Central Asia the Caucasus

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Journal of Social and Political Studies

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Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

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Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council ISMAILOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Murad ESENOV Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (46) 920 62016 E-mail: [email protected] Jannatkhan Deputy Editor-in-Chief EYVAZOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Timur represents the journal in Kazakhstan (Astana) SHAYMERGENOV Tel./fax: (+7 - 701) 531 61 46 E-mail: [email protected] Leonid represents the journal in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) BONDARETS Tel.: (+996 - 312) 65-48-33 E-mail: [email protected] Jamila MAJIDOVA represents the journal in Tajikistan (Dushanbe) Tel.: (992 - 917) 72 81 79 E-mail: [email protected] Farkhad represents the journal in Uzbekistan (Tashkent) TOLIPOV Tel.: (9987-1) 125 43 22 E-mail: [email protected] Ziya KENGERLI represents the journal in Azerbaijan (Baku) Tel.: (+994 - 50) 3006694 E-mail: [email protected] Haroutiun represents the journal in Armenia (Erevan) KHACHATRIAN Tel.: (374-10) 56 59 65 E-mail: [email protected] Kakhaber ERADZE represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) Tel.: (+995 - 95) 45 82 88 E-mail: [email protected] Sun ZHUANGZHI represents the journal in China (Beijing) Tel.: (86) 10-64039088 E-mail: [email protected] Konrad SCHÄFFLER represents the journal in Germany (Munich) Tel.: (49 - 89) 3003132 E-mail: [email protected] Vladimir MESAMED represents the journal in the Middle East (Jerusalem) Tel.: (972 - 2) 5882332 E-mail: [email protected] Irina EGOROVA represents the journal in the Russian Federation (Moscow) Tel.: (7 - 495) 3163146 E-mail: [email protected] Robert GUANG TIAN represents the journal in the U.S. (Buffalo, NY) Tel: (716) 880-2104 E-mail: [email protected]

Rustem ZHANGUZHIN represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) Tel.: (380-44) 524-79-132 E-mail: [email protected] CENTRAL ASIA AND THEE DCAUCASUS I T O R I A L B O A R DVolume 12 Issue 1 2011

Giuli ALASANIA Doctor of History, professor, Vice Rector of the International Black Sea University (Georgia) Bülent ARAS Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey) Mariam ARUNOVA Doctor of Political Science, leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS (Russian Federation) Garnik ASATRIAN Doctor of Philology, professor, head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia) Bakyt BESHIMOV Doctor of History, professor, Vice President, American University-Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan) Ariel COHEN Doctor, leading analyst, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.A. (U.S.A.) William FIERMAN Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Paul GOBLE Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Sergei GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG Doctor of Political Science, professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander IGNATENKO President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russian Federation) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), assistant professor, head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA Doctor of History, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) S. Neil MACFARLANE Professor, Director, Center for International Studies, The University of Oxford (Great Britain) Alexei MALASHENKO Doctor of History, professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Russian Federation) Abbas MALEKI Dr., Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran) Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa Peace MATSUNAGA Foundation (Japan) Roger N. McDERMOTT Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) Vitaly NAUMKIN Doctor of History, professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russian Federation) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Vladimer PAPAVA Doctor of Economics, professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Senior Fellow of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (Georgia) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion Editorial Office: CA&CC Press AB Hubertusstigen 9. 97455 Luleå SWEDEN WEB ADDRESS: http://www.ca-c.org

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

IN THIS ISSUE:

REGIONAL SECURITY

Jannatkhan THE WEST AND Eyvazov. POST-SOVIET CENTRAL EURASIA: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF AMERICAN AND EU SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE REGION ...... 7

Eldar CENTRAL ASIA: Gabdullin. GEOPOLITICS, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS ...... 22

Georgy FORECAST ON Dubovtsev, THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION EMERGING Erlan IN THE WORLD AND Galymzhanuly. THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION ...... 36

Shaislam THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION Akmalov. IN AFGHANISTAN: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF STRATEGY ...... 44 4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

REGIONAL POLITICS

Mahir IRAN AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: Khalifa-zadeh. A STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE ...... 51

Marco ABKHAZIA, KOSOVO AND Siddi. THE RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES ...... 62

David SOME ASPECTS OF CHINA’S POLICY Babayan. IN THE CAUCASUS ...... 70

Bakhtiar CENTRAL ASIA’S Bakas uulu, HYDROPOWER PROBLEMS: Kadyrzhan REGIONAL STATES’ POLICY AND Smagulov. DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS ...... 81

Amalia ARMENIA’S SOCIOECONOMIC POTENTIAL Saribekian. IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENT ...... 87

Konstantin CHINA’S PRESENCE Syroezhkin. IN KAZAKHSTAN: MYTHS AND REALITY ...... 101

Murat SOME PROBLEMS OF Laumulin. KAZAKHSTAN’S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY ...... 114

Ikbalzhan THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: Mirsayitov. A NEW POLITICAL REALITY ...... 124

Farkhad DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURALIZING IN UZBEKISTAN: Tolipov. THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM AND THE OPPOSITION ...... 132

REGIONAL STUDIES

Bakhodyr NATIONAL IDEOLOGY Ergashev. IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: ITS PHENOMENON, SPECIFICS, AND PROSPECTS ...... 141 5 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Maxim RUSSIA AS A SUBJECT OF Kirchanov. THE IDEOLOGY OF GEORGIAN NATIONALISM ...... 150

MASS MEDIA

Bakytzhan THE POLITICAL INTERNET Temirbolat. IN KAZAKHSTAN: TRENDS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS ...... 158

FOR YOUR INFORMATION The Special Feature section in the next issue will discuss:

n Central Eurasia: Religion in the Sociopolitical Context

n Energy Policy and Energy Projects in Central Eurasia

n Regional Centers of Power and Their Policy in Central Eurasia

6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

REGIONAL SECURITY

THE WEST AND POST-SOVIET CENTRAL EURASIA: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF AMERICAN AND EU SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE REGION

Jannatkhan EYVAZOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan)

Introduction

he threat of a wide-scale armed attack on the gy in Central Eurasia,1 their key security interests United States and its European allies disap- in the region and policy aimed at realization of T peared together with the Soviet Union. The these interests. post-Soviet space, however, became a zone of what can be described as “sustained political instabili- 1 Here I am referring to the conception of Central ty” and a source of new challenges on the Western Eurasia and Central Europe suggested by Eldar Ismailov, agenda. Moreover, the new geopolitical entity and who includes three post-Soviet regions in the political make- energy resources in its territory became a target of up of Central Eurasia: Central Europe—Belarus, Moldova, rivalry of the world powers. This meant that merely and Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia, winning the Cold War was not enough: the victors and Georgia; and Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (for more detail, needed a new strategy in the post-Soviet territory. see: E.M. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Func- Here I intend to outline some of the special tion in the 21st Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, features of the American and EU security strate- No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29). 7 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS The Western Tandem in Central Eurasia

First of all I want to turn to the question why within the framework of the problem studied in this article I tend to contemplate these actors as a tandem, although, of course, each of them may have their own specific interests in the region and political activity stemming from this. First, the social and axiological identity of the European Union and the United States created by the fact that they belong to the same civilizational community (Western civilization, to borrow the term from Samuel Huntington) looks especially important in the context of their common security. A social and axiological community, however, cannot “remove” the fairly static (material) factors, such as geographic proximity/remoteness. The geographic proximity of Central Eurasia makes the Euro- pean Union much more concerned about security issues, while the geographic remoteness of the United States makes it much less concerned. At the same time, if not conducive to absolutely identical ideas about security, shared values are responsible at least for the two actors’ common approaches to and standard assessments of which phenomena/processes can be described as real/potential threats and to what extent and priority. The way Western societies are responding to the transnational security threat can be used as a pertinent example. In Europe and the United States, the entire set of environmental issues or, for instance, the problems created by international organized crime have developed into permanent and real security issues irrespective of their geographic proximity/remoteness. The same applies to the issues related to the proliferation of democracy, human rights, and the market economy expected to create a context indispensable for a sustainable, conflict-free, and prosperous political environment. The economic and technological development of the EU and the U.S. has left its imprint on their ideas about security. Both can be described as models of post-industrialism complete with the common standards of the outside world securitization (including the energy security issues which are rapidly coming to the fore). Second, the two actors have NATO as a common security mechanism which survived the Cold War and preserved the de facto status of a collective security system. The U.S. and EU jointly respond to external threats and are involved in military operations designed to prevent such threats (including outside the Alliance’s responsibility zone). Their common security standards and shared security mechanism suggest that the EU and the United States can be regarded as a real political tandem rather than two political actors who pooled forces ad hoc on the “Central Eurasian chessboard.” Their different degrees of proximity to Central Eurasia are balanced out by their common security standards and mechanisms. Their impact on the region’s security system should be assessed accordingly even though specific geographical aspects and the actors’ different global political statuses do not allow us to look at the motivations of their involvement in the region as absolutely identical. Based on the geographical specifics, only the European Union can be related to the security system of Central Eurasia, while the United States, the only superpower, should be regarded in the context of its inevitable global involvement. By moving eastward, the EU came in direct geographic contact with Central Eurasia. Having integrated Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania in 2004 and 2007, the Europe- an Union acquired a 3,172-km border with the region’s European part (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine).2

2 Calculated from CIA—The World Factbook 2010. 8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

n This means that, first, the ethnoterritorial issues the new EU members shared with the three Soviet-successor states became part of the European agenda. n Second, the EU’s eastward expansion liquidated the buffer zone that separated the EU from political instability and conflicts in the post-Soviet space and related threats (of a transnational nature among other things), such as international organized crime, international terrorism, illegal migration, drug trafficking, etc. n Third, the configuration of geopolitical ties between the EU and Russia, the key power factor of the post-Soviet space, also changed. Two successive waves (in 2004 and 2007) brought the European Union into the sphere of Russia’s vital interests and into places (the Baltic and Poland) directly on the Russian borders. Concerned with the EU’s expansion into the post- Soviet space and the desire of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and certain other newly independent states to join the European Union, Moscow responded with actions spearheaded against these states and the EU. The so-called gas conflict (Moscow’s attempts to use energy resources to put pressure on the post-Soviet space and the EU) can be described as a glaring example that the security issue became one of the linchpins of the EU-Central Eurasian newly independent states-Russia vector.3 Suspen- sion of gas deliveries to Europe and Moscow’s obvious intention to monopolize the oil and gas transportation sphere in the post-Soviet space, coupled with Gazprom’s attempts to gain control over Europe’s gas distribution system, only made the European Union more determined to end its dependence on gas supplies from Russia by diversifying oil and gas transportation lines outside Russia. At the same time, an analysis of Europe’s involvement in Central Eurasia and its functional expediency in the context of its security relations with other actors casts doubts on the EU’s compe- tence as a single holder of interests and an agent of corresponding policy. The degree of integration achieved so far is hardly enough to describe the European Union as a state or a power. The Theory of Regional Complexes Security gives the European Union a chance to develop from an “institutional” regional security complex4 into a closer-knit political actor.5 Today, however, this is a prospect rather than reality, which creates numerous questions. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, formulated three of them: “Is the EU able to take care of its own security without dependence on external powers? What are the interregional security dynamics between EU-Europe and its neighboring complexes? And to what extent and in what ways does the EU appear at the global level as a power of sorts?”6 This explains, among other things, why I regard the EU as part of the U.S.-EU tandem despite their very different geopolitical connections with Central Eurasia. The United States has no common borders with Central Eurasia, yet today, very much as throughout the entire post-Soviet period, its presence there is much more tangible than that of Europe. America’s global presence, explained by its interests far and wide beyond all geographic limits and its capabilities of projecting its influence on a global scale, is enough to take its role in the functioning and development of the Central Eurasian system into account. This explains why the interests of the two entities of Western civilization (united Europe and the United States) are described as relatively identical, the latter playing the first fiddle. From time to time, this pushes the

3 Here I have in mind the gas conflict with Ukraine which flared up in 2005 when Russia suspended natural gas deliveries to the Ukrainian and European consumers. 4 See: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 62. 5 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, pp. 218-219; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, Se- curity. A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998, p. 12. 6 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 373. 9 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS seemingly common (transnational) problems which the Western tandem seeks to resolve into a geopolitical context.7

The Key Security Interests

Disintegration of the Soviet Union put the problem of the vast Soviet nuclear heritage on the American and European security agenda. Tactical nuclear armaments were promptly moved to the Russian Federation, but an enormous number of strategic warheads remained in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.8 In view of the political and social-economic difficulties, the problem of safety of the Soviet “nuclear heritage” came to the fore. Indeed, these arsenals might be captured by so-called “rogue states” or non-state extremist groups, which explains why the West deemed it necessary to be involved in the post-Soviet space.9 Luckily, disintegration of the former Soviet space was stemmed and Russia’s nuclear potential was never divided.10 The people in power in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to join the Non- Proliferation Treaty and either to transfer their nuclear arsenals to Russia or liquidate them to become non-nuclear states. By December 2001, the process was completed.11 On the whole, the Soviet nuclear heritage issue was resolved, while the problem of nuclear non- proliferation in the post-Soviet space has not yet been removed from the Western agenda. The region borders on the obviously anti-Western countries or, to be more exact, ties them together. Their geopolitical interconnection might lead to illegal cooperation in the nuclear sphere. Since the mid-2000s, the Iranian nuclear file has remained in the center of relations between the U.S. and EU, on the one side, and Iran, on the other. The nature of the Iranian political regime,12 its oil and gas riches, and the related geopolitical problems,13 as well as ballistic missiles (which cannot be dismissed as another point on the Western agenda), easily account for the tandem’s close attention.

7 The problem is not limited to the United States’ ability to use its European partners to realize its geopolitical interests. It is important to take into account how America’s rivals (Russia and China) respond to America’s leadership in the Western tandem. Not infrequently, they perceive everything the West is doing as another “American geopolitical project.” This downplays the role of the EU as a holder of its own interests in the eyes of other actors. In the absence of military- political mechanisms of their own, the Europeans have to follow in the footsteps of the United States, even if they are not interested enough in this or that aspect of Central Eurasian policy. 8 See: J. Simpson, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 70, Issue 1, 1994, p. 27. By the time the Soviet Union fell apart, the main elements of strategic and nuclear infrastructure and the larger part of the strategic nuclear weapons were concentrated in the RF. Ukraine had 130 launchers for UR-100HU (SS-19) and 46 launching silos for RT-23 UTTH missiles (SS-24), 19 Tu-160 bombers; 25 Tu-9MC, and 2 Tu-95 bombers. In Belarus, there were 81 Topol ground missile sites (SS-25.) In Kazakhstan, there were 104 launching silos for R-36MUTTH/P-36M2 (SS-18) missiles and 40 Tu-95MC bombers (see: “Strategicheskie iadernye sily SSSR i Rossii,” available at [http://www.armscontrol.ru/course/rsf/p9.htm]). 9 See, for example: S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Cauca- sus, Curzon Press, Surrey, 2001, p. 367; R. Sokolsky, T. Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security. A Mission Too Far? Rand Corporation, Washington, 1999, p. 7; Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 2001, p. 11. 10 The West feared that other nuclear countries, including the Russian Federation itself, might fall apart; after all, in the early 1990s, the RF was living though a fairly unstable period in its history (see: J. Simpson, op. cit., p. 27). 11 See: “Strategicheskie iadernye sily SSSR i Rossii.” 12 The Iranian regime is determined to stand opposed to Western values. 13 The political motivation for control over Iran’s huge oil and gas resources fits the logic of the developed countries’ mounting competition over gradually depleting energy resources and their efforts to oppose Russia’s attempts to use gas and oil against the West. 10 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

The fact that Iran cooperates with other powers, Russia and China in particular, in the nuclear sphere adds to the tension. Today, about 300 Russian enterprises are involved in the Bushehr nuclear power station project.14 The Russian Federation insists that its cooperation with Iran is of a purely peaceful nature and that it does not want another nuclear state on its southern borders; there is no, the Russians argue, indication that Tehran intends to violate its nonproliferation obligations to become another nuclear power.15 America, in turn, believes that this cooperation adds to Iran’s scientific and technical knowledge and moves Tehran closer to nuclear weapons.16 The United States and its European allies are exerting great efforts, so far to little effect, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Acting in accordance with the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000,17 they introduced sanctions against the companies (mainly Chinese and Russian) cooperating with Tehran in the nuclear sphere.18 From time to time, they threaten to use military force against Iran and demonstrate their military might in the Persian Gulf. Central Eurasia is more than a geopolitical link between the main “nuclear rivals” of the West; it is one of the most unstable political zones on the Eurasian continent that emanates the threat of WMD proliferation and other (non-traditional) challenges: international organized crime and terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. The very fact that most of the local states are fairly weak explains the instability and frequent conflicts, as well as the high possibility of the local threats spreading to neighboring regions. The post-Soviet history of Central Eurasia abounds in conflicts of all types and intensity. In the late 1990s, Zbigniew Brzezinski coined the term “the Eurasian Balkans” (in keeping with the analogy of “the traditional Balkans” of the early 1990s) to describe the south of the post-Soviet space.19 The term will remain valid as long as the territory continues to be dotted with unsettled armed conflicts. Today, the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia are described as frozen, while these territories de facto remain outside national (Azerbaijani, Moldovan, and Georgian, respectively) or international control. The fact that there has been no large-scale fighting since the mid-1990s20 does nothing to reduce the “negative” effect of the lack of control “in peace time” there. “All secessionist regions represent challenges and security risks in the hard security field, as they constitute growing threats of resumed military violence in the region and contribute to state weakness, hampering economic and democratic development in the South Caucasus and Moldova. However, a wide range of soft security issues are also connected to the unresolved conflicts, as these constitute a form of uncontrolled free trade zones.”21 These regions have huge amounts of military equipment outside the international quotas set by the CFE Treaty for the simple reason that the “frozen” zones are controlled by actors with no

14 See: V.E. Novikov, Problema nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia na sovremennom etape, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, 2007, p. 229. 15 See: Ugrozy rezhimu nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke., ed. by A. Arbatov, V. Naumkin, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2005, p. 25. 16 See: V.E. Novikov, op. cit., p. 231. 17 Since 2005, Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 18 A list of these companies can be found on the U.S. Department of State’s official website (see: Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, U.S. Department of State, available at [http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15234.htm]). 19 See: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 123. 20 The conflict in South Ossetia was “defrosted” in August 2008 by the Russian-Georgian crisis, which developed into wide-scale hostilities. 21 S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, The Wider Black Sea Region; An Emerging Hub in European Security, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington and Uppsala, 2006, p. 51. 11 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS legal and internationally recognized functions. In some places, the amount of illegal military equipment exceeds that of the states from which these areas are trying to escape with the use of these weapons. Lack of control has encouraged illegal trade in arms, drugs, and people, as well as money laundering.22 Because of its relative proximity to the EU borders and Odessa, one of the Ukrainian Black Sea ports, Transnistria has succeeded more than the others in illegal arms trade and should, therefore, be described as the greatest hazard in Europe in this respect.23 Though relatively far removed from the borders of the Western tandem, the uncontrolled Caucasian zones are causing a lot of concern in Europe and America as potential zones of illegal trade in military materials. Moreover, certain facts point to the possibility that trade in components bought in Russia which could potentially be used to create nuclear weapons might flourish in these uncontrolled territories. In February 2006, a group of people headed by Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was detained in Georgia when they tried to smuggle 100 grams of enriched uranium into Georgia across the South Ossetian stretch of its border with Russia.24 Iran is not the only country on the Western lists of potential nuclear actors. There is another serious treat: terrorist groups might lay their hands on nuclear technology or materials to be used to attack American and European cities. The 9/11 events not only added urgency to the issue of international terrorism in the West, but also pushed forward the threat of nuclear terrorism: terrorists might either acquire nuclear charges from rogue-states or gain access to nuclear weapons by chance. The “uncontrolled zones” and the “corridors of illegal activities” are not the only factors of nuclear threat in Central Eurasia. There is any number of extremist groups operating in this space up to and including al-Qa‘eda, No. 1 on the list of extremist organizations compiled by the United States and its European allies. It is believed to be behind the 9/11 terrorist acts. The counterterrorist coalition, which used every possibility supplied by the Central Asian newly independent states, is still fighting it in Afghanistan. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, operating in the region, is also on the list of terrorist organizations, along with certain other movements which reject Euro-American values and Western policies in the developing world (Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brothers, etc.). There is any number of actors in Central Eurasia that might seek nuclear weapons to use against the West, and the region offers many chances. First, it borders on several nuclear powers—Russia, China, India, and Pakistan—which, in principle, might serve as a source of illegal supplies of nuclear weapons or their components from their inadequately guarded nuclear facilities. The report supplied by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University dealing with prevention of nuclear terrorism pointed out that in terms of unsanctioned access to nuclear facilities, Russia and Pakistan pose some of the world’s most urgent risks of nuclear theft.25 Second, seen from the West, the Central Asian newly independent states look like a possible source of WMD components. In October 2005, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair of the House Subcommit- tee on the Middle East and Central Asia (the Committee on Foreign Affairs), stated: “Major U.S. security interests have included the elimination of nuclear weapons remaining after the collapse of the

22 See: S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, op. cit. 23 The Transnistrian region has enough production facilities; since 1996 it has been producing arms and ammunition exported to Kosovo, Chechnia, Abkhazia, and the Arab countries. In 2003, co-rapporteurs of the Council of Europe Parlia- mentary Assembly, Jossette Durrieu and Lauri Vahtre, emphasized the threat represented by arms trafficking in the Tran- snistrian region (see: B. Radulescu, “The Transnistria ‘Republic’ and Illegal Arms Export,” EuropeFront News, 2 January, 2007, available at [http://www.europefront.com/news/267/the_transnistria_republic_and_illegal_arms_export.html]). 24 See: M. Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2007,” Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, 2007, p. 17, available at [http://www.nti.org/e_research/ securingthebomb07.pdf]. 25 See: Ibid., p. 25. 12 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Soviet bloc. There are active research reactors, uranium mines, milling facilities, and nuclear waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, many of which reportedly remain inadequately protected. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan reportedly had significant chemical and biological warfare facilities during the Soviet era. U.S. efforts to dismantle chem-bio and nuclear facilities in the region to prevent terrorists from procuring these deadly weapons are a priority concern for this Sub- committee.”26 The events of 9/11 pushed the problem of international terrorism, whether nuclear or not, to the fore in the West. The terrorist acts in the United States demonstrated that the threat can be only partly limited by geographic remoteness.27 Terrorist organizations can deliver strikes at the United States and its European allies from control centers stationed at considerable distances from the targets. The terrorist acts in the United States and later in Spain in March 2004 and Great Britain in July 2005 revealed Western vulnerability to this asymmetric threat and the vital necessity for the West to address the threat collectively up to and including the use of military force. International terrorism and other non-traditional threats were not the only challenges in the 2000s: the West became aware of the need to ensure its energy security. It became abundantly clear that fuel supplies and dependence on energy resources were on the geopolitical and security agenda. United Europe has been exposed to the logic of new energy geopolitics to a much greater extent than the rest of the world. The post-Soviet space, or rather Russia and its “energy policy,” proved to be in the epicenter of the new threats. According to Svante Cornell and other authors, Russia’s “energy policy” rested on the following elements: “state control over the production of gas for export; keeping a monopoly on acquiring Central Asian gas at cheap prices; achieving increasing dominance over the European consumer markets; and utilizing dominance over both the import and export to CIS countries of gas for political purposes.”28 Suspension of gas supplies to Ukraine and the EU countries in 2005-2009 and the Kremlin’s attempts to monopolize the gas market of the post-Soviet space showed the Russian Federation not only to be an unreliable supplier, but also its obvious intention to realize its geopolitical interests in Eurasia through the post-Soviet dependence of the European Union on Russian gas, which can be described as considerable.29 Not directly dependent on fuel supplies from the post-Soviet space, Washington is also worried about the rapidly increasing geopolitical value of energy resources and particularly about the intention of its formerly mighty rival to restore its domination in the post-Soviet territory. Indeed, monop- olization of the post-Soviet oil and gas sphere could have affected the world fuel market, with negative results for the American economy. Washington had its eye on the recently transformed post-So- viet space, Central Asia and the Caspian region, as a source of energy that might lower its dependence on the Persian Gulf long before the United States became involved in energy-related collisions with Russia.30

26 See: U.S. Security Concerns in Central Asia, Opening Statement of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia Hearing, 26 October, 2005 (quoted from: A. Ibrahim, “Evolving United States Policy toward the Caspian Region: A Delicate Balance,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, p. 38). 27 See: O. Oliker, “Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications of Foreign Interests and Involve- ment,” in: Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Implication for the U.S. Army, ed. by O. Ol- iker, Th.S. Szayna, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. 223. 28 S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, op. cit., p. 76. 29 Russia delivers about 46% of European imports of natural gas and 17% of oil (see: N. Norling, “EU’s Central Asia Policy: The Adoption of a New Strategy Paper 2007-2013,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 11; A. Burkhanov, “The EU Strategy in Central Asia: Successes and Failures,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 21). 30 See, for example: R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: Central Asia. A Gather- ing Storm? ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 116; R. Sokolsky, T. Charlick-Paley, op. cit., p. 69; O. Oliker, op. cit., p. 221; Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, op. cit., p. 98. 13 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

No matter how dependent the European Union becomes on Russia, the situation is fraught with grave strategic repercussions for the United States. First, this might undermine the united European-American strategy in Eurasia which, along with other reasons, will limit America’s geopolitical capabilities in the post-Soviet space. Second, after acquiring control over the post-Soviet energy and communication sphere, Russia could essentially restore its domination over the newly independent states. This might help to restore a Soviet-type empire or create a wide coalition (alliance) of the pro-Russian states. Back in the mid-1990s, Zbigniew Brzezin- ski formulated, in detail, the main geopolitical imperative of America’s strategy in post-Soviet Eura- sia: “Perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism … and prevent the emergence of a hostile coalition … that could eventually seek to challenge America”s primacy.”31 This might prove unrealiza- ble if Russia’s energy geopolitics proves successful. The EU and its trans-Atlantic ally might be negatively affected if the post-Soviet oil and gas sphere acquires geopolitical dimensions amid the worldwide depletion of energy sources. The Energy Diplomacy and Security Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 2007 is very indicative in this respect. It says among other things: “It is imperative to the national security and prosperity of the United States to have reliable, affordable, clean, sufficient, and sustainable sources of energy.”32 Senator Richard Lugar, one of its authors, said in 2006 at the NATO Riga summit: “In the coming decades, the most likely source of armed conflict in the European theater and the surrounding regions will be energy scarcity and manipulation. It would be irresponsible for NATO to decline involvement in energy security, when it is abundantly apparent that the jobs, health, and security of our modern economies and societies depend on the sufficiency and timely availability of diverse energy resources.”33 Since Russia’s “energy policy” creates more dangerous risks for Europe, it is much more pertinent to say that the EU should be more involved in Central Eurasia. For the United States, nevertheless, it also became a stimulus for the active involvement in the region that emanates traditional and new security threats. The ideological background of the end of the Cold War was very favorable for the West and its strategic activity. The same is true of the newly independent states and the international community. Western strategic activities looked less related to geopolitics; rather they were geared at successful development of the newly liberated states. In these conditions, the West could use “soft power” to promote its Central Eurasian strategy.

Security Interests Realized

The thesis that the post-Soviet space should be transformed into a zone of strong democratic states with smoothly functioning market economies is not a tribute to the idealism that triumphed in the West after World War II and which is intended mainly for domestic audiences. Neither it is limited to the humanitarian interests of those who won the Cold War. This thesis was expected to guarantee long-term geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet space and allow the United States and its allies in Eurasia to set up an “open system geared toward a more transparent and interdependent world”34 as one of their greater aims.

31 Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 198. 32 See: Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, available at [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:2:./temp/ ~c110JBKdrz::]. 33 See: Richard Lugar Speech in Advance of NATO Summit at Opening Gala Dinner of the Riga Conference, 27 No- vember, 2006 [http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/36/]. 34 L. Tchantouridze, “Eurasia, Geopolitics, and American Foreign Policy,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, ¹ 5 (53), 2008, p. 15. 14 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

The strong, democratic, and economically effective states in the post-Soviet territory are seen, with good reason, in the West as a guarantee that America and Europe will be able to realize all of their interests, viz. prevention and containment of armed conflicts and other threats (WMD proliferation, terrorism, religious extremism, drugs, and illegal migration) in the zones of Western vital interests up to and including stable fuel supplies. It is not surprising that the West is still talking about the need to support independence, sovereignty, democratic changes, and progress toward a market economy in the newly independent states and their integration into the world political and economic system.35 This called for a wide range of instruments—money, technical assistance, military training, and coordination of the local countries’ armed forces with NATO military structures,36 political support indispensable when relations between the newly independent states and Russia (or other geopolitical powers) become strained.37 At times, the West supported, unofficially and undemonstratively, the revolutionary changes in these countries known as the Color Revolutions. The results were hardly unambiguous; this is especially true of Western efforts to bring democracy to the post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation: not infrequently, Western zeal reduced to naught the results and efficiency of the West’s efforts. In its approaches to democratization of the newly independent states, America was either too rational, which smacked of double standards, or too ideologically biased and demonstratively tough. As a result the West suffered several painful strategic defeats in Central Eurasia. In the early 1990s, for example, the United States, determined to prevent proliferation of the So- viet nuclear stockpiles across Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, was also resolved to transform Russia into a democratic state with a functional market economy.38 Everything else (including similar democratic designs in other newly independent states) was practically ignored or even sacrificed to the “loftier” aim. The “Russia first” policy proved a failure for the simple reason that this encouraged the Kremlin to look at the post-Soviet space as a sphere of its natural domination, while the other Soviet-successor states were left to guess whether the West was determined to support their independence and its “democratic supplements.” This policy increased the pro-Russian geopolitical orientation in the newly independent states to the extent that later the West found it much harder to form a sustainable alternative. In the 2000s, the relatively tougher approaches of the U.S. Republican Administration to the democratic standards in the newly independent states complicated the situation even more. The new American leaders refused to take the real possibilities for democratic transit in the newly independent states into account. This created the Color Revolution phenomenon which engulfed Central Eurasia in 2003-2005 with different results. Strategically, the “revolutionary wave” brought the West both positive and even more negative results. On the whole, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan39 created more democratic regimes and increased pro-Western

35 This was registered by strategic documents issued in the United States and the EU (see, for example: A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, Washington, D.C., October 1998. P. 39; European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, 15 June, 2006, p. 7, available at [http://www. delkaz.ec.europa.eu/pr/eng/REPOSITORY_assistance/Programmes_and_Projects/Geographic/DCI/CA_CSP&IP_2007-2010/ Regional_%20Strategy_Paper_%20CA_2007-13_%20rev_%20june-15-2006_En.pdf]). 36 The U.S. Foreign Assistance program is one of the pertinent examples; in full accordance with the 1992 Freedom Support Act it was expanded to include the former Soviet republics, the TACIS program initiated by the European Com- munity in 1991, the Partnership for Peace program NATO launched in 1994, and the programs of financial, military and technical assistance to individual countries. 37 Georgia was supported in August 2008 during the military clash with the RF and Azerbaijan in July 2001 during the Caspian incident which involved Iran. 38 See: S.E. Cornell, op. cit., p. 367. 39 We have no reliable information to which extent Washington was involved in these revolutions; anyway, it is not my intention to plunge into a discussion which goes beyond the limits of this article. It was a well known fact that the United

15 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS orientation, however the results looked fairly shaky.40 These changes alarmed the political elites in other post-Soviet states; their leaders (especially in Central Asia) could not but wonder whether the West was nurturing similar plans in relation to their countries. While Georgia and Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan, became more pro-Western, the other newly independent states in Cen- tral Eurasia demonstrated an opposite trend. To remain in power, their elites had to turn to Russia (which is much less picky when it comes to democratic standards). This produced at best their “balanced” foreign policy course. At times, it brought about stronger pro-Russian biases in these states. This was especially obvious in Uzbekistan where the tension reached its highest point in Andijan in May 2005. Since 2001, Central Eurasia has been and remains a zone of Western military activity. The United States and its NATO allies responded to 9/11 with a counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan; the Taliban was accused of sheltering international terrorists41 represented by Osama bin Laden and al- Qa‘eda fighters responsible for the terrorist acts in America. This operation added vigor to cooperation between the United States and the Central Asian and Caucasian countries in the military sphere (in the form of the right of the U.S. Air Force to use their air space and American military bases in their territories).42 At first, the operation brought together and stirred into action not only the Western countries43; its geopolitical rivals in Eurasia caught some of the Western dedication: “The United States has also received unprecedented cooperation from the Russian Federation in this effort… The United States and Russia have exchanged intelligence in support of the counterterrorism fight and have pledged further cooperation in the long term. While many in Russia have continued to express concern at U.S involvement in its ‘back yard,’ President Putin has been consistent in reiterating that Russia does not oppose the U.S. actions (in Afghanistan.—J.E.).”44 Since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan the Kremlin’s position and its support of the U.S. have become of paramount importance to the United States. The compromise between Wash- ington and Moscow concerning the U.S. military operation and the American bases in Central Asia served the interests of both sides. Together with the military bases in Central Asia, the United States acquired a geopolitical key to the main post-Soviet sector. Russia, which could never accept this in the long term, wanted to defuse the potential threat on its southern borders presented by the Taliban regime. Cooperation between Russia and the West in Central Eurasia was of a temporary nature riveted to the war in Afghanistan. Neither Russia nor the other regional powers (China and Iran) would have

States hailed the revolutionary changes which produced an impression that it had been involved in them. The Section “Suc- cess and Challenges since 2002” of the 2006 National Security Strategy says: “The ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have brought new hope for freedom across the Eurasian landmass” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D.C., March 2006, p. 2). 40 Indeed, in January 2010 Victor Yanukovich, who five years earlier had been an object of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, was elected president. In April 2010 a revolution in Kyrgyzstan removed President Bakiev, one of the leaders of the Tulip revolution of 2005. 41 See: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D.C., Sep- tember 2002, p. 5. 42 From the very beginning of the military operation against the Taliban, the United States stationed their air forces in Uzbekistan (where the Americans used the Karshi-Khanabad base) and in Kyrgyzstan (at the Manas military base). In 2005, vexed about the mounting tension in its relations with the United States, Tashkent demanded that America withdraw its armed forces from Uzbekistan. In November, America moved its air base to Kyrgyzstan. 43 Before and after the counterterrorist operation, the West regarded the production and trafficking of drugs as one of the most serious threats coming from Afghanistan stimulating Western involvement in this country and the relatively recent newcomers (the Central Asian Soviet-successor states). In post-Soviet times, this area has become the most promising market and the best transshipment base used by Afghan drug traffickers. 44 O. Oliker, op. cit., p. 224. 16 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 hailed NATO’s stronger position in this area. They needed Washington to remove the Taliban and put an end to the non-traditional threats in the form of religious extremism and drug trafficking, of which Afghanistan was the source. They cooperated within these limits, which explains why the geopolitical neutrality of Central Asian players was short-lived. Concerned about the obvious successes scored by ISAF, which disorganized the Taliban and undermined its resistance, and the fact that the country had acquired alternative power structures set up under Western protection, the regional rivals were growing impatient. They demanded that the United States should specify the date of its withdrawal from Central Asian states. At the SCO summit which took place on 5-6 June, 2005 in Astana, Russia and China demonstrated their unity on the issue of the American military presence in Central Asia. Despite the fact that there was no unanimity on the issue among the Central Asian SCO partners,45 they, on the whole, agreed with what was said on that score in the summit’s Declaration: “Considering the completion of the active military phase of antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member-states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider it necessary that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states.”46 This spoke of rising geopolitical rivalry between the Western tandem and the Russian Federa- tion, which spread far beyond Central Asia. It spread far and wide across the whole of Central Eurasia rather than just some of its regions, while military-strategic interests and the struggle against non-traditional security threats remained intertwined with energy and communication issues. The Western idea of a new pipeline system in Central Eurasia was suggested by Moscow’s intention to turn energy resources into a political instrument, which became obvious in the 2000s. It merely stimulated the West and added vigor to its rivalry with Moscow. The idea that fuel from alternative sources could be brought to the world energy market had been born and developed even before Russia and Ukraine disagreed over gas supplies. It was expected to facilitate integration of the Central Eurasian newly independent states into the world economic system and strengthen their inner stability. By the same token, it was expected to reduce the risk of a new Eurasian empire which would dominate the post-Soviet space and to strengthen geopolitical pluralism in this vast area. After launching the Interstate Oil and Gas transport to Europe (INOGATE) program in the mid-1990s, which envisaged a pipeline system to bring together the EU with the Caspian fuel-rich countries, the European Union accepted, albeit indirectly, the Caspian as an alternative to the RF to be used to counterbalance its dependence on Russia.47 However, implementation of this program left much to be desired: Russia was too weak to be perceived as a rival able to use energy resources as an instrument to put pressure on the West; it depended on American and European aid to an extent which ruled out any threat to Europe’s energy security in the short term. At that time, increased import of Russian energy resources did not look like a threat; Russia had a ramified energy transportation infrastructure, while it was hardly advisable to build systems outside Russia while fuel prices remained relatively low. In the late 1990s, however, it became obvious that the West should revise its geopolitical and, later, energy security ideas about the post-Soviet space. The Balkan crisis of 199948 put an end to

45 Kyrgyzstan’s approach differed from what the final document said. In October 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Con- doleezza Rice reached an agreement during her visit to Kyrgyzstan on moving the American air base from Uzbekistan. 46 See: Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, 6 July, 2005. 47 See: Th.N. Marketos, “European Energy Security and the Balkans: A Battleground for the U.S.-Russia Struggle for the Geostrategic Control of Eurasia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (53), 2008, p. 57. 48 NATO’s military operation in Yugoslavia launched in 1999 in connection with the Kosovo crisis aroused an un- precedentedly tough response from Moscow and stirred up anti-Western sentiments in Russia. 17 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the honeymoon between Russia and the West; it became clear that Russia could hardly be transformed into the Western-style democracy. It also became clear that Moscow was not going to get rid of ideas about the restoration of its influence in the Soviet periphery; it was no longer expected that relations between Russia and the West could become a “mature strategic partnership” or a “global condominium.”49 Even before NATO attacked Serbia, relations between Russia and the West had deteriorated mainly because of NATO’s eastward expansion. Zbigniew Brzezinski has written that by 1996 the United States had identified a larger and safer Euroatlantic community as its political priority.50 For obvious reasons, Russia could hardly accept what the United States and its NATO allies were doing. Moscow believed that the idea of a “sanitary cordon” around Russia or, a softer formula, Russia’s isolation were coming to the fore in Western policy. Anatoly Utkin wrote the following in this respect: “Strictly speaking, it is not the half a million more soldiers who will join the seven-million strong NATO contingent, three hundred state-of-the-art airdromes on our borders, and control over the territory that was repeatedly used as a springboard to march on Moscow in 1612, 1709, 1812, 1920, and 1941 that is important. What is important is the failure of the course launched by Peter the Great and continued, with a lot of pomp, by the Western-minded democrats in 1988-1993. I have in mind NATO’s expansion, which signifies another attempt at isolating our country. This is the West’s third attempt in the 20th century to push Russia out of the all-European security system. The Versailles system and the ‘sanitary cordon’ on our borders can be described as the first of such attempts… The Marshall Plan and NATO was the second.”51 In 1997, an alliance of four newly independent states—Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM)—with strong Western biases and strong Western support appeared in the post- Soviet space. In 1999, Uzbekistan added another “U” to turn the alliance into GUUAM. Its geopolitical component, which was clearly discerned amid the talk about economic development and democratization, caused a lot of worries in the Kremlin. The West said next to nothing about the “sanitary cordon,” however the post-Soviet reality of the latter half of the 1990s supplied ample food for thought. The Kremlin did not trust the United States, which never concealed its intention to entrench itself in the Caspian regarded by Russia as a sphere of its special interests. In 1997, Washington announced that the area was a sphere of U.S. vital interests and was included in the U.S. Central Com- mand responsibility sphere. This meant that Washington no longer took Russia’s special interests in this part of the near abroad into account.52 It was at the same time that the idea of bringing Azeri oil to the West by circumventing Russia appeared in the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline; there was talk about a trans-Caspian pipeline to gain access to the energy resources of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.53 Russia, which had recovered after the default of 1998 and where Vladimir Putin and his administration had consolidated the vertical of power, responded with much better organized and tougher anti-Western measures.54 Relations between Russia and the West were gradually returning to the

49 Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 98. 50 See: Ibid., p. 101. 51 A.I. Utkin, Mirovoy poriadok XXI veka, Eksmo, Moscow, 2002, pp. 358-359. 52 See: M. Laumulin, “U.S. Strategy and Policy in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, p. 47. 53 The foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan discussed this in March 1998 (see: A. Bülent, “Turkey’s Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 41). 54 In 2001, the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan brought the West and Russia closer to a certain extent on the anti-Taliban basis, however the “thaw” was short-lived for the reasons discussed above. 18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 ideological confrontation of the half-forgotten Cold War. The Kremlin criticized the West, and Amer- ica in particular, for its efforts to perpetuate a unipolar world order; its consistent inattention to the U.N.’s multisided mechanisms, air strikes on Serbia, and the war on Iraq. The West responded with scything criticism of Russia: overuse of military force during the second war in Chechnia and strict centralization of power, which the West interpreted as curtailment of the democratic changes and a return to authoritarianism. The United States and its European allies could not help being worried by Moscow’s increasingly obvious intention to use the economic instruments at its disposal to put pressure on the newly independent states and by placing its wager on energy geopolitics, which peaked in the Ukraine gas crisis. The new forms of Russia’s geopolitics which affected the strategic interests of the West and, in the case of the European Union, its security called for an adequate response. The West readjusted its idea about Central Eurasia; the changed context called for a much more integral idea and corresponding practical steps in the area. The new ideas and practical steps took the forms of the Greater Central Asia55 and the Greater Black Sea region56 conceptions. Alternative transportation routes were seen as the most adequate response to Russia’s energy policy, which means that the West needed a stronger position in the fuel-rich and transit countries as one of the components of its new strategy. To achieve this, it was necessary, first, to increase political, economic, and military-technical support of the most vulnerable newly independent states; second, to establish closer cooperation among these countries and between them and NATO and the EU (including in the energy and transportation spheres) on a bilateral level and within the common West-oriented institutions. The BTC oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (commissioned in 2006 and 2007, respectively) could be used to set up routes for transporting Azerbaijani oil and gas; an East- West energy transportation system bypassing Russia designed to hook up Central Asian producers, primarily of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, to this route was seen as the next step. The fuel-rich countries, in turn, want to lower their present dependence on Russia and to be able to move their hydrocarbons to the West along alternative routes, which explains why, despite Rus- sia’s negative attitude to these projects, the Central Asian states are demonstrating their at least partial acceptance of the Western position. In June 2006, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement On Promoting Oil Transportation from Kazakhstan via the Caspian and the Territory of Azerbaijan to the World Markets through the BTC System. This meant that Kazakhstan officially joined the pipeline project. It was expected that oil from Kazakhstan would be moved across the sea by tank- ers to be transported further along the BTC pipeline.57 In January 2007, Kazakhstan’s national company, KazMunayGaz, and the Western oil companies working in the Northern Caspian and the Ten- giz projects (ENI, Total, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, ConocoPhillips, Inpex, and Chevron) signed a Memorandum of Mutual Understanding of the Main Principles of Cooperation on the Kazakhstani Caspian Transportation System Project intended to move the oil extracted in Kashagan and Tengiz across the Caspian Sea (the Eskene-Kuryk-Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route),58 the relevant figure being 23 million tons of Kazakhstani oil at the initial stage.59

55 See: S.F. Starr, “A ‘Greater Central Asia Partnership’ for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors,” Silk Road Paper, March 2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2005, available at [http:// www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/Strategy.pdf]; S.F. Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, July/August 2005, pp. 164-178. 56 See: S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, op. cit. 57 At the first stage, it was expected to move up to 10 million tons of Kazakhstani oil every year. 58 See: S. Smirnov, “Morskoy flot. Kaspiy ne zhdet,” KAZAKHSTAN, No. 3, 2007, available at [http://www. investkz.com/journals/52/500.html]. 59 See: “The Eskene-Kuryk Oilpipeline,” available at [http://www.kmg.kz/page.php?page_id=1128&lang=1]. 19 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

It was at the same time that the West returned to the earlier abandoned idea of a trans-Caspian pipeline system (the Aktau-Baku oil pipeline and a gas pipeline to move gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline)60 actively discussed in the 1990s. This made the planned Nabucco61 and the TGI62 (Turkey-Greece-Italy) gas pipelines, as well as the White Stream idea (a pipeline intended to move gas from Georgia to Rumania along the bottom of the Black Sea)63 much more attractive. In March 2007 in Washington, the U.S. Secretary of State and Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Cooperation in Energy Security in the Caspian which emphasized the sides’ desire to start a high-level dialog on energy security in the Caspian under the joint chairmanship of the U.S. Department of State and the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan and their intention to cooperate in gas pipeline projects which would bring gas to Europe via Turkey.64 In April 2007, Rumania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy signed a treaty on the Constanþa- Trieste oil pipeline with an annual carrying capacity of up to 100 million tons that will connect the Black Sea and Adriatic costs. In this way, Kazakhstani and Azeri oil will arrive in Europe without passing through the Russian Federation and Turkey.65 In May and October, Western countries organized energy summits, in Krakow and Vilnius, respectively, to discuss energy supplies, which brought together the presidents of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, and Poland, the minister of energy and mineral resources of Kazakhstan, and representatives of the EU, the United States, and other countries. The Vilnius summit adopted several documents, in particular, an Agreement among Az- erbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine on cooperation in the energy sphere; an Agreement among Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine on setting up a company to promote the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk66 project, and an Agreement on the Lithuanian-Polish energy bridge.67 In May 2009, the EU summit in Prague approved the idea of the Southern Energy Corridor to ensure stable deliveries of Caspian and Middle Eastern energy resources to Europe.68 In January 2011, during the visit of Head of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso to Azerbaijan, the sides signed a joint declaration on the Southern Energy Corridor. This means that Azerbaijan agrees to send its gas to Europe along this energy corridor. The Kremlin, which cannot block these Western initiatives, tried to minimize their effect and bind Europe tighter to its own energy resources. In 2006, as soon as the Nabucco project had been approved, Gazprom, the Kremlin-controlled monopolist, announced that it had signed an agreement with Hungary on increasing the carrying capacity of the Blue Stream gas pipeline69 and its extension

60 It was expected that the planned carrying capacity of the trans-Caspian pipeline would be within the 26-32 billion cu m limit (see: I. Tomberg, “Energy Policy and Energy Projects in Central Eurasia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (8), 2007, p. 47). 61 Planned carrying capacity—26 to 32 billion cu m a year. 62 Planned carrying capacity—12 billion cu m a year. 63 See: B. Grgic, A. Petersen, “Escaping Gazprom’s Embrace,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 14, Spring 2008, available at [http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/14/grgic&petersen.php]. 64 See: “Azerbaijan and the United States Signed a Memorandum on Energy Security,” Day Az, 23 Match, 2007, available at [http://www.day.az/news/politics/74232.html]. 65 See: I. Tomberg, op. cit., p. 44. 66 The reverse oil pipeline Odessa-Brody, which connects the Black Sea terminal and the Druzhba pipeline, was completed in 2001. It is expected that the branch from Brody to Plock in Poland will move Caspian oil to Gdansk and further on to European customers (see: I. Tomberg, op. cit., p. 43). 67 See: “Energetichesky summit v Vilniuse,” Echo, No. 188 (1669), 11 October, 2007, available at [http://www.echo- az.com/archive/2007_10/1669/politica03.shtml]; “Na summit v Vilniuse pribyl glava Evrosoiuza,” Echo, No. 189 (1670), 12 October, 2007, available at [http://www.echo-az.com/archive/2007_10/1670/politica04.shtml]. 68 The Southern Corridor consists of several routes: Nabucco, Turkey-Greece-Italy, the White Stream, and the trans- Adriatic gas pipeline. 69 The pipeline, commissioned in 2003 and which passes along the bottom of the Black Sea, is the main pipeline via which gas from Russia reaches Turkey; its annual carrying capacity is 16 billion cu m. 20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 to Hungary from Turkey and the Balkan states. Gazprom’s other maneuvers include its attempts to gain control over Hungary’s oil and gas company, MOL,70 and Serbia’s state oil company, NIS71; its initiatives to build the South Stream gas main pipeline72 and the Caspian Gas Pipeline73; its raising the carrying capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium74; its building the Burgas-Alexandroupoli oil pipeline75; and its striving to purchase extra volumes of gas from the countries that can sell their gas to Europe through the Southern Energy Corridor (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan).

Conclusion

The radically changed post-Cold War geopolitical situation in Central Eurasia inevitably invited the United States and its European allies to revise the region’s security-related role. The mighty Soviet state disappeared along with the main threat to the Western world. Liberated from Soviet control, the region has gradually developed into a source of new threats. The Soviet “nuclear legacy” and the uncontrolled zones in Central Eurasia, as well as the armed conflicts and domestic instability in the regional newly independent states have created the threat of WMD proliferation. The Iranian nuclear file and the possibility that non-state extremist organizations might gain access to WMD have made the West especially sensitive to the threat. The West is equally aware of Central Eurasia as a link between the key Eurasian geopolitical actors (Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran) and an outlet to Afghanistan, which today is the main theater of struggle against international terrorism. The region is also an area of potentially diversified sources of hydrocarbons the West needs to lower the EU’s dependence on Russia. The main priorities of the Western tandem’s political course in Central Eurasia throughout the entire post-Soviet period have been to strengthen the newly independent states through democratization and promoting a market economy, to encourage geopolitical pluralism at the regional level, and to develop a ramified system of oil and gas pipelines to ensure energy flows to Europe. The absence of any obvious success either in Iran or in Afghanistan, the steady depletion of the world oil and gas resources, the equally steady increase in their consumption, the rivalry among the world powers for energy sources, China’s successful advance toward a superpower status, and Rus- sia’s attempts to restore its great power status with the help of its energy policy are increasing, and will continue to increase, the role of Central Eurasia in ensuring the security of the United States and the European Union and, therefore, their consolidated involvement in the region.

70 See: B. Grgic, A. Petersen, op. cit. 71 See: “Serbia gotova ustupit ‘Gazpromu’ natsionalnuiu neftianuiu kompaniiu za 1billion,” NEWSru.com, 27 De- cember, 2007, available at [http://palm.newsru.com/finance/27dec2007/srpska.html]. 72 The planned annual carrying capacity of the South Stream is 30 billion cu m. It is expected to pass along the bottom of the Black Sea to Bulgaria. There are two alternatives: it will either move to the southwest—across Greece and the Adriatic Sea to South Italy, or to the northwest—across Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Slovenia to Northern Italy. Gazprom is prepared to implement either of these projects or both of them (see: Th.N. Marketos, op. cit., p. 59). 73 In May 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan signed the Declaration on Building the Caspian Gas Pipeline with an annual capacity of 30 billion cu m. It will stretch along 360 km of the Turkmenian and 150 km of the Kazakh coast to join the Central Asia-Center main pipeline (see: I. Tomberg, op. cit., p. 50). 74 It is planned to increase the initial annual carrying capacity of 28.2 million tons to 67 million tons. 75 Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria signed the agreement in December 2007; the initial annual carrying capacity of 15 million tons could be increased to 50 million tons (see: “Podpisano soglashenie po nefteprovodu Burgas-Alexandrupo- lis,” 18 January, 2008, available at [http://top.rbc.ru/economics/18/01/2008/134533.shtml]). 21 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS CENTRAL ASIA: GEOPOLITICS, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS

Eldar GABDULLIN Ph.D. (Philos.), Expert at the Center for Contemporary Policy (CECOP) (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

s global power and influence move pro- Central Asia, a small energy-rich area, oc- gressively eastward, all the main interna- cupies a special place in the Asian architecture. A tional actors have their sights set on playing This region determines the flows of energy re- a leading role in Asia. The world nations are trying sources to every corner of the earth, and also to build new relations and form advantageous bal- neighbors on unstable Afghanistan. ances of power with the developing Asian countries, The interests of the largest global players where the soil is already fertile for both expanding are concentrated precisely on Central Asia; in cooperation and intensifying competition. some sense, the region holds the key to the geo- In all likelihood, present-day Asia, where political future and stability of the entire Asian most of the world’s population lives and signifi- continent. cant achievements in industrial development have This article presents the author’s view of the been made, will largely determine the future vec- situation in Central Asia, conducts an analysis of tors of globalization. The region’s countries are the risks and challenges the region’s countries are also characterized by rampant military spending, encountering, and determines the possible paths fierce competition over resources, and smolder- of development in the context of internal problems ing seats of conflict. and external influence.

Central Asia Today

Central Asia continues to retain its international importance thanks to its advantageous geopolitical location close to Russia, China, Iran, and the Caucasus, its high energy and natural resource potential, its transportation and transit capabilities, and its proximity to the hotbeds of armed conflicts (Afghanistan and Pakistan), which have a strong impact on international security. In this respect, the region will remain an area where the interests and strategies of the CA states themselves and many external geopolitical players, mainly Russia, the U.S., China, the European Union (EU), Iran, and Turkey, intercept. Defining the development prospects for Central Asia largely depends on the assessments of current policy toward the region, as well as the strategies of foreign countries that are having a crucial influence on the situation and security in the Central Asian region. Central Asia is a young region that is still building its institutional structure and system of international organizations, as well as searching for its cultural and political identity. The region is charac-

22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 terized by many different cultural practices and identities, as well as by a wide range of interpretations of historical heritage. It should also be noted that the Central Asian region is developing in the context of the diverse, frequently contradictory, integration projects that are being advanced by powerful geopolitical forces. Central Asia is distinguished by a unique combination of the diverse challenges and threats that exist in it. The situation is aggravated by the rivalry among external forces and the absence of cooperation among the Central Asian states themselves. Thus, all the attempts of international cooperation to neutralize the risks are reduced to naught. The Central Asian region is a hostage of the ever-growing global ambiguity; its dependence on the structure of world politics is a long-term problem since the correlation of power on the global arena among the key external players is in constant flux.1 From the geopolitical viewpoint, Central Asia’s security is a complex multilateral structure in which different forces function simultaneously. Moreover, the Central Asian states participate in various regional organizations and are related in the security respect to several geopolitical power centers at the same time. There are many reasons for the challenges and threats to the stability and sustainable development of the Central Asian states. They are generated, for example, by the aggravated domestic political processes, by the various active extremist and terrorist organizations in the region, by the growing drug trafficking, by migration and city marginalization problems, by environmental degradation and water shortages, by the high conflict-prone nature of the region in terms of ethnic and confessional intolerance, and so on. All the problems related to Central Asia’s security are interregional in nature. Despite the fact that the place and role of Central Asia in the world community have not been ultimately defined, the region is gradually being drawn into various interregional and global processes, including destructive ones. The transnational nature of the threats and the low level of independence of each of the region’s states make it impossible for them to resolve the entire set of current problems unilaterally. Only joint efforts can help to eliminate the threats, increase security, and prevent and overcome crisis situations in Central Asia. But it should be noted that the prospect of Central Asia’s real integration, at least using those models that have already been tested, is very discouraging due to the antagonism existing in the relations among the region’s countries. Moreover, all the Central Asian states are developing in diamet- rically opposite directions.

