8 October 2009 [http://en.rian.ru/mli- Case of Self-Defeating Exaggeration?, Eurasia tary_news/20091008/156393316.html]. Daily Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 7, January 12, 58 Ibid. The translation is essentially Dr. Pavel 2010 [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/ Podvig’s. He points out that Patrushev really made single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35902&tx_tt it clear that preventive strikes, as distinguished news%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=b50c from pre-emptive strikes, are to be reckoned with. 6d1081] 19

The role of non-strategic nuclear weap- reductions in tactical nuclear weapons is ons in Russia’s defence policy was once directly linked to this issue. Russia wants again emphasised during military exer- to maintain a clear distinction between cises conducted recently. The Russian strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. army performed several high-profile Strategic nuclear weapons are there for exercises in the summer of 2009, for in- ultimate deterrence purposes. stance Ladoga 2009 close to Finland and Zapad 2009 (West 2009), a joint exercise The official Polish reaction to Zapad conducted by Russia and Belarus in the 2009 is that Poland wants the USA and vicinity of the Baltic Sea area in Septem- NATO to deploy troops in Central Eu- ber. This latter exercise coincided with rope. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei the 70 year anniversary of the Soviet in- Lavrov expressed astonishment over vasion of Poland, which 2009 was cast such news.65 as “potential aggressor”. Russian armed forces stormed a “Polish” beach in Kalin- The European position concerning ingrad and the hostilities against NATO NATO’s non-strategic nuclear weap- forces were reportedly terminated by a ons in Europe seems to be in transition. simulated Air Force use of tactical nu- Pressure is growing in Germany for the clear weapons.62 The earlier Zapad exer- removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from cise in 1999 also ended in the use of tac- Europe.66 Germany’s new Foreign Min- tical nuclear weapons to thwart a NATO ister Guido Westerwelle is the driving attack that could not be stopped otherwise. force here, and Germany is supported by The message from Russia is clear, tactical Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. nuclear weapons still matter in the context of Russia’s present defence posture. Dur- The USA has silently withdrawn most of ing the current process of transformation its aging free-fall B61 nuclear bombs from of Russia’s defence forces tactical nu- Europe, the only type of tactical nuclear clear weapons are needed. A reference weapon still deployed in Europe.67 The op- to NATO’s famous doctrine of Flexible ______63 Response is often made. An opposite strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, The James and not very convincing view has, how- Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ever, been presented recently.64 Russia’s Monterey Institute of International Studies, De- strong refusal to negotiate with USA on cember 2009, p. 14 [http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/ pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf]. “Contrary to common as- ______sumptions, short-range weapons do not appear to 62 Matthew Day, Russia ’simulates’ nuclear attack have a place in that strategy [i.e. de-escalation] on Poland, The Daily Telegraph, 1 November 2009 simply because potential targets are too distant”. 65 [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/eu- RIA Novosti, Lavrov says surprised Po- rope/poland/6480227/Russia-simulates-nuclear- land seeking U.S. protection from Russia, RIA attack-on-Poland.html] See also, Ariel Cohen, Novosti, 5 November 2009 [http://en.rian.ru/ A Nonstarter on Arms Control, The New York world/20091105/156725321.html]. 66 Times Op-Ed article, January 9, 2010 [http:// Julian Borger, Germans press for removal of www.nytimes.com/2010/01/09/opinion/09iht- U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, The Guardian, edacohen.html]. 6 November 2009 [http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 63 RIA Novosti interview with former Deputy world/2009/nov/06/germany-removal-us-nucle- Minister of Defence, GRU colonel (retd.)Vitaly ar-weapons]. Foreign Minister Westerwelle af- Shlykov, head of the Security Policy Commission firmed this at the Munich Security Conference on of the Defense Ministry’s Public Council [http:// 2 February 2010 [http://www.securityconference. en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20090914/156124823.html] de/Joseph-R-Biden.451.0.html?&L=1]. 67 64 Miles A. Pomper, William Potter, and Nikolai Angela Charlton, Disarmament talks strained Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non over Mideast, Russia, The Washington Post, 20 erational value of such gravity bombs can advisers in the intelligence community is be questioned, since it appears that only poor, we should be prepared for unpleas- stealth aircraft could have real capability ant surprises.68 to penetrate heavily defended airspace. Such aircraft, certified to carry nuclear Time eventually proved the Swedes to be weapons, are not operational in any Eu- right. Examples given above concerning ropean air force. nuclear decision-making in the USA, basic technical and physical facts related to Removing the non-strategic nuclear the issue of the third U.S. ballistic mis- weapons from Europe altogether will sile defence site in Europe, and certain force NATO members to find other basic provisions of the CFE Treaty, have ways of ensuring extended deterrence. clearly been presented to the Russian It would, however, be wishful thinking leaders in a biased way. Sometimes the to assume that Russia would follow suit assessments are even in outright viola- and remove and eventually dismantle tion of the laws of nature. its own non-strategic nuclear weapons. One Russian observer asked rhetorically All the more “disturbing is also the re- in Helsinki in June in a closed seminar: emergence of certain modes of thinking “Why would Russia trade thousands of which from the time of Gorbachev until non-strategic nukes for less than two the late 1990’s had been receding, at least hundred?” at official level, and one is a conspirato- rial view about absolutely everything”, Conclusions said the British Russia expert James Sherr in testimony before the House of “Do you in Finland think much about Commons Defence Committee.69 The who actually works out the threat assess- Committee’s own summary assessment ments in Russia?” This issue was raised was the following: by a senior researcher at the Swedish De- ______fence Research Establishment (FOI) in 68 It is very disturbing that the mindset of former Stockholm in spring 2004. The Swedish KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov seems to be alive and well in the Kremlin. Jack Matlock, the former colleagues were convinced that the Rus- U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, gave the following sian military intelligence GRU seemed description in 1995: “[Kryuchkov] consistently to be getting the upper hand. This was failed in his primary duty to supply Gorbachev with accurate intelligence. His reports were delib- worrisome since the GRU’s perform- erately skewed to promote the particular policies ance in the past is not very impressive. he favored. Furthermore, he resorted to outright On the contrary, the assessments and lies … His shrill alarums over nonexistent foreign estimates produced were too often both interference, while perhaps useful in maintaining a bloated intelligence budget, deflected attention from unreliable and distorted. If the quality of the real problems the Soviet Union faced …” Jack F. information given to the President by his Matlock, Autopsy of an Empire – The American Am- bassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Un- ______ion, Random House, New York, 995, pp. 665-666. February 2, 2010 [http://www.washington- 69 Oral evidence by Mr. James Sherr before the post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/02/ House of Commons Defence Committee, 24 Feb- AR2010020200596.html]. Ambassador Rich- ruary 2009, in the House of Commons Defence ard Burt, former nuclear chief negotiator in the Committee, Minutes of Evidence - Russia: a new Reagan Administration and leading figure in the confrontation?, Summary, Tenth Report of Ses- Global Zero movement stated that the USA has sion 2008–09, prepared 10 July 2009, p. Ev 13 “about 100 tactical air-delivered warheads in Eu- [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ rope while Russia has at least 7 000”. cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/276/09032401.htm]. 21