Evaluation of the Current Development of the Region’s States

The region’s states have reached a crossroads, whereby each of them is promoting its own scenario of future development, which is not only having a significant impact on the situation in the Central Asian region, but is also increasing misunderstanding among the regional players.

1 See: A. Kazantsev, Bolshaia igra s neizvestnymi pravilami: mirovaia politika i Tsentral’naia Azia, Nasledie Evrasii, Moscow, 2008, 241 pages. 23 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Kyrgyzstan. From the political viewpoint, present-day Kyrgyzstan is an extremely unstable state formation in which forced changes in power periodically take place. A systemic socioeconomic crisis is going on in the country that is retaining the tension (social and ethnic). Moreover, the country does not have enough military and force potential, which makes it a favorable environment for transnational organized crime, the drug mafia, and religious extremist groups. And they, coalescing with the authorities at different levels, are becoming even more firmly ensconced on the republic’s political scene. From the economic viewpoint, Kyrgyzstan is an industrially undeveloped country with a low standard of living and high level of unemployment, which prompts workers to leave the country in search of a living. Remittances from Kyrgyz guest workers are a principal component of the state’s financial system. The republic also has untapped economic potential that is primarily concentrated in the farming (fruit and vegetables), energy (hydropower), and resource (water and gold) branches of the economy, as well as a certain amount of human capital that actively participates in regional labor migration (low- qualified specialists). Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy course is aimed toward multivectoral cooperation with Russia, the U.S., China, and Kazakhstan; on the whole, however, the country is in favor of regional integration as the best way to ensure its integrity and strengthen national security. In recent years, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy has also been characterized by instability, fluctuat- ing along with the changes in its relations with Russia and the U.S., which are trying to put pressure on Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan does not have enough political clout; its capabilities are stymied by the strong influence and pressure of neighboring states, as well as by the existing territorial disputes with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It should be noted that Bishkek makes active use of the economic levers of pressure (the region’s water and energy supply) to defend its interests. Tajikistan. From the political viewpoint, present-day Tajikistan is an extremely unstable state that is subject to domestic political fluctuations and sociopolitical crises. Religious-extremist groups and criminal syndicates that control drug trafficking from Afghanistan have a strong influence on the republic. The political situation in the country is severely aggravated by the systemic problems of socioeconomic development, which remain unresolved and so are causing permanent tension and a power crisis in the country. In economic terms, Tajikistan is an industrially undeveloped country with an extremely low standard of living and high level of unemployment. Remittances from Tajik migrant workers are a major element of the financial system. The republic also has untapped economic potential that is primarily concentrated in farming, and in the energy (hydropower) and resource (water and gold) industries. The country also has certain amount of human capital that actively participates in regional labor migration (low-qualified specialists). The country’s foreign policy course is aimed toward multivectoral cooperation with Russia, the U.S., the EU, China, and Iran, on which Tajikistan is very economically and politically dependent. The country’s main military and political priorities are largely related to developing cooperation with Russia, as well as with the U.S. and EU (via NATO). The main stakes in trade and economic and investment activity are placed on relations with China and Iran, with the help of which Tajikistan is trying to solve various problems, including building its infrastructure. So Tajikistan’s activity in the integration sphere is directed toward resolving problems of economic development and strengthening national security. Tajikistan has relatively weak political potential; it is under strong pressure from Uzbekistan and Afghanistan and also has several political and territorial disputes with some neighboring countries (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan).

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Dushanbe defends its interests by making active use of the levers of pressure it has (water supply, territorial disputes, drug trafficking), as well as by means of its involvement in the processes going on in Afghanistan, with which it has close ethnocultural ties. Turkmenistan. Politically, Turkmenistan is a country with relatively stable sociopolitical conditions ensured by the country’s closed nature, rigorous domestic course, and relatively high (in regional terms) standard of living. Turkmenistan is less subject to outside pressure, although the republic’s domestic political situation is characterized by unstable legal rules and an unsophisticated mechanism for transferring presidential power. Economically, Turkmenistan is a country with a relatively high standard of living, which is largely maintained by exporting energy resources (gas and oil). At present, Ashghabad is placing its stakes on extensive and active development of infrastructure, particularly in the transportation and telecommunications sphere. The republic’s service sphere has reached a high level of development, much higher than the growth of the industrial and agricultural sectors. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy course is based on the principle of neutrality. The country does not participate in international and regional integration structures, while it establishes its relations with different states on an exclusively bilateral basis. The republic is primarily interested in attracting large investments into Turkmen energy projects (from China, Iran, and Europe), as well as developing multivectoral transportation corridors (to Chi- na, India, Iran, and Europe), including pipeline routes that bypass Russia. Turkmenistan has a low level of political and economic influence. The republic pursues a cau- tious policy toward its regional neighbors (primarily in the economic sphere), with an emphasis on keeping the existing problems in check. Uzbekistan. In the political respect, Uzbekistan, the most densely populated Central Asian country, is a state with a strict authoritarian regime, the mechanisms of which make it possible to keep sociopolitical tension and discontent in the country under control. Uzbekistan’s state and political structure is distinguished by high personalization of the current president’s power; the ruling regime tries to retain total control over all the processes going on in the country and keep the clamps on any liberal initiatives. The unstable legal rules and unsophisticated mechanism for transferring presidential power are the main threats to destabilization of the situation. Uzbekistan is characterized by a high level of poverty and unemployment, which is aggravated by the specifics of the state’s economic policy based on repressive and confiscatory methods. Busi- ness is strictly controlled, and remittances from migrant workers are a principal component of the financial system. Uzbekistan has a large amount of untapped economic potential that is primarily concentrated in the farming (fruit, vegetables, and cotton), industrial (food and chemical), and energy (gas) branches of the economy, and it also has colossal (by regional standards) demographic resources. Uzbekistan’s foreign policy course greatly depends on the changing geopolitical situation in the world at large; whereby Tashkent tries to maneuver between Russia and the West, periodically shift- ing the military and political accents, while at the same time establishing close ties with China (mainly in the economic sphere). Uzbekistan is inconstant with respect to its participation in integration (international and regional) and military-political structures. Uzbekistan does not have common borders with Russia, China, Iran, or other large countries, which greatly hinders realization of its potential. But thanks to its advantageous geostrategic location (the republic borders on all the CA countries and Afghanistan), Uzbekistan has significant political and economic influence on the Central Asian region and openly demonstrates its claims to regional leadership.

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The republic has a whole set of tools for influencing its neighbors and makes active use of pressure in establishing regional relations and meeting its national interests. Kazakhstan, in contrast to the other CA countries, is not trying to preserve its fundamental civilizational values. Nevertheless, this country suffers from such regional “illnesses” as semi-authoritarian rule, corruption, a resource-oriented economy, and so on. In order to occupy a worthy place among the Eurasian leaders, Kazakhstan is exerting unre- lenting efforts to change the vector of its development by actively transforming the existing political and economic system. But, despite the republic’s potential, it faces a multitude of geo-economic challenges. Its course toward economic growth, gradual liberalization, and stability of foreign political priorities has made Kazakhstan an attractive target for foreign investments, which stimulate the republic’s development. Kazakhstan also differs from the other states of the region in the fact that it tries to derive as much benefit as possible from close cooperation with Russia, the West, and China, as well as from active participation in international processes. It cannot be claimed that Kazakhstan’s current identity is related only to its post-Soviet past, or to its affiliation with the Asian area; nor is there a pro-western tilt in the republic’s policy. Kazakhstan is trying to position itself as a Eurasian integration bridge; various projects (mainly utopian) are being put forward aimed at turning Central Asia into a united political and economic union of sorts (a Union of Central Asian States) that so far have no prospects. On the whole, it seems that precisely by retaining the current model of state development and fulfilling the declared plans, Kazakhstan will be able to distinguish itself among the CIS transit states and spearhead Central Asia’s evolution. The “-stan” identity that has survived from the common historical past continues to play its part; it could also become the basis of a new dialog among the CA countries destabilized by regional rivalry.

Security Risks in the Central Asian Region

At present, the factors listed below, which are often interrelated, are arousing particular concern in the development of the regional situation in Central Asia. The existing internal development problems are promoting the emergence of and increase in overall destabilizing factors. All the region’s countries have serious population problems in terms of both quantity and quality; overpopulation and the polyethnic nature of many countries are aggravating the socioeconomic and political situation even more. Moreover, in addition to the increased tendency toward conflicts, rise in extremism, uncontrollable migration processes, and higher transnational crime, spiritual-cultural deformation, which is also stimulating the emergence of overall destabilizing factors (domestic and regional), is seen in some states. Mid- and long-term development of the Central Asian states is characterized by unpredictabil- ity. In this context, it seems appropriate to mention the ongoing negative processes and phenomena that could have a dramatic effect on domestic political development and cause profound and extensive domestic political instability in Central Asia prompted by destabilization of the ruling regimes and the use of force during changes in power.

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It is also possible that states could split along ethnic or territorial lines (Tajikistan-Gorny Ba- dakhshan and the regions contiguous to Uzbekistan; Uzbekistan-the Fergana Valley), or interstate tension increase. The region is still under the influence of asymmetrical threats and challenges that form both within the CA states and beyond them. In the context of the weak state regimes, extensive corruption, and difficult socioeconomic situation in several CA countries, transnational entities (religious-extremist organizations, drug cartels, cross-border criminal groups, and so on) are becoming independent players in the region. They have significant resources (financial, human, and infrastructural), as well as a large military arsenal, and in the future their influence will most likely grow. So in the next few years, there will be a shift in the vector of activity of the CA states toward ensuring national security. Particular attention must be directed not to the risks posed by the influence of external nations, but to the growing threats from transnational criminal entities. The region is being subjected to Islamism, which is related to the development of extremist trends and the increase in terrorist activity. International Islamist forces are taking advantage of the specifics of the ethnocultural composition of the CA states. In light of the events of 2010, it can be claimed that extremist organizations are continuing to destabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. They are also spreading their influence to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (AfPak), as well as to the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) with the aim of creating an “Islamic state.” The absence of the necessary measures for opposing the activity of the sufficiently widespread and coordinated network of Islamist organizations is creating the real threat of extremist ideas spreading in the northwesterly direction. A major difference in interests is seen among the ruling elites of the CA countries with respect to national interests, preferences, and development goals and objectives; several interstate problems remain unresolved. It is extremely likely that if the existing situation continues, the misunderstanding among the CA states with respect to many regional issues will significantly grow (in the medium and long term). Relations with neighbors are essentially continuing to occupy a secondary place in foreign political priorities of the CA countries and this tendency is growing, which could greatly hinder the establishment of a regional dialog. Preservation and periodical intensification of disputes in relations among the region’s countries. One of the most controversial issues involves the balanced distribution of water resources. For example, Uzbekistan is extremely displeased with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s attempts to implement hydropower projects. Moreover, there are unresolved issues among the three countries concerning state borders and territorial claims, which is aggravating the existing ethnic contradictions and could lead to conflicts. Ongoing economic instability and the region’s insufficient potential. The global economic crisis has become a serious challenge for the CA countries; it is very likely that its negative repercussions will be felt for the next several years. The economy of most of the CA countries, which is oriented toward the raw material sector, has been dealt a severe blow by the negative changes in the global situation. The matter primarily concerns the least developed countries of the region, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are more subject to systematic energy crises. There has also been an abrupt drop in demand for migrant workers from these countries, primarily in the Russian and Kazakhstan markets. It should be noted that instead of establishing close economic cooperation, the CA states prefer to rely only on their own capabilities or on interaction with external actors. Influence of external factors on regional destabilization. In order to redistribute and reinforce the zones of their influence and domination, the external actors are exerting various levers of pressure

27 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS on the region’s states, the geopolitical rivalry of which is in all likelihood gradually growing into a new active phase. Moreover, the region’s border areas are potential sources of challenges and threats to its stability, primarily from Iran (risks related to the military threat from the U.S.) and possibly Mongolia (risks related to aggravation of the domestic political situation in that country). The permanent negative impact Afghanistan is having on the situation in Central Asia also undermines the region’s stability. The security problem is complicated by the fact that there is not one state in the region capable at present of independently opposing mass threats and challenges for an extended length of time, particularly if they become institutionalized, that is, turn into a mass movement or organized institution. This likelihood will significantly increase if new economic or political problems emerge in the CA countries.

* * *

Analyzing and forecasting the development of the CA countries is complicated by the fact that many different internal factors (low level of socioeconomic development, political uncertainty, uneven state-building processes) are causing the internal regional situation and dynamics of relations among the states to constantly change. Many risks are also generated by Afghanistan’s proximity (drug trafficking through the region, active religious extremists and transnational crime groups). Central Asia becoming a target of geopolitical rivalry among the major international players is also fraught with unpredictable consequences.

Policy, Interests, and Degree of Influence of the External Players and Transnational Entities in Central Asia

Today, the main participants in the Great Geopolitical Game in Central Asia are Russia, the U.S., and China; the EU, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Iran are also showing an increasing interest in the region. However, the players’ interests do not always coincide and often escalate into severe geopolitical conflicts that have a negative effect on the regional situation. So successful political and economic development of the Central Asian region in the long term largely depends on the quality of relations with external actors.

The G-4 in the Region

Russia has always regarded Central Asia as a zone of its vitally important interests. Moscow is trying to retain a high level of influence on the region’s countries by making active use of the economic ties developed in Soviet times and of the integration structures (CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC, and Customs Union). Russia is particularly interested in expanding its own and putting the clamps on external military presence in the region, increasing its economic influence, developing new raw

28 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 material and hydropower resources, controlling oil and gas transportation routes, and forming a common information and cultural expanse with the CA countries aimed at ensuring Russian information dominance. For historical and geographic reasons, Russia is very involved in the processes going on in the region and has the most effective levers of pressure on the CA countries. It is also trying to acquire monopoly access for its companies to the development of valuable mineral and energy resource fields. The Russian side is not interested at all in diversification of the national economies of the region’s countries, since this process could undermine its influence and lead to the appearance and development of alternative economic projects (without Russia’s participation). On the whole, Russia’s long-term strategy in Central Asia will be targeted at forming and implementing reliable ways of having an influence on the region’s states. The U.S., like Russia, regards the Caspian-Central Asian region as a sphere of its vitally important interests; its Eurasian geostrategy is based on the Greater Central Asia conception that envisages recruiting the region’s countries to support the military campaign in Afghanistan. The U.S.’s main interests are concentrated in the production and transportation of energy resources, while its military-political presence in the region’s countries is of particular strategic importance to it (due to the proximity of Russia, China, Iran, and the AfPak zone). In other words, the U.S. regards the region’s territory as a favorable springboard for exerting direct political influence on Russia and China, carrying out military action in AfPak, or launching a potential military strike on Iran. Whereby it is crystal clear that the U.S. is trying to distance the CA states as much as possible from Russia’s influence; to this end, Washington is using political levers of pressure, democratic rhetoric, and exerting all the influence it can on the region’s countries (directly and through international organizations or NGOs). On the whole, the U.S.’s strategy in Central Asia does not envisage large investments in the socioeconomic development of the region’s countries and is mainly directed toward the energy and resource-producing sectors of the economy. The PRC regards the CA in the long term as a zone of its domination and a source of cheap energy and natural resources. China is slowly, consistently, and cautiously building its relations with the region’s countries while trying to increase its own economic influence on them. So China’s strategic task is to fortify its own position in the CA region, which is necessary for its large-scale economic expansion. China’s powerful financial and investment capabilities are making it possible for it to penetrate the region’s economy and, in so doing, prepare the way for exerting its political influence. China’s long-term goal is to gain as much economic control over the CA states as possible and turn them into its raw material base. At the present stage, Beijing is focusing its attention on reorienting the pipeline routes from Central Asia away from Russia and toward China. In its regional strategy, China is trying to distance itself as much as possible from geopolitical competition with other external players. Security in the border regions and primarily in XUAR is an important aspect of China’s foreign policy interaction with the CA states. Beijing’s steps will be directed toward keeping conflict potential and separatist moods under wraps. China regards the SCO as an important mechanism for solving its tasks. It holds a dominating position in this organization, and it is this regional organization that will become the main “tool” in Beijing’s policy in Central Asia in the future. Chinese migrants who come to the region (along with investments and commercial business) without attracting attention are posing a particular threat to Central Asia.

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As for the EU, it is trying to apply its own more independent approach to Central Asia. The Europeans are making use of detailed programs in their activity and are in general acting in a very organized way. The EU Strategy for CA until 2013 regards the region as a source of challenges to European security. Moreover, this document envisages cooperation in bilateral and multilateral for- mats in various spheres. This approach is noteworthy since it recognizes and keeps in mind alternative ways of promoting regional development and establishing security institutions. So, to avoid additional risks, the Europeans have been adapting their approaches to the real situation in the region from the very beginning. The main areas of European interests include the production and transportation of Central Asian energy resources (bypassing Russian pipelines) and combating the threats to security coming from Afghanistan. The humanitarian component of European policy toward the CA will include increasing the number of educational programs and issuing study grants. Both existing and new projects promoted by international organizations (the OSCE) and regional programs (TACIS, TRACECA, and BOMCA) can be described as a “soft” means for penetrating the region. The EU has the opportunity in the medium term to actively join the regional processes aimed at resolving the water and hydropower problems. On the whole, however, the EU’s Central Asian policy is still rather amorphous, although some European countries (Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands) are taking active steps on the regional arena, acting largely in keeping with their own national interests. It should be noted that the EU is prevented from becoming a serious competitive player by the complicated bureaucratic mechanism of collegial decision-making that exists within this organization itself.

New Powers in the Region

Turkish politicians are putting forward the idea of creating a Turkic world under the aegis of Ankara and regard Central Asia as one of its important components. At the current stage, however, Turkey’s foreign political activity in Central Asia is not distinguished by a comprehensive approach and is rather feeble. This is primarily due to the political problems that exist in Turkey itself, as well as its foreign policy strategy oriented toward the EU and U.S. Although it consistently promotes its Central Asian strategy, Turkey has still not set itself the goal of becoming actively involved in the game. It is integrating into the region’s economy by means of joint business projects and investment programs. Ankara is also putting particular effort into en- hancing its cultural influence by introducing a variety of sociocultural and educational projects. Turkey is currently increasing its political activity in the region; the country is making intensive use of the potential of such regional structures as TURKSOI, the OIC, and CICMA. An increase in the pro-Islamist political forces within Turkey itself will also promote Ankara’s greater involvement in resolving regional problems. Iran is striving to increase its influence in the region by developing trade, transit projects, religious propaganda, and cultural kinship with Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Iran, which is in international isolation to a certain extent, is stepping up its foreign policy activity in Central Asia to expand its economic and political contacts; relations with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are particularly important to Tehran from the viewpoint of settling the Caspian question. Iran’s interests are mainly concentrated in the trade and economic sphere and in the development of transportation corridors through Central Asia toward Russia. Tehran’s striving to find a niche for itself in Central Asia is also prompted by its desire to receive timely information about the U.S.’s

30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 plans, since this country could use the region’s territory as a springboard for launching a military attack on Iran. The Iranian side could also use the religious-extremist channels that pass mainly through Tajikistan and Afghanistan in order to penetrate into the region. In the long term, it is likely that Tehran will toughen up its policy toward certain CA states, which will depend on their stance regarding the Irani- an nuclear program and level of development of cooperation with the U.S. and its allies. Pakistan is establishing cooperation with the CA states in developing the economy and ensuring regional security. At present, Pakistan is undergoing relatively rapid economic growth and so the raw material potential of the Central Asian region is of special interest to this country. The most promising aspect is the import of energy resources from hydro-resource-rich Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan. In the short term, Islamabad’s strategy of cooperation with the Central Asian countries will be aimed as before toward developing energy transportation routes not controlled by India (the Trans- Afghan gas pipeline, the Karakorum highway, and the high-voltage power transmission line from Tajikistan). In the medium and long term, it is predicted that Islamabad will step up its efforts to gain full- fledged membership in the SCO as a way to ensure its regional security interests (in light of the active steps being taken by the U.S. and India in Southeast Asia). But internal socioeconomic problems, domestic political instability, the continuing confrontation with India, and the country’s involvement in the Afghan conflict are factors hindering Pakistan’s full-scale integration into Central Asia’s regional processes. India is also showing an interest in increasing its influence in Central Asia in the medium and long term. At the current stage, India’s influence in the region is limited, but there are opportunities for it to increase. The country is interested in gaining a foothold (regardless of how strong) in the Central Asian region for strategic reasons. Its new foreign policy is based on the need to expand its traditional sphere of influence, which encompasses Southeast and South Asia, as well as the water area of the Indian Ocean. India is also trying to indirectly hamper Pakistan’s influence on the region, so we can expect an increase in its interaction with Iran (Pakistan’s opponent) in Central Asia. The main vectors of India’s cooperation with the Central Asian countries in ensuring regional security include the joint struggle against Islamic extremism, terrorism, and the drug business, as well as settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. The region’s states are a potential source of energy resources for India, as well as a promising sales market for its industrial production. At the same time, the absence of a developed transportation and energy infrastructure, as well as the crisis situation in Afghanistan and in the north of Pakistan are hindering the development of In- dia’s full-fledged multilateral relations with the CA states. Interaction within the SCO (India has been an observer in this organization since 2005, and at present is striving to become its member) and CICMA (New Delhi is one of its active participants) are promising vectors of institutional cooperation between India and the Central Asian states. In the long term, India’s strategy will most likely be aimed at targeted and gradual integration into the economy of the Central Asian countries with an emphasis on cooperation in the oil and gas, energy, and mining sectors. Achieving a certain concentration of Indian capital in the economy of the Central Asian countries will help to increase New Delhi’s influence on the region.

* * *

Such is the variegated geopolitical situation in the region, which is giving rise to the many different foreign policy orientations of the CA countries and the absence of clear rules in the emerging

31 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS strategic game for influence. So Central Asia’s further development will depend on how the nearby nations and the distant geopolitical players wield their growing might (whether they will act independently or in partnership with other countries, what scenarios will be put forward, and so on). Russia, which is gradually losing ground in the region, is well aware that the remnants of the Soviet elites are gradually disappearing from Central Asia’s political arena. Despite the region’s increasingly negative perception of its northern neighbor, Moscow is trying to draw the Central Asian region as much as possible into its integration network. However, its integration projects are not that interesting from the ideological viewpoint, while participation in them mainly depends on tactical pragmatics. China’s rising status is attracting particular attention; its active steps in the region have left the other players far behind. India’s Central Asian strategy is still not entirely clear; it is difficult to predict how China and the Islamic “Messiah” Republic of Iran, which is striving to gain access to the region by means of its ideology and political “product,” will respond to India’s growing activity. Pakistan’s influence in Central Asia is rising. By manipulating the military-political situation in Afghanistan, this country is trying to put pressure on the U.S., in so doing tying the geopolitical knot even tighter. The future of the Central Asian region will depend on the nature and degree of interaction between the Central Asian states and the external players. The region could eventually become a target of tough international competition.

Development Scenarios of the Situation in the Region

In the foreseeable future (until 2015), stable development of Central Asia will depend on the following factors: (1) the state of the economy throughout the entire region in the context of the global situation; (2) the level of consensus or antagonism among the external geopolitical forces; (3) the political situation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and possible changes in the political elites in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; (4) the influence of the situation in Afghanistan; (5) the likelihood of the U.S. carrying out any new military operations against Iran; (6) the degree of involvement of the new regional forces (India, Iran, and Turkey) in the Central Asian processes. In the next five years, there may be a shift in vectors of political development in the CA countries. For example, there may be a relative warming trend if a new leadership comes to power in Uz- bekistan and Tajikistan, but in no way a breakthrough in internal regional relations. Development of the region’s countries will largely depend on the economic problems, as well as on the threats to political stability created by the increase in extremism. Keeping in mind the worsening situation in the region and the growing significance of natural- resource potential, it can be asserted that Central Asia is increasingly becoming the arena for a geopolitical game, the new rules of which will be drawn up in the foreseeable future.

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Russia and the U.S., whose relations have warmed up somewhat, will most likely retain the status quo and continue to engage in “soft” competition. Such relations are advantageous to both states, since Russia needs American investments and innovations, and the U.S. wants to ensure its military presence in Central Asia for as long as possible. China will continue to take active steps aimed at increasing its economic presence in the region. In the long run, this will help Beijing to step up its political influence on Central Asia. The increase in religious extremism and aggravation of the situation in XUAR could force Chi- na to shift from observer to active military interference in the Afghan conflict (in order to weaken the Taliban). Turkey, which is gaining a stronger foothold on the international arena, will also become more active in Central Asia. Ankara is trying to augment its presence in the region and form a Turkic-speaking world in Eurasia. Turkey still has its sights set on retaining a strong economic position in the region, taking active part in oil and gas routes from CA (the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline and Nabucco), and developing its transit-transportation infrastructure. The Central Asian region is of particular geopolitical importance to Iran due to the U.S. military facilities deployed in the former’s territory capable of becoming a springboard for launching a military strike. Isolated by the West, Iran will augment its economic presence in the region. As it increases its participation in the regional processes, Tehran might try to put pressure on some of the region’s countries (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan). In counterbalance to China’s stronger position and the growing export of radical Islamism from Pakistan, India’s activity will noticeably grow, which has already been attempting to institutionally enforce its presence in the region, including military (for example, in Tajikistan). It should be noted that the Indian economy’s acute energy hunger is the second most important factor (after containing Pakistan) prompting the country’s increased activity in Central Asia. A long-term analysis identifies four main groups of global factors that will determine the situation in the Central Eurasian expanse until 2030: (1) a shift in economic vectors of development and scientific-technological breakthrough (shift in energy priorities); (2) radical changes in the correlation between the dimensions of the economies and the general balance of forces between Western and non-Western countries; (3) a demographic slump in the old industrial countries (“the global North”) and a sharp increase in population in the developing countries (“the global South”); (4) global competition between the new and old world nations and uncertain world order. By that time, Central Asia will be a regional formation with uneven political, economic, social, demographic, and cultural development capabilities. The following scenarios might emerge based on the macro-regional correlation of geopolitical forces throughout Central Eurasia (see Figure on p. 34). The “Central Asia as a Collapsing Region” scenario presumes progressive disintegration due to the increase in civilizational differences, self-removal from interaction and gravitation of different fragments of the region toward different development areas (Western, Russian, Chinese, Islamic, Turkic, Indian). Another alternative is possible: isolation of self-contained Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from regional instability and collapse of statehood in several countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).

33 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Permanent rivalry of several geopolitical projects for influence in the region Balance in the context of consensus domination external players—Russia, China, the U.S., EU, Iran, India, etc. Central Asia 2030: In the event of a constructive change in political elites, elimination interstate antagonism and increase in the countries’ cultural economic gravitation toward each other due to their understanding of the need for sustainable development, or that there is no other choice, by means of cooperation Multipolar Domination Independent sustainable economic development of the region’s countries at different rates with the support of various external forces in context balanced multipolar domination in the region Complete disintegration, self-removal from interaction and gravitation of different fragments of the region toward development areas (Western, Russian, Chinese, Islamic, Turkic, Indian) Isolation of self-contained Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from regional instability and collapse of statehood in several countries (Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan) Unipolar domination in the following alternatives: Sinocentric World, Russia’s Post-Imperial Project, Pax Americana/Europica, or Islamic Caliphate Long-Term Forecasted Scenario External Domination Central Asia as a Collapsing Region Central Asia as an Established Region Asia 2030 Central

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“External Domination.” Depending on the geopolitical breakdown on a macroeconomic scale in the region, different models of unipolar domination could be built: a Sinocentric World, Russia’s Post-Imperial Project, Pax Americana/Europica, or an Islamic Caliphate. Within the framework of the system of multipolar domination, another two scenarios are possible: one of them presumes a balance in the context of consensus domination of external players, and the other permanent rivalry of several geopolitical projects (the region’s energy-resource and transit potential will be the main factors, as well as the need to control the seat of instability in AfPak). There are two versions of the “Central Asia as an Established Region” scenario: 1. Constructive change in political elites, elimination of interstate antagonism and an increase in the countries’ cultural and economic gravitation toward each other due to their understanding of the need for sustainable development, or that there is no other choice, by means of cooperation. 2. Independent sustainable economic development of the region’s countries at different rates with the support of various external forces in the context of balanced multipolar domination in the region. The direction Central Asia will take in its development far from only depends on the region’s countries themselves; the global breakdown, Eurasian trends, and situation developing in Asia also have an effect on its positioning and stability. But during the years of independent development, not all the countries have realized that coordinated joint and non-conflict movement in the same direction (not necessarily within the framework of an integration union) will make it possible for Central Asia to grow stronger and be ready for future changes.

* * *

When Central Asia first appeared on the world map it was all the rage to perceive the processes going on there as destructive and predict the collapse of the states belonging to it and the blowup of the entire region as such. Of course, the region cannot be called calm, since it is frequently the scene of recurring destructive phenomena (political instability, terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and so on). However, during the 20 years of their development, the CA countries, despite the antagonism among them, have in one way or another managed to find ways to jointly combat these threats. Despite the current opinion that the situation in Central Asia is extremely unstable and explo- sive, the region’s countries, thanks to the effective security mechanisms, have never entered into direct military conflict with each other. At present, Central Asia is undergoing a transition; the likelihood of a disruption in the balance of power is prompting the need to establish a regional dialog, develop institutions of cooperation, and create positive scenarios of a joint future. We should not wait until Asia becomes an axis of global geopolitical transformation; the existing situation has everything required at present for the Central Asian countries to find ways to move toward sustainable development.

35 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS FORECAST ON THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION EMERGING IN THE WORLD AND THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION

Georgy DUBOVTSEV Ph.D. (Military Sciences), Colonel in the Reserves, President of JSC Center for Military-Strategic Research (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Erlan GALYMZHANULY Master of International Relations, Research Fellow at JSC Center for Military-Strategic Research (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

oday, the effects of worldwide globalization separatism, confessional and ethnic clashes, con- are being felt far and wide, while the old in- solidation of ethnic groups in the economy, cor- T ternational world order, which toppled in the ruption, social contradictions, etc.) require state first decade of the 21st century, has become one interference. Today, however, the state is slowly of its victims. but surely losing its functions, which is narrow- Globalization has intruded into the spheres ing down its role. of the vitally important interests of individual Today’s global players (countries, transna- states and the world community as a whole, which tional corporations, and regional alliances) have can be described as one of its worst impacts. This mastered new methods and strategies: economic has added urgency to several extremely important intrusion into domestic markets; fast movement problems, such as peace and universal security; of finances; migration of highly skilled human arms control; disarmament; deterioration of the resources; the use of information as a weapon of environment; demography; depletion of natural struggle, etc. resources; energy production; space research; The wars have differed: new strategies rely poverty and backwardness; drug trafficking and on terrorist operations, the mass circulation of international terrorism. drugs, non-conventional types of weapons, etc. The negative charge of these transnational This has already changed the international problems is immense; moreover, they are inter- security structure, thus creating new challenges twined to form an entanglement of all sorts of and threats. inner ties and links. Today, the West and the Islamic world are Globalization is gradually destroying all locked in a geopolitical confrontation which has structures—national, political, economic, social, assumed the form of a smoldering Middle East- and others—the negative impact of which (ethnic ern conflict and the West’s determination to re- 36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 duce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The world is gradually acquiring several Most of the Muslim states are dead set against diversified models (the centers of military might the West, its domination, and its desire to im- will not necessarily be centers of economic pow- pose “alien” Western values on them. From er or cultural impacts); this means that in the fu- time to time, the struggle assumes hypertro- ture, the system of international relations will phied forms. acquire several levels and several dimensions.

1. The Military-Political Situation in the Contemporary World

In the last decade the number of military conflicts in the world has not decreased. In some regions, the number of local wars and armed clashes might increase. In the mid- and long-term perspective, the military-political situation in the world will be greatly affected by strategic rivalry over energy resources; terrorism; the spread of high-tech WMD technologies; cyber crimes, etc. Since the end of the bipolar confrontation, states have acquired more opportunities to cooperate at the regional and global levels; today, the U.N. and other international organizations are involved more actively than ever in establishing regional and global cooperation, which is helping to reduce the threat of a global armed conflict to the minimum. “The leading countries, however, do not haste to discard their obviously superfluous arsenals, which are consistently upgraded with new types of offensive weapons.”1 On the one hand, economic globalization and informational support of international relations have already created unprecedented development potential; while on the other, under their impact, the international security system is growing increasingly vulnerable to terrorism, WMD, and information weapons. An increase in the number of conflicts inside states and their higher intensity cannot be excluded either. This is primarily true of some of the Middle Eastern, African, and Balkan states, as well as of several post-Soviet regions (such as the Ferghana Valley and the Caucasus). The security challenges along Russia’s borders, namely the permanent presence of a NATO military group (within the framework of the Alliance’s eastward expansion policy) and the American MD system, are doing nothing to improve the military-political situation in Europe. Today, the world is moving from the unipolar to “a multilayer and highly mobile international and interstate system,” which has already pushed to the fore global problems calling for new multisided mechanisms and adequate institutions. Confronted with global problems, the world needs new multisided mechanisms and institutions to avoid destabilization or even chaos2 fraught with loss of control and undermined security. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said that it was necessary to tilt “the balance away from a multi-polar world toward a multi-partner world” in which America would abandon its “the only superpower” strategy for the sake of leadership in the polycentric system of international relations.3

1 S.V. Kortunov, “Military-Political Situation in the World: The Year 2025,” International Affairs, No. 3, 2010. 2 See: Ibidem. 3 See: S.M. Rogov, “Amerikanskoe liderstvo v mnogopoliarnom mire. Osnovy ‘Strategii natsionalnoy bezopasnosti’ administratsii Obamy,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 21 (618), 2010, p. 6. 37 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

According to expert assessments, in the next 10 to 15 years, a fierce struggle for access to energy resources will strongly affect the military-political situation in the world. To retain control over their natural riches, states will have to steadily build up their defense capabilities with an accelerated arms race as a byproduct. Weapon technologies are obviously developing: new cruise missiles can reach much more distant targets; air and sea-based delivery systems have been greatly improved; conventional weapons have acquired much greater destructive force, while a surprise attack has become much more probable. This means that those who own them are relatively more secure than the rest of the world; it also means that preemptive strikes might look advisable or even imperative. So-called destabilizing weapons—small yield nuclear warheads and non-nuclear strategic missiles—have become a much more real threat than before. Some countries, intent on placing their weapons (including nuclear weapons) in outer space, might initiate operations in outer space and launch network attacks and information wars. America’s intention to impose a unipolar world order (in which it will enjoy the right of unilateral use of force) on the world community and its determination to adjust the key international institutions (the U.N., OSCE, and ASEAN) to its interests can be described as two negative trends of plan- etary dimensions.4 In fact, the United States is ready with a strategy of achieving its foreign policy goals irrespective of what the other states want. The White House is convinced that military-technical domination is enough to secure world leadership. It should be said that today the role of the United States in the international relations system is determined by its huge military potential present in all key regions of the world and the well-oiled mechanism of alliances and partnerships which includes all or nearly all of the important states, as well as America’s well-developed economy. In the military-political sphere, America, the military budget of which is equal to 40 percent of what the entire world spends on defense, has left all the other countries far behind. According to experts, the United States has outstripped the rest of the world by at least 15 to 20 years in terms of technical equipment of its army with new types of weapons. In addition, the United States controls the main sea routes and has over 700 military bases throughout the world. The military programs underway in this country suggest that in the next 8 to 10 years the gap will become even wider. It should be said, however, that its military domination is useless when confronted with guerilla warfare and international terrorist networks: this is amply confirmed by what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. American experts expect their country to remain the key state in the mid-term perspective; its global impact on international processes, however, will inevitably weaken even though its influence in the economic, technological, military, and diplomatic spheres will survive and acquire more weight. There is the opinion in the Russian academic circles that in the next few years America will lose some of its influence and will succumb to the “post-Iraq syndrome” some time in the future. The United States intends to restore, albeit partly, its international position by the end of 2017 even though it will never regain the “only superpower” status.5 According to Russian experts, the United States is geared toward preventing Russia’s resurgence as a strong power and a “center of attraction” for the Soviet successor states. It should be said that

4 See: A.I. Vladimirov, “Strategiia gosudarstva v voenno-politicheskoy sfere,” available at [http://www.kadet.ru/ lichno/vlad_v/Strategiya_Gos.htm]. 5 See: S.A. Karaganov et al., Mir vokrug Rossii: 2017. Kontury nedalekogo budushchego, Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow, 2007, p. 7. 38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 from the military-strategic point of view, Russia stands no chance of becoming America’s equal partner in the near future (with the exception of nuclear weapons). The Russian expert community regards all the various foreign policy, military-political, economic, information, and other plans devised in the United States as a threat to Russia’s national interests. So far, despite all the problems and contradictions that regularly emerge between Russia and the West, Moscow has been coping with the task of cooperating with NATO, the U.S., and the EU on key security issues for the simple reason that all countries are prepared to act jointly to keep the global challenges and threats in check. On the whole, Russia has elaborated a strategy for building its relations with the West; in the near future it intends to develop partnership with the United States, NATO, and the European Union in the security sphere. It also plans to establish and strengthen contacts with the CIS countries and the “Asian giants” (China and India) within the SCO, among other things.

2. The Military-Political Situation in Asia

The military and political instability in Asia might negatively affect the rest of the world. Asia, which is actively involved in shaping a new system of global relations, is a factor of the geopolitical and geo-economic changes in the worldwide configuration and distribution of strategic forces. The impact of China, India, and the APR countries on world economy is mounting; new international organizations, unions, and alliances are appearing everywhere in the world. The geostrategic changes are caused by technological breakthroughs and new conceptions related to the use of military force; the role of the Asian region has been likewise revised and reassessed. The so-called Chinese factor, which is gaining momentum, aggravates the old and creates new contradictions, while the mounting rivalry might inflate the significance of military force. By fortifying its position on the world arena, in the APR and in Central Asia in particular, China is out to retain its rivals (Russia, the United States, and India) in the zone of its strategic interests. Experts believe, however, that China’s ambitious plans will force it to seek bilateral relations with the same rivals. By the mid-21st century, China is expected to become a superpower with a lot of military-political influence throughout the world (to say nothing of the APR and the Central Asian Region). With this aim in view, Beijing is concentrating on the country’s dynamic economic development; it is further fortifying its political regime and building favorable external conditions very much needed to modernize the country (its armed forces in particular). The report of the U.S. National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World says in part: “China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power… U.S. security and economic interests could face new challenges if China becomes a peer competitor that is militarily strong as well as economically dynamic and energy hungry.”6 China, which needs latest military technologies at the lowest possible prices, is attaching special importance to its military-technical cooperation with Russia; it is interested in the most promising types of weapons, a field in which the country is still lagging.

6 [http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf]. 39 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Some Chinese experts think that China’s current security-related sphere includes three extremely important aspects: border security; the separatist movements in East Turkestan and Tibet; and the geopolitical factor. Separatism in East Turkestan and Tibet is treated as an absolute priority, which is much more important than the geopolitical security issues.7 Chinese experts make no secret of the fact that Kazakhstan is the key country in the struggle against the East Turkestan Islamist Movement.8 The ongoing political crisis in Iraq, where political consensus remains outside the reach of the main national forces and leaders, is one of the most serious threats to Asia’s military-political stability. The political instability inside the country, from which America has started to pull out, narrows down the country’s foreign policy leeway. Some believe that the armed opposition, terrorists, and criminals might exploit the political vacuum; mass protests of the impoverished population which flare up across the country create even more problems. The fact that foreign armed forces still remain in the country is stirring up the Islamic radicals, who regard Iraq as a “battle field” with the West. The prevailing doctrines of the Iranian leaders are neither confrontational nor aggressive; they look at the United States and Israel as political and ideological opponents rather than military adver- saries. Some experts believe that Tehran’s interest in the Soviet successor-states (the countries of the Southern Caucasus and the Central Asian Region in particular) is explained by its fear that Washing- ton and its allies might gain a military-political toehold in both regions to be used to undermine Iran’s political system; Tehran, in turn, is trying to prevent unwelcome developments.9 The United States, in turn, regards the Iranian nuclear file and Iran’s hegemonic designs as the region’s main military threat (up to and including the countries of the Central Asian Region), which makes a military conflict possible rather than probable.

2.1. The Military-Political Situation in Afghanistan

War in Afghanistan has an essential impact on military-political situation in Asia. The upsurge in Taliban operations shows than the counterterrorist coalition has so far failed to achieve its original aims. Indeed, the mounting scope of ISAF military operations in the country’s south and southeast did nothing to quench the Taliban’s activities in large cities and some of the provinces. Subversion and terrorism have worsened the situation across the country, where central power is limited to the capital and some of the provinces. In recent years, the Taliban has stepped up its activities: whereas in 2007, it controlled 54 percent of the country’s territory, in December 2009, its presence was felt in a much vaster area (which covered 72 percent of the territory). According to military observers, today the Taliban has spread its influence to practically every province. In 2007-2010, the Taliban captured several local centers in the south and remains in control there. It set up alternative administrative structures; controls local traffic; collects taxes; regulates trade;

7 See: Zhao Huasheng, “Kitaysko-kazakhstanskie otnosheniia: nastoiashchee i budushchee,” Analytic, No. 1, 2010, p. 28. 8 See: Ibid., pp. 35-36. 9 See: J. Eyvazov, “Postsovetskoe prostranstvo skvoz prizmu interesov bezopasnosti Irana,” Sardar, No. 1 (6), 2010, p. 86. 40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 controls morality; and applies the Shari‘a laws. The ISAF can do nothing to weaken the Taliban’s influence; its presence is especially obvious in the fighting zones.10 The counterterrorist forces in Afghanistan include servicemen from 46 countries (NATO members, Mongolia, Georgia, Ukraine, and other non-members); between 2003 and 2010, their numbers increased from 5 to nearly 100 thousand; however almost everywhere they remain disunited and, therefore, highly vulnerable. The bulk of the ISAF tries to maintain security in the provinces, provide assistance in restoring the social and economic infrastructure, and help the local administrations to be more efficient in what they are doing. Americans, British, Dutch, Canadians, and Australians, on the other hand, are fighting in the south and southeast.11 The nine years of the counterterrorist operation have done nothing to stabilize the situation; the central government has so far failed to draw the Taliban into a reconciliation dialog: fighting goes on very much as before (according to official sources, the war has already caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths). The Taliban argues that national reconciliation can be negotiated only if and when the foreign troops have been removed from the country. It should be said that the military operation of the United States and its allies has not brought security to Afghanistan’s neighbors or to the West. A network of Islamic extremists was exposed before its members managed to organize resounding terrorist acts in London, Berlin, and Paris. Terrorist organizations have been traced to Pakistan which, while remaining a U.S. ally, has become a “safe haven” for terrorists. This is particularly true of North Waziristan, a so-called tribal region which borders on Afghanistan. It is commonly believed that the Taliban leaders and, according to some sources, Osama bin Laden, head of al-Qa‘eda, are based there. So far, the Western special services have not found, let alone liquidated, the Number One terrorist. The expert community agrees that the Taliban cannot be defeated as long as its rank-and-file fighters remain the main target. There is no shortage of warriors of Islam to join its ranks: three decades of fighting have made armed struggle and violence a salaried job. The Taliban leaders are relatively safe in Pakistan, where they concentrate the financial and material resources coming from all sorts of “sponsors.” American drone attacks on Waziristan did kill fighters, but they also fed extremist feelings in Pakistan. The active attempts of the neighboring states (particularly Pakistan, India, and Iran, which have aims of their own) to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs add to the confusion. The never-ending regional crisis adds an edge to the ongoing confrontation between the U.S. and NATO and the Muslim world; the Taliban regards all countries which help the coalition in one way or another as their foes. The chances of prompt military-political stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan are too vague to be discussed. Force is impotent in Afghanistan; the military campaign did not liquidate the centers of international terror and the drug business. Neither the Afghan administration nor the international coalition can destroy the fighters’ training camps scattered across the country. A final victory requires even larger forces and assets of better quality. No political settlement is feasible while the profound ideological contradictions survive. The Americans, who expected Pakistan to act as an effective ally, pumped billions of dollars into it, but the Pakistani special services continued to support the Afghan militants.

10 See: V.V. Evseev, “Afganskaia problema: vzgliad iz Moskvy,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 10, 2010, p. 12. 11 See: Ibid., pp. 12-13. 41 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Pakistan, where radical Islam is one of the strongest pillars, cannot afford to withdraw its support of the fighters, even though Islamabad is fully aware of the great threat the Taliban presents to the country. The Indian factor is another reason for Pakistani support of the Taliban: Islamabad is very much concerned about India’s consistent efforts to establish close relations with the Karzai regime. The Pakistani generals do not want an Indian ally in their strategic rear. The middle and higher ranks of the Pakistani army are stuffed with Pashtoons (a tribe to which the Taliban also belongs); very strong clan ties force them to be loyal to the Pashtoons of Afghan- istan. Today, the military and the special services are in control of Pakistan’s political life, while the civilian authorities are too weak to fight those who support the Islamic extremists. On the whole, this poses a serious threat for Central Asia.

2.2. The Military-Political Situation in the Central Asian Region

The above should be treated as ample evidence of the fact that the Middle Eastern developments are undermining Central Asian stability. First, the Middle East is a source and, not infrequently, a “sponsor” of all sorts of radical extremist movements and groups; second, its instability affects the world economy and oil prices. A direct military threat in the short- and mid-term perspective looks highly improbable; however the Central Asian Region is plagued by many other problems: terrorism, religious extremism, separatism, the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, etc. The illegitimate (unconstitutional) regime change in Kyrgyzstan is another negative factor. Our analysis has revealed the main trends of military-political developments in the Central Asian Region: 1. Conflict potential will increase because of the following factors: —the worsened military-political situation in Afghanistan caused by religious extremists; —the gradual strengthening of Islamic extremism amid the unfavorable social and economic developments; —the negative impact of the world financial crisis on the local economies; —the aggravated interstate contradictions in many spheres, including border issues, distribution of water and energy resources, etc; —the continued internal contradictions and the weak ruling elites in some of the countries. 2. The key world powers will step up their geopolitical involvement in the region to gain control over energy resources and transportation routes; to be able to station their military bases in the region; and to impose ad hoc foreign policies on the local states, etc. 3. The Central Asian countries will not abandon the isolationist policy caused by personal disagreements among their leaders, as well as by the already depleted economic potential of interstate cooperation previously rooted in the Soviet past. It looks advisable to develop the traditional economic branches in Kyrgyzstan and the countries which include the territory of the Ferghana Valley for the sake of restored regional stability. 42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

In the long-term perspective, the same purpose will be served by gas and oil pipelines and transportation routes intended to connect the region with China and India. These and other strategic projects will create more jobs; remove some of the social problems; upgrade the infrastructure; and, on the whole, stabilize the situation.

Conclusion

An analysis of the military-political situation in the world confirms that globalization has radically changed the architecture of the international security system. Today, a large-scale (world) war seems highly unlikely, but the world is obviously moving toward the greater possibility of regional conflicts; today, local wars and armed conflicts over controversial territories caused by ethnic and religious contradictions, misinterpreted historical justice, etc. are much more likely than before. The content of military conflicts has changed; they have acquired the following common features: —wide use of indirect, non-contact forms and methods of fighting and long-range fire and electronic systems; —active information warfare, disorientation of public opinion in individual states and throughout the world community as a whole; —disorganization of state administration and military command and control systems; —use of state-of-the-art and highly efficient armament systems and military technologies based on newly discovered physical principles; —fighting in several sectors involving airmobile forces, landing parties, and special-purpose forces on a wide scale; —involvement of irregular units in armed conflicts. Today, some fundamentally new means of warfare based on the latest, primarily information, technologies are being devised, which is slowly but surely changing the nature and methods of fighting. An analysis of current military conflicts shows that the reduced probability of a large-scale war does not exclude new seats of potential conflicts everywhere, including in the Central Asian Region. Indeed, tension along the Afghan border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan might trigger destabilization in these two countries, as well as in Kyrgyzstan, which, in turn, will undermine the region’s military security. All forecasts on the military-political situation in the world should account for the fact that growing globalization largely affects the geo-economic interests of the Central Asian countries with the factor of uncertainty coming to the fore. This factor extends the sphere in which military force can be used; it retains the efficiency and adequacy of military force when dealing with new threats and challenges such as international terrorism; drug trafficking; organized crime; piracy; uncontrolled migration, etc. It seems that military force will remain an inalienable (or even determining) element of international relations, irrespective of the future world order. In the next 10 to 15 years, access to energy and other natural resources against the background of the steadily deteriorating environment might cause military conflicts of various dimensions.

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Regional and international security is threatened and will remain threatened by the rivalry among the existing and emerging power centers in the political, economic, and military spheres; the same is true of the potential seats of tension, internal armed conflicts, and the strong armed (including nuclear) forces of certain states.

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF STRATEGY

Shaislam AKMALOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Assistant Professor, Pro-Rector, Tashkent Islamic University (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Introduction

ettlement of the situation relating to Afgha- petent government has merely added to the obvi- nistan has been and remains one of the most ous impotence of power in Kabul.2 Surgent tasks of world politics. It is becoming The situation in the country is extremely increasingly clear that pacification calls for non- unstable despite the fact that coalition forces have military methods: the counterterrorist coalition has been stationed in the country for 9 years now. The failed. With each passing day, the war is pushing destructive forces have stepped up their activity the people of Afghanistan deeper into an abyss and in the country’s north (the Balkh and Kunduz making any solution next to impossible.1 provinces), as well as in other parts of the coun- The huge efforts of the international commu- try that were recently considered “safe,” which is nity and the coalition forces have done nothing to arousing particular concern. It should be said that improve the situation; it is going from bad to worse: the Taliban has mastered fundamentally new tac- radical forces are regaining their positions to add tics: today suicide bombers are its inalienable part. an edge to the already high tension, while the mil- The scores of international conferences and itants are stepping up their terrorist activities. meetings expected to solve the Afghan problem The trouble broiling in Pakistan is having a have proven useless; there is no more or less spe- negative effect on everything that is going on in cific plan of action either. This means that the in- Afghanistan; Hamid Karzai’s corrupt and incom- ternational community has learned to live with the problem.

1 From the speech President of the Republic of Uz- bekistan Islam Karimov delivered at the plenary session of 2 See: J. Daly, “Pragmatichnaia otsenka geo- the Millennium Development Goals U.N. Summit, 20 Sep- politicheskoy i strategicheskoy situatsii v Afghanistane,” tember, 2010. Narodnoe slovo, 10 November, 2009, pp. 1-2. 44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

The number of civilian casualties has recent- The considerable number of casualties in the ly increased by 30 percent compared to 2009: ac- ranks of the counterterrorist coalition (by early cording to the U.N., in the first six months of 2010, October 2010 it had lost over 2,100) has already 1,200 Afghans were killed and about 2,000 stirred up the Western public. wounded.3

3 From the speech of the Foreign Minister of Uz- State and Prospects of Ensuring Security in Afghanistan” bekistan V. Norov at an international roundtable called “The held in Tashkent on 15 October, 2010.

Strategy and Tactics

The international academic and expert communities are actively discussing the pro et contra of the current strategy and tactics the international coalition is employing in Afghanistan. Both the supporters and the opponents are very concerned about the prospects of the NATO military operation in the country. Whether there is a military solution to the problem or whether the coalition should pull out to shift the burden of responsibility for law and order onto the Afghans remains a highly debatable issue. Much is being said about the money to be poured into training centers (in the capital and the provinces) for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Accord- ing to the political community, in 2013, the former will number 240 thousand and the latter reach 210 thousand, the figures for 2010 being 140 and 106 thousand, respectively. The NATO generals will have to recruit a large number of trainers in the West to staff the new centers. Neither the military nor the politicians have a more or less clear idea of how the vast and highly trained army equipped with the latest weapons will be controlled and how the very fact of its existence will affect the Central Asian context in the long run. There is also the possibility that Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar will gain control over these structures. The NATO officers explain that a large army is needed to control this country with its far from simple terrain and undeveloped infrastructure; they add that its neighbors (India, Pakistan, and Iran) have large armies. Despite its potential, the international coalition in Afghanistan does not control the entire theater of war, partly because its strategy and tactics leave much to be desired. For example, the NATO command ignores the classical method of struggle against militants. Their fighting potential can be depleted by blocking supplies and deliveries. Neither the Taliban, nor al-Qa‘eda, nor any other terrorist organization can go on fighting without regular supplies of ammunition and weapons. One cannot but wonder why the vast military contingent, special service agents, space-based and electronic monitoring systems, AWAKS planes, and other high-tech instruments used in Afghanistan and around it have failed to identify and block the supply routes? The strategy and tactics of information war, likewise, are far from perfect: it was wrong to identify the strategic tasks and goals of future operations and make public the dates and schedule of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. This gave the enemy a chance to spread its efforts in order to survive until the coalition’s final pullout. We all know that what was said about large-scale operations and the pullout timetable was intended for domestic use in Europe and America. After all, the European nations and Americans had been counting on the promised prompt victory in the Hindu Kush. This means that the leaders of the counterterrorist coalition are primarily guided by political considerations.