“There are weighty reasons why Russia “reset” its Russia policy, are likely to be will continue its current policy. The lat- interpreted in the Kremlin as weakness. ter is increasingly created by traditional The very pronounced silence in Wash- Soviet motivations: morbid suspicious- ington, Brussels and all major capitals in ness; an imperial syndrome; attempts to Europe regarding simulated employment play the US off against Europe; the de- of tactical nuclear weapons in the Zapad sire to preserve Central and Eastern Eu- 2009 exercise against Poland, a member rope as zones of probable expansion, et state of EU and NATO, raised questions cetera. The war in the Caucasus proves of concern. It may, however, be wise pol- that Russian international behaviour for icy to address the security deficiency felt the most part is decided by circles, which by Poland and other states in Central and wittingly provokes Russia’s defiant and Eastern Europe in concrete, albeit more aggressive international behaviour with discrete ways. 72 a view to restore a mobilized economy and its privilege status in the political Even Finland was recently reminded of system.”70 The U.S. think-tank Stratfor Russian military perceptions of military recently published a detailed assessment history and its implications for current of the Kremlin “circles”.71 policy. The official website of the Rus- sian Ministry of Defence (www.mil.ru) The current Western rapprochement with writes about the lessons of the war be- Russia, the willingness to leave the war tween the Soviet Union and Finland in in Georgia behind quickly, including the an article – 65 years since Finland’s with- real territorial gain of Russia’s proxies drawal from the Second World War.73 in violation of the accords between the The article ended in a thinly veiled EU and Russia, the U.S. willingness to threat: “Alas, many Finnish politicians (and not only Finnish, and not only poli- ______ticians) prefer to forget the lessons of the 70 House of Commons Defence Committee, Rus- sia: a new confrontation?, Summary, Tenth Re- last war. They think that modern Russia port of Session 2008–09, prepared 10 July 2009, is not the Soviet Union. This is a dan- p. Ev 84 [http://www.publications.parliament. gerous misconception. Russia is always uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/276/27602. htm]. Russia no matter what she is called.” 71 STRATFOR, The Kremlin Wars 1-5, October 22-30, 2009 [http://www.stratfor.com/theme/ the_kremlin_wars]. The Kremlin “circles” that the British defence committee refers to, are understood to be two competing clans led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, respectively. Mr. Sechin’s clan, the “si- loviki”, rely strongly on the FSB and the power ministries, while Mr. Surkov’s clan includes lib- ______eral-leaning economists called “civiliki”, but also 72 RIA Novosti, Poland, US sign SOFA deal on people directly connected to the GRU. Interest- troop deployment terms, December 11, 2009 ingly enough President Medvedev is ranked be- [http://en.rian.ru/world/20091211/157203058. low Mr. Surkov, who is perceived to be the real html]. Grey Cardinal. Mr. Surkov also has a long career 73 Министерство обороны Российской in the military intelligence and is, in fact, now re- Федерации, 65-летие выхода Финляндии из ferred to as the chief strategist of the GRU. The Второй мировой войны в сентябре 1944 г. role of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is to bal- (65 years since Finland’s withdrawal from the ance these two factions and act as the final arbiter Second World War in September 1944) [http:// between the two clans. www.mil.ru/940/65186/66882/index.shtml]. 22

About the author

The author is a physicist and Senior Researcher at the Unit of Policy Planning and Re- search at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Adjunct Professor at the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies at the National Defence University in Helsinki. The views expressed are his own.

Latest publications in this series: (full list in http://www.mpkk.fi/fi/tutkimus-opetus/julkaisut/stratl/)

Series 4: Working Papers (ISSN: 1236-4983)

No 32, 2009 Nina Græger: “Inside Nato - Outside the EU”: Norwegian Security and Defence Policy in the High North

No 33, 2009 Agilolf Kesselring: NATO – Towards a New Strategic Concept 2010

No 34, 2010 Juha-Antero Puistola, Tom Hanén, Tommy Jeppsson, Joonas Sipilä, Kari T. Takamaa, Kaarle Wikström: Merirosvous ja merellinen terrorismi

No 35, 2010 Agilolf Kesselring: The Formation and Role of the Kosovo Security Force

Strategian laitos Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu PL 266 00171 HELSINKI

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