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NATO spokesmen refute the fairly commonly accepted opinion that the intensity of fighting in Afghanistan is a result of the Alliance’s failures. On 15 October, 2010, speaking at a conference at the French International Relations Institute in Paris, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said: “I am not in favor of suspending military operations in Afghanistan. On the contrary, I think that a continuation of military operations is a precondition for a successful reconciliation process, because victory over the Taliban will facilitate reconciliation.”4 It is clear, however, that on many occasions the Taliban puts pressure on its own initiative. It should be said that there is no agreement on the current situation in Afghanistan among the coalition’s political and military leaders. While the former would like to see a gradual pullout of the coalition forces, the latter obviously prefer their increase. Political scientists and NATO officers cannot agree on the possible impact of the Afghan campaign on the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. There is the opinion that the war has reached the “point of no return;” if the Alliance fails, it will lose the “confidence of its partners and respect of its enemies, while the accelerating internal disintegration might cause a split.” It seems that the war will not dent NATO: irrespective of its outcome, the Alliance will go on with its wider global partnership; it will capitalize on its Afghan experience to upgrade its battle worthiness and tactics and master high-tech military equipment. NATO used the war to launch practical military cooperation with non-members: the ISAF is staffed with servicemen from 47 countries (only 28 of them being NATO members). NATO is gradually involving some of the CIS and CSTO members: Azerbaijan (90 military); Armenia (40); Georgia (925); and Ukraine (15). The counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan allows NATO to develop its partnership with the Asian and Arab-Muslim countries: today military units from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, UAE, Jordan, etc. are fighting as part of the international coalition. The war has allowed NATO to train its members and coordinate their war efforts; the newcomers (Albania and the Baltic countries) had to learn the hard way. Germany has been involved in land fighting for the first time since 1945 when the Nazi regime was defeated in World War II. The Americans are busy setting up their military bases in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe, and the CIS. In 2005, they came to Kyrgyzstan, Rumania, and Bulgaria. In 2009, they used the Pápa Air Base in Hungary for the first ever international structure, which serves as the key transportation point of strategic airlift. This means that the war has allowed NATO to upgrade the fighting potential of the coalition forces and improve coordination of joint large-scale operations, i.e. NATO has improved its efficiency. It assumed the role of an international expeditionary force used for armed intervention and, as such, is enlarging the range of its activities.

Combating Narcotics: Where Views and Strategies Differ

There is no effective anti-narcotics strategy in the country, which has become the main source of international drug trafficking. In recent years, the Russian Federation has been insistently call-

4 “NATO Must Keep Military Pressure on Taliban: Rasmussen,” 16 October, 2010, available at [http:// www.sabanews.net./net/en/news226456.htm]. 46 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 ing on the West to step up its struggle against drug trafficking from Afghanistan5; so far, however, the fundamentally different assessments of the threats keep cooperation at a low key. In 2009, the sides set up a joint workgroup; since then, Moscow has supplied Washington with information about 175 laboratories in Afghanistan and 34 drug dealers. Washington reciprocated with a trickle of relevant information.6 Since 2001, Afghanistan has increased its opium production ten-fold; it is responsible for 93-94 percent of the world’s production of heroin (in 2009 alone, it exported 6.9 thousand tons). Every year, 900 tons of opium and 375 tons of heroin cross the Afghan border; Iran consumes 80 percent of the bulk, the rest goes mainly to Europe and Russia. In the last 10 years, drugs have claimed over 1 million lives, the annual toll reaching 100 thousand (Russia alone lost 30 thousand lives). Table Afghanistan’s Share in World Opium Production

Share of Production World Afghan Drugs Years in Afghanistan Production in World Production (metric tons) (metric tons) (%)

1998 2,693 4,346 62

1999 4,565 5,764 79

2000 3,276 4,691 70

2001 185 1,596 12

2002 3,400 4,491 76

2003 3,600 4,765 76

2004 4,200 4,850 87

2005 4,100 4,620 89

2006 6,100 6,610 92

2007 8,200 8,847 93

2008 7,700 8,298 93

2009 7,800 8,100 94

S o u r c e: “Afghanistan—Opium Survey 2010,” United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, November 2010.

5 In Russia, drug addiction is a “national catastrophe;” over 2.5 million are registered as drug users; a dose of heroin can be bought for as little as $2.5 (a bottle of vodka is much more expensive). In 2009, 120 thousand drug dealers and drug pushers were sentenced to various terms in prison (in China the figure is twice as low—60 thousand). 6 See: S. Iskanderov, “Afghansky opium—narkobizness ili geopolitika?” 29 June, 2010, available at [http://www. 1newsaz.com/authors/51/20100629032735857.html]. 47 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Americans are convinced that the total destruction of opium fields (according to experts, too expensive to be contemplated) might destabilize the situation in the country. They prefer to fight drug trafficking and big drug dealers. Russia insists on the complete destruction of opium plantations, which it believes will be much more effective than arresting drug traffickers and drug dealers. Russia refers to America’s experience in Columbia where nearly 75 percent of the cocaine plantations were defoliated from air (at a moderate cost of $50 million). American experts, however, point out that this experiment not only failed to yield the anticipated results, it caused an increase in the export of drugs. According to Russian experts, in Afghanistan (in the Helmand Province where nearly 60 percent of drugs are produced), opium is grown by large landowners on vast plantations rather than by peasants on their land plots, peasants only being hired to bring in the harvest. This means that special cadastre registration of the territory will help identify and liquidate the opium plantations. The Americans, in turn, are convinced that this will deprive the peasants of their source of sub- sistence and push them toward the Taliban. This means that the already far from simple situation will become even worse, which will create a lot of problems for NATO. On 9-10 June, 2010, Moscow hosted an International Forum on Drug Production in Afghani- stan: A Challenge to the International Community, at which it was said that drug production was limited to 12 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. According to American experts, about 3.5 million Afghan peasants earn their living from growing opium poppy. In the first quarter of 2010, NATO carried out 56 anti-drug operations in the country and destroyed 16.3 tons of opium, 195 kg of morphia, 1.2 tons of heroin, 9.8 tons of hashish, and 10.1 tons of chemical precursors. The United States went even further: the annual subsidies of about $500 million were increased by $100 million to persuade Afghan farmers to switch to growing other types of crops. Russia has developed a Rainbow-2 plan designed to put an end to drug production in Afghani- stan: NATO is expected to destroy 25 percent of the poppy fields, develop energy production, and create over 2.5 million jobs. On top of this, Moscow is prepared to help restore 140 Afghan infrastructure facilities, including the Naglu electric power station and the Salang tunnel. According to the RF Federal Drug Control Service, it is also prepared to finance training of over 300 Afghans for the Afghan Drug Police (an increase over the previous figure of 30-50 people); there are also plans to add vigor to cooperation with the CSTO.7 It should be said that the U.S. and NATO regard terrorists, not drug dealers, as their main enemies because Afghan drugs almost never reach the American market. In Russia, on the other hand, drug addiction has developed into a national threat. The above explains the cardinal differences between the Russian and American approaches to the aims of the anti-drug struggle in Afghanistan and to its tasks and strategies. Russia will unlikely be able to convince the United States to destroy the poppy plantations: there are too many other unresolved security problems in Afghanistan. To succeed, Russia must step up

7 See: Speech by the President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev at the International Forum on Drug Produc- tion in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community, Moscow, 9 June, 2010, available at [http:// www.kremlin.ru/news/7996] (see also: “Rossia predlozhila mirovomu soobshchestvu kardinalnye mery protiv afghanskoy narkougrozy,” Rossiiskaya gazeta—Federalny vypusk, 10 June, 2010, available at [http://www.rg.ru/2010/06/10/narko.html]; R. Weitz, “Afghanistan: Rossia prizyvaet k rasshireniiu vzaimodeystvia ODKB i NATO v dele borby s narkotikami,” 18 November, 2010, available at [http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/58443]; Speech by Viktor Ivanov, SADC Chairman and FDCS Director, at the enlarged ambassador-level session of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels on 24 March, 2010, available at [http://stratgap.ru/pages/strategy/3662/3886/4391/print.stml]). 48 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 anti-drug propaganda at home and cooperate, on a much closer basis, with Afghanistan’s neighbors to seal off the borders.

Regional Economic Cooperation in the Light of Economic Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Stabilization in Afghanistan greatly depends on the situation in Pakistan and the further development of economic relations and trade in particular. The international community is working in this direction. Meanwhile, Kabul and Islamabad have not yet agreed on several issues of regional politics and cannot, therefore, tap cooperation potential to the full. Today, Pakistan is Afghanistan’s key trade partner; in 2009, bilateral trade turnover reached $1.4 billion. Pakistan exports foodstuffs, building materials, transport facilities, textiles, and agricultural, pharmaceutical, and chemical products and imports coal, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and agricultural products from Afghanistan. On 18 July, 2010, the two countries signed a transit trade agreement brokered by the United States. To facilitate and speed up the signing, Washington extended financial aid and publicized a 5-year program of aid to Islamabad to the tune of $7.5 billion; the donor countries promised to increase their financial aid to Kabul. It was expected that the two countries would open transit routes across their territories to move Afghan and Pakistani commodities to third countries; according to experts, by 2015, bilateral trade would reach $5 billion. Under this agreement, Afghanistan will gain access to the Pakistani Arabian Sea ports and to third countries through them; 15 trade routes will bring it to the Indian market by land. Pakistan, in turn, will reach the Central Asian and CIS countries across the territory of Afghan- istan, a promising prospect for a country whose access to the European and American markets is limited by tariff and non-tariff barriers. The expert community, however, is very skeptical about future cooperation between the two countries and believes that ratification of the Washington-brokered agreement might take several years. Trade and economic cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is stalling for the following reasons: n First, Islamabad is dead set against broad economic cooperation between Afghanistan and India and fears Delhi’s increased pressure on Kabul. Pakistan has already de facto banned the transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan across its territory. This means that the treaty will inevitably be lopsided: while Afghanistan will move its goods to India via Pakistan, reverse transit will be banned. This will probably increase smuggling from India to Afghanistan. n Second, Afghanistan, which is becoming increasingly dependent on Pakistan, will be unable to push forward its cooperation with India while Pakistan will go on raising its bilateral trade turnover with India.8

8 See: N. Zamaraeva, “Pakistan-Afghanistan: proval torgovogo tranzitnogo soglashenia: chto za etim stoit?” available at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/15-07-10b.htm]; N.V. Galishcheva, “Iuzhnoaziatskiy vector vneshneekonom- icheskoy politiki Indii,” Mirovoe i natsionalnoe khozyastvo, No. 1 (12), 2010. 49 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

n Third, Kabul is accusing Islamabad of subversive actions against Afghanistan; the sides are hurling accusations at each other of inadequate border control and abetting in smuggling. n Fourth, America’s blockade of Iran makes it hard to organize transit trade between the two countries (in the westerly direction, in particular). The North-South routes (from the southern seas up north to Central Asia and vice versa) look more promising from the viewpoint of transit trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Political disagreements between Pakistan and India, as well as the United States and Iran, are one of the main factors interfering with regional trade and economic cooperation. Pakistan desperate- ly trying to retain its control over the Afghan economy, which explains its ban on the transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan. American attempts to develop and strengthen economic cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan while keeping other countries (India and Iran in particular) out in the cold can hardly be described as effective. Victor Korgun, a prominent Russian expert on Afghanistan, has pointed out that NATO should build up its military potential, much should be done to promote the social and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, and the interested sides and neighbors should give a helping hand.9

In Lieu of a Conclusion

Obviously, the world (Russia and the United States) and regional (Iran, Pakistan, and India) actors know full well that peace and stability in Afghanistan are the main factors of global security that open up, in particular, greater possibilities for dealing with the vitally important problems of sustainable social and economic development of all the Central Asian and South Asian states. At the same time, they all, hopefully, know that the Taliban, as a military-political structure, and its supporters in certain regional countries (mainly in Pakistan) are the main obstacle on the road to the desired aims. For the sake of normalizing social, political, and economic life in Afghanistan, the states involved must learn to act together; they should be absolutely clear about the aims and prospects of their involvement in Afghanistan, otherwise the situation might deteriorate into irreversible negative transformations in Central and South Asia, to say nothing of Afghanistan.

9 See: V. Korgun, “SShA v Afghanistane,” Azia i Africa segodnia, No. 6, 2008, p. 46.

50 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

REGIONAL POLITICS

IRAN AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: A STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE

Mahir KHALIFA-ZADEH Ph.D., Member of the Center for Research on Globalization (CRG), an independent research and media organization based in Montreal (Montreal, Canada)

Introduction

t is a well-known fact that for many centuries Azerbaijan, respectively). A rock inscription was the Southern Caucasus was of strategic im- found near the shores of the Caspian Sea (Gobus- I portance for the great powers that dominated tan, 60-70 km from Baku in the Azerbaijan Re- at different historical times. The Roman Army’s public) that mentions the presence of one of the advances on the Caucasus under the command of centurions of XII Fulminata named Lucius Julius General Pompey (66-65 BC) and General Mark Maximus.1 Antony (36 BC) mark the beginning of the great powers’ struggle and provide ample evidence of 1 See: Legio XII Fulminata: one of the Roman le- the attempts to secure their interests in this stra- gions. Its name means “the lightning legion” (see [http:// tegic part of the world. And in 75 AD, Roman www.livius.org/le-lh/legio/xii_fulminata.html]); History of Emperor Domitian sent Legio XII Fulminata to Azerbaijan, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, support the allied kingdoms of Iberia and Alba- available at [http://www.azembassy.org.uk/sehife.php? nia (the present-day republics of Georgia and lang=eng&page=0105]. 51 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS The Region’s Strategic Dimensions

For centuries, great powers like the Roman and Persian Empires,2 the Caliphate, the Persian and Byzantium Empires,3 and the Ottoman, Persian and Russian Empires4 struggled to control the South- ern Caucasus. Since the time of the Great Silk Road, the Southern Caucasus has undoubtedly played an important role and is the shortest land route from China to Europe. The region is also a land bridge between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea and a gateway to the Middle East and Central Asia. In this light, the Southern Caucasus has strategic geographical and transportation dimensions. In the era of industrialization and the world’s economic dependence on oil and gas, the Southern Caucasus has gained an additional strategic dimension—the energy dimension— specifically in terms of Azerbaijan’s huge hydrocarbon reserves and production. At the beginning of the 20th century, Azerbaijan produced more than half of the world’s oil production and 95% of Russian oil (11 million tonnes/per year).5 And nowadays, the Southern Caucasus is a neighboring region of the oil-rich Per- sian Gulf and of multi-dimensional strategic importance for the global and regional powers. The region’s strategic significance has been brilliantly described by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski (former national security adviser to U.S. President Jimmy Carter) in his well-known book The Grand Chess- board.6

The Key Players of South Caucasian Policy

The Southern Caucasus’ present-day policy is characterized by a high level of complexity and dynamic rivalry among the global, regional, and local players. The United States, the Islamic world, Russia, and the European countries are the global players, the regional actors include Turkey and Iran, while the independent South Caucasian countries, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, constitute the local players. Moreover, several powerful international organizations, such as the OSCE, CIS, EU, NATO, OIC, and others, plus religious and humanitarian organizations, are operating and shaping policy in this part of the world. Meanwhile, the large family of influential multinational oil corporations and companies, such as BP (UK), Amoco (U.S.), UNOCAL (U.S.), McDermott International (U.S.), and others, have their own stakes in the Caucasus’ tangled web of oil and politics. So, in the 21st century, the Southern Caucasus, just as the entire Greater Caucasus region, continues to be a complex and unassimilated area for the Russians and of strategic importance for global policy, international security, and energy security.

2 See: L.C. Stecchini, History of Iran. The Persian Wars, Iran Chamber Society, available at [http://www. iranchamber.com/history/articles/persian_wars3.php]. 3 See: Ch. van der Leeuw, Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity: A Short History, Palgrave Macmillan, July 2000, p. 48, available at [http://us.macmillan.com/azerbaijan-1]. 4 See: Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (Organization: U.S.), 1994, p. xiii, available at [http://www.paperbackswap.com/Azerbaijan-Seven-Years-Conflict-Nagorno/book/1564321428/]; T. Marshall, “Caspian Sea: Oil in a Tinderbox,” Kansas City Star, 8 March, 1998, p. K-6. 5 See: Mir Yusif Mir-Babayev, “Baku Barons Day, Foreign Investments in Azerbaijan’s Oil,” Azerbaijan Internation- al, Summer 2004, pp. 82-85, available at [http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai122_folder/122_articles/ 122_foreign_investment.html]. 6 See: Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books: New York, 1997. 52 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Iran, as mentioned above, is one of the key players in the Southern Caucasus. And, just as it has been throughout history, Iran (Persia) is still one of the powers competing for its interests and goals in this region. So present-day Iran has extensive and deep historical experience for playing its own strategic game in this part of the world.

The Main Sources of Iran’s Foreign Policy

It must be emphasized that throughout history, Iran (Persia) has been able to conduct a smart, precise, balanced, and pragmatic foreign policy. This successful approach has ensured Iran its continued existence on the world map and has made it one of the powerful nations today. Moreover, Iran is able to pursue an effective foreign and security policy that reflects the strategic environments of different historical periods. The many centuries of Persia’s foreign policy experience and its ability to implement a smart policy testify to the fact that Iran has fundamental sources which shape the nation’s foreign policy. With respect to the present-day Islamic Republic of Iran, scholars from the RAND Corporation (a California-based research organization) emphasize that Iran has certain characteristics that are the driving force behind the nation’s foreign and security policy.7 The authors state that, since the Islamic Republic’s establishment, two factors, revolutionary Islam and Persian nationalism, continue to be strong sources of the nation’s foreign policy. However, they argue that the revolutionary or ideological element has been declining in the 20 years since the Islam- ic revolution. This decline has occurred due to the unsuccessful attempts to export or spread its revolutionary ideas to other parts of the Islamic world, particularly to Central Asia and Southern Cauca- sus. On the other hand, according to RAND, it was its revolutionary ideas that brought Iran into confrontation with the superpowers and caused the country’s isolation. So, as many scholars agree, the revolutionary ideas have declined and pragmatic, economic, and geopolitical factors have come to the fore as the driving forces behind the country’s foreign policy. RAND’s experts consider ethnicity and communalism to be the next sources of Iran’s foreign policy. They emphasize that the close ties of some ethnic minorities (Azeris, Kurds) with neighboring states and ethnic communities across the Iranian border are key sources of the nation’s foreign policy. And we agree with this implication. The Azeris are the main ethnic minority in Iran. The current ethnic composition is as follows: Persians make up 51% of the country’s population, Azeris 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Lurs 2%, Balochs 2%, Turkmen 2%, and others 1%.8 Some ethnic groups are concentrated mainly in the border areas and have ties with ethnic groups or states across the Iranian border, such as the Kurds and Azeris, respectively. The Azeris have close ties with the South Caucasian independent Azerbaijan Republic and the Kurds have contacts with the Kurdish communities in Iraq and Turkey. Moreover, Iran’s Azeris have experience in establishing their own independent state (the South Azerbaijan Democratic Republic) that emerged in 1945-1946 with the support of the Soviets.9 Finally, the Azeri minority’s experience in building their own independ-

7 See: Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, Chapter Two, “Fundamental Sources of Iranian Foreign and Security Policies,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2001, available at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/ MR1320/MR1320.ch2.pdf]. 8 See: CIA, The World Factbook, available at [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ ir.html]. 9 See: A. Priego, “The Southern Azerbaijan Question and Its Implications for Iranian National Identity,” Azerbaijan in the World, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, Vol. II, No. 7, 1 April, 2009, available at [http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/ vol2no7/20090406025632009.html]. 53 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ent state, as well as the existence of the independent Azerbaijan Republic and Tajikistan (a Persian- speaking Central Asian state) have key policy-making implications for Iran’s foreign and security policy toward the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. The next fundamental source of Iran’s foreign policy is the economy. Since the Islamic Rev- olution of 1979, Iran has been facing significant problems with respect to modernizing its national economy and army. And now both issues are of high priority on Tehran’s agenda. Iran needs foreign investments, both to diversify the national economy and to ensure access to new technologies. However, Iran’s isolation in global affairs, as a result of U.S.-Iranian tension, is making it very difficult for Tehran’s government to launch the nation’s economic, military and technological modernization. Meanwhile, it must be emphasized that the relations between Iran and the United States are dominating Iran’s foreign policy and driving or fueling the nation’s behavior at the global and regional levels. Moreover, a key strategic issue for Iran’s foreign policy is to solve the problems with the West (the United States). So, from our viewpoint, Iran is conducting its foreign policy from the prism of its relations with the United States, and Tehran’s government is applying this same approach toward the Southern Caucasus.

Iranian-Russian Relations and Iran’s Policy Toward the Region

The Southern Caucasus is an oil- and gas-rich region with a strategic location that creates brilliant prospects for the local nations to become rich and prosperous. However, the Caucasus belongs to “the areas of the greatest insecurity in today’s world, which lie along an arc from the Balkans through the Middle East to Central Asia.”10 Unfortunately, the Southern Caucasus is the arena of a grueling struggle between the global and regional powers for geopolitical influence and for control over Cas- pian energy resources, as well as over the energy transportation routes. And Iran is engaged in this rivalry. It is well known that, during the past three centuries, the main threat to Iran’s security and territorial integrity has come from the North—from imperial Russia and later from the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the local states of the Southern Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia—emerged as independent countries after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. And now these states form a “buffer zone” between Iran and Russia.11 Iran clearly understands that the existence of such a buffer zone is vital for the nation’s security because of Russia’s strong imperialistic ambitions and Moscow’s nos- talgia for the glorious days of the Red Empire. So Iran strongly supports the independence of all three states. On the other hand, the existence of the South Caucasian countries creates new opportunities and challenges for Iran’s foreign and security policy. We think that Tehran’s strategy toward the Southern Caucasus originates from Iran’s specific position in global affairs, especially from the nation’s confrontational relations with the West (U.S.). Iran’s relations with the U.S., as the backbone of Tehran’s strategic foreign and security policy, are the driving force behind Tehran’s behavior at the global and regional levels, including in the Southern

10 Ph. Stephens, “A Political Awakening That Recasts the Global Landscape,” The Financial Express, 21 July, 2007, available at [http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com]. 11 See: A. Ramezanzadeh, “Iran’s Role as Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis,” in: Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. by B. Coppieters, Brussels, 1998, available at [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0701.htm]. 54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Caucasus. Moreover, some scholars believe that the U.S.-Iranian confrontation is continuing to a significant degree in the Southern Caucasus as well.12 It is a well-known fact that Iran is trying to contain and minimize Western pressure. So, in accordance with this strategy, Tehran is actively cooperating with Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Empire notwithstanding, present-day Russia continues to consider itself a global competitor of the U.S.13 Russia is a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council. Tehran takes this into consideration and regards Moscow as a key supporter. The cooperation between Iran and Russia is highly saturated and covers a wide agenda: science, technology, military, nuclear, and other issues, with a multibillion dollar turnover. Meanwhile, strategic cooperation with Iran is beneficial for Russia as well. Iran is a huge market for Russia’s military weapons and nuclear technology exports. Since 2005, Russia has had an observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s influence in the Islamic world is an effective tool for creating and supporting Russia’s friendly image in the Mus- lim states. Moreover, by cooperating with Iran and the OIC, Russia is trying to minimize Islamic pressure in Russia itself, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, as a global competitor of the U.S., Russia is trying (in accordance with the old Soviet strategy) to challenge Ameri- ca’s global position, particularly in the Islamic world. Russia is very sensitive about the “advance” of the U.S. and NATO into the Kremlin’s Near Abroad, particularly into the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia is trying to weaken the West’s influence and presence in this part of the world, as well as to secure the Caspian energy resources and energy transportation routes under Moscow’s control. It should be emphasized that Iran has similar strategic goals in the Southern Caucasus. So, Iran’s South Caucasian strategy is oriented toward supporting Russia’s dominance in this part of the world. It is beneficial for Tehran to be under Russia’s umbrella or shadow in this region.14 Both Russia and Iran are strengthening their positions in the struggle for influence with the United States, which has declared that the Caspian basin is strategically vital to America’s national interests.15 Moreover, the European Union is gradually strengthening its position as well. In other words, the West is actively implementing a set of strategic programs, such as the Silk Road Strategy, Partner- ship for Peace, Eastern Partnership, and others, which are oriented toward projecting Western influence onto the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. These programs are vital for increasing the West’s presence and redesigning the post-Soviet local order, as well as minimizing Russian influence and control. Therefore, Russia must react to and counter the challenges that might weaken Russia’s traditional dominance in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Finally, Russia needs to have a strategic partner, and Iran is very valuable. It should be noted that Iran’s hostility toward the United States and Israel is pushing Tehran closer to Moscow. Moreover, Russia is trying to prolong Iran’s problems with the United States for as long as possible. In so doing, Russia is drawing Washington’s strategic attention away from Russia itself and Russia’s Near Abroad and creating a significant “headache” for Washington’s decision-

12 See: S. Markedonov, “The Caucasus Approaches of Iran: Main Priorities and Challenges,” Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIES), 1 June, 2009, available at [www.rieas.gr]. 13 See: S. Kapila, “Russia: The Inevitability of a New Cold War with the Unites States,” South Asia Analysis Group, 26 August, 2008, available at [http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers29%5Cpaper2822.html]. 14 See: M. Javedanfar, “Iran Foreign Policy Analysis—Iran’s Alliance with Russia,” 4 May, 2005, available at [http:// www.meepas.com/russiairanfpaanalysis.htm]. 15 See: F.W. Engdahl, “The U.S.’s Geopolitical Nightmare,” Asia Times, 9 May, 2006, available at [http:// www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE09Ad01.html]; D. Kaliyeva, “The Geopolitical Situation in the Caspian Region,” UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS, Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation, available at [http://revistas.ucm.es/cps/ 16962206/articulos/UNIS0404130011A.PDF]. 55 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS makers. It stands to reason that if Russia considers itself a competitor of the U.S. for global dominance, Russian strategists believe that U.S.-Iranian tension, as well as America’s problems in Iraq, the North Korean issues, and the Afghan war will weaken the United States’ global dominance and superiority. Finally, continuation of the U.S.-Iranian hostility ensures Iran’s dependence on Mos- cow and guarantees Tehran’s billion-dollar flow to the Kremlin, which is vital for modernizing the old-style Russian economy. From our perspective, the development of Iran’s foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus demonstrates that Tehran has abandoned ideological (Islamic or Shi‘a) considerations and adopted pragmatic (supports Russia’s policy) and regional (is developing bilateral relations) approaches toward the Southern Caucasus. Iran is trying to expand its political-security and economic role in the region. Some Iranian scholars believe that “regionalism” could be a beneficial approach in Iran’s foreign policy. They argue that a regional approach will strengthen Iran’s national interests at the regional and international levels and increase Iran’s capacity to deal with the great and regional powers.16 There can be no doubt that, by developing bilateral relations with the South Caucasian states, Iran could significantly increase its capabilities on the international scene. In this light, Iran considers the Southern Caucasus to be a possible and promising platform for cooperation with the West. And this is a key strategic dimension of Iran’s foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus. Iran is trying to participate in large international projects (with Western participation) for producing and transporting Caspian energy resources. However, the United States strongly opposes any Iranian participation, just as it opposed Iran’s involvement in Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century. The United States excludes any possible cooperation with Tehran due to its nuclear ambitions and carefully monitors Iran’s behavior. Nevertheless, Iran is establishing economic cooperation with the local countries and considers bilateral relations to be a valuable tool for increasing political influence and strengthening strategic positions. In this light, the cooperation between Iran and Armenia (with Russia’s blessing) is an example of such a strategy. Undoubtedly, Iran-Armenian cooperation has key implications for the Southern Caucasus and is an effective approach to containing Turkey’s influence, the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic alliance,17 and Azerbaijan’s rising economic and military power. Obviously an improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations will decrease the role of the Tehran- Moscow axis and weaken the axis’ significance in the region. Moreover, elimination of the Turkish- Armenian hostility will dramatically decrease or undermine Russia’s dominance in the Southern Cau- casus. So Turkish-Armenian reconciliation is not in keeping with Russia’s (first) or Iran’s (second) strategic interests. And indeed, this process has already reached a deadlock.18 Moreover, Iran is trying to contain Turkey as a key NATO member and close U.S. ally in the Greater Middle East region,19 with respect to which Iran has its own strategic interests and political goals.20 Iran also has an extensive historical heritage for dealing with the Southern Caucasus; however, Tehran’s capabilities are significantly limited. Iran, unlike Turkey, is not as attractive for the South Caucasian countries because of Tehran’s tension with the U.S. This is a primary and key point. Both

16 See: K. Barzegar, “Regionalism in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” Iran Review, 8 February, 2010, available at [www. iranreview.org/content/view/5334/37/]. 17 See: V. Masimoglu, “Turkey-Azerbaijan Strategic Alliance Treaty and Russia-Armenia Military Agreement: Sta- tus-quo in the Southern Caucasus Remains Unchanged,”Analytics, APA News Agency, 20 August, 2010, available at [http:// en.apa.az/news.php?id=128191]. 18 See: A. Grigorian, “Russian Hegemony and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Resolution: A Quandary or an Im- passe?” Caucasus Edition Journal, 1 October, 2010, available at [www.caucasusedition.net]. 19 See: O. Örmeci, “Caspian Weekly: Turkey’s Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference,” JDP Government and the Greater Middle East Project, 29 May 29, 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/22373/caspian_weekly.html]. 20 See: K. Barzegar, op. cit. 56 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Azerbaijan and Georgia, unlike Armenia, consider the West (U.S.) to be a key source for securing their independence and counterbalancing Russia’s predominant power. Second, the Islamic nature of Tehran’s regime significantly limits political cooperation; and third, Russia is a major bone of contention. The elimination of Iranian-U.S. tension or any significant improvement in their relations does not coincide with Russia’s long-term interests. Finally, the strategic approach of Iran’s foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus is more pragmatic than ideological. It is based on ethnicity and oriented toward preventing any significant shifts that could strengthen the position of the United States, the European Union, or NATO; supporting Russian dominance; and maintaining a balance between local states.

The Region’s Political Dynamics and Iran’s Strategic Priorities

Since the Soviet Union’s breakup, we can identify two significant shifts in the geopolitical game of the Southern Caucasus. The first is Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century of 1995; and the second is the Russo-Georgian war that broke out in August 2008. From our viewpoint, the first shift led to the second, so the consequences of the event indicate that the Russo-Georgian war was unavoidable. Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century opened the doors to large-scale Western penetration and investments not only in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sectors, but throughout the South Caucasian region. And investments have brought wide and active political engagement of the West in Caucasian affairs. The United States, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey have begun gradually fortifying their positions and implementing several strategic programs, such as the Silk Road Strategy, Partnership for Peace, and Eastern Partnership, as well as strengthening the Turkic identity. These programs and sets of initiatives, such as the Caspian Guard,21 are oriented toward establishing pro-Western security order and ensuring Western (U.S.) interests and direct control over Caspian energy resources and energy transportation routes. It stands to reason that Iran regards such initiatives as a direct threat to its security. Moreover, Iran was the first (possibly with Russia’s approval) to try and overcome the situation and stop the West’s advance into the region, where Russia and Iran are traditional players and have common strategic goals. So Iran’s reaction was very clear and aggressive, as was the case in 2001 when an Iranian war- ship forced a British Petroleum boat to return to port, or when Iranian military aircraft violated Azer- baijan’s air borders and entered the country’s air space.22 Moreover, only the diplomatic intervention of Ankara and Washington prevented a full-scale war.23 These events emphasize that Tehran was very angry about Azerbaijan and Georgia’s pro-Western orientation, as well as about the rising influence of the United States throughout the Caspian Basin. It must be noted that Russia at that time was engaged in dealing with the unrest in Chechnia. And it was possibly Chechen issues that prevented Moscow or the Tehran-Moscow axis from stop- ping, or at least slowing down, the West’s advance.

21 See: P. Goncharov, “U.S. in Caspian Region and Russia’s Position,” RIA Novosti, 4 May, 2005, available at [http:// en.rian.ru/analysis/20050504/39817504.html?id]. 22 See: G. Ismailova, “Azerbaijani Presidential Visit to Iran Again Postponed,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Analyst, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/448]. 23 See: F. Ismailzade, “The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Center for World Dialogue, Global Di- alogue, Vol. 7, No. 3-4, Summer/Autumn 2005—The Volatile Caucasus, [http://www.worlddialogue.org/ content.php?id=354]. 57 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Finally, in the following years, the West was able to significantly increase its presence in the Southern Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia directly and Azerbaijan indirectly began to speculate about joining NATO. It was a time of hope for the local states to resolve their security issues. So during the years after the Contract of the Century, Russia was forced to gradually retreat from the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. And Moscow reacted very sensitively to the West’s and Asia’s advances into these regions. Some experts emphasize that “...to counter this development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances...”24 So, in our opinion, the Russo-Georgian war possibly originated from this strategy. And Moscow’s strategic goals were clear: to stop Russia’s retreat, resume the strategic initiative, and ensure Russia’s interests. Unfortunately, Georgian President Saakashvili’s miscalculations provided an opportunity to shift the balance of power and strengthen Moscow’s security position in the region. Finally, there is the second significant shift and the emergence of the region’s new or current security pattern as a result of the Russo-Georgian war. The war enabled Russia to significantly strengthen its position and influence. Moreover, Russia showed the global and regional powers that the Southern Caucasus (like the whole of the CIS) is Russia’s Near Abroad and Moscow has the exclusive right to use force and manage the situation in accordance with Russia’s interests. The war provided Russia with a brilliant opportunity to resume the strategic initiative and enforce Moscow’s strategic position in its immediate neighborhood. And now, Georgia’s and Ukraine’s advances toward NATO membership have been removed from the agenda. Some scholars directly emphasize: “Western actors have in practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia.”25 As a logical continuation of the current strategic opportunity, Russia (two years later) extended the lease of its military base in Armenia until 2044.26 This was Russia’s next significant step to utilize its advantage after the war with Georgia and thus strengthen its position in the region. Iran, which is against any Western military presence in the region, did not make any statements against Russia extending lease of its base. So Tehran’s silence means approval of such developments. Meanwhile, Russia is accelerating its role in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.27 Obviously Russia is capitalizing on the advantages it gained as the result of the Russo-Georgian war and is trying to establish its own security order. Finally, we can say that now the pendulum has swung toward the Tehran-Moscow axis. However, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s latest visits to the Southern Caucasus have ensured the United States’ engagement in the ongoing tough rivalry in this strategic part of the world.28 Undoubtedly, Russia’s strong position means that neither the U.S. nor NATO will able to de- ploy military bases close to the Iranian border. The continuation of Russian dominance, therefore,

24 M. de Haas, “Current Geostrategy in the Southern Caucasus,” Eurasianet.org, 6 January, 2007, available at [http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml]. 25 K. Strachota, cooperation with W. Górecki, “The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the Russian-Georgian War—The Geopolitical Consequences,” Center for Eastern Studies, Poland, 24 September, 2008, available at [www.osw.waw.pl]. 26 See: “Russia Extends Lease on Military Base in Armenia through 2044,” RIA Novosti, 20 August, 2010, available at [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html]. 27 See: “Leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia Discuss Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement in Russia,” RT-Russia Today TV Channel, 27 October, 2010, available at [http://rt.com/Politics/2010-10-27/azerbaijan-armenia-russia-karabakh.html]. 28 See: “Clinton’s Caucasus Campaign Gains Tepid Results,” Eurasianet.org, 5 July, 2010, available at [http://www. eurasianet.org/node/61464]; J. Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), 16 September, 2010, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33453.pdf]. 58 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 is of strategic significance for Iran’s foreign and security policy and is beneficial to both Tehran and Moscow because of their common strategic priorities in the Southern Caucasus, which are as follows: — To counter and reduce U.S. influence; — To oppose the current and long-term objectives of the U.S., NATO, and EU; — To contain EU influence and oppose the EU’s strategic initiatives; — To prevent the deployment of U.S. or NATO military bases; — To oppose Israeli cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan; — To stop a Georgian and Azerbaijani drift toward NATO/EU membership; — To make security arrangements in accordance with Iran’s (and Russia’s) strategic interests; — To ensure control over Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes; — To contain the rising influence of Turkey and the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance; — To prolong Turkish-Armenian hostility; — To oppose long-term strategic cooperation in the Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle; — To maintain a strategic balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia and thus contain Azerbai- jan’s rise to a regional power; — To support Russia’s leading role in Caucasian and Caspian affairs and thus maintain the current status-quo. Finally, it is beneficial for Iran to maintain the status-quo and support Russian dominance. Iran, in this case, will be able to ensure its paramount strategic goal: to limit or decrease U.S. influence and thus prevent America’s attempts to redesign the region’s political landscape and secure Washington’s dominance.

Iran’s Bilateral Relations with the Local Countries

It should be noted that bilateral relations with the South Caucasian states are a priority of Iran’s foreign policy when dealing with the border countries. Cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia is a powerful tool for strengthening Iran’s influence and is of political significance for the local and global actors. An increase in bilateral relations could partially compensate for Iran’s limited capacity, due to the nature of Tehran’s regime, to participate in the large international projects that are currently being implemented in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. Moreover, Iran considers bilateral relations to be an effective way to maintain a strategic balance among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Within the last decade, Azerbaijan has been able to increase its political, economic, and military might and now “the balance of power in the region has shifted in favor of Azerbaijan.”29 Moreover,

29 S. Meister, “Recalibrating Germany’s and EU’s Policy in the South Caucasus,” DGAP, No. 2, July 2010, available at [http://aussenpolitik.net/themen/eurasien/kaukasus/recalibrating_germany-s_and_eu-s_policy_in_the_south_caucasus]. 59 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS some European scholars argue that Azerbaijan should be considered the key country in the region and call for focusing or redirecting EU policy toward Azerbaijan instead of Georgia.30 Undoubtedly, Iran clearly understands Azerbaijan’s strategic importance and is trying to keep the dialog with Baku on track. Tehran is significantly intensifying its high-level contacts, and Ira- nian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has paid several official visits to Baku to discuss the region’s agenda. Azerbaijan’s rising power and its long-term cooperation with the U.S./EU and Israel greatly concern Iran. Some experts argue that Iran prefers to see Azerbaijan remain involved in the conflict with Armenia. In this case, as scholars believe, Azerbaijan will be “unattractive for Iran’s Azerbai- janis and unable to allocate resources to stir up South Azerbaijan.”31 Iran supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, but it is rendering large-scale economic assistance to Armenia. Interestingly, Iran, as a Shi‘a state, is carrying out a so-called “double track” policy toward the Azerbaijan Republic (87% are Shi‘a Moslems). Tehran possibly considers the “double track” policy to be an effective approach toward containing the Azerbaijan Republic , which is becoming a new regional power. Moreover, Iran’s decision-makers think that Azerbaijan’s involvement in the conflict with Armenia is helping to contain Turkey and the Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic alliance, which covers energy, transportation, economic, political, and military issues. Meanwhile, prolongation of the Turkish-Armenian hostility is an important element in Tehran’s calculations to keep Ankara under pressure and limit the projection of Turkish power onto the South- ern Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, Turkish-Armenian hostility is increasing Tehran’s strategic significance for Armenia and Russia. Finally, Iran is capitalizing on the political and economic advantages gained from the current deadlock situation in relations between the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance and Armenia. The main economic benefits are to retain Iran as a valuable exporter for the Armenian market and a vital transportation route that links Armenia with Iran’s Persian Gulf ports. Meanwhile, the political advantages are enormous: to counterbalance Azerbaijan’s alliance with Turkey; to reshape Tehran’s image; and to facilitate U.S.-Iran rapprochement with assistance from the Armenian diaspora. And this point is a key strategic element in Tehran’s efforts to keep its relations with Erevan on track. It should be noted that Iran kept silent about the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Some scholars think that “behind Iran’s official silence is a combination of factors. These range from Iran’s common cause with Moscow against expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), interpret- ing this crisis as a major setback for NATO’s ‘eastward expansion’ in light of the unabashed pro-West predilections of Tbilisi’s government, to Iran’s sensitivity to Russia’s national security concerns.”32 Iran’s position in the Georgian crisis notwithstanding, Iranian-Georgian relations are now rapidly developing. So, according to Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze: “Our relations have entered a new phase.” And at a joint news conference in Tbilisi on 27 May, 2010, Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast (who is a deputy minister) added that Georgia and Iran intend to resume direct air flights, cancel visa requirements for travelers, and open an Iranian consulate in Batumi. Moreover, as he has mentioned, the Iranian side “unconditionally supports Geor- gia’s territorial integrity.”33

30 See: S. Meister, op. cit. 31 B. Shaffer, “Iran’s Role in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian Basin: Diverging Views of the U.S. and Europe,” Belfer Center, Harvard University, July 2003, available at [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/]. 32 K. Afrasiabi, “Iran Gambles over Georgia’s Crisis,” Asia Times, 16 August, 2010, available at [http://www. atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JH16Ak01.html]. 33 Quoted from: V. Socor, “Georgia Develops Functional Relations With Iran,” Georgian Daily, 27 May, 2010, available at [http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18724&Itemid=132]. 60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Iran expressed the same position on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Baku and Erevan feel some mistrust toward Tehran because Iran has a huge Azeri population but supports Armenia. However, Tehran tried to mediate a peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.34 Finally, Iran is playing its own game in the classic Persian style among the rivals and securing its own interests.

Conclusions

As the world’s oil and gas dependence rises, safe and regular energy supplies will continue to be a high priority on the world powers’ strategic agenda. In this light, the export of Caspian energy is an alternative to Persian Gulf energy resources. Within the last 15 years, the West has invested billions of dollars in the survey, development, and transportation of Caspian energy resources bypassing Rus- sia, which is trying to gain a monopoly on the delivery of oil and gas from the post-Soviet area to the world market. The Clinton administration and the George W. Bush administration launched several strategic programs and initiatives aimed at promoting and securing the West’s presence and thus ensuring stable energy deliveries from the Southern Caucasus. Unfortunately, the Obama administration is not paying significant attention to the Southern Caucasus. This lack of attention from Washington is beneficial to Iran and Russia but detrimental to America’s stakes in the region. The decline of Washing- ton’s strategic attention creates an opportunity for the Tehran-Moscow axis to gradually push the U.S. out of the region and regain full control over Caspian resources. On the one hand, the continuation of U.S.-Iran tension means that Iran will continue to be oriented toward Russia. And Iran will support Russia’s strategy to keep the region’s “frozen conflicts” alive, because it is better for the local conflicts to remain unresolved and wait for a further opportunity to establish pro-Russian-Iranian order than to allow the United States to solve the conflicts and create pro-Western security order. On the other hand, Tehran’s decision-makers clearly understand that insecurity in the South- ern Caucasus threatens Iran. So Iran will try to avoid any involvement in the “frozen conflicts” and minimize or eliminate any threat of other conflicts in the Central Asia. The continuation of insecurity in the Southern Caucasus could directly affect Iran’s domestic policy. Moreover, the military operations close to the Iranian borders represent a serious threat to Iran’s security. If a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia breaks out, the behavior of Iran’s huge Azeri population will be unpredictable. In addition, it will not be clear how Iran’s Azeris might react to the current Tehran’s regime, which could fall. “We are very concerned about security in the Caucasus region, it is a rather sensitive topic for Tehran, so we are ready to take part in solving the problematic issues in the region,” said Iranian Foreign Minister Monouchehr Mottaki in Tbilisi at a joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze.35 However, we can see that Iran’s foreign policy toward the Southern Caucasus poses a strategic dilemma: either to maintain the status quo and thus counter Western influence, or to facilitate the settlement of conflicts and secure peace and stability along Iran’s borders.

34 See: A. Ramezanzadeh, op. cit.; M. Muradova, “Iran Seeks Role in Karabakh Settlement,” Johns Hopkins Univer- sity, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Analyst, 18 March, 2010, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5291]. 35 See: “FM: Iran Stands Ready to Play ‘Significant Role’ in Resolving Conflicts in Caucasus,” Trend News Agen- cy, 11 November, 2010, available at [http://en.trend.az/print/1776791.html]. 61 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Undoubtedly, a stable Southern Caucasus will be an optimal environment for ensuring the de- pendable delivery of Caspian energy resources to Western markets. Moreover, the United States has great stakes in the region and in the Caspian oil business which obligate Washington to secure peace and stability in the region.

ABKHAZIA, KOSOVO AND THE RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

Marco SIDDI Marie Curie Research Fellow and Ph.D. candidate at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, United Kingdom)

Introduction

n 26 August, 2008 the Russian Federation policies in South Ossetia and the existence of sim- recognized the independence of Georgia’s ilar plans for Abkhazia.1 O breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and Therefore, in the August 2008 crisis Russia South Ossetia. In the statement that explained the supported the controversial principle of external reasons for Russia’s recognition, President Dmitry self-determination of peoples in exceptional cir- Medvedev referred to the “freely expressed will cumstances, which it had fiercely opposed until of the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples” and to sev- then, most notably in the case of Kosovo’s decla- eral fundamental international instruments that ration of independence. External self determina- stress inter alia the principle of self-determination tion implies “the right of every people to choose of peoples, notably the U.N. Charter, the 1970 the sovereignty under which they live”. The con- U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles cept of external self-determination is broader than of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela- that of internal self-determination, which refers tions and Cooperation among States (U.N. Gen- primarily to “the right of peoples to select their eral Assembly Resolution 2625) and the 1975 own form of government” within a sovereign Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Medvedev also specified that Abkhazians and South Osse- 1 See: “Medvedev’s Statement on South Ossetia and Abkhazia,” The New York Times, 27 August, 2008, availa- tians had the right to decide their destiny by them- ble at [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/ selves in the light of Georgia’s allegedly genocidal 27iht-27medvedev.15660953.html], 31 January, 2011. 62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 state.2 Internal self-determination thus concerns race and religion fail to provide solid criteria for the granting of minority rights, regional autono- the identification of a people. In addition, so far my regimes or federalism within an existing state. state practice has favored the classical territorial On the other hand, external self-determination approach to self-determination rather than the refers in particular to the right to establish an in- romantic or ethnic approach, which stresses the ternationally recognized independent state to rep- relevance of ethnicity, language and religion. resent a people. In other words, external self-de- Since the 19th century, particularly in the context termination implies the separation of a sub-group of decolonization and during the break-up of of a state with the consent of the central govern- multinational states such as the Soviet Union, ment, or its secession without the consent of the Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia after the end of state concerned, and the establishment of a new the Cold War, the principle of uti possidetis was state. Considering that international law is dom- applied, which meant that the borders of former inated by sovereign states and that secession pos- colonies or federated republics became the bor- es a threat to their territorial integrity, the princi- ders of the newly established sovereign states, ple of external self-determination constitutes a regardless of whether this implied the separation very controversial issue.3 of communities speaking the same language, pro- The controversy is further complicated by fessing the same religion or belonging to the same the fact that the concept of self-determination is ethnic group.5 a right granted to peoples. The definition of “people” as enshrined in international documents and of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Aurelieu court decisions is vague and evasive.4 Language, Cristescu, in: A. Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination, United Nations publications, New York, 1981, pp. 2-16. 5 See: D. Archibugi, “A Critical Analysis of the Self- 2 See: B. Neuberger, “National Self-Determination: determination of Peoples: A Cosmopolitan View,” Constel- A Theoretical Discussion,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 29, lations, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, pp. 489-492; H. Quane, “The No. 2, 2001, p. 392. United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-determina- 3 See: B. Neuberger, “National Self-Determination: tion,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Dilemmas of a Concept,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 1, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1998, p. 537; M. Koskenniemi, “National No. 3, 1995, pp. 297-325. Self-determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 4 See, for instance, the frequently cited definition by Practice,” The International and Comparative Law Quarter- the Rapporteur of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention ly, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1994, pp. 241-269.

The Legal Foundations of the Right to Self-determination: Treaties and Practice until 2007

Before analyzing the application of the concept of external self-determination to the Abkhaz conflict, the former will be put into context through an analysis of its legal foundations in international treaties and customary international law. As far as legally binding international treaties are concerned, the principle of self-determination of peoples is enshrined in Arts 1 (2) and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations and in Art 1 of both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6 However, the U.N. Charter does not provide any definition for the concept

6 See: Charter of the United Nations, Arts 1 and 55, available at [http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/], 31 Jan- uary, 2011; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December, 1966, available at [http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm], 31 January, 2011. 63 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of self-determination of peoples and does not distinguish between internal and external self-determination. As Antonio Cassese has noted, the debate preceding the adoption of Art 1 (2) proves that ne- gotiating States did not intend to include a right of secession in the provision. Art 55 does not include any reference to external self-determination either. Furthermore, Arts 2 (1) and 2 (4) of the Charter emphasize the concepts of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which can hardly be reconciled with the principle of external self-determination. Thus, the practical significance of the provisions concerning self-determination in the U.N. Charter is limited to the idea that internal self-determination should be granted as much as possible. Similarly, the wording of Art 1 of the 1966 Covenants implies exclusive reference to internal self-determination, as is exemplified by its focus on the peoples’ right to freely determine their political status and economic, social and cultural development.7 Customary international law provides for the right of secession, but only in certain cases satisfying very specific requirements. The formation of a rule of customary international law requires appropriate state practice and the firm belief that this practice meets a legal obligation (opinio juris). State practice and opinio juris indicate that the right to external self-determination is widely endorsed by the international community in the context of decolonization (namely when colonies declare their independence from a colonial power), or if a state that had been unlawfully annexed by another state declares its independence, as was the case with the former Soviet Baltic republics in 1990. In addition, the existence of a right to external self-determination is widely accepted in cases in which the majority of the population takes the decision of allowing the formation of a new state, and the decision is both anchored in national law and follows the regular constitutional procedures; the secession of Montenegro from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006 provides an example in this respect. On the other hand, no state practice existed until 2007 with regard to a right of secession in cases of serious human rights violations. As will be discussed below, the international community was deeply divided when some states claimed the existence of such a right in the context of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008.8 The contention that an exceptional right of secession exists as a fundamental principle of international law in cases of serious human rights violations is very controversial too. Advocates of this interpretation usually refer to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625), notably its saving clause. The latter reads as follows: “Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.”9 According to Antonio Cassese, the analysis of the Declaration’s text and preparatory work war- rants that a right to secede is not ruled out for racial and religious groups that are persecuted by the central authorities of a state. Stringent requirements would have to be met simultaneously in order for

7 See: A. Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 41-43, 52-53; Charter of the United Nations, Arts 1, 2, and 55; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art 1. 8 See: H. Krueger, “Implications of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for International Law,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2009, pp. 122-123, available at [http://cria-online.org/7_2.html], 31 January, 2011); D. Archibugi, op. cit., pp. 488, 496-498. 9 See: Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625, 24 October, 1970, available at [http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ ares25.htm], 2 April, 2010. 64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 this right to apply: the state persistently refuses to grant participatory rights to a religious or racial group, it grossly and systematically tramples upon their fundamental rights and denies the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement. According to this interpretation, internal and external self-determination would be linked in the exceptional circumstances mentioned above, as denial of internal self- determination allows the affected people to demand external self-determination.10 However, Cassese’s interpretation displays several weaknesses. The overwhelming majority of states that participated in the drafting of the Declaration opposed the idea that peoples might have a right of secession outside the colonial context. In addition, the principle of territorial integrity was considered inviolable, as is demonstrated by the fact that it is mentioned both in the Declaration’s preamble and in the saving clause. The preamble states inter alia that any attempt at the partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and with the spirit of the Declaration. Furthermore, the Declaration is not legally binding upon U.N. member states, as it was adopted as a General Assembly Resolution, and thus it does not represent a solid legal basis for the right to external self-determination, particularly in the absence of relevant and consistent state practice.11 Advocates of external self-determination also refer to the 1975 CSCE Final Act. Although the CSCE Final Act only constitutes a political document, its relevance to the concept of self-determination needs to be discussed. The document has been agreed upon by all the main sovereign actors involved in the Abkhaz conflict and has been explicitly mentioned by President Medvedev in his statement accompanying Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia. The second paragraph of Principle VIII of the CSCE Final Act is the key part of the document with regard to external self-determination. According to Principle VIII, all peoples have the right to determine in full freedom, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. If read alone, the reference to the freedom to determine external political status might be interpreted as an endorsement of the principle of external self-determination. The phrase “all peoples” implies that the principle would not only apply to racial and religious groups persecuted by a state, as can be inferred from the Friendly Relations Declaration, but to the entire population. The expression “all peoples” also indicates that the principle does not only apply to the context of decolonization, a view that was then held by the socialist and Third World states.12 Furthermore, the third paragraph of Principle VIII recalls “the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle [self-determination]”, which could be interpreted as a call upon the international community to guarantee that self-determination as defined in the CSCE Final Act is respected in all participating states.13 However, the interpretation of these paragraphs changes radically if they are read within the wider context of the CSCE Final Act. Principle I of the document is devoted to the respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty and Principle IV enshrines the respect for the territorial integrity of the participating states. Principle VIII itself affirms that the participating states shall respect the right to self-determination of peoples acting in conformity with the U.N. Charter and the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of states. Furthermore, Principle X states that all the principles in the CSCE Final Act “are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others”.14 Thus, the CSCE Final Act, like the Friendly Relations Declaration, up-

10 See: A. Cassese, op. cit., pp. 118-123. 11 See: H. Krueger, op. cit., p. 127. 12 See: A. Cassese, op. cit., pp. 285-286. 13 See: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Principle VIII, available at [http://www. osce.org/who/43960], 31 January, 2011. 14 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Principles I, IV, VIII and X. 65 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS holds the hardly reconcilable principles of self-determination and territorial integrity simultaneously and does not specify the primacy of one over the other. However, the fact that territorial integrity is mentioned in different parts of the document and is explicitly spelled out in the first paragraph of the Principle concerning the self-determination of peoples represents a solid counter-argument for any interpretation of the CSCE Final Act which aims to prove that the document endorses the principle of external self-determination.15

The Kosovo Case: A Precedent?

As has been discussed above, the prevailing view is that international law does not provide any unilateral right of secession for peoples, groups and minorities, with the exception of very few and specific cases in the context of decolonization, regular constitutional procedures or redressing previous violations of international law that involved the forcible annexation of a state. The international treaties that refer to the right to self-determination also stress the inviolability of the principle of territorial integrity. External self-determination and territorial integrity are legal antinomies that cannot be easily harmonized. Consequently, it can be argued that the right to self-determination as enshrined in the documents discussed above entails a right to an adequate democratic representation, but not a right to secession.16 However, according to Antonio Cassese and Angelika Nussberger an additional case exists in which the right to external self-determination can be granted as ultima ratio, namely when a minority group is categorically and permanently excluded from participation in the political process, there are gross violations of its elementary human rights and there is no realistic prospect of conflict resolution, as all peaceful methods have been exhausted. Granting external self-determination in these circumstances would be a last resort remedy (hence, the term “remedial secession” is used in this context) to solve an irreconcilable conflict. Cassese contends that in these cases it might be too late to plead for a peaceful solution based on internal self-determination and goes as far as arguing that intervention of the international community is desirable with a view to promoting independent statehood for the minorities at issue.17 Although an extraordinary right to secede has not found general acceptance so far, contentions such as those made by Cassese and Nussberger became of particular relevance when Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008 and several members of the international community recognized it. In this context, the Kosovo case will be discussed in terms of its impact on the international law concerning the right to external self-determination and its value as a precedent for the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia. Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia until 1989, when its status was revoked by Ser- bian President Slobodan Milosevic. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, the principle of uti possidetis was applied to define the borders of the new states, which meant that the boundaries of the constituent

15 See: H. Krueger, op. cit., p. 128; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Principles I, IV and VIII. 16 See: H. Krueger, op. cit.; Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Geor- gia, Vol. I, p. 17; A. Nussberger, “The War between Russia and Georgia — Consequences and Unresolved Questions,” Göttingen Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009, pp. 347-348. 17 See: A. Nussberger, op. cit., pp. 348-349; A. Cassese, op. cit., pp. 120-123, 359-362. For a more detailed analysis of the issue of humanitarian intervention, see: H. Neuhold, “Human Rights and the Use of Force,” in: Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber, ed. by St. Breitenmoser et al., Zürich, St. Gallen and Baden-Baden: Dike, 2007, pp. 479-498. 66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 republics of Socialist Yugoslavia became the new international frontiers. As a result, Kosovo remained part of Serbia. However, tensions escalated in the late 1990s, as the Serbian government continued to implement repressive policies and the ethnic Albanians resorted to armed force through the formation of a Kosovo Liberation Army. Increasing brutality by Serbian forces caused civilian victims and a flow of refugees, which eventually led NATO member states to launch an air campaign against Serbia. Under the impact of operation Allied Force, Miloðeviæ agreed to a peace plan proposed by the G-8 and adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations in Resolution 1244. Kosovo was put under international administration, although it formally remained within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This status could have been changed only by another Security Council Resolution, but deadlock in this organ and the failure to achieve a negotiated settlement led the de facto Kosovo Al- banian authorities to unilaterally declare Kosovo’s independence on 17 February, 2008.18 However, so far only 74 out of the 192 U.N. member states have recognized Kosovo’s independence. State practice affects the interpretation of international treaties, therefore a uniform and coher- ent practice may have influenced the interpretation of the provisions concerning self-determination in the U.N. Charter and the 1966 Covenants. However, the international community is divided over the issue of Kosovo’s recognition and recognizing states constitute little more than a third of all U.N. member states. Furthermore, recognizing states have not indicated any clear legal reason to justify their conduct. For instance, in the Declaration on the Independence of Kosovo the recognizing states in the Council of the European Union (22 out of 27 EU member states) argued that Kosovo is a sui generis case which does not call into question the provisions of the U.N. Charter, the 1966 Covenants and the Helsinki Final Act. In the light of these considerations, the Kosovo case had no identifiable implications on the interpretation of international treaties.19 The lack of a uniform and prevalent manner of conduct in the Kosovo case also prevented the formation of a customary norm in international law that supports the right of secession under certain conditions. Opinio juris was insufficient too, as the community of states was not united in the belief that such a right exists. The countries that refused to recognize Kosovo are those potentially or actually affected by internal separatist movements, therefore only their positive stance would have allowed the creation of a new and meaningful international norm. Furthermore, even if a new customary norm had emerged, opposing states would have to be considered persistent objectors and would be excluded from relying on such a new rule themselves. Even recognizing states were extremely reluctant to support the formation of a customary norm and claimed that Kosovo was a unique case rather than a precedent. Therefore, the independence of Kosovo had no implications on customary international law, as one single case over which the international community is deeply divided does not fulfill the requirements for the formation of a new customary norm.20 On the basis of these considerations, and in the light of the evasive answers provided by the International Court of Justice in its recent advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, it can be claimed that the independence of Kosovo was unjustified and unlawful due to insufficient legal bases.21 The claim that Kosovo represents a legal precedent is therefore unfounded. In addition,

18 See: H. Neuhold, “The United Nations as a Security Organization: The Balkan Laboratory”, in: Studies in Applied International Law, ed. by Ch. Benicke et al., Giessen, 2007, p. 16. 19 See: “Council Conclusions on Kosovo, 2851st External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 18 February, 2008,” in: H. Krueger, op. cit., pp. 133-134. 20 See: H. Krueger, op. cit., pp. 134-135; Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. I, pp. 140-141. 21 On the ICJ advisory opinion, see: H. Krueger, “Was Kosovo’s Split-off Legitimate? Background, Meaning and Implications of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2010, available at [http://cria-online.org/12_7.html], 30 January, 2011. The advisory opinion of the ICJ on Kosovo is available at [www.icj- cij.org/docket/files/141/16012.pdf], 31 January, 2011. 67 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS precedents are not a source of international law; they can only give indications concerning the emergence of a new customary law if they are substantiated by general state practice over a certain period of time and if the belief exists that this practice reflects law.22

The Abkhaz Case

Advocates of the sui generis nature of the Kosovo case argue that Kosovo is exceptional in several respects, notably the scale of human rights violations, persistent denial of representative government, involvement of the international community and the existence of a multilateral process for the definition of future status.23 However, an analysis of the Abkhaz case shows that the claim that Kos- ovo is a sui generis case rests on fragile foundations. Strong parallels exist between Kosovo and Abkhazia. Both enjoyed substantial autonomy within a multinational state until 1990 and lost this status during the process of dissolution of the multinational state. The actions of the Georgian government in 1992-1993 and the Serbian government in 1998-1999 resemble each other in terms of escalation of the conflict and military intervention; the ensuing refugee streams, ethnic hatred, ethnic cleansing and mutual atrocities also display numerous similarities. Both the actions of Serbian military and paramilitary groups in Kosovo and the attacks of Georgian regular and irregular troops resulted in serious human rights violations.24 Furthermore, also the Georgian government denied internal self-determination and prevented a peaceful settlement of the conflict. After resorting to armed force in 1992, Georgia ignored the 1999 referendum in Abkhaz- ia, when the majority of people residing in the secessionist province voted in favor of the proposal to create a federation including Georgia and Abkhazia as independent republics on an equal standing. Moreover, the Saakashvili government decisively disrupted negotiations in July 2006 by removing the main Georgian officials in charge of conflict resolution talks at a stage when significant progress was being made and, most importantly, by introducing armed forces in the Kodori Gorge in violation of international agreements. In August 2008 Saakashvili resorted to armed force in the other Georgian secessionist province of South Ossetia, once again in violation of international law and international agreements. Although the Georgian military offensive was not directed against Abkhazia, it had obvious repercussions on the negotiations and relations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, resulting in Su- khumi’s fear that it would be the next victim of Georgian aggression.25 Advocates of Kosovo’s sui generis nature argue that in Kosovo at least 90 percent out of a total population of 2 million are ethnic Albanians, whereas Abkhazians constitute only 43 percent of the 200,000 inhabitants of Abkhazia, without counting the 230-250,000 ethnic Georgians that left the country as refugees after the war in 1992-1993.26 Furthermore, the argument is made that in

22 See: Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 140. 23 See: W. Benedek, “Implications of the Independence of Kosovo for International Law,” in: International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation, Liber amicorum in Honour of Gerhard Hafner, ed. by I. Buffard et al., Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 2008, p. 411. 24 For human rights violations in Abkhazia, see: Report of the Secretary-General’s Fact-Finding Mission to Inves- tigate Human Rights Violations in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, 17 November, 1993 (quoted from: Report of the Inde- pendent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 146). 25 See: Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. I, pp. 22-23 and Vol. II, pp. 195-197; B. Harzl, “Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo,” Review of Central and East European Law, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2008, p. 508; M. Weller, “Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent Developments,” The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, p. 134; A. Nussberger, op. cit., p. 362. 26 See: W. Benedek, op. cit., p. 403; D. Tolksdorf, “Kosovo Precedent—Applicable in Many Parts of the World, but Not Directly in the South Caucasus,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2009, pp. 106-107, available at [http://cria-online.org/6_10.html], 31 January, 2011. 68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Kosovo there was an exceptional involvement of the international community in status negotiations, resulting in the advice of U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari in favor of “supervised independence”. The first of these two arguments is the most convincing: ethnic Abkhazians are not a majority in Abkhazia, particularly if Georgian refugees, who should be granted a right to return and participate in status decisions, are taken into account. The second argument tends to ignore that the international community was actively involved in Abkhazia too since the early 1990s. In 1993 the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) began to operate; a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States was also established in 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement. In addition, the Group of Friends of Georgia was created in December 1993, comprising France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United King- dom and the United States. The forum was later renamed as Group of Friends of the U.N. Secretary- General and aims to support peace efforts, which are now taking place within a mechanism known as Geneva Process. The Geneva Process is supported by a wide range of international actors and is co-chaired by the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Coop- eration in Europe.27 Thus, an analysis of the Kosovo and the Abkhaz cases reveals numerous similarities and casts serious doubts on the claim that Kosovo is a sui generis case. Consequently, it is debatable whether a right to secession in exceptional circumstances involving human rights violations, denial of representative government and no prospect of peaceful conflict settlement would apply to Kosovo alone. Ben- edikt Harzl goes as far as arguing that Kosovo’s sui generis status is no more than a fairy tale that the West keeps repeating in order to deny reality. In some respects, a stronger argument for independence could be made for Abkhazia, which has enjoyed de facto statehood longer than Kosovo, since the early 1990s, and had already existed as an independent republic in the Soviet Union until Stalin unilaterally demoted its status to that of autonomous republic. According to Harzl, Kosovo is therefore a precedent with far-reaching implications for other breakaway regions, particularly in the South Caucasus.28 Harzl’s argument is certainly valid in political terms: as the case of Abkhazia shows, the independence of Kosovo encourages other breakaway regions to claim a right of secession in exceptional circumstances, which they themselves define. However, in strict legal terms the Kosovo case does not bear any significance, as it has neither led to a reinterpretation of international treaties where the right to self-determination is mentioned nor to the formation of a new norm of customary international law in favor of the right to external self-determination in exceptional circumstances. This emerges even more clearly in the case of Abkhazia, which has been recognized by four states only, namely Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru.29

Conclusion

The declaration of independence of Abkhazia and its recognition by some members of the international community constitute violations of international law. The Abkhaz case, together with the Kosovo and South Ossetia cases, has therefore contributed to a trend that is seriously undermining the validity of international law. It can be expected that secessionist attempts will increase in the near future; secessionists will be less willing to compromise and will use the sui generis argument to justify their

27 See: Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, pp. 80-91. The text of the Moscow Ceasefire Agreement is available at [http://www.unomig.org/data/moscow_agreement.pdf], 31 Jan- uary, 2011. 28 See: B. Harzl, op. cit., pp. 491, 508-518. 29 See: H. Krueger, op. cit., pp. 136-137. 69 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS demands. Mother states will also show less willingness to compromise and will resort more often to violent countermeasures in order to crush secessionist movements without making concessions. Within this context, third countries will be given more scope to intervene in secessionist conflicts in order to pursue their own interests.30 As Antonio Cassese has noted, the risk exists that the most regressive and reactionary features of self-determination gain the upper hand, namely the centrality of the ethno- national self as the principal subject of self-determination and the ethno-national territorial state as vindication of the right to self-determination. As a result, minorities could be seen as long-term aliens and be forced to assimilate, which contradicts the values that the principle of self-determination seeks to promote.31 According to Benedikt Harzl and Daniele Archibugi, a shared legal framework would be necessary, as self-determination cannot be self-assessed by interested parties. Archibugi advocates the emergence of a cosmopolitan legal order and of bodies with the authority of assessing conflicting claims in the area of external self-determination. Looking at existing institutions, the United Nations could provide such a cosmopolitan framework. However, internal divisions in the Security Council have prevented it from taking a final decision concerning the status of Kosovo and from responding effectively to the crisis in the South Caucasus in August 2008, despite Russia’s speedy action to bring the issue of Georgian aggression to the Council. By simultaneously upholding the principles of territorial integrity and external self-determination in exceptional circumstances, member states have paralyzed the U.N. Security Council and undermined its authority.32

30 See: Ibid., pp. 141-142; B. Harzl, op. cit., p. 513. 31 See: A. Cassese, op. cit., p. 364. 32 See: B. Harzl, op. cit., p. 502; D. Archibugi, op. cit., pp. 488-489; R. Muzalevsky, “The Russian-Georgian War: Implications for the U.N. and Collective Security,” Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2009, pp. 35-39.

SOME ASPECTS OF CHINA’S POLICY IN THE CAUCASUS

David BABAYAN Ph.D. (Hist.), Independent Expert

Introduction

or centuries, one of the perceptible points of viously been an element of China’s geopolitical contact between China and the Caucasus interests. Nor would it be entirely true to say that F was the Great Silk Road. However this con- the Caucasus has become a priority vector of Chi- tact related primarily to trade and economic and nese geopolitics today either. For example, nei- cultural relations and the Caucasus has never pre- ther the president nor the prime minister of Chi-

70 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 na has ever made an official visit to the region. political, historical, psychological, and other types Even Chinese ministers rarely visit the region. The of antagonism that exist between the countries and Chinese delegations that have come to some of the nationalities of the region with relative ease. Caucasian countries on official visits are usually China’s activity in the Caucasus at present headed by deputy ministers. Nevertheless, in the is primarily oriented toward strengthening eco- near future relations between China and the Cau- nomic relations with the region and improving casian countries could undergo a new boost, since, the socioeconomic situation in the regional coun- due to its geographical location, the Caucasus is tries, thus decreasing the influence of such ide- destined to court China’s involvement in its geo- ologies as Islamic fundamentalism and pan- politics. Turkism that China finds undesirable. Moreover, The PRC has elaborated its own specific both Russia and regional countries such as Iran geopolitical style, which can be quite clearly seen find Beijing’s stronger position in the region to both in the Caucasus and in the nearby regions. their advantage. This style is based on what can be described as a For Moscow, a stronger China in the South- cluster approach, the gist of which lies in the fact ern Caucasus and its closer relations with the that, by developing cooperation with one of the Northern Caucasus are beneficial both in terms of countries of the region, Beijing inescapably estab- their joint geopolitical resistance to Turkey and lishes relations with the countries contiguous to the West and in the context of improving the so- it, which often act as its rivals and competitors. cioeconomic situation in the North Caucasian China’s comparatively low level of historical ex- republics, which is having a positive influence on perience in terms of geopolitical contact with the the fight against extremism. While for Tehran, Caucasian countries is very conducive to this Beijing is a natural ally in the geopolitical stand- approach, since it makes it possible to sidestep the off with Turkey and the West.

The Southern Caucasus

The Southern Caucasus, with its unresolved conflicts and serious contradictions, is one of the most problematic regions on the planet. China is trying to distance itself as much as possible from political problems, primarily from settlement of the conflicts existing in the region. China’s activity in this sphere is mainly limited to official statements indicating the need for peaceful settlement of the regional conflicts.

Azerbaijan

President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev laid the foundation of relations between Azerbaijan and China. The year 2005, when President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev paid an official visit to China, can also be described as an important stage in the development of relations between these two countries.1 Within the framework of this visit, an Azerbaijani-Chinese business forum was organized attended by the representatives of 40 Azeri and 400 Chinese companies. Approximately 20 contracts were signed between the business structures of both countries at the forum, in particular on establishing a base in

1 See: State Visit of President of the Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliev to the People’s Republic of China, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the People’s Republic of China, available at [http://www.azerbembassy.org.cn/eng/ Prezident.htm], 17 March, 2005. 71 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Azerbaijan for developing Chinese knowhow in the manufacture of fiberglass cables, computer technology, mobile drilling rigs for the oil and gas industry, materials for storing and packing agricultural products, and so on. China is particularly interested in the energy sphere. Beijing is being gradually drawn into the competitive struggle over the Caspian’s oil and gas resources. China has already carved out a niche for itself in Azerbaijan’s oil sector. China’s energy giant, Sinopec, has a stake in two projects: K&K and Gobustan, with investment of more than $250 million. In recent years, the K&K project has maintained an annual output of about 300,000 tons of crude oil and it is Azerbaijan’s largest onshore oil field.2 In December 2010, representatives of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) visited China and Singapore where a contract was signed for delivering oil to China.3 The Chinese side is actively helping Azerbaijan to reconstruct and repair thermoelectric and hydropower plants. The China National Electric Equipment Corporation, or CNEEC, is the top per- former in this area. In 2007, this corporation won a tender to rebuild the Azerbaijan Thermoelectric Power Station and modernize its seven power-generating units. This thermoelectric power station accounts for 45% of all the electric power generated in the country.4 After the work is finished, the capacity of the power-generating units will amount to 2,600 MW. In 2010, CNEEC also acquired the right to repair the Mingechevir cascade of a hydropower plant comprised of the Mingechevir and Varvara hydropower plants.5 After reconstruction, their energy-generating capacity will increase from 360 to 429 MW. These hydropower plants also play an important role in Azerbaijan’s energy balance. Azerbaijan and China are also actively cooperating in other areas, particularly in the cultural and educational sphere. In this context, it should be noted that an agreement was reached between the countries on opening a Confucius Institute in Azerbaijan in 2011. But the PRC still accounts for only a small percent of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade balance. For example, in 2009 the trade turnover between the two countries amounted to almost $614.7 million, which constituted only 3% of the total volume of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade.6 In terms of this index, China lagged behind such countries as the U.S., Russia, France, Turkey, and Germany. China even trailed Taiwan, the volume of trade turnover with which exceeded $690 million in 2009. However, if we look at the dynamics, a slightly different picture emerges. Compared with 2000, trade turnover between the countries has increased 22-fold.7

Armenia

Relations between China and Armenia are also developing quite dynamically. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1992.8 Both sides highly value bilateral coopera-

2 See: “China Oil Giants Join Hands for Caspian Sea Oil Field,” People’s Daily, available at [http:// english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6900258.html], 23 February, 2010. 3 See: “SOCAR Delegation Visits China and Singapore,” Official Website of State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Re- public, available at [http://socar.az/2913-news-view-en.html], 13 December, 2010. 4 See: “Azerbaidzhanskaia TES v ianvare-aprele utroila obiom vyrabotki elektroenergii,” Interfax-Azerbaijan, available at [http://www.interfax.az/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=64646&Itemid=9], 12 May, 2010. 5 See: “Chinese Company Repairs Mingechevir Cascade,” Contact.az, available at [http://www.azcontact.com/ topics_en.asp?id=4800&pb=5&vr=en&yr=2010&mn=12&day=6&pg=2&cl=1&cmpg=1&cmcl=1&sbpg=1&sbcl=1&srch=0&ms= NaN&clnd=0&mdn=1], 6 December, 2010. 6 See: Azerbaijan in Figures. External Trade Turnover Indicators of Azerbaijan 2009, The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, available at [http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2010/en/018.shtml]. 7 See: External Economic Activities, The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, available at [http:// www.azstat.org/MESearch/details]. 8 For more detail, see, for example: “Kitaisko-armianskie otnosheniia,” Posolstvo Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki v Respublike Armeniia, available at [http://am.chineseembassy.org/rus/zygx/t392051.htm]. 72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 tion. For example, Chinese leader Hu Jintao described Armenia as a “trustworthy friend” and called for a further expansion of bilateral political, economic, and cultural ties.9 According to Armenian President Serzh Sargsian, development of relations with China is one of the republic’s foreign policy priorities.10 Manufacturing industry and its various branches represent one of the main areas of cooperation. Shanxi-Nairit, a joint venture for the manufacture of chloroprene rubber, is a major project in this sphere. The Shanxi-Nairit joint venture was established on the basis of a contract between the Nairit plant in Erevan and China’s Shanxi Synthetic Rubber Group Co. Ltd. signed in 2003. The share of the Armenian side in the enterprise amounts to 40%. The plant’s annual capacity reaches 30,000 tons, $220 million has been invested in its construction, and the enterprise’s annual income is estimated at $100 million.11 The Chinese side is also participating in a number of different energy projects in Armenia, for example, in the reconstruction and repair of thermoelectric power plants. One such plant is in the Armenian capital and another is located in the city of Hrazdan, where the Chinese side is carrying out 80% of the repair and reconstruction work on the fifth power-generating unit of the Hrazdan thermoelectric power plant. A corresponding agreement was signed between China’s HPCC-3 Company and Armenia’s ArmRosGazprom in 2008. After reconstruction, the turbine that operates on natural gas will generate up to 440 MW of electricity, which is more than the Metsamorsk atomic power plant produces.12 China has also expressed an interest in participating in a very important geopolitical transportation project—the building of a railway that will link Armenia with the Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf. Issues relating to this project were discussed at a meeting between the presidents of Armenia and China in May 2010. The railway is to stretch 470 km, 410 km of which are within Armenia, and the cost of this transportation artery is estimated at $1.5-1.8 billion.13 Keeping in mind Iran’s developed transportation network, this railway will give Armenia access to the Central Asian markets, as well as to Pakistan, India, China, and the ASEAN countries. Likewise, China will also gain additional access to the Caucasus with all the ensuing political-economic consequences. Armenian-Chinese relations are also developing in other spheres of the economy. In 2010, 41 enterprises with Chinese capital were registered in Armenia, the main activity of which entails wholesale trading in foodstuffs, beverages, and cigarettes, the restaurant business, the manufacture of household electrical appliances and clothing, retail trading in medication, medical supplies, cosmetics, and accessories, and wholesale trading in textiles and footwear.14 Relations between the two countries are also developing dynamically in the humanitarian sphere. In this context, it is worth noting that it was in Armenia that the first Confucius Institute in the Cau- casus was opened. The University of Shanxi is the founder of this institute on the Chinese side.

9 See: “Chinese Leader Wants Closer Ties with ‘Friendly’ Armenia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/Chinese_Leader_Wants_Closer_Ties_With_Friendly_Armenia/2031447.html], 3 May, 2010. 10 See: “Prezident Serzh Sargsian prinial uchastie v tseremonii otkrytiia Vsemirnoi vystavki ‘Shankhai Ekspo-2010’,” Official website of the President of the Republic of Armenia, available at [http://www.president.am/events/visits/rus/ ?visits=1&id=155], 29 April, 2010. 11 See: “Prezident Armenii otkryl v Kitae zavod po proizvodstvu kauchuka,” RIA Novosti, available at [http:// www.rian.ru/economy/20100504/230325032.html], 4 May, 2010. 12 See: “Armenia Economy: Energy Sector—the New Growth Driver,” ViewsVire, available at [http://www.eiu.com/ index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=1704034955®ion_id=&country_id=870000287&channel_id=190004019& category_id=500004050&refm=vwCat&page_title=Article&rf=0], 11 November, 2008. 13 See: “Chinese, Armenian Leaders Discuss China’s Participation in Armenia-Iranian Railway Construction,” RIA Novosti, available at [http://en.rian.ru/world/20100502/158845910.html], 2 May, 2010. 14 See: “Armeniia i Kitai rassmatrivaiut vozmozhnost sozdaniia SP po pererabotke bazalta,” ARKA, available at [http:// www.arka.am/rus/economy/2010/09/21/21507.html], 21 September, 2010. 73 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

How well Chinese-Armenian relations are developing can be clearly seen by taking a look at the indices of foreign economic turnover between the two countries and its dynamics. In 2000, the total amount of bilateral trade reached $5.98 million and at that time China occupied 22nd place in Arme- nia’s export balance.15 In 2009, that is, in 8 years, the trade volume between the two countries reached almost $302.5 million, exceeding the 2000 index by more than 50.5-fold. In the export balance, China moved from 22nd to 11th place (it accounted for 2.5% of export), while in the import balance, it occupied 2nd place (8.6% of the total import volume), lagging only behind Russia.16 Such growth dynamics were not seen in any of Armenia’s other foreign trade partners.

Georgia

Diplomatic relations between China and Georgia were established on 9 June, 1992 with the signing of a corresponding protocol.17 Chinese-Georgian relations are also developing at the regional level.18 In 2007, a memorandum on mutual cooperation was signed between the cities of Rustavi and Khar- bin. A similar document was also signed in November 2009 between the Georgian town of Poti and China’s Qingdao. In 2007, a declaration on intent to cooperate was signed between the Georgian region of Kakheti and the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. In November 2008, an agreement on cooperation was signed between these two regions. The transportation industry holds promise. Some sources indicate that the PRC is showing an interest in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project,19 although no specific steps have yet been taken. In 2010, the China Sino-Hydro Corporation and China Railway 23rd Bureau Group won an international tender organized by the Georgian side for reconstructing the Rikoti Tunnel, a strategically vital transportation junction connecting East and West Georgia, as well as for building a railway that bypasses Tbilisi, which is also an important project for Georgia’s transportation development and transportation security.20 The cost of this railway alone amounts to $353.5 million and envisages building a 30-kilometer stretch, as well as bridges, tunnels, and other structures. Building the Khadori Hydropower Plant with a capacity of 24 MW on the Pankisi River was a major joint project. This hydropower plant was built by China’s Sichuan Electric Power Import and Export Company.21 Building began in 2001 and was finished in November 2004. The Khadori

15 See: Eksport i import Respubliki Armenii po stranam, Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Armenii 2001, Natsionalnaia statisticheskaia sluzhba Respubliki Armenii, Erevan, 2001, Table 337. 16 See: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Armenii 2010, Natsionalnaia statisticheskaia sluzhba Respubliki Armenii, Erevan, 2010, pp. 483-485. 17 For more detail, see: Relations between Georgia and the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, available at [http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=381&lang_id=ENG]. 18 Ibidem. 19 See: “Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project Draws China’s Interest,” Georgian Business Week, available at [http:// www.gbw.ge/news.aspx?sid=b0d41470-6f73-4ba0-b565-fd618eb8b776], 8 December, 2008. 20 For more detail, see: Chen Runyun, “Mutual Benefit & Common Development: Economic and Commercial Co- operation between China and Georgia,” in: Chinese Business in Georgia, Georgian Business Consulting Group Ltd., pp. 8- 10, available at [http://ge.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201010/1288000194529.pdf]; “Rikotskii tonnel zakryt na remont,” Novosti-Gruziia, available at [http://newsgeorgia.ru/economy/20100608/213252253.html], 8 June, 2010; “Tbilisi Railway Bypass Project, Georgia,” Railway Technology, available at [http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/tbilisirailwayby- pass], 23 November, 2010. 21 See: “Dams Built by Chinese Companies and Financiers,” International Rivers, available at [http:// www.internationalrivers.org/files/ChineseOverseasDams0409.xls], 13 April, 2009; “China Dams Overseas,” Energy Probe Research Institution, available at [http://eprf.probeinternational.org/node/8501], 6 September, 2010; “The Khadori Hydro- power Plant was Built and Commissioned with the Participation of Chinese Capital in 2004,” Georgia Investment Guide, available at [http://www.investmentguide.ge/print_version.php?sec_id=45&lang_id=ENG]; “‘China’ Hydropower Plant in Kakheti,” Chinese Business in Georgia 2010, special magazine, pp. 14-15. 74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Hydropower Plant is the largest hydropower plant to be built in Georgia since it declared its independence. China and Georgia are also developing cooperation in the scientific-educational and cultural spheres. At the end of November 2010, the Confucius Institute opened in Georgia.22 The Georgian- Chinese Silk Road Cultural Center, founded in 1992, is also playing an important role in developing bilateral cultural relations.23 Intellectuals from different spheres who are interested in Chinese culture gather at the center. The center’s main purpose is to develop and intensify cultural and economic relations between the two countries. However, the development dynamics of Georgian-Chinese relations are not stable and the relations between these countries often undergo declines. This trend can be seen particularly clearly in the dynamics of the foreign trade turnover between the two countries.24 In 2000, the trade volume between the PRC (including Hong Kong) and Georgia amounted to $4.1 million, and in 2009 to almost $213.2 million, thus increasing 51.8-fold. None of Georgia’s other foreign trade partners demonstrated such growth dynamics. Taiwan took second place; its trade turnover volume for the same period increased 23.1-fold. Meanwhile, in 2007, the trade turnover between the two countries amounted to $219.4 million, and in 2008 to more than $330 million. So the dynamics have been negative recently. Moreover, in the absolute respect, the volume of trade turnover with China is much lower than trade turnover with other countries. For example, in 2009, foreign trade turnover with the EU was 7.2-fold higher than China’s index; more than 4.7-fold higher with Turkey; 1.4-fold higher with Russia; and 1.2-fold higher with the U.S. In 2009, the share of the PRC in Georgia’s foreign trade turnover amounted to only 3.8%. Nevertheless, the situation could change in the near future. Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gi- lauri’s visit to China at the end of October-beginning of November 2010 was particularly important in this context.25 At meetings with the Chinese leadership, the Georgian side made several rather economically promising proposals. For example, Tbilisi proposed expanding and modernizing the sea port of Poti, implementing several large hydropower projects, opening a branch of the China Devel- opment Bank in Georgia, and establishing direct air communication between the two countries with transformation of the Tbilisi international airport into a transit hub in the air communication system between China and Europe. During his visit, the Georgian Prime Minister said that China’s interest in Georgia is much greater than was presumed26 and emphasized that his country expected potential investments amounting to $500 million from China and India in the next few years.27 Georgian Pres- ident Saakashvili gives a figure of $600 million.28

22 See: “Georgia Opens its Confucius Institute,” Xinhua, available at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/culture/ 2010-11/27/c_13624282.htm], 26 November, 2010. 23 For more detail, see: “Georgian-Chinese Cultural Center ‘Silk Road’,” Chinese Business in Georgia 2010, special magazine, pp. 96-97. 24 For more detail, see: Statistical Yearbook of Georgia 2006, Department of Statistics under Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2007, pp. 273-281; External Trade, National Statistics Office of Georgia, available at [http:// www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=137&lang=eng]. 25 For more detail, see, for example: “Prime Minister’s Visit to China and India,” Official Website of the Government of Georgia, available at [http://www.government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=187&info_id=31506], 23 Decem- ber, 2010; N. Patsuria, “Georgian Prime Minister Touts Chinese and Indian Investor to Invest in Georgia,” The Weekly Georgian Journal, available at [http://georgianjournal.ge/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=963:georgian- prime-minister-touts-chinese-and-indian-investor-to-invest-in-georgia&catid=4:economy&Itemid=6], 3 November, 2010; N. Edilashvili, “Georgia Seeks Partnerships in China and India,” Georgia Today, available at [http://www.georgiatoday.ge/ article_details.php?id=8437], 12 November, 2010; “Georgian PM Hopes to Boost Co-op with China,” Xinhua, available at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-10/28/c_13579218.htm], 27 October, 2010; “Georgian PM Visits China, India,” Georgia Update, Weekly edition, A Publication of the Government of Georgia, 28 October, 2010, p. 2. 26 See: N. Edilashvili, op. cit. 27 See: Georgia Update, Weekly edition, 4 November, 2010, p. 1. 28 See: N. Edilashvili, op. cit. 75 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The PRC is keeping a low profile with respect to the semi-recognized and unrecognized actors of the Southern Caucasus, avoiding the establishment of any direct contacts at the state level. If such contacts are made, they are strictly humanitarian, thus minimizing any possible undesirable geopolitical consequences for China.

The Northern Caucasus

The Northern Caucasus is one of the strategically important and at the same time most unstable regions of the Russian Federation. Loss of the Northern Caucasus is fraught for Moscow with unpredictable geopolitical consequences. In particular, Russia’s fate as a great nation will be at stake. Desta- bilization of the Northern Caucasus is not in China’s interests either. Nor is Beijing interested in a change in the Northern Caucasus’ geopolitical status, since this could lead to an increase in the influence of socio-ideological trends in Central Asia and in the vulnerable Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) that are undesirable for China. Therefore, China’s involvement in North Caucasian affairs is not only important for Russia from the socioeconomic perspective, but also from the geopolitical standpoint. China is already one of the main trade and economic partners of the North Caucasian and contiguous regions of Russia.29 It accounts for 21.5% of all the machine-building production delivered to the region. The Celestial Kingdom is also one of the four leading exporters of chemical products and occupies a leading position in the foreign trade of the North Caucasian Federal District. It accounts for 17.1% of the metallurgical production imported by the region and occupies first place in terms of this index. China also occupies an appreciable place in the import structure of textiles and textile commodities. It accounts for approximately 20% and occupies second place in terms of this index after Turkey. In 2009, China occupied sixth place among the foreign trade partners of the Krasnodar Ter- ritory, accounting for 4.53% of the foreign trade volume, which in monetary terms amounted to $290 million.30 China’s share in the territory’s export was insignificant, but the PRC was the territory’s second largest import partner, accounting for 10.4% of the entire import volume, which amounted to $287 million. Construction is one of the areas of cooperation between the PRC and Kuban. The winter Olym- pics planned for 2014 in Sochi are creating favorable conditions for developing cooperation in construction. Investors from the Celestial Kingdom have expressed their willingness to finance the construction of at least ten hotel facilities with a total of around 13,000 rooms. The cost of this project in Sochi could reach $2 billion.31 Another large-scale construction project is the agreement signed in April 2010 between Russia’s Doninvest Company and the China Gezhouba Group Corporation for building sea terminals in Sochi.32

29 For more detail, see, for example: Vneshniaia torgovlia IUTU za 9 mesiatsev 2010 goda, Southern Customs Ad- ministration, available at [http://yutu.customs.ru/ru/statistics/]. 30 See: Doklad o rezultatakh i osnovnykh napravleniiakh deiatelnosti Departamenta vneshneekonomicheskoi deiatelnosti Krasnodarskogo kraia (2010-2013), Department of Foreign Economic Activity of the Krasnodar Territory, available at [http://www.gokuban.ru/department/drond/index.php?sphrase_id=2081], Krasnodar, 2010. 31 See: N. Kopeichenko, N. Mikhalev, “Olimpiada Made in China,” PBK Daily, available at [http://www.rbcdaily.ru/ 2010/04/06/market/469225], 6 April, 2010. 32 See: April 2010—CGGC Corporation, Official website of the Doninvest Company, available at [http://doninvest- sochi.ru/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1], 14 April, 2010. 76 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

China is also cooperating with the Krasnodar Territory in machine-building. In this context, it is worth noting the agreement signed in mid-October 2009 between the Krasnodar Territory and Chi- na’s Yantai Shuchi, according to which the company will assemble 500 Shuchi buses with 35-60 seats at the Vorovsky Tikhoretsk Machine-Building Plant.33 Cooperation between the Krasnodar Territory and China is also touching on other areas, in particular, the gambling business. In February 2010, operators from China’s Makao gambling zone announced their intention to build their own casinos, an all-season sports complex for winter sports, and an entertainment infrastructure, including hotels and shopping centers, in the Azov City gambling zone. According to preliminary estimates, Chinese investors could invest more than 5 billion rubles in this construction.34 According to the results of 2009, China occupied 7th place in terms of foreign trade volume with the Stavropol Territory.35 It accounted for 5.2% of the territory’s total foreign trade turnover, which amounted to $74.3 million. The PRC occupied 16th place in the export structure, accounting for $14.1 million, while it occupied second place in the territory’s import (accounting for $60.2 million). Compared with 2002, in 2009, the foreign trade volume rose 3.3-fold, whereby import rose almost 27-fold. Tourism is a promising area of cooperation. In this respect, it should be noted in particular that in March 2010, the administration of Piatigorsk, the Energiia Company, a business customer, and China’s Norinco International Cooperation Ltd. signed an agreement, according to which the Chinese side will build a tourist health complex, Sana, in Piatigorsk costing 7.5 billion rubles.36 The complex is supposed to go into operation in 2012, and its payback time will be 8.5 years. Relations between China and Ingushetia are at the initial stage of development, although the PRC is already one of Ingushetia’s main foreign trade partners.37 One of the most important Chinese projects in Ingushetia is building a plant in the republic for producing spare parts for the Chinese cars manu- factured in Russia. This agreement was signed at the World Expo-2010 Fair held from May to Octo- ber in Shanghai. As head of the republic noted, Russia does not have any enterprises like this one yet, and specialists believe there will be a demand for the plant’s production.38 In December 2010, the Chinese side invited representatives of the South Russian Investment- Financial Corporation and the Ingushetian Vils Light Alloys Plant to visit the PRC.39 The sides held talks and determined the prospects for joint activity. The main purpose of this cooperation is to organize technological processes in the Russian regions with the assistance of Chinese specialists. The main trends in the development of the industrial facilities were designated, which include creating contemporary production of electrical tools in Ingushetia and delivering production lines for

33 See, for example: “Kitaiskie avtobusy Shuchi budut sobirat v Krasnodarskom krae,” Avto.ru, available at [http:// avto.ru/news/news_18289.html], 23 October, 2009. 34 See: “Investory iz Kitaia namereny postroit v ‘Azov-Siti’ sportkompleks i gostinitsy,” Interfax, available at [http:// www.interfax.ru/print.asp?sec=1466&id=122682], 8 February, 2010. 35 See: Informatsiia o vneshneekonomicheskom sotrudnichestve Stavropolskogo kraia s Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respub- likoi, Ministry of Economic Development of the Stavropol Territory, available at [http://www.stavinvest.ru/?__=1293]. 36 See, for example: S. Rudkovskiy, “Kitaiskaia korporatsiia postroit v Piatigorske kurortnyy kompleks,” RIA Nov- osti, available at [http://www.rian.ru/tourism/20100309/213152606.html], 9 March, 2010. 37 See: A. Larina, “Kazne na popravku. Novaia nalogovaia politika v Ingushetii zastavila chinovnikov na mestakh iskat sposoby popolneniia biudzheta,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, Special Edition Ingushetia, No. 5197(118), 2 June, 2010. 38 See: V Ingushetii budut proizvodit zapchasti dlia kitaiskikh avtomobilei, Permanent Representative Office of the Republic of Ingushetia under the Russian Federation President, available at [http://www.postpredstvo.ru/2010/12/6180.html], 9 December, 2010. 39 For more detail, see: “Zakliucheno soglashenie o sotrudnichestve s kitaiskoi kompaniei “Manzhouli Heyuan” v oblasti razvitiia promyshlennykh ob’ektov na territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Official website of South Russia Invest- ment-Financial Corporation Open Joint-Stock Company, available at [http://www.urifcorp.ru/china.html], 21 December, 2010. 77 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS gypsum plasterboard and corrugated packaging, as well as lines for manufacturing a variety of household appliances. Despite the fact that Chechnia is one of the most unstable republics in the Northern Caucasus, China is relatively active there. This activity is also of particular political importance for Beijing. Suffice it to say that the Russian special services have reported on several occasions that Chinese citizens from XUAR are participating in the hostilities in Chechnia on the side of the militants.40 It stands to reason that Beijing is not at all interested in internationalizing extremism and if separatists from China have been participating in the hostilities in Chechnia, it is entirely possible that Chechen formations have been participating in the separatist activity in XUAR. So Chechnia’s socioeconomic revival is important for Beijing. The oil and gas sphere is one of the vectors of China’s cooperation activity in Chechnia. In 2005, it became known that Chechnia was working with China on implementing projects in the oil and gas industry.41 Chechnia and China are also cooperating in the humanitarian sphere. In this context, it is worth noting China’s assistance in treating Chechen children suffering from cerebral palsy.42 Hundreds of Chechen children diagnosed with cerebral palsy underwent treatment using traditional Chinese methods with specialists from the Shanxi Rehabilitation Center who have been working in the republic since the beginning of June 2009. A group of Chechen doctors came to the Shanxi Rehabilitation Center in 2008 to learn about the treatment methods for cerebral palsy. Industry, particularly machine-building, is one of the main vectors of cooperation between China and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In this context, it is worth mentioning an extremely successful investment project under which the Chinese Lifan Company and the Devreis Automobile Company from Karachaevo-Cherkessia have begun manufacturing cars.43 In November 2010, this plant expanded the range of products it manufactures. Putting new production capacities into operation will make it possible to raise the car assembly plant’s overall productivity to 100,000 cars a year.44 This is also an important social project for Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Operation of the plant is providing the republic with up to 5,000 new jobs. And this is keeping in mind that before the plant went into operation, Karachaevo-Cherkessia had an official unemployment level of 7,500 people.45 In addition to this, the amount of tax payments to the budgets of various levels could reach 5 billion rubles a year, which will have a positive effect on the socioeconomic situation in the republic.46 However, relations between the PRC and Karachaevo-Cherkessia are not only limited to machine-building. China occupies second place in the republic’s foreign trade balance and accounts for 20.3% of the total volume of Karachaevo-Cherkessia’s foreign trade,47 which amounts to $15.1 mil-

40 See, for example: A. Sobianin, “Uigurskii separatism,” Ekspert, No. 31, 28 August, 2000. 41 See: “Chechnia i Kitai rabotaiut nad realizatsiei proektov v neftegazovoi oblasti,” RosInvest.com, available at [http:// www.rosinvest.com/news/122270/], 25 August, 2005. 42 For more detail, see: “Bolee 260 detei c diagnozom DTsP proshli lechenie kitaiskoi metodikoi,” Official website of the head and government of the Chechen Republic, available at [http://chechnya.gov.ru/page.php?r=126&id=5906], 25 August, 2009. 43 See: A. Semenov, “V Karachaevo-Cherkesii postroiat eshche odin avtozavod,” Kavkazskii uzel, available at [http:// adygeia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/122214], 28 August, 2007. 44 See, for example: “Avtomobilnyi zavod ‘Derveis’ zapustil novuiu liniiu NAIMA,” Official website of the president and government of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia Republic, available at [http://www.kchr.info/index.php?do=search#/ news/4890-avtomobilnyjj-zavod-dervejjs-zapustil-novuju.html], 8 November, 2010. 45 See: “V Karachaevo-Cherkesii avtozavod predostavil 3,000 novykh rabochikh mest,” Kavkazskii uzel, available at [http://adygeia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/139115], 12 July, 2008. 46 See: “15 ianvaria avtomobilnaia kompaniia DERWAYS otkryvaet novye tsekha po promyshlennoi sborke avtomobilei,” Official website of the president and government of the Karachaevo-Cherkessian Republic, available at [http:// www.kchr.info/news/4090-15-janvarja-avtomobilnaja-kompanija-derways.html], 12 January, 2010. 47 For more detail, see: “Vneshneekonomicheskaia deiatelnost Karachaevo-Cherkesskoi Respubliki za 2009 god,” Ministry of Economic Development of the Karachaevo-Cherkessia Republic, available at [http://minek-kchr.ru/load/ 78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 lion. Moreover, China accounts for 36.1% of the cost volume of import and occupies first place in this respect. The PRC is also active in Kabardino-Balkaria. In November 2006, an official delegation from the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic headed by the president participated in a Russian national exhibi- tion in Beijing organized within the framework of the Year of Russia in China.48 Kabardino-Balkaria offered the Chinese side an investment project for restoring the production capacity of the Tyrnyauz Mining and Concentration Plant for producing and refining primary wolfram-molybdenum products. At that time, a preliminary agreement was reached on possible cooperation. The republic also offered to cooperate with China in manufacturing tobacco from Chinese raw material. And the prospect was discussed of building a Chinese health center at one of the sanatoria in Nalchik. Admittedly, these projects have not been further developed. In May 2010, several of China’s trade organizations showed an interest in the production of the Nalchik Stankozavod Company, the only enterprise in Russia specializing in the manufacture of uni- tized complete plant for furniture edge banding and veneering and a manufacturer of automatic edge banding and veneering lines and machine tools for making furniture.49 As a result, several contracts were entered and an order portfolio was drawn up for the future. China is one of the republic’s main foreign trade partners. In 2009, it accounted for 14.3% of Kabardino-Balkaria’s import and occupied second place in terms of this index among the republic’s foreign trade partners.50 Cooperation between China and North Ossetia-Alania is developing quite dynamically. Alania is also actively cooperating with the provinces of the Celestial Kingdom. In 2006, it established twin town relations with the province of Xiechuan.51 The agreement reached in March 2007 on opening a North Ossetian Center of Economic Trade Cooperation with the PRC in Vladikavkaz was an important event in bilateral relations. The agreement between Alania and the Chinese province of Xiechuan on creating a specialized zone in the republic for the light industry can also justifiably be considered an important economic undertaking.52 Despite the fact that emphasis is placed on the light industry, other industries will also be set up in this zone, in particular the manufacture of household appliances. North Ossetia and China are also cooperating in the humanitarian sphere. For example, the Chinese side invites groups of children who suffered from the terrorist act in Beslan to participate in rehabilitation programs every year.53 Moscow greatly appreciates this Chinese initiative. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev noted in particular that Russia will never forget the concern residents of China, particularly of the Xiechuan Province, have been showing for the children of Beslan.54 otdel_vneshneehkonomicheskikh_svjazej_i_vnebjudzhetnykh_investicij/vneshneehkonomicheskaja_dejatelnost_karachaevo_ cherkesskoj_respubliki_za_2009_god/9-1-0-44], 18 November, 2010. 48 For more on the visit, see: “Kitaitsy proiavili interes k Kabardino-Balkarii,” Official website of the president of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, available at [http://2008.president-kbr.ru/events/connections/?id=93&aktiv=3], 16 November, 2006. 49 See: “Stankozavodom zainteresovalis v Kitae i SNG,” Investment Passport of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, available at [http://www.kbr-invest.ru/index.php?p=news&news_id=452], 18 May, 2010. 50 See: “Mezhdunarodnye sviazi,” Portal of the government of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, available at [http:// pravitelstvokbr.ru/k-br%5Ckbr-main.nsf/html/MEJDUNARODNESVYAZI]. 51 For more detail, see: “Severnaia Osetiia i Kitai: sotrudnichestvo prodolzhaetsia,” Administration of the Head of the Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania and government of the Republic of Northern Ossetia-Alania, available at [http:// www.rso-a.ru/vlast/gov/head/detail.php?ID=4874], 10 June, 2009. 52 See: Z. Gurdzibeeva, “Sviazuiushchaia nit. V Severnoi Osetii planiruetsia sozdat spetsializirovannuiu zonu dlia legkoi promyshlennosti,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, No. 4937, 24 June, 2009. 53 See, for example: “Severnaia Osetiia i Kitai: sotrudnichestvo prodolzhaetsia.” 54 See: “Severnaia Osetia gotova priniat detei iz Kitaia,” Administration of the Head of the Republic of North Osse- tia-Alania and government of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, available at [http://www.rso-a.ru/vlast/head/activity/ detail.php?ID=2987], 23 May, 2008. 79 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Foreign economic relations between the Republic of Daghestan and the PRC are being actively implemented at the level of economic entities and between the representatives of small and medium business.55 In November 2006, a declaration of intent was signed in Beijing on cooperation between the government of Daghestan and China’s Huawei Technologies Cî., Ltd. Within the framework of a memorandum on cooperation between the Russian Builders Association and the Chinese Builders Association for developing the building-material industry and increasing construction facilities in the Russian Federation, agreements were reached on implementing several important projects in Dagh- estan, in particular building a hotel and recreation complex, a manufacturing plant with a capacity of 24 million sq. m. for manufacturing polished glass, a brick factory with a capacity of 75 million red bricks, and so on. The agreement signed in 2009 with China’s Norinco International Cooperation Ltd. on building a cement factory with an annual capacity of 3.6 million tons can justifiably be called one of the most important Daghestani-Chinese projects.56 The factory is to be put into operation within the next three years. An agreement has also been reached between China and Daghestan on setting up an assembly plant for Chinese mini vans at the Makhachkala Aviaagregat Plant.57 In May 2010, Daghestan and China signed an agreement with the Kharbin Guaxin Dongfang Investment Company on cooperation in implementing an investment project to build a plant for manufacturing sheet glass using the float technique.58 Several Chinese companies have expressed a desire to take part in implementing a project to build the International Caspian Logistics Complex.59 This is quite a large-scale project aimed at building an international logistics hub center. It also presumes intensive development of port infrastructure accompanied by diversification of freight flows and the development of the North-South transportation corridor. Caspian Logistics will be oriented both toward serving the region and toward transit flows within the framework of the North-South transportation corridor that links Russia to the South- ern Caucasus. On the whole, foreign trade relations between China and Daghestan are developing quite inten- sively.60 For example, whereas in 2000 the total volume of goods turnover amounted to $336,400, in 2009, it amounted to $11.4 million, thus increasing 34-fold.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

As can be seen from the above, the People’s Republic of China is cooperating quite actively with the Caucasian region. There is every reason to believe that the current geopolitical and geo-economic

55 For more on the chronology of Daghestani-Chinese relations, see: “Sotrudnichestvo s Kitaem,” Agency of Invest- ments and Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Daghestan, available at [http://investrd.ru/2009-09-16-08-12-51/ 202-2009-09-15-13-33-19.html], 16 August, 2010. 56 See, for example: “China’s Norinco to Build $610m Cement Plant in Daghestan,” Marchmont Capital Partners, available at [http://www.marchmontnews.com/story.php?story_id=10277], 5 November, 2009. 57 See: “V Dagestane kitaitsy otkroiut tsemzavod i proizvodstvo po sboru avtomobilei,” Delovoi mir Dagestana, available at [http://www.dmdag.ru/news.php?id=334&PHPSESSID=740d2207562e0d03db2e9e11b6a6a469], 12 March, 2010. 58 See: “Pekin-Kuban DAGEKSPO,” Delovoi mir Dagestana, available at [http://www.dmdag.ru/ journal2.php?jid=1&jnum=14&jcat=C0000043&jaid=81], 14 May, 2010. 59 See: “Realizatsiia investitsionnogo proekta ‘Stroitelstvo mezhdunarodnogo logisticheskogo kompleksa “Kaspii Lozhistik”,’” Agency of Investments and Foreign Economic Relations of the Republic of Daghestan, available at [http:// investrd.ru/news/35-news/268—l-l-r.html], 21 April, 2010. 60 See: “Vneshniaia torgovlia Respubliki Dagestan,” Territorial Structure of the Federal State Statistics Service of the Republic of Daghestan, available at [http://dagstat.gks.ru/digital/region7/DocLib/Âíåøíåýêîíîìè÷åñêàÿ%20 äåÿòåëüíîñòü.htm]. 80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 processes in the Caucasus and, consequently, the increase in its importance in the Eurasian powers’ relations will help to raise the Celestial Kingdom’s activity in this regional vector.

CENTRAL ASIA’S HYDROPOWER PROBLEMS: REGIONAL STATES’ POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

Bakhtiar BAKAS UULU Ph.D. (Econ.), Member of the Board of Directors, Chairman of the Audit Committee of Dos-Kredobank Open Joint-Stock Company (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

Kadyrzhan SMAGULOV M.S. (Political Science), Doctoral candidate at the al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

ater in Central Asia has always been not quently, the runoff perceptibly increases only in only a source of life, but also a source of the highlands. So the main water resources are W disputes. This is because the region has controlled by mountainous Kyrgyzstan and been agricultural from time immemorial and rice Tajikistan; these countries account for a total of and cotton, which require a lot of irrigating, are 80.7% of the entire region’s runoff. Both repub- its main crops. But most of the region is extreme- lics use river water to generate electricity for ex- ly arid; water evaporation in Central Asia is high- port and for domestic consumption, while Ka- er than in similar regions of the world. This, in zakhstan and Uzbekistan use it only for irrigation turn, is the reason for the insufficient drainage purposes. In this scenario, Tajikistan and Kyr- density. In the expanses of Central Asia’s desert gyzstan increase water discharge in the cold win- lowlands, the drainage density amounts to 2 m per ter months in order to engage the hydropower 1 sq. km, whereas the same index in the northern plants during increased electricity consumption part of the Russian lowlands amounts to 300- and reduce it in the summer in order to replenish 350 m per 1 sq. km. the amount of water in the reservoirs, again with Another important feature of Central Asia the aim of engaging hydropower capacities dur- is that the amount of precipitation and, conse- ing the winter. But this leads to waterlogging of

81 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Kazakh and Uzbek territory in the winter and a framework agreement among Kazakhstan, Uz- shortage of irrigation and drinking water in the bekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the joint summer. This strikes a hard blow at the economy: and comprehensive use of the hydropower re- according to some experts, the Central Asian sources of the Naryn and Syr Darya reservoirs and countries incur up to $770 million in economic the Toktogul hydro system. losses from the submergence of farm land in the It should be noted that use of the shared winter and water shortages in the summer.1 water resources in Central Asia today is becom- In the former Soviet Union, attempts were ing a political rather than an economic issue. made to resolve this problem by creating a Joint Common integration mechanisms are needed, the Energy System responsible for controlling and first of which should be an effective agreement on ensuring the rational use of river runoff, as well water and energy.2 In turn, integration will help as for distributing electricity in a way that avoid- to consolidate efforts to improve the socioeco- ed grid overload. This goal was reached by nomic situation in the region’s states, create a means of energy exchange: Kazakhstan and large integrated market of 50 million people, as Uzbekistan delivered gas, coal, and petroleum well as free trade areas, raise the efficiency of products to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while the mutual investments, and ensure coordinated for- latter, in turn, discharged water during the veg- eign policy actions. etation periods and supplied electricity. This This means that the CA countries are ex- streamlined energy exchange consolidated the tremely interdependent on each other regarding countries. But when the Soviet Union collapsed water use issues. It should also be kept in mind and the economic ties broke down, the region’s that water shortage in the region will become even countries were left to resolve their hydropower more acute in the future due to population growth, problems on their own. the development of industrial and agricultural pro- 3 In 1998, the independent Central Asian duction, and the increase in arable land. countries tried to tackle the issue on the basis of a 2 See: K. Smagulov, “Obyedinenie vodoi i svetom,” Vox Populi (Almaty), No. 2, 2008. 1 See: V. Paramonov, “Vodnoenergeticheskaia proble- 3 See: Vodnoenergeticheskie resursy Tsentral’noi ma Tsentral’noi Azii i politika Rossii,” available at [http:// Azii: problemy ispolzovaniia i osvoeniia, Branch Review of www.sfu-kras.ru/node/6759], 21 February, 2011. the Eurasian Bank of Development, Almaty, 2008, p. 4.

Water—A Dwindling Resource

According to U.N. experts, the age of cheap food is behind us. This means that there will be growing competition throughout the world for food products and the dwindling sources of their production. In Central Asia, this has been a signal to step up the fight for control over the region’s water resources. The results of fixed surveillance and the numerous scientific studies confirming changes in climate can be added to this factor. Thanks to the data published in the hydrological yearbooks of the main hydrometeorological services, the average arithmetical amount of total runoff for the basin of the Aral Sea throughout the period of observations (1911-2000) constitutes 112.609 cubic km/year, of which the basin of the Amu Darya river accounts for 77.093 cubic km/year and the basin of the Syr Darya river for 34.076 cubic km/year.4 An assessment of the long-term annual average runoff clearly distinguishes three 19-year

4 See: “Poverkhnostnye vody,” available at [http://www.cawater-info.net/bk/water_land_resources_use/docs/ water_res.html], 21 February, 2011. 82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 cycles, beginning with 1934 and ending in 1992 in the Amu Darya river basin, and six 12-year cycles, beginning with 1928 and ending in 1997 on the Syr Darya river. The amount of long-time average annual runoff recommended by the Scientific-Information Center of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) of Central Asia is 79.280 cubic km/year for the basin of the Amu Darya river and 37.203 cubic km/year for the basin of the Syr Darya river.5 As a result of the fluctuations in water content, the annual water resource indices vacillate between low-water and high-water years within the following ranges: between 58.6 cubic km and 109.9 cubic km for the Amu Darya and between 23.6 cubic km and 51.1 cubic km for the Syr Darya. Last century, an unfavorable environmental situation developed caused by extreme runoff withdrawal in the river basins. For example, the entire Aral region was declared an environmental disaster zone since runoff withdrawal in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers basins feeding it exceeded 90% of the annual runoff. According to world data, whereas between 1900 and 1950, the average increase in water consumption per decade amounted to 156 cubic km, between 1950 and 1960, it had risen to 630 cubic km, that is, a four-fold increase, and in subsequent years it grew by another 800-1,000 cubic km per decade. The climatic warming trend caused a steady shrinking of glaciers. According to the forecasts, by 2025, the glacier area in Kyrgyzstan will shrink by 30-40%, which will lead to a decrease in water content of 25-35%.6 According to the data of the Hydroelectric Engineering Institute of the Kyrgyzstan National Academy of Sciences, glaciers are currently receding three times faster than they did in the 1950s. According to some studies, glaciers are receding at 50 m a year. If this rate keeps up, Kyr- gyzstan will lose all of its small glaciers and be left with only a few large ones. Glacier melting and, consequently, local river runoff will peak around the 2020s-2030s, thus resulting in a decrease in runoff volume of 40%. If the glaciers continue to melt as rapidly as they are at present, in approximately 20 years, Central Asia will find itself on the brink of an environmental disaster. When the Toktogul hydropower station with its 215-meter reinforced concrete dam was built last century, a reservoir of long-term regulation was formed with a water volume of 19.5 billion cubic meters. This made it possible to significantly increase the water supply for consumers in the basin of the Syr Darya river, enlarge the area of irrigated land in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan by 400,000 hectares, and raise the amount of irrigation water for an area of 918,000 hectares from 70% to 90%. But the melting glaciers and the resultant drop in the level of river runoff could have a catastrophic effect on farming activity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Risks

As current reality shows, neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan are capable of independently building such large facilities as the Kambar-Ata and Rogun hydropower stations. The reasons for this include the weakness of these states, the absence of permanent and long-term funding, the shortage of qualified personnel and experience, and the rigorous opposition by neighboring countries. Nor are foreign investors in any rush to pump money into them, being justifiably deterred by the unstable political situation, high level of corruption, and investment risks. The Kambar-Ata-2 project, for example, shows that a generating station that will meet all the security and environmental requirements, as well as ensure a return on investment, cannot be built and

5 See: Official website of the Scientific-Information Center of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia [http://sic.icwc-aral.uz/], 21 February, 2011. 6 See: Situational analysis, available at [http://gef.undp.kg/main1_r.html], 21 February, 2011. 83 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS put into operation in the current conditions. This is graphically shown by the following statistics: the estimated cost of construction work amounted to $270 million; more than $200 million was spent on building the first generating unit, $26 million of which was stolen, which naturally had an effect on the quality. There is also evidence that blasting and building work was not carried out at a sufficiently high level, which is fraught with a halt in the operation of the hydropower station. According to the technological specifications, Kambar-Ata-2 will have to be built after or at the same time as Kambar-Ata-1, since there is the risk of it quickly becoming incapacitated due to silting. In turn, Kambar-Ata-1, with an installed capacity of 1,900 MW and estimated cost of $1.7 billion, is the largest facility in the entire Kambar-Ata hydropower station complex. According to the project, the dam will be built by means of controlled blasting, which could lead to a change in the structure of the earth’s crust. The risk of an environmental disaster, floods, and drop in water level threatens to significantly worsen relations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the one hand, and Kazakhstan and Uz- bekistan, on the other. Whereas Uzbekistan may still be able to compensate water losses in the vegetation period, Kazakhstan will essentially receive no irrigation water. Taking into account China’s increased water withdrawal from the Irtysh and Ili rivers, which could lead to the Balkhash and Zaysan lakes drying up, the decrease in discharge from the Syr Darya river will be extremely detrimental to Kazakhstan. Today, it is becoming more or less clear that the problems are mainly caused by inefficient and corrupt management. A negative role is also played by the unwillingness of the governments of the neighboring states to understand the designation of the Toktogul reservoir: it was built in Soviet years as part of single regional complex, and the money spent on its operation was compensated for in the form of deliveries of alternative energy resources. This creates a whole chain of interrelated problems. But each country is pursuing its own national interests, so the only solution is to find a compromise, each side must make concessions.

Political Maneuvers of the Regional States

The buildup in tension in relations between Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the other, led to Tashkent officially announcing on 1 December, 2009 that it was withdrawing from the Central Asia Joint Energy System (JES), which Turkmenistan also withdrew from in 2003. This led to a halt in electricity supply (1.2 billion kWh) to Tajikistan from Turkmen- istan via Uzbekistan’s power transmission lines, thus placing Tajikistan in complete energy isolation. In addition, approximately one third of the energy consumers in Kyrgyzstan also found themselves in complete electricity isolation. It is also worth noting that throughout the years of its independence Uzbekistan has been deliberately conducting a policy aimed at forming its own energy security. For example, in 2009, a 500-kV power transmission line was put into operation between the Guzar and Surkhan substations, which made it possible to deliver electricity directly to the Sur- khandarya Region, bypassing Tajikistan, and increase the export of Uzbek electricity to Afghani- stan to 300 MW. In the future, Uzbekistan plans to draw $3.5 billion in investments into the energy industry.7

7 See: “Uzbekistan Plans to Draw $3.5 Billion in Investments into the Energy Industry,” available at [http:// www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=13410], 21 February, 2011. 84 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

However, it must be noted that right before Uzbekistan withdrew from the JES, Ambassador of Uzbekistan to Tajikistan Shoislam Shokasymov told the Tajik authorities that Tashkent was willing to continue cooperating with Dushanbe in the energy sphere on the basis of bilateral intergovernmen- tal agreements. So it is obvious that Uzbekistan is not striving toward integration, but is pursuing bilateral relations with its neighbors. Some experts say that this is because the integration unions want to delegate sovereignty to supranational structures, but Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan’s current president, is against this. Suffice it to recall Tashkent’s unwillingness to participate in the CAC and its withdrawal from the EurAsEC. Another reason is the rivalry between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for leadership in Central Asia, which boils down to personal rivalry between Islam Karimov and Nursul- tan Nazarbaev. It is obvious that if an integration union is created, Kazakhstan, which is economically more powerful than Uzbekistan, will play the leading role. Immediately following Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the JES, Kazakh diplomacy stepped up its activity to create an energy ring around Uzbekistan. For example, an agreement was reached on establishing a joint energy system with Kyrgyzstan, which was later joined by Tajikistan. Kazakhstan announced that it would build the Kemin (Kyrgyzstan)-Almaty power transmission line costing a total of $140 million. A protocol was signed between the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on building a high-voltage power transmission line from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan,8 which envisages 30 June, 2012 as the date for completing the feasibility report. At the same time, the government of Kazakhstan began discussing the construction of a new coordinating dispatch center called Energia II in Almaty, in counterbalance to Tashkent’s Energia Coordinating Dispatch Center.9 A closer look at these decisions shows that building the Datka substation not far from Jalal-Abad (Kyrgyzstan) will make it possible to send it all the electricity directly from the Kurpsai, Tashkumyr, Shamaldy-Sai, and Uch-Kurgan generating units in the lower cascade of the hydropower station without going through Uzbekistan.10 Bishkek also signed an agreement with China on the Datka-Kemin project, according to which a 500-kW power line will go from the Datka substation through Kambar-Ata-2 and Kambar- Ata-1 in the direction of the Naryn Region to the Kemin substation, thus improving electricity supply to the north of Kyrgyzstan. The Kazakh side, in turn, has joined these projects and is funding the construction of the Kemin-Almaty power transmission line, while Tajikistan is planning to build a line from Datka to Khujand with access to Afghanistan. In this grid, the energy systems of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan will operate in coordination with UES Russia, with the Energia II Coor- dinating Dispatch Center in Almaty being responsible for dispatching electricity and capacity inter- change. According to Senior Researcher of the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry L. Gusev, creating a new Central Asian energy system is advantageous for Tajikistan since it reduces the country’s dependence on Uzbekistan. This is keeping in mind that the South-North power transmission line joining the northern and southern parts of Tajikistan and bypassing Uzbekistan was put into operation in 2009.11 The Kazakhstan government has also been engaged in discussing the possibility of putting a thermal power plant into operation on the rich Kyrgyz coal deposit of Kara-Keche, the proven reserves

8 The Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Energy, NES Kyrgyzstana Open Joint-Stock Company, the Kazakhstan Ministry of Industry and New Technologies, and KEGOC Joint-Stock Company discuss building a 500-kV power transmission line at a meeting of Kyrgyz and Kazakh working groups to examine bilateral cooperation issues and render assistance to Kyr- gyzstan, 14 July, 2010 (see: [http://www.akipress.kg], 21 February, 2011). 9 See: Report by A.M. Satkaliev, President of KEGOC Joint-Stock Company, called Aspects of International Coop- eration in Developing the Main Infrastructure of the Energy Complex (see: [http://www.kazenergy.com], 21 February, 2011). 10 See: “LEP Datka-Kemin obespechit elektroenergiei sever Kyrgyzstana,” available at [http://www.tokmak.kg/nevkg/ akonomkg/5458-lyep-datka-kemin-obespechit-yelektroyenergiej.html], 21 February, 2011. 11 See: V. Zhavoronkova, “Obyedinennaia energosistema v Tsentral’noi Azii vygodna dlia Tadzhikistana—ekspert Leonid Gusev,” available at [http://ru.trend.az/print/1640529.html], 21 February, 2011. 85 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of which are estimated at around 4 billion tons.12 Construction of this facility, with an estimated capacity of 1,200 MW and prospective increase of up to 2,400 MW, will be completed within four years. Moreover, this plant will make it possible to alleviate operation of the cascade of the Toktogul hydropower station in the winter in order to accumulate water and ensure its more rational use in the spring- summer period. This will have a favorable effect on the water supply and help to eliminate the electricity shortage in the southern regions of Kazakhstan. However, Astana is more interested in the possibility of creating, by participating in building the Kara-Keche thermal power plant and by building power transmission lines from the Toktogul hydropower station through the Kara-Keche thermal power plant to Issyk-Kul, the new Central Asian energy ring, which will be coordinated by the Energia II Coordinating Dispatch Center in Almaty. Kazakhstan has already completed the construction of the Koksarai Counter-Regulator and is planning to build an automated water supply complex in the Kazakh section of the Dostyk canal, whereby resolving at least two problems at once. First, it will be able to save the population settlements in the Syr Darya basin from flooding and, second, it can independently control the discharge of water from the Shardara hydropower station along the Dostyk canal. This will raise the generation of electricity and make it possible to increase the amount of arable land, consequently improving food safety.

External Players

Despite Astana’s strivings, it should be understood that not one of the leading powers with interests in Central Asia (Russia, China, the U.S., and Iran) wants the region’s countries to integrate. The current isolation of the region’s countries, not to mention the growing contradictions among them, is precisely what the external players need to advance their long-term strategic interests in Central Asia. For example, the U.S. is actively promoting the CASA-1000 (Central Asia-South Asia) project, the objective of which is to create a system for transmitting electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan.13 Moreover, Afghanistan will gain a secondary advantage from charg- ing for the transit of energy exported to Pakistan.14 By implementing this project, Washington is trying to resolve three problems at once: prevent the Central Asian countries from integrating; replenish the Afghan budget by means of energy transit through Afghanistan, which will provide it with more money for making the transition to a peaceful lifestyle; and increase energy deliveries to Pakistan. Russia is striving to integrate the CA countries by means of the EurAsEC, CIS, and CSTO under its own aegis. China, which is against the establishment of a large Muslim integration union in the direct proximity of its borders, is trying to conduct its policy through the SCO. At the same time, Beijing is trying to prevent the CA countries from uniting by participating in the resolution of hydropower issues, thus also resolving its own domestic problems. In particular, China is participating in the construction of small hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan in order to supply its western provinces with electricity, while also building railroads and highways to Kyrgyzstan along the power transmission lines, in so doing binding Bishkek to it.

12 See: E. Karybekov, N. Doskali, Novaia model Obyedinennoi energosistemy Tsentral’noi Azii. Monografiia, Almaty, 2009, p. 31. 13 See: Z. Ergasheva, “Tajikistan has Lost $150 Million due to Redundant Discharge of Water from the Nurek Res- ervoir,” available at [http://news.tj/ru/news/tadzhikistan-iz-za-kholostogo-sbrosa-vody-iz-nurekskogo-vodokhranilishcha- poteryal-150-mln], 21 February, 2011. 14 See: “Blake oboznachil prioritety Administratsii SShA v Iuzhnoi i Tsentral’noi Azii,” Speech by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake, Jr., Rice University, 19 January, 2011, Houston, Texas, available at [http://www.12.uz/ ru/news/show/comments/5601/], 21 February, 2011. 86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Between 2006 and 2009, China assisted in building two power transmission lines in Tajikistan— PTL-100 and PTL-500, which connect the country to China’s electric power system. After withdrawing from the JES in 2003, Turkmenistan’s energy system has been operating in conjunction with Iran’s energy system. However, joint operation of the energy systems of the CA states and external countries is leading to the greater dependence of the former on the latter, since this provides the external players with levers of pressure on Central Asia.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

Since the interests of the regional countries are at variance, which the external players are encouraging, there can be no talk of their integration and a common solution to the hydropower problems. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will most likely continue their unsuccessful attempts to build large hydropower plants and charge the other regional countries for water. Uzbekistan, in turn, will try to block such initiatives in every way it can, including via multilateral structures. Kazakhstan’s steps will be instrumental in the development of this situation. For example, if Astana takes Uzbekistan’s side, this will increase the isolation of the regional countries in water use issues and the development of the energy industry. If, however, it takes the side of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, keeping in mind Russia’s interest in building hydropower plants, Kazakhstan has every chance of becoming a key participant and moderator in the management of water resources in Central Asia. It could create a hydropower ring around Uzbekistan, that is, Astana could gain a lever of pressure on Tashkent, which, if used sensibly, could promote the creation of an integration union of the Central Asian countries.

ARMENIA’S SOCIOECONOMIC POTENTIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENT

Amalia SARIBEKIAN Ph.D. (Econ.), Council Member at the Central Bank of Armenia (Erevan, Armenia)

Introduction

he world financial crisis has brought the emergence of many risks associated with the new contradictions in Armenia’s socioeconom- approaches to economic management and with T ic development into the limelight. The the global changes that have occurred in the events of the post-crisis period have led to the world.

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The anticrisis measures adopted have ing the existing value system and reassessing the brought about certain positive changes, but this available resources. is not enough to ensure stable economic growth Unfortunately, there is a wide gap in Arme- and a rise in the standard of living. A shift to a nia between ideas and their realization, which is qualitatively new level of economic growth is complicating self-organization of the nation; the needed, which requires pursuing an active poli- historical past must be perceived in a new way. cy based on the application of new criteria. De- The people need a philosophy supported not only fining a new starting point for economic devel- by a material foundation, but also by cultural and, opment, as well as identifying the possible (or primarily, moral and psychological values. optimal) alternative solutions and correctly set- This is the viewpoint most conducive to ting the priorities are key elements in resolving defining the priority vectors for developing na- this problem tional potential, keeping in mind the nation’s ca- The tasks facing the republic can best be pabilities and opportunities for self-organization, solved by revealing the real opportunities for rais- and to designating ways to most efficiently intro- ing national potential, which requires re-examin- duce a new socioeconomic policy.

Comprehensive Approaches to Economic Development in Post-Crisis Conditions

Judging from the level and rates of economic development, it can be ascertained that Armenia has withdrawn from the crisis, although many unresolved tasks still remain. But the crisis not only creates problems, it also provides new opportunities for successful and dynamic development of the economy. The current period in Armenia’s economic development requires essentially new interrelated approaches that anticipate the following:

ensuring maximum understanding of forthcoming actions and opportunities è determining the priorities of economic development è drawing up efficient ways to implement them è choosing optimal ways of development è ensuring their consistent implementation.

These measures must also be implemented in an integrated way (see flow chart in Fig. 1). As can be seen from the flow chart, when a transfer is made to each subsequent stage, the forthcoming actions and starting points for solving the subsequent tasks must constantly be corrected and new priorities and development goals, strategic approaches, and precedence of the necessary measures determined. The flow chart presented makes it possible to determine the achievements at each new stage of economic development, decide what direction to take, choose the optimal starting conditions and possible ways of implementing the tasks, decide how to resolve particular problems, determine the country’s potential, select the preferable alternatives, and so on. One of the most important tasks is defining the starting conditions required for transferring to each subsequent stage and determining the new direction of development: incorrect choice of starting point could lead to negative results.

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Figure 1 Integral System of Socioeconomic Development

Starting Identifying tasks for assessing the situation point

re-examination Identifying Identifying and forthcoming re-examining actions opportunities

Priorities Alternatives Identifying social 1 yes 1 yes potential yes yes 2 2 yes yes Assessing n n the impact of factors of social potential

End point Forming a system of competitive 1 advantages 2

It should also be kept in mind that each country defines its own future development goals: some want to retain the achieved level, others need to go on to the next stage, while still others think it important not to wander from the chosen path and/or lag behind, and so on. Taking proper account of the correlation between goals and resources and their interdependence plays a fundamental role in successfully solving the strategic economic tasks. It is also very important to properly assess the classical “goal-controllable variables-resources” correlation. It is obvious that the choice of goal influences the choice of means to be used (resources); however, the reverse dependence is less obvious: the influence of the available resources on the setting of goals. Incidentally, the well-known principle “live within your means” is extremely apt here.

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On the other hand, such a “strict” approach might curb socioeconomic progress: it requires setting ambitious goals and not sparing resources to achieve them, while a conscious effort to remain within the bounds of limited resources will require setting more modest goals. Correctly identifying the priorities of economic development and precisely defining their precedence is an important prerequisite of effective development. Priorities must be defined based on the specific situation; moreover, there could be several of them. The situation might require re-examining the defined priorities or rejecting them altogether, or their realization might be postponed or, on the contrary, accelerated. The diversity of priorities and their precedence might be determined by the country’s resource supplies and the way they are used; resources frequently have to be used sparingly in order to ensure successful economic development. The choice of priorities might be based on ideas of what is actually needed for modernizing the economy, or on culture, which is an important source of national resources; education, human capital, etc. also play an extremely important role in the country’s development. There can be no doubt that economic priorities should reflect general features and global processes, on the one hand, and the state and processes inherent in the national economy, on the other. Tasks that meet national interests are of prime importance. For example, the correct choice of optimal alternative of economic development will make it possible for Armenia to become fully integrated into the world economy. Corresponding mechanisms are needed in order to bring the chosen goals and priorities to fru- ition; in particular, a mobilized economy could play an important role in achieving these goals. A mobilized economy is a system of socioeconomic relations based on a mechanism that primarily ensures:

n maximum identification and targeted distribution of material and non-material resources; n maximum use of these resources; n clear definition of development goals and priorities and constant control over implementation of the set tasks; n modernization of the economy and progress (as a result of the points listed above). A mobilized economy presumes the use of new, non-traditional approaches; it requires pursuing a policy aimed at full identification, incorporation, and targeted use of all the national resources (historical-cultural, intellectual, psychological, financial, and natural) with the direct participation of the state. Synergetics is also a rather efficient management method which could offer new ways of resource use. Synergy is the mutually advantageous conjunction of distinct elements, producing a result that might prove much higher than the one obtained from simple composition of the potential of all the components of this system. Moreover, synergetics is capable of identifying universal management mechanisms and ensuring more efficient self-organization; it could create much broader alternatives by combining specific components of national potential in different ways. The most important prerequisite for producing a synergetic effect is optimal determination of the working group, distribution of the roles within it, and so on. Analyzing the conditions for achieving synergy, fully identifying resources, ensuring their integrated use, and assessing their availability are also extremely important.

90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 Identification and Targeted Use of Socioeconomic Potential as the Main Prerequisite of Progress

In present-day conditions, actions aimed at the integrated and comprehensive use of national potential can significantly help to identify further opportunities for the country’s economic development and progress.1 This, in turn, implies the use of a program-integrated approach when carrying out policy aimed at “…uninterrupted activity of the economic system and strict provision with resources and communications, ensuring balance in management, clarifying the role and significance of the state…”2 The approach being examined requires full identification of socioeconomic potential and its integrated use.

Socioeconomic Potential and Its Components

The possibility of pursuing an integrated and resource-guaranteed investment policy depends primarily on full identification and rational use of the country’s socioeconomic potential. Socioeco- nomic potential is a composite of non-material and material resources, which include the nation’s spiritual and cultural level, its economic and ideological basis, society’s ability to self-organize, and the country’s educational, financial, and national capabilities (see Fig. 2).

Figure 2 Components of Socioeconomic Potential

1. Culture

2. Knowledge

3. Human resources Social capital

4. Institutional foundation

5. Infrastructure

6. Financial resources AGGREGATE CAPITAL capital 7. Natural resources Physical

1 See: Upravlenie izmeneniiami (The Harvard Business Review Classics Series), Alpina Business Books, Moscow, 2007, pp. 20, 52; H. Haken, Informatsiia i samoorganizatsiia, Mir, Moscow, 1991, p. 27 (H. Haken, Information and Self- Organization: A Macroscopic Approach to Complex Systems, Third Edition, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 2006); C. Hidalgo, B. Klinger, A.-L. Barabasi, R. Hausmann, “The Product Space and Its Consequences for Economic Growth,” Science Mag- azine, 2007, p. 193. 2 A. Markosian, Osnovnye problemy ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti, Noravank, Erevan, 2005, p. 47. 91 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Table 1 Contents of Integrated Potential

Art Music, painting, architecture Norms Acceptable behavior, traditions, Culture and so on National psychology Language, creative attitude, trust Health and demography Physical and intellectual health, population structure in terms of gender and age Human Education and Primary, secondary; secondary, resources advanced training higher, etc. Attitude and motivation Personal responsibility, orientation Qualitative and Statistics, opinions quantitative data

Social capital Knowledge Conceptions, programs Theories, processes Educational institutions Universities, higher learning institutions, etc. Health, transparent Non-shadow, open management management system Justice system Predictability of regulatory Institutional norms, protection of property foundation rights, and so on Contiguous structures Chambers of Commerce and Industry, public organizations, unions Financial system Markets, institutions, infrastructure Private structures Companies: close joint-stock Financial companies, open joint-stock potential companies, limited companies, corporations, etc. Public organizations Unions, clubs, self-regulating organizations, etc. Transportation and supply lines Infrastructure Energy Physical capital Water channels Mining and raw material base Natural Environment resources Location, weather, etc.

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Socioeconomic potential can be divided into seven main groups; four of them can provisionally be applied to social capital (culture, knowledge, human resources, and institutional foundation), and the rest to physical capital. Socioeconomic potential is also formed on the basis of the derivatives of the above-listed components (see Table 1).

Logic for Realizing Integrated National Potential

A key factor of economic progress is streamlined and consistent actions aimed at realizing the country’s potential keeping in mind the globalization of economic life and resource support. From this perspective, forming integrated national potential is a rather complicated task: this process includes seven variables, and the country’s economic development and prosperity, as well as the formation of its national investment potential depend on how optimally these variables are combined (see Fig. 3). When forming integrated national potential, it is very important to keep in mind the close interconnection and interdependence of all its components. This complicates their targeted and har-

Figure 3

Human resources Knowledge

Institutional Culture Infrastructure foundation

Financial resources Natural resources

Socioeconomic potential

National investment potential

Economic development program

Raising the standard of living: Increase in prosperity

93 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS monious use, on the one hand, and promotes maximally integrated formation of national investment potential, efficient definition of economic priorities, and successful reaching of goals, on the other. It is important to correctly choose the general features that correspond to international criteria (structural, substantial, features of socioeconomic potential and integrated national potential of economic progress), which will later ensure smooth functioning of the country’s economic system. From this viewpoint, the substantial features of Armenia’s socioeconomic potential are rather interesting.

Armenia’s Socioeconomic Potential and Primary National Tasks

Identifying socioeconomic potential is a rather difficult process: all seven of its components are constantly changing, both qualitatively and quantitatively, under the influence of different factors.3 Moreover, depending on the specific goals and priorities, as well as on the time limits for reaching the set goals (within the framework of short-term, medium-term, or long-term programs), the relative importance of each of the seven types of capital4 and precedence of measures for their use could change. In this respect, it is necessary to correctly assess the value system basis of each period and determine the formula of national self-organization, otherwise the consequences may be irreversible (the nation might simply disappear). Throughout the entire existence of the Armenian nation, the family has been the primary priority of national self-organization. But is it not time to move on to other forms of self-organization, such as a strong state and national health? A good case in point is the Jews, who, after losing their statehood, retained their national self- organization and, thanks to that, have always occupied a special place among other nations, thus prov- ing their viability. On the other hand, in the U.S., the role of the family and the nation as elements of self-organization is very insignificant, while the state is strong. An edifying example is the lifestyle of the Japanese, which fully corresponds to their national value system; this system has been incorporated into family, social, and, what is most interesting, economic relations. Japanese business is entirely built on the basis of religious ideology, while corpo- rate management is based on national traditions, mutual trust, and common interests; the rules of the game are the same for everyone. Perhaps Armenia too should transfer to the formula of “strong family-strong state-strong nation”?

National Priorities of Socioeconomic Potential

Globalization and socioeconomic development in different countries often take different forms since they are based on different ideological foundations and formulas of self-organization. Moreover, depending

3 For example, as the result of several global trends (in particular, longer life expectancy), education opportunities have increased, which in turn has had a significant effect on the development of technology, productivity of labor, and creation of material benefits. As a result of certain changes in economic philosophy, the command-administrative system has given way to the market economy and this, in turn, has led to an acceleration in world trade turnover, an expansion of new markets, and a spread in global processes. The financial system began developing at a rapid rate, which led to a breakdown in the balance between the real and financial sectors, thus provoking the crisis, and so on. There are many such interrelated and interdependent cause-and-effect sequences, but a more detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article. 4 Capital is the used resource that has become the main component of national investment capital. 94 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 on the specific period and situation, development might progress differently in one and the same country. This is caused primarily by the special features of socioeconomic potential and by the quantitative and qualitative features of the individual components of national investment potential. In the context of post-crisis development, the state’s ability to make productive and effective use of socioeconomic potential could ensure the country’s further progress.

Results of a Survey on the National Priorities of Armenia’s Socioeconomic Potential

For almost ten years, we polled first-year students studying for Master’s degrees at the Depart- ment of Economics of Erevan State University on the subject “Social Management.” The survey was designed to assess the national priorities of Armenia’s socioeconomic potential and the impact of each of them on the country’s development. The choice of respondents was based on two factors: n First, the respondents were people who in the near future would have to make decisions themselves about different components of socioeconomic potential; n Second, conducting an annual poll of first-year students at the same learning institution and in the same field of specialization made it possible to trace the changes over time. As Table 2 shows, the poll yielded extremely interesting results. Table 2 Assessments of Socioeconomic Potential (2001-2010) Target group of respondents—economists studying for a Master’s degree (“0”—lowest, “1”—highest assessment) Human Culture Science National Potential Financial Resources Resources Infrastructure Institutionalism

2001 0.35 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.35 0.26 0.61 2002 0.42 0.76 0.56 0.62 0.25 0.34 0.55 2003 0.49 0.75 0.65 0.63 0.30 0.22 0.47 2004 0.48 0.74 0.76 0.63 0.26 0.15 0.48 2005 0.41 0.72 0.55 0.60 0.31 0.33 0.58 2006 0.65 0.82 0.63 0.61 0.26 0.21 0.32 2007 0.64 0.83 0.68 0.60 0.26 0.24 0.24 2008 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.51 0.22 0.36 0.24 2009 0.72 0.69 0.80 0.47 0.30 0.33 0.18 2010 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.44 0.23 0.33 0.17

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So scientific-educational potential and human capital received the highest assessments. These assessments remained rather stable throughout the reporting period (within the range of 0.7-0.8 and 0.6-0.8, respectively); the respondents considered the role of physical capital to be less important. Moreover, the assessments did not principally change throughout the entire survey (apart from the assessment of natural resources); in particular, financial resources were given an assessment of 0.2- 0.3, and infrastructure of 0.20-0.35. The dynamics of the respondents’ assessment of some of the factors influencing the formation of national potential is extremely interesting (see Fig. 4). Figure 4 Dynamics of the Assessment of the Different Components of Socioeconomic Potential (2001-2010) (“0”—lowest, “1”—highest assessment)

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Culture Science Human resources Institutionalism Infrastructure Financial potential Natural resources

For example, in 2010, the assessment of the role of natural resources dropped compared to 2001 from 0.61 to 0.17, while that of culture, on the contrary, rose from 0.35 to 0.80. The factorial change in the assessment of institutional capital was an unpleasant surprise (the assessment of its role dropped from 0.63 to 0.44); it is very possible that this change is related to the realities of social life. It is likely that institutionalism is regarded as a derivative of historical-cultural capital and national psychology, which is considered the most important factor influencing the others.

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The Master’s degree students polled preferred culture and national psychology, regarding historical-cultural and moral-psychological values as the foundations of the country’s development potential: “If we cannot make a breakthrough in the moral-psychological sphere today, it will be difficult to make progress in the other spheres.” So, as of today, the most important element is social potential, as well as its ability for self-organization. It is also necessary to keep in mind the important role of historically developed national psychology as an important factor of economic development and national prosperity. In 2010, a new public opinion poll was conducted in Armenia,5 since the previous (ten-year) poll was unable to provide answers to many of the existing questions. As a result, some assessments and conclusions of the previous polls were confirmed and some clarity was shed on the problem of developing socioeconomic potential. The comparative assessments obtained as a result of the poll of two target populations, Master degree students and the population as a whole, showed both similarities and certain contradictions (see Table 3). Table 3 Comparative Assessments of Socioeconomic Potential for Separate Groups of Respondents (2010) (“0”—lowest, “1”—highest assessment)

Potential Human Natural Culture Science Finances Resources Resources Foundation Institutional Group Infrastructure

Master’s degree students 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.44 0.23 0.33 0.17

Population as a whole 0.40 0.74 0.69 0.56 0.24 0.62 0.24

Both the population as a whole and the Master’s degree students gave the highest assessments to scientific-educational and human capital. All the respondents, regardless of age, income, education level, and place of residence, considered scientific-educational capital important; the assessments fluctuate within the range of 0.73-0.78. The same is also seen with respect to human capital. The way both groups assessed culture and natural resources is especially interesting. The population as a whole assessed culture at only 0.40, while the Master’s degree students assessed it at 0.80. Whereas in the case of the Master’s degree students, the main factorial shift over ten years occurred between culture and natural resources with a rise in the assessment of culture, the population as a whole, while rating culture fairly low, highly assessed the role of the financial factor (0.62).

5 The target population of this poll consisted of all the households in the republic (800,000), while those over 18 years of age in the family at the time the poll was conducted represented the unit of the target population. The household sam- ple included all the administrative districts of Erevan and the cities of all the regions of the republic, as well as rural areas chosen by special means in order to achieve maximum representation. Households were selected using stratified random sampling: in cities using one-phase, and in rural areas using two- phase selection. 97 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Today, the shortage of financial capital is the reason for many problems in the life of the country’s population and this most likely influences the population’s perception. The Master’s degree students, on the other hand, believe that “with a sufficient level of education and awareness, it is always possible to find free financial resources and the necessary mechanisms and ways to engage them.”

Figure 5 Comparison of the Poll Results in the Two Target Populations (“0”—lowest, “1”—highest assessment)

0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

Culture Finance Natural Knowledge Institutional potential foundation Infrastructure resources Human resources

Economists studying for a Master’s degree Population as a whole

Attention should be paid to both groups’ low assessment of natural resources (0.24 and 0.17, respectively). The popular view that “natural resources are a given, a fixed value, and since they are unlikely to increase we would do better to think about how to use them more efficiently; and this is where culture, national psychology, and scientific-education capital become important” probably played a role here. Neither poll made it possible to answer all the questions. What is more, many additional problems were identified, the solution to which may reveal hidden opportunities and lead to new approaches in the future.

Important Features of National Investment Potential and the Role of Culture

In the survey conducted, the questions relating to culture are particularly interesting (in the narrow sense they are viewed as national culture per se, while in the broad sense they can be seen as a way

98 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 of thinking, education, and organization); in the current conditions of globalization, traditional ideas about culture are changing. The question of the role and place of culture in the life of society is becoming increasingly urgent, primarily from the viewpoint of providing the resources necessary for the country’s socioeconomic development. The solution to this problem depends directly on the economy’s compatibility, where the quality of the workforce plays a decisive role, that is, the level of knowledge of the people occupied in material production (“human capital”). The concept “human capital” comprises the ability of the individual, as well as of the company, enterprise, or country as a whole, to produce the goods, added value, and services needed for expanded reproduction. As of today, culture is not only a systemic composite of material and spiritual values, but also the usual way of performing a particular activity; it is incorporated into any organizational structure, into macro and micro spheres, and, naturally, into any socioeconomic development project. An increase in labor productivity greatly depends on the level of culture of economic activity; in our day and age, management of even the smallest organization depends not so much on material resources as on the ability to make the fullest use of the potential of the personnel. The nation’s intellectual potential, that is, knowledge, is the next important factor in the country’s development and prosperity. It is no accident that in countries where the population is highly educated, there is a stable trend in sustainable economic development. An economy based on knowledge has long become a strategic reserve and the main factor of production. Investments in human capital are the most justified today. In the advanced countries of the world, 75%-85% of GDP is generated not by energy resources, but by an economy based on knowledge, that is, the development of society largely depends on the level of national culture; at the current stage, it is scientific-technological and intellectual potential that defines the country’s status on the international arena, as well as the degree to which it is integrated into international structures. Human potential and human capital should be given special emphasis among the country’s development priorities; they are determined both by demographic features and the need to maintain the nation’s physical and spiritual health. The fourth component of national-investment potential is the institutional foundation. Whereas national psychology, educational potential, and human capital remain relatively constant in the short term (although they may eventually become transformed), institutional potential is more flexible and is quicker to change and improve. On the other hand, the institutional foundation is largely predeter- mined by the same culture, particularly national psychology. Capital associated with the state of the infrastructure occupies first place among the physical components of socioeconomic potential. It is followed by financial resources; they are no less important, but most countries of the world do not have enough of them. A place for and ways and means of engaging these resources can always be found if there is a favorable institutional foundation and healthy investment conditions, as well as if the population is sufficiently educated and informed. The nation’s potential is also designated by the territory in which it lives and its natural resources; the capital they form is initially a constant amount (“we have what we have”). For Armenia, making maximum use of the available resources is of prime importance, since the country has no oil or gas, and other natural resources are very scarce. Therefore the emphasis is placed on the role of infrastructure and production capacities that can help the nation fully tap its potential and make a breakthrough in economic development. And once again national psychology, education, human capital, and so on come to the forefront.

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So it is not economic or financial resources that are the most important for the country’s development and nation’s prosperity, but correct self-organization, that is, maximum identification and mobilization of the existing potential (historical, value, intellectual, psychological, financial, and resource-related) and its balanced use. It should be noted that the attitude of the individual and the population as a whole toward the state is formed on the basis of a multitude of factors: national and financial resources, national achievements in sports, art, and science, human skills and knowledge, personal achievements, job satisfac- tion, happiness in life, and so on.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

So an assessment of the current situation in the country, identification of the problems, and as precise a definition of possible of social potential and capabilities are all equally important for further raising the efficiency of economic development. Each country must establish the ideological foundation of its own development and develop a formula of national self-organization. A correct assessment of Armenia’s social potential and its intel- ligent targeted use will make it possible to modernize the economy and raise its competitiveness, as well as find the most acceptable development alternatives based on national specifics that also coincide with world trends. There is no doubt that any change can be upsetting and requires revision and reassessment of some values, approaches, and standards. This means that the country must learn how to quickly and flexibly adapt to the changes going on in the world economy. It requires possessing the knowledge, values, and capabilities necessary for the country’s institutions to be able to draw up a new strategy in the changing situation. The special role of culture created by generations of our ancestors cannot be underestimated; it always provides an inexhaustible source of efficient socioeconomic development. In this context, educational capital also has special significance, since the ability to perceive, assimilate, and efficiently use new knowledge is increasingly predetermining the nation’s entire economic potential. So strengthening Armenia’s socioeconomic potential requires the following: n restoring, preserving, and developing cultural traditions, as well as reinforcing the entire national value system using innovative approaches; n forming a systemic bond among culture, education, and science aimed at ensuring the harmonious development of each citizen; n ensuring the formation of information flows as a guarantor of the preservation and development of the national identity, as well as the country’s incorporation into the global cultural processes.

100 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CHINA’S PRESENCE IN KAZAKHSTAN: MYTHS AND REALITY

Konstantin SYROEZHKIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Chief Researcher at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

valuating the level of China’s presence in surrounding this problem, but hardly any serious Kazakhstan and, most important, the attitude studies, although this absence can be explained. E of the government and society toward this The official statistics provided by the internal phenomenon is a thankless task, although both affairs structures give no cause for concern, but a interesting and necessary from the viewpoint of visit to any Kazakh market tells a different story. national security. This evaluation is not only The albeit fragmentary, but very convincing sta- complicated by the numerous myths surround- tistics regarding the enterprises with Chinese in- ing this topic, but also by the unavailability of vestments registered by the judicial authorities some of the information, the reason for which is also tell a different story. Any ordinary citizen not entirely clear. And it is this “secrecy” that who familiarizes himself with these statistics gets often gives rise to the myths about Kazakh-Chi- the impression that China is “marking out its ter- nese relations, as well as the phobias about Chi- ritory,” and this conclusion is what feeds the “Chi- na itself. nese expansion” theory. Information about major Kazakh-Chinese The geopolitical arguments of some au- projects is even harder to come by. It is entirely thors about China’s presence in Central Asia and out of bounds, while the facts that reach the pag- Kazakhstan give rise to many questions. It is bla- es of the Kazakh and foreign press give rise to tantly clear that China is fortifying its position many questions, to put it mildly. This is particu- in the Central Asian region and particularly in larly true regarding the details of project funding, Kazakhstan, but this fact can in no way justify the participation of the sides in the implementa- the conclusion that “China will begin its advance tion and further operation of a project, its recoup- on the former Soviet Union from Kazakhstan.”1 ment, its economic and geopolitical importance Even more far-fetched is the conclusion other for Kazakhstan and China, and so on. What is “experts” come to when analyzing the changing there to hide? Openly publicizing a bilateral doc- geopolitical situation in Central Asia and the ument is always better than rumors and conjec- active changes going on in Kazakhstan: “The tures about it. Government officials look very un- main question today is where the demarcation trustworthy when they begin trying to find justi- fication for what could have been said openly. 1 D. Aslamova, “Kitai nachnet pogloshchat byvshiy The same goes for Chinese labor migration. SSSR s Kazakhstana,” Komsolmolskaia pravda, 17-18 No- There are more than enough myths and phobias vember, 2009. 101 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS line will fall when Russia and China divide up menistan’s energy resources.”3 I do not think this Kazakhstan.”2 poses such a terrible threat to Russia. On the con- I do not think the situation is that serious. trary, a competitive environment can help Russian There are of course problems, but this does not oil and gas companies to function more efficient- mean that China has laid claim to the region and ly, rather than simply sitting back on their laurels. begun making inroads into it. It is certainly mak- I think the problem lies in something else. ing some acquisitions, but it is doing this by buy- We are living in an era of economic globalization ing companies from other foreign investors. This and China, unlike its strategic partners, Russia and is normal practice, whereby not only for China Kazakhstan, has already become incorporated into and not only in the region under discussion. If it. This, in any case, is the gist of the concept you have money, you should spend it. China has “going global,” which China has been following a lot of money; more than two trillion in inter- since 2003. And everything it is doing both in national reserves alone, a state investment fund Kazakhstan and Russia is being carried out with- of $200 billion, and a multitude of private invest- in the rules of the game dictated by the globaliz- ment funds with appreciable possibilities. So ing world. On the other hand, the phobias about China is spending its money. And rightly so, China (and sometimes about Russia) are based on because today problem companies and raw ma- two things. First, they belong to the category of terial resources can be bought up cheaply. Any psychological fears. Second, they are dictated by country, if it had the opportunity, would do the the fact that we are neighbors—even the best of same thing. neighbors can come under fire, and if this neigh- Let Russian journalists broadcast their apoc- bor is successful as well, negative feelings toward alyptic forecasts at their own peril. Although the it become even more intense. answer to why they have this view of geopoliti- There is nothing very positive about phobi- cal reality can be found precisely in what they as, primarily because they lead to the formation of write: “Russia is losing its monopoly on oil and stereotypes and prevent people from seeing the real gas transit from the countries of the Caspian re- threats and challenges. But if a certain phobia does gion, and Russia could be cut off not only from arise, it means there must be some reason for it. I Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbons, but also from Turk- will try, as far as the available information allows, to gauge the severity of the problems associated 2 O. Maslov, A. Prudnik, “Kazakhstan nachala XXI with China’s presence in Kazakhstan. veka kak Polsha pered 1939 godom,” Ezhenedelnoe nezavisimoe analiticheskoe obozrenie, 30 January, 2007, available at [http://www.polit.nnov.ru/]. 3 Ibidem.

Myths and Phobias

The myths and phobias associated with China’s presence in Kazakhstan can be arranged into several hypotheses. n First, during state demarcation, Kazakhstan yielded a significant part of its territory to China, and the main objective of the latter’s foreign policy “to move north” is dictated by its interest in Central Asia’s mineral resources, whereby Siberia, the Far East, as well as Kazakhstan fall into the zone of Chinese expansion.4

4 See: M. Adilov, “V politike ne byvaet druzei i vragov, a est tolko interesy,” Respublika—Delovoe obozrenie, 3 No- vember, 2006; N. Amrekulov, “Damoklov mech kitaiskogo drakona,” Svoboda slova, 8 February, 2006; A. Beibarsov, “Ka- zakhstan-Kitai: vmeste, riadom ili vnutri?” Respublika—Delovoe obozrenie, 16 September, 2005; M. Safin, “Poglotit li Kitai iugo-vostochnuiu chast Kazakhstana?!” Internet newspaper Zonakz, 23 July, 2008, available at [http://www.zonakz.net/]. 102 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

n Second, there is a hypothesis that a springboard is being prepared in Xinjiang for launching the next advance into Central Asia and Kazakhstan.5 And to take this idea even further— China and Russia are hatching plans to divide up Kazakhstan between them.6 To the credit of Ka- zakh authors, they have not yet begun entertaining this last idea. n Third, there is the threat of China swallowing Kazakhstan demographically.7 There are several aspects to this. The first is based on the demographic growth in the regions of China bor- dering on Kazakhstan (primarily in XUAR), the surplus workforce this is generating, and, consequently, its migration to Kazakhstan. The second is planned resettlement of Hans from the interior regions of China in XUAR, and, as a result, aggravation of ethnic competition and expulsion of the Kazakhs and Uighurs who live in the region. The third aspect relates to Kazakhstan becoming overrun with Hans within the framework of legal and illegal labor migration. The conclusion of the authors sounds really threatening: “Where will the cataclysms and demographic pressure send the floods of Chinese migrants? To those places where there is arable land (that is, Zhetysu) and plenty of minerals (that is, in our direction). And we are already seeing how XUAR is being settled by Hans, thus wiping away the buffer (Turkic) zone between Kazakhstan and the PRC.”8 n Fourth, China’s economic expansion.9 As in the previous case, this hypothesis is also comprised of several components. First—domination of Chinese goods on the Kazakh market. Second—export to China of strategic raw resources and currency. Third—lack of competitiveness and degradation of domestic industry and agriculture as a result of China’s economic expansion. n Fifth, an increase in China’s share in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan and the threat to Kazakhstan’s national interests this poses.10 The main conclusion of the authors of such statements boils down to the following thesis: “We must re-examine our development strategy and stop Kazakhstan from turning into China’s (and not only China’s) raw material appendage. If we are unable to do this, we should at least implement these projects ourselves without allowing the representatives of a one-and-a-half-billion nation into our territory!”11 n Sixth, the environmental disaster threatening Kazakhstan as a result of the irrigation projects being implemented in China (XUAR).12

5 See: M. Auezov, “Nachalos velikoe pereselenie!” Respublika—Delovoe obozrenie, 11 November, 2004; K. Dani- iarov, O novoi istorii Kazakhstana, Almaty, 2004. 6 See: O. Maslov, A. Prudnik, op. cit. 7 See: K. Daniiarov, op. cit; Zh. Morzabaeva, “Kazakhstanu grozit ‘kitaizatsiia’?” Respublika—Delovoe obozrenie, 3 November, 2006. 8 N. Amrekulov, op. cit. 9 See: “Vostok aleet vse silnee,” Epokha, 24 February, 2006; K. Daniiarov, op. cit.; O. Makushina, “Kitaiskiy fak- tor: mify i realnost,” Respublika—Delovoe obozrenie, 10 November, 2006. 10 See: M. Adilov, op. cit.; Sh. Kaigy, “Nastalo vremia vozvrashchat,” Parts 1-2, Internet newspaper Zonakz, 12, 14 September, 2005; Idem, “Kitaiskaia ekspansiia prodolzhaetsia,” Parts 1-2, Internet newspaper Zonakz, 19-20 September, 2005; Idem, “Do vykupa kitaitsami aktsiy ‘PetroKazakhstan’ ostalos dve nedeli…,” Parts 1-2, Internet newspaper Zonakz, 3-4 October, 2005; “Kitai prodolzhaet ekspansiiu. Pogranichny dozor,” Internet newspaper Zonakz, 2 February, 2006; “Pris- utstvie Kitaia v Kazakhstane: ‘dostizheniia’ i ‘perspektivy.’ Pogranichny dozor,” Internet newspaper Zonakz, 10 February, 2006; “I eshche o Kitae v Kazakhstane… Pogranichny dozor,” Internet newspaper Zonakz, 13 February, 2006. 11 “Prisutstvie Kitaia v Kazakhstane: ‘dostizheniia’ i ‘perspektivy.’ Pogranichny dozor.” 12 See: N. Aidarov, “O kazakhstano-kitaiskom peregovornom protsesse po transgranichnym rekam,” Diplomaticheskiy kurier, No. 2, 2002, pp. 102-104; M. Auezov, “Tsena pogranichnogo spora: Kitai-Kazakhstan,” XXI vek, 6 May, 1999; A. Baliev, A. Medvedev, “Reki sami ne umiraiut. Ikh ubivaiut,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 12 February, 1999; G. Zholamanova, “Rol Shankhaiskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva v uregulirovanii problemy transgranichnykh rek mezhdu Kazakhstanom i Kitaem,” Analytic, No. 1, 2007, pp. 34-42; D. Rakhmetov, “Besprosvetny vodozabor,” V[o]x Populi, No. 9, 1-15 April, 2009, pp. 41-43. 103 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

n Finally, the pro-Chinese lobby in the Kazakh government that supports China and protects its interests.13 The list could go on, but I think the above-mentioned points are sufficient. Now let’s ask two questions: 1) what is myth, and what might be true; 2) what is political and socioeconomic reality, and what potential threats are posed by China’s presence in Kazakhstan?

Mythology and Reality

The first two hypotheses are undoubtedly myths. China has no intention of attacking anyone in the near future. And there is no need for this. In present-day economic globalization, it is much more efficient not to conquer and claim territory, but rather use its potential in one’s own interests. This is what China is doing. The concept of “going global” (zou chuqu), which China has been following since 2003, makes it possible to solve these tasks fairly effectively without using armed forces. As for Central Asia, China is interested in the region as a resource base, a sales market for Chi- nese products, and a transit territory. China has not shown any interest in making claims to this region and developing it on its own. All the talk about how “tomorrow millions of Chinese peasants will come to claim Kazakhstan’s land” is another scare tactic conceived by the opposition and cannot be under- pinned by real facts. Real facts, on the other hand, show that efforts are being made to step up cooperation between Kazakhstan and China in agriculture and establish joint agroindustrial enterprises. I do not see this as threatening Kazakhstan’s national interests in any way. On the contrary, I think that creating joint agroindustrial complexes is the most promising sphere of Kazakh-Chinese economic cooperation. We have laid significant groundwork and gained experience in this area, and this is where we can compete with China. It is also important that these enterprises will not only manufacture competitive commodities, but also have a guaranteed consumer of their products. The Kazakh-Chinese border has been delimited and demarcated. So this problem, which, like history, can have no “ifs and buts,” has become a thing of the past. Moreover, it should be stressed that if the current dynamics of relations in the China-Kazakhstan-Russia triangle and the continuity of Chinese foreign policy are retained, this kind of problem will not feature in bilateral and multilateral relations. Delimitation of the border was carried out by clarifying the border line envisaged by the Russian-Sino agreements of the 19th century. This means that although China regards some of these agreements as unequal and this topic is still discussed in historical studies, at the political level China and its neighbors have de facto and de jure recognized the status quo that existed at that time. There are, admittedly, several problems in Kazakh-Chinese relations that dampen my opti- mism somewhat and make it difficult to answer the question of how Kazakh-Chinese relations will develop in the midterm and what factors will have a primary impact on them, but we will talk about that later. As for Xinjiang being viewed as a springboard for launching a Chinese offensive on Central Asia, let us take a closer look at this problem. If we accept the fact that everything China does is aimed only

13 See: N. Amrekulov, op. cit.; “Vostok aleet vse silnee”; “Kitai prodolzhaet ekspansiiu.” 104 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 at meeting its own interests and satisfying its global ambitions, the authors of these alarmist statements will largely be right. There can be no doubt that Xinjiang has made qualitative leaps in the past 20 years, and the development of its infrastructure can also be viewed from the military perspective as preparing a springboard for “China’s future wars.” If , however, we take a calmer look at the problem, first, the whole of China has made qualitative leaps, and, as already mentioned, has no intention today of conquering neighboring territories. There is no need for this when the territory in question is working in your interests anyway. Second, Xinjiang’s rapid development is an objective need called upon not only to resolve the economic problems in this region of China, but to some extent also the problem of ethnic separatism in the PRC. Third, the building of highways and railways leading to the Kazakh-Chinese border can be viewed not only in the context of “preparing a springboard for aggression,” but also as a necessary measure for practical implementation of the “going global” concept and extending Chinese trade expansion. Incidentally, China’s participation in large-scale infrastructure projects in Central Asia can also be viewed from this perspective. There is no altruism here on its part. The undeveloped infrastructure and weak economy of the region’s states is slowing down the development of China’s northwest regions. China is well aware of this and so is investing in the development of those economic branches of the region’s states that are directly related to solving the major task of turning Xinjiang into the economic and financial center of the entire region. And in this sense, China’s economic cooperation with the Central Asian states and Kazakhstan is indeed based on the need to develop the Chinese economy. Is China to blame for this? Hardly. It is simply doing what it has to do. So it is ridiculous to cast aspersions on the achievements made in the economic development of XUAR or on its fortifying its economic position in the Central Asian region. The main economic trends in the region have already been defined and they clearly demonstrate that, in contrast to China, other states of the region have lost precious time. If we keep in mind the current opportunities and prospects for implementing the concept of “extensive development of the west” and compare the development dynamics of Xinjiang and the neighboring Central Asian states, it becomes entirely clear that the balance will not be in our favor. And Russian researchers are largely right who, when analyzing the trends in XUAR’s current development, are concluding: “In the event of the continuing accelerated growth of the western provinces of China, Xinjiang has every chance of becoming a leading financial and economic center of Central Asia and the contiguous and near-lying Russian regions, in other words of fortifying its position as an economic center of Greater Central Asia that is emerging.”14 It is difficult to say with any certainty whether this is posing a threat to the national security of the region’s states or providing them with a new opportunity. But it is very evident that China will not be able to secure full domination in Central Asia, not only due to the growing competition in the region on the part of Western countries and Russia, but also due to its many serious internal problems, which will sooner of later make themselves known. Things are more complicated with the third and fourth groups of myths and phobias, since they consist both of obvious mythology and entirely reasonable fears based on Chinese and Kazakh reality. The population of Xinjiang is steadily increasing. As of the end of 2008, it exceeded 21.3 million people, its ranks swelling by almost 5 million people compared with 1990.15 Whereby, no matter

14 S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, Tsentral’naia Azia i Kitai: ekonomicheskoe vzaimodeistvie v usloviiakh globalizatsii, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS, Moscow, 2009, p. 164. 15 See: Xinjiang tongji nianjian, 2009 (Statistical Yearbook on Xinjiang for 2009), Beijing, 2009, pp. 69, 84. 105 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS what Chinese propaganda has been claiming, it is entirely evident that Hans are indeed migrating from the interior regions to XUAR. It stands to reason that this is having an impact on ethnic competition and causing “surplus workforce.” Consequently, conditions are potentially being created for external labor migration and, if the situation in the autonomous region becomes aggravated, for the problem of refugees from XUAR. Nevertheless, I do not see any reason for alarmist conclusions. First, the prospect of a flow of refugees from XUAR is a hypothetical threat. Second, the thesis that “Hans have flooded Kazakhstan” is another myth. Neither the official figures, nor the polls conducted by Kazakh researchers among Hans working in Kazakhstan give any grounds for such conclusions. As for the official statistics regarding PRC citizens who are temporarily living in Kazakhstan (that is, those who have come on official or private business, as well as those in transit), they assure us that their numbers are not critical, although they have significantly risen compared to the end of the 1990s (see Table 1).

Table 1 Number of PRC Citizens Temporarily Living in Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2009 (persons)

Year Brought Tourism Account To Work Deported Business Business On official On Private Registered to Administrative

2000 13,328 11,233 131 1,305 659 5,221 430 2001 13,415 9,064 1,224 2,476 651 1,198 203 2002 20,243 13,945 984 4,344 970 661 159 2003 16,974 9,772 916 6,016 270 363 151 2004 28,558 16,179 890 10,860 629 1,429 191 2005 34,108 12,755 2,604 17,108 1,641 3,881 531 2005 34,108 12,755 2,604 17,108 1,641 3881 531 2006 29,183 70,56 2,513 19,168 446 3,587 866 2007 45,570 11,249 4,720 29,246 355 4,715 553 2008 46,370 14,005 5,593 26,235 474 5,998 666 2009* 23,725 6,442 3,357 13,673 253 3,286 151

* January-June.

The statistics showing how many PRC citizens have settled in Kazakhstan are just as eloquent (see Table 2). Judging from these data, representatives of the Kazakh ethnic community mainly settle in Kazakhstan.

106 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Table 2 Migration between Kazakhstan and the PRC in 1999-2008

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Total arrivals in Kazakhstan 41,320 47,442 53,548 58,211 65,584 68,319 74,807 66,731 53,397 22,682

Arrived from China 145 189 655 1,059 2,080 3,463 4,562 5,003 5,829 6,328

number of Kazakhs among them N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,865 3,268 4,460 4,813 5,771 6,279

Total departures from Kazakhstan 164,947 155,749 141,710 120,223 73,890 65,530 52,139 33,690 42,435 8,149

Departed for China 5 1 11 159 407 121 108 90 50 48

number of Kazakhs among them N/A N/A N/A N/A 281 86 91 84 47 46

Balance for China 140 188 644 900 1,673 3,342 4,454 4,913 5,779 6,280

The only thing that concerns me is the unavailability of information on numbers, on where migrants are settling, on the structure of labor migrants from the PRC, and on their problems, on the one hand, and the lack of reaction of the Kazakhstan authorities and official representatives of China to the information that has recently appeared in the Chinese press stating that there are 300,000-500,000 Chinese citizens living in Kazakhstan, on the other.16 But two things must be kept in mind. First, Kazakhstan’s desire to join WTO. Second, the designated shortage of labor resources in Kazakhstan. It hardly makes sense to raise the question of the “inevitability of Chinese labor migration,” as some authors in Russia are doing, but we will have to reckon with the reality of labor migration from China, and we will have to learn, when engaging in any kind of cooperation, to consistently protect the interests of our own citizens. The Chinese are doing this very strictly and skillfully in their own country. As for “China’s economic expansion,” there can be no arguing with the figures, both the increase in goods turnover between Kazakhstan and China, and the increase in China’s presence in several branches of Kazakhstan’s economy are obvious. But China is only one of many countries with which Kazakhstan is maintaining foreign economic contacts. And if we take a purely formal approach, according to official Kazakhstan statistics, China did not become a leader among Kazakhstan’s foreign economic partners until recently, and did not occupy third position until 2008, lagging behind Russia and Italy.

16 See: “V Kazakhstane proshla gosregistratsiiu gazeta Hasakexietan huaqiao bao, orientirovannaia na prozhivaiush- chikh v strane kitaitsev,” Kazakhstan Segodnia Agency, 22 April, 2009, available at [http://www.kt.kz/]; Open letter of the Kazakh youth of the city of Urumqi of the People’s Republic of China, Internet newspaper Zonakz, 24 June, 2009. 107 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Only the goods inventory of export-import transactions between Kazakhstan and China can arouse serious concern (see Figs. 1 and 2), which confirms the conclusion of Russian and Kazakh experts that Kazakhstan has already become a raw material appendage of the Chinese economy.

Figure 1 Kazakhstan’s Export to the PRC in 2009

1% 2% 1%

13% 45%

15%

16%

Mineral fuel, oil, and their refining products Ores, slag, and cinders Ferrous metals Copper and its products Non-organic chemical products Zinc and its products Salt, sulfur, earths and stone, plastering materials, lime, and cement Other

S o u r c e: Calculated according to Kazakhstan customs statistics.

As for foreign direct investments in Kazakhstan’s economy, they do not constitute a large percentage of the total volume and between 1993 and September 2009 amounted to $3.6 billion (see Fig. 3). In terms of this index, until 2009 China lagged significantly behind the U.S. and European countries, and so it is not entirely correct to talk about “China’s economic expansion” (see Fig. 4). Another important fact is that there is no substitute for Chinese goods on the Kazakh market today and we, like our regional neighbors and, on the whole, the entire world, have to face the inevitable fact of Chinese goods expansion in the near future. China has already become the “world’s factory,” and there is nothing we can do to change this. On the contrary, with each passing year, we are importing more and more commodities bearing the label “made in China.” The reason is simple: there are not enough domestic goods in the necessary quantity and quality, on the one hand, and it is much cheaper to import Chinese consumer goods even

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Figure 2 Kazakhstan’s Import from the PRC in 2009

21% 21%

4% 11% 4%

4% 9% 7%

8% 9%

Knit clothing & accessories Products from ferrous metals Nuclear reactors, boilers, equipment Footwear, leggings, and similar products Textile clothing & accessories Other finished textile products Electric machinery and equipment Ground transportation means Polymer materials, plastics, and their products Furniture Other

S o u r c e: Calculated according to Kazakhstan customs statistics. keeping in mind the official customs duties and unofficial payments, on the other. And this cannot be avoided; the market dictates its conditions, and this is probably not a bad thing. As for the fears relating to Chinese loans, they are only partially substantiated, in the sense that sooner or later they will have to be paid back. But, first, compared with the debts we have accumulat- ed in the West, what we owe China is a drop in the bucket. Second, it is not China imposing these loans on us, we are asking for the money ourselves. Third, foreign loans are not objectionable in and of themselves, the problem is using them efficiently. If a loan is used efficiently and not pilfered, it can be paid back with no problem. Finally, when the state borrows large amounts of money, it would be a good idea to let the people know the terms on which these loans are issued. Governments come and go, but debts have to be paid back by future generations, and it would be best to know precisely what you are in for. On the whole, expanding spheres of activity is a normal phenomenon in bilateral economic relations. I personally welcome this, particularly today when China is beginning to join projects in the

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Figure 3 Gross Inflow of Chinese Direct Investments into Kazakhstan (million dollars)

692.5

550.6

387.8 362.9 358.2 313.0 248.6 211.9 216.1

86.7 90.1 49.6 64.7 5.0 5.0 2.0 0.0 first 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2005 2000 2001 9 months of

S o u r c e: National Bank of Kazakhstan.

Figure 4 Gross Inflow of Direct Investments between 1993 and September 2009

25.0% 23.57%

20.0% 19.08% 18.95%

15.0%

10.0% 8.53% 6.12% 5.28% 4.40% 5.0% 3.70% 3.54% 3.53% 3.30%

0.0% U.S. Italy Other China Virgin France Islands Canada Russian countries Federation Switzerland Netherlands Great Britain

S o u r c e: National Bank of Kazakhstan.

110 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 real sector of the economy, and not only in branches relating to the production and transportation of energy resources. We have signed documents with China that regulate our strategic partnership and many areas can be found in them that envisage this kind of partnership. And there is nothing wrong with this, and it is certainly not related to “Chinese expansion.” The main thing is honoring national interests. This is precisely where the problem lies. And here I am in absolute agreement with the conclusion of Kazakhstan political scientist Dosym Satpaev, who thinks that “it is not China’s economic expansion that is posing a threat, but the corruption of our officials, which is permitting the country to enter detrimental contracts and dealing a blow to Kazakhstan’s economic security. In the final analysis, any investor plays by those game rules the government sets for him. If these rules are not in Ka- zakhstan’s favor, it is the government’s fault and not the investor’s.”17 As for Chinese companies violating Kazakhstan’s tax and labor laws, which the Kazakh press sometimes point to, Chinese companies are unfortunately no exception here. This is true of almost all foreign companies operating in Kazakhstan. Most of them try to evade tax payment, and some even do this with the blessing of the Kazakhstan authorities. In essentially all foreign companies operating in our country, the salaries of foreign specialists are higher than for Kazakhstan employees. As for working conditions, I cannot judge since I do not know, although I am aware that there are conflicts. But this is our problem. The government is always at liberty to put any foreign investor in his place. And only the government can say why it does not do this. As for giving preference to Chinese citizens when filling job vacancies, first, this again is normal practice for foreign investors in Kazakhstan. Second, compared with other “foreigners,” the number of Kazakhstan employees in a joint venture with Chinese investments is usually quite high. For example, according to the data of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as of 1 January, 2010, the number of workers hired on contract to work in enterprises with Chinese participation amounted to 17,733 people, the number of Kazakhstan employees among them amounting to 17,519 people, or 98.8%.18 The most discussed and sensitive topic is China’s presence in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector. We could agree with these concerns if it were not obvious that they are politically dictated. When talk turns to the national security threat posed by the foreign presence in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector, the finger is always pointed at China for some reason, while it would be worth calculating the percentage ratio of all “foreigners” present in Kazakhstan. China occupies far from the leading position on this list. According to my estimates, in 2008, China’s share in the total volumes in Kazakhstan amounted to 20.05% in oil production and to 11.60% in gas production. If China’s share in Mangistaumunaigaz Joint-Stock Company and KazMunaiGaz Survey and Production Joint-Stock Company acquired at the end of 2009 is added to these estimate figures, it can be approximately forecast that China’s share in oil production in Kazakhstan will grow to 25-26% and in gas production to 13-14%. This, of course, is not that small. But, for example, the share of the two largest gas- and oil-producing companies in Kazakhstan alone, which mainly belong to Western investors—Tengizchevroil and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V.—amounts to 40.90% in oil production and 71.61% in gas production. The answer to other questions is also extremely important: what companies did Chinese investors acquire (anticipated and recoverable reserves, as well as the beginning of field operation); how and on what terms were they acquired; how do these companies function with the new investor; and, finally, what was Kazakhstan’s interest?

17 Quoted from: O. Makushina, op. cit. 18 See: Expert Report of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan upon the request of Majilis Dep- uties of the Kazakhstan Parliament, 14 October, 2010, available at [www.kazenergy.com]. 111 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

I am not trying to defend China, but facts are facts. n First, China acquired private companies registered offshore belonging to other foreign investors that became established in Kazakhstan in the mid-1990s. It acquired them at open ten- ders and on rather advantageous terms for their owners. So those worried about China’s presence in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector should be primarily demanding explanations of how, why, and on what terms these shares ended up in private hands, whereby at times in the hands of “foreigners” of very dubious reputation. n Second, essentially all the oil fields acquired by China in Kazakhstan have low in place and recoverable reserves. Moreover, most of them have been under development since the end of the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s. And if we rely on the forecasts of the Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in the next decade, the share of Chinese companies in oil and gas production in Kazakhstan will not only fail to grow, it will even decrease somewhat (see Figs. 5 and 6). n Third, we ourselves are saying we want to diversify the transportation routes of our hydrocarbons, as well as the list of foreign investors. In this sense, China, as Kazakhstan’s neighbor,

Figure 5 China’s Share in Oil Production in Kazakhstan in 2010-2020 (million tons)

180

150

140

120

100

0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Other Kashagan Karachaganak Tengiz Companies with Chinese investments Including with Chinese stake

S o u r c e: Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

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Figure 6 China’s Share in Gas Production in Kazakhstan in 2010-2020 (bcm)

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Other Kashagan Karachaganak Tengiz Companies with Chinese investments Including with Chinese stake

S o u r c e: Ministry of Oil and Gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

looks rather inviting as the most promising market of hydrocarbon deliveries and a very sol- vent state. n Fourth, contracts on subsurface use signed with the Chinese side are preferable to those signed with Western companies. Moreover, unlike Western companies working under Production Sharing Agreements, all Chinese companies are functioning in compliance with current tax legislation. n Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that in contrast to other foreign investors, Kazakh-Chinese joint ventures will be created in future on the basis of enterprises acquired by the PRC. This is a big plus for Kazakhstan’s economy, if, of course, these joint ventures are used judiciously.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The myths about the Chinese threat in Kazakhstan are largely aimed at drawing the public’s attention away from the true culprits of the problems existing in the republic. In this context, I would

113 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS like to quote one of Confucius’ sayings: “Don’t complain about the snow on your neighbor’s roof when your own doorstep is unclean.” This is to say that we are to blame for many of our hardships, not China. I think there are more than enough examples of this and everyone is aware of them. The real threat comes from the rapidly escalating incompetence and corruption of officials who allow detrimental contracts to be signed and deal a blow to Kazakhstan’s economic security. And although I do not really believe there is a pro-Chinese lobby in the Kazakhstan parliament, it is just another myth, the high corruption component of Kazakh-Chinese relations cannot be denied. If a job is worth doing it is worth doing well. And in this context, we are bound to come across real and hypothetical threats and challenges in Kazakh-Chinese relations. But this is a topic for another article.

SOME PROBLEMS OF KAZAKHSTAN’S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY

Murat LAUMULIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Chief Researcher at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

t the beginning of 2011, Kazakhstan’s for- cific problem in international relations. In this eign policy entered a new stage. The coun- context, the present turning point in Kazakhstan’s A try passed a serious political test—chair- foreign policy is a clear sign of the demands of ing the OSCE and hosting the Organization’s the times. summit meeting in Astana. This year, it faces two Recent experience is good way to gage the new tests: chairing the Organization of the Islamic transformation in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy Conference and the Shanghai Cooperation Organ- and its international status. The year 2010 will ization and hosting the Council of Foreign Min- be remembered in the history of Kazakhstan and isters of the Organization of the Islamic Confer- its foreign policy for its many important events. ence and the SCO summit. The most vibrant of them was without a doubt The OSCE summit in December 2010 am- the OSCE summit in Astana. However, in terms ply showed that such events are far from formal- of strategic consequences, establishment of the ities requiring no more than paying official trib- Customs Union among Kazakhstan, Russia, and ute to political obligations, this time Astana’s. Belarus should be considered the most impor- Such functions are often closely related to a spe- tant.

114 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 The Heritage of 2010

It was Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the OSCE, however, that set the pace for the country’s foreign policy as a whole in 2010. As one Kazakhstan observer noted, Kazakhstan’s task was not to meet the OSCE standards, but to create new standards corresponding both to present reality and to the interests of the Organization’s participating states, whereby with the help of those countries that view the OSCE as an effective mechanism for maintaining stability and ensuring security. The Kazakhstan president’s participation in the anti-nuclear summit in Washington in April can be singled out as one of the head of state’s noteworthy foreign visits. This historical meeting of three presidents—America’s Barack Obama, Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev, and Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev—in Washington in April 2010 at the anti-nuclear summit brought attention once again to Kazakhstan’s enormous contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. This was largely promoted by the initiatives the Kazakhstan president laid on the table before the leaders of the leading, primarily nuclear, nations and the world community as a whole. Nuclear security and non-proliferation is an area in which Kazakhstan recognizes its moral superiority. It is also the source and essence of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy conception. Kazakhstan essentially asked the old members of the nuclear club to forego their nuclear sovereignty (which they promised to do during the drawing up of the NPT at the end of the 1960s). The Kazakhstan president also proposed revising international law regarding nuclear non-proliferation. He suggested conducting an expert analysis of all the existing international acts on non-proliferation and the fight against nuclear terrorism and combine them into a single strategic policy document—a new universal agreement on comprehensive horizontal and vertical non-proliferation and destruction of nuclear weapons. This kind of document is called upon to guarantee that double standards are not used and envisages specific sanctions against its violators. This proposal was also revolutionary in nature. The well-known events in Kyrgyzstan in April and June of 2010 were a serious test for Kazakh- stan’s foreign policy. In fact they were a test of Kazakhstan’s strength not only as OSCE chairman, but also as a responsible regional leader. The political situation that developed as a result of the events in Kyrgyzstan was fraught with many ambiguous consequences for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, economy, and national security. Kyrgyzstan is Kazakhstan’s closest neighbor and the closest country to it culturally, historically, and mentally. This factor, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s direct geographic proximity, its specific international status, Kazakhstan’s national security interests, and the close social and economic ties between the two republics make Kazakhstan far from indifferent to the further development of events in this country. Kazakhstan’s policy toward Kyrgyzstan was built on certain fundamental criteria. Astana’s actions were closely coordinated with Russia’s, which was also extremely interested in rapid stabilization of the situation in Kyrgyzstan. Astana notified all the participants in the political struggle in Kyrgyzstan through diplomatic and political channels (primarily via the OSCE) that it would not tol- erate the use of armed forces or repetition of the bloodshed in the republic. Astana also supported all the progressive and moderate forces in the republic in order to bring about rapid stabilization and normalization of the situation. Regular consultations were held with the republic’s temporary leadership on current and mid-term issues regarding further development, keeping in mind such objectives as holding full-fledged and legitimate parliamentary and presidential elections within time-limits conducive to retaining stability. The Kazakh and international law enforcement structures also coordinated their efforts to neutralize the Kyrgyz criminal environment and its influence on the republic’s political life.

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Nursultan Nazarbaev’s visit to South Korea can be singled out as a key event in the Asian vector, which brought both countries to a qualitatively new level of cooperation. The sides agreed to declare 2010 the Year of Kazakhstan in South Korea and 2011 the Year of South Korea in Ka- zakhstan. The third CICMA (the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia) summit should be named as one of the significant events in security. Kazakhstan passed on the CICMA chair to Turkey, but retained control over the Conference through the system of partner organizations. Kazakhstan attended the third CICMA summit held on 8 June, 2010 in Istanbul as the current chairman of two large regional structures on the continent—CICMA and the OSCE. The mandate for chairmanship in the Conference was passed from Kazakhstan to Turkey. This demonstrated that CICMA is not a purely Kazakh project. Consensus blocking was applied at the Istanbul summit (the Conference members condemned Israel’s actions regarding a caravan of ships taking humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, but Israel refused to support the inclusion of any provisions condemning its actions in the text of the final resolution). The final document adopted in Istanbul was a corrected and updated version of the declaration of the second CICMA summit adopted on 17 June, 2006 in Almaty. The corrections were stylistic in nature, while the updates reflected the changed situation with its regional risks and threats. For example, an entire section in the Istanbul declaration is devoted to Afghanistan. In his message to the forum participants, Nursultan Nazarbaev noted that CICMA is adapting quickly to the changing world and consistently increasing its cooperation with the OSCE, so Kazakhstan does not exclude the possibility of creating “some joint platform regarding security and trust throughout the Eurasian expanse” in the future. German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Astana in July 2010 was an important event in the European vector. Kazakhstan made it understood that it is ready to deliver its gas to Germany via the Nabucco pipeline. It stands to reason that Germany is interested in this project coming to fru- ition. But its resource base has not been ultimately determined. The improved project presumes transporting natural gas from the Caspian region to the European countries without passing through Rus- sia—from Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Austria—whereby it will supplement the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, which is already in operation. President Nursultan Nazarbaev claims that it is the European Union’s sluggishness that is causing Astana’s hesitancy. The Kazakhstan leader named two conditions necessary for his country’s participation in this project: the gas pipeline must be laid along the bottom of the Caspian Sea through the Caucasus to the Black Sea and further or LNG plants must be built on the Kazakhstan coast of the Caspian. This is Kazakhstan’s way of testing the waters and seeing how the West and Moscow will react. Astana has changed its tactics and is taking Baku’s cue by looking at several projects at once and choosing the most advantageous. At the beginning of 2010, Uzbekistan and the U.S. expressed serious objections to holding the summit in Astana. The disagreement with Tashkent was settled in March during Nursultan Nazarbaev’s meeting with Islam Karimov. And, later, Astana also managed to secure Washington’s support. In August 2010, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada visited the republic. To- kyo was intent on stepping up the activity of Japanese companies in developing energy resource fields in Kazakhstan and other republics of the region. Cooperation in the nuclear sphere was also a fundamental topic of discussion during Katsuya Okada’s visit to Astana. President Nursultan Nazarbaev formulated a cooperation plan while he was in Tokyo in the summer of 2008: “We have the uranium and you have the high technology.” This plan is still being implemented today. The problem is delivering Kazakhstan uranium to Japan. Almost all of the uranium intended for Japan is sent through St. Petersburg to the U.S., Canada, and France for enrichment, and only then reaches

116 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 the Land of the Rising Sun. Moreover, only a small part of nuclear fuel is enriched in Russia. The project of an eastern route for delivering Kazakhstan uranium to Japan is currently being drawn up. There are plans for it to pass through the Far East. In exchange, Japan wants to suggest that all the uranium imported from Kazakhstan be enriched in Russia. Japan is also interested in the region’s oil and gas industry. An example of this kind of cooperation in Kazakhstan is the activity of Japan’s JOGMEC Corporation in the Caspian Sea, which is actively cooperating with KazMunaiGaz, Kazakhstan’s national company. An important event in the Russian vector was the meeting between the presidents of the two countries in Ust-Kamenogorsk in September 2010 where they signed 27 agreements that touched on almost every sphere of Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s economies. And finally, the Astana summit was an impressive finale not only to last year, but also to an entire era in the history of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, and proved that the republic is a responsible member of the international community and capable of hosting such high-level meetings. On the whole, 2010 was a time of renewal for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and its main vectors, goals, and objectives, which shows that Kazakhstan is transforming from a regional country into one of the main international players, that is, moving up to a higher and more important rung on the world’s ranking ladder. Kazakhstan is essentially already leaving the boundaries of Central Asia. The world community regards it as a responsible Eurasian state with its own interests and healthy ambitions. All the same, despite the successes and achievements of the past year, the problems relating to Central Asian security and Kazakhstan’s international status, along with the constant geopolitical pressure is feels from different sides, are still very evident and have shifted to a new level.

Traditional Policy

The Russian vector is still vitally important in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and is comprised of an extremely extensive agenda, ranging from security and the economy to social and humanitarian cooperation. There can be no doubt that 2010 was an outstanding year from the viewpoint of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia in all areas. The creation of the Customs Union, Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the OSCE, and the political interaction between Astana and Moscow, particularly at the presidential level, were determining factors in bilateral cooperation last year. Russia rendered Kazakhstan unconditional political support during its chairmanship in the OSCE. Kazakhstan and Russia are strategic partners and close allies in the post-Soviet expanse. The cooperation between the two states encompasses almost every sphere of possible interaction: from the economy to cultural and humanitarian relations. At present, cooperation is actively developing in the political, military-technical, economic, and humanitarian spheres, which is of particular significance for the internal development of the two states and their interaction on the international arena. During 2010, Kazakh-Russian relations developed both at the bilateral level and within the framework of multilateral cooperation institutions, such as the CIS, EurAsEC, Customs Union, CSTO, SCO, and OSCE. The joint action plan for Kazakhstan and Russia in 2009-2010 played an important role in the development of bilateral relations, formed the backbone of the agreements reached between the two countries, and included 40 specific undertakings. They cover the entire range of Kazakh-Russian cooperation in the political, economic, scientific, and humanitarian spheres, whereby the scope of these undertakings is enormous. For example, a joint oil balance and oil transportation plan is being developed in the fuel and energy complex, and a comprehensive cooperation program with respect to peaceful use of the atom is being implemented.

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Kazakhstan’s share in bilateral trade turnover amounts to more than 18 percent of the total volume of the country’s foreign trade. Industrial cooperation covers such spheres as energy, space explo- ration, and innovative technology. After the Customs Union was established, Kazakhstan became the closest country to Russia in the post-Soviet expanse. And after the Common Economic Space (CES) is launched in 2012, both countries, along with Belarus, might be quite capable of forming a structure similar to the EU. The chronology of 2010 is a graphic illustration of the progress accomplished in Kazakh- Russian relations. The Customs Union of three states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia—has been functioning officially since 1 January and in practical terms since 1 July. This has become the main and determining factor in the relations among the three countries actively discussed in Kazakhstan throughout the year. Many have been noting the fact that the republic is supposedly losing large amounts of money (a figure of 75 billion tenge—$500 million—was mentioned) due to the reduc- tion in customs revenue into the budget. This gives reason to conclude that joining the Customs Union was a political rather than economic move. But it should be noted that similar viewpoints have been expressed at the level of public opinion in both Russia and Belarus. Many people in these countries also believe that significant losses have been incurred from creating the Customs Union. So who benefited from it? In reality, creation of the Customs Union will attract investments in the non-raw-material sector of Kazakhstan’s economy. Kazakhstan manufacturers can expand their opportunities in the pharmaceutical industry. Mutual recognition of all permits will make it possible for medication to cir- culate freely in the Customs Union. The barriers in Russia are too high at present for foreign manufacturers to gain access, however these restrictions no longer apply to Kazakhstan. On the whole, in the long term, the union should have a positive effect on Kazakhstan’s economy. In particular, an increase in the competitiveness of Kazakhstan manufacturers and a decrease in smuggling can be expected. In grain production, Kazakhstan and Russia provide up to 17 percent of the world’s wheat export. There are currently around 3,000 companies with Russian investments operating in Ka- zakhstan, and most of them are involved in border cooperation. The problem today is Kazakhstan’s southern border, which is now the border of the Customs Union. Transfer of customs control to the external borders of the countries has only been partially accomplished: the Russian-Belaru- sian customs border has disappeared, while the Russian-Kazakh border will continue to exist until July 2011, by which time Kazakhstan must put a stop to smuggling and the re-export of Chinese goods by Kyrgyzstan. At the beginning of December, the countries of the Customs Union agreed to introduce unified regulations and standards for oil and petroleum products within the framework of the Common Eco- nomic Space. Kazakhstan wants to increase the throughput of the pipeline to 67 million tons of oil a year. But this will require building new pumping stations and oil reservoirs at the terminal near Novo- rossiysk and installing another single mooring point. The hopes rest on Russia, which agreed to almost double Kazakhstan’s quota in the CPC from 27.5 million to 52.5 million tons, thus saving the republic from having to look for other alternatives for delivering crude oil to Europe. As of today, Kazakhstan is pretty much satisfied with the pumping capacities through Russia. Close cooperation between the two states has made it possible in recent years to soften the blows of the world financial and economic crisis. There has been a drop in demand for bank loans in both Kazakhstan and Russia. In the uranium industry, the national nuclear companies of both countries are acting as a united front in relations with foreign partners. In so doing, the Russian nuclear industry is still Kazakhstan’s main partner, ensuring the complete processing and enrichment cycle of Kazakh uranium.

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Russia and Kazakhstan are also closely cooperating in the space industry. Both states are about to launch a large-scale international program. Of particular significance is the fact that the launching pads at Baikonur are designed for Russian- and Ukrainian-made missile carriers. In 2010, cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan actively continued in the transportation sphere. As early as 2008, a memorandum was signed between the transport ministries of Ka- zakhstan and Russia on cooperation and the development of roads linking Western Europe and Western China. Kazakhstan has begun building the Western Europe-Western China highway and has already begun rebuilding the roads in certain sections of this major artery. Russia, in turn, is carrying out feasibility studies of this project. By 2013, it will be possible to put part of the highway, the Kazakh and Chinese sections, into operation. By this time, Russia is expected to have begun building its section of the highway. But there are still unresolved problems in bilateral relations: one of them is related to increasing the amount of time the citizens of one country can stay in the other country without registration (for example, Ukrainian citizens can stay in Russia without registration for 90 days, while Kazakhstan citizens can stay for only three days). There is a shortage of drinking water in Central Asia. So at a meeting in Ust-Kamenogorsk, President Nursultan Nazarbaev suggested returning to the idea of reversing the flow of Siberia’s rivers. The participation of Kazbrig in the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan is still a bone of contention in the military-strategic sphere, which Moscow is against. Astana, in turn, does not want Moscow to squeeze Georgia out of the Commonwealth’s orbit regardless of the fact that Georgia has already officially withdrawn from the CIS. Work has begun on the joint action plan for 2011-2012, which is conducive to Kazakh-Russian relations, and a program that will extend to 2020 is being drafted. In the next ten years, Russia will evidently play an even greater role as Kazakhstan’s main political and economic trade partner.

Security Problems and the European Vector

Kazakhstan’s main objective is to strengthen the collective security system in Central Eurasia; that is, settle the Afghan problem and eliminate the threat posed by radical Islamism in general, as well as increase cooperation among all the security institutions operating in Central Asia—NATO, the CSTO, OSCE, and SCO (possibly also the CICMA)—as a way to achieve this objective. The OSCE summit in Astana was a step toward this end. The Afghan problem is a key element in many respects for Central Asian security and Ka- zakhstan’s national security. And the summit in Astana graphically demonstrated this. It is extremely important to know and understand the West’s strategy and plans regarding this country, which is a source of military-political, religious, and drug threats. In the geopolitical context, the situation in Afghanistan affects the security of a much broader region that includes South Asia, the Middle East, the CIS, and the PRC. From the very beginning, Astana has suggested including the states located along the perimeter of the Organization’s geographic zone and on which the security of the participating states depends as OSCE partners in this process. Pakistan is a country that holds the keys to settling the Afghan problem and on which Central Asia’s security to one extent or another depends.

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In 2011, chairmanship in the Organization will go to Lithuania. It stands to reason that Vilnius will shift the accent in the OSCE’s activity toward its own region—Central and Eastern Europe. It is very likely that such issues as Eastern Partnership of the European Union, the Belarusian Question, relations between the European Union and Russia, supplying Europe with energy, and so on will be put on the agenda. The EU countries will try to shift the OSCE’s geopolitical activity toward Europe and European security. There are indeed many problems in this area: the fate of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, deployment of the U.S. AMD theater of operations, the fate of the European Secu- rity Treaty, and several others. It should be noted that Astana also addressed these topics during its chairmanship. Despite the future strong influence of the European factor, Kazakhstan, like the Cen- tral Asian countries as a whole, can continue to use the OSCE Astana Declaration of 2010 as an effective political tool. It is to the historical credit of the Astana OSCE summit that it designated this problem within the Organization’s framework and pointed out ways to resolve it. Another set of problems is associated with relations between Kazakhstan (and the Central Asian countries as a whole) and the European Union. Kazakhstan’s relations with the European Union are rather specific. Technically speaking, many foreign partners think Kazakhstan belongs to Asia; and from time to time Astana also emphasizes this aspect of its geopolitical identity. However, at the doctrine level, Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a Eurasian state (for which it has every objective reason). When talking about the strategy and tactics of Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries with respect to the EU, we should proceed from an understanding of the nature of Europe’s interest in cooperating with the region and the interests the EU and CA have in common. It stands to reason that the European Union is interested in Central Asia as a stable source of natural resources. At the same time, Brussels is interested in applying its standards to the region. On the other hand, as NATO members, the European countries play an important role in combating the threats coming from Afghani- stan. Moreover, the EU does not welcome the U.S.’s dominating role in Eurasia and tends to reckon with Russia’s role in the region. Experts have recently been saying that the European Union in particular can act as a counterbalance in the future (since Russia has removed itself from this role) to Chi- na’s growing domination in Central Asia. All these factors should be kept in mind when forming the position of the Central Asian countries regarding the EU. In these conditions, Kazakhstan’s policy aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan and the situation in the region as a whole is objectively a policy that protects the European Union’s direct interests, primarily in the security sphere. In its relations with the European Union, Kazakhstan will have to keep in mind the fact that the EU is undergoing significant internal transformation at present, which affects essentially all areas of cooperation between this organization and the outside world. At present, the EU’s activity in the external vectors is being hampered by the acute budget deficit crisis in the South European countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy), since all of the European Union’s available resources have been directed toward helping these countries. During Germany’s chairmanship in the EU, an attempt was made to re-examine the entire range of relations with the CIS countries. In so doing, the EU’s new foreign policy was far from always successful. The EU was unable to enter a new agreement on partnership and cooperation with Russia or remove the contradictions in the Organization’s policy toward the Ukraine, Belarus, and the Cau- casian and Central Asian states. What is more, certain contradictions and even rivalry for control over the transportation of hydrocarbons from the CIS countries were designated between the old and new EU members. In addition, the EU’s strategy aimed at establishing control over traditional and alternative sources of resources is inevitably encountering (and this is an irreversible process) other foreign competitors—the U.S., Japan, China, and India.

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Keeping in mind the EU’s growing interest in the region, Kazakhstan should use different tools and methods for putting pressure on its powerful partner. The attention of European partners must be directed toward the shortcomings and weak spots in Europe’s strategy toward Central Asia. For example, the EU is not taking the threats (religious radicalism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, and so on) coming from Afghanistan and the vast region to the south of Central Asia seriously enough. The partners’ attention must be directed to the fact that a political, rather than economic, approach dominates in the EU’s Central Asian strategy. The EU’s priorities regarding building democracy in the region’s countries often change and even contradict each other. The EU traditionally exag- gerates the potential of civil society as a driving force behind democratic changes and underestimates the state’s role in these issues. The EU’s relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are being established within the framework of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument and its relations with Central Asia are regulated by the Document on Economic Cooperation and Cooperation in Development, which does not relate to a specific region. So an island is forming in the center of Asia that is regarded neither as “Asia” nor as part of the “European neighborhood,” which is creating a basis for unjustified discrimination of the interests of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. In addition, Kazakhstan must ensure that the visa regime for its citizens is simplified as much as possible. In trade relations, Astana must promote favorable changes for Kazakhstan in the EU’s tariff policy with respect to some of its export commodities (steel, uranium, and so on). This issue could be tied to specific steps and concessions in the energy dialog between Kazakhstan and the EU. It appears that the EU will have a long-term impact and that it is here to stay in the post-Soviet expanse, including in Central Asia. So, the EU is still one of the most important geopolitical and geo- economic dimensions determining the future and security of Central Asia. In its relations with the European Union, Kazakhstan must keep in mind that the EU may lose its dominating position as the main economic center in Eurasia. Moreover, the EU countries are becoming targets of external migration. Extensive transformation processes are occurring in the EU social structure and industry. At the same time, the EU will long remain dependent on Eurasian sources of energy. Kazakhstan’s program “Road to Europe”—that is, as much political and economic integration of the country into the European Union as possible—has little chance of being implemented in current conditions. This is due to the special features of the EU’s political culture, its geopolitical and geographic imperatives, and, most important, its prejudiced attitude toward the post-Soviet states. This attitude is clearly shown by the EU’s complicated relations with Russia and other CIS states. A key problem for Kazakhstan, Russia, and several other CIS countries is the systemic incompatibility between the states guided by principles of sovereignty and the European Union’s integration machinery with its “bureaucratic imperialism.” It is obvious that geopolitical factors and the geo-economic situation will have an impact on the relations between the European Union and Kazakhstan, as well as Central Asia as a whole, in the near future. Here we are referring to the U.S.’s new strategy in Central Asia, the unclear prospects of the development of the military-strategic situation in Afghanistan, the state of relations between Russia and the West, the world economic crisis, the growing significance of energy resources, and food safety. These factors could have both a dynamic and positive influence on relations between Europe and Central Asia, as well as a negative effect on their further development.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In 2011, Kazakhstan will complete its chairmanship in the SCO, which should be crowned by a summit this summer. In this respect, the importance of Kazakh-Chinese relations will abruptly grow. 121 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Much for Kazakhstan (and the other CA states) will depend on the dynamics of China’s development and its ability to resolve the arising problems. It must be recognized that neither the Central Asian countries nor Russia can do anything to prevent China’s trade and economic penetration into the region. Moreover, at present China is a more important partner for Central Asia than Central Asia is for China. Today it is utterly clear that cooperation with the PRC is crucial for maintaining positive economic dynamics in the region’s states. So China’s presence should be made to work in favor of Kazakhstan’s socioeconomic development. This could be accomplished by expanding Kazakh-Chinese cooperation in the non-raw-material branches of the economy. A thorough expert analysis of all the contracts entered with China must be carried out and every effort made to ensure they are transparent. Unfortunately, Chinese labor migration is an objective reality that must be reckoned with. But we are capable of organizing strict registration of migrants and control over their activity. The only thing that can realistically stop China’s advance into the region is to step up the integration processes in Eurasia (the CIS). The establishment of the Customs Union among Russia, Kaza- khstan, and Belarus is a significant step forward in limiting China’s expansion in the post-Soviet expanse. China has begun acting as a rival in the region, not only to the West, but also to Russia. China’s presence in Central Asia, which is traditionally Russia’s zone of influence, is becoming increasingly perceptible. It is very likely that in the near and mid term, China and Russia, either competing with each other or uniting to counteract the West, will become engaged in a fight for the geostrategic space and strategically important minerals of Central Asia and the Caspian region. The prospects for further cooperation between Kazakhstan and the SCO should be viewed from the perspective of intensifying cooperation and achieving the following strategic objectives: stepping up regional integration processes as an important factor in reducing the negative manifesta- tions of globalization; assisting in ensuring regional security in CA; conducting a policy aimed at intensifying regional integration; attracting the monetary resources of other states of the Organiza- tion to implement economic projects in Kazakhstan; protecting the SCO countries from the impact of external economic crisis phenomena, as well as their consequences; further strengthening Ka- zakhstan’s relations with the SCO states; and increasing its participation in regional structures. There is no doubt that an effective fight against terrorism and drug trafficking can be organized within the framework of the SCO. In customs relations, the procedure for crossing the SCO’s internal borders and registering transportation documents must be simplified as much as possible. Increasing access to foreign markets, including in the SCO countries, is extremely important for the country’s further development. More rational use of the region’s transportation and transit potential and formation of a transportation service market should become the main ways to solve this task. In order to raise the efficiency of freight and passenger traffic, a common tax system for transportation means and services should be drawn up. The crisis processes going on in the financial markets of Europe and the U.S. are dictating the need to take countermeasures not only at the national, but also at the supranational level. In this respect, the SCO countries must be economically protected. For this, the Kazakh side suggests creating a Regional SCO Center for monitoring the state of the world financial markets and macroeconomic processes. Space research might be a qualitatively new and promising vector of Kazakhstan’s activity in the SCO. It is obvious that the only way to show how efficiently the Organization is operating and how important it is for the region is to strengthen economic cooperation in the SCO. The first step in this direction might be to create an SCO Investment Bank. There is also the question of how China might join the integration structures that already exist in the Central Asian region and within the CIS.

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The Afghan problem is a key element in many areas for Central Asian security and Kazakhstan’s national security. It is important to understand the West’s strategy toward this country. The U.S. has long been talking about the possibility of sending a Kazakh contingent to Afghan- istan, particularly in the context of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the OSCE. It should be kept in mind that such a step could have certain political repercussions, both in domestic policy and in terms of its negative impact on Kazakhstan’s international status. Moscow’s extremely negative reaction to this development of events is already obvious. On the other hand, Kazakhstan, like the other Central Asian states, cannot stand impartially by and watch the situation in Afghanistan deteriorate should the destabilizing effect from the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops escalate. Evidently the answer to this problem lies in intensifying Kazakhstan’s and the CA countries’ cooperation with the nations whose responsibility in Afghanistan will automatically rise after evacu- ation of the Western forces. These nations include (in addition to Pakistan) China, India, Iran, and Russia. The Central Asian states only have the CSTO and SCO, which also need institutional fortifi- cation and strategic reformation, at their disposal as tools for strengthening their own security. Ka- zakhstan also has such a political tool as the OSCE Astana Declaration, which makes it possible to initiate measures in Eurasian security, including regarding the Afghan problem, which one way or another affects most of the OSCE members. In 2011, the Republic of Kazakhstan is chairing (technically) the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC. The tempestuous events in several Arab countries at the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011 will inevitably have an impact on the activity of the OIC and Kazakhstan’s chairmanship. Retaining stability in the direct geographical proximity and in the sphere of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical interests—Central Asia, Afghanistan, XUAR, Iran, and the Caspian-Caucasian region—is the primary task for Kazakhstan’s security. It is also important that, in addition to Kazakhstan, other CIS republics are also members of the OIC and the Russian Federation is an observer. So Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC in 2011 is aimed at keeping the Organization of the Islamic Conference clear of conflict-prone political processes. At the same time, as chairman of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Astana can concentrate on stepping up activity in such vectors as economic cooperation, public health, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, and interconfessional and intercivilizational cooperation. Chairmanship in the OIC will make it possible for Kazakhstan to actively assist in resolving the problems associated with Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear program, and the water shortage. Kazakhstan must intensify cooperation in the oil and gas industry. In this respect, Qatar’s experience in the gas sphere is interesting, since the production of liquefied natural gas will provide Ka- zakhstan with access to new markets and allow it to possess innovative technology that has still not been introduced into practice. In trade and economic cooperation, it would be expedient to initiate talks on developing an open system of trade, investments, technological exchange, and economic cooperation for the OIC zone (possibly within the framework of a multilateral agreement). In the public health sphere, the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC may (on Kazakhstan’s initiative) intensify cooperation in children’s health care and in combating polio and epidemic diseases (within the framework of OIC resolution No. 3/36). In cultural-humanitarian, interconfessional, and intercivilizational cooperation, it would be expedient to adopt an OIC resolution (addressed to the U.N. and OSCE) on the Organization’s support of the idea of creating an international institute (center) in Astana for developing a dialog among the world religions.

123 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: A NEW POLITICAL REALITY

Ikbalzhan MIRSAYITOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Independent Expert (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

Introduction

n 7 April, 2010, President of Kyrgyzstan clashed in the Jalal-Abad Region; several people Kurmanbek Bakiev was removed. The were killed. O Kyrgyz Republic lived through a second Between 10 and 16 June, ethnic clashes regime change, a unique event in the history of between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the cities of Osh Central Asia. and Jalal-Abad developed into bloodshed. Ac- An Interim Government headed by Rosa cording to official data, 423 were killed and about Otunbaeva was put together by the leaders of 14 2 thousand private houses were damaged (1,690 opposition parties, the most prominent among of them were totally destroyed). them being O. Tekebaev (Ata-Meken), A. Atam- Despite the political instability and tragic baev (Social-Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan), events in the south, the Interim Government con- T. Sariev (Ak-Shumkar), A. Beknazarov (United vened the Constitutional Assembly to amend the People’s Movement), and E. Kaptagaev (Uluu Constitution and transform the presidential repub- Birimdik). The new government described itself lic into a parliamentary one. The constitutional as “usurpers” and “dictators.”1 changes called for a national referendum to be The Interim Government disbanded the leg- held on 27 June, 2010. islative and executive power branches, as well as On the eve, about 100 thousand Uzbeks all the ministries and the bureaucracy, to concen- (citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic) were in the Re- trate power in its hands. This caused a political public of Uzbekistan as “temporary migrants,” default and stirred up a lot of trouble in the coun- while Kyrgyz left the zone of conflict to join their relatives elsewhere. This obviously called for an try’s south. amendment to the Election Code of the Kyrgyz Between 13 and 19 May, supporters of the Republic that allowed citizens to vote at the place former president made an aborted attempt in the they were actually living at the time of the elec- Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Batken regions to recapture tion, rather than at their place of registration.2 power in the south. This resulted in the arrest of This produced enough votes to amend the Con- Usen Sydykov, former head of the Administration stitution. of the KR President in 2005-2006, and Iskhak This meant that the people were voting for Masaliev, head of the Party of Communists of stability and security rather than a new govern- Kyrgyzstan. The country house of Bakiev’s fam- ment; on the strength of the referendum results, ily in the village of Teyit was burned down when Rosa Otunbaeva was elected President of the supporters and opponents of the former president

2 See: Decree of the Interim Government of the Kyr- 1 O. Tekebaev, “My iavliaemsia uzurpatorami i dik- gyz Republic No. 94, 1 July, 2010 On Amendments and Ad- tatorami,” available at [www.24.kg]. denda to the Election Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. 124 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Kyrgyz Republic for the transition period (until Central Election Commission and joined the 31 December, 2011).3 race. Parliamentary elections were scheduled The election results were baffling: five po- for 10 October, 2010; on 10 August, the race of- litical parties gained seats in parliament: Ata-Zhurt ficially began. By the time the date of the elec- (K. Tashiev); the Social-Democratic Party of Kyr- tions was announced, over 150 political parties gyzstan (A. Atambaev), Respublika (O. Babanov), had been registered with the Ministry of Justice; Ar-Namys (F. Kulov), and Ata-Meken (O. Teke- 57 of them announced that they intended to run; baev), while the pro-government SDPK and Ata- 29 submitted lists of their candidates to the Meken failed to reap the majority of votes, and Ak-Shumkar and UPM, two other pro-governmental parties, did not even reach the 5% barrier. 3 See: Decree of the Interim Government of the Kyr- gyz Republic No. 39, 19 May, 2010 On the President of the For more detail on the election and its results, see Kyrgyz Republic for the Transition Period. below.

Specifics of the Political Shifts in the Kyrgyz Republic

By late 2009, the Country Renovation course, presidential elections, and reform of the civil service had speeded up the formation of a united radical opposition; social opposition was developing along- side political opposition. On 1 January, 2010, electricity and other utility fees went up, which prompted unification of the social and political opposition. Protest rallies were scheduled for 6 April, 2010; in the Talass Region they developed into armed clashes with the law enforcers. Under the pressure of a confrontation between the opposition and the government in the capital, which did not abate until late in the night of 7 April, Bakiev unexpectedly left Bishkek for Jalal-Abad. Confrontation between the supporters and opponents of the former president continued until he left the country for good. Southern Kyrgyzstan was swept by a wave of indignation raised by the much obvious South vs. North opposition and heated by leaflets calling on the people to set up a Southern Kyrgyz Republic.4 Intervention from the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the United States, as well as Bakiev’s departure, halted the dangerous developments that were bringing the country to the brink of a civil war. The Interim Government steered the country toward constitutional reform; a Constitutional Assembly was set up to represent all sorts of public, civil, and youth organizations, politicians, and lawyers. The country’s future constitutional order generated a lot of discussion inside and outside the country. Most of the members of the Interim Government (O. Tekebaev, R. Otunbaeva, A. Atambaev, T. Sariev, A. Beknazarov, and E. Kaptagaev) were convinced that the country was ripe for a parliamentary form of governance. The leaders of Ata-Zhurt (K. Tashiev), Ar-Namys (F. Kulov), and Bu- tun Kyrgyzstan (A. Madumarov) argued that the country needed strong presidential power and promised to do everything possible to strengthen it. President Medvedev was also very critical of the parliamentary form of governance for Kyrgyzstan.5

4 They appeared on the forum [www.diesel.elcat.kg]. 5 President of the RF Dmitry Medvedev made public his opinion on Russian TV; the information agencies of Kyr- gyzstan informed the whole country about it (see: [www.24.kg]). 125 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The new government found it hard to legitimize itself. The national referendum on the new Constitution was scheduled to be held on 27 June, 2010. The new version of the Constitution divided power among the president, the Zhogorku Kenesh (parliament), and the prime minister in the following way: n The president is commander-in-chief of the Republic’s Armed Forces; he appoints and dis- misses the top commanders of the Armed Forces; appoints the prosecutor general of the Kyrgyz Republic approved by the Zhogorku Kenesh; represents the state inside and outside the country; conducts negotiations and signs international agreements; he is chairman of the Defense Council. n The Zhogorku Kenesh schedules the dates of referendums and presidential elections; amends the Constitution; passes decisions on changes to the state borders; elects a certain number of members of the Central Election Commission and the Auditing Chamber; appoints and dis- misses the ombudsman of the Kyrgyz Republic; creates military ranks; and forms coalition governments from among its deputies. The government is personally accountable to the Zhogorku Kenesh. n The prime minister heads the government, conducts negotiations and signs international treaties, and appoints and removes heads of the administrative structures and local state administrations. The Kyrgyz Republic was one of the first post-Soviet countries to switch to the parliamentary form of governance. The heads of the other Central Asian countries were critical, while the European countries, Japan, Turkey, and the United States approved the novelties. In fact, the system should be described as presidential-parliamentary because the president and the parliament have identical powers and are mutually complimentary. The huge number of former civil servants and the deputies of the disbanded parliament refused to accept the decrees of the Interim Government and recognize its actions as legitimate. This threatened the referendum scheduled for 27 June, 2010. Some of the regions remained beyond the control of the Interim Government, which caused a political crisis and emboldened the criminal structures. Between 13 and 19 May, Usen Sydykov, former head of Bakiev’s administration and leader of Jany Kyrgyzstan, and governors of the Osh (M. Bakirov) and Jalal-Abad (K. Masirov) regions headed an aborted coup. Those supporters of the former president who tried to capture the regional administrations in Osh and Jalal-Abad were defeated; several people were killed in armed clashes.

The Tragic Events in the Osh and Jalal-Abad Regions and Their Aftermath

The June events could not be dismissed as the country’s domestic problem; they threatened stability of the entire region since the Central Asian peoples are not only closely related, they have been sharing the same territory for many centuries. The expert community is of two minds about the events: the trust which existed between two fraternal peoples (the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks) in the republic was damaged; both ethnic groups feel vulnera-

126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 ble; some of them moved away to become internal migrants, while others preferred to become guest workers in Russia and Kazakhstan. The public mood has been dampened; people are disappointed and pessimistic. The state structures, international human rights organizations, and leaders of the Central Asian states offer different explanations of the tragic events in the republic’s south.

The State Version

The State Service of National Security of Kyrgyzstan (NSK) was one of the first to come forward with an explanation of what happened in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions. Its press service pointed out that early in May 2010, emissaries and warlords of the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) met in the Afghan city of Bahorak (in Afghan Badakhshan); the meeting was also attended by M. Abdullo and two members of the Bakiev family. It was agreed that the IMU should be assisted in its efforts to destabilize the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic; the family of the former president promised a cash incentive of $30 million.6 The special services preferred to shift the blame for the conflict onto international terrorists and Bakiev’s family. President of the transition period Rosa Otunbaeva, in turn, set up a National Commission of 29 members to look into the causes and aftermath of the June events. According to Commission Chairman Abdygany Erkebaev, the Commission had planned to publish its results on 10 Septem- ber, but in the face of the upcoming parliamentary elections the chairman temporarily suspended his powers. On 17 August, 2010, A. Erkebaev and Zh. Zheksheev published the preliminary results, which stirred up the indignation of the other members.7 The preliminary report accused the law-enforcement bodies of inefficiency; the militia had been demoralized and had not prevented distribution of firearms in June. Six foreign citizens suspected of subversive actions and detained in Southern Kyrgyzstan accused the Bakiev family of igniting the riots. Zhykar Zheksheev pointed out that on the eve of the riots large numbers of foreign journalists arrived in the south “as though they knew what was coming,” since their publications often anticipated the actual events. Today, the Commission is trying to sort things out. He also insisted that there had been no spontaneous ethnic conflict: the events were carefully planned and organized, although no culprits were found. Alexander Kniazev, one of the Commission members, scathingly criticized the Commission and its chairman; he said that the results looked dubious, while he himself had been never invited to any of the Commission’s meetings.8 A report on the results of the Commission’s work that accused certain leaders of the Uzbek community of instigating the clashes was published and presented to the parliament and caused three- day long heated debates among the intelligentsia, deputies, and experts.

6 Press service of the NSK of the Kyrgyz Republic, 24 June, 2010 (see: [www.24.kg]). 7 See: A. Abdirasulova, “Chairman of the Commission for Investigating the Events in Osh Flagrantly Violated the Principles of its Work,” available at [http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=15396, www.24.kg]. 8 See: A. Kniazev, “The Politics of National Chauvinism Supported by the Government Might Cost Kyrgyzstan Its Statehood,” available at [http://www.24.kg/community/80727-aleksandr-knyazev-politika-nacionalnogo.html]. 127 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Version of International Organizations

On 22 July, the OSCE’s PA Special Representative for Central Asia Kimmon Kiljunen informed that an International Independent Commission for Inquiry into the June Interethnic Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan had been set up on Rosa Otunbaeva’s initiative. The Commission intended to look into all facts related to the flare-up of violence in Osh and the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions; its chairman pointed out that there were too many rumors and too many hypotheses. To find out the truth, the Commission, said its head, intended to gather and analyze all the facts and find a way toward reconciliation; the National Commission headed by Abdygany Erkebaev and the republic’s law-enforcement structures would also be involved in the inquiry. The Commission, made up of members of all sorts of international organizations and independent experts, started working early in August. In January 2010, it was ready with a final report, which it presented to the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the interested sides.9 The Human Rights Watch published its report on what had triggered the riots in Southern Kyr- gyzstan on 16 August. Its 91-page-long report entitled Where is the Justice? Interethnic Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan and Its Aftermath said in part: “The government investigation into the violence, which left hundreds dead and thousands injured, has been marred with abuses, while ethnically motivated attacks are taking place in the south.” The report said that the Kyrgyz authorities should conduct an effective investigation and all guilty should be detained and punished to the full force of the law. The report is based on over 200 interviews with Kyrgyz and Uzbek victims and witnesses, lawyers, human rights defenders, government officials, and law enforcement personnel. The report also analyzed satellite imagery and photographic, video, documentary, and forensic evidence.10 This publication raised another wave of popular indignation: the activists of the Movement of 7 April picketed the U.N. office in Bishkek; politicians and experts voiced their disagreement with the Human Rights Watch’s conclusions. In the wake of the tragic events, Rosa Otunbaeva invited the OSCE Police Advisory Group (PAG) to be stationed in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions; on 22 July, 56 members of the OSCE Permanent Council passed a corresponding decision. A memorandum on mutual understanding between the Government of the KR and the OSCE on the OSCE PAG in Kyrgyzstan was drafted on the strength of this decision and signed11; Markus Mu- eller was appointed head of the PAG in Kyrgyzstan.12 It was expected that the Group would consist of 32 international representatives (of the middle and higher level, including its head and his deputy); the original term of four months could be extended on the sides’ initiative and depending on the state of security in the area. The country, both the political class and the grass-roots level, was divided: the leaders of Ata- Zhurt, Ar-Namys, the Movement of 7 April, and Azattyk were very critical of the decision and those who had initiated it. On 30 July, Mayor of Osh M. Myrzakmatov and the deputies of the city kenesh, in turn, refused to let the OSCE PAG enter the city.13 Youth movements in Osh and Bishkek joined the rallies and pickets.

9 See: K. Kiljunen, “We Want to Find out the Causes of the Tragedy and the Truth about the June Events in South- ern Kyrgyzstan,” available at [http://kyrgyzel.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=783&Itemid=1]. 10 [http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/08/16/where-justice-0]. 11 See: “Foreign Ministry of the KR: The OSCE Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan will be Governed by the Prin- ciples of Neutrality, Impartiality, Transparency and Multi-nationalism,” available at [www.24.kg], 23 July, 2010. 12 [www.IA SA-News]. 13 [www.akipress.kg], 30 July, 2010. 128 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Representatives of the ethnic minorities in the Assembly of the Peoples of Kyrgyzstan, some of the NGOs, official structures, and the Foreign Ministry backed the government. In the south, the Uzbek NGOs wanted to see the PAG in their region, while the Kyrgyz NGOs were against it. Those who were against it feared that this measure might divide the country and launch a Kos- ovo scenario; it was rumored that the OSCE was prepared to offer government members huge bribes; some people feared that the OSCE policemen might be threatened. More than anything else people feared that the PAG members might take the side of the one of the conflicting groups, which would distort the true picture and make it necessary to establish external governance in Kyrgyzstan (as happened in Kosovo). President Otunbaeva was forced to postpone bringing in the PAG; the memorandum signed between the Kyrgyz Republic and the OSCE is being revised and amended.14 At around the same time, speaking in the Bukhara Region, President of Uzbekistan Karimov refused to accept the opinion about the ethnic origin: “Neither the Kyrgyz nor the Uzbeks who live there have any reason to fan the tragedy. This action was stirred up, on the sly, by those who call themselves our friends.”15

Parliamentary Elections and the Beginning of Parliament-Building

On 9 August, 2010, the Interim Government passed Decree No. 117 On Abolition of the State of Emergency in the Cities of Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Uzgen, the Kara-Suy and Aravan Districts of the Osh Region, and the Suzak and Bazar-Korgon Districts of the Jalal-Abad Region of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Presidential Decree On the Elections to Zhogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic of 9 August, 2010 scheduled 10 October as the election day. On 9 August, the Interim Government issued a Decree On Recognizing the Invalidity of the Decree of the Interim Government of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 94 of 1 July, 2010 On Amendments and Ad- denda to the Election Code of the Kyrgyz Republic. Fifty-seven political parties intended to run for parliament; 29 of them submitted lists of their candidates to the Central Election Commission and were registered. Late in July, some of the political parties initiated a Forum of Confidence which signed an Eth- ical Code of the Participants in the Parliamentary Elections-2010. On 11 August, 26 political parties signed the OSCE-supported Code of Conduct of Political Parties drafted by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, and USAID. The pre-election campaign was officially launched on 10 September, 2010. Three hundred and sixty-five international observers from 31 countries who represented 11 structures, including ODIHR/OSCE, IPA CIS, EurAsEC, the Elections&Democracy International Associ- ation, and the Embassy of Brazil, were accredited by the CEC. Under the Election Code, accreditation of international observers should be completed five days before election day.16

14 See: “Mission of the OSCE Police Advisory Group in Kyrgyzstan: Questions and Answers,” available at [www.zpress.kg]. 15 I. Karimov: “I Am Sure that We Shall Live in Peace and Agreement!” I. Karimov’s Speech in the Bukhara Region, 18 June, 2010, available at [http://www.kyrgyz-el.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=775&Itemid=1]. 16 [www.shailoo.gov.kg]. 129 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On 21 September, 2010, speaking at the first congress of voluntary public order squads, Secre- tary of the KR Security Council Marat Imankulov said that the government had taken unprecedented security measures to ensure security on election day.17 It should be said that it was the SDPK candidate who consolidated the efforts of the voluntary public order squads.18 I have written above that people feared the coming elections; they did not feel totally secure and remained tense. Even in these conditions many of the voters were quite sure of their choice; the population’s support of the political parties was mounting. The election campaign was accompanied by rallies of those who protested against the arrests of the Alpha Group fighters and the officers of the State Guard Service accused of killing demonstrators on 7 April in Bishkek. The colleagues of the arrested officers, who threatened to resign, joined the relatives. The human rights activists protested against procedural violations during the investigations; they addressed the General Prosecutor’s Office with a statement which said, in part, that the investi- gators were guided not so much by the Code of Criminal Procedure as by emotions; on 4 October, head of the special services department of the Alpha Group Almazbek Joldoshaliev was released under public pressure.19 The election campaign unfolded at the same time as the court cases related to the tragedy in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions. The human rights organizations were very concerned about the information that the law enforcement and judicial structures had beaten up the accused and threatened their lawyers. Some of the international organizations demanded that security and fairness be ensured. Despite the fairly active election campaign, during which candidates met with their constituen- cies, a large part of the population remained ignorant of the coming elections, the voting procedure, and the rights of the voters. It should be said that all the political parties relied on criticism of the people in power and their rivals rather than on positive programs to pull potential voters onto their side. This means that people knew next to nothing about how the parties intended to realize their ideas and programs. The international community showed a lot of interest in the election campaign, while the media in foreign countries offered highly varied opinions about the campaign, the parties, and their leaders. Inside the country, the public was stirred up by information about one of the leaders of a political party that was running for the parliament. The independent media and human rights activists were indignant about the fact that the Russian NTV company interfered in the election campaign of a sovereign country.20 The Human Rights Council approached President Medvedev.21 As distinct from the previous elections, in 2010 the leading political parties and their leaders sought support abroad. Felix Kulov of Ar-Namys was supported by President of Russia Medvedev and President of Kazakhstan Nazarbaev; Omurbek Tekebaev of Ata-Meken sought the support of Kazakhstan, China, and Turkey; Kymchibek Tashiev and Akhmatbek Keldibekov of Ata-Zhurt met with President of Kazakhstan Nazarbaev; Almazbek Atambaev of the Social-Democratic Party repeatedly went to Russia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan, while Omurbek Babanov of Respublika relied on his personal acquaintance with Head of the Administration of the RF President Sergey Naryshkin. On 10 October, 2010, five political parties were elected; the opposition parties Ata-Zhurt and Ar-Namys gained more seats than the pro-governmental parties Ata-Meken and the SDPK. On the whole, Ata-Zhurt received 28 seats; the SDPK, 26 seats; Ar-Namys, 25; Respublika, 23; and Ata-Meken, 18.

17 [http://www.kyrgyz-el.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1348]. 18 [http://www.24.kg/bishkek24/77266-v-obespechenii-obshhestvennogo-poryadka-v-stolice.html]. 19 [http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=15666&mode=snews]. 20 [http://www.24.kg/community/83568-sovet-pravozashhitnikov-kyrgyzstana-rassmatrivaet.html; http://thvpi.tk]. 21 [http://www.24.kg/community/83592-sovet-pravozashhitnikov-kyrgyzstana-obratilsya-s.html]. 130 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

President Otunbaeva entrusted Almazbek Atambaev of the SDPK with forming the coalition government; he failed because the deputies refused to elect Omurbek Tekebaev as speaker of the parliament. By the end of 2010, Omurbek Babanov of the Respublika Party had put together a coalition government which included the SDPK, Ata-Zhurt, and Respublika; Ata-Meken and Ar-Namys formed the opposition (in full accordance with Part 4, Chapter 1, Art 70.3 of the country’s Constitution) and were given the opportunity to set up parliamentary committees for finances and law and order. Almazbek Atambaev became prime minister; Omurbek Babanov was appointed first vice premier; and Ibrahim Junusov of Ata-Zhurt acquired the post of vice premier.

Conclusions

n First, between 2005 and 2010, the republic changed its regime twice, which caused concern in its Central Asian neighbors. Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian country to switch to the parliamentary form of government. Many influential political figures, however, are still in favor of the presidential form of government. n Second, the constitutional reforms polarized the positions of the international centers of power; the attempts to change the geopolitical map of Central Asia inevitably caused clashes of interests among the major powers in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. n Third, bloodshed in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions demonstrated that neither the CSTO nor the SCO can influence the domestic developments in their member states. The CSTO leaders announced their willingness to revise their organization’s charter to be able to offer its members stronger protection of their state systems and information security. n Fourth, there are signs that the geopolitical gap between Central Asian countries will widen under the impact of the world powers and clashes of their own interests; this will affect the social, economic, and political situation in all the Central Asian countries. The events of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan created new political relations and institutions; the regime change intensified regionalism, nationalism, and ethnic contradictions. The government pooled forces with civil society to create a new ethnopolitical conception. The new people are building their vertical of power which will inevitably leave a certain number of regional clans and former bureaucrats out in the cold; redistribution of the spheres of influence is accompanied by protest actions. Social opposition is taking shape in the country: teachers, doctors, and pensioners (the most vulnerable population groups) are dissatisfied with their incomes. In 2011, the country will acquire a new president for the next 6 years; in the summer of 2011 the parliament will set the date for the presidential election; all the parliamentary parties will nominate their candidates. In the summer and fall of 2011, political passions will fly high. The people, who have learned the bitter lessons of the 2010 parliamentary elections when some of the parties capitalized on nationalist sentiments and the “image of a common enemy” to get into parliament, now want stability and ethnic tolerance.

131 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURALIZING IN UZBEKISTAN: THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM AND THE OPPOSITION

Farkhad TOLIPOV Ph.D. (Political Science), Independent Analyst (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Introduction

t all times, a multiparty system and oppo- tiparty system and opposition that frequently es- sition have been regarded and are still cape simplistic or one-track approach. A viewed as a sign of democracy. To a great Any detailed investigation of the issue dis- extent, the importance and functions of the multi- closes new dilemmas and problems in the situation- party system depend on the specific features of the al analysis of the Central Asian countries, especial- political order in any given country, its type of elec- ly in the East-West context. In this case, however, tion system, and its model of governance, etc. The the Central Asian countries are placed in a specific sum-total of the above speaks volumes about the Eastern context where building a new democratic systemic nature of the country’s politics. society (complete with a multiparty system and In-depth studies of the issue reveal the nu- opposition) has been struggling to surmount the ances, specifics, and regularities of forming a mul- “ontological” barriers that exist there.

On the Axiomatics of the Issue

One of the fundamental axioms of democratic theory says: “Democracy is unthinkable without opposition parties in the country’s political system.” It is generally believed that the level of democracy depends on the nature of the political struggle in a country; an academic approach, however, reveals an ontological flaw. After watching the fairly slow process of democratic structuralizing1 in Uzbekistan for many years, I had what can be rated as a minor “revelation”: there is no clear understanding of theoretical terms (starting with “democracy”) and practical concepts (such as “civil society,” “NGOs,” etc.). Not only has the term “opposition” failed to be specified as a theoretical concept in Uzbek political science, it is treated almost as “obscene.” The term “opposition” meanwhile is derived from the Latin oppositio and means the following: (1) opposition of one’s politics to the politics of others;

1 I use the words “democratic structuralizing” instead of the commonly used “democratic construction” to emphasize not so much the practical process of moving toward democracy as a political system but rather the process of building an adapted conception of democracy at the theoretical level. 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

(2) opposition to the opinion of the majority or the prevailing opinion in legislature, party, and other structures which pose themselves as democratic. Opposition can be moderate, radical, loyal (prepared to support the government), constructive (offering meaningful and constructive decisions), or destructive.2 Contraposition (in most cases a priori described as all-embracing) is the centerpiece of any opposition. The aim serves as the main distinguishing feature: different opposition forces have different ideas about the future of their countries—this is the meaning of their existence and functioning. It seems that to be “against” is a special teleological characteristic of the opposition, which explains why the word “opposition” is frequently associated with the idea of “revolution.” The terminological fog (never dissipated by the terms “loyal,” “constructive” and “moderate”) scares authoritarian rulers. They look at the opposition members not as “well-meaning others” but as “threatening aliens.” This serves as the starting point of my discussion. I consider it my duty to clarify the political theory in the part it applies to opposition because, I am convinced, this term cannot and should not be applied to all forms of political rivalry. According to prominent political scientist Joseph La Palombara, political parties appear when and where the government becomes convinced that the people should be involved in the life of the state. He writes that just as the bureaucracy appeared when society could no longer be ruled from the prince’s palace, political parties, likewise, appeared when political power and political actions could no longer be executed by a narrow circle of people (who knew next to nothing about what the people really wanted).3 Axel Hadenius, in turn, has written: “The link between party development and the survival of democracy, it seems, is mainly taken for granted. There may of course be some sort of connection, but this remains to be demonstrated. It is an overstatement, in other words, to say that the ‘to be or not to be’ of democracy hinges on the development of a certain type of political party.”4 Robert Dahl, a prominent American political scientist, introduced the concept of polyarchy to describe a form of government in which power is vested in three or more persons (democratic systems in today’s parlance); democracy is seen as an ideal to be achieved through polyarchy. He went on to say that polyarchies, rather than democracies, should be built, the first being distinguished by the fact that the winning majority rules the country and respects the rights of the defeated minority.5 His theory has been confirmed, at least partly, at the practical level, where the term “good governance” seems to be gaining popularity. A greater number of public structures; more elaborate relations among social groups; a high level of social demands and expectations; a wider range of uncertainties and risks; a stronger impact of international factors on domestic policy; widespread information awareness; plummeting popular trust in the central government, etc. brought about a revision of the traditional administrative methods, especially those which ignored the specifics of the public sphere. This explains the growing popularity of the so-called network theories which look at governance efficiency through the “aims-processes” rather than “aims-means” prism. The policy network conception has modified the idea of centrally concentrated power or, rather, replaced it with the idea of mutual responsibility and obligations.6 According to Tanja A. Borzel, any policy network is a “set of relatively stable non-hierarchical … relations among a variety of actors united by common political interests who exchange resources to

2 See: Politologia. Entsiklopedichesky slovar, Publishers Publishing House, Moscow, 1993, p. 230. 3 See: J. La Palombara, M. Weiner, “Political Parties and Political Development,” in: The Origin and Development of Political Parties, Princeton, NJ, 1966, pp. 3-4. 4 A. Hadenius, “Party Development: Russia in a Comparative Perspective,” in: The Political Party System in Russia in the Period of Yeltsin Presidency, ed. by A. Hadenius, V. Sergeev, Letny Sad, Moscow, 2008, p. 6. 5 For more detail, see: R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984. 6 For more detail, see: L. Smorgunov, “Setevoy podkhod k politike i upravleniiu,” Polis, No. 3, 2001. 133 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS promote their interests and who know that cooperation is the shortest route to common aims.”7 In other words, the network makes use of formal and informal relations among actors united by common sec- toral interests to arrive at a common political decision. American political scientist Ian Shapiro has pointed out the dilemma: “An enduring embarrass- ment of democratic theory is that it seems impotent when faced with questions about its own scope. A chicken-and-egg problem thus lurks at democracy’s core. Questions relating to boundaries and membership seem in an important sense prior to democratic decision-making, yet paradoxically they cry out for democratic resolution.”8 The American political scientist suggests that the so-called causal principle of relevant interests related to political decisions should be taken into account. He deems it necessary to remind us that this approach undermined the arguments in favor of pushing aside the principle of citizenship as the main one when determining the right to democratic participation. It should be replaced with a system of intersecting jurisdictions where different groups are independent when making different categories of decisions (this is practiced in the European Union).9 The above suggests that the relatively novel policy network concept has already acquired an international character. It seems that from the very beginning civil society has been potentially capable of developing into an elaborate entity of interconnected networks at the national and international levels. This sheds new light on what Friedrich Engels said at one time: “As all the driving forces of the actions of any individual must pass through his brain, and transform themselves into motives of his will in order to set him into action, so also all the needs of civil society—no matter which class hap- pens to be the ruling one—must pass through the will of the state in order to secure general validity in the form of laws.”10 This idea about civil society, as well as the causal principle of relevant interests suggest questions about the nature of laws and political decisions (in addition to who passes them and for whom) and whether they are best suited to the prospects of democratic development. The network nature of contemporary societies (and “digital politics” which can also be called “digi-politics,” “byte-politics,” “or e-politics”), which relies on the latest digital technology and other means to shape and conduct politics, is changing the theory and ideas about the forms and ways of manifesting oppositional political opinion. Indeed, today the opposition can express its opinions or even criticize the government through global communication lines, the Internet in particular. Any opposition group can inform the public about its policy in the form of “e-politics.” This means that today the theory that regards a multiparty system and opposition as the main signs of democracy requires a certain amount of revision.

On the Democratic Experience of the Multiparty System

It is more or less commonly believed in Uzbekistan that division into left, right, and center will inevitably create what is called an opposition. Let’s take a look at the multiparty system in developed democracies.

7 L. Smorgunov, op. cit. 8 Democracy’s Edges, ed. by I. Shapiro, C. Hacker-Gordón, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 1. 9 See: I. Shapiro, “Pereosmyslivaia teoriu demokratii v svete sovremennoy politiki,” Polis, No. 3, 2001. 10 F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Part IV, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973. 134 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

The concepts of “left wing” and “right wing” were born by the French revolution of 1789 which “de-Christianized” political culture and split society into the Catholic and anticlerical blocs that paved the way for two resilient sub-cultures,11 the “right wing” and “left wing” of European politics. The “right wing” consisted of clericals and legitimists who supported the Ancien Régime; the “left wing” consisted of anti-clericals and anti-legitimists, that is, republicans looking forward to the new ideal order that was expected to emerge as soon as the revolution had tapped its potential to the full.12 Later, the term “left wing” was applied to socialist and communist parties and movements intended to change the old order through revolutions. This division still survives in the West, but the gradually changing society (“digi-politics”) and, to a great extent, the very developed culture of multiparty cooperation are gradually changing the West- ern political spectrum. The quest for new organizational forms of political life based on close cooperation and interaction, rather than on the zero-sum game, is underway in the West and in the East. Germany’s two-bloc system (the CDU/CSU and SPDG) developed into a multiparty system when the Free Democratic Party, the Alliance 90/The Greens, and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) emerged on the political scene. The presence of the Alliance 90/The Greens and the Party of Demo- cratic Socialism, which are leftwing parties, provided the SPDG with room for maneuver: its ideology allows it to side with the left wing and the right wing. The so-called “rightwing extremists” (the German People’s Union, the Republicans, and the National Patriots) who speak in the name of German nationalists are not numerous; their electorates are fairly limited, even though they capture protest votes from time to time. The rightwing extremist parties with extremist views and small electorates are unwanted partners; they balance on the brink of constitutional legitimacy and risk their official registrations much too often. I had the opportunity to attend the Bundestag to observe its functioning at close quarters and talk to the members of its Central Asian Committee; during the general discussions and drafting of decisions, all of them (despite their different party affiliations) demonstrated a readiness to cooperate. In the United States, the bi-party system goes back to practically the first day the state became established. At no time, however, did the Republican-Democratic rivalry assume unacceptable forms and split the nation. President Obama is functioning within this pattern: in his State of the Union Address of 26 January, 2011 he called on the Americans to put aside party disagreements and unite for the sake of the country’s global competitiveness. The democratic order in India, Japan, and Malaysia deserves special mention: there is a dominating party in these countries which can be described as a hierarchical structure of political patron- age uniting the “upper” and the “lower” layers of the political system. In these countries the dominant party and the opposition form a single whole, while the individuals involved in the political process move between the two poles. It should be said that no one pays particular attention to the ideological identity of either the dominant party or the opposition. This system has attracted a lot of sociological attention. A national poll carried out in Japan (with a high percentage of literate and politically aware people) during general elections revealed that in the Miyagi Prefecture (agriculture and fishing being the main local occupations) 77 percent were aware of the party affiliation of at least one candidate, while two-thirds of the population knew at least half of the candidates on the list. Only one out of four, however, had at least some idea about the programs of the two main parties.

11 See: A.B. Zubov, Parlamentskaia demokratia i politicheskaia traditsia Vostoka, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1990, p. 269. 12 See: Ibidem. 135 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Any analysis of the parliamentary democracies of the East (including “post-industrial” Japan) creates the impression that few outside the group of Westernized intellectuals are interested in ideology and few take it into account, irrespective of its founders and prominent supporters.13 The table is based on an analysis of the way voters in the West and the East respond to parties’ ideologies. It should be said that in Japan, India, Malaysia, and a few other countries the dominant parties are supported by all social groups even outside their electorate.

Table Attitude to the Differences between the Parties Depending on the Respondent’s Preferences14

Level of Party Support, % Attitude/Country high low none at all

The parties are very different. Agreed

India 36 34 20

Norway 85 60 47

Thee parties are not different. Agreed

India 42 44 44

Norway 2 14 16

The above suggests that efficient democracy requires mechanisms through which the demands of the masses can reach the corridors of power and which ensure the state’s adequate and timely decisions in the interests of the common people. More often than not, political parties, being one of these mechanisms, act together, while the so- called opposition practically never identifies itself as an antagonist of the powers that be. This means that the political systems in the developed democracies are not so much multiparty as pluralistic and that the conception of political opposition should be revised.

The Multiparty System in Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan, the multiparty system and the entire process of political transformation is developing in a highly specific post-Soviet and regional context.15 During the course of the reforms, the state has been very concerned about preserving social and political stability. Today, after nearly twenty years of Uzbekistan’s independence, it turns out that

13 See: A.B. Zubov, op. cit., pp. 262-263. 14 Ibid., p. 287. 15 See: F. Tolipov, “Uzbekistan: Soviet Syndrome in the State, Society, and Ideology,” Central Asia and the Cau- casus, No. 6 (54), 2008. 136 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 stability is treated as the status quo. Here is what E. Wayne Merry, Senior Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, has to say on this score: “One thing is certain: ‘stability’ is no answer to the problems of Central Asia: indeed, a focus on stability is the heart of the problem. Central Asia need profound political and economic transformations to escape its neo-Soviet morass—change, compara- ble to those of Eastern Europe—and the sooner the better.”16 The desire to preserve stability explains why the party system in Uzbekistan (and Kazakhstan) has been built from top to bottom. The people in power, who remain in control in the parties (all of them being pro-presidential), have deprived the potential opposition (in the traditional sense of the word) of the leeway it needs to demonstrate more political activity. The life-span of the opposition parties in Uzbekistan proved to be short: set up in the first days of independence, they disappeared in the mid-1990s. I have in mind the Birlik (Unity) and Erk (Lib- erty) parties, which were very critical of the people in power. Relentless persecution forced their leaders to emigrate. Birlik and Erk were the only two parties in Uzbekistan built from the grass-roots level; no other opposition party has appeared in the country since then. A. Shomanov of Kazakhstan put the pro-presidential parties into a nutshell by saying: “The party system in our country developed and became institutionalized with essentially no social content,”17 which means that in Uzbekistan it was an exercise in keeping the situation under control and, at the same time, impressing the public at home and abroad with democratic developments. A. Chebotarev, another analyst from Kazakhstan, said something which can be applied to Uz- bekistan with certain reservations: “On the whole, party construction is highly ambiguous. There are two mutually exclusive, yet very obvious, processes: the number of parties increases and decreases. The resultant quantitative fluctuations make it hard to say how many parties exist in the republic.”18 In Uzbekistan, practically all the political parties are opportunistic. As part of the state system, they have busied themselves with reproducing loyal functionaries rather than channeling social and political pluralism from the grass-roots level up. In view of what I said above about the opposition, this is normal—if pluralism is blocked the situation might develop into an anomaly. Indeed, the parties in Uzbekistan are practically indistinguishable ideologically—they show no intention of achieving ideological pluralism. On the other hand, there are attempts to build a so-called parliamentary opposition to withdraw from the crisis; this does nothing but distort the idea of opposition still further. The environment of the opposition as a natural phenomenon cannot be limited to the parliament—it must function in civil society. We are tempted to ask: Is it true that no opposition can emerge on the basis of the existing parties? Do we need new parties, or should we cut down the number of already functioning parties? Here are tentative names for new parties: n The Islamic Democratic Party (along the lines of the CDU/CSU in Germany) n The Conservative Party (critical of any political, social, and, especially, cultural changes) n The Republican Party (working in the interests of a stronger state)

16 E.W. Merry, “The Politics of Central Asia: National in Form, Soviet in Content,” in: In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21st Century, ed. by D. Burghart, T. Sabonis-Helf, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. 41. 17 A. Shomanov, “Problemy i perspektivy razvitia grazhdanskogo obshchestva v kontekste politicheskoy moderni- zatsii,” in: Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii: “Perspektivy politicheskikh reform v Respub- like Kazakhstan: obshchestvennye ozhidaniia i mezhdunarodnye standarty,” Central Asian Foundation for Democratic Development, Almaty, 2007, p. 47. 18 A. Chebotarev, “Partiynoe stroitelstvo v kontekste provedenia politicheskikh reform v Kazakhstane na sovremennom etape,” in: Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii “Perspektivy politicheskikh reform v Re- spublike Kazakhstan: obshchestvennye ozhidaniia i mezhdunarodnye standarty”, p. 26. 137 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

n The Liberal-Democratic Party (based on Western liberal values) n The Environmental Party n The Turkestan Party (working toward regional integration of Central Asia) n The Agrarian Party. I am not suggesting that these parties should be created, I am merely offering food for thought. Regrettably, political scientists in Uzbekistan are not discussing this topic, a sure sign that Uzbek political science is languishing. This appears even stranger when we consider that the opposition is a vehicle of alternative political ideas and the driving force behind corresponding decisions. It cannot appear out of blue: “there was no opposition yesterday—there will be an opposition tomorrow.” Before the opposition can come to the fore, different opinions must be positioned as oppositional at least at the expert and public level. This has not yet happened. Those interested in forming an opposition (parliamentary, constructive, etc.) are erroneously trying to reinvent the wheel. But they are forgetting that the opposition as a form of existence of the other cannot be built on order; it is an immanent feature of any society which is pluralistic by nature. Moreover, the opposition as an organized action of the other cannot be created by a government not initially interested in it. On the other hand, let me contradict myself: the opposition presents no threat to the leaders of Uzbekistan because it does not exist (just as it does not exist anywhere else) in the sense described at the beginning of this article. The concept of “opposition” (in the absolute meaning of the word) does not fully reflect the real political process, which might more aptly be described as “rivaling groups” or even “cooperating political entities.” Today, the people in power need to create a technical form of representation of “opposition” in the government; we need a social context for the pluralistic frame of mind, an a priori requirement of any society, to move it into the political context. On 12 November, 2010, speaking at a joint plenary session of both chambers of the parliament, President Islam Karimov suggested that the Constitution be amended. He formulated one of the amendments as follows: “In the event the president of Uzbekistan is unable to fulfill his duties, his power shall be transferred to the Chairman of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis.” The majority interpreted this as a new stage in the development of the republic’s party system. The president went even further: he suggested that the parties with the largest number of seats in the parliament nominate the prime minister and that the deputy corps acquire the right to pass a vote of no confidence against the government. This stirred up a lot of interest among international observers and in the media: people began wondering whether the president’s suggestions were related to imminent reshuffling of the country’s top leadership. No matter how logical, these speculations are a bit premature: this is not the first time the president has come forward with similar “breakthrough” initiatives. Back in November 2006, he said that the country needed a Constitutional Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Strengthening the Role of Political Parties in the Renovation and Further Democratization of State Governance and Moderniza- tion of the Country,19 its focal points being: 1. The factions of political parties and deputies elected from initiative groups who disagree with the course and program of the newly elected government or with specific aspects of its plans may describe themselves as the opposition;

19 See: Doklad Prezidenta Islama Karimova na torzhestvennom zasedanii, posviashchennom 14-letiyu Konstitutsii Re- spubliki Uzbekistan, available at [www.uzreport.com]. 138 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

2. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall nominate the prime minister of the Repub- lic of Uzbekistan to be approved by the Legislative Chamber and the Senate of the Oliy Majlis after consultations with all the parliamentary factions; 3. The prime minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall be dismissed by the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in particular, on the initiative of the factions of political parties in the Legislative Chamber submitted to the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The president of the Republic of Uzbekistan may dismiss the prime minister if a fully substantiated initiative is supported by the leading factions of the political parties of the parliament and if, when submitted by the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan for voting, it is supported by over two-thirds of the votes of the total number of deputies of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis and members of the Senate. Dismissal of the prime minister is followed by resignation of the government of the Re- public of Uzbekistan. From this it follows that the parliament, which has been enjoying vast powers for a long time, never acquired a parliamentary opposition. Moreover, it failed to express any opinion about the prime minister and the Cabinet even when a new parliament was elected in 2010. Can we expect anything new from the deputies? The presidential administration controls and coordinates all the state structures, albeit not openly; just as in the past, this may reduce all democratic innovations to naught. This means that the latest presidential initiatives are nothing more than a continuation of what was said four years ago. The latest initiative was largely prompted by the tragic events in Osh, in the south of Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Uzbekistan badly needs a better international image to develop its contacts with the West. Reshuffling at the top cannot be ruled out either. In any case, the legislative initiatives are much more than mere propaganda; they are intended to prepare the public for possible democratic changes. Despite the wide gap between the de jure and de facto of the political process, one thing is clear: the democratic legislative innovations mean that the government cannot deviate from its own course toward democracy. The republic’s laws will contain even more provisions that can be used to criticize the government or register certain achievements on the road toward genuine democracy. The terms “factions” and “opposition” introduced into the new draft Law on Strengthening the Role of Parties… reflect the widely shared delusion about them; the “shop window” opposition is pushing these delusions deeper into people’s minds. The formula: “…deputies elected from some of the political parties will represent the majority and from others the minority in the Legislative Chamber and the local Kengashes elected by popular vote, while some parties might prefer to oppose the course announced by the newly formed government” throws the artificial nature of the new construct into bolder relief.

Conclusion

Here are the preliminary conclusions about party-building in Uzbekistan and its neighboring countries: At all times society has been brimming with ideas, interests, opinions, and even decisions, the number of which by far exceeds the number of parties able to articulate them in the course of political activities or struggle. An excessive number of parties does not allow any of them to negotiate the 2%, 3%, or 5% barrier to get into the parliament on its own, outside a coalition. The right to set up a party should not be driven

139 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS to the extreme (the same applies to the right of nations to self-determination up to and including formation of an independent state). We should go deeper into the functional-problem, rather than ideological approach, which will help us to identify social problems and channel them toward the power structures. These are my preliminary conclusions. This problem calls for wide-scale comparative studies of party-building and the phenomenon of the opposition in different countries. It is important to find out which deeply rooted driving forces cause politicization (party-zation) of social groups and how they become the opposition. The role of ideology deserves special mention. It is even more important to look at the means and forms for stirring up sociopolitical plurality of the problems, ideas, interests, requirements, and demands and translating them into effective political actions. While I was writing this article, several Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt) were shaken by events of historic dimensions that led to the overthrow of their long-term authoritarian regimes. The world started talking about similar developments in Central Asia. This is probably unfounded, but the events in the Arab world should be treated as a warning. The political order of the Republic of Uzbekistan must be radically changed; the “semi-artificial” party system should be reformed—this is one of the fundamental tasks of very much needed perestroika.

140 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

REGIONAL STUDIES

NATIONAL IDEOLOGY IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: ITS PHENOMENON, SPECIFICS, AND PROSPECTS

Bakhodyr ERGASHEV D.Sc. (Philos.), Professor and Independent Researcher (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

Introduction

he political processes underway in the inde- ern Caucasus (including Georgia); they are com- pendent Central Eurasian republics call in pared with what is going on in this respect in other T particular for a detailed analysis of the emer- CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine).1 gence, functioning, and development of their na- In view of the fundamental role of the state2 tional ideologies. Throughout world history, no and weakness of civil society in practically all the reform, modernization, or democratization during the formation and development of nations could 1 Because of the far from unambiguous recent polit- have succeeded, nor can ever succeed, without ical regime change in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, I limited my majority support for a set of clearly formulated contemplation of the national ideology in these countries to the forecasts about “the change in format.” I also had to ig- and desirable aims and easily grasped ideas. In nore similar problems in Moldova due to the still vague so- fact, at all times, states with a national ideology ciopolitical trends and presence of a separatist region in its left those states which rejected ideology as part territory. Finally, I decided it would not be entirely correct or unbiased to give particular attention to the ideology of of their policy far behind in every respect. national independence in Uzbekistan, my own country. The following fairly succinct comments are 2 Certain complicated issues—the correlation be- intended as an analysis of the past, present, and fu- tween the national idea and state ideology, a common CIS ideology, positive nationalism, and some others—which ture of the national-ideological complexes in eight deserve an independent analysis are only touched upon here independent republics of Central Asia and the South- in passing. 141 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

CIS countries, I concentrated on the official po- systemic and non-systemic opposition, that has so sition in the particular country, because it is this far attracted the attention of the academic and position, and not the alternative platform3 of the expert communities.

3 One such platform was formulated by well-known Moskvy radio station [www.echo.msk.ru], 9 October, 2005; writer and philosopher Mikhail Weller in his highly popular “a national idea cannot be invented; it is an element of nature; essay entitled “The National Idea” (2005) (see: it is a task related to the psychology of the nation” (see: Kom- [www.weller.ru]). He has pointed out, in particular, that a somolskaya pravda, 12 October, 2005). Great Russian writ- “national idea cannot be invented, constructed, or formulated er Alexander Solzhenitsyn wrote: a national idea should not out of nothing to be planted in the minds by political technol- be invented in the corridors of power or imposed on the na- ogists. A national idea emerges as an element of nature—this tion by force (see: “Napisano krovyu,” Interview with Alex- is the country’s shared idea” (see the web site of the Ekho ander Solzhenitsyn, Izvestia, 24 July, 2007).

1. Evolution, Periodization, or Expansion? The Cornerstones of National Ideas Interpreted

The leaders of Tajikistan have offered the most complete description of the starting point of the country’s national idea which, Dushanbe believes, existed before everything else (it was born along with the nation, or rather, along with its language, irrespective of the national market and industrial epoch, the two main prerequisites for the emergence of a nation). President Rakhmon has pointed out that the national idea reached unprecedented heights under the Samanids and rested on “political” (I. Samani) and “spiritual” (A. Rudaki) foundations. Avicenna, Beruni, and other prominent figures of the Muslim Renaissance “developed and strengthened” the national idea of the Tajiks. S. Ayni, A. Lakhuti, B. Gafurov, and others are hailed as “intrepid scholars and writers” who managed “to preserve the national idea, develop and strengthen it.” The legal act of 1989, which made Tajik the state language, and the 16th Session (twelfth convocation) of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan (1992) are accepted as the starting points of Tajikistan’s recent history and the latest stage of the development of the national idea.4 The logic of the Tajik leaders, though obviously time-serving and very vague when it comes to establishing the “beginning” of the nation’s historical destiny and genetic roots, has one strong point which opponents are prepared to accept: it connects generations and ties together the contradictory periods of history; the most complicated issues are pushed aside, while history is separated from ideology. (President of Ar- menia S. Sargsian, likewise, believes that this approach is desirable and even indispensable.5) The national idea is closely connected with a strong state. This much is obvious in the official positions of the leaders of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus. (Contemporary international law, likewise, associates the nation with the state, but there is hardly an expert or historian prepared to equate ethnic identity with the national state.) The meaning of the ideological processes underway in Uzbekistan is best revealed by what is said about the personality and deeds of statesman and military leader Amir Temur, who built a “great and mighty state in Turkestan.”6 The position of Ashghabad is “perfectly adjusted:” the state is described as a “mechanism for realizing the national idea.”7 Minsk believes that the national idea should

4 See: E. Rakhmon, Speech at the gala meeting dedicated to the 11th anniversary of Unity Day, 27 June, 2008, available at [www.president.tj]. 5 See: S. Sargsian, Speech at a meeting of representatives of the Armenian diaspora in America, 24 September, 2008, available at [www.president.am]. 6 I.A. Karimov, Speech at the gala meeting dedicated to the 2200th anniversary of Tashkent, 1 September, 2009, available at [www.press-service.uz]. 7 G. Berdymukhammedov, “Economic Strategy of Turkmenistan—Relying on the People for the Sake of the People,” 9 May, 2010, available at [www.turkmenistan.gov.tm]. 142 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 be rooted in the nation’s awareness of its statehood and acceptance of the priority of national interests.8 President Rakhmon, too, said practically the same.9 In similar cases, the capitals of the republics mentioned above tend to forget that the term “national interests” applies to the ideas formulated by a nation-state. The leaders of the most of the CIS states seem to be convinced that the state is the main reformer even though in many of them there is a legal ban on treating any ideology as the state one. President Ilham Aliev, however, seems to disagree with the idea about the synchronous emergence of the national state and the national idea: “For centuries the Azeri people lived within other countries or empires,” said he. “At times their land was a colony. However, they preserved their national specifics, national spirit, and native language. This is a firm foundation for any national state.”10 The academic community has repeatedly pointed out that the historiography of the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics remains in the clutches of what has become the classic definition of the nation with its five common features—language, territory, economic life, psychic makeup, and culture—supplied by Stalin, even if the Soviet past has been rejected, at least in words. So far the regional expert community (raised, on the whole, on the tenets of scientific communism) has not moved away from the post-Lenin formula. World history has shown that all attempts to describe (1) any pre-national (including early medieval) state as national; (2) any nation or nationality as specific; (3) any religion or confession as dominating; or (4) any language as a specific language of religious worship are doomed. We should bear in mind that nearly every empire was created by sword and fire, capturing and annexing territories and nations to it by force. It is futile (1) to base the national idea on Aryan roots or (2) on the allegedly “mono-ethnic” nature of a medieval empire; (3) to ignore the fact that conquests served as the national idea in such empires; (4) to describe a religious teaching or madhhab as “national”; (5) to indulge in selective historical analysis by lauding the feats and achievements of one’s own people while pushing crimes aside; (6) to describe one’s people as “chosen,” etc. The leaders of Kazakhstan realized the futility of these attempts much earlier than others; their realization proved to be much more profound because the very first attempts to create a national idea ran into the multi-national and multi-confessional nature of the republic’s population. From the very first days of independence, President Nazarbaev has been warning against “hurting the feelings of other people”11 when addressing the problems of the Kazakh language, people, and traditions. President Saakashvili is exercising an identical approach in his monoethnic country and admits that it needs a

8 See: A.G. Lukashenko, Speech at the Third All-Belorussia People’s Assembly, 2 March, 2006, available at [www. president.gov.by]. 9 See: E. Rakhmon, Speech at a meeting of lecturers and students on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the State University of Law, Business and Politics of Tajikistan, Khujand, 9 September, 2008, available at [www.president.tj]. 10 I. Aliev, Speech at the ceremony dedicated to the 87th birthday of national leader Heydar Aliev and the 6th anniversary of the Heydar Aliev Foundation, 10 May, 2010, available at [www.president.az]. 11 N. Nazarbaev, Live program with participation of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 143 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS national ideology: “We want to build the country not from an ethnic standpoint, but from the standpoint of statehood.”12 Strange as it may seem, corruption (which has not decreased in these republics over the last 20 years) and the struggle against corruption affect the relations between the national idea and the state. Indeed, a corrupt state contradicts the national idea; a corrupt state shamelessly calling on the people to close ranks for the sake of vague and distant aims creates nothing but a revolutionary situation (Egypt and Tunisia being recent pertinent examples).

2. Slogans, Phenomenon, or a System of Values? On the Meaning and Content of National Ideas

Slogans are used with a great deal of success to express the gist of national ideas in the regions discussed here. Indeed, people find it easier to grasp the meaning of simplified formulas rather than academic deliberations. A well-developed ideology, as a rule, comes forward with fairly attractive ideas. A regional slogan which dominated in the first half of the 1990s only to disappear later for obvious reasons was “Turkestan is Our Common Home”; today, slogans vary from country to country: “The State for Man” and “The State for the People” in Turkmenistan; “Uzbekistan is a Country with a Great Future,” “Progress for the Motherland!”, “Peace in the Fatherland!”, and “Prosperity for the People!” in Uzbekistan; “The World is our Home; Armenia is our Hearth,” “For a Strong and Prosperous Be- larus!”, etc. Slogans are useful: they put economic, political, social, and spiritual goals in a nutshell. No matter how inspiring, the official slogans have several shortcomings: (1) they do not inspire the drive needed to oppose the negative trends in state- and society-building,13 sometimes these trends are merely ignored; (2) they suffer from affirmation but never call to action; (3) they are too bombastic; (4) they are deliberately insulated and do not take into account the slogans of neighbors; (5) they simplify the situation and present one side as the complete picture, etc. Significantly, in 2009 the construction project of the Rogun Hydropower Plant became the “highest national idea” and the “most important factor of the unity of the Tajik people;”14 the de facto new official Tajik slogan is nothing but a strong irritant for neighboring states living on the lower reaches of the same river. A few words about the important role philosophy has to play in the ideological overtones (ranging from ethnic to transcendental) of the national idea concept; the range of definitions stretches from the mechanism of state governance to a sort of Messianism. Ilham Aliev, who became president of Azerbaijan after his father Heydar Aliev (1993-2003), described a strong state, sustainable economy, a nation united around the national idea and the philos-

12 M. Saakashvili, Speech at the Meeting with Members of Supreme Council of Abkhazia, available at [www.president.gov.ge]; idem, “The President of Georgia Congratulated the Georgian Population with New Year,” available at [www.president.gov.ge]. 13 President Medvedev enumerated some of these trends: lack of initiative, lack of new ideas, outstanding unresolved issues, poor quality of public debate, including criticism, and paternalistic attitudes. This is true of the other Soviet successor states (see: D. Mevedev, “Go Russia!” 10 September, 2009, available at [www.kremlin.ru]). 14 A. Sharifzoda, Z. Sirojov, “Emomali Rakhmon and the Commemorative Year of the Great Imam,” 26 January, 2010, available at [www.president.tj]. 144 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 ophy and ideology of Azerbaijani specifics, and a contemporary state based on national spiritual values as the main results of his father’s presidency.15 In Turkmenistan, the so-called new ideology (more details below) formulated by its leader is based on a “new philosophy of being (italics mine.—B.E.).”16 The “new ideology” is based on peaceful disposition, humanism, and social justice.17 These examples prove that those who formulate national ideas are scrupulous when elaborating them; they go into the minutest details of their methodologies. The question is to what extent are the leaders of the Central Asian and South Caucasian republics aware of the correlation between this philosophy and (1) world outlook; (2) lifestyle; (3) science (including contemporary science); (4) religion; and (5) art? Philosophy as a handy instrument divorced from adequate knowledge and its latest achievements invariably produces nothing but chaos or ideological dogmas. We should always bear in mind that national ideologies, even those based on philosophy, are never purely scientific (even though brimming with scientific knowledge): science is impartial and unbiased while ideology is inevitably subjective. One aspect—the correlation between the national and ideological complexes and social justice—has escaped the attention of the architects of national ideas in all eleven republics. Social justice, meanwhile, is the core of the Central Asian Muslim philosophy of the Middle Ages, its heyday; in many countries social justice is one of the constitutional principles. Why is this important? The social ills of the 1990s caused by “shock therapy,” mindless privatization, social stratification, and the appearance of oligarchs have made most people more aware of embezzlement and stirred up protest sentiments resulting in (1) an urge to ravage in order to restore social justice, (2) xenophobia, and (3) national isolation.18 For this reason, the national ideological complexes should pay more attention (this has not happened yet) to social consolidation; fighting poverty, social alienation, and unemployment; respect for human dignity; and the concerns of the man-in-the-street and the needs of the destitute and vulnerable social groups. Interrelations with liberalism, liberal ideology, and liberalization as part of the philosophy of the national idea are not easy to grasp or explain. The liberals treat the national idea as a fairly prim- itive method for mobilizing the nation to address a public project and put human rights higher than the rights of the state. Treated as a state instrument, the national idea puts the rights of the nation above human rights. This means that whether we want it or not, the priority of national interests infringes on human rights to a much greater extent than the ideology of liberalism. This will require of the leaders of all republics to identify where liberalization ends and the national idea in its concentrated form begins.

15 See: I. Aliev, Speech at the Ceremony dedicated to the 87th birthday of the national leader Heydar Aliev and the 6th anniversary of the Heydar Aliev Foundation. 16 President of Turkmenistan called on the scholars of the country to work on the state ideology of a New Renais- sance, 15 September, 2010, available at [www.itar-tass.com]. 17 See: Sitting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, 29 September, 2008, available at [www. turkmenistan.gov.tm]. 18 Any discussions of destructive methods should bear in mind that nationalism (the linchpin of any national idea) can manifest itself positively and negatively. 145 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The experience of Armenia has fully revealed the complexities of methodological substantiation of the quest for a national idea. President Sargsian calls on the nation to strengthen national unity by rallying around the Armenian national identity; to create a new type of Armenian free from the stereotypes of the past19; and to develop a diaspora that is united on Armenia’s behalf. The Armenian president pointed out that the new Armenian identity “should not be complicated and mysterious; it should be free from linguistic, religious, party, or ideological biases;” it should be based on “diversity and tolerance.”20 He is prepared “to make his modest contribution” to the cause of strengthening the Armenian Apostolic Church, “which should remain one of the main pillars of the Armenian spirit and national specifics.”21 President Rakhmon has pointed out that the national idea in Tajikistan “is a moral phenomenon (italics mine.—B.E.) shaped by fully grasped national interests”22 which determine “everything the state and state structures and bodies are doing, as well as the main directions of the people’s activity.”23 Al- exander Lukashenko, in turn, describes the national idea as a system of values24 that is still bombastic yet “great and lofty.”25 President Medvedev has described the national idea of Russia as a set of values shared by the majority of the country’s population in the given historical situation (more details below). The president of Kazakhstan has offered a general formula for the national idea: competitiveness of the nation26 and “to be one of the best countries,”27 and enumerated the necessary conditions: (1) development of state sovereignty; (2) a strong competitive economy; (3) stronger unity of the nation; (4) an intellectual society; and (5) Kazakhstan’s image as a respected state.28 President Berdymukhammedov specified the tasks of realizing the “new ideology” of Turkmeni- stan as a law-governed and secular state in politics; free market in the economy; social security for all in the social sphere; and preservation of national legacy and restoration of the national spirit in culture,29 etc. President Yanukovich of Ukraine believes that the European choice is his country’s “integral national idea,”30 although all ideas and initiatives should be aimed at creating a better life for the people.31

19 See: S. Sargsian, Speech at a meeting with representatives of the Armenian diaspora of Belgium, Brussels, 5 No- vember, 2008, available at [www.president.am]. 20 S. Sargsian, Speech at a meeting of representatives of the Armenian diaspora in America, 24 September, 2008, available at [www.president.am]. 21 S. Sargsian, The inaugural speech, 9 April 2008 [www.president.am]. 22 E. Rakhmon, Speech at a meeting of lecturers and students on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the State University of Law, Business and Politics of Tajikistan, Khujand, 9 September, 2008, available at [www.president.tj]. 23 Ibidem. 24 See: A.G. Lukashenko, Address to the Belarusian Nation and the Parliament of the Republic of Belarus, 16 April, 2003, available at [www.president.gov.by]. 25 A.G. Lukashenko, Verbatim report of the press conference of the president of Belarus to the regional media of Russia regional media, 2 October, 2009, available at [www.president.gov.by]. 26 See: N. Nazarbaev, Speech of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbaev at the 12th Session of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, available at [www.akorda.kz]. President of Russia Vladimir Putin spoke about competitiveness as a national idea on 12 February, 2004. 27 N. Nazarbaev, Press Conference of 23 January, 2006, available at [www.akorda.kz]. 28 See: N. Nazarbaev, Live program with participation of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 29 See: Sitting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, 29 September, 2008, available at [www. turkmenistan.gov.tm]. 30 V. Yanukovich, Address to the Ukrainian People, 2 June, 2010, available at [www.president.gov.ua]. 31 See: V. Yanukovich, Maximum De-politicization of All Departments is a Condition Needed for People to Be Able to Perform Their State Duties. Our Policy should Ensure the Efficiency of Our Work, 12 March, 2010, available at [www.president.gov.ua]. 146 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

It seems that the economic calls which predominate in the national-ideological complexes of most of the CIS countries open up no new horizons for the simple reason that they are short-lived. Mikhail Weller was quite right when he pointed out that consumerism (the true meaning of the calls for a comfortable and satiated life) cannot serve as a national idea.32 None of the national ideas in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus mentions diligence and entrepreneurship as one of the aims, even though world history and the history of the East offer positive examples, Japan being one of them. Whether they want it or not, the leaders of all the republics rely on the thesis about the nation as the highest form of social unity and the key factor of state formation; that is, they rely on nationalism (in its state-forming and liberal, rather than extreme, versions; none of them promotes ethnic, cultural, or religious intolerance. A national ideology can be either conservative or liberal or radical depending on the nature of its nationalist core; not infrequently, democracy needs nationalism as one of its elements). In all eleven republics, nationalists and not cosmopolitans feel very much at ease. The very different approaches to the form of the national idea are explained not only by the “rich- ness” of history, the nature of the ruling regime, and its pragmatic aims, but also by the level of the expert communities and the nature of their contacts with power, acceptance of the entire wealth of international experience, and the people’s political culture.

3. The Individual, Society, or Religion? On Certain Still Untapped Reserves of National Ideologies

The Tajik national idea relies on the teaching of great Islamic theologian Abu Hanifah33 (from a noble Persian family which lived in northern Afghanistan): this is one of the most specific features of the official Tajik position. He is an unquestionable authority for all followers of the Hanafi madhhab and the founder of a comprehensive school of Muslim law. This is very important because religion plays a special role in uniting people. It should be said that since Abu Hanifah is revered as a spiritual teacher by many other nations and peoples and the founder of a tolerant madhhab in Islam (Emomali Rakhmon agrees with this), (1) this figure brings the national ideologies of the Central Asian republics closer together and (2) his method of legal decisions based on the most convincing argument or opinion of the majority plays an important role in accumulating democratic sentiments. The president of Turkmenistan operates with the ideas of the “great Renaissance” and “new Renaissance” to formulate his own version of the national idea. He calls on the nation “to preserve national specifics and to borrow the best achievements of other nations, world civilization, and the Turkmen’s own experience of the period of independence.”34 The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kaza- khstan also call on their nations to bring together the values created by mankind and national values; this is a tolerant, correct, and well-substantiated position.35 The Russian leaders, on the other hand,

32 See: Komsomolskaya pravda, 12 October, 2005. 33 See: E. Rakhmon, Speech at the International Symposium on the Subject “The Great Imam and the Contemporary World,” 5 October, 2009, available at [www.president.tj]. 34 Neytralniy Turkmenistan, 27 September, 2008. 35 Here are several convincing examples: the World Literature journal is published in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (on the initiative of Islam Karimov and Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov) in the national languages (see: Sitting of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, 4 February, 2011, available at [www.turkmenistan.gov.tm]). 147 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS say: “We must and we will also base our endeavors upon the moral values that our people have forged over the more than 1,000 years of their history.”36 Uzbekistan is living under the slogan of “Man, His Rights, Freedoms, and Interests are the Highest Value.” The “new ideology” of Turkmenistan relies on the formula “The State for the People.” Why? Because during the years of independence, the successful reforms and social renovation were associated in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus with man as the linchpin of all the changes, with the majority of the people being involved in the process, and, to use a term popular during perestroika, with the human factor. This means that economic growth is intended to promote harmonious development of the individual, while the individual and his higher political culture are expected to lay the foundations of a civil society. Armenia and Belarus made friendship with Russia their ideology.37 The other nine republics are implementing their national ideological projects within their own borders. Acknowledging the right to pursue this approach and with all due respect for the Armenian experience, there are, however, certain flaws: (1) “inertia of following the lead of another country” when developing one’s national ideology; (2) the national idea being part of geopolitical theories, while foreign policy factors strongly affect ideology; (3) ideology being tied to the economy of one particular country.

4. In Lieu of a Conclusion: How do the Events in the Russian Caucasus and the Attitude toward Guest Workers in the RF Affect the Development of National Ideologies in the CIS?

The official positions of the CIS countries are very much influenced, in one way or another, by what is going on in Russia. The following five specific features of Russia’s national ideology (as the key CIS country) affect the corresponding spheres in its CIS neighbors: (1) the national idea is represented as a set of values; (2) strong reliance on the European tradition; (3) traditional negative forms of conduct which should be eliminated; (4) national ideology is described as a process (in temporal and meaningful terms); and (5) new Russia resolutely condemns Stalinism and never tries to defend its ideology and practice. It should be said that while criticizing idle talk about the national idea, President Medvedev favors a set of values voluntarily shared by a large part of nation.38 The Russian leader has pointed out that a “set of ideas accepted by consensus” cannot be “too different from those in European tradition:” he referred to fundamental human rights, a civilized market economy, and an Anglo-Saxon social and state order. The president is aware of the “persistent social ills” of Russians39 (see above). Vladimir

36 V.V. Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 26 April, 2007, available at [www. kremlin.ru]. 37 See: S. Sargsian, Speech at the meeting with Russian politologists and heads of mass media, 24 June, 2008, available at [www.president.am]. 38 See: D.A. Medvedev, “On the National Idea,” available at Dmitry Medvedev’s personal site [Medvedev.kremlin.ru]. 39 See: D. Mevedev, “Go Russia!” 10 September, 2009. 148 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Putin, in turn, had the following to say: “Here in Russia we have this old tradition, a favorite pastime of searching for the national idea;”40 earlier, however, he admitted that the outlines of a new national ideology were becoming clearer.41 In December 2010, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, when speaking about ethnic relations in Russia, pointed out that in Soviet times much more was done to avoid excesses: first, “there was a struggle against law-breaking” and, second “much more effort was poured into education and upbringing.”42 Earlier, in July 1996, President Yeltsin started talking about a national idea; in Uzbekistan, the leaders formulated the task of creating an ideology of national independence in April 1993. On the whole, informal organizations talked about the need for national renaissance in the late 1980s. Independence stirred up nationalism, which helped to strengthen and protect the newly independent nations. The informal structures were caught unprepared, while their leaders (L. Ter-Petrosian, Z. Gamsakhurdia, and A. Elchibey) lost power. At least one of the five specific features of Russia’s national ideology enumerated above (Euro- centrism) does not reflect Russian reality and cannot be borrowed by other (especially non-Slavic) countries. According to Nikolai Danilevsky (1822-1885), Russia stands apart as a highly specific cultural-historical type. This explains the distinctions between Russians and Europeans and points to Russia’s close ties with the Asian-Turkic world. All the other CIS countries are too small and too weak to talk about the need to get rid of “persistent social ills.” The ethnic disturbances in Moscow in December 2010 and several other events (the terrorist act at Domodedovo Airport on 24 January, 2011, etc.) can be described as a turning point in the building of an ideology of national relations in the Russian Federation. There are other opinions. The president of Georgia sees the events of August 2008 as the point when “Georgia became the first target of imperialism and ideology of the past.”43 Some think that the riots in Kondopoga in 2006 raised the wave of xenophobia in the Russian Federation. Moscow’s official position has nothing in common with reality; this much was said by Chair- man of the Council of Muftis of Russia Rawil Ðaynetdin. The statements made by the high-ranking public figure are nothing short of a sensation: it was thanks to the Golden Horde khans that the Rus- sian principalities united; the alliance of Slavic and Turkic peoples ensured Moscow’s greatness (Sep- tember 2009); labor migrants are hardworking; the Russian Federation has begun falling apart (De- cember 2010). In December 2010, Vladimir Putin admitted that Orthodox Christianity was closer to Islam than to Catholicism; in January 2011, he pointed out that traditional Islam should receive greater support and attention from the state. Russia’s nationalities policy is heading for an even deeper hole, which will largely affect the national ideologies in Russia’s CIS neighbors. There is no shortage of “extravagant” statements by top Russian political figures who insist on (1) official recognition of the special role of the Russian people in creating the Russian state; (2) the state-forming role of the Russians, which should be set forth in the RF Constitution; (3) separation of destructive ethnic nationalism from constructive civil nationalism; (4) special attention to the Russian culture “as the backbone of the entire national culture”, etc., which, however, never remedied the position of the Russian leaders that can best be described as a jumble of Marxism-Leninism and Great Power chauvinism.

40 V.V. Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 26 April 2007 [www.kremlin.ru]. 41 See: V.V. Putin, Interview to Izvestia, 14 July, 2000, available at [www.kremlin.ru]. 42 Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin held a working meeting with head of the Re- public of Daghestan M.M. Magomedov, 27 December, 2010, available at [www.premier.gov.ru]. 43 M. Saakashvili, “The President of Georgia Congratulated the Georgian Population with New Year.” 149 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

This should not shock or amaze: nationalism, as Adam Michnik, outstanding Polish publicist writer, has written, is the last stage of communism.44 Everything being done by some Russian politicians to marry the “European choice” with the plans of reestablishing domination in a large part of Asia, to revive political ambitions, and to insist on the right of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad to engage in active proselytism will echo in the other CIS countries and their national policies. One tends to agree with Mikhail Weller who has written: “By pushing Orthodox Christianity to the core of the national idea, we are dismissing all of Rus- sia’s other religions as second-rate. This smacks of inequality; this is undemocratic and can hardly be described as being in line with the trends of the day. In this form, the ‘national idea’ will stir up national pogroms or religious wars.”45 Moscow is turning a blind eye to Russian reality, while much inside the country and many of what are presented as Russia’s foreign policy achievements depend solely on oil and gas prices. This does nothing for national and confessional peace in the CIS.

* * *

In the near future, the CIS will remain a patchwork of national ideologies hardly affected by globalization and integration into the world community. Tolerance of the lifestyle, behavior, customs, feelings, ideas, and religions of others comes hand in hand with a developed economy. So far, this stage is out of even Russia’s, the largest of the CIS countries, reach. It is unlikely that the regional leaders will stumble across a common denominator, time-tested human values, that could serve as the cornerstone of conflict-free coexistence any time soon.

44 See: A. Michnik, “Natsionalizm: chudovishche probuzhdaetsta,” Vek XX I mir, No. 10, 1990, p. 22. 45 M. Weller, “Velikiy posledniy shans,” available on the Biblioteka Maksima Moshkova [lib.ru] website.

RUSSIA AS A SUBJECT OF THE IDEOLOGY OF GEORGIAN NATIONALISM

Maxim KIRCHANOV Ph.D. (Hist.), Lecturer at the Chair of International Relations and Regional Studies, International Relations Department, Voronezh State University (Voronezh, Russia)

Russian Narratives of Georgian Nationalism

oday, Russian narratives have moved to the fore in Georgian nationalism and have a special role to play in its development. For a long time, Georgia was part of the Russian Empire, and then the T Soviet Union, which Georgian national consciousness regarded as a predominantly “Russian” state. 150 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and Georgia’s regained independence opened a new stage in Georgia’s relations with Russia. The discourse on history, which concentrates on contemporary political figures, is intimately connected with a particular political myth1 that presupposes the presence of certain political images (“others”). The post-Soviet expanse interpreted the collapse of communism as “disintegration of the official collective memory,” which revived its numerous “unofficial narratives”2 related to the “images” of various states, including Russia. In the 1990s, when South Ossetia and Abkhazia detached themselves from Georgia, Georgian politicians and nationally-biased intellectuals imposed the “victim syndrome” on their nation and blamed regional separatism on the “hand of Moscow.” “Deconstruction of the historical mythogenesis”3 of the Soviet period and the gradual crumbling of Russia’s image as the “elder brother” contributed to these interpretations. The political changes of the early 2000s and Mikhail Saakashvili’s attempt to cut the Gordian knot of regional problems in August 2008 merely confirmed the anti-Russia stand of the nationalist- minded Georgian ideologists, which inevitably added to the tension between the two countries. The Georgian political community believes that Eduard Kokoyty, the leader of the Republic of South Ossetia (RSO), has the “mind of a half-witted dictator”4; and the results of the armed conflict of August 2008 are described as follows: “The war of 2008 was the culmination of Russia’s latent aggression which had been going on for many years. It brought Kokoyty’s gang and the local people ‘duped’ by Russia’s ideology ‘the independence’ they wanted so much.”5 The Georgian nationalists are convinced that the construct Russia applied in Ossetia destabilized and aggravated the relations between different ethnic groups, which triggered the Georgian-Ossetian and Ingush-Ossetian conflicts: “There is no South Ossetia, just as there is no North, East, or West Ossetia; the Bolshevik artifact known as ‘South Ossetia’ disappeared along with the Soviet Union.”6 D. Thompson7 writes that the recent developments, being related to national identity and self- awareness, are inevitably fairly painful, while their impact on politics is considerable. The Georgian nationalists have the following to say about Russia’s policy toward the South Ossetian regime: “The Kremlin is applying its North Caucasian tactics in South Ossetia: a corrupt client is receiving a carte blanche in exchange for loyalty. In other words, Moscow does not care a damn about the local Ossetians; the Kremlin is unconcerned about the embezzlement of funds intended for restoration.”8 It is often written that a regime associated with Russian politicians and businessmen of dubious reputation9 can be nothing but corrupt: “Kokoyty’s criminal regime is seeking maximum profits from money laundering; it is hard to imagine, however, that Russian officials are not involved: the Ossetian

1 See: J. Friedman, “History, Political Identity and Myth,” Lithuanian Ethnology: Studies in Social Anthropology and Ethnology, No. 1, 2001, p. 41. 2 W. Outhwaite, L. Ray, “Modernity, Memory and Postcommunism,” Palitychnaia sfera, No. 6, 2006, p. 29 (in Byelorussian). 3 A. Cusco, V. Taki, “‘Kto my?’ Istoricheskiy vybor: rumynskaia natsiia ili moldavskaia gosudarstvennost,” Ab Imperio, No. 1, 2003, p. 493. 4 “Pochemu sbezhali iz Gruzii bratia Karkusovy,” Ponedelnik, No. 61, 2009, pp. 5-7. 5 B. Khubulov, “Iuzhnaia Osetiia: proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/ index.php?action=more&id=53&lang=rus]. 6 G. Vasadze, “Svet i teni novoy strategii po okkupirovannym territoriiam,” available at [http://www.apsny.ge/analytics/1264907003.php]. 7 See: D. Thompson, “Must History Stay Nationalistic? The Prison of Closed Intellectual Frontiers,” Encounter, Vol. 30, No. 6, 1968, p. 27. 8 “Osetiny mogut lishitsia svoey ‘nezavisimosti’ blagodaria Chechne,” available at [http://lazare.ru/post/21393/]. 9 For more details on the efforts of the South Ossetian authorities to obtain a loan from Russia to build a railway to connect South and North Ossetia which will bypass foreign territories and the territories of other RF regions, see: “Russko- osetinskiy La Manche: Alexander Zhmaylo v roli Ostapa Bendera,” available at [http://lazare.ru/post/28735/]. It should be said that even in Soviet times similar projects were never discussed. 151 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS government is staffed mainly with Russian appointees. Logic suggests that both sides involved in corruption are equally guilty: this is honor among thieves.”10

Russian Narratives and the Image of Ossetian Separatism

The Georgian nationalist idea offers the following image of the Republic of South Ossetia: “Tyran- nical rule, social and economic hardships, and embezzlement of the money intended for postwar rehabilitation are far from a complete list of the accusations the opposition is presenting to the ruling regime.”11 It is said that the RSO and Abkhazian regimes are pursuing a policy better described as “ethnic cleansing”12; supported by Russia, the South Ossetian separatists are moving toward an ethnocentric development model for their state, which is manifested as mounting Ossetian nationalism and persecution of everything Georgian. Georgian authors describe this policy as apartheid.13 It is said, on the other hand, that the South Ossetian regime has as good as rejected its social obligations to the Ossetian people and placed the responsibility for resolving the social and economic problems on Moscow: “Hardly twelve months have passed since the ‘cherished dream’ (recognition of independence of South Ossetia) was realized. Instead of finding themselves in the promised para- dise, the local people were plunged into a struggle for survival; the hopes for prosperity and a cloud- less existence have fallen through. It turned out that the Kokoyty regime was best at making empty promises; the tales of an independent and flourishing state proved nothing more than a utopia.”14 Jerome Friedman from America believes that historical studies directly related to the recent past influence the development of identity; today, being connected with the recent national catastrophe, they have moved to the center of nationalist reflection.15 Significantly, the Georgian nationalists are not so scathing of the RSO’s attempts to present itself as an Ossetian state as they are of the political regime existing in its territory. This narrative was also discernable at earlier development stages of Georgian nationalism when images of political ad- versaries (but not ethnic enemies) were formed. The Georgian media are holding forth about the Russian and Ossetian sides, both of which “are trying to present the RSO as a bona fide state; the impression is created, however, that they have never heard of the key priorities of such a state (human rights, democracy, humanism, etc.). The local NGOs and human rights activists can serve as the best example of the degradation of Ossetian society. Sad but true, they are showing concern only for citizens of Ossetian nationality.”16 This narrative is intended as proof that, unlike Ossetia and the Russian Federation, Georgia is part of the European political expanse and that Russia and South Ossetia are pursuing a policy designed to put an end to human rights and set up an authoritarian political regime. The Georgian nationalists present Eduard Kokoyty as a modern-day Nazi dictator who has pushed the non-Ossetians outside the sphere of law: “The liquidated Georgian villages are being replaced with

10 “Rezhimu Kokoyty ugrozhaet sotsialny vzryv,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more& id=78&lang=rus]. 11 “Pravitelstvennye i oppozitsionnye perepitii v separatistskoy ‘Iuzhnoy Osetii,’” available at [http://www. kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more&id=62&lang=rus]. 12 “Maroderstvo i provokatsii—kak instrumenty sovremennoy politiki Rossii,” available at [http://lazare.ru/post/13124/]. 13 V. Kvirikashvili, “Tskhinvalskiy region ili … Rossiyskiy platsdarm ‘Iuzhny,’” available at [http://lazare.ru/post/ 31147/]. 14 “Rezhimu Kokoyty ugrozhaet sotsialny vzryv.” 15 See: J. Friedman, “Myth, History, and Political Identity,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. VII, 1992, p. 195. 16 “Rossiisko-osetinskiy gumanizm,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more&id=63&lang=rus]. 152 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

Russian military bases; the Georgian language is banned in the Republic of South Ossetia; schools no longer use Georgian textbooks or Georgian. Works by Georgian and world classics are destroyed in public in the very center of Tskhinvali; inscriptions in Georgian are removed from the monuments of culture and history; Georgian burials are defiled.”17 There is a more or less widely accepted opinion that while Georgia offers adequate conditions for the development of Ossetian identity, the Russian Federation in the RSO is moving toward assim- ilating the Ossetians and liquidating them as a nation. Georgian nationalists believe that Russia’s recognition of the RSO will gradually integrate it into a political region of the Northern Caucasus, which is fraught with persecution of Christians and Islamization of the Ossetians.18 They do not exclude ethnic clashes against the background of the still simmering Ossetian-Ingush conflict and the dramatically increased influence of President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov.19 Prominent Georgian analyst G. Maisuradze, likewise, has pointed to the alarming signs of growing Islamophobia in the RSO.20 Many in Georgia share the opinion that Russia, which supports the separatist regimes in Ab- khazia and South Ossetia, might be confronted with inflated separatist and nationalist sentiments in its own regions. M. Abashidze, for example, has written: “The Russian media are keeping mum about the very complicated situation in the Northern Caucasus; the complications worsened when the so-called counterterrorist operation regime was lifted in Chechnia at the insistence of Ramzan Kadyrov… Independ- ent Russian experts are very much concerned about the situation in the North Caucasian republics; some think that if the trend continues Russia might lose control, for a certain period, over this area of its territory… The Kremlin seems unaware of the fact that the Northern Caucasus and the federal Center communicate as parts of a confederation and that the Shari‘a laws are much more effectively applied there than the Constitution of Russia.”21

Russian Narratives and the Georgian Political Strategies in the Caucasus

Other Georgian nationalists are even more radical. Z. Kasrelishvili, for example, who heads the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples, believes that Georgia should recognize the independence of Chechnia and Ingushetia.22 He argues that this is suggested by Russian policy: “Russia is involved in active anti-Georgian propaganda in the Northern Caucasus.” He is convinced that “this recognition will cause Russia’s disin-

17 Ibidem. 18 See: “Religioznaia ekspansiia v separatistskoy Iuzhnoy Osetii,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/ index.php?action=more&id=84&lang=rus]. 19 See: “Ramzan Kadyrov—novy gubernator Severnogo Kavkaza?” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/ index.php?action=more&id=59&lang=rus]; “Kadyrov—novy sovetnik Kremlia po voprosam vneshney politiki,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more&id=81&lang=rus]; “Chechnia v vodovorote avtoritarizma,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more&id=91&lang=rus]. 20 See: G. Maisuradze, “Svadby s tochki zreniia gosbezopasnosti: v Tskhinvali opolchilis na Islam,” available at [http:// lazare.ru/post/35018/]. 21 M. Abashidze, “Rossiia teriaet kontrol nad Severnym Kavkazom,” available at [http://www.inosmi.ru/print/ 249649.html]. 22 See: “‘Konfederatsiya narodov Kavkaza’ priznala nezavisimost Chechni i Ingushetii,” available at [http:// www.apsny.ge/2009/pol/1256251549.php]. 153 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS tegration. The people in Abkhazia and the RSO will have to talk to Georgia for the simple reason that Russia will no longer be willing to support them. Tatarstan, Chechnia, Ingushetia, Daghestan, Karach- aevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Adigey will push Russia to the brink of disintegration.”23 In their descriptions of what is going on in the RSO and Abkhazia, the Georgian nationally-biased media rely on narratives which speak of the local regimes’ illegitimacy and the high level of corruption: “After the war, the celebrations of victory over the ‘Georgian aggressors’ continued as a series of recognitions of ‘South Ossetia’s independence’ by the Russian occupants, the terrorist organization HAMAS, Hugo Chaves of dubious psychic qualities, and drug dealer Daniel Ortega, and was crowned with the ‘world’s largest barbeque.’ The euphoria ended, and the local people woke up to bitter reality. While Kokoyty held forth about large-scale housing construction, those who once occupied the houses destroyed by the Russian ‘liberation’ army are still living in tents. The protest rally of homeless people was described as anti-state and cruelly dispersed on the ‘president’s’ orders… Today, ‘South Ossetia’ is a bankrupt entity which will become a second-rate military settlement rather than an independent state.”24 In this way, the nationalists are trying to build the idea of a Georgian political nation which includes the Ossetians and Abkhazians. A positive image of Georgia as a civil nation-state and the true home of all national minorities is being juxtaposed against the negative images of the separatist regimes. Today, Georgian nationalism is concentrating on Russian narratives: Georgian authors and the nationally-biased media are not letting Russia out of their sight (including the crisis of 2009). It is presented as a country of omnipotent special services: “There is no sense in talking to the Russian special services about the lives of citizens of other states. When carrying out their shady projects, they never hesitate to sacrifice the lives of their own citizens. Russian officials would do better to revive the memory of the terrorist acts of 1999 carried out by the special services in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buden- novsk, of which Chechen fighters were accused. Three hundred people lost their lives, and about two thousand were wounded. Later, the FSB decided to repeat the ‘performance’ in Ryazan, where the local people sounded the alarm just in time. The special services described this as a ‘training exercise’ to check the vigilance of the locals. Mr. Putin used these events to invade Chechnia once more.”25 These narratives not merely describe Russia as a backward country that poses a danger to Eu- rope26 and the post-Soviet expanse. The Georgian nationalists insist that the Russian Federation is gradually losing the features of a European democratic state and is sliding down to the development level of the undemocratic Asian regimes. The Russian Federation as a state unable to cope with the Northern Caucasus is the pet image of the Georgian information expanse. Georgian nationalists insist that the Russian leaders are striving to restore a repressive model of governance over the national regions: “The new initiative of the Russian government—an employment program for the Ingush—caused quite a stir in Ingushetia… It envisaged resettlement of the Ingush… From the very first days of Russia’s military presence in the North- ern Caucasus, each of the consecutive Russian rulers has inherited from his predecessors such measures as forced resettlement, physical violence, and the fanning of ethnic strife in full accordance with the ‘divide and rule’ principle. Each of these leaders applies his own interpretation of the ‘Russian plan.’ The North Caucasian nations have survived more than one attack designed to liquidate whole

23 “Neskolko evropeyskikh gosudarstv gotoviatsia k priznaniiu nezavisimosti Chechni i Ingushetii,” available at [http:// www.apsny.ge/interview/1255740461.php]. 24 “Iuzhnaia Osetiia: proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee.” 25 “Prodolzhenie informatsionnoy voyny ili podgotovka k novoy agressii?,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/ index.php?action=more&id=89&lang=rus]. 26 On how Europe perceived Russia’s foreign policy after the military conflict of August 2008, see: J.-Ph. Tardieu, “Russia and the Eastern Partnership after the War in Georgia,” Russie.Nei.Visions, August 2009, 26 pp. 154 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 nations. The smallest of them find it hard to stand up to the pressure of ‘Mother Russia’ and to preserve their cultures and their identity.”27

Russia as the Topos of National Intolerance

When commenting on the ideas of Russian politicians, the Georgian nationalists invariably point to the continuity between the assimilatory strategies of czarist Russia and the Russian Federation. They are convinced that the universal nature of the assimilatory policies and the deliberate destruction of national cultures are two elements of the Russian model of ethnic relations: “The aim of the Russian government is absolutely clear: today it will resettle the Ingush; tomorrow it will be the turn of the Chechens (if they survive), followed by the Avars, etc. This, very much in keeping with the tradition, will go on together with Russian settlement of the vacated lands. In Ossetia, this has been going on for a long time with obvious results: very soon, try as you might, you will not find an Ossetian speaking his native language or an Abkhazian speaking Abkhazian.”28 According to the nationally-biased Georgian media, Russia’s policy in the Northern Caucasus can at best be described as highly contradictory: while suppressing the national movements in Chech- nia, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, it is flirting with their leaders. The Georgian nationalists point out the following: “The Kremlin is cornered in the Northern Caucasus. While Mos- cow is looking for a way out, the situation is going from bad to worse by the hour. The experience of many years confirms that force alone cannot bring stability to the region. The Northern Caucasus turned out to be a test of sorts of Russia’s ability to preserve its territorial integrity.”29 It is frequently said that the Russian Federation is in a grave crisis: “The Russian crisis is a bou- quet of crises. It consists of several components: the crisis of the physically depleted technosphere caused by huge under-investment. Russia-91 entered the era of global confusion and crises as a worn- out state; it should expect an avalanche of technogenic accidents, breakdowns, and catastrophes. In the Russian Federation, the average age of industrial equipment is 21.5 years compared to 9.8 years in the Soviet Union (1990) or 10 years in the developed world today. The share of investments in basic assets in the developed countries is 25 to 30 percent of GDP; in Russia, it is a mere 18 percent.”30 The huge efforts being exerted to create a negative image of Russia and its history show that in Georgia history is geared at politics.31 While insisting that the Russian model of economic development is detrimental to its own interests, the Georgian nationalists point out the following: “The West has managed to set up a corrupt regime in Russia patterned on the banana dictatorships, the members of which, while pursuing their own interests, guarantee that in the near future the country will remain uncompetitive and, therefore, a raw-material appendage of the developed world.”32

27 “‘Mirnaia’ deportatsiia ingushey?!” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more&id=64&lang=rus]. 28 Ibidem. 29 “Neskonchaemye strasti na Severnom Kavkaze,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more& id=33&lang=rus]. 30 “U nas—dva krizisa,” Ponedelnik, No. 93, 2009, pp. 6-7. On what the Georgian nationalists think about Russia, see: “Prosushchestvuet li RF do 2014 goda?” available at [http://lazare.ru/post/12646/]. 31 On the interconnection between historical studies and politics, see: R. Lindner, “Immutability and Changes in Post- Soviet Historiography of Belarus,” in: Belarusika/Albaruthenica (Minsk), Vol. 6, 1997, Part 1, p. 114 (in Belorussian). 32 G. Vasadze, “Strategiia natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Gruzii,” available at [http://www.apsny.ge/analytics/126412 6857.php]. 155 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In 2009, while the crisis was gaining momentum, the Georgian nationalists became even more concerned about Russia’s future: they feared that its economic collapse would trigger its disintegration with highly negative consequences for the situation in the world.33 The nationally-biased Georgian authors turned to the memory of the common past; they posed themselves as the defenders of Russian interests before the Russian political elites, which, according to some intellectuals, “are steering the country toward annihilation.”34

The Impasses of Modernization: Socioeconomic History of Contemporary Russia and Georgian Interpretations

The Georgian nationally-biased media are especially critical of the RF Armed Forces; much is being done to create an extremely negative image of the Russian army as a backward and thoroughly corrupt institution: “The Russian army is facing a multitude of problems: the structures and mechanisms of command and control are outdated; discipline is slack, while the corruption level is high… In fact, the Russian army is unfit for action… Numerous factors interfere with the reforms, the top military bureaucrats being one of them, since the cutbacks will primarily affect the generals and officer corps. They will lose their jobs, their privileges, and their source of income (created by the corruption that reigns supreme in the armed forces). They cannot command brigades for lack of adequate experience, which will affect the end result. The Defense Ministry and the General Staff cannot agree on the reforms; there is no new conception of national security. This means that military reform, the military doctrine, and the national security conception will be realized independently which, in the final analysis, will negatively affect the results of the reforms in the Russian army.”35 Georgian intellectuals are convinced that the Russian elites have opted for the wrong model of crisis settlement, which is leading to an impasse: they prefer to look for external enemies to distract the nation’s attention from the real problems. The Georgian media have written the following in this respect: “Aware that it is losing its grip on the region, the Kremlin is resorting to the time-tested So- viet methods: it is concealing its own impotence by pumping up fear of an external enemy. This is being done to brainwash the domestic audience and to shift the blame for the regional problems onto Georgia. Russia is trying to convince its own people and the world community that Georgia is a terrorist state. It remains to be seen whether these outmoded tactics are justified or not. The fact is that Moscow is tilling the soil for another military operation in Georgian territory. Russia is seizing any pretext to build up tension along its borders with Georgia and create the necessary context for military provocations. This explains why Georgia is being accused of contacts with al-Qa‘eda.”36 The development of these narratives within the Georgian political expanse shows that the Geor- gian nationalist ideas are gradually changing: on the one hand, nationalism is growing more ethnic; on the other, the strong tradition of civil nationalism (despite the national catastrophe of August 2008) has survived. This probably explains why ethnic nationalism that demonizes the Russians as universal “others” (today, demonization is limited to Russia’s political class) has failed to develop in Georgia.

33 See: “Razval ‘sverkhu’ kak elitarny interes,” Ponedelnik, No. 93, 2009, pp. 13-15; “Velikaia nesamostoiatelnost,” Ponedelnik, No. 93, 2009, pp. 13-15. 34 “Gotovitsia k momentu ‘Ch,’” Ponedelnik, No. 93, 2009, pp. 12-13. 35 “Reforma vooruzhennykh sil Rossii,” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/index.php?action=more&id=76&lang=rus]. 36 “Prodolzenie informatsionnoy voyny ili podgotovka k novoy agressii?” available at [http://www.kavkasia.ge/ index.php?action=more&id=89&lang=rus]. 156 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 Conclusion

The political transformations in Georgia did not bring about the “triumph” of civil society (which cast doubt on the universal nature of the Western political model of coexistence of civil society and civil nationalism);37 instead they revived ethnic and ethnicized nationalism, radical political thinking, and protest. In the conditions of a democratic transit and political instability, Georgian nationalism remained as prominent as in the Georgian S.S.R. The Georgian nationalist discourse, a product of independence, lived through the following stages: (1) early 1990s-1993—the period of political instability and dramatic ethnic radicalization of Georgian nationalism; (2) mid-1990s-2003—unstable development of the nationalist discourse within the political regime of Eduard Shevardnadze which exhibited a strong authoritarian bias; (3) 2003-August 2008—the period from the Rose Revolution to the military operation against South Ossetia and Russia’s interference when the nationalist discourse was consolidated and radicalized and when attempts were made to use radical methods to settle the problems; (4) the present stage of the nationalist discourse; amid political instability, Georgian nationalism is developing as a sum-total of political and ethnic trends in the country with considerable and diverse nationalist experience. It seems that considerable radicalization of Georgian nationalism, which relied on rich traditions, transformed it, in the 1990s-2000s, into state ethnic nationalism, thus creating its main development problem: the Georgian ruling elite imagined that it could move away from a dialog toward military force as a method for settling territorial disputes. This transformation of the Georgian nationalist narrative became possible under the impact of several factors. In Georgia, political transition has been taking place in a society burdened with an authoritarian past; for several decades it was subjected to enforced modernization, which destroyed the traditional relations and political institutions. This has probably made the democratic transit much more complicated by radicalizing Georgian nationalism to a certain extent, and, in the final analysis, supplying the nationalist discourse with considerable ethnic overtones. The fact that Georgia was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union for nearly two centuries warped the Georgian political culture even more.

37 On the problems of establishing a civil society in transition regimes discussed theoretically, see: J. Kocka, “Ev- ropeyskoe grazhdanskoe obshchestvo: istoricheskie korni i sovremennye perspektivy na Vostoke i Zapade,” Neprikosno- venny zapas, No. 2, 2003, pp. 54-61.

157 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

MASS MEDIA

THE POLITICAL INTERNET IN KAZAKHSTAN: TRENDS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS

Bakytzhan TEMIRBOLAT Ph.D. (Political Science), Independent Expert (Astana, Kazakhstan)

Introduction

he new wave of computer and communica- problem might trigger an avalanche of unpredict- tion systems has opened a new stage in the able events. T development of the information society; the Today, the global processes are gradually Internet, one of the symbols of globalization, is making the Internet part of the political process developing into the main virtual arena of interna- of Kazakhstan; it has become an important arena tional business. of interaction of opinions and clashes of interests In the developed countries, the mechanisms in the multi-pluralistic virtual community. New of state administration and politics, along with the mechanisms of cooperation with public opinion basic technologies designed to maintain stability are taking shape together with forms of self-or- and organize a dialog between the ruling struc- ganization of citizens and interest groups, name- tures and society, are undergoing qualitative ly, the electronic media, web portals used for changes: politics inevitably blends with technol- political discussions, and virtual communities and ogy, thus accelerating the development of elec- groups united by shared goals, including politi- tronic democracy. The state is rapidly losing its cal goals. former monopoly on every kind of information; Today, the state structures, political par- it is no longer capable of controlling the social and ties, public movements, associations, NGOs, political processes unfolding on the Internet. To- media, and private citizens of Kazakhstan are day, society is free to discuss any problem in vir- demonstrating a lot of dynamism in mastering tual space; if it spilled over into real life, any such virtual space.

158 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 The Internet in Kazakhstan’s Public Life

The problem calls for an integrated analysis of the potential of the Internet; I relied on a PEST market analysis (rarely used in political science) to identify the Political, Economic, Social, and Technological factors of the external macro-environment that might affect or are already affecting the topic of this study.1 Al- though fairly limited in its applications, this method will become more pertinent when applied to dynamic electronic development which depends, to an equal extent, on social and economic indices and technological level. The PEST-analysis offers the fullest possible investigation of four closely interconnected factors which affect, to the greatest extent at the present development stage of the information community, the political process in Kazakhstan (up to and including representation of various interests). The results of the PEST-analysis can be represented as follows:

P: Political factors S: Social factors

E: Economic factors T: Technological factors

P: Political Factors

1. The steadily growing impact of the Internet on real politics has already called for certain re- adjustments both in the functioning of the government and in the way the state power system is formed. The same applies to the entire structure of ties and cooperation with the public (higher efficiency of the government is directly related to the state’s readiness to use information technologies to establish consistent feedback with the public). 2. Traditional ideological instruments are losing their efficiency to independent electronic information centers in terms of their impact on public opinion and the real sector of public politics. Today, it is much easier than before to evoke a public response to any issue—a factor readily exploited by interest groups. 3. State structures should be actively involved in cyberspace—this is an imperative of the information era. All decisions call for preliminary investigation of the social trends and problems and monitoring of the social networks, blogs, and portals where people express their opinions and formulate their interests. 4. In the Kazakhstani segment of the political Internet, the traditional interest groups (political parties, public associations, business, scientific and educational structures, individual politicians, and other entities of civil society) rub shoulders with the increasingly active yet little studied virtual network communities of a new type and format, each with a vast audience of its own. 5. There are attempts to set up a legal framework designed to regulate the Internet, such as the draft Law on Regulation of the Kazakhstani Segment of the Internet2 and the amendments to the Law on the Mass Media related to the ways the electronic information resources and electronic media are used.

1 See: J.W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 3rd Edition, SAGE, London-Los Angeles, 2009. 2 See: Draft Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Regulation of the Kazakhstani Segment of the Internet, available at [www.zakon.kz/118785-dose-na-proekt-zakona-respubliki.html]. 159 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

6. When accepted on a more or less wide scale in Kazakhstan, information technologies (IT) might become an important factor of democracy, civil initiative, and new level of self-organization of citizens. The electronic expanse is obviously developing into the quintessence of an idealistic model of civil society.

E: Economic Factors

1. The country’s strategic course geared at high-tech production serves as a powerful impetus for the further development of IT; it also expands the country’s virtual space. 2. Computers, services, and access to the Internet are becoming cheaper, while the communication zone is steadily enlarging. 3. Economic management and commercial services (flow of documents, logistics, banking, electronic money and payments, shopping, etc.) have moved into the virtual sphere, which means that IT and the Internet have been accepted as a legitimate and inalienable part of real life. 4. Despite the fact that the state has not yet created an adequate basis of legal regulation, the virtual economic sector with its vast financial resources is developing at a fast pace. 5. Today, Kazakhstan is living amid rapidly developing electronic commercial activities in the form of Internet shops, auctions, etc., and business activities (advertizing and services).

S: Social Factors

1. So far society cannot agree on how to treat the new information capabilities: on the one hand, paternalism is on the rise: people who learned to rely on the state have no use for the newly acquired “virtual freedom”; on the other, the older generation is somewhat puzzled by the new IT and the need to master them. The number of those who have resolutely rejected the traditional forms of life as archaic is likewise increasing. 2. In Kazakhstan, the growing virtual information expanse affects the Internet and its function as a sphere of public life; it is seen as a more or less customary way of social communication: the number of people visiting information resources and all sorts of forums at which ordinary people offer their views and opinions is steadily and rapidly growing. 3. The social sphere has acquired new trends: people who practically never leave virtual space (young city-dwellers, programmers, analysts, etc.) remain immune to official ideology. They create their own behavior models and culture; they might create new instruments for aggre- gating their interests for which the traditional system of representation is still not ready. 4. The Internet stimulates division into groups and integration by interests (from hobbies and professional interests to social development and political problems); this means that the Ka- zakhstanis are free to communicate in the person-to-person format and set up all sorts of communities. Today, people are free to translate their interests and aspirations into reality.

T: Technological Factors

1. Globalization, open borders, and the country’s involvement in international processes are stimulating the demand for the developing IT in Kazakhstan.

160 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

2. The fact that IT have penetrated all spheres of human life affects the structure and organization of society, as well as the means and methods of social communication, while the fact IT are becoming cheaper is drawing more people into virtual space. 3. To further develop the means of information communication, Kazakhstan is determined to increase the latest technological infrastructures, set up a technological basis for the Electron- ic Administration project, and promote electronic democracy. 4. All official bans on the political Internet are doomed; the user can gain access to practically any portal: the latest technologies can easily bypass blocks. 5. To join the IT era, the country must systematically develop its technological infrastructure indispensable for electronic plebiscite as a future form of political representation of interests. The analysis confirmed that the new information era is inevitably affecting the traditional lifestyle in Kazakhstan; the changes underway in the country have affected its political system. The fact that the political Internet in Kazakhstan has no clear landmarks so far and cannot, therefore, find its place in the state’s real social and political context complicates the situation. The absence of an adequate legal framework is another obstacle; the state does not have the experience needed to regulate the political Internet. Despite the problems outlined above, the Internet is steadily expanding; the new aspects of the country’s economic and social development and its involvement in international processes can be described as another contributing factor. The analysis showed that Kazakhstan has acquired the primary technological basis needed for the politicization of its virtual space. But this is not enough: the technological infrastructure requires political legitimization of virtual activities. Today, the virtual political expanse in Kazakhstan is exhibiting a consistent trend toward dynamic development which, in the future, might become even more obvious.

Retrospection of the Political Internet in Kazakhstan (Kaznet)

As a segment of the World Wide Web, Kazakhstan’s Internet has an important role to play in public politics (for several reasons it is functioning in the foreign segments of the Internet). Today, there are over 5,859 registered websites.3 About 3.4 percent of its virtual field (about 200 sites)4 are social-political and government sites: it is too early to describe the Kaznet as politicized. We should also say about such categories as news websites (delivering political news) and political websites (they are platforms of purposeful political activity manifested in discussions of topical issues, calls, addresses, etc., and allow the users to express their opinions and identify their interests to familiarize the public, government, and individuals with them). News websites play the role of agents of communication that actively retranslate information of the political events with no feedback potential. Political websites, on the other hand, are not only vehicles of information—they are a public arena where ideas are voiced and public and narrow-group interests and conflicts are discussed. The latest electronic technologies have given the user community the opportunity to become perceptibly involved in discussions, opinion polls, etc.

3 According to the “Site.Kz” catalogue for 2011, available at [http://catalog.site.kz]. 4 According to analysis of resources [www.resurs.kz] and [http://catalog.site.kz]. 161 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

To identify the specifics of Kazakhstan’s virtual political expanse, it is advisable to analyze its chronology: the political Kaznet is barely 11 years old; its life span can be divided into 5 stages. 1. 1994-1997: the Internet comes to Kazakhstan. In 1994, the SU domain (shared by all the Soviet successor-states) was replaced with national domains. On 7 April, the Russian national RU domain was registered with the IANA data base; on 19 September, KZ (Kazakh- stan) was registered.5 At the first stage, virtual space was barely developed; there was no political Internet at that time; the Internet was seen as a vehicle of globalization of the information expanse. 2. 1998-1999: the political Internet is born and begins developing. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, which raised a wave of information activities among all the political agents involved, coincided with an upsurge in popularity of the new technologies. This explains the rapid development of the Internet’s information and political sector in Ka- zakhstan. Each of the election campaigns bred new responses to the electoral process. The election campaigns of 1999 affected the political segment of the Internet to the greatest extent; the information and propaganda potential of the World Wide Web was tapped to the full; information traveled far and wide with lightning speed, which meant that the latest “inven- tions” of the political technologists became immediately known to the user community. The Internet, still a rarity in many corners of the republic, was by far the public opinion leader, even though by that time information agencies and the press had already mastered the new technologies. 3. 2000-2003: the republic acquires its information infrastructure. In March 2001, the president approved The State Program for Creating and Developing the National Information Infrastruc- ture in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the first document intended to put the state administration system into the information context.6 As a tool of the political technologists, the Internet attracted the journalist community; it was at that time that the first sociopolitical sites—Navigator (in 2000),7 Kub (2001),8 No- mad (2002),9 and others, appeared. Considerable public interest forced practically all the political players to pay attention to them. Some of the political structures set up official websites of their own. 4. 2004-2005: the political Internet becomes professional and poly-functional. On 10 Novem- ber, 2004, the republic acquired The State Program for Forming an “Electronic Government” in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2005-200710; this can be described as an important event. The Internet audience grew by leaps and bounds, which forced the political community to learn how to use IT to manipulate public opinion. Internet representation became a mass phenomenon; political parties and movements (probably spurred on by election campaigns) demonstrated a lot of zeal when setting up their websites. A large number of portals and media were intended to keep the public informed about political developments and transform the positions of their participants into public opinion.

5 See: A. Liakhov, “KazNet predvyborny,” Internet i Ya (Internet and Me), No. 9, 2004. 6 See: “Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan ‘Gosudarstvennaya programma formirovania i razvitiia natsionalnoy informatsionnoy infrastrutury v Respublike Kazakhstan’,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 20 March 2001. 7 [www.navigator.kz]—operates at a different address. 8 [www.kub.kz]—operates at a different address. 9 [www.nomad.su]. 10 See: “Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 10 noyabrya 2004 goda No. 1471 ‘O gosudarstvennoy programme formirovaniia ‘Elektronnogo pravitelstva’ v Respublike Kazakhstan na 2005-2007 gody’,” Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 16 No- vember, 2004. 162 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

5. 2006-the present: the Internet has much more influence on politics and public opinion. Discus- sion platforms have appeared on which politics are openly discussed as well as virtual interest groups which formulate real questions and are geared at real activity. The Internet has finally become a legitimate field of political activities of the government and public. This means that at the early stage, the political Internet depended on the election campaigns for the simple reason that politicians regarded the Internet and their involvement in it as one of the symbols of technical progress and the country’s high-tech future. It should be said that the majority still doubted that Internet technologies could be of any practical use: they were seeking reputation gains. Today, however, the Internet (until recently a virtual reflection of real politics) is developing into an independent and influential field of public politics which might affect what individual players are doing and makes it possible to manipulate public opinion. The Internet as a means of political communication is much more than a source of information or a sum total of traditional sites (which offer textual or graphic information or e-mail services). Re- sources of a wider communication type make wide-scale information or political action possible.11 It should be said that while some people treat the Internet as an inalienable part of information and promo campaigns, others treat it as their natural environment, a field of political battles where information is used to put pressure on the government and where they can communicate and interact with loyal audiences or like-minded people. The much stronger influence of the virtual political expanse in Kazakhstan can be explained by a certain imbalance between the desire to widen popular representation in the power structures and the insistent demand that the government pay more attention to what the people need. The present system of representation of interests is fairly limited; it cannot adequately respond to the much greater political involvement of the masses or cover the entire spectrum of public relations.

The Government and the Political Internet Community: In Search of Mutual Understanding

In the last five years, the political Internet has been developing at a much faster pace than before; some of its contours have become clear together with some of the points it shares with public opinion. The political Internet in Kazakhstan has already acquired considerable resources (technological and political) needed for its further development; its political influence has become fairly tangible. Today, it uses extra-institutional forms of articulation and aggregation of public interests: electronic protests; information pressure on the government; provocative hack attacks; and slogans of political mobilization in real life. There are even more radical initiatives calling for civil disobedi- ence; a struggle for civil rights; political confrontation with the government, etc. On the whole, the Internet helps preserve the democratic balance and actively contributes to the development of civil society in Kazakhstan (with active involvement of its citizens). It should be said that the state and its structures have learned to be much more attentive to virtual political activity and the information supplied by the electronic media. This is fully con-

11 See: N. Solenikova, “Politichesky Internet v rossiyskikh izbiratelnykh kampaniiakh,” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, No. 5, 2007, p. 71. 163 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS firmed by the gradually growing number of court cases against websites (political websites among others) and the administrative measures applied against them: temporary or complete technical block-outs. Life has shown, however, that complete block-outs are impossible: the [www.svoboda.kz] site set up in 2005 by the public movement against the ban on RHD cars was blocked out; access was opened at a new address [http://svobodakz.blogspot.com]. Administrative pressure and the block-out attempts added a political edge to the public movement, a sure sign of the high level of self-organization of the citizens of Kazakhstan. The case of the Young Professionals of Kazakhstan Society set up by young people with different ideas about the country’s development model can be described as another pertinent example. The Society gained new supporters when it moved its blocked site [http://ompk.kz] to a new address [http:// my.mail.ru/community/www.ompk.kz]. This means that the attempts to block out virtual information activity of Internet communities might cause tension between them and people in power, boost protest potential, and inflate the popularity of interest groups. The much stronger influence of virtual movements on public opinion and the political process as a whole means that, so far, the government and society have not yet created an adequate communication channel. Here is what happened to Navigator, a highly popular site, which since 2004 has survived several block-out attempts. To remain on the web, it changed its address five times while gathering even wider audiences and much higher authority: “the officials responsible for the site’s block-outs merely boosted its popularity.”12 The fate of the [www.posit.kz] site offers another example of the same. Blocked for six months in the fall of 2007 by a decision of the Public Prosecutor General of the Republic of Kazakhstan and a court decision,13 it was revived as a foreign domain [www.posit.su] to go on with its political activities. The blocked-out site of the Respublika—delovoe obozrenie newspaper14 was replaced with at least a dozen alternative sites. This means that block-outs of political websites echo across the world and do nothing for the country’s image as a democratic state.15 The above suggests that the Internet cannot be controlled through block-outs or administrative measures: politically they lead nowhere. The government should respond to protest activities in virtual space (such as extremist movements): this much is clear. It is no less obvious that the government should go to the roots of such sentiments. On the other hand, adequate information services (very much in line with the culture of the local Internet users) are also needed; virtual challenges fraught with political destabilization should be promptly intercepted. It seems that the republic’s authorities should pay much more attention to what is happening on the Internet and be much more actively involved. The Internet’s forums largely affect the republic’s public life; the press, in turn, quotes their participants much more frequently (even if with a great deal of caution) than before. To identify the structure and content of public opinion on the most urgent political issues, political forums conduct online polls on all sorts of topics. The very popular Nomad website, for example,

12 A. Kustov, “Blok host IATs MGU ot 23 oktiabrya 2007 g.,” available at [www.ia-entr.ru/archive/public_ detailsa12e.html?id=934]. 13 See: A. Tynyshbaeva, “Internet v set?” Liter, 25 May, 2009. 14 See: “Obrashchenie redaktsii obshchestvenno-politicheskogo ezhenedelnika ‘Respublika’ k chitateliam,” available at [www.respublika.kz]. 15 For example: “Internet v Kazakhstane: protiv loma est priem!” Deutsche Welle, 11 February, 2009,” available at [www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4020932,00.html]. 164 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 organized regular polls to compile ratings of the country’s political leaders; analytical publications familiarize the public with the results.16 Being unengaged and free from censorship, the online polls provide a much clearer picture of the dominating trends and political preferences, which traditional polls cannot identify. According to experts, the expert community pays particular attention to what bloggers think about the problem at hand. It should be said, however, that because of the still low culture of the absolute majority of bloggers involved in virtual discussions, and the absence of the state’s clear position on legal regulation of the Internet expanse some of the political sites develop into information battlefields among interest groups, accompanied by attempts to put political pressure on the government or spread negative information; conflicts among bloggers are not infrequent. Today, the expanse of the political Kaznet is open to discussions; it is a platform where individuals or interest groups are free to air their opinions, assessments, and positions. An analysis of the political websites revealed that the most important social and economic issues (national relations, language policy, efficiency of the state, and interaction of the political elites), as well as Kazakhstan’s mid- and long-term future, are widely discussed on the Internet (often in negative terms). The Internet community raises real and, sometimes, debatable issues; the absence of an adequate response from the authorities might create all sorts of risks and even threaten the state’s stability. The obvious discrepancy between the public opinion structure and the traditional mechanisms and institutions of political representation of interests (including the results of sociological polls) shows that a new superstructure and new instruments are needed to coordinate “input” re- quests and “output” decisions.

The Kaznet and New Trends in Political Activities

Together with individuals and communities of like-minded people organized interest groups are also involved in virtual discussions. In Kazakhstan, for example, real interest groups (political parties, public movements, NGOs, all sorts of foundations, the media, etc.) operate in virtual space together with new groups that emerged spontaneously (or otherwise) on the basis of shared political views and interests. The first category is seeking new ways of increasing their impact on public opinion. The activity of the second, still inadequately studied, category of virtual interest groups is unpredictable, while their aims and the real scope of activity remain unknown. Political parties with their own websites, the main agents of political struggle, deserve special mention; this is primarily true of those registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan: 1. The Adilet Democratic Party [http://dp-adilet.kz] 2. The Akzhol Democratic Party [www.akzhol.kz] 3. The Azat Democratic Party of Kazakhstan [http://azat-party.info] 4. The Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan [www.knpk.kz] 5. The Nur Otan People’s Democratic Party [www.ndp-nurotan.kz] 6. The National Social Democratic Party [www.osdp.kz] 7. The Rukhaniyat Party [www.rukhaniyat.kz].

16 See: “Kto chelovek No. 2 v Kazakhstane,” available at [www.nomad.su/?vt=1&vn=200910020002]. 165 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

These political structures use web resources as additional channels of strategic communication to move closer to the voters and present their interests and goals. Life has shown that the parties with no chance of figuring prominently on the real political arena (because of inadequate financial resources, experience, or for other reasons) maintain contacts with their electorate through their websites and transfer their positions to the political expanse. It should be said that the Auyl Party and the Party of Patriots of Kazakhstan are politically pas- sive; they have no Internet representations, which adds nothing to their competitiveness. There is another interesting phenomenon: politically active parties not registered with the Min- istry of Justice operate on the Internet. The following parties have demonstrated a lot of virtual political activity, at least during the time these data were gathered and analyzed: 1. The Alga People’s Party [www.npdvk.kz] 2. The Green Party of Kazakhstan [http://greenparty.kz] 3. The Internet Party of Kazakhstan [www.iparty.kz]. Their clear aims and programs have attracted a more or less stable audience. These structures need neither considerable resources nor official recognition; for the same reason, they do not need offices or official registration, since they already have a substantial influence on public opinion. From the point of view of political practice, these structures stand no chance of coming to power through elections; they probably do not need this; at least for the present, they are obviously pursuing different aims. Still, some of the unregistered parties and their brands are recognizable—the state has to accept this. There are stable virtual groups with shared, and clearly formulated, interests and goals (social, economic, ethnic or national, religious or confessional, cultural, ideological, political, etc.) which are determined to translate them into practice. Some of the virtual communities are closely knit (even if not free from internal conflicts) to the extent that they succeed in ideological propaganda or mobilize large masses in real politics. NGOs, public movements, and all sorts of associations, as well as national communities, trade unions, student and human rights associations, etc. are widely represented in the political virtual expanse. Their fields are extremely diverse: charity, development of businesses, gender issues, youth policies, ecology, veteran problems, employment, social security, etc. More than 150 structures which represent the interests of all sorts of groups and social strata have their official sites; prominent politicians and even ordinary people have their personal websites. It can be said that the political community and society as a whole are mastering virtual expanse, which is becoming much more adjusted to the institutional electronic plebiscite currently functioning in the developed Western democracies. The official pages of central and local state structures make the Kaznet, the basis of electronic democracy, look more logical and more complete. At the early stages, these resources merely supplied official information. Today, a large number of state websites are equipped with feedback technology; the citizens of the country can address any official or service. On the other hand, not all state structures are psychologically ready to communicate with the public, even though they may be equipped with departments designed to process information and maintain online communication. Not infrequently, online inquiries remain unanswered. According to the Kazakhstani expert community, “the state structures were obviously baffled by the new challenges of globalization and the scientific and technological revolution.”17

17 A. Morozov, “Vzgliad na globalizatsiiu media-prostranstva cherez prizmu obespechenia natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Respubliki Kazakhstan,” Kazakhstan-Spektr, No. 2, 2009. 166 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 12 Issue 1 2011

There are positive shifts as well: the government is trying to keep in step with the times and is expanding its presence on the Internet in an effort to acquire more channels of cooperation with different audiences. The site of the parliament [www.parlam.kz] allows people to address any of the senators or deputies of the Majilis; heads of departments and ministries have their own blogs. Today, the blog-platform of the republic’s government [http://blogs.e.gov.kz] is developing feedback with the public with more gusto than the others; in fact, it is the most frequented site. Local political scientists have pointed out that introducing new communication technologies into the state administration system is increasing the mobility and responsibility of officials and the interactive potential of the power structures.18 An online conference which brought together the president and heads of state structures and about 170 thousand Internet users19 added vigor to the political segment of the Internet in Kazakhstan; public response was, on the whole, positive. The electronic government project continues to develop; according to the latest report of the U.N. Department, in 2010, Kazakhstan occupied 46th place in terms of the development level of “electronic government” (obvious progress compared to 2008 when it held 81st place).20 According to the RK Agency for Informatization and Communications, the number of users of the “e-gov” portal has been growing on an average of 20 thousand users every month21; this means that people need this sort of communication. An analysis of the topics discussed in the government’s blog has revealed that many questions and problems should be resolved at the local level, within the National Strategy of Decentralization of State Governance.22 Direct addresses to national structures speak, at least, of an absence of political mechanisms for dealing with regional problems and the inefficiency of the traditional communication channels (political parties are one of the actors of political communication). On the whole, people prefer to go directly to the top because their interests are not represented in the local communities. Today the Kazakhstani Internet is a real political platform; as distinct from the official information expanse, it is a sphere of uncompromising ideological discussion of real social problems. At the same time, neither the social institutions, nor the parties and organizations (to say nothing of the ordinary people) can, so far, tap the potential of the virtual network to the full in order to express and protect their interests. Today, extra-constitutional forms of political representation still predominate on the Kaznet. With each passing year, the Internet will gather political weight which means greater risk of extra- constitutional (uncontrolled) mechanisms of articulation and aggregation of public interests. The above suggests that the virtual political processes should acquire civilized institutional forms similar to those the developed democracies are acquiring. The possibility of active, direct, and simultaneous communication among all the categories involved (society, interest groups, virtual network communities, and the government) is the key principle for organizing a new system of political representation of interests. This means that a new type of political system and assessment of its future development in Kazakhstan will call for non-standard methods.

18 See: M. Kasen, “Perspektivy primeneniia interaktivnykh informatsionnykh technologiy v politike,” Analytic, No. 1, 2007. 19 See: Internet Conference of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbaev, available at [www.akorda.kz/www/www_akorda_kz.nsf/sections?OpenForm&id_doc=11AA8E023D73]. 20 [www.unpan.org]. 21 See: K. Esekeev, “‘Elektronnoe pravitelstvo’: tekhnologii ne sozdaiutsia radi tekhnologiy,” Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 6 October, 2009. 22 See: The official blog-platform of the heads of the state structures of the RK, available at [http://blogs.e.gov.kz]. 167 Volume 12 Issue 1 2011 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Conclusion

On the whole, the above analysis of the Kaznet’s development has identified not only new possibilities, it has revealed a number of problems, challenges, and threats which, in the future, will largely determine the state’s competitiveness as a political system. Kazakhstan is facing numerous problems and challenges; this is explained by the fact that the traditional political institutions have not yet acquired their final shape, while a transfer to a new level of civilizational development can be described as an imperative of the times. Developing an innovational political system proceeding along the traditional lines is greatly complicated by the fact that the state has so far not developed a new conceptual idea of its realization. It seems that Kazakhstan might miss the opportunity to launch advanced development; the interests of the state demand that the government should be involved in virtual space in order to properly regulate it. The Kazakhstani political establishment knows that Internetization of politics will develop at a fast pace; it will spread to new spheres and penetrate real politics. The process will not be limited to electronic voting or electronic government. The Internet is affecting, in the most profound and irreversible way, the principles and structure of relations between the government and those involved in politics and administration which have appeared thanks to virtual space; this can no longer be ignored. On the other hand, the government is looking in vain for means and methods it can use to tame the political Internet and transfer it to a controlled legal area; this is hardly achievable. The information era is exerting the strongest possible influence on international relations and the political systems of individual countries; this is testified by the processes going on at the global level and by scandals (WikiLeaks, the virtual activity of which caused non-virtual conflicts in some countries, serves as the best example). The wide range of challenges (some of them shared by the information sphere and some of them related specifically to Kazakhstan) calls for resolute measures: the country’s leaders should grasp them at the theoretical level and arrive at conceptual definitions and strategic planning to avert the dangers of disorganization and inefficiency of the reforms; they should minimize the risk of delays or mal- functioning of the program for setting up a technological infrastructure of electronic democracy. It is not yet absolutely clear where “electronic democracy” should move; we know next to nothing about its limits and long-term capabilities. But it is clear that the developed countries have started moving toward mastering the vast expanses of the political Internet and that this process will accelerate. The answers to the challenges of the information era will shape the mid-term political agenda; they will serve as the basis of an improved political system. In Kazakhstan, the readiness of the people at the helm to operate in the new format, to transform political procedures, and to implement them on the basis of a consensus is the key to the successful development of electronic democracy.

